THE

# JESUITS MORALS.

COLLECTED

By a *DOCTOR* of the *COLLEDGE*

OF

## Sorbon in Paris.

WHO HATH

Faithfully extracted them out of the *Jesuits* own *Books*, which are printed by the permission and approbation of the *Superiours* of their *Society*.

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Written in *French*, and exactly Translated into *English*.

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*But they shall proceed no further, for their folly shall be manifest unto all Men.* 2. Tim. Ch. 3. V. 9.

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*LONDON*,

Printed for *John Starkey*, at the *Miter* in *Fleet-street*, near *Temple-Bar*, MDCLXX.



I Have peruſed a Book, Entituled *The Jeſuits Morals*, Tranſlated into Engliſh, and compared divers of the Quotations therein mentioned with the Original Authors, as they are in *Sion*-College-Library, *London*: and do find them faithfully and exactly recited. *Viz.*

*Laymannus.*
*Leſſius.*
*Filliutius.*
*Sanchez.*
*Azorius, cum aliis.*

April 27. 1670. *John Spencer* Library-keeper.

John Spencer Library-keeper.

# AN ADVERTISEMENT

## Concerning the Publication of this Work.

THE Greatneſs of God hath never been more reſplendent than in the particulars, wherein the Benefit of his Church hath been concerned. Herein he is ſo abſolute, that he alone diſpoſeth of all Events, which have any reſpect of tendence towards it, and overturning all the meaſures which humane prudence hath made for it ſelf, he permits them not to appear in the eyes of men, but cloathed with ſuch circumſtances, as he judges moſt proper for his deſigns, and wherein they are leaſt expected.

Such is the conduct he pleaſed to obſerve about this Book which we have now publiſhed. The Author took it in hand in a time which appeared of all that ever were the moſt favourable for it. The Morality of the Jeſuits then happening to be in the greateſt averſation and horrour to all them who had any light or piety. The ingenious Letters of *Montalte* to the Provincial, and the learned Writings of the Parochial Rectors of *Paris* having diſcovered the corruption of the greater part of their Maxims; and a great number of the Prelates celebrious for their ability and piety, having already cenſured them. So that it ſeemed, that the Church had no farther need in that particular, than of ſome prudent and clear-headed perſon, who might collect together in one and the ſame Writing all the Principles of theſe corrupted Morals, and who therein might repreſent their exceſſes, to the end that thereby the reſt of its Paſtors might be animated fully to baniſh from its boſom all thoſe pernicious Novelties which diſfigure the purity of its manners.

This was the cauſe which moved the Author of theſe Books with an incredible care and labour to apply himſelf thereunto, having extracted out of the Books of the Jeſuits all the principal Errours which they had introduced into Chriſtian Morality, and having reduced them unto certain heads with a very neat and pure order, which may be worthy to have the name of the particular Character of his Spirit. But God permitted that when he had finiſhed this ſo important Work, he delivered it into the hands of a Doctor, one of his Friends, that he might communicate it unto others, who were of known Learning and Zeal. This Doctor acquitted himſelf faithfully in this Commiſſion: but thoſe to whom he committed

this Book, that they might examine it, being diverted therefrom, by a multitude of affairs, returned no anſwer unto him of a long time; ſo that the Author continuing ſick, ſaw himſelf nigh unto death, without knowing in a manner what was become of his Book, and only underſtood that they judged it moſt worthy to be printed, and that the Church might draw therefrom very great advantages, if it pleaſed God to give it his bleſſing.

As therefore he propoſed unto himſelf in this Work no other thing than to ſerve the Church, this anſwer ſufficed to baniſh out of his mind all the diſquiet which he could have had thereabouts, and he very eaſily, and without farther trouble, did wholly commit the care of it to Divine providence, to which he had been always moſt ſubmiſſive. This ſubmiſſion notwithſtanding hindred not, but that ſome time before his death he recommended it unto another of his friends, whom he knew to be very greatly concerned, for every thing whereunto he had relation. But this Friend being not able to addreſs himſelf to any other ſave that Doctor, who had not the Book any longer in his own hands, and who could not himſelf learn thereof any news at all, ſaw himſelf ſpeedily after out of condition to ſerve both the Church and his Friend in ſuch manner as he earneſtly deſired.

Some years paſt over in this uncertainty of what was become of this ſo precious a Work, at which time God, who had reſerved unto himſelf the diſpoſal thereof, cauſed it to fall happily into the hands of a perſon who had no correſpondence with its Author, but ſeeing that it might be profitable to the Church, thought himſelf obliged to contribute all his credit and power to its publication.

Here you have what was thought meet for the Readers to know concerning the Hiſtory of this Book. It were to be deſired that we might ſpeak here more openly concerning its Author; but the Society of the Jeſuits have accuſtomed themſelves ſo to uſe thoſe who endeavour to ſerve them by diſcovering unto them the exceſſes wherein they engage themſelves, and ſuch is the implacable fury with which they pretend to have right according to their Maxims to perſecute them, as will not permit us to render unto his name the glory he hath therein deſerved. All that we can ſay therein, to the end we may not leave thoſe who come after us without knowing at leaſt ſomething of a perſon to whoſe zeal they will eſteem themſelves ſo much obliged, is only this, that he ſeemed to have been raiſed to combate and confound the Errours of theſe Fathers.

He had a mind facile, clear, and ſolid; a ſweetneſs and moderation in all reſpects charming, an humility ingenuous beyond all that can be imagined, ſtealing away the ſplendour of his other vertues from the eyes even of his moſt intimate Friends. His education was admirable, and contributed not a little to the beauty of his Spirit, the purity of his Learning, and the innocence of his Manners. For he was born of a Father who had a care altogether peculiar to him to fortifie happily his Children againſt popular Errours, to inſpire into them the moſt pure Maxims of the Goſpel, and to enlarge their minds with the faireſt ſpeculations.

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This ſo ſage and ſo Chriſtian conduct helped very much to augment the inclination which he had unto piety; ſo that he had no ſooner finiſhed his courſe in Philoſophy than he proceeded of himſelf to the ſtudy of Divinity, to which he applyed himſelf with ſo great ſucceſs, that being received into the Colledge and Society of *Sorbonne*, he performed all his acts with univerſal applauſe, and thereupon received there the Doctors Cap.

The only thing he had to combate with in this his laudable enterpriſe, was the paſſionate affection which he had for the Mathematicks. For as this Science is the moſt aſſured of all humane Sciences, and almoſt the only one in which may be found any certainty capable to ſatisfie a Spirit which loves the truth; the love which he had even to this truth it ſelf, wrought in him ſo violent an inclination to this Science, that he could not withhold himſelf from applying and buſying his thoughts therein for the inventing ſome or other new machine. But at length the Holy Spirit, which did conduct his Studies, made him overcome in a little time the propenſion he had to theſe innocent inquiries and curioſities, and he thought that it was not ſufficient for a Divine to deſpiſe the divertiſements of the world, but that he ought alſo to deprive himſelf of thoſe of his mind, and he did only ſearch after the truth where it was to be found, that is to ſay, in the Holy Scripture and in the Books of the holy Fathers. So that we may well ſay of him what S. *Gregory Nazianzene* ſaid in commendations of his Brother *Cæſarius*, who had greatly loved Aſtrology and the Mathematicks, that he had the ingenuity to draw out of theſe ſorts of Sciences all that was profitable therein, learning thence to admire the inviſible greatneſſes of God, which were reſplendent in his works, and knew to defend himſelf from that which was pernicious in them, which is the adherence they have, who apply themſelves thereunto, to their conjectures and to thoſe truths which they pretend to diſcover therein.

This generous diſengaging himſelf from all other things, advantaged him not a little in the progreſs which he made in Eccleſiaſtical knowledge, and in that part of Divinity which they call Scholaſtick, which conducts Reaſon by the light of Faith and Tradition. This his progreſs appeared more eſpecially in the troubles which agitated the Faculty of Divinity of *Paris* in the year 1656. for he there defended the truth with ſo great moderation, that he did not render it odious, but on the contrary he did aſtoniſh and ſurprize his enemies.

The zeal he had for it was ardent, but this ardour was tempered by his prudence: and his knowledge was not leſs modeſt than his ſweetneſs was couragious, that there might be ſeen equally lightning in his diſcourſe, the regard which he had not to diſoblige any perſon, and the inflexible firmity which God had given him for the defence of his truth.

The wounds which that renowned Body received then in its Diſcipline, entred very deep into his heart; and the grief which he received therefrom, increaſed by the conſideration of the miſchiefs

which the Church was threatned with, and which it resents unto this day, began to alter his health, and to indispose him towards that sickness whereof he dyed.

But nothing touched him more to the quick than the corruption which the Jesuits had introduced into the Morality of the Church. He was a mortal enemy to their compliances, and he could not bear with their presumption which bent them to consult no other in their Divinity than their own proper light. He declared against their looseness in all the Ecclesiastick Conferences whereunto he was invited, and he gave himself up particularly in the Sermons and Instructions which he made in the Churches, to fortifie the Faithful against their pernicious Maxims.

His Discourses made so much deeper impression upon their Spirits, because they were sustained by his own examples, and the truths of Christianity were no less visible in his manners, than they were intelligible in his words. He handled all sorts of matters with such exactness and solidity, as if he had employed all his life only in study of some one of them alone; and it might be perceived that he studied in all his Discourses only to clear the understanding, to touch hearts, and heal diseases; and not to puzzle the mind, please the ears, and flatter the diseased.

But the love which he had for the purity of Christian Morals was too great for to suffer him to rest so contented. He believed that to heal well the mischiefs which the Jesuits had done the Church, it was necessary to have a perfect knowledge thereof, and to imitate Physitians who addict themselves to know the bottom of diseases before they apply themselves to any remedy. He gave himself for this cause to read the Books of these Fathers, and to extract out of them the principal Errours, of which he hath composed this Book which we now publish, but at length he could not but sink under so painful and afflicting a labour. His patience found it self exhausted. The grief he had to see the Morality of Jesus Christ so horribly disfigured, seized his heart, and cast him into such a languor as dyed him up by little and little, and ravished him away from the Church, after he had received with great resentments of Piety and Religion all the Sacraments at the hands of his upper Pastor.

I will not take in hand to give here an Idea of the design which this excellent Man hath had in this Work, of the order which he hath observed, of the reasons which he hath had to undertake it, and of those in particular which have engaged him to cope with the Doctrine of the Jesuits, because he hath himself given satisfaction in all these points in his Preface.

I shall only answer here to those who have wished that he had not discovered the Errours which are represented in this Work, without refuting them by the true Principles of Christian Morality, which are Scripture and Tradition. They avow that this had been advantagious to the Church; and it was the very design of the Author. But this hinders not but that his labour, although separated from the more large Refutation, may have also its utility. For they who are acquainted with the Affairs of the Church, understand

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that it is no new thing ſimply to ſet down the Errours which the Corrupters of Faith and Manners have attempted to introduce into the Church, without undertaking to combate them by long Reaſoning, and that S. *Epiphanius* (as alſo S. *Auſtin* obſerved) hath only repreſented by way of Hiſtory the pernicious Opinions of the greater part of Hereticks, without taking in hand to refute them in particular; rehearſing all things with an Hiſtorical Narration, but not contending for the truth againſt falſhood by any diſputation.

Hiſtorica narratione commemorans omnia, nulla diſputatione adverſus falſitatem pro veritate decertans. *S. Auguſt. de Hæreſ.*

I know well that there is cauſe to believe, by that which S. *Auſtin* adds preſently after, that he had only an Abridgment of the Books of S. *Epiphanius*. But I know alſo, that if this Saint had ſeen them all entire, he would ſtill have diſcourſed after the ſame manner, and that this Judgment may very juſtly be paſſed on them; for that of eighty different Sects, of which *Epiphanius* hath undertaken to report the Errours, he only tracks the foot, as I may ſay, of them one by one, and refutes in the manner of a Divine only four or five, contenting himſelf in a few words, and as it were on his way paſſing by them, to ſhew the abſurdity of the Conceits of thoſe Hereticks, and how far they were diſtanced from the truth. See how he interprets himſelf in his Preface concerning the manner in which he had deſigned to handle theſe things: *In which truly this one thing we ſhall perform, that we ſhall oppoſe againſt them as much as in us lies, in a few words, as it were an Antidote, whereby we may expel their poyſons, and by Gods help may free any one who either wilfully or unawares happens to fall into theſe Heretical opinions, as it were into the poyſon of ſome Serpents.*

In quo quidem hoc unum præſtabimus, ut adverſus illa quicquid in nobis ſitum erit paucis uno atq; altero verbo velut antidotum apponamus, quo & illorum venena propulſemus, & ſecundum Deum quemlibet qui vel ſponte vel invitus in hæretica illa dogmata velut ſerpentum virus inciderit, ſi quidem velit ipſe, liberare poſſimus.

This is the ſame thing which the Author of this Book of Morals, which is now made publick, hath given us to ſee therein with a marvellous addreſs and vivacity of Spirit. For though he undertake not to refute theſe Errours of the Jeſuits, but only to diſcover them, he does notwithſtanding diſcover them without making their exceſſes to appear moſt plainly, and the oppoſition alſo which they have to the truth and ſound doctrine. So that according to the progreſs by which we advance in reading this Book, we find our ſelves inſenſibly convinced of the falſities of all the Maxims which are therein related; and our minds filled with the oppoſite truths; and our hearts piouſly animated againſt theſe ſo horrible corruptions, and edified by the violence which we obſerve this Author hath done upon himſelf for to moderate his zeal, and to keep himſelf back from refuting opinions ſo contrary to the common ſenſe of the Faith. *For unto ſuch evils deep ſighs and groans are more agreeable than long diſcourſes.*

Cum talibus malis magis prolixi gemitus & fletus quam prolixi libri debeantur. *S. Aug. Epiſt.* 122.

Indeed the arguings of the Jeſuits which he relates, and whereof they make uſe to authorize their monſtrous opinions, are ſo evidently contrary to the Principles and Maxims of the Goſpel, and to the light of Nature; the abuſe to which they put the words of Scripture and the Fathers, is ſo viſible and ſo groſs, and there needs ſo little diſcerning to ſee that they take them in a ſenſe contrary to what they do indeed contain, that theſe Authors deſtroy themſelves,

ſelves, and are refuted themſelves by themſelves, and it ſuffices ſimply to report their Doctrine, to make appear that it overturns the Foundations of Religion, and that it is not only oppoſite to the Wiſdom of the Croſs and Chriſtian Philoſophy, but alſo to Reaſon and the Philoſophy of the Heathens.

It is true that this corruption is not equally evident in all their Maxims, and that to ſurprize more eaſily thoſe who have ſome fear of God, they do propoſe theſe unto them with ſome kind of temperament, covering them with ſome ſpecious pretences, which ſerve for reaſons to engage them to follow them without ſcruple. But the Author of theſe Morals hath ſo dextrouſly unfolded all theſe Artifices, and all theſe ſtudied ſubtilties, and hath ſo neatly diſcovered their malignity, that there is no fear that thoſe who read them will ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by them, nor that they can have any confidence in the people, whom he hath made clearly to appear to have a priviledge to ſpeak every thing that they pleaſe, and not to contradict themſelves at all in ſpeaking things altogether contrary, according to the diverſity of places, times, and the intereſt of their Society; who give themſelves the liberty and the right, not only of two contrary opinions, to chuſe that which is moſt for their commodity, but even to follow both the two according to divers occaſions, and the different reliſhes of thoſe who conſult with them; finally, who content not themſelves only to refute the holy Fathers, the Popes, and the Councils, when they are not for their convenience, but who alſo take the confidence to make them ſpeak what they pleaſe, altogether contrary to what they do ſpeak.

It is true alſo, that this Author having undertaken to make us ſee the general corruption which the Jeſuits have ſpread all over the Morals, could not avoid to ſpeak of thoſe matters, which S. *Paul* ſaith ought not to be proceeded in ſo far as to be named by Chriſtians; and that he is forced to ſhew how they would make Marriage, which is the Image of all pure and all holy Union of Jeſus Chriſt with the Church, and which ought to be handled with all honour, to give right to ſhameful filthineſſes, which even the Pagan Philoſophers themſelves have condemned, according to theſe excellent words of an ancient Author: *Adulter eſt uxoris amator acrior. He is an Adulterer who is too eager a Lover of his Wife.*

Notwithſtanding he hath been careful not to tranſcribe thoſe ordures, with which *Sanchez* hath filled whole Volumes, among which ſome have been ſo ſcandalous, that they have been left out in ſome Editions, which yet have been no hinderance to *Tambourin* and *Amadeus* to renew them; where he ſpeaks of theſe exceſſes and other ſuch like, it is with ſuch temperance, that diſcharging the Reader of a good part of the confuſion which he might have received thereby, he doth not forbear at all to inſtruct him ſufficiently, and make him conceive all that horrour wherein he ought to have theſe miſerable Writers, who ſeem principally to be compoſed to ſatiate their imagination with moſt enormous unheard of crimes.

Finally, That which doth yet more juſtifie the deſign of the Author of theſe Morals, and the manner wherein he handles theſe things,

things, is that now of a long time all theſe exceſſes which are herein rehearſed, have been made publick by the Jeſuits themſelves, who have cauſed them to be printed and ſold, and who have delivered them into the hands of an infinite of Religious perſons and Directors of others not very clear ſighted, who think that they cannot better learn the Maxims of Chriſtian Morality than in reading the moſt famous Authors of ſo celebrated a Society. So that it will be of very great importance to make the corruptions of theſe Authors ſo known, that no man may hereafter be miſtaken in them. And this cannot be better executed than by propoſing thoſe very ſame Maxims as impious and deteſtable, which the Jeſuits have propounded in their Books as good and ſafe; this alone being ſufficient to work effects altogether contrary in mens ſpirits, as may be ſeen in the Example of *Eſcobar*, who having been imprinted thirty nine times, as a very good Book, hath been now imprinted the fortieth time, as one of the moſt miſchievous Books in the whole World; which hath ſo wrought, that whereas the firſt thirty nine Editions were very prejudicial to the Church, this fortieth hath been very beneficial unto it.

And the ſame we believe may happen in the publication of theſe Morals, which the alone zeal and love of the purity of the Morality of Jeſus Chriſt hath induced us to make publick. It is hoped that this Publication will prevail to remove the ſcandal which the Jeſuits have cauſed from the Church, to which they gave place to the Hereticks to attribute thoſe Opinions for which it hath the greateſt horrour; and that theſe unhappy perſons who are ſeparated from its communion, ſhall not impute them unto it any more, after ſo publick a diſavowing of theſe Maxims altogether abominable as they are; not giving them yet any advantage above the Jeſuits themſelves, becauſe it is not hard to make appear that the Principles of their Morality are no leſs corrupted nor pernicious than thoſe of theſe Fathers.

It is hoped that this Publication will ſtir up the Paſtors of the Church to renew the zeal which they have already made appear againſt the Authors of ſo many corruptions; that they will interdict in their Dioceſſes the reading of theſe Books; that they will take the ways which the Sacred Canons have preſcribed them, (*2 Tim.* 2. 17.) to repreſs ſo pernicious Novelties, and that they will hinder them that they ſpread not over mens ſpirits, as Gangrenes which waſte and corrupt by little and little that which was ſound; and that they will fear, leſt while they diſſemble theſe exceſſes, and paſs by thoſe who are their Authors, they make themſelves culpable of the loſs of a great number of Souls, which theſe blind Guides ſeduce and train along with them into the pit.

We deſpair not even of the Jeſuits themſelves, that they alſo may draw from thence the advantage which this Author hath earneſtly deſired to procure them. For although it ſeems by their conduct, which they have hitherto held herein, that they are reſolved to perſevere in maintaining theſe damnable Maxims, and to deſpiſe the wholeſom advertiſement which the whole Church hath given them,

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to abandon them; yet notwithſtanding it may be ſaid, that if they have uſed them in this ſort, it hath been perhaps, becauſe they were not yet ſufficiently convinced of the juſtice of the reproaches which have been caſt on them, and that ſome ſecret intereſt hath hindred them from perceiving them in the Writings of thoſe whom they looked upon as their Adverſaries. But now that a perſon whom they cannot ſuſpect, and who hath never been engaged againſt them, hath preſented unto them ſo diſtinctly the concatenation of the Maxims and Concluſions which their Authors have taught, it will be very hard for them not to be ſurprized therein, and not to be powerfully ſtruck by ſo many deteſtable Opinions. Who knows but God, hearing the prayers, which have now for a long time been ordained by the whole Clergy of *France*, and which have been made publickly in ſome particular Dioceſſes, to beg for them, that he would open their eyes, may touch them and bring them on highly to diſowne the Authors of ſo many abominations, and to make it appear by their condemning them themſelves as publick Plagues and declared Enemies of all Truth and Juſtice, that the Crimes with which they have been reproached belong only to ſome private men, and not to the whole Society.

The approbation of the Doctors hath not been ſought after for the Publication of this Book. For beſides that there was no apparent need to expoſe the Approbators to the indignation of a Society, who hold it for a Maxime, that they may with a ſafe conſcience kill them who pretend to hurt them in their reputations, it was believed that this precaution would not be neceſſary on this occaſion. Indeed the Author producing nothing of his own in this Book, and having preſcribed unto himſelf only therein to repreſent faithfully thoſe Maxims alone of the Jeſuits Morals which are notoriouſly wicked, and which are the very ſame againſt which all the Parochial Rectors of the moſt conſiderable Towns of the Realm have been ſtirred up; ſo that the Pope, the Biſhops, the Sorbonne, and the other Catholick Faculties have condemned by their Cenſures the Apology of the Caſuiſts; and that the Faculty of Divinity in *Paris* have now very lately cenſured in the Books of *Vernant* and *Amadeus*, we believe all theſe Cenſures to be as ſo many Approbations of this Book, and that for that cauſe the Pope, the Biſhops, the Sorbonne, and the other Faculties, and the Parochial Rectors of the principal Towns of *France* may paſs for its Approbators, or at leaſt of the Doctrine contained therein. For as to the knowing whether the Author hath been a faithful Relator of the Propoſitions of the Authors whom he cites every one in particular, may well be allowed to judge thereof, becauſe indeed better Judges of this ſort of differences than the eyes of thoſe who ſhall have any ſcruple in this point, cannot be had.

But if the Jeſuits and ſome of the Partiſans of their Society complain of this Author, becauſe he hath ſo exactly repreſented their Extravagances, there is cauſe to hope that all other faithful people will be ſatisfied therewith, becauſe that one may ſay in truth that he gives by his Book unto every one that which belongs unto him,

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and which the Caſuiſts of the Society have uſed their utmoſt force to raviſh from them. He gives unto God the love, the acknowledgment, and the worſhip which belongs unto him; to the Church the belief and ſubmiſſion of the Faithful; to worldly Powers their honour and the fidelity of their Subjects, ſafety to their Eſtates; to Fathers and Mothers the obedience and reſpect of their Children; to Children the love and tenderneſs of their Fathers and Mothers; Conjugal fidelity to Husbands and Wives; to Maſters the fidelity of their Servants; to Servants kindneſs of their Maſters; to the Eccleſiaſticks Piety and Religion; equity and integrity to Judges; true honour unto the Nobility; fair dealing unto Merchants. Finally, he eſtabliſhes in the World all thoſe Vertues which the Jeſuits ſeem reſolved to baniſh from thence, that they might entertain and cauſe to reign there all the diſorders which the malice of men or the Devil himſelf was capable to invent.

### *The Tranſlators Conjecture concerning the Author of this Advertiſement, and of the Book it ſelf.*

THis Advertiſement ſeems to be Father *Arnolds*, the Preface and Work his Nephew Monſieur *Paſcals*, who is alſo ſuppoſed to have written the Porvincial Letters, not without his Uncles privity and aſſiſtance; whoſe head and hand could not be wanting to this Work alſo, if his. The ſtyle much differing, and *Lewis Montalt* affirming himſelf to be no Doctor, makes me ſuſpect a third hand to have been made uſe of in drawing up thoſe Letters; however theſe Doctors, as I am credibly informed, were the Head-contrivers of them. There are alſo many paſſages in the Provincials, which ſeeming to promiſe this Work, confirm my Conjecture.

# The Preface of the Author.

## *The Design and Order of this Work.*

*THE end of Morality, not only among Christians, but also among the Pagans, hath always been to make known that which is good, and to separate it from the bad; to carry men on to vertue and to good actions, and to turn them away from vice and from sin; and in pursuit thereof to teach them the means to proceed from the one to the other. It cannot be shewed, more easily and more evidently, how dangerous and prejudicial the Moral Divinity of the Jesuits is, than by making it appear that it tends and leads to a quite contrary end; and that it walks in ways opposite to Reason and to the Law of Nature, as well as those of Christian Piety; that it confounds good and evil, or to use the words of Scripture, it calls evil good, and good evil; that the more part of the resolutions which it gives upon the points and particular cases which respect conscience, tend to the stopping up in men the lights and motions of conscience it self, and favours lust which corrupts it; that the Principles from which they draw their Resolutions, and the Reasons of which they make use for to support them, are so many means and expedients proper for to authorize vice, to sustain sin, to excuse the most criminal actions, and to entertain looseness and disorder in all sorts of Professions.*

*This is that which I have a design to make appear in this Book. And to the end that I may before-hand give a general Idea of all that which I handle therein, and represent most clearly the Method and consequence of the means whereof I make use to justifie that which I pretend, I will expose here in a few words the whole order and disposition of my Discourse.*

*I reduce all these matters to certain principal Points, which I handle after such manner and in such order as seems to me most clear and most proper to make appear the consequence of the Moral Doctrine of the Jesuits, the connexion of their Principles with their Conclusions, and the conformity of their practice with their Opinions. For the consort and the resemblance which is between their Doctrine and their Conduct is so perfect, that it is visible it proceeds from the same Spirit, tends to the same end, which is to please men, to satisfie them by flattering their passions and their interests, and to train them up in vice and disorder.*

*To see clearly the truth of this point, which is the whole subject of this Book, it must first be considered that there seems not possible to be found a way more proper to authorize vice and sin, than to approve and tolerate all that which nourishes them, and to abolish all that which is opposite to them, and may destroy them.*

*2. That the things which beget and nourish vice and sin, are partly within*

*within man, as corrupt ſeeds from whence proceed all the evil which he commits; and partly without man, as outward objects, which beating upon his ſenſes and his mind, carry his will to conſent unto evil and ſin, which abides and acts inceſſantly within him.*

*3. That the things which are within man, as the corrupt fountain from whence comes all the diſorders and ſins which he commits, are luſt, ignorance, and evil habits, and hypocriſie, or the ſecret malice of the heart covered with a veil of good intention; and that the outward things which carry him on unto evil are the occaſions of ſin, the objects which draw on the evil examples, the evil cuſtoms which excite them and nouriſh them; and above all, humane Authority and humane Reaſon corrupted by ſin, which furniſheth Inventions for continuance in evil, and in the occaſions of evil wherein he is engaged, and to juſtifie or excuſe the moſt criminal actions by imaginary probabilities.*

*4. That the things which deſtroy or expel ſin are likewiſe of two ſorts, ſome as if it were internal, and others external. I call thoſe internal which attract to and eſtabliſh in the heart of man the Grace of God, by which ſin is deſtroyed, ſuch as are Faith, Prayer, Repentance, good Works, and a right uſe of the Sacraments. I call theſe external, which do from without repreſent ſin unto a man, whether it be by the knowledge which they give him of its malice, of the hatred which God bears towards it, of the puniſhments which he hath prepared for it in the other life, and thoſe with which he puniſheth it ſometimes even in this very life; or which in any other like manner may give him an averſion from it, and hinder him from committing it; as are the Commandments of God, thoſe of the Church, and generally all the holy Scriptures old and new, which contain all the Promiſes which God hath made to good men, and all the evils with which he doth threaten ſinners.*

*There is no perſon, I am confident, who will not eaſily agree to theſe Truths and general Principles. So that I have nothing to do, but apply them to the particular Subject which I handle, to acquit my ſelf entirely of what I have undertaken to prove, to wit, that the Divinity of the Jeſuits is as favourable to vice and ſin as poſſibly it can be. It ſuffices me for this purpoſe to make appear that it nouriſhes luſt, ignorance, evil habits, and the corruption of the will, covered with a veil and pretence of a good intention.*

*That it entertains men in occaſions of ſin, in evil cuſtoms, in licences and abuſes, as well publick and common to all, as peculiar to every Profeſſion, making uſe of humane and corrupt Reaſon for authorizing theſe diſorders, and to make them paſs as good and indifferent, and gives for a Rule of Chriſtian life and the Foundation of eternal life, not Faith and the Word of God, but the Authority of Men, and all the imaginations and thoughts which preſent themſelves unto their minds, provided they can render them probable, and give them ſome colour and appearance of truth.*

*That it aboliſheth or corrupts Repentance, Prayers, good Works, the Sacraments, the Commands of God, of the Church, and the Holy Scriptures.*

*That finally it introduceth and confirmeth corruption and looſneſs in*

*all ſorts of Profeſſions Seculars and Eccleſiaſticks, attempting to juſtifie and excuſe thoſe vices and ſins which are moſt oppoſite thereto, and which are to them for all that moſt common, as injuſtice in the Courts, unfaithfulneſs in Traffick, and other ſuch like.*

*If I can juſtifie all theſe things, I have all my deſign accompliſhed, and I ſhall have ſhewed that the Jeſuits Divinity favours and nouriſhes vice and ſin as much as men can do, and that they ſeem to be become thereof the Advocates and Profeſſors.*

*Which I hope to do in this Writing with ſo much clearneſs, that no perſon ſhall be thereof unconvinced, and with ſuch perfect fidelity, that thoſe who are the leaſt equitable, becauſe they are too ſcrupulous or too paſſionate, ſhall have nothing to reproach me with on this Subject. For I will do nothing elſe but report ſimply the Opinions of the Authors Jeſuits as they have expreſſed themſelves in their Books. I will frequently add their proper Reaſons, and in the more important Points I ſhall ſometimes aſcend to the Principles from whence they draw their Concluſions.*

*I undertake not to refute their Errours, but only to diſcover them, and make them appear. This is the cauſe why without engaging my ſelf to produce the places of holy Scripture or of Tradition, any more than the Reaſons which may be alledged to reſel them, I content my ſelf to conſider and repreſent them in ſuch ſort, that they may be underſtood what they are; and many times I content my ſelf to reherſe them as they themſelves expreſs them, when that is ſufficient to raiſe an horrour againſt them. When the malice is more concealed, I endeavour to diſcover it, and to make it evident by ſome Reflections or ſome Obſervations, or by Examples and ſenſible Compariſons: and if I make uſe of any Reaſons, I take them in a manner always from themſelves, or from Principles of Faith and natural Light, which are altogether indubitable, and ſo evident, that to oppoſe them, were to renounce common ſenſe, as well as Chriſtian Piety and Religion.*

*I meddle not here with matters of Faith, nor Myſteries of Religion, where it was as eaſie to make appear that the Jeſuits are no leſs tranſported than in the Maxims of Morality, as will appear clearly by one Example out of the Chapter* (of Jeſus Chriſt) *which I thought ſhould be added to that* of Grace. *There may be ſeen in what manner they ſpeak of the Son of God, of his Incarnation, of his Humanity, of his Divine Perſon, and that they have thereof thoughts ſo baſe, ſo unworthy, ſo ſhameful, that they are not more proper for any end than to expoſe our Myſteries to the ſcorn and contempt of Infidels and Libertines, and to raiſe horrour and averſation in the Faithful themſelves by their impious expreſſions and reaſonings, by which they profane Holineſs it ſelf, and deſtroy the reſpect and veneration which ought to be given it.*

*I inſiſt upon Moral matters only, and even without deſign to contain them all. I ſhould need many Volumes only to make an Extract of that which may be found in their Books contrary to good Manners and to Chriſtian Piety. I intend only to collect ſome principal Propoſitions by which Judgment may be made of the reſt. I report them ſimply as they are in their Books. And when I tranſlate them, I will*

*ſet*

ſet the paſſages on the Margent in Latine, to the end that the fidelity and ſincerity with which I recite them may appear.

If amongſt many paſſages which I commonly produce on the ſame Subject, there be ſome which appear not clear enough, there may be found in others that which ſeems to be wanting in them. But I have reaſon to believe that there is no cauſe to reproach me herein, for I have taken a particular care not only to ſpeak things, ſo as I underſtood them, but alſo to enter as far as I could into the very thoughts of the Fathers whom I have alledged, knowing that it is never lawful to wound Juſtice or Charity under a pretence of combating Errour, and defending Truth, and that Errour it ſelf may not be aſſailed, nor Truth defended by lying and diſguiſement.

I am ſo far from deſiring to augment this evil, or to exaggerate theſe things, that I oftentimes abſtain from ſpeaking as I could without departing from my deſign. They that have any love or knowledge of the Truth, will eaſily perceive this my moderation, and they will oftentimes find nothing elſe to reprove me for in many important points, but that I have not ſpoken enough therein, and that I give over many times where they would cry out to me that I ought to go on, and follow my Subject to the utmoſt.

If there be any who find herein expreſſions which ſeem to them to be too vehement, and far removed from that ſweetneſs and moderation which they love; I beſeech them not to judge according to their diſpoſition, but according to the things whereof I ſpeak. The paſſion or the præoccupation they may be under, either for the pernicious Maxims which I repreſent, or for the Authors, or for the Defenders of them, may be capable to perſwade them that I ought to have ſpoken of them with ſo much reſpect and moderation, as belongs to the moſt ſerious and holy things. But the reaſon and the nature even of the things themſelves may eaſily undeceive them, if they conſider that expreſſions ought to correſpond with their ſubjects, and that it would introduce a diſproportion to repreſent thoſe things which are ridiculous and contemptible as ſeriouſly as if they were not, and that this were to give too much advantage to preſumption and inſolence, which ſpeaks proudly to make Errour triumph over Truth, and to give it in ſome ſort the victory, to treat it otherwiſe than with ſuch force and vigour as is capable to repreſs and humble it.

So it is that Truth would be defended, and hath it ſelf declared that it will one day revenge it ſelf on them that have aſſailed it with ſcorn and obſtinacy, not only bruiſing their heads, but alſo inſulting over them, that they may be covered with confuſion.

So that I have ſome cauſe to fear in this point on the behalf of Truth, that I have been rather too reſerved than too free. And it ſeems that they who have any love for it, may complain of me, that I have not defended it with force and ardour enough in an encounter where it hath been aſſaulted by a very extraordinary Conſpiracy of perſons who for their own intereſt, ſufficiently well known, have endeavoured to blot out of the memory of the Faithful, and Books of the Church the moſt pure and ſafe Maxims concerning the Regulation and Conduct of Chriſtian life and Manners.

And

*And I may perhaps have ſome trouble to defend my ſelf from this reproach, and to hinder that it be not believed, That I have not defended the Cauſe of the Church and of Truth with the zeal which they deſerved, but that I have already declared that I have not at all undertaken properly to defend it, or refute thoſe who have aſſailed and hurt it ſo cruelly; but to make appear only the Errours and the pernicious Maxims by which they have overturned all Diſcipline and all the Rules of Manners and Chriſtian life, even the moſt holy and beſt eſtabliſhed upon the Scriptures and Books of the Saints, and alſo by their Examples.*

*Hereunto I have limited and obliged my ſelf in this Work. It may be God will raiſe up ſome other who ſhall go on where I leave, and will undertake to refute fully the Errours which I have diſcovered, and to eſtabliſh by the Principles of Faith and Tradition the Truths which I have only noted in my paſſage. The manner in which this firſt Book ſhall be received, and the profit which will come thereon, may procure a diſpoſition to receive alſo yet better another of greater importance, and be a motive to engage God to ſtir up ſome other perſon to labour therein. We are all in his hands, our travels and our thoughts, whereof the firſt and principal ought to be never in any thing to have other than his deſigns. He knows that which he hath given me in this Work, is no other than to perform ſome Service to his Church and my Neighbour. I beſeech him to bleſs it with ſucceſs, leaving it to his Providence to diſpoſe of it according as he ſhall pleaſe, and I do for the preſent accept with all reſpect and ſubmiſſion whatſoever he ſhall ordain thereof.*

## The Neceſſity and Utility of this Work.

*IF the pernicious Maxims of the Jeſuits Morality ſhould for the preſent be preſented no otherwiſe than in an extract, without adding any thing thereto but what is found in their Authors, the World is at this day ſo indifferent in things which reſpect their Salvation and Religion, there would be found very few perſons who would be touched therewith, or who would take any pains to conſider them.*

*But it is come to paſs by the particular order of Divine Providence, that he who hath enterpriſed to diſcover them ſome years ago, hath expreſt them in a manner ſo taking, that hath attracted the whole World unto him to read them by the grace of his ſtyle, and thereupon hath made them eaſily to appear odious and inſupportable by their proper exceſſes and extravagancies.*

*This ſo happy beginning had hath ſucceſs much more happy; for mens minds being touched with a deſire to know particularly things ſo important and ſo prejudicial to their Conſciences and Salvation, my Maſters the Parochial Rectors of* Rouen *and* Paris *have in purſuit thereof publiſhed with a zeal worthy of their Charge many learned Writings, which have given to all the World enough of inſtruction and light to conceive the diſtance and horrour they ought to keep towards that wicked Doctrine, and the danger whereinto they put them who follow theſe Guides who purſue or practiſe them.*

*But as their deſign was only to make a ſpeedy order againſt an evil which then did but begin to appear, they believed that it was ſufficient*

*to*

*to adviſe their people thereof in general terms, in notifying unto them ſome of the more pernicious propoſitions, without extending them further to diſcover their principles, conſequences, and unhappy effects, as it had been eaſie for them to do; and they thought that to ſtrangle them in their birth, it would have been ſufficient only to expoſe them to the view of the whole World, being in themſelves ſo odious and monſtrous, and to oppoſe themſelves to thoſe that teach them, as the Shepherds obliged to reſiſt the Wolves who would devour their flock. Yet they omitted not to have recourſe to the Authority of the Church, and to addreſs their complaints and requeſts to my Lords the Biſhops and to the General Aſſembly of the Clergie of* France, *in the year* 1656. *who ſeeing that it was not at all in their power at that time to do them juſtice, did at leaſt make it known to the whole Church, that opportunity only was wanting unto them. And for that cauſe ordained that the Inſtructions of S.* Charles *ſhould be imprinted by the order of the Clergie, with a circular Letter to all my Lords the Prelates, which ſerved to prejudge their opinions, and to give as it were a commencement to the condemnation of all theſe Maxims in general, expecting till ſome opportunity were offered to do it more ſolemnly.*

*The voice of theſe charitable Paſtors was heard and faithfully followed by their ſheep, who by the ſubmiſſion they owed to them, and through the confidence which they had in their honeſty and ſufficiency, entred into an averſion againſt this new Doctrine, as ſoon as it was declared unto them, that it was contrary to the Doctrine of the Church and that of the holy Fathers.*

*It were alſo to be wiſhed, that this ſame voice which came from Heaven, being Jeſus Chriſt ſpeaks in the Church by its Paſtors, had turned, or at leaſtwiſe ſtayed the Authors of this Doctrine, and had kept them in ſilence, and that they had themſelves alſo ſuppreſſed theſe ſtrange opinions and pernicious Maxims, againſt which they ſaw the whole World to riſe with a general indignation, and with a moſt juſt zeal.*

*But this did nothing but provoke them yet more, ſo that inſtead of receiving Chriſtian-like the charitable correction of theſe worthy Paſtors of Souls, they had the confidence to appear in publick to maintain ſo great Errours by Writings yet more wicked; imitating thoſe fierce beaſts, who iſſue in fury out of the Foreſts and Dens to defend their young when they are about to be taken from them.*

*My Maſters the Parochial Rectors had by an extraordinary temperance and moderation ſuppreſſed the names of the Jeſuits, and not diſtinguiſhed them from the other Caſuiſts, attacquing the Doctrine only without touching the perſons of any particular Order. But theſe good Fathers could neither lye hid, nor keep ſilence, and judged themſelves unworthy of the favour which they had received upon this occaſion. And as if this Doctrine had been their own particularly, they would needs declare themſelves the Defenders of it, as indeed they are the principal and even the firſt Authors thereof in many of its moſt important points. They made for it an Apologie, wherein ſo very far were they from diſavowing and retracting thoſe pernicious Maxims wherewith they were reproached, that they did highly maintain them: and to teſtifie that they never intended to recant them, they have declared*

*that*

*that in many matters wherein their exceſſes are moſt viſible, they can yet ſpeak more, and give yet more licence to their ſpirits.*

*An evil ſo publick and ſo obſtinate cannot be healed nor ſtayed by ſimple words. Which thing hath obliged my Maſters the Parochial Rectors, to renew their complaints and their inſtances to my Lords the Prelates.*

*Some of them have already worthily acquitted themſelves in this their duty to the Church and People who depend on their charge. And it is hoped that the zeal and charity of the reſt will preſs them to give the ſame teſtimony unto the truth, and that if ſome of them, for ſome particular reaſons, cannot do it ſo ſolemnly as they deſire, yet they will not ceaſe to condemn in their hearts, and upon occaſions which ſhall be offered, this novel Doctrine, and to keep thoſe whom they can at a diſtance from it, as a moſt pernicious Divinity.*

*After all this, it was thought to be high time farther to diſcover this Doctrine, and to repreſent it in the whole extent it hath in the Books of the Jeſuits, that the corruption and the venom of it might be better known. It had been to little purpoſe to have done it ſooner, becauſe that the exceſs and overthrow it hath given to all the true Rules of Morality and Chriſtian piety, are ſo great and ſo incredible, that the world having yet never heard any thing like unto it, would have been ſurprized at the novelty and impiety of the principal Maxims of theſe dreadful Morals: ſo that many would have been troubled to believe it; others would have been offended at it; and many would have altogether neglected it, and would not ſo much as have taken the pains only to have informed themſelves ſo far as that they might not ſuffer themſelves to be ſurprized therein.*

*The Jeſuits themſelves would not have failed to have broken out into complaints, calumnies, and impoſtures, which are common with them in uſe againſt ſuch as diſcover their ſecrets, and the ſhame of their Divinity: and they would have employed all their artifices and diſguiſes to elude or obſcure the moſt clear things wherewith they ſhould have been reproached, though they had been repreſented ſimply as they are expreſſed in their Books.*

*But yet notwithſtanding that theſe pernicious Maxims had been confounded and decryed by my Maſters the Parochial Rectors, fulminated by the cenſures of the Biſhops, there is cauſe to hope that expoſing them to the day will be uſeful to many of the Faithful, and hereby will be ſeen more clearly the juſtice and neceſſity of the purſuits which the Parochial Rectors made for obtaining a cenſure of them, the equity of the Judgment of the Prelates made in purſuance thereof, and the obligation which all the Faithful have upon them to ſtifle theſe Monſters of Error and Impiety, which multiply continually, and prey upon the Church. So that this will even contribute very much to redouble the ſubmiſſion and confidence which they ought to have towards their Paſtors, ſeeing from what miſchiefs their vigilance and their zeal hath preſerved them, and with what prudence and wiſdom they have conducted them in this affair, having not diſcovered the greatneſs of the evil to them before, as it may be ſaid, they had delivered them from it.*

*And it may alſo come to paſs, that the Authors and Defenders of theſe wicked*

*wicked Doctrines may themſelves be ſurprized and have horrour, when they ſee together in a ſequence of Principles and Concluſions the opinions which they have maintained to this preſent. Becauſe it is very common for things good or evil, which apart make no great impreſſion upon the ſpirit, ſurprize and touch it powerfully when as they are united and joyned together.*

*There is alſo cauſe to believe that many of thoſe who have followed unto this preſent theſe novel Maxims of the Jeſuits, only becauſe they did not perceive all the unhappy conſequences and pernicious effects of them, now coming to know them, as this Book will give them means to do, will relinquiſh them with joy, and thoſe who ſhall adhere to them, through paſſion or intereſt may be brought to teſtifie the horrour they have conceived againſt them, by the renunciation which they ſhall make of them, or at leaſt by the ſilence they ſhall keep, and wherein they ſhall bury them, ſo as neither to hold nor teach them any more for the future.*

*But if they ſhall not draw hence the fruit which is deſired, and they perſiſt both the one and the other to maintain the ſame Maxims, they teſtifie openly hereby, that they alſo admit all the conſequences, whereof they cannot be ignorant any longer. And by conſequence they ſhall make themſelves reſponſible for all the conſequences and all the unhappy effects which are therefrom inſeparable. And if after all this they make an out-cry in the world, and hold themſelves offended when ſuch diſorders are imputed to them, and when they are declared the Authors and Cheriſhers of theſe Irregularities, of Corruption, of Libertiniſm, which are ſpread over all conditions in theſe laſt times, they cannot attribute it to any other than themſelves, becauſe they are reproached with nothing but what they have avowed themſelves, in that they would not diſavow it, after it hath been repreſented unto them, and they have been condemned by the Church.*

*The Faithful ſhall at leaſt draw hence this advantage, that they may hereby diſcover the falſe Prophets and falſe Paſtors from the good and true ones, and take heed of thoſe who under a pretence of piety do corrupt piety it ſelf, ſeducing ſimple and innocent Souls, ſo far as to endeavour to hale them out of the boſom of their true and lawful Paſtors, and to turn them away from their conduct, and engage them in horrible precipices.*

## Reaſons wherefore we take the Morals of the Jeſuits for the Subject of this Book rather than thoſe of other Caſuiſts.

*THat I produce in this Work no other Authors than thoſe of the Society of the Jeſuits, is not through any paſſion towards them, or toward others. For though I ſpeak not of other Caſuiſts; yet do I not neglect them entirely, as neither do I approve them, nor excuſe them, in their opinions which they have common with the Jeſuits, and which are conformable to thoſe which I reprove.*

*But as he who would cut down a Tree, amuſes not himſelf in cutting off the branches one after another, but betakes himſelf to its body and root, which being cut, the branches muſt neceſſarily fall; and ſo, I*

*believe, that deſtroying the pernicious Doctrine of the Jeſuits, touching Manners, and Caſes of Conſcience, I overturn all at once, whatſoever there is conformable unto it amongſt the new Caſuiſts, becauſe they are in a manner all their Diſciples; having learned that which they ſay in their Schools, or in their Books.*

*After all this, the Jeſuits declare themſelves the Maſters of this ſort of new Learning, and they give this name to their principal Authors, whom they would have paſs for the Doctors and Maſters of the whole World. And they would, even that they might aſſure themſelves of the poſſeſſion of theſe Titles, eject the holy Fathers therefrom, endeavouring to hinder men from hearing them, from following them, and from imitating the example and holineſs of their lives by this pernicious Maxime which they have invented and eſtabliſhed, as a Principle of their Divinity; that it is not the ancient Fathers, but the new Divines and Caſuiſts of theſe times, who muſt be taken for the Rule of Manners and Chriſtian life.*

Quæ circa fidem emergunt difficultates conſona veteribus ſancienda; quæ vero circa mores homine Chriſtiano dignos à novetiis ſcriptoribus. *Reginald. Præfat. ad lect.*

*It is with the ſame Spirit that did teſtifie ſo great an eſteem for Novelty, they profeſs to follow it, and many amongſt them, as* Poſa, Celot *have taken in hand to defend it, to praiſe it, and to make Apologies for it. And hereby without doubt they deſigned to make the preſumption paſs for current, that they borrowed nothing at all from others, and eſpecially nothing from the Ancients, but that they produced their Opinions themſelves, and found them in their own heads; and that they have no other Rule for their conduct and their knowledge, but their own ſenſe and humane reaſon, and not the Authority of the Saints; and that being as it were Independents, they ought not to paſs for Children of the Fathers, and for Diſciples of the holy Doctors, but Maſters of Novelties amongſt the Authors of theſe times.*

*But although they think hereby to exalt their Doctrine, and to acquire more honour unto it, they diſgrace and ruine it themſelves in effect; becauſe that Novelty hath always been blamed as a mark of Errour, not only by the Catholicks, but alſo by the Hereticks, who have always affected and attempted to make people believe, that their Doctrine, as well as their Religion, were ancient, ſo that there were never any found, who would ſuffer themſelves to be reproached, much leſs who would boaſt themſelves to advance new Maxims, as is to be ſeen in the Example of the Lutherans and Calviniſts, who vaunt themſelves, though falſly, to follow the Doctrine of the ancient Church and of the Diſciples of Jeſus Chriſt, and hold it for a great injury to be called Innovators, though indeed they be ſuch.*

*The Jeſuits, on the contrary, ſeem to affect this odious Title, ſince they deſpiſing the Authority of the holy Fathers, and renouncing the Doctrine of the Ancients, preſer Novelty before them, and make open profeſſion to follow and invent new Opinions, which none had ever produced before them, as is manifeſtly ſeen in the proper declaration of* Molina, Poſa, Amicus, Maldonat, *and as may eaſily be proved by many other Caſuiſts of the Society.*

*As they are the chief Maſters in this novel Science, ſo they are ſollicitous to make themſelves many Diſciples, who in time becoming Maſters, make up a Body ſo puiſſant, and an Aſſembly of probable Doctors*

*ſo*

*ſo numerous, that it would be hard to find ſo many in all other Societies taken altogether. So that whether we conſider the Votes, or compute them, they will ſtill prevail above all others, and remain the ſole Arbiters and Maſters of this new Morality.*

*And the better to maintain themſelves for ever in this advantage above other Caſuiſts and novel Doctors, knowing that Empire and Dominion amongſt the Learned as well as amongſt the Vulgar, is ſupported by union, and ruined by diviſion, they are expreſly ordered by their Superiors to agree in the ſame opinions, and to maintain them all at leaſt as probable, and above all, when they are advanced by ſome of the Heads and principal Authors of the Society, and they believe that the intereſt and honour of their whole Body is in queſtion.*

*This Conſpiration in the ſame Opinions whereto the Glory of the Society hath engaged them, does hold them faſtned thereto with ſo much obſtinacy, that no Conſideration nor Authority whatſoever, no not even of the Church, can oblige them to acquit them; or if they quit them, being forced thereunto by the publick Complaints and Cenſures, it is only in appearance, and for a time, and they afterwards reſume their very ſame opinions, and maintain and publiſh them as before, as one may ſee in the Books of the Engliſh Jeſuits, of* Sanctarel, *of* Bauny, *of* Celot, *and of* Poſa, *and of divers others, who having been cenſured by the Church, they have diſavowed and ſuppreſſed them for a ſeaſon, but have ſhortly after produced them with the ſame opinions, which had been condemned in them, and with the approbation of the Superiors of their Company.*

*They have alſo eſtabliſhed upon the ſame foundation the inſupportable confidence which they have had unto this preſent to handle the Caſes of Conſcience, and to govern Souls, not only in an imperious manner, but in a kind of Tyranny, and to paſs over all the primitive and true Laws of Chriſtian Morality and Diſcipline, that they may regulate all things according to their own proper reaſon and ſenſe, and ſometimes againſt their own proper thoughts, by their will only, regarding nothing but their own intereſt, and the ſatisfaction of the world, whom they endeavour to pleaſe, by conducting them rather according to their deſires, than according to the Rules of Truth, and for their Salvation.*

*It is by this confidence joyned to ſo great complacency, that they labour to introduce themſelves in the world more than all others who hold their Maxims, and endeavour to get credit with all perſons, great and ſmall, who finding their Divinity favourable to their intereſt and their paſſions, do eaſily follow their advice and their conduct. And ſo they eaſily diffuſe every where the venom of their pernicious Doctrine, which brings looſneſs and corruption into all ſorts of conditions, as we ſhall make it evidently appear at the end of this Extract.*

*Theſe reaſons have obliged me to take the Jeſuits Morals for my Subject in this Book, rather than thoſe of others who are in the ſame opinions, conſidering that they are the firſt Maſters of this new Science; that they ſurpaſs others in number of Writers, as well as they believe themſelves to ſurpaſs them in knowledge; that they are the Inventors of many Opinions, and thoſe the moſt pernicious; that they are all of a piece, and agree together to ſuſtain them; that they are moſt obſtinate*

*in defending them, even then when they are condemned; that they are moſt adventurous and moſt inſinuating to diffuſe them unto the world, and moſt complacent to cauſe them to be received.*

*So that I believe I ſhall combate all the corruption which Novelty hath introduced into Chriſtian Morality, by faſtning upon the Divinity of the Jeſuits, ſince it is all incloſed therein, as in the fountain from whence it diffuſeth it ſelf into the Spirits of other new Caſuiſts, who imitate them, and into the conſciences of the people of the world who follow them, becauſe of the facility of their conduct, who permit them every thing that they will, and ſometimes more than they durſt hope for.*

## The Order of the Matters of this Book.

*I Diſtribute all this Book into three Books. In the firſt, I will handle the Principles of Sin, to make appear that the Jeſuits do eſtabliſh and nouriſh them. In the ſecond, I will ſpeak of the Remedies of Sin, to ſhew that they aboliſh or alter them. In the third, I will examine the particular Duties of every Profeſſion, and the Sins which they do ordinarily commit, to ſhew that they excuſe and favour theſe laſt, and diſpenſe with the firſt, by aboliſhing and obſcuring them in ſuch manner, that they appear not at all.*

*The firſt Book ſhall have two Parts. The firſt ſhall be of the Interior Principles of Sin, and the other of the Exterior. I will divide every Part into ſo many Chapters as there are Principles of Sin, which I ſhall take notice of. And when the abundance of matter, or the diverſity of queſtions ſhall require it, I ſhall divide alſo the Chapters into Articles, the Articles into Points, and the Points into Paragraphs; I ſhall keep the ſame order in the other Books.*

THE

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Article III. Of the Commandment to communicate at *Easter*, and of the Confession to be made every year. *That according to the Jesuits Divinity, these Commandments may be satisfied by true Sacriledges.* Sa, Escobar, Filliutius, Amicus, Celot, Coninck, Azor. 378

Article IV. *That the Jesuits teach that the Church cannot command spiritual and internal Actions; that its Laws and Guidance are humane; that it is it self only a Politick Body.* Sanchez, Filliutius, Layman, Amicus, Escobar, Celot. 385

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THE



# THE FIRST BOOK.

## Of the Inward and Outward Principles of SIN.

## THE FIRST PART:

### Of the Inward Principles of Sin.

*These Principles are Luſt, Ignorance, Ill Habits, the Intention, and the Matter, or the Object of Sin. I will treat ſeverally of theſe five internal principles of Sin, in ſo many different Chapters.*

### CHAPTER I. *Of Luſt in general.*

CHarity and Luſt divide our whole life: theſe are the two Trees of the Goſpel, of which the one produceth alwayes good fruits, and the other can produce none but bad. As all the good which we do comes from the Spirit of God, who works it in us, and cauſes us to do it, forming in our hearts thoſe good deſires which are as it were the ſeed thereof: in the ſame manner Concupiſcence, which every one beareth within him, is the general ſource of all the temptations which we feel; or, to ſpeak better, it is a continual temptation, which carries us on to evil and ſin, in drawing us without ceaſing, by ſecret ſollicitations, to ſenſual and temporal good, which ſerve for a bait and entertainment to our paſſions. This is that which made St. *Leo* to ſay, [a] *That he committed no ſin without luſt; and that every unlawfull deſire is a ſickneſſe and diſorder, which comes from that violent motion which carries us on unto evil.*

[a] *Nullum peccatum ſine cupiditate committitur, & omnis illicitus appetitus illius evidentis, eſt morbus.* S. Leo Serm. 9. de Paſſione, cap. 4.

So that to juſtifie that the Divinity of the Jeſuits makes an entertainment for ſin, we need no other proof, neither can any better be brought, than to ſhew that it favoureth and nouriſheth the luſts of men as much as it can upon all occaſions, as I ſhall make clearly appear in the whole progreſſe of this Book, by the ſimple repreſentation of their Opinions and their Maximes.

This Chapter of Luſt in general will notwithſtanding not be unprofitable; for that as our bodies are ſo compoſed of four qualities and four humours, that there is alwayes one which is predominant and prevails above all others, and

which at length gives the name unto the temperament, and causes one to be stiled melancholique, and another cholerique; thus likewise our souls are so, I will not say composed, but corrupted, by the lusts and passions which sin hath produced therein, that there is no person who carries them not all in his bosome enclosed in concupiscence, which is thereof the spring and principle, although they appear not, nor act altogether equally in all sorts of persons; yet there is commonly one more strong than the rest, which domineers in every person, and which seems to be as it were proper unto him, adhering to his nature, his age, his manner of living, and his condition or profession: so we see that the lusts and passions of young people are other than those of the ancient; that those of persons of great Birth, are different from those of Peasants, and Artificers; and those of Merchants from those of Lawyers.

For this cause, that I may compleatly accomplish the design I have undertaken, to prove that the Divinity of the Jesuits doth favour the lusts and passions of men so much as is possible for it, and consequently those sins which are the products and effects thereof, I will make it appear that in every condition and profession they cherish the lust and vice which is peculiar thereunto; as namely, the covetousnesse and frauds of Merchants, the Ambition and Vanity of the Nobility, the injustice of Officers. But first of all I will say something in general of the more common lusts and passions, which are found in all men, and are in them as it were the spring of corruption, the matter of vices, and the cause of all sins, as *Hate*, *Pride*, *Covetousness*, *Uncleanness*, *Gluttony*, and *Injustice*. For this purpose, I will divide this first Chapter into 6. Articles.

## Article I. Of Hatred.

*That the Divinity of the Jesuits entertains aversions against our Neighbour: that it permits to wish, and do him ill, and even to kill him, though it be for temporal concernments; yea, though also you be assured that in killing him you damn him.*

a *Bauny* in his Summe, ch. 7. p. 81.

B*Anny* in his Summe, after he had delivered unto us the marks of an irreconcilable hatred in these terms: [a] *The third mark of hatred against our neighbour, is not to be willing to accompany him, to have such an alienation, and so violent from him, as not to refuse to talk with him upon any matter whatsoever, nor to assist him in his businesse, or not to pardon him at all when he acknowledges his faults, and offers reasonable satisfaction.* And after he hath reported two authorities and two passages, one of St. *Ambrose*, and the other of St. *Austen*, in which these holy Doctors shew us the obligation we have to love, and wish well to one another, and to serve one another as members of the same body, he concludes boldly in this manner; *Notwithstanding I believe it is no mortal sin to be wanting in these points, if it be not in case of scandal*; that is to say, it is never, or almost never, mortal sin, according to the doctrine which he establisheth, Chap. 39. p. 623. that a man is not capable of the sin of scandal, *but when by a formal design he doth some thing to destroy his neighbours soul*; which is a design of hell, and which seems not easily to come into the spirits of other persons than the damned and Devils.

b *An indignatio non volentis videre vel audire eum cui irascitur, sit mortale peccatum? Communiter negatur esse mortale.* Tolet. affirmat. De Escob. Tract. 2. Exam. 2. de peccatis, n. 98. p. 304.

*Anthony de Escobar* sayes the same thing briefly in his Moral Divinity, where, after he hath put this question; [b] *If that indignation, which is the cause that a man will neither see nor speak with him against whom he is angry, be a mortal sin?* He answers, that *Tolet assures us, That ordinarily this is but a venial sin.*

The words of this Jesuit are of great weight with his Society, because first of all he professes to advance nothing of his own, and withall to borrow nothing of Authors that are strangers; but only to report in every matter the opinion of the Doctors and Writers of the Society. [c] *I sincerely declare*, saith he, *that*

c *Hoc ingenue profiteor, me nihil toto libello scripsisse, quod Societatis Jesu non acceperim ex Doctore. Quas enim proprias passim resolutiones innuo, ex schola Societatis aperte deductas existimaverim.* De Escobar in Idæa operis, in fine.

*I have written nothing in all this Book, which I have not taken out of ſome Doctor of the Society of* Jeſus; *and I would not have it believed that the reſolutions which I have ordinarily given as my own, are any other than concluſions evidently drawn from the principles of the School of the Society.*

2. Of all the Caſuiſts of the Society he choſe 24. particularly, the moſt knowing and experimented, whom he conſidered and hearkned to as his Maſters, or rather as the Maſters of all the World, and he repreſents them as ſitting upon 24. Thrones, to teach the whole Church, abuſing in this that place of the *Revelation*, where 24. Elders ſitting about the Throne of God are ſpoken of. [a] *I preſent unto you*, ſaith he, 24. *Jeſuits ſitting on ſo many Thrones, having choſen them as the moſt antient and moſt elevate of the Society, not only for age, but alſo for knowledge, that is* Sanctius, Azor, Tolet, &c.

3. Neither yet doth he take indifferently all that theſe knowing-men have ſaid or written, he hath choſen that only which is beſt and moſt certain in every of them, concerning all the matters which they handle, yet without depriving himſelf of the liberty of reporting alſo out of other Authors of the Society whatſoever he could that was good in them. [b] *In every matter*, ſaith he, *I have kept cloſe peculiarly to the principal Authors of the Society, and I have choſen out of them the beſt, and as it were the marrow of their diſcourſe, leaving it to the diſcretion of Confeſſors to make uſe thereof, as they ſhall judge to be convenient.*

4. And that he might give all kind of repute to theſe 24. Elders of the Society, whom he compares to the 24. Elders of the *Revelation*, he propoſes their Reſolutions in matter of Conſcience, as ſo many Revelations made unto them, and which they had received from the mouth of God and Jeſus Chriſt. Here are his terms; [c] *I only report the Revelation which the Lamb hath made to the principal Jeſuits whom he hath choſen for his Secretaries, whoſe Writings I have devoured*; like as St. *John* in the *Revelation* devoured the Book preſented to him by the Lamb.

After this none can eaſily judge, but that the Reſolutions of theſe Authors ought to paſs in the Society, not only for common and aſſured Opinions, but alſo for Oracles, and almoſt for Articles of Faith, of which they are not permitted to doubt. And indeed the Book of this Jeſuit is in ſo great reputation in the Society, and they have ſo diſperſed it all over, that it hath been already printed 39. times, as is obſerved in the firſt Page.

*Emanuel Sa*, who laboured near upon 40. years in the ſtudy of Moral Divinity, and to compoſe a Book, which he hath publiſhed in form of Aphoriſms, as he ſaith himſelf in his advice to the Reader, treating of Charity, is not contented to ſay with *Bauny* and *Eſcobar*, that one may without mortal ſin deſire never more to behold ones Enemy; but he addes thereto, that it is permitted to deſire his death, and to be well pleaſed that it is come upon him. [d] *You may*, ſaith he, *deſire the death of an Enemy that is capable of doing you much hurt, provided you do not this out of hatred, but only to avoid the evil which he would do you. It is alſo permitted you to rejoyce in his death, becauſe of the good which may come to you thereby.*

We need only, according to this Author, love our own Intereſt, that we may without crime deſire the death of our Neighbour, and rejoyce in it when it befalls him. That is to ſay, that Covetouſneſs or Ambition may juſtifie a murtherous and inhumane ſoul; and that inſtead of being doubly culpable, it ought to paſs for innocent. For he condemns only theſe who deſire the death of a man in a frolick, and without being tranſported by any intereſt.

There is no Murderer nor Parricide who may not very well fit unto himſelf this maxim, and who may not eaſily make uſe thereof to cover his crime and his paſſion. If you reproach him, that in the ſight of God he hath killed his Brother by the will and deſire he hath had to ſee him dead, he will tell you with this Jeſuit, that he had not deſired his death, but that he feared he would do him ſome miſchief: *non odio, ſed ad vitandum damnum*, not out of hatred, but to avoid damage; or becauſe he might hinder him from enjoying ſome good, *ob bonum inde ſecutum*. So almoſt all mortal hatreds, and all revenges ſhall be permitted, becauſe they do not ariſe commonly but from worldly intereſt

a *Conſident lectiones 24. Jeſuitæ ſeniores quidem, non ætate ſolum, ſed ſcientia, videlicet* Sanctius, Azorius, Tolctus, *&c.* Ibid. in principio.

b *Quolibet in materiâ inprimis authorum Societatis exhaurio medullam Confeſſariorum in examen exponendam.* Ibid. ad finem.

c *Ego ſolummodo memoro reſerationem factam ab Agno ſuis authoribus Jeſuitis, quorum ſcripta abſumere eurabo.* Ibid. ad finem.

d *Potes optare hoſti tibi alioqui valde nocituro mortem, non odio, ſed ad vitandum damnum tuum: item de morte ejus gaudere ob bonum inde ſecutum.* Emanuel Sa, verbo Charitas, n. 5. p. 46.

reſt of Ambition, Covetouſneſs, and Pleaſure; and it belongs only to Devils and Deſperadoes to deſire the death of men of pure malice, and without deſign of drawing therefrom any worldly advantage.

*Bauny* extends this maxim indifferently to all ſorts of perſons, and giveth the ſelf-ſame liberty to a Mother, who, according to him, may deſire the death of her Children. *One may*, ſaith he in the 6. Chapter of his Summe, p. 73. *deſire evil to befall his Neighbour without ſin, when he is urged thereunto by any good motive.* So *Bonacina* on the Firſt Commandment, *d.* 3. *q.* 4. *n.* 7. *exempts a Mother from all fault who deſired the death of her Daughters,* [a] *when ſhe could not diſpoſe of them in mariage according to her deſire, becauſe of their deformity and poverty; or becauſe for their ſakes ſhe was abuſed by her Husband, or injured. For ſhe did not properly deteſt her Daughters out of a diſpleaſure towards them, but in deteſtation of her own evil.*

a *Quando ob deformitatem aut inopiam nequeat juxta animi ſui deſiderium eas nuptui tradere; quia occaſione earum male ſecum agitur à marito, aut injuriis afficitur. Non enim proprie deteſtatur filias ex diſplicentia earum, ſed in deteſtationem proprii mali.*

He terms a lawfull motive to carry a Mother on to deſire the death of her Daughters, *the want of beauty*, for that they were not handſome, *ob deformitatem*, or becauſe they were not rich enough, *aut inopiam:* and becauſe ſhe could not marry them according to her deſire, that is, not after her ambition, or ſo advantagiouſly as ſhe would.

I leave it to the Reader to reflect upon this abominable maxim, and to draw conſequences from it. I wonder only that *Bauny* did not carry it yet farther, and ſaid not, that this Mother might procure the death of her Daughters, as well as deſire it, provided ſhe might do it without ſcandal. For this ſeems to be the neceſſary conſequence of his opinion; for ſhe may do that which ſhe may deſire; the things which are lawfull to be deſired cannot be other than good and lawfull. And indeed this is the Doctrine of the Society, and almoſt of all the Jeſuits, aſſerting and maintaining it in other matters, changing only the examples and not the maxime, as I ſhall ſhew when I come to ſpeak of Murder. I will here only report as it were by way of advance one paſſage of *Leſſius*, who aſſures us, [b] *That it is permitted to a man of Honour to kill an enemy, who with intent to affront him, attempts to give him a blow with a cudgel, or a box on the ear, if he cannot otherwiſe avoid this diſhonour.* And a little after, repeating the reaſon for which one may attempt the life of another, and deprive him thereof, he ſpeaks in this manner; [c] *The fourth caſe in which you may kill without ſin, is when by falſe reports attempt is made to decry you in the ſpirit of a Prince, a Judge, or other perſons of Honour, and that you cannot otherwiſe hinder this wrong they would do you in your reputation, than by killing him ſecretly, who is the author thereof.* P. Navarre n. 375. *inclines very much to agree, that it is lawfull to kill this Enemy.* Bannes *holds the ſame opinion the more probable,* q. 64. art. 7. d. 4. *And he addes, That we may affirm the ſame thing, though the crime whereof he accuſeth us were true, ſo it be ſecret.*

b *Dico ſecundo fas etiam eſt viro honorato occidere invaſorem, qui fuſtem vel alapam nititur impingere, ut ignominiam inferat, ſi aliter hæc ignominia vitari nequit.* Leſſius de juſt. & jure l. 2. c. 9. dub. 12. n. 77. p. 81.

c *Quartus modus eſt, ſi nomini meo falſis criminationibus apud Principem, Judicem, vel viros honoratos detrahere nitaris, nec ulla ratione poſſim illud damnum famæ avertere, niſi te occulte interficiam.* Petrus Navarrus n. 375. *inclinat licitum eſſe talem è medio tollere: eandem tanquam probabiliorem defendit* Bannes, q. 64. art. 7. d. 4. *addens idem dicendum etiamſi crimen ſit verum, ſi tamen eſt occultum.* Leſſius ibid. n. 81.

In this caſe, and theſe examples of *Bauny*, *Eſcobar*, *Sa*, and *Leſſius*, the three principal degrees of Hatred againſt our Neighbour may be remarked; the firſt is to have and entertain an ill will, and an irreconcilable averſion againſt him, ſo as not to be willing either to ſee or ſpeak with him any more; the ſecond is, to deſire his death; the third is, actually to kill him. And all this is lawfull, or it is no great ſinne, according to the Divinity of theſe Authors the Jeſuits.

After this that might be juſtly ſaid of thoſe who teach theſe pernicious maxims, as well as of thoſe that practiſe them upon their word, which our Saviour Chriſt ſaid of Tyrants; [d] *They kill the body, and after there is nothing that they can do;* if they did not proceed yet farther, and gave power to make ſouls periſh alſo as well as bodies, in permitting to kill him from whom we fear to receive any diſpleaſure, or any damage in reputation or temporal good, though we be aſſured that he ſhall be damned.

d *Occidunt corpus, & poſt hæc non habent amplius quid faciant.* Luc. c. 12. v. 4.

This is the opinion [a] of *Molina*, who ſaith, that this circumſtance ought not to hinder from killing him; and that there is no Law of Juſtice, noreven of charity it ſelf, which obligeth us to ſpare the eternal life of his ſoul, no more then that of his body. This is alſo the opinion [b] of *Amicus*, who, that he might better expreſſe his mind upon this caſe, propoſes an example of a man who had committed a mortal Sin, and afterwards was drunk, or fallen into madneſs: he aſſures us that if he aſſaile us in this eſtate, we ought not to make any difficulty to kill him, though we know aſſuredly that he is in mortal ſin, and by conſequence that he ſhall be damned.

a *Quod autem circumſtantia illa æterni interitus injuſti aggreſſoris non impediat, affirmat Cajet. 2. 2. q. 64. art. 7.* Molina de juſt. commut. tr. 3. d. 13. n. 1. p. 1762. *Tunc lege charitatis non eſt neceſſe præponere vitam illius ſpiritalem noſtræ propriæ corporali, imò vero neque noſtro honori, aut bonis noſtris externis quæ ille injuſtè velit à nobis auferre.* b *Quid ſi invaſor ſit ebrius vel amens ad tempus, quem ante amentiam mihi certo conſtet fuiſſe in peccato mortali, & cum eo in amentiam incidiſſe? Reſpondeo ex Silvio eodem art. 7. q. 3. adhuc in ejuſdem amentia licitè poſſe invaſum contra invaſorem ſuæ vitæ cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ, uſque ad necem invadentis ſe defendere.* Amicus tom. 5. de juſt. & jure. d. 36. ſect. 5. n. 85. p. 408.

This is alſo the Doctrine of the four and twenty Elders of the Society, or rather it is the opinion of all the Society reported by *Eſcobar*, who hath placed this deciſion amongſt the Oracles which the Lamb hath pronounced by the mouth, and written by the pen of the Jeſuits, whom he hath choſen to be his interpreters: [c] *We may kill*, ſaith Eſcobar, *all thoſe that do us wrong, as thoſe that rob by night or by day, and all other ſorts of perſons, who offend us, though we be aſſured that they ſhall be damned*, dying in this eſtate.

c *Malefactores poſſunt occidi, nocturni, diurni fures, & alii quicumque malefactores, etiam certo damnandi,* De Eſcobar tr. 1. exam. 7. c. 2. pag. 1154. ſect. 1. num. 21.

Obſerve theſe words, *quicumque malefactores, whatſoever offenders or malefactors.* Whence it follows, that though this aſſailant were our friend, or our kinſman, it were permitted to kill him though he ſhould be damned. Yea, even a Monk might kill his Superiour, and a Son his Father in a like caſe. For that is the ſenſe of theſe words, *quicumque malefactores poſſunt occidi; any malefactors whatſoever may be killed.* And although this explication of it ſelf be clear and natural enough, yet for fear it ſhould trouble any one, and appear ſuſpected becauſe of the ſtrange exceſſe which it contains, *Amicus* hath made a particular concluſion of it, and declares in formal terms, that this liberty of killing any one whoſoever it be that is ill-affected towards us, or any thing that belongs to us, is a right which ſuffers no limitation or exception whatſoever. [d] *This right*, ſaith he, *of thus defending ones life doth not appertain only to one private man againſt another private man, but to a private man againſt a publique perſon, to a Subject againſt his Superiour, and to a Son againſt his Father, to a Father againſt his Son, to an Eccleſiaſtique or Monk againſt a Secular, and to a Secular againſt an Eccleſiaſtique or a Monk, without incurring any irregularity therefore.*

d *Hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non ſolum habet privata perſona contra privatas, ſed etiam privata contra publicam, ſubditus contra Superiorem, filius contra patrem, parens contra filium, Clericus aut Religioſus contra ſecularem, & contra, abſque ulla irregularitatis contractione.* Amicus de juſt. & jure diſp. 36. ſect. 5. n. 76. p. 407.

It is true that this Jeſuit ſeems not here to give power to kill a Father, Mother, Superiour, and any one whoſoever, but onely to defend ones life againſt their enterprizes and wicked deſigns; but he expounds himſelf more clearly afterwards, ſpeaking of honour and goods, for defence whereof he gives liberty indifferently to kill all ſorts of perſons, as well as for the defence of ones life. [e] *The Authors of whom I have already ſpoken*, ſaith he, *are all agreed in this point, that to defend our ſelves from ſome affront that would be put upon us, it is permitted to prevent the aggreſſour by killing him: as well as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjuſtly of our life, or of any member, we may kill him before he be able to execute his miſchievous deſign.*

e *Conveniunt ſupradicti fas eſſe ad propulſandam ignominiam, quam mihi aliquis inferre conatur, illum præveniens occidere; ſicut fas eſt ad declinandam mortem quam mihi injuſtus invaſor molitur, illum occidere antequam mihi mortem vel mutilationem inferat.* Ibid. ſect. 7. n. 106. p. 410.

It is not needful, according to this Author, to ſtay untill your Father or Maſter ſmites you, maims you, or makes you loſe your honour. For if he attempt onely to do it, and you know his evil deſign, he permits you to prevent and kill him: *Potes illum*

a *Sicut mihi licet pro tutela vitæ meæ & honoris, ita & pro bonorum meorum quæ ad vitam, vitaque ſtatum & honorem conſervandum neceſſaria ſunt, aggreſſorem, ſi alia via illa defendere non poſſum, interimere.* Ibid. ſect. 8. n. 127. p. 413.

*illum præveniendo occidere.* And a little after ſpeaking concerning goods. [a] *As I may,* ſaith he, *ſlay him who aſſaults me in the defence of my life and my honour, ſo is it also lawful for me to do the ſame for defence of my goods, which are neceſſary for the preſervation of my life, my eſtate, and my honour, if I cannot preſerve them otherwiſe.*

But if this crime appear too horrible to be undertaken upon the word of this Caſuiſt, I will make it appear in that which follow in this work, that his opinion is the common ſenſe of the Society. In the mean while this charitable man and lover of the peace of conſciences, to remove from them all ſcruple about this point, makes no difficulty to teſtifie that he is ready incaſe of neceſſity to do the ſame himſelf firſt of all which he advizeth unto others. [b] *It is lawful for me,* ſaith he, *as well as any other whoſoever he be, for the defence of my life and my honour, &c. to kill any one without exception whoſoever aſſails me.*

b *Licet mihi pro tutela vitæ meæ & honoris, &c. aggreſſorem interimere, &c.*

So that a Monk himſelf ought not to make any difficulty upon this point, unleſs he will be ſo preſumptuous as to think himſelf a man of better abilities or more honeſt than a Jeſuit, who aſſures him that he is permitted to kill all thoſe in general who would attempt any thing againſt his honour, againſt his eſtate, or againſt that of his Society. For he doth not attribute this unto his Company as a particular priviledge; but he aſſures us that it is a common right to all the Religions of what Order or reformation ſoever they be. [c] *It ſhall be lawful,* ſaith he, *for an Eccleſiaſtique or a Monk to kill a ſlanderer who threatens to produce great crimes againſt him, or againſt his Order of Religion, if he have no other way to defend them there-from; as indeed it ſeems that he hath no other, when the ſlanderer is ready to reproach him, or his Order of Religion with thoſe crimes publiquely, or before ſome perſon of great Authority, if he be not ſlain before.* To kill ſuch a man it is not needful to ſtay till he attempts, it is enough that he be ready to produce the crimes, *ſi calumniator ſit paratus, &c.* it is enough that he threatens to defame and to ſpeak much evil, *gravia crimina ſpargere minantem.* And to aſſure the Monks yet more in an enterpriſe of this conſequence, theſe Divines declare that herein they do not onely nothing againſt Juſtice; but alſo that it may ſo happen that Juſtice it ſelf, charity and the affection which they owe unto themſelves and their Society may oblige them to uſe this remedy ſo ſweet and ſo charitable. It is *Amicus* who urges this diſcourſe alſo for the reſt. [d] *The Eccleſiaſtiques and Monks may alſo defend their honours, even at the coſt of their lives who attempt to deprive them thereof, provided they paſſe no farther then to what is ſimply neceſſary to defend themſelves; and they may be even obliged, at leaſt by the Law of Charity, thus to maintain their reputation, if your Infamy ſhould redound to the diſgrace of their whole Order.*

c *Licebit Clerico vel Religioſo calumniatorem gravia crimina de ſe vel de ſua Religione ſpargere minantem occidere, quando alius defendendi modus non ſuppetit, uti non ſuppetere videtur ſi calumniator ſit paratus ea vel ipſi Religioſo, vel ejus Religioni publice & coram graviſſimis viris impingere, niſi occidatur.* Amicus ibid. ſect. 7. n. 118. p. 544.

d *Hunc honorem poterunt Clerici ac Religioſi cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ, etiam cum morte invaſoris defendere. Quin etiam interdum, lege ſaltem charitatis, videntur ad illum defendendum teneri, ſi ex violatione propriæ famæ integra Religio infamaretur.* Amicus ibid.

This is a very ſtrange charity, ſince it hath the effects of the moſt violent hatred: and rather it is a moſt monſtrous hatred which brings one to kill in cold blood, and to take away life in charity from him, for whom he ought to lay down his own, ſince our Saviour hath ſaid, that charity obliges us to lay down our life for our friends; and that it requires us not onely to love our friends, but our nenemies alſo, and thoſe who wiſh or do us hurt.

There remains now, as it ſeems, onely one difficulty in this important ſubject, which is, that poſſibly every one knows not how to kill men; and have not hearts hard enough to embrue their hands in the blood of a Superiour, or of a Father in ſuch caſes, in which the Jeſuit aſſures him that in conſcience he may do it. But he himſelf and his companions furniſh him with many very eaſie expedients to be rid of them as by ambuſhes, and by other ſecret and ſure ways, which may be learnt of them when I come to rehearſe more largely their opinions upon the Commandment of God which forbids murder.

## Article II. Of Pride.

*That the Jesuits countenance Pride and Vanity in all sorts of persons, even in the most Holy actions: and that according to their Divinity it is almost impossible to sin mortally by pride or vanity.*

I Take Pride in this place generally, containing under this name ambition, vanity, boasting, presumption, and all lust and desire of honour, glory and esteem amongst men.

Ambition is the vice of the Great ones, and of the Nobility; and one of the subjects, in which it doth most appear, and in which the effects and consequences of it are most deplorable, especially in *France*, are Duels.

Although *Fillintius* dare not absolutely authorize these unhappy combats which are made for an imaginary point of honour, yet he proposes an opinion which maintains them as probable. [a] *It is demanded*, saith this Casuist, *what is to be said of the fourth pretence which they make for those who fight duels, saying that it is to defend their honour? I answer, that the opinion which assures us that this reason is sufficient, may passe for probable.* He makes this opinion so probable by the reasons wherewith he strengthens it, and which we may elsewhere deduce from other places of his book, that the contrary opinion which he teaches afterwards, as the more true, appears much less probable in his writtings.

*Escobar* who writ after *Fillintius* is bolder than he, because he is authorized by his Society. He answers absolutely and clearly to this question: For after he had demanded [b] *whether a Gentleman might accept a Challenge to defend his Nobility?* he saith, *he may, if, in refusing the Combat, he run the hazard of losing his honour, or Office.* He may even, according to this Divinity, challenge him that attempt any thing upon his honour, as well as against his life, and even against his goods, as I shall make it appear by the testimony of this Jesuit, and many others of his Society, when I shall handle the matter of Duels, in expounding the duties of the Nobility, and the vices which are common amongst them.

If Ambition be the vice of persons of honour, who live after the Laws of the World, vanity is that of Women, and they give themselves thereto especially in what concerns their beautie. For those who are not fair, do whatthey can to appear so; and those who are, do endeavour to appear yet more so, and they make use of all sorts of artifices and disguises for this end. *Emanuel Sa* justifies the first sort, and renders the sin of the other slight. [c] *A Woman*, saith he, *may dresse her self to hide her deformity; and if she do this through vanity to cause her self to appear fair when she is not, it is no mortal Sin.*

*Escobar* speaks yet more clearly and more resolutely: [d] *When a Woman adorns her self without any wicked design, by a natural inclination which she hath unto pride, it is but a venial sin, and sometimes it is no sin at all.* He troubles not himself as others do to palliate and excuse the vanity of women, the luxurie of their habits, and the too much care and art which they use to dresse themselves upon divers pretences, as their quality, the custom, the desire to please their Husbands: he absolutely justifies the natural passion which they have unto pride and vanity, as a thing which in it self is not ill, and which cannot passe, according to the Laws of Divinity for an evil end. And if there be found some, whose consciences are somewhat scrupulous, who make difficulty to follow so strange a Doctrine, he can easily accommodate himself to their humour, by assuring them that if it be any sin, it can be at most but a venial one: *Veniale tantum erit, aut aliquando nullum. It will be onely a venial one, or sometimes none at all.*

*Emanuel Sa* gives the same licence to Nuns. For having before said generally, [e] *that a woman may adorn her self to hide her deformity: and if she do this of vanity, to cause her self to appear fair when she is not, there is in that no mortal sin*; he adds, *that this*

a *Quid juris de quarta causa, ob honoris defensionem? Respondeo, & dico videri posse probabilem opinionem id affirmantem.* Filliutius tom. 2. mor. q. tract. 29. c. 8. n. 145. p. 294.

b *Potestne quis vir nobilis acceptare duellum in nobilitatis defensionem? Potest si ex illius recusatione honorem aut munia publica esset amissurus.* De Escobar tr. 1. Exam. 7. n. 96, 97, 98. p. 134. sect. 12.

c *Ornari potest fœmina ad tegendam turpitudinem: quod si fiat ob vanitatem, ad fingendam pulchritudinem, mortale non est.* Sa verb. orn. n. 1. p. 384.

d *Ornatus corporis si fiat non malo fine, sed ob naturalem fastus inclinationem, veniale tantum erit, aut aliquando nullum.* De Escobar tract 1. Exam. 8. n. 5. p. 139.

e *Ornari potest fœmina ad tegendam turpitudinem: quod si fiat ob vanitatem ad fingendam pulchritudinem, mortale non est, etiam in Religiosa, si moderate se ornet.* Sa verb. orn. n. 1. p. 381.

*true even in reference to a Nun, provided always that she dresse her self with moderation.* That is to say, as he expounds himself afterwards, provided that she imploy not for adorning her self, and to make her seem fair, that which is necessary for her Nuns maintenance, if she be their Superiour, or that which is appointed for the alms whereunto they are obliged. For in this case alone he should be troubled to excuse her from mortal sin. [a] *It is true,* saith he, *that if she imploy that which she is obliged to give unto the poor, she sins therein mortally.*

But when she gives occasion of sin to some who see her adorned in that sort, doth she offend mortally or not? This Jesuite thinks that they who would make her responsible for this crime, would be too severe, and he loves rather to conclude with others more favourable and more complacent, who discharge her from mortal sin. [b] *But if any one,* saith he, *take from thence an occasion to offend God mortally, there are some who say that in this case the Nun sins mortally, but others have more reason to deny it.*

a *Illud verum si in eo expendatur quod esset necessario dandum pauperibus, peccari mortaliter.* Ibid.

b *Quod si quis alius sumat inde occasionem peccandi mortaliter; tunc mortalle esse quidam aiunt: Sed melius alii negant.* Ibid.

*Sanchez* in this point accords with *Emanuel Sa.* For proposing this question: [c] *Whether a Woman who presents her self to the view of a Man whom she knows to love her dishonestly, do commit a sin of scandal which is mortal?* After he hath reported the common opinion of the Casuists in these terms: [d] *The Doctors commonly answer, yea, when she doth it without any necessity, and when she courses about without discretion onely for her pleasure.* Afterwards he relates the opinion of some persons, who exempt this woman from mortal sin. [e] *Yet there are others who hold that this woman doth not sin mortally.* And after he hath deduced their reasons, or rather those which he invented himself for to justifie this vitious liberty, he concludes in this manner: [f] *And therefore although I believe that the first opinion is probable, yet nevertheless I believe the second is the truer, and therefore that this reason is not sufficient to conclude that a woman is obliged to deprive her self of the liberty of standing at a door or a window, or to walk forth into the Town.*

c *An fœmina conspectui viri se offerens, à quo se turpiter amari novit, peccet mortaliter peccato scandali?* Sanchez op. mor. lib. 1. c. 6. n. 16. p. 19.

d *Communiter Doctores eam peccare mortaliter censent, quando nulla necessitate ducitur, sed ut suæ voluptati satisfaciat, indifferenter hac & illac discurrit.* Ibid. e *Alii tamen placet hanc non peccare mortaliter.* Ibid. f *Et ideo quamvis primam opinionem probabilem credam, ex istima, &c.*

His principal reason is, because this woman *doth nothing* in this, *but make use of her right and of her liberty*: and that if one would constrain this woman, as some do, whom he terms scrupulous, to deprive her self of the pleasure which she takes in walking abroad, and going out to be seen when she pleases, although she have no occasion; *quando nulla necessitate ducitur, sed ut voluptati satisfaciat*, this would give her too much trouble, and she should be too much disquieted, if she were obliged to consider when she had reason to go out, and when she had not. And therefore she ought not to torment her own spirit, nor trouble her self about that which may befall her, being it is lawful for her [g] *to make use of her right and of her liberty, which she cannot be deprived of, without making way for a thousand scruples, which would come into her minde whensoever she had a desire to go abroad, for to understand whether she had any necessity for it or not.* So that to take away these scruples, he would have the reins let loose to passions and other disorders. But this Divinity, doth not accord with that of our Lord, who saith in the Gospel, that it were better one were cast into the Sea with a Mill-stone fastened about ones neck, than to offend the meanest of men; and who commands expressely to pull out the eye, and to cut off the foot and the hand, rather than to suffer them to be causes of offence.

g *Jure suo & libertate sibi concessa utitur, nec ea commode privari potest quin mille scrupuli aditus pateat circa egressum è domo, necessarius sit, nec ne.* Ibid.

After they have thus authorized a-part amongst men and women these two vices of ambition and vanity, they authorize them jointly amongst Ecclesiastiques and persons consecrated unto God. I have already touched something of Ambition in the precedent Treatise, and I have showed how the Jesuits give unto the Ecclesiatiques and the Religious, Monks and Nuns, the same licence which they give to the Seculars, to preserve their worldly honour by all sorts of effectual ways, and even to prevent and kill, if need be, those who would deprive them thereof. Therefore I will not touch this point here, of which I must also speak elsewhere. I will onely relate some passages of their Casuists: to make it appear that they justifie

vanity amongſt the Eccleſiaſtiques, and that they do introduce it into the moſt high and holy functions of their miniſtry.

See how *Emanuel Sa* ſpeaks in this buſineſſe. [a] *There are that ſay that it is mortall ſin to ſay a Maſſe, or to Preach principally for vain glory; and others ſay the contrary.* Mindes being divided in this point, the one and the other opinion are at leaſt probable, and by conſequence one may follow which likes his conſcience beſt, according to the conſtant maxime of the Jeſuites School.

a *Vana gloriæ cauſa præcipue prædicare, Miſſam celebrare, peccatum eſſe mortale quidam aiunt, quidam negant.* Sa, verb. vana gloria, num. 2. pag. 485.

210 He ſaith elſewhere ſimply that there are ſome who at leaſt do excuſe this action from mortal ſin, without ſaying that there are any that condemn it. [b] *Some Caſuiſts*, ſaith he, *hold that it is a mortal ſin to Preach without allowance; others ſay that it is not to Preach Principally for the glory of this world or for money.*

b *Mortale quidam cenſent prædicare ſine legitima licentia, &c. non eſſe autem ſi quis ob gloriam aut pecuniam principaliter prædicet, aiunt nonnulli.* Sa verb. prædicare. n. 4. p. 405.

*Eſcobar* ſpeaks more confidently, and ſaith that by his advice, which is that of the Society, there is not in this any appearance of mortal ſin. [c] *I am aſſured*, ſaith he, *that it is no great crime to relate a fable in a Sermon or relation, which one hath invented; and if it be done to excite the ſpirits of the Auditors to hear with more devotion, it is no ſin at all; but I maintain it, that one may without mortal ſin Preach out of vanity, or for money, although one ſhould regard vanity or money as the principal ends.*

c *Scio non eſſe grave crimen fabellam recitare, imo ſi id ſit animo excitandi auditores ad pie audiendum, nullum peccatum eſt. Porro prædicare quem principaliter ob gloriam aut pecuniam, mortale non eſſe affirmo.* Eſcobar tract. 6. Exam. 7. n. 132. pag. 769.

*Sanchez* ſaith the ſame thing, and taking it yet higher, he expounds it alſo with advantage in this manner: [d] *To do the moſt ſacred actions out of vanity, as to adminiſter all the Sacraments, or to receive them, or to celebrate the Holy Maſſe for vain glory, can be but a venial ſin, though vain glory be propoſed as the principal end.* They are not content to excuſe as much as may be the vanity of the Clergy and the Friers, but they pretend alſo that they may make it their principal end in the moſt Holy and Divine Functions of Religion, without committing any great fault. *To*
220 *Preach*, ſay they, *or ſay Maſſe principally for vain glory, is no more then a venial ſin.* But to Preach, and to ſay Maſſe principally for the glory of this World, is to ſacrifice the Body of Jeſus Chriſt to vanity, to the World, and to the Devil, who is the Prince of the World and the Father of pride and vanity; and this is no great matter according to the Divinity of the Jeſuites; this is at moſt but a venial ſin; *non excedit culpam venialem.*

d *Res quantumvis ſacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia miniſtrare vel recipere, Sacrum celebrare, non excedit culpam venialem.* Sanch. l. 1. oper. Mor. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9.

*Sanchez* diſcovers in a few words the foundation of this Doctrine, eſtabliſhing for his firſt concluſion, that [e] *if boaſting and vain glory have for its object any good, it is onely a venial ſin*: That is to ſay, that one may vaunt and glory as much as one will of things which are good in themſelves and advantagious, without committing a great ſin.

e *Si jactantia & vana gloria de aliquo bono ſit, eſt ſola culpa venialis.* Sanch. loco citato.

*Eſcobar* flies higher than *Sanchez*. For he doth not onely free them from mortall ſin who glory in the good qualities which they have, or which they think they have, but thoſe alſo who would make men believe that they have ſuch as they have not, and who go about to eſtabliſh their honour and reputation amongſt men by a falſe appearance of Sanctity which they affect and counterfeit on this deſign. For after he hath given this definition of hypocriſie: [f] *It is a manifeſtation of ones proper excellency by fained and deceitful actions*, he adds, *This is always a ſin, becauſe a lye is alway prejudicial; and this ſin is mortal, when one would be wicked within, and appear good without: but it is onely a venial ſin, if one do onely ſomething before men to appear Holy.*

f *Hypocriſis eſt manifeſtatio propriæ excellentiæ per facta ficta, & falſa. Porro hypocriſis ſemper eſt peccatum, quia mendacium ſemper perniciosum eſt; mortale quidem erit ſi intus vult eſſe malus, & foris tantum bonus apparere: veniale autem ſi aliqua præſtet exterius ut ſanctius appareat.* Eſcobar tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 11. p. 291.

He proceeds yet farther, and ſaith in the ſame place n. 9. that one may without fear of mortal ſin boaſt of evil, and glory in the greateſt crimes of the World, whether one have or indeed have not committed them. [a] *When,* ſaith he, *a man boaſteth himſelf to have committed ſome enormous crime, provided that he doth this without ſcandal, and without compleaſance in this action true or fained, and without deſire to commit it, it is but a venial ſin.* That is to ſay, that if a man onely vaunt himſelf of a crime, it is but a light fault, and that he ought onely to take heed to avoid ſcandal; *modo non adſit ſcandali occaſio.* So that if a man who doth glory in the moſt enormous crimes, have but onely the diſcretion not to ſpeak thereof before perſons who may thereby be ſcandalized, he may vaunt thereof freely before debauched people, who will onely laugh and take pleaſure thereat. 230

He ſpeaks in the ſame ſame manner of novelties, and of thoſe who invent new faſhions and new opinions, that they may as well content their own curioſity and vanity, as that of others, whom he alſo exempts from mortal ſin. For having propoſed this queſtion: [b] *What is it that is called invention of novelties?* He anſwers, *It is a demonſtration of ones own excellence by certain actions, as in inventing new opinions or new ſorts of Garments. This invention of novelties is of it ſelf but a venial ſin,* 140 *if there occur no other circumſtance which may render it more criminal. His reaſon is: Becauſe commonly the Authors of theſe novelties do look after nothing but the eſtimation and praiſes of the World.* Provided then that a man ſet his ſoul and heart onely on the deſire of worldly honour and glory, this deſire is either not evil at all, or it is but a ſmall fault according to theſe Divines; and what ever one doth or ſaith for this end well or ill, with truth or falſehood, he ſhall not loſe the grace of God, nor fall ſhort of Salvation.

a *Porro eum quis ſe jactat flagitium grave feciſſe, ſi non adſit ſcandali occaſio, aut facti vel confictî operis non admiſceatur complacentia, vel faciendi voluntas, veniale eſt.* Ibid. n. 9. p. 291.

b *Quidnam inventio novitatum? Eſt manifeſtatio propriæ excellentiæ per facta quædam, puta novas opiniones, novas veſtes exponere. Quæ quidem inventio niſi aliunde gravius vitietur, ex ſe venialis tantùm culpæ eſt: quia communiter ejuſmodi inventione quis ſolummodo geſtit aliorum laudem comparare.* Eſcobar, ibid. n. 10.

If this be no heynous fault, to boaſt himſelf, even of crimes, to invent novel opinions, to counterfeit actions of piety and vertue, to gain honour in the world, it muſt needs be that neither is it a great fault to deſire honour even with a deſire irregular and vitious. For this cauſe *Eſcobar* concludes well, according to his own principles, in that place, where after he hath given us this definition of that haughtineſſe of mind, which they commonly call Pride: [c] *Pride is no other thing then an irregular deſire of ones own greatneſs*: he makes this queſtion: [d] *When is it that this deſire doth notably hurt conſcience?* And he anſwers: *When it is joyned with contempt of God.* And that he may leave no doubt nor difficulty in this ſo nice a point, he adds alſo by way of demand: [e] *Expreſſe your ſelf, that we may know when this contempt is contained in Pride.* And as if he had a deſign to ſatisfie the deſire, or rather the paſſion of the ambitious, and ſettle their conſciences in quiet, he declares that there is no contempt of God, and by conſequence no mortal ſin, in the moſt vehement paſſion that a man can have for his own excellence, and for worldly glory, except onely in theſe caſes. 150

c *Superbia eſt appetitus propriæ celſitudinis perverſè voluntarius.* Eſcobar Tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 4. p. 290.

d *Quandonam appetitus ille graviter vulnerat conſcientiam? Quando cum Dei contemptu copulatur.* Ibid. n. 5.

e *Exprime quandonam ſuperbia tum Dei contemptu admiſceatur.* Ibid. n. 6.

f *Quando quis à Deo habet, à ſeipſo habere exiſtimat.*

*Aut vult ab aliis tanquam à ſeipſo bona haberi exiſtimari.*

*Aut vellet à ſeipſo & non à Deo bona ſua poſſidere.*

*First, When he thinks to have of himſelf that which he receives from God.*

*Secondly, When he would have others think that he hath thoſe good things from himſelf.*

*Thirdly, When he deſires to have them from himſelf, and not from God.*

*Fourthly, When he is ſorry that he hath received them from God, and not from himſelf.*

*Fifthly, When one believes indeed that he hath received from God all that he hath, but he thinks that he holds them not by his mere grace, but that he owes them to him of juſtice, and becauſe of his Faſts, Alms, and other good works, which he hath done.*

*Aut dolet quod hujuſmodi bona à Deo, & non à ſeipſo receperit.*

*Aut cum quis exiſtimat quidem ſe bona habere à Deo, ſed non gratis ei obvenîſſe, verum ex juſtitia ſibi debita propter jejunia, eleemoſynas, &c.* Eſcobar ibid. n. 6. p. 290.

And a little after n. 9. ſumming up all the marks, and all the effects of contempt of God, which alone according to his opinion makes a mortal ſin of Pride, and contracting them together into one point alone which contains all the reſt, he concludes in theſe words: [a] *If Pride doth notably wrong the honour of God, or the reputation of ones Neighbours, it may be mortal ſin, or at leaſt it comes near thereto, ad mortalem accederet.*

a *Tunc autem ad mortalem accederet, quando graviter aut Dei reverentia laederetur, aut proximi fama.* Ibid. n. 9.

He will not abſolutely avow that this great irreverence againſt God is mortal ſin, but onely that it may be, and that it approacheth thereto: and nevertheleſs explicating what it is that he underſtands by this great irreverence againſt God, he adds immediately after: [b] *That the honour of God is greatly injured by Pride, when a man is ſo fooliſh as to ſay like the King of* Tyrus: *I am a God.*

b *Fit equidem cum gravi Dei irreverentia, cum in modum Regis Tyri dixerit ſatuus: Ego ſum Deus.* Ibid. n. 9.

So that to offend God mortally in matter of Pride, according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits, it is required that this paſſion be ſo ſtrange, that it carry a man to the utmoſt extravagance, and make him loſe all ſenſe and reaſon.

And moreover they hold not this exceſſe of Pride, which tranſports a man ſo far as to put himſelf in the place of God, to be always mortal ſin; but onely that it may be, and that it comes nigh unto it, *accederet ad mortale*: of which it ſeems that he could not alledge any better reaſon, then to ſay that an imagination ſo fooliſh could never come into any but a ſpirit altogether perverted, and almoſt incapable of ſin as well as reaſon. So that to ſpeak properly, according to theſe Doctors, it will be true that a man who hath his judgement ſound, can never offend God mortally by Pride, in what manner ſoever his heart be puſt up and elevated.

## ARTICLE III. Of Fleſhly pleaſure, and diſhoneſty.

First. WE will ſpeak in this Article, firſt of diſhoneſt Diſcourſes, Looks, and Touches. Secondly, Of Panders, and maintainers of debauched Women, and the ſervices which the one and the other may do them. Thirdly, Of diſhoneſt thoughts and deſires, of fornication and Adultery, and other like actions, and of pleaſure one may take therein according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits. And as for this ſubject, we will divide this Article into three Points.

### I. POINT.

### *Of diſhoneſt Diſcourſes, Looks, and Touches.*

AS the ſpring and ſeat of all carnal impurity is in the pleaſure of the ſenſes, ſo all other ſenſes and all other pleaſures ſerve that of the touch, and are related unto it as their end, and that wherein impurity is attained and finiſhed, becauſe it is the moſt material and baſe of all the ſenſes. This is the reaſon that the Divinity of the Jeſuits, which is all methodical, obſerves well to keep the order of the means, and the end in this matter; it gives all ſorts of liberty to the ſenſes, and juſtifies in a manner all ſorts of pleaſure which it can taſte, as if they had a deſign to excuſe or to diminiſh with all their power the crime which is committed, with the loweſt and moſt infamous pleaſure of the fleſh.

*Filliutius* after he had ſaid that diſhoneſt words, though they repreſent the moſt filthy actions and matters, are of themſelves indifferent, he eſtabliſheth this for a concluſion, that [c] *diſcourſes even of filthy things, though they proceed from curioſity and levity, do not go beyond a venial ſin.*

c *Dico 2. loquitionem eorundem factam ex levitate & curioſitate quadam, non excedere peccatum veniale.* Filliutius tom. 2. mor. tract. c. 10. n. 227. p. 325.

He ſaith moreover that when one adds unto the pleaſure of curioſity, that which may be taken from diſcourſing, even of filthy things, and from expreſſing the moſt diſhoneſt actions that are, this exceeds not a venial ſin. [d] *To ſpeak*, ſaith he, *of*

d *Si locutio ſit de rebus turpibus, ſolum ob voluptatem quæ præciſe oritur ex ipſa narratione, abſque ulteriore intentione ipſarum rerum, ſic non excedit culpam venialem.* Ibid. n. 209.

*filthy things, for the pleaſure that is taken in thoſe diſcourſes, without having a deſign to paſſe on to diſhoneſt actions, is but a venial Sin.*

He is no leſſe indulgent to thoſe that hear theſe filthy diſcourſes, then to thoſe who utter them: [a] *You will ask,* ſaith he alſo, *what we ought to think of thoſe that hear theſe filthy diſcourſes? I anſwer as before, that it is in it ſelf an indifferent thing; and that if it be done through curioſity or lightneſs, it is but a venial Sin.*

a *Quæres de auditione rerum turpium? Reſpondeo eodem modo ex ſe eſſe rem indifferentem, ſi audiantur ex levitate quadam & curioſitate vana, non excedit peccatum veniale.* Ibid. n. 212.

He is not more rigourous in condemning thoſe who take pleaſure in reading filthy books, concluding by his principles, [b] *That the ſame thing is to be ſaid of thoſe who read filthy books, and which have diſhoneſt loves for their principal ſubject. For to read theſe books ſimply of curioſity, and for the pleaſure they take to conſider the art, and ſtrange encounters of the diſcourſes which they contain, is but a venial Sin.*

b *Ex his infertur, idem dicendum de legentibus libros turpes & tractantes ex profeſſo de obſcœnis amoribus. Ob ſolam enim curioſitatem & delectationem quodam modo ſpeculativam ex artificio & miro modo rerum ſic narraturum, non excedit veniale.* Ibid. n. 213.

He gives the ſame liberty to the ſight as to the hearing, to ſatiate it ſelf with filthy things, without ſinning otherwiſe then venially: [c] *The beholding of filthy things for natural & ſenſual delight onely, without deſign, and without danger of paſſing on to the pleaſure of the fleſhly act, ſeems to me to be onely a venial ſin.* And a little after proceeding in the ſame matter, he ſaith that his apprehenſion is, [d] *That one may without any Sin behold all the parts of his own or anothers body, which are commonly uncovered, without indecency in the converſe of the world, as the Arms, Boſom, and the Leggs.* 290

c *Aſpectus rerum turpium ob delectationem naturalem & ſenſitivam tantùm, ſublato periculo transeundi ad delectationem veneream, non videtur excedere culpam venialem,* Ibid. n. 215. d *Partes quacumque corporis propriæ vel alienæ, quæ communiter & honeſtè in humano convictu oſtendi ſolent, ut brachia, pectus, crura, abſque peccato ullo aſpici poſſunt.* Ibid. n. 217.

He declares that it is ordinarily lawful to go with the Breaſt open, and to walk in company with the arms and *legs uncovered.* And he adds thereupon that [e] *when one bathes, whether privately or in the River, for any neceſſity or benefit, or even for any convenience or pleaſure, which ſerve for health, one may behold all his own or anothers body naked without any Sin,* as he ſaid before, *provided that they hide their ſhame.*

e *Totum etiam corpus coopertis pudendis in balneo vel flumine ſi neceſſitas vel utilitas aliqua, vel etiam commoditas vel delectatio ob ſanitatem intercedat, abſque ullo peccato aſpici poteſt.* Ibid.

After ſo many motives and pretences of neceſſity, profit, convenience, pleaſure, or health, for which he gives full liberty to behold ones own or anothers body naked, he condemns in this reſpect curioſity alone; [f] but yet with ſo great indulgence, that he holds it onely for a venial ſin. And becauſe vice, unto what exceſſe ſoever it may arrive, cannot take away that natural confuſion, which falls on a man and woman in beholding one another all naked; to the intent he might remove from them this ſhame, if he could, which elſe might hinder them from contenting their curioſity, and to take this ſhameful pleaſure which he permits them when occaſion preſents it ſelf, he lays down for his ſecond concluſion; [g] *that one may behold the naked bodies of perſons of different ſexes of more curioſity without mortal Sin, provided that one behold them at a diſtance and for a ſhort time, in ſuch manner that place be not given to ſome notable emotion.*

f *Ex ſola curioſitate non excedit culpam venialem.*

g *Perſonæ diverſi ſexus nudæ è remoto loco brevisſimo tempore, ita ut non detur occaſio notabilis emotionis, ob ſolam curioſitatem aſpici poſſunt.* Ibid. n 218.

But a little after he overturns theſe clauſes and theſe reſtrictions, ſpeaking in this manner of perſons of different ſexe: [h] *I believe that they cannot be beheld nearhand and for a long time, without mortal Sin, conſidering theſe things practically, and as* 300

h *E loco proximo longiori tempore communiter & regulariter loquendo ob probabile periculum in praxi, cenſeo abſque mortali fieri eas non poſſe, quidquid ſpeculativè alii excuſent à mortali; qua in re quiſque ſatisfaciat ſuæ conſcientiæ. Ipſe enim aſpectus damnatur tantùm quia periculoſus moraliter.* Ibid. n. 218.

*they ordinarily happen, by reaſon of the danger to which ſuch would probably be expoſed, notwithſtanding, there are others who conſidering this caſe onely in general, and in the theorie, exempt them from mortal Sin. In this every one ought to follow the judgement of his own conſcience. For this beholding cannot be condemned but becauſe it is commonly dangerous.*

That is to ſay, that although his own opinion be favourable enough to corrupt paſſions, yet notwithſtanding the contrary opinion, which is yet more favorable, is alſo probable at the leaſt, conſidered in it ſelf and in general, without particular circumſtances, which may make it evil; and that it may be defended in diſpute and in diſcourſe, and which indeed ſome do defend, and conſequently may be followed without ſin, according to that maxime and reaſoning which is common with this ſort of people. This is the reaſon why this Jeſuit complying therewith, as he that knows not what it is to torment any perſon, after he had ſimply ſpoken his own thought, leaves every one to his own conſcience; *quâ in re quiſque ſatisfaciat ſuæ conſcientiæ*: Thereby teſtifying that he treats of a thing which cannot be abſolutely condemned.

And that he might yet give more aſſurance to carnal curioſity and concupiſcence, he attempts to cover it with this reaſon: [a] *Looking is not blamed, but that it is ordinarily dangerous.*

*Eſcobar* hath recollected and couched in a few words all that which *Fillintius* hath written upon this point. For he ſaith generally, that [b] *to ſpeak of diſhoneſt things, is a thing indifferent in it ſelf.* And a little after: *ſpeaking out of more curioſity and lightneſſe, taking away the danger, or other evil end, is but a venial Sin.* And in the end he concludes, *that to talk thereof for the pleaſure we take or receive by the diſcourſe of ſuch things, can be but a veniall Sin.*

a *Ipſe enim aſpectus damnatur tantùm quia periculoſus moraliter.*

b *Locutio rerum turpium ex ſe res indifferens eſt ..... ob curioſitatem tantum vel levitatem, ſublato pericula, aut alio malo fine, veniale peccatum eſt; ob delectationem vero ex narratione non excedit venialem culpam.* Eſcobar tract. 1. Exam. 8. c. 1. n. 2. p. 1348.

And in the following page n. 4. demanding what evil may be in diſhoneſt looks, he anſwers: [c] *To behold diſhoneſt things for natural pleaſure onely, is but a venial Sin, provided that one bring not himſelf in danger to go on forward unto carnal pleaſure.* And ſome lines after: *to behold theſe of curioſity is but a venial Sin, provided one be out of danger of proceeding unto carnal pleaſure.* He is alſo more hardy then *Fillintius* who permits, or at leaſt paſſes by as ſmall faults, all ſorts of beholding all parts of the body, except thoſe which nature obliges us to cover. For he declares that this exception is not abſolutely neceſſary: [d] *As for me,* ſaith he, *if one look on thoſe parts of the body which natural modeſty obliges us to hide, or even a man in the act with a woman, I will not condemn him, conſidering the thing in it ſelf and in general, all be it that, in the practique, I believe that it ought to be condemned of mortal Sin, becauſe there is therein danger to paſſe to that which is unlawful.* If he condemn this look, it is not becauſe he doth acknowledge it to be abſolutely evil, but onely becauſe of the danger therein of committing, and paſſing on from an action lawful to that which is not lawful.

c *Aſpectus rerum turpium ob delectationem tantùm naturalem, omni periculo ſublato tranſeundi ad ventream, venialis culpa tantùm eſt.* Ibid. n. 4. p. 139.

d *Enimverò ſi eſſet aſpectus partium, quas pudor velat, vel ipſum concubitus, ſpeculativè quidem non damnarem, practicè tamen ſub mortali damnandum exiſtimo, ob periculum facilitèr tranſeundi ad illicita.* Ibid. num. 4. pag. 139.

And to ſhew yet better the conformity of the opinions of theſe Jeſuits, who agree alſo with the moſt part of the reſt who have written on this ſubject, it is worthy to be obſerved, that as *Fillintius* after had ſaid what he could to take away or diminiſh the ſin of impurity, which is found in theſe diſhoneſt looks, leaves every one to his own judgement and to his own conſcience to do that which he pleaſeth; *quâ in re quiſque ſatisfaciat ſuæ conſcientiæ*: in the ſame manner *Eſcobar* leaves every one to his liberty in particular to follow his own ſenſe in a matter ſo dangerous, and to rule himſelf by his complexion and age: *conſulatur cujuſque complexio & ætas.*

There is nothing that carries men more ſtrongly to impurity then Stage-plays, and particularly thoſe which repreſent diſhoneſt things. For in other ſenſual objects and divertiſements there are but one or two ſenſes commonly that are ſatisfied: but in Stage-plays all the ſenſes in a manner are affected, are almoſt all engaged in impurity

by ſenſible images and repreſentations, which hath obliged the Saints to condemn them ſo often, and to turn men away from them as one of the moſt dreadful inventions of the Devil, and moſt capable to deſtroy ſouls.

For this cauſe *Eſcobar* ſpeaks according to the truth, where he ſaith, [a] *They who act Comedies wherein diſhoneſt things are contained, or repreſented in ſuch manner as ordinarily to excite impurity, ſin mortally.*

a Repræſentantes comedias res turpes continentes, vel eo modo ut ad venerem excitent ut plurimum, mortaliter peccant. Eſcobar tr. 1 Exam. 8. c. 1. n. 3. p. 138.

But if the Comedians finde this propoſition at firſt ſight to be rigorous, I am aſſured that they will receive it without much trouble when they ſhall underſtand that which follows. For after he had condemned of mortal ſin thoſe who act Comedies, he adds that [b] *thoſe that go thither to learn ſomething, or for any other good end, ſin not at all; and if they go thither of curioſity or lightneſs, they ſin onely venially.*

b Porro audientes ob ſcientiam, ob aliquem bonum finem, non peccant, ob curioſitatem aut levitatem, venialiter delinquunt. Ibid. n. 3. p. 1349.

Theſe Stage-players will eaſily ſatisfie themſelves by this laſt propoſition, ſeeing it deſtroys the former, and ſhews clear enough that their Profeſſion is in effect good, or at leaſt indifferent, for there is no appearance that one can be a partaker in an other mans ſin, or be preſent voluntarily without cauſe, by lightneſſe, or onely to pleaſe his curioſity at a wicked action, and an exerciſe which of it ſelf is a mortal ſin, and draws on to ſin, being St. *Paul* doth teſtifie, that not onely they who do evil are worthy of death, but they alſo who conſent thereto; that is to ſay, thoſe who approve it by their actions, by their words, by their preſence, and even by their ſilence. So that if *they who act Stage-plays ſin mortally*, as *Eſcobar* ſaith in his firſt propoſition, it follows according to St. *Paul*, that thoſe who go to hear them expreſſely *upon lightneſs, and curioſity*, make themſelves partakers of their ſin. And if on the contrary, *they who go to them ſin not at all, or ſin venially*, as the ſame *Eſcobar* ſaith, though they go thither *through lightneſs, and more curioſity*, it will follow *that they who act the Comedies do not ſin at all neither, or ſin but venially*, contrary to what *Eſcobar* affirms in his firſt propoſition, and againſt the judgement of all the Saints. 340

*Fillintius* in the place which I have cited, ſpeaks of Stage-playes almoſt like *Eſcobar*; [c] *If one goes thither*, ſaith he, *only for curioſitie, or for the pleaſure he takes in beholding good Actors, and not of the things which they repreſent, this is but a venial ſinne; provided that he come not thereby in apparent danger of falling into mortal ſin.*

c Si ob ſolam curioſitatem audiantur vel delectationem repreſentationis, non rerum repreſentatarum, & alioquin non ſit probabile periculum lapſus in mortale, non excedit veniale. Filliutius, mor. tom. 2. Tr. 30. v. 10. n. 212.

And to ſhew that he eſteems this venial ſin to be a very ſmall one, and that commonly there is even none at all in attending on theſe filthy and diſhoneſt Stage-playes; he permits this to the Eccleſiaſtiques. [d] *The Eccleſiaſtiques themſelves*, ſaith he, *ſin not in going to a Stage-play, provided that it be without ſcandal, which hardly happens at all*, ſaith Sanchez, *becauſe they go thither very frequently.*

d Non etiam Clerici peccant ſublato ſcandalo, quod fere non intercedit, ex Sanchez, quia frequentiſſime interſunt. Ibid.

He ſaith, that Eccleſiaſtiques ſin not in going to Stage-playes, provided they can go thither without ſcandal; and at the ſame time he declares that there is no ſcandal therein, *becauſe they go thither very frequently.* It is true, and we ſee it too well at this day, that the greateſt crimes cauſe no horror, nor offend the world, but only when they are not common; as ſoon as they become ſo they ceaſe to cauſe horror, and daunt no more the ſpirits of men, and often times they paſſe even for innocent actions. 350

For what concerns diſhoneſt touches, *Eſcobar* ſaith generally, that they are permitted betwixt perſons eſpouſed, and relates this as the opinion of *Sanchez* and many others. [e] *Sanchez*, ſaith he, *and many others aſſure us that they are permitted, provided that no danger of falling into pollution come thereby, nor of giving conſent unto any unlawfull thing.*

e Sanchez & alii multi affirmant licere, ſi abſit pollutionis & conſenſus in rem illicitam periculum. Eſcobar tr. 1. Exam. 8. n. 74. d. 149. ſect. 3.

He alſo makes *Sanchez* ſpeak more boldly in this point, citing him again the ſecond time: [f] Sanchez, *whom I have already cited, ſaith, that kiſſes, and touches of the body are permitted to perſons betrothed, though they foreſee that pollution will follow thereon; provided the man be moved to it by ſome juſt reaſon; as namely, that he may not appear to be of an ill humour, or too auſtere.* It is better, according to *Sanchez* and *Eſcobar*, to give a mans ſelf up to impurity and unnatural exceſſe, than to paſſe for an uncivil perſon before men or women.

[f] Sanchez citatus ait licere oſcula & tactum externos, etiam ſi ſecutura pollutio prævideatur dummodo adſit juſta cauſa ſponſo, ſcilicet ad vitandum inurbanitatis ſeu auſteritatis notam. Ibid. n. 74.

*Fillintius* reports it as an opinion of the ſame *Sanchez*, [g] *that it is no mortal ſin, nor commonly a venial one, to kiſſe the tender and delicate fleſh of children.*

[g] Non eſſe mortale, nec ſæpe veniale exoſculari molles infantium carnes. Filliutius moral. tom. 2. tract. 30. c. 9 n. 171. p. 321.

360 [h] And ſpeaking of touches and kiſſes which are given for pleaſure only, he ſaith, that they can be but venial ſins; and beſides, he teſtifies, that he could hardly condemn them of venial ſin: *Erunt ad ſummum peccata venialia.* And a little after having made this queſtion, [i] *If the embraces of two perſons all naked, be of the ſame nature with theſe touches,* (he ſpeaks of Criminal touches) *or if one may well place them alſo in the rank of touches which are to teſtifie good will,* which before he had ſaid were innocent and lawfull? He anſwers, [k] *that conſidering things in the theory and in general, theſe embracings themſelves are things indifferent, and may be done without ſin.*

[h] Etiamſi fiant ob ſolam delectationem naturaliter conſequentem, erunt ad ſummum peccata venialia. Ibid. n. 176.

[i] An amplexus nudi cum nudo pertineat ad hoc genus tactus vere poſſit etiam eſſe inter tactus cauſa benevolentiæ? Ibid. n. 174.

[k] Reſpondeo ſi ſpeculative loquamur etiam eſt res indifferens, & poteſt ſine peccato fieri. Ibid. n. 174.

And a little after puſhing on the queſtion yet farther, and to the uttermoſt extremity that it can go, without entirely accompliſhing the crime; he ſaith, [l] *that if theſe embraces of bodies all naked be made by perſons of different ſex, or of young people of the ſame ſex, he beleeves they can hardly be done without mortal ſin, conſidering them practically, eſpecially in places ſecured and removed from the view of the world.*

[l] Si tamen fierent inter perſonas diverſi ſexus, vel adoleſcentes ejuſdem ſexus, præſertim in locis clauſis & remotis ab aliorum aſpectibus, practicè vix fieri crediderimus abſque peccato mortali. Ibid. n. 174.

He dares not abſolutely condemn of mortal ſin an action ſo ſhamefull, ſo immodeſt, and which leads manifeſtly to the extremity of ſin, under pretence that it was done out of love and friendſhip; honouring with the name of amity a paſſion ſo looſe and infamous: And although he ſaith, that it is hard as to the practice not to commit ſin in theſe embracements, and even mortal ſin; yet he forbears not at the ſame time to give us to underſtand, that it may be done without any ſin at all; ſo that what he affirmed in the beginning, continues alwayes true: according unto him, that this action is good or indifferent in it ſelf: *ſi ſpeculativè loquamur, etiam illa eſt res indifferens, & poteſt ſine peccato fieri:* which ſuffices to give unto
370 men the liberty of embracing in that manner, every one being eaſie to be perſwaded that there is no hurt in it, or that he may do a thing in it ſelf indifferent.

## II. POINT.

### *Of the Miniſters and Panders in the trade of Whoredom, ſuch as they are who carry meſſages, bear letters, appoint meetings to debauched women, or who lodge or protect them.*

I Suppoſe that I have ſufficiently proved that the Jeſuits do cheriſh the Vice of Impurity, in making it manifeſt that they juſtifie it, or at leaſt they diſcharge from this crime diſhoneſt readings, looks, touches and embraces, which are the

moſt common and neareſt diſpoſitions unto it. But I will not ſtay there, becauſe their Divinity goes yet farther, and it favours and approves more than any perſon that hath any little of honour or reaſon can beleeve, the accompliſhment of this crime which is Fornication, Adultery, Inceſt, and other ſuch like crimes.

First, in permitting to co-operate with, and be aiding to the commiſſion of theſe crimes.

In the ſecond place, in giving liberty to the ſpirit to entertain voluntarily and with pleaſure the thoughts of theſe ſhamefull actions, when they do not actually commit them. 380

And, in the third place, in giving means to perpetrate theſe infamous actions, or at leaſt to juſtifie them after they are done, and to take as much pleaſure in the remembrance of them as if they had been innocent actions.

For the firſt point, *Sanchez* ſpeaking generally of thoſe who make themſelves partakers of other mens ſins by co-operating therein, eſtabliſheth this rule as a principle whereon depends the reſolution of all difficulties which may occurr in this matter. *We muſt anſwer*, ſaith he, *that it is lawfull to ſell all things which are indifferent; as alſo to perform all ſorts of ſervices which are in themſelves indifferent, though we know certainly that they will be abuſed; provided that we have no intention to co-operate to the ill uſe whereunto they are put by others, and we have ſome reaſonable motive to excuſe us.*

m *Dicendum eſt licere quæcunque indifferentia vendere, aut obſequia indifferentia exhibere, quamvis conſtet alterum abuſurum, dummodo deſit intentio co-operandi ad malum alterius uſum, & adſit proportionata excuſans cauſa.* Sanchez oper. moral. lib. 1. c. 7. n. 13. pag. 21.

If it be lawfull to ſell and to lend all indifferent things, and alſo, in ſerving another, to do every indifferent thing, it will follow, that it is lawfull to ſell, to lend, and to do almoſt all ſorts of things, becauſe every thing that may be ſold or lent, is not only indifferent, but good in it ſelf, being the creature of God, who hath made nothing but what is good. And although one cannot ſay that all the actions of men are good, yet notwithſtanding, the greater part even of thoſe which are bad, being not ordinarily ſuch, but by the occurrence of evil circumſtances and evil conſequences, they will be all lawfull as well as the other: for it is ſufficient, according to this principle of *Sanchez*, that they be indifferent in themſelves, and conſidered in general; though in particular, with their evil circumſtances and effects which ariſe from them, they are very criminal, and this be certain and known by him who doth theſe actions, or ſells theſe things; becauſe he ſees clearly, that he for whom he doth them, or to whom he ſells them, will abuſe them: *quamvis conſtet alterum abuſurum.* 390

So that according to this Divinity, if one ſee a man who ſeeks for a precipice to throw himſelf down, or a ſword wherewith to kill himſelf or ſome other, one may help him to a ſword, or ſhew him a precipice, and even lead him thither, if it be needfull, without partaking in his crime, provided only that he have no intention to co-operate with him therein; *modò deſit intentio co-operandi ad malum alterius uſum*, though he do in this manner actually co-operate with him therein.

The Jeſuites ſerve themſelves of this rule to juſtifie the greateſt crimes. And indeed if this be to be received, a man that gives a ladder to robb his neighbour, that lends his Chamber wherein to deliberate and reſolve to murder him, who ſells poiſon for this intent, or provides a ſword to kill him, ſhall have no part in any of all theſe crimes, if he in this manner knowingly and willingly co-operate therein, he may ſay his intention was not to co-operate therein; *dummodo deſit intentio co-operandi*; eſpecially if having no formal intention of doing ill, he have ſome reaſon which may excuſe the ill he doth actually; *& adſit juſta cauſa proportionata excuſans.* 400

And the beſt reaſon, or at leaſt the moſt common one, and which the Jeſuits approve, and alledge moſt uſually in theſe occurrents, is that of ſome temporal intereſt or worldly reputation. So they allow a Gentlewoman of good quality not to refuſe a man to enter into her houſe with whom ſhe hath offended God, if ſhe cannot ſo do it but that the world wil talk thereof; a maid-ſervant not to depart from the houſe of her Maſter who abuſeth her, if he will not pay her her wages; a ſervant-

vant not to quit the ſervice of his Maſter who imployes him in his debauches, if he receive or hope therefrom any good recompence.

Theſe are the conſequences which the Jeſuits themſelves draw from this principle, with many other which we ſhall ſee in their Caſuiſts. *Sanchez* who is the principal author of this maxim, after he hath eſtabliſhed it upon divers foundations which he propoſeth, amongſt many Concluſions which he drawes therefrom, puts this ſame for the fifth: [a] *It follows from this principle, that a ſervant may ſaddle the horſe of his Maſter, accompany and attend him, if it be not to defend him or ſtand centry for him, of which we ſpeak in the next following numbers, although he well know that he goes to viſit debauched women.* And to expound what he intends by that reſtriction, *quando non cuſtodiæ cauſa comitantur*; He adds in the ſequel: [b] *For if they go with their Maſter with a deſign to aſſault and combat his Corrivals, that is not lawfull, becauſe it is an action evil of it ſelf: but if they go only to defend their Maſter againſt thoſe who ſhall aſſail him, or to give him notice of any come to offend him, to the end that he may ſave himſelf without receiving any hurt, it is lawfull, though this very rarely, and only upon great neceſſity.*

a Quinto, deducitur poſſe famulos ſternere equum, herum comitari & expellere, quando non cuſtodiæ cauſa, de quo numero ſequenti dicemus, quamvis norint ipſum ad fornicandum abire. Sanchez op. mor. l. 1. c. 7. n. 22. p. 23.

b Si enim comitantur ut rivales illius mulieris invadant cum ea pugnaturi, nulla ratione licet, quòd ſit intrinſece malum. Si autem ut à rivalibus aggredientibus herum tueantur, vel ut admoneant herum advenisse aliquo qui ipſum offendere poſſit, ut ſic incolumis evadat, adhuc rariſſime erit licitum, & urgentiſſima neceſſitate concurrente. Ibid. n. 23.

It is therefore true, according to *Sanchez*, that a ſervant may be innocent in all theſe occurrences, becauſe that he pretends that all theſe offices he doth for his Maſter, [c] *are things of themſelves indifferent, and which may be well or ill uſed.* This is his general principle and his principal reaſon, whereby he maintains that theſe things are lawfull for ſervants: only he wills that they be done rarely and upon great extremities, becauſe he avows that they are dangerous, and eaſie to be abuſed, the ſervants who are imployed on theſe occaſions having commonly more courage than diſcretion and moderation: So that inſtead of contenting themſelves to defend their Maſter, as is lawfull for them, they are eaſily tranſported to aſſault and outrage thoſe who would interrupt their diſhoneſt pleaſures. For this cauſe he is wiſe, and conſiders that he ſhall not give warranty to their exceſſive heat, if he be content to maintain, *that all this is permitted becauſe it is lawfull and indifferent in it ſelf*; and it is only needfull to conſider the ill uſe that may be made thereof, and the danger that therein may occurre: [d] *becauſe the ſervants that are imployed on theſe occaſions expoſe themſelves to the danger, not only of barely defending their Maſters, but alſo of fighting and aſſayling, which makes their Maſters more bold and confident in their ſin.*

c Quia etſi hæ actiones indifferentes ſint, utpote quæ bono & malo uſui poſſunt deſervire, & ideo poſſe aliquando licitas eſſe affirmo. Ibid. n. 23. p. 24.

d Quia famuli hi manifeſto ſe non ſolùm defenſionis, ſed pugnæ ineundæ periculo exponunt, atque herus ea ſeveritate animoſior ad peccandum redditur, ac majori libidine peccat. Ibid.

He draws alſo this Concluſion from this Principle; [e] *That it is lawfull for a ſervant to make meat ready, to wait at the Table, and to make the bed for his Maſters Concubine:* And he quotes for this opinion *Ledeſma* and *Emanuel Sa*, whom he makes to ſay, with ſome others, [f] *That it is no fault for one that ſerves a whore, to help her to dreſſe her ſelf:* which is not found ſo expreſs'd in *Emanuel Sa*. But the ſecret paſſion which *Sanchez* hath for this affair, hath drawn him on to borrow the quill of another to write that which he durſt not publiſh in his own proper name, contenting himſelf with a reaſon deduced from his principle, which is, [g] *that all theſe things are of themſelves indifferent, and have no reference to ſin but from afarre off.*

e Sexto deducitur licere famulis cibos condire, ad menſamque miniſtrare, lectum ſternere concubinæ heri. Ibid. n. 24.

f Fas eſt ornare heram meretricem. Ibid.

g Quia hæc omnia ſunt ex ſe indifferentia, & valde remotè ſe habent ad peccatum. Ibid. n. 24.

He finds, that to prepare a banquet for debauched men and women, to attend them at the table, to make their bed, are actions farr remote from ſin, though it follows ſo cloſe thereupon: and therefore they are lawfull to men and maid-ſervants; and that there needs no other reaſon to juſtifie them in theſe affairs, than the ſervice they owe to their Maſters and Miſtreſſes; That is to ſay, that for a ſer-

vant to perform all theſe good offices to his Maſter without fear of ſin, it is enough that he be hired to ſerve him: But for a friend or any other perſon that would do ſo much, it behoves that he have ſome particular reaſon, as he declares in expreſſe terms, ſaying, [h] *that if they are not ſervants, it behoves that they have ſome juſt reaſon for to do it*; which thing ſeems to agree very well with his principle. For if theſe actions in themſelves be indifferent, as he preſuppoſes, they may as well be lawfull for a friend as a ſervant, the quality of a friend giving no leſſe liberty to ſerve a friend, than that of a ſervant a Maſter.

h *At in non famulis aliqua juſta cauſa deſideraretur.* Ibid.

So that *Hurtado* is more reaſonable, and acknowledging the natural conſequence of this principle, he gives abſolutely the ſame liberty to a friend, a ſon, and to any other, as to an houſhold ſervant. For after he had ſaid, [i] *That a ſervant might watch a woman whither ſhe went, or where ſhe abode, if his Maſter command him; and carry her little preſents, and accompany his Maſter, whether it be to honour him, or to defend him when he goes to ſee her, hold him by the foot when he goes in to her through the window, buy for him the pourtraiture of his Miſtreſſe, go to tell her that his Maſter prayes her to come to meet him, accompany her, and conduct her to the place where he is, open the door for her, make the bed, but not incite her to ſin with him.* After all this, I ſay, he adds; [k] *That a ſon may do all the ſame things if his father command him, eſpecially if he fear he ſhall draw on him his indignation if he refuſe. What a ſervant or a ſon may do in theſe occurrents, any other may do as well as they, if he hopes that thereby there may ſome conſiderable benefit come to him, and much more for avoiding ſome great loſſe, or ſome great evil.* 440

i *Famulus poteſt juſſu heri videre quæ fœmina aliqua eat, & ubi habitet, eique munuſcula deferre, herumque comitari ad domum concubinæ, ſive cauſa honoris, ſive defenſionis heri, & ei pedem ſuſtinere ad ingrediendum per feneſtram domus concubinæ, & ei picturam concubinæ emere, & ire ad concubinam, & ei dicere: herus meus te vocat, & eam ad domum heri comitari, & januam aperire, & eis lectum ſternere; non tamen poteſt eam invitare ad actum ipſum inhoneſtum cum herd.* Gaſpar Hurtado apud Dian. part. 5. p. 435. in addendis atque emendandis in par. 5. reſp. mor. in tr. 7. de Leand.

k *Et eadem omnia poteſt filius ad mandatum patris, præſertim ſi ex omiſſione indignationem patris timeat. Et eadem omnia quæ poſſunt famulus & filius, etiam poteſt quilibet alius titulo alicujus conſiderabilis utilitatis ſibi accreſcentis, & multo melius titulo vitandi aliquod grave incommodum aut damnum.* Ibid.

It remains only that we affirm the ſame thing of a daughter towards her father, and a wife towards her husband; For it is not worſe for a wife to do theſe diſhoneſt offices for her husband, than for a ſon or a daughter to perform them for a father or mother; and the reaſons of this Caſuiſt prove it equally, or they prove nothing at all.

And although ſhame, as it ſeems, kept him back from this, yet he hath notwithſtanding ſufficiently diſcovered his thoughts by theſe general terms; *etiam poteſt quilibet alius*; *alſo any other may do it*; ſhews plainly, that what he ſpeaks expreſſly of a ſon in regard of his father, ought alſo to be extended to a wife towards her husband; and he condemns not, it may be, theſe good offices even in a Monk or Prieſt, ſince he excepts no perſon at all: *etiam poteſt quilibet alius.*

As for carrying of preſents to diſhoneſt perſons, *Sanchez* makes no difficulty thereof for ſervants; And he drawes this alſo from his principles: [l] *It followes*, ſaith he, *that it is lawfull for a ſervant to carry, at his Maſters commandment, to a woman whom he keeps, little preſents, and things to eat*: and the reaſon of his principle alwayes returns; *becauſe theſe things are indifferent.*

l *Nono deducitur licere famulis juſſu heri portare aliqua munuſcula aut eſculenta ad concubinam, cum hæc ſint indifferentia.* Sanchez l. 1. c. 7. n. 29. p. 25.

He is a little more troubled to permit ſervants to deliver meſſages, and to appoint meetings, and to carry them Love-letters; but that which hinders him principally, is, that this opinion is not commonly received, and that there are ſome who condemn this traffique as a thing that is evil in it ſelf: [m] *Some*, ſaith he, *do condemn this as a thing evil in it ſelf*; and not only as evil, but alſo as ſhamefull; ſaying, that thoſe who meddle with this commerce are decried and noted with an infamous name, which is at this day of ſo little credit in *France*, that we muſt content our ſelves to rehearſe it in Latine, as *Sanchez* alſo hath ſet it, *quod communis exiſtimatio teſtatur, hos lenones appellans*; *which the common opinion teſtifies, whilſt theſe are called panders and bands.* 450

m *Quidam hoc tanquam intrinſece malum damnant.* Ibid. n. 26.

But there is cauſe to beleeve, that it is rather the name than the thing which

diſpleaſeth him: For after he had cited ſome Authors who condemned juſtly theſe infamous ſervants, he adds in their favour, *that* [n] *Others exempt from ſin theſe ſervants, Who becauſe of the ſervice they owe their Maſters do theſe meſſages, and carry theſe Letters, by which their Maſter commands a woman to come meet him in the night, although they know that he cauſes her not to come in the night but that he may ſin with her.* And to make us perceive that this is his opinion, though he dares not ſay it openly, he applyes his principle to it: [o] *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *theſe letters and theſe meſſages are indifferent things, inducing the perſon only to come, without ſpeaking of the ſin.* He beleeves that this mental diſtinction and reſtriction is ſufficient to ſhelter this crime and any other, how great ſoever they may be.

n *Alii vero excuſant à peccato famulos qui ratione famulatus hæc internuntia aut ſcripta deferunt, in quibus herus petit à concubina ut ea nocte ad ſe veniat, etſi norint velle ut veniat ſed ad adventum ad fornicandum.* Ibid. n. 26.

o *Quod hæc rem indifferentem contineant, cum non ad fornicationem inducant.* Ibid.

*Molina* ſaith, that in places where Whores are tolerated, [p] *It is no ſin to let them a houſe, provided that he who ſets it have only an intention to let it them to lodge in, and not to proſtitute themſelves therein, though he knows that they will abuſe his houſe to ſin in it.* According to this reſolution, it is lawfull to lend or ſell a ſword to a man who is known to demand it for no other reaſon than to kill himſelf or ſome other, provided only there be no expreſſe intention to co-operate with his ſin.

p Peccatum non eſt locare eis domum modo locator non intendat fornicationem earum ibi, ſed locare ſolum domum ad habitationem illarum, ſciens eas abuſuras ea habitatione ad peccata. Molina de juſt. tom. 2. tr. 2. diſp. 500 p. 1122.

*Eſcobar* makes *Valentia* to ſay the ſame thing. For demanding, [q] *If it be lawfull to let ones houſe to Common Women, or to any who deſires it to keep ſuch therein?* He anſwers, *That* Valentia *holds that this is lawfull; becauſe to ſet ones houſe is a thing in it ſelf indifferent, which is not evil, but through the evil intention of theſe who abuſe it.* And becauſe the queſtion is important, he puts it again the ſecond time in theſe terms: [r] *Is it lawfull to let ones houſe to a Whore, or an Uſurer?* After he had teſtified that *Mendoza* made ſome difficulty therein, he anſwers, [s] *That* Valentia *holds that he may let them it, though he might eaſily let it to ſome other*; that is to ſay, provided a perſon find any Temporal advantage therein, it concerns him not though God be offended in his houſe, and that to offend God is alſo an indifferent thing with him, as well as the letting of his houſe to perſons whom he knowes do hire it to offend God therein.

q Licet ne ex juſta cauſa locare domum meretrici, vel alteri petenti ad fornicandum? Valentia docet licere, quia locare domum eſt res per ſe indifferens, quæ ex ſola prava abutentis intentione ad malum ordinatur. Eſcobar tract. 1. Exam. 8. n. 98. p. 155.

r *Num liceat locare meretrici aut uſurario domum.* Eſcobar tract. 3. Exam. 9. c. 4. n. 28. p. 441.

s Valentia tom. 3. diſp. 5. qu. 11. part. 4. *docet locari poſſe, etiamſi alteri commode poſſet locari.* Ibid. n. 28.

There is no ſon ſo unnatural who dares ſo much as think of letting a houſe which he holds of his father, to perſons whom he knowes to require it for no other end than therein to offend his own father, and to abuſe his own ſiſter, or his mother; and if any ſon were capable of this exceſſe, there is no father who could ſuffer this affront, and who would not think himſelf in this more injured even by his ſon, than by his enemies, and thoſe who attempted to diſhonour him in this ſort; and yet according to the Divinity of the Jeſuites, God is not offended by ſuch unworthy uſage; and he will not take it ill, that a man who is related to him by ſo many titles of Son, Servant, and Creature, who holds all he hath of him, and who depends abſolutely upon him, lets out his houſe to offend him, and to commit crimes and abominations againſt him.

It is hard to have ſuch thoughts of God without renouncing faith, and even reaſon it ſelf, and without repreſenting God as an Idol of wood, or ſtone, to beleeve that he is unſenſible of ſuch outrages and infamous actions as theſe; and to imagine that he would not take it ill, that a perſon who makes profeſſion to be his, and to ſerve him faithfully, not only ſuffers theſe in his houſe, but gives them his houſe to commit them in, without other reaſon than his intereſt; and even without reaſon, and without neceſſity, as ſome Jeſuits maintain.

So it is that *Sanchez*, who is the Maſter in this ſubject, after he had ſaid, that Navarre *was therein too exact and too ſcrupulous, ſatis ſcrupuloſè locutus*; com-

mends *Valentia* and *Azor* for having been more bold, and for having ſurpaſſed all others in the defence of ſo good a cauſe; [a] *But* Valentia, ſaith he, *ſpeaks in this better than all the reſt.* And in another place he ſaith, *that he hath ſurpaſſed himſelf, and that* Azor *and he held that one might let out his houſe to a Whore, though he had no juſt reaſon to do it.*

a *Sed ultra alios optime Valentia 2. 2. diſp. 5. q. 20. punctо 5. col. 5. verſ. Ex hoc autem, Et melius q. 21. punctо 4. col. penult. & Azor Tom. 2. Inſtit. moral. l. 12. c. ult. q 3. cenſent etiam nulla cauſa juſta excuſante licere locare domum meretrici.* Sanchez op. mor. l. 1. c. 7. n. 20. p. 23.

Theſe are three Jeſuites who ſpeak together after this manner, and theſe three the moſt famous of their *Society*, *Azor*, *Valentia*, and *Sanchez*, who reports the opinions of the former to confirm his own.

It is with the ſame ſpirit that *Sanchez* doth all he can to excuſe thoſe who take ſuch infamous perſons into their protection, who retain them, who pay them money, who furniſh them with garments, who keep them in their houſes, and walk with them to defend them when they go abroad. For though at firſt he confeſſes that he finds ſome difficulty in giving abſolution to theſe perſons; yet for all that he afterwards facilitates the things in ſuch manner, that a Confeſſor who hath but a little contrivance, and is well entred in his opinions, ſhall have therein no trouble at all. He builds alwayes upon the ſame foundation, and draws from the ſame principles all the concluſions which he advances upon this matter. [b] *It is very hard*, ſaith he, *to abſolve them who make themſelves the protectors of Common Women.* See here a formed difficulty; but he weakens and diſſipates it in the ſame moment, ſaying, [c] *It is lawfull to perform this office to them when there is no deſign to favour their debauchery, but only to hinder that any wrong be done them.* 490

b *Duodecimo deducitur patronos meretricum difficillimo negotio poſſe abſolvi.* Ibid. n. 32. p. 25.

c *Quamvis enim id munus obire liceat, quando non ut meretricio faveant id obeunt, ſed ut incolumes meretrices ſervent.* Ibid. 3.

He would ſay that it is not lawfull to entertain nor protect debauchery, but only debauched women. As if it were as eaſie to ſeparate theſe things in effect, as in the diſtinctions of the Schools; and as if this were not to protect debauchery, to hinder thoſe who would take from them the liberty and licenſe without which it could not ſubſiſt. The Whore may take the ſame excuſe for her ſelf, which is alledged for her protector, and ſay that ſhe loves not the debauch, but the profit; that ſhe her ſelf hath the ſame averſion from theſe diſorders, but neceſſity hath therein engaged her, having not whereupon to live without proſtituting her ſelf. It is ſufficiently clear, that this anſwer juſtifies her no leſſe than her protector, and the ſame gives us well to perceive, that ſubtilties of ſpirit and metaphyſical abſtractions are bad rules for the conduct of mens manners and conſcience.

I will relate one concluſion more of *Sanchez* before I return to the reſt. [d] *It followes*, ſaith he, *that it is lawfull to lend mony, yea or a Chamber to ſin with women, when it cannot be refuſed without great damage, which hath ſome proportion to this evil.* There needs only a promiſe of ſome notable ſumme, and preſently this money and the danger of loſing it will blot out all the crime of this infamous action, according to theſe Caſuiſts: or it would be good to hire out the Chamber inſtead of lending it; both the one and the other being lawfull according to the Divinity of *Valentia* cited and approved by *Sanchez*, [e] *although you have no juſt reaſon which may ſerve you for an excuſe.* 500

d *Undecimo deducitur licere alicui dare mutuo nummos alteri, aut cubiculum accommodare petenti ad fornicandum, quando abſque gravi detrimento proprio proportionato denegare nequit.* Ibid. n. 31.

e *Etiam nulla juſta cauſa excuſante.*

*Eſcobar* ſpeaks of the ſame caſe in the ſame ſenſe, and almoſt in the ſame words. For having ſuppoſed it as a thing altogether certain and manifeſt; [f] *that it is ſin to co-operate to the ſin of another, and that he that contributes to it only at diſtance ſins not at all.* He inquires, *Whether it may be ſaid that he co-operates to the ſin of another as a near cauſe, who lends his Chamber to his friend to corrupt himſelf with women,*

f *Scio co-operari peccato alterius, peccatum eſſe, & qui concurrit ut cauſa remota, à peccato excuſari. Rogo an quis dicatur proxime peccato co-operaſſe dum commodat v. g. cubiculum amico fornicaturo, ut magnum incommodum vitari poſſit? Negative reſpondeo ex Doctorum meorum mente.* Eſcobar tr. 2. Exam. 1. n. 58. p. 215.

*to the end that he may avoid ſome great evil? I anſwer, no*; ſaith he, *according to the opinion of my Maſters.*

He would have us know that this is not his particular private opinion, nor of two or three, but of all his Fraternity, and eſpecially of the 24. elders whom he had taken for his Maſters, and whom he makes profeſſion to follow: *ex Doctorum meorum mente.* And the reaſon of this anſwer is, [g] *becauſe to lend a Chamber in this manner is a thing of it ſelf indifferent, and is rendred bad only by the evil intention of him that abuſeth it.*

g *Quia talis commodatio cubiculi ex ſe eſt indifferens, & ſola abutentis voluntate vitiatur.* Ibid.

This Author ſpeaks yet more largely, and makes many queſtions about the good offices which one friend may do for another, and a ſervant to his Maſter, in *Treatiſe* 1. *Examen* 1. *page* 285. But I paſſe all this in ſilence, as many other things, which I could relate out of other Jeſuits, to cut ſhort as much as I can a matter whereof I deſire not to ſpeak at all.

I will only obſerve farther that which he ſaith in the 7th. *Treatiſe, Examen* 4. *chap.* 8. *p.* 835. which is as it were an abridgement of all that which he had ſaid, and is in a manner all that can be ſaid or done in this matter according to the rules and morals of the Jeſuits. For the 7. and 8. Chapters of the book which I have now cited are intitled: The firſt: [h] *The practice upon the matter of penance taken out of the Doctors of the Society of Jeſus.* And the other which follows immediately; [i] *Other deciſions of particular caſes for the inſtruction of Confeſſors, how they may well diſcharge their offices.* In the latter of theſe two Chapters he makes this queſtion concerning the Confeſſor? [k] *How ſhall he deal with thoſe perſons who mediate betwixt debauched perſons?* Firſt he makes ſome diſtinctions about things which a Confeſſor ought to tolerate, and thoſe things which he is to forbid theſe perſons; after he ſaith that all indifferent things are lawfull for them, and by conſequence, that they ought not be forbidden them. And to relieve the Confeſſor, he obſerves unto him, in particular, many actions he calls indifferent.

h *Praxis circa materiam de pœnitentia ex Doctrina Jeſu Doctoribus.*

i *Practicæ ad hæc ſpeciales reſolutiones Confeſſarium ad munus rectè obeundum inſtruentes.*

k *Quonam modo ſe geret cum libidinis mediatore?* n. 223. p. 835.

[l] *I will obſerve unto you*, ſaith he, *in particular, what actions are indifferent amongſt the ſervices which Maſters are wont to receive from their ſervants, to ſaddle the horſe on which their Maſter muſt go to ſee his Miſtreſſe, to ſtand at the door, and keep it ſo long as his Maſter ſtayes with her; to make ready diet, to cover the table and wait at it; to bring his Maſter home again, to carry Letters, if he be not aſſured that they are extremely diſhoneſt.* That is to ſay, that it ſufficeth that the ſervant be not aſſured that they are full of words and diſcourſes manifeſtly filthy, but that he beleeveth that his Maſter will content himſelf to teſtifie diſcreetly to her whom he loveth the affection which he beareth her, which he expreſſeth by theſe words which he addeth: [m] *Though they be written with paſſion.*

l Indicabo quænam actiones communiter à famulis aſſumptæ indifferentes ſint: parare equum quo dominus proficiturus eſt ad amaſiæ domum; eum inibi commorantem foris cuſtodire; amaſiæ menſam apponere, cibos præparare, ad domum reducere, epiſtolas deferre, de quarum turpitudine gravi non moraliter conſtet. Eſcobar tract. 7. Exam. 4. n. 223. p. 835.

m Licet affectus ſint exaratæ. Ibid. 832.

He alſo ſets down in the number of ſervices which ſervants may do their Maſters on theſe occaſions; [n] *To carry and bring back preſents, to ſhew her houſe whom his Maſter loves; to open the doors or windows for him, to help his Maſter to get over a wall, or to paſſe through a window*, as he ſaith expreſly in another place; *and to hold the ladder if the wall or the window be too high.*

n Dona ferre ac referre, oſtia aut fenéſtras aperire, domum amaſiæ oſtendere, auxilium domino præſtare ut aſcendat. Ibid. p. 832.

There may be many of thoſe people whom he calls *mediatores libidinis*, mediators for luſt, who are grown old in the myſtery, without ever having known or practiſed all that which he teaches; and I am aſſured that he will not find any ſo hard, or ſo untoward, who will not be content, and ſerve himſelf very advantageouſly of what he allows him. But I doubt whether the moſt obdurate and deſperate can give credit unto his word, and that of his Fraternity, which permits them to do that in Conſcience, and before God, which the light of reaſon alone, and the reſentments of honour, which remains unto them in ſo miſerable a profeſſion, re-

preſents unto them as ſo ſhamefull and infamous, that they are conſtrained to hide themſelves therein from men, and to bluſh ſecretly in the preſence of God.

He hath only forgotten to ſpeak in this place of the appointments which a ſervant may make with a Curteſan on the behalf of his Maſter, if it be not that he beleeved that this was ſufficiently compriſed in the words which I have related; *epiſtolas deferre, licet affectu ſint exaratæ: to carry letters, though they be paſſionately written:* or in theſe others a little above, [n] *The letters which a man writes to her whom he loveth, or whom he keepeth, to deſire her to come and meet him, are indifferent things.* Notwithſtanding, for the convenience of a Confeſſor, whom he pretends to inſtruct, as well as for the repoſe of the conſcience of theſe honourable mediators, it ſeems to him that he ought to explicate it a little more clearly, or at leaſt to remit them to the place where he decides this controverſie more clearly, and places it in the rank of things indifferent; and by conſequence lawful in this traffique: [o] *For a ſervant to ſay on the behalf of his Maſter to a woman; my Maſter commands me to tell you that you ſhould attend him this night, or that you come meet him at his lodging, or at leaſt to ſhew him the houſe of this woman.*

n *Literæ quibus advocatur amaſia, indifferentes ſunt.* Ibid. n. 223. Tract. 2. Exam. 2. n. 61. p. 286.

o *Dicere nomine heri concubinæ: Dominus dicit ut hac nocte expectes, aut in domum accedas, aut ſignare locum ubi ſit concubina.* tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 61. p. 286.

It ſeems to me after this there is nothing more to ſay, nor to deſire, for the clearing up of all points and all the difficulties of a profeſſion ſo honeſt, and for the entire ſatisfaction of them who engage therein, but only to advertiſe them, that they ought to ſet a good rate on their myſterie and trade, and to teſtifie how dear and acceptable the counſels and inſtructions which the Jeſuits give them in the whole practice of their profeſſion are unto them, that they cauſe them whom they ſerve to pay well for it. For if they think to do it freely, *Hurtado* and others will not excuſe them from ſin: [p] *Hurtado*, ſaith he, *will not excuſe theſe, but by reaſon of their gain alone.*

This is the concluſion of *Eſcobar* after the words which I have now related; that is to ſay, that to avoid, or rather to cover a crime, another muſt be committed; and that a man may not be accounted impudent, according to the rules of the Jeſuites Divinity whereby they ſhamefully ſerve lecherie, a man may help himſelf by avarice, and looking to the lucre he gets in the ſervice he performs to Luſt.

p *Porro haſce omnes actiones; Hurtadus 2. 2. d. 10. diſt. 9. ſolius utilitatis ratione excuſat.* Ibid.

## III. POINT.

### *Of diſhoneſt thoughts and deſires: Of Fornication, Adultery, and other ſuch like ſins, and of the pleaſure that may be taken therein.*

THe Jeſuites are not yet come ſo far as to deny that Fornication and Adultery are ſins. The Commandment of God and the Law of Nature are very expreſſe in this point. All that they could do herein, is, to ſeparate by their rules and by their metaphyſical abſtractions, the pleaſure which is found in theſe crimes, from the Criminal actions, that by this means they may give the ſpirit that ſatisfaction which they beleeve they cannot allow unto the Body. But yet, being they could not authorize the action conſidered abſolutely in it ſelf, they have permitted it under a condition, and hold that one may deſire it, and pleaſe themſelves therein in this manner.

Amongſt the Aphoriſms of *Emanuel Sa* we find theſe very terms; [a] *It is no mortal ſin to think and ſay in ones ſelf; If Theft or Adultery were no ſin, I would commit it.* He that is thus diſpoſed, hath his will not farre removed from Adultery, though the Law alone and the fear of puniſhment ſeems to keep him back from committing it: For if it had been the deformity of the action and the hate of ſin had held him back, and kept him off from Adultery, wrong had been done in ſaying that he had only not ſinned mortally; for he had not ſinned at all: and it had been on the contrary a good diſpoſition, and an act of vertue to have eſchewed an action, becauſe it is evil.

a *Non eſt mortale cogitare ſic apud ſe: ſi peccatum non eſſet furtum aut adulterium, illud facerem.* Sa ver. peccatum n. 2. p. 560.

This is without doubt an excellent means and a very eaſie expedient to do without

out fear, or at leaſt to deſire and will to do all things whatſoever they be, if they may be made lawfull by repreſenting them as lawfull; and if for to remove truly the evil from the moſt criminal actions, it be ſufficient to ſeparate it by thought only, and by an abſtraction meerly imaginary, or to adde to them in the ſame manner that which is neceſſary to make them lawfull.

*Sanchez* ſerves himſelf of this expedient, more freely than *Emanuel Sa*, for the defence of diſhoneſty, giving by this rule to all perſons a liberty to fill their ſpirits with the thoughts, and their wills with the pleaſures, which they may have in the enjoyment of any women, whom they pleaſe to repreſent to themſelves as if they were their own wives. This is in the Firſt Book of his Morals, where after he had eſtabliſhed this general maxim: [b] *That the pleaſure which the will doth take in an object conſidered under a certain condition, which without this condition had been mortal ſin, and was not ſuch therewith, is not unlawfull being taken with that condition put upon it.* He brings for proof and clearing of that his propoſition, this example: [c] *As the pleaſure which a man hath to deſire to lye with a woman if he had married her.* He had already ſaid the ſame thing before, and he repeats it again, whether for the pleaſure he takes therein, or becauſe he thinks it to be important; *as if any one deſire to lye with a woman*, whatſoever ſhe be, a married woman, kinſwoman, or a Nun. For he removes the evil which might be therein in regard of the one as well as of the other, by this condition, which he puts in their imagination; [d] *if ſhe were my wife*; *ſi uxor mea eſſet*, Ibid. And the reaſon he alledges thereupon proves it very well according to his principles; for adding only this condition, in his thoughts, [e] *if ſhe were my wife, or if I had married her, it takes away the ſin that had been in lying with her; becauſe ſin conſiſts only in lying with a perſon whom we have not married.*

b Delectatio voluntatis de objecto conditionali, quod ſeclusa conditione eſſet peccatum mortale, non autem ea poſita, non eſt illicita. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 2. n. 34. p. 9.

c ut gaudium voluntatis de concubitu, ſi eſſet uxor. Ibid.

d Si eſſet ſua uxor.

e Eſt præciſio malitiæ à copula quæ conſiſtit in ea habita cum non ſua, apponendo conditionem, ſi eſſet ſua. Ibid. n. 33.

*Fillintius* ſaith the ſame thing, and he expounds and extends it yet further. He propoſes firſt this general maxim, which may ſerve for a principle to reſolve many difficulties in this and other matters; [f] *That when the condition whereupon an action is deſired doth remove the evil that is in it of it ſelf, as when a man ſaith, I would eat fleſh in* Lent *were it not forbidden me; I would lye with ſuch a woman if ſhe were my wife*: *in this caſe one may deſire without ſin a thing which in it ſelf is a mortal ſin, under this condition, if it were lawfull.* And although this condition, being altogether voluntary and ſubſiſting only in the imagination, be alſo impoſſible in it ſelf in an ordinary way according to thoſe laws which God hath eſtabliſhed in all things: it will not fail for all that, according to theſe Doctors, to make innocent the moſt Criminal action. As when a man ſaith ſeriouſly and with diſpoſition to do as he ſaith; [g] *I would revenge my ſelf, if it were lawfull; I would embrace this woman, if it were no ſin.*

f Dico primo, quando conditio tollit malitiam ab actu, ut comederem carnem in Quadrageſima niſi eſſet vetitum, cognoſcerem Titiam ſi eſſet uxor, tunc poteſt abſque peccato deſiderari res ex objecto mortalitas, ſub tali conditione, ſi liceret. Filliutius mor. tom. 2. tract. 21. c. 8. n. 269. p. 27.

g Vindictam ſumerem ſi liceret; accederem ad mulierem niſi peccatum eſſet. Ibid. num. 298.

And the reaſon for which he juſtifies theſe motions, is, [h] *that if the omnipotence of God ſhould in any manner whatſoever cauſe this condition to be accompliſhed, it would remove all the evil that is in the action.* And though this were alſo impoſſible in regard of Gods omnipotence, and that he could not in any manner hinder the thing to be evil, it would be of no importance at all: [i] *For although that malice were ſo intimately annexed to the action and intirely inſeparable from it, yet notwithſtanding he who deſires this thing under this condition directs not his affection towards the evil, but rather reſtrains his will from moving towards it, becauſe God hath forbidden it.*

h Nam ea conditio ſi poneretur per quemcunque modum divinæ potentiæ, tolleret malitiam ab actu. Ibid.

i Quamvis malitia eſſet intrinſeca actui, tamen qui ita vult objectum, non habet affectum ad malum, ſed potius cohibet voluntatem à malo ob divinam prohibitionem. Ibid.

And this is ſo reaſonable and certain according to the Jeſuits Divinity, that by making only this mental abſtraction and reſtriction in the mind; *If it be not ſin, if it be lawfull, if I had married her*; A man may without ſcruple not only ſuffer himſelf

himſelf to run out to ſome tranſient and imperfect motion; but alſo to humour himſelf with a perfect and efficacious deſire of the moſt filthy and criminal things and actions. [k] Sanchez *agrees, ſaith* Filliutius, *that one may alſo deſire theſe things with an efficacious deſire, and others, even with a compleat deſire, only with this condition which he ſet above; if it were lawfull; if it were no ſin; if I had married her.*

k *Et quidem in deſiderio efficaci concedit etiam* Sanchez, n. 25. *Alii etiam in deſiderio abſoluto cum tali conditione.* Ibid.

This maxim explicated and practiſed in this manner doth ſeem unto them ſo innocent, that they permit the Monks and Nuns themſelves to follow it. [l] *Whence it follows,* ſaith alſo *Filliutius, that this deſire and this will would be no ſin in a Monk who ſhould deſire to marry if he were free from his vow.* Or one might well ſolace himſelf with this thought or this deſire, as he ſaith above: *I would lye with ſuch a woman, if ſhe were my wife.* And by conſequence, a Monk may take this pleaſure without ſcruple. The reaſon of this Jeſuit is; [m] *Becauſe when a man who is not married, or no Monk, pleaſeth himſelf with thinking of the pleaſure which he might have in lying with a woman if it were lawfull for him, his will or reaſonable appetite carries him not out to that carnal action, but under a condition, after he hath firſt of all removed from it all the evil that is therein, when it is done with a woman not lawfull for him. For conſidering if in this manner it is not evil, and the pleaſure that is taken therein is only a ſimple complacence, and by conſequence, as it is lawfull for a Monk to deſire it, that is to ſay, to lye with a woman upon ſuch condition; ſo alſo is it lawfull for him to take pleaſure and have joy in this will.* 590

l *Unde etiam voluntas aut deſiderium ejuſmodi in Religioſo, qui deſideraret uxorem ducere ſub conditione, ſi liber eſſet à voto, non eſſet peccatum,* Ibid. n. 297.

m *Quia cum delectatur cælebs vel Religioſus de acceſſu ad mulierem ſi liceat, voluntas ſeu appetitus rationalis fertur ſub ea conditione præſcindendo malitiam à copula, & à copula cum non ſua, quo pacto non eſt malum objectum, & coincidit ejuſmodi delectatio voluntatis cum ſimplici complacentia. Quare ſicut deſiderium ſub conditione licet, ita etiam licebit delectatio quæ propriè gaudium dicitur in voluntate.* Ibid. n. 229.

And though *Layman* be not entirely of the ſame opinion with *Filliutius* and *Sanchez*, becauſe he ſaw there was danger in it, yet he propoſes it as a true opinion, but whereof the practice is difficult. [n] *Though we ſuppoſe,* ſaith he, *theſe things to be true in general in the theory, yet it happens rarely that they can be ſo done in practice.* Yet for all this he explicates and fortifies the reaſon of *Sanchez* better than *Sanchez* himſelf, reducing it into the form of a ſyllogiſme. [o] *The pleaſure,* ſaith he, *that the will taketh in a thing which is repreſented to it as good, is not mortal ſin. But to lye with a woman conſidered as ones own wife, is a good and not an evil object. By conſequence the will may without mortal ſin, not only deſire this action conſidered in this manner, as* Cajetan *alſo affirms, but may alſo regard it ſimply with pleaſure.*

n *Quamvis hæc ſpeculativè vera eſſe putamus, tamen in praxi vix locum habent.* Layman. l. 1. tract. 3. c. 6. n. 12 p. 41.

o *Complacentia voluntatis cujus apprehenſum bonum eſt, non eſt bonum objectum. Ergo ſimplex voluntatis complacentia & non ſolum deſiderium, ut* Cajetanus *exiſtimat dub.* 1. *de tali objecto apprehenſo, à mortali peccato excuſatur.* Ibidem.

If this deciſion ſeem too large, you muſt beleeve notwithſtanding that this Jeſuit doth yet reſtrain himſelf in this point, and that he hath not ſaid all that he could ſay therein. For if it be true, as he preſuppoſeth and ſaith in the ſecond propoſition of his ſyllogiſme, [p] *that to lye with a woman whom he repreſenteth unto himſelf as under a condition, and as if he were married to her, is a thing which is not evil, and which on the contrary is good.* One may infer thence not only, as he doth, that it is no mortal ſin; but alſo, that it is no ſin at all to pleaſe ones ſelf with this deſire, and to apply ones ſelf to this object, becauſe it is good in it ſelf. 600

p *Concubitus cum muliere apprehenſa ſub conditione & ſub ſtatu conjugii, non eſt malum, ſed bonum objectum.*

Another expedient propoſed by *Sanchez* for to juſtifie the deſire of fornication, or to take therein all the pleaſure that can be taken, is that which he teaches in the reſolution which he gives in this caſe, viz. [q] *If a ruſtique have heard it ſaid by a man that is in reputation for a knowing and honeſt man,* as are in a manner all thoſe of their Society, and eſpecially in the judgement of the Peaſants of whom

q *Si ruſticus à viro exiſtimato docto & pio audiiſſet fornicationem & furtum externa eſſe peccata, at licere fornicandi aut furandi deſiderium.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. p. 71.

he ſpeaks, *that fornication and theft are ſins, but that the deſire of the one and the other are lawfull.* For after he had ſaid, that even amongſt the Modern Caſuiſts there are ſome who would not excuſe this Peaſant of mortal ſin, if following the advice of this man whom he beleeves to be learned and pious, he ſhould voluntarily entertain ſuch a deſire of fornication; he adjoyns in favour of this Peaſant, or rather of fornication; [a] *though that opinion be probable, yet I beleeve that it is more probable that this interiour act is exempt from all ſin.*

a *Quibuſdam neotericis doctis videtur hanc ignorantiam minime excuſare; at quamvis hoc probabile ſit, probabilius tamen credo actum internum excuſari omnino à malitia.* Ibid.

Theſe two expedients may be made uſe of indifferently, albeit the firſt is more proper for men of underſtanding, who know how to make metaphyſical abſtractions, and the ſecond for ſimple and ignorant perſons, ſuch as are Peaſants, who may alſo draw this advantage from the Divinity of the Jeſuits above perſons of wit and underſtanding; that becauſe of their ignorance, they may even commit fornication
610 it ſelf without ſin: Becauſe invincible ignorance excuſing them from ſin, as the whole Society do agree it, as we ſhall ſee hereafter when we come to ſpeak of ſins of ignorance; *Filliutius* and ſome others aſſure us, that one may be ignorant that fornication is a ſin, without being guilty. [b] *It may be demanded,* ſaith *Filliutius, if a man may be invincibly ignorant that fornication is a ſin?* And he adds immediately after: *I anſwer, that one may. Azor* having taught the ſame thing before him, putting into the number of things which a man may be invincibly ignorant of, [c] *to go to a Whore.* Whence it follows, according to them, that one may in this eſtate of ignorance commit fornication without ſin.

b *Septimo quæro an dari poſſit ignorantia invincibilis fornicationis? Reſpondeo poſſe dari.* Filliut. mor. q. tom. 2. tr. 30. c. 2. n. 50. p. 389

c *Ad ſcortum accedere,* Azor. tom. 1. l. 1. c. 13. p. 34.

It is true, that they are conſtrained to acknowledge that it is hard to find this invincible ignorance amongſt Chriſtians; but then they return preſently to their general propoſition: [d] *That for all this it is not impoſſible, that one may be invincibly ignorant even amongſt Chriſtians that fornication is a ſin, for there are many perſons amongſt the Common people, who know not how to diſcern amongſt certain ſins, thoſe which are tolerated or not forbidden, which though they be not puniſhed, yet their diſorders are not approved: as in regard that ſimple fornication is not puniſhed, or that*
620 *common women are tollerated, they think alſo that it is no ſin to go to them. Which thing happens even in Cities where great pains are taken to inſtruct the people in the matters of Faith and Religion, as they know very well who hear their Confeſſions.* And by conſequence, thoſe perſons may by the favour of their ignorance innocently commit fornication, and particularly with common women.

d *Dari poteſt ignorantia invincibilis fornicationis. Multi enim vulgares homines ſunt, qui neſciunt diſtinguere inter peccata permiſſa vel non prohibita quoad pœnam, ut ex eo quod non puniantur fornicatione ſimplex, ſed impunè permittuntur meretrices, putant etiam non eſſe peccatum ad eas accedere, quod etiam in Civitatibus alioquin bene inſtitutis in fide & religione perſæpe locum habet, ut in qui confeſſiones excipiunt ſatis norunt* Filliut. ibid. n. 51.

Men of ingenuity and underſtanding may alſo enjoy the ſame priviledge with theſe ignorants, when they are not in a condition to make uſe of their knowledge and wit. For *Filliutius* gives them his liberty to commit the acts, not only of fornication, but alſo of adultery, of inceſt, and of all other crimes, or at leaſt he will excuſe thoſe that they have committed in that eſtate: and if after they come to remember what they have done, he permits them to take pleaſure and to rejoyce, as if they had done the moſt honeſt and moſt lawfull actions. [e] *I demand,* ſaith he, *whether ſleep, drunkenneſſe, madneſſe or ignorance frees from ſin, the pleaſure that one takes in a criminal action which one committed in that eſtate?* He relates on this matter two contrary opinions, of which the firſt condemns this pleaſure of ſin; the ſecond frees it therefrom. He in the following diſcourſe decides this controverſie, and concludes in theſe terms; [f] *I ſay firſt, that the former opinion is probable,*
630 *and that it is good to adviſe according thereto as the more aſſured for them who aſpire unto perfection, and to thoſe who have made vows of Chaſtity, or who are much in love with this vertue: for though this kind of pleaſure were not ill, yet it is a mark that Chaſtity is but imperfectly loved.*

But as for common perſons and ſuch as lead an ordinary courſe of life in

e *Quæro quinto an delectatio de re mortali ratione ſomni, ebrietatis, amentiæ, vel ignorantiæ excuſetur?* Filliut. ib. tr. 21. c. 5. n. 290. p. 34.

f *Delectationes illæ etiamſi malæ non eſſent, tamen indicant imperfectum affectum ad caſtitatem,* Ibid. n. 291.

in the world, he eſtabliſheth for them this other concluſion: [a] *The ſecond opinion ſeems to me more probable than the former, and abſolutely one may follow it with confidence. The reaſon is, becauſe this pleaſure hath not for its object any evil action, but an indifferent one.* Which he repeats alſo a little while after, anſwering the principal reaſon of the contrary opinion: which was, that it is not lawfull to take pleaſure in an evil action. [b] *I anſwer,* ſaith he, *to the reaſon alledged againſt this opinion, that this action is not a mortal ſin in it ſelf, becauſe being done without liberty, it follows that it is indifferent; as the killing of a beaſt, or the coupling of beaſts.*

He makes great uſe of this compariſon to this purpoſe, in imitation of the Holy Scripture, which compares thoſe who are addicted to fleſhly pleaſure, to Horſes and Mules: but he conceives amiſſe of the ſenſe of the Scripture; for in that he ſo boldly juſtifies theſe infamous perſons, he muſt condemn it, which condemns them. [c] *When men proceed unto marriage,* ſaith the Angel *Raphael* talking with *Tobit, without thought of God, to take their own pleaſure, and ſatisfie their paſſion, as* 640 *Horſes, and unreaſonable beaſts, the Devil hath power over them.*

If the Holy Scripture ſpeaks after this manner of perſons that enter into a married eſtate only to find their pleaſure therein, what will it ſay of thoſe who having chaſed God and reaſon it ſelf out of their minds by drunkenneſſe, take that pleaſure out of marriage, and commit adultery or fornication? and after being come to themſelves, inſtead of bewayling their exceſſe, do approve it, and entertain with pleaſure the thoughts thereof which remain with them, or the remembrance whereby they do call to mind that they have committed it.

a *Dico 2. ſecundam ſententiam videri probabilem & abſolutè tutam: quia non eſt delectatio de opere malo: ſed ex indifferenti.* Ibid.

b *unde ad rationem oppoſitam reſpondetur factum de ſe non eſſe mortale, quia hoc ipſo quo fit abſque libertate, res quædam eſt indifferens, ſicut occiſio animalis, & concubitus brutorum inter ſe,* Ibid. 293.

c *Hi nempe qui conjugium ita ſuſcipiunt, ut Deum à ſua mente excludant, ut ſuæ libidini vacent, ſicut equus & mulus quibus non intellectus, habet poteſtatem dæmonium ſuper eos* Tobiæ c. 6. v. 17.

## Article IV. Of Gluttony.

### *The opinions of the Jeſuits concerning the exceſſe of Eating and Drinking, and the bad effects which ariſe therefrom.*

THe firſt rule, which the Divinity of the Jeſuits doth preſcribe in this matter is, that it is lawful to eat and drink as much as one will, and as one can, without any neceſſity, onely to ſatisfie the ſenſual appetite and taſt. *Eſcobar* puts this queſtion: [a] *whether it be lawful to eat and drink ones fill without neceſſity for pleaſure onely?* He anſwers generally and without heſitation: [b] *I anſwer, with* Sanctius, *that it is no ſin. There is onely one condition to be obſerved; provided that it do not prejudice ones health.* 650 As if health were more dear unto them then conſcience. The reaſon is, [c] *Becauſe the natural appetite may be ſuffered to move according to its own inclinations, and enjoy the pleaſure it finds therein*; That is to ſay, that we may grant nature, or to ſpeak better, to ſenſuality whatſoever it demands, relating all to pleaſure onely, *ob ſolam voluptatem*, and regulating onely our pleaſure by our health and bodily advantage: *modo non obſit valetudini.*

a *An comedere & bibere uſque ad ſatietatem abſque neceſſitate ob ſolam voluptatem, ſit peccatum.* Eſcobar, tract. 2. Exam. 2. num. 102. p. 304.

b *Cum* Sanctio reſpondeo negativè; *modò non obſit valetudini.*

c *Quia licitè poteſt appetitus naturalis ſuis actibus frui.* Ibid.

The *Epicures* may eaſily be content with this maxime, [d] and it expreſſes very well the foundation of their errors and all the diſorder of their life. The end which they propoſe to all their actions in general, is that which this Jeſuit approves in eating and drinking, which is, [e] *to be carryed thereto without conſideration of the neceſſity, and for pleaſure onely, onely taking heed that health receive no prejudice*; and not to loſe the greateſt of all pleaſures, which is that of health and life, for a leſſer pleaſure, as that of the taſt, or any other particular ſenſe.

d *Licitè poteſt appetitus naturalis ſuis actibus frui.*

e *Abſque neceſſitate, ob ſolam voluptatem, modò non obſit valetudini.*

But if it happen that one hurts his health by not being content to eat his fill *uſque ad ſatietatem*, to ſpeak in the language of this Jeſuit, and that one takes in more then one can carry, ſo that he be forced to vomit, this will be no great harm according

cording to him, provided that his health be not thereby notably prejudiced. [f] *What ſort of ſin is gluttony?* ſaith he, and he anſwers that *in it ſelf it is but a venial ſin, though one without neceſſity fill himſelf in eating and drinking till he vomit, if it be not ſo that he be notably incommodated in his health.* He adds in his morall Divinity, [g] *That there is no mortal ſin therein, no though one even commit this exceſſe with a deſign to commit it and to vomit.*

f *Quodnam peccatum gula eſt? Ex genere ſuo veniale, etiamſi abſque utilitate ſe quis & cibo & potu uſque ad vomitum ingurgitet, niſi ex ejuſmodi vomitione gravia ſaluti incommoda experiantur.* Ibid. n. 56. p. 298.

g *Mortale non eſt, imò quamvis advertenter id faciat ac evomat.* Eſcobar ibid.

And as for drinkings he gives there in the ſame liberty as in eating, although he takes not his meaſures from the ſame rule. The rule of temperance in eating, according to this Jeſuit, is to eat as much as you will, provided you do not vomit, and hurt your health; and the rule of temperance in drinking is according to the ſame, to drink as much as you can without loſing your judgement. Whence it comes that, according to this principle, after he had made this doubt: [h] *One drinks to exceſſe, not ſo far as to be drunk, but in ſuch manner that his head akes, or the Wine diſturbes him in ſuch ſort, that he knows not very well what he doth; but yet he hath reaſon enough to know that he hath drunk too much. What ſort of ſin is it?* He anſwers definitively: *I find no difficulty at all but that I may ſay, it is but a venial Sin of intemperance.* And the reaſon is, [i] *he hath not wholy loſt the uſe of reaſon.*

h *Immoderato potu quis non quidem inebriatur, ſed aut dolore capitis laborat, aut capite tentato à vino non ſibi omnino conſtat: attamen uſus rationis perſeverat qui ſe nimis potui indulgere cognoſcit: quodnam hoc peccatum? Venialem intemperantiam dixero.* Ibid. n. 62. p. 299. i *Quia abſolutè uſum rationis non tollit.*

The Heathen Philoſophers have ſpoken with more moderation, and they have been aſhamed to give ſo great liberty unto drunkards. But as the Jeſuits make more account of the uſage of reaſon then of the rules of vertue, ſo alſo they reſpect health above reaſon, and the intereſt of the body above that of the Soul. They maintain that provided, that reaſon continue ſound, temperance cannot be hurt; and they hold on the contrary, that reaſon may be ſtifled as well as temperance, to preſerve health.

This is the opinion of *Eſcobar*, when he demaunds [k] *whether it be lawful to make a man's ſelf or an other drunk to recover the health of the body?* The anſwer is, *that one may probably believe that it is lawful when there is no other remedy. As if, for example it were neceſſary to vomit.*

k *Licèatne ſe vel alium pro ſalute corporis recuperanda inebriare, cum aliud remedium non ſupereſt? Probabiliter quis licere opinabitur, v. c. ſi opus ſit ad vomitum excitandum.* Ibid. n. 63

This is alſo *Azors* opinion: [l] *It is no ſin,* ſaith he, *to take it* (a potion to make one drunk,) *when it is taken becauſe it is proper to make one vomit, though it be taken in a quantity exceſſive for a ſound man, but not for a ſick man.*

l *Si ſumatur ut eſt potus aptus ad vomitionem, ſano quidem immodicus, ſed non male habenti, peccatum non eſt.* Azor. Inſtit. mor. l. 7. c. 22. p. 694.

[m] Tolet *ſaith the ſame thing, adding notwithſtanding a condition to exempt him from ſin who makes himſelf drunk by a maxim of health: that there be no cauſe to fear that there ariſe from his drunkenneſſe any of thoſe evils which are wont to accompany it.* But *Eſcobar*, who relates this limitation of *Tolet*, refutes it at the ſame time. [n] *This great man,* ſaith he, *ſhall pardon me, if I ſay that in my judgement this limitation is needleſſe; for when a man doth any thing with a formal deſign to provide for his health, all the evils that happen in conſequence thereof are to be eſteemed as coming by accident.*

m *Adjecit: Toletus tunc licere quando non timetur ex ebrietate aliquod malum ſecuturum, quod aſſoleat ebrietatem comitari.*

n *Quam quidem limitationem, tanti viri pace dixerim, inutilem judico; quia cum directè valetudini conſulitur, cuncta mala ſequentia accidentaria reputantur.* Eſcobar ibid. n. 63. pag. 299.

And without doubt it is for this very cauſe, and in conſequence of this principle, that he ſaith a little after, that though a man know that he ſhall fall into pollution by exceſſive eating and drinking, it is no great fault.

a *Gulæ indulges nimis venialiter: & ex ejusmodi nimietate prævides futuram in somnis pollutionem, num sit grave gulæ ex hoc capite flagitium?*

a *You sin venially*, saith he, *in suffering your self to exceed in gluttony. But you foresee that this exceſſe will cauſe you to fall into nocturnal pollution.* Thus you have the caſe. He demands, *if for this cauſe this exceſſe of Gluttony be a great ſin?* And taking *Leſſius* for his warrant, he anſwers with him, b *that it is no mortal ſin, if one have not a formal deſign to procure pollution by eating and drinking exceſſively in that manner.*

Eſcobar tr. 2. ex. 2. n. 101. pag. 304. b Ex Leſſio reſpondeo, non eſſe culpam mortalem ſi pollutionem per ſe non intendant, & per hujuſmodi cibum & potum non procurent.

He had already ſaid the ſame thing, and that alſo with advantage in the firſt Treatiſe. For here he ſpeaks of pollution which comes by a venial intemperance, but there he ſpeaks of that which ariſes from an exceſſe which is mortal. c *A perſon*, ſaith he, *ſins mortally by eating and drinking too much; is he obliged to hold himſelf guilty of the pollution which follows upon it?* This is the ſecond time that he propoſes this difficulty. He anſwers expreſly in the ſequel of the diſcourſe: d *If it happen unto him beſides his intention, he is not guilty, though he did fore-ſee that it would befall him upon it*; as he had ſaid already. And *Sanchez* ſaith the ſame expreſly, upon the ſame difficulty: e *When pollution comes through an exceſſe of gluttony, which is a mortal ſin, it is not a mortal ſin though it were fore-ſeen, if one had no intention to procure it.*

c *Peccat quis mortaliter in nimio cibo & potu; teneturne ſe reum ſequentis pollutionis habere?*

d *Minimè, ſi præter intentionem accidit.* Eſcobar tr. 1. ex. 8. n. 76. p. 151.

e *Pollutio præviſa in cauſa, nec intenta, quæ ex ſola gula mortali provenit, non eſt mortalis.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 44. p. 75.

He doth not only excuſe this crime, but all others likewiſe, as ſottiſh diſcourſes, impudencies, extravagances, quarrels, and murthers themſelves, which a drunken man may commit when he is drunk. For propoſing this queſtion: f *When a man is drunk by his own fault, and being drunk committeth ſins which are yet in his power to avoid, becauſe he hath loſt his reaſon: the difficulty is to know, whether his impotence and ignorance excuſe theſe ſins?* After he had reported the opinion of many, of whom ſome anſwer with diſtinction, and others condemn abſolutely as mortal ſins all the crimes which are committed in drunkenneſſe, he concludes: g *that we muſt affirm, that though theſe accidents do commonly befall a perſon when he is drunk, yet they are not imputed to him for ſin, if when he deſigned to be drunk, he had no ſuſpition nor any thought of theſe things, neither in general, nor in particular.* 690

f *Quando quis culpa ſua mortali inebriatur, & ebrius factus committit peccata, quæ defectu rationis non eſt in ſua poteſtate vitare: difficultas eſt, an hæc peccata ratione impotentiæ aut ignorantiæ excuſentur.* Ibid. n. 41.

g *Dicendum eſt, etiamſi eventus ſoleat eſſe frequenter ei qui inebriatur: ſi tamen tempore quo voluit inebriari, non habuit prorſus ullam dubitationem aut cogitationem de illo, nec in ſpecie, nec in genere, minimè imputari culpæ.* Ibid.

But for fear that drunkards ſhould abuſe that liberty which he gives them, or rather that they may make uſe thereof with more aſſurance and without ſcruple, he gives them this charitable advice, that when they have a mind to be drunk they take along with them ſuch pre-cautions as poſſible they can for hindring thoſe evil accidents to which they know by experience that they are ſubject whilſt they are drunk, that they may not befall them; h *becauſe that otherwiſe they would be anſwerable for them: whereas after this pre-caution, all the crimes and abominations which they can commit, being drunk, ſhall not be imputed unto them at all*, according to him; no more than if when they went to be drunk, it never came in their minde to foreſee that ſuch conſequences might follow from their drunkenneſſe; for this cauſe he ſaith purpoſely, *ſi advertat, if he perceive it,*

h *Ea autem adhibita, etſi poſtea eveniant, non imputabuntur.*

And though the ſame thought ſhould come into his minde, and as he goes to debauch though ſome friend ſhould admoniſh him, or his conſcience, and his own proper light repreſent unto him the exceſſe unto which he is wont to be tranſported while he is drunk; yet if he be not carried thereunto commonly, but by the occaſion of other perſons, who provoke him thereto, he beleeves, that he is for this never the more obliged to keep himſelf from being drunk, and he is even diſpenſed with from having any care of avoyding theſe bad effects in his 700

drunkenneſs. [a] *Notwithſtanding here are two things to be obſerved,* ſaith he: *The firſt is, that men who are drunk do not ordinarily thoſe actions, which are ſins when they are comitted by other perſons, if they be not provoked; in ſuch manner that they are commonly accidental actions in reſpect of drunkards; and they are not at all obliged to uſe precaution to avoid them, becauſe they are to be attributed to them who provoke them, and not to the drunkards themſelves to whom they happen by misfortune.* *Sanchez* indeed endeavours to uſe ſome moderation in this, or rather put a mask upon theſe words, after he had ſaid this is the opinion of *Vaſquez*: but it is his own opinion alſo, as it appears by this his ſecond advertiſement.

[a] *Duo tamen obſervanda ſunt; prius eſt, ebrios non communiter perpetrare ea quæ alias peccata eſſent, niſi ab aliis irritatos; & ita communiter eſſe à caſu nec teneri ebrios ea præcavere, quod irritantium culpæ id potius tribuendum eſt, ac reſpectu ebriorum caſu accident.* Ibid. num. 42.

710 [b] *The ſecond thing to be herein obſerved,* ſaith he, *is, that the drunkards ſay and do many things which are not to be imputed unto them for ſins, though they have foreſeen them, for either they indeed hurt no body, for being done without knowledge, they are without all malice, which had been in them if they had been done with the uſe of reaſon, ſuch as are outragious words or actions.* He contents not himſelf to juſtifie theſe crimes by two reaſons, which he gives in ſo few words: to wit, that they hurt no body; [c] *and that they commit them without reaſon and liberty.* He adds alſo a third reaſon, which is, that [d] *this exceſs which befals a man when he is drunk, does not commonly paſſe in the opinion of men for injurie, but rather for the moſt part for drollerie. So that they themſelves whom they fall upon, inſtead of being offended with them, onely laugh and make ſport at them.* As if the rule of ſin were the opinion of Men, and not the Law of God. There are many Fathers and Mothers who do but laugh at the debauches of their Children; and there are many crimes in which God is no leſs offended, though men be not offended at all, but eſteem them as honorable actions.

[b] *Poſterius eſt, plurima ebriorum dicta vel facta de ſe iniqua, non reputari culpabilia, etiamſi prævideantur, quia vel nullum damnum afferunt, atque in ebrietate commiſſa, deſtituuntur prorſus ratione malitiæ quam habent in mente ſana facta, ut verba vel facta contumelioſa.* Ibid. n. 44.

[c] *Quia vel nullum damnum inferunt, atque in ebrietate commiſſa deſtituuntur omni prorſus ratione malitiæ.*

[d] *Quippe tempore ebrietatis talia in communi æſtimatione hominum non reputantur contumelioſa, ſed tanquam facetiæ admittuntur; atque ita ipſimet adverſus quos dicuntur vel fiunt, tantum abeſt ut loco contumeliæ ea accipiant ad iramque excitentur, ut potius oblectentur & rideant.* Ibid. n. 44.

720 He adds alſo in favour of theſe exceſſes, which drunkards commit, as are blaſphemies, treacheries, perjuries; [e] *That to make them imputed as ſin, it is neceſſary that they be done on purpoſe and with knowledge,* pretending that the ſins which reſpect God directly, cannot be committed but by a deſign formed on purpoſe and with full knowledge; but [f] *when we have to do with mens intereſt and things which hurt them, he holds that it is ſufficient to foreſee them, to make them culpable in what ſort ſoever they commit them,* [g] *becauſe,* ſaith he, *it is no leſs prejudice being committed by a man thats drunk, then if he had done it with judgement.*

[e] *Vel quia poſtulant ſcientes fieri uti imputentur, ut ſunt blaſphemiæ, infidelitas, perjuria.* Ibid.

[f] *Quæ vero damnum proximo inferunt, imputantur ſi prævideantur.* Ibid.

[g] *Ira non minus lædunt in ebrietate, quam ſanæ mentis in tempore commiſſa.* Ibid.

So that, according to this Doctor, it is not ſo eaſie to offend God as Man; and there is leſs evil in ſins againſt God then Men; againſt the Creator, then thoſe that are againſt his creatures; ſo that a little temporal intereſt of a man appears unto him more conſiderable than the honor of God; and the loſs of a little Wealth, of more importance than blaſphemie it ſelf.

He alſo rehearſes, under the name of *Vaſques*, an opinion, which juſtifies all the blaſphemies of drunkards, ſaying that he would not abſolutely maintain it, but he onely diſſents from it in words, and not in reality. But it follows manifeſtly from his principles, and he has indeed propounded and expounded them with clearneſs enough in many places of his writings; and *Eſcobar* maintains them openly. [h] *Drunkenneſs,* ſaith he, *excuſes from all ſin the actions which are done without judgement,*

[h] *Ebrietas excuſat ab omni peccato in his quæ inſana mente fiunt, injurioſa, ac proinde quæ ſana quidem mente peccata eſſent, item blaſphemia, infidelitas, perjurium in ebrio, &c.* Eſcobar tract. 2. Exam. 1. c. 12. n. 56. pag. 285.



*ment,*

*ment, although they hurt others, and by conſequence they had been ſins if they had been done with knowledge; as alſo blaſphemy, treachery, and perjurie, which are committed by a man that is drunk.* See here an abolition, or rather a juſtification of all ſins in general, which a drunken man can do while he is drunk.

## THE SUMME

## *Of the foregoing* ARTICLE.

IT will be hard to alleadge any thing in the favour of drunkards and drunkenneſs, which the Jeſuits have not ſaid for their defence. For [a] *to eat and drink as much as one will, unto ſatietie*, as ſpeaks *Eſcobar*, *without neceſſity, and for pleaſure onely*, they do not acknowledge for any ill.

[b] Thoſe who eat and drink more then they can bear, ſo that they are conſtraind to vomit, or that they are thereby damnified, ſo that their head akes, or they are reduced to the ſtate wherein they know not what they do or ſay, according to them, commit but a ſmall fault and eaſie to be pardoned.

a *uſque ad ſatietatem ſine neceſſitate, ob ſolam voluptatem.* Eſcobar tr. 2. Exam. 3. n. 102. p. 304.

b *Etiamſi abſque utilitate ſe quis cibo & poto uſque ad vomitum ingurgitet.* Ibid. n. 56. p. 298. *Immoderato potu quis, non quidem inebriatur, ſed aut dolore capitis laborat, aut capite tentato à vino non ſibi omnino conſtat, venialem intemperantiam dixero, quia abſolute uſum rationis non tollit.* Ibid. n. 62. p. 299.

[c] If it be needful for a man to be quite drunk to recover his health, or to be better in health, they hold that it may be done without ſin, and that even when one is drunk for pleaſure, and with a formal deſign, he is not reſponſible for the exceſſes and diſorders which he may commit being drunk, if he did not foreſee them before he began to drink, though he had formerly often fallen therein when he was drunk.

c *Licet ſe vel alium pro ſalute corporis temperanda inebriare? Probabiliter quis licere opinabitur.* Ibid. n. 63.

*Etiamſi eventus ſoleant eſſe frequentes ei qui inebriatur, ſi tamen tempore quo inebriari voluit, non habuit prorſus ullam dubitationem aut cogitationem de illis, nec in ſpecie, nec in genere, minime imputari culpæ dicendum eſt.* Sanchez op. mor. l. 1. c. 1. 16. n. 42. p. 75.

[d] But if one think of theſe incoveniences and hath foreſeen them, they pretend that he is quit thereof, provided that he beſtow onely ſome little precaution, though to no purpoſe, whatſoever evil may happen thereupon; and that one is not at all obliged even unto this precaution, when one is urged to theſe diſorders by others.

d *Ea adhibita diligentia, etſi poſtea eveniant, minime imputabuntur.* Ibid.

*Non teneri ebrios præcavere.* Ibid. num. 43.

[e] As to the injuries, or follies, and inſolences which are committed againſt our Neighbours in drunkenneſs, they count them as nothing, and let them paſs for divertiſements, as well as blaſphemies and impieties againſt God, becauſe they provoke laughter for the moſt part, as well as other exceſſes of drunkards. In a word, they permit all things unto drunkards whilſt they are drunk, provided that they do not notably prejudice their own health, nor quite loſe their reaſon, and that they do not cauſe ſome temporal damage unto men.

e *Quippe tempore ebrietatis talia in communi hominum æſtimatione non reputantur contumelioſa; ſed tanquam facetiæ admittuntur.* ibid. n. 44.

*Niſi grave malum corporis ſequatur.* Eſcobar tr. 2. exam. 2. n. 72. p. 301. *modo non obſit valetudini.* Ibid. n. 102. p. 304. *Quando vero damnum proximo inferunt, imputabuntur ſi præviderentur.* Sanch. ſupra.

Gluttony of it ſelf is with them but a venial ſin, and they believe that it becomes a mortal ſin but onely in ſome certain caſes, and with circumſtances very rare, [f] *as when a man makes it his laſt end*, ſaith *Eſcobar*. It is true that this exceſs is very great; and notwithſtanding, it ſeems that this word eſcaped him, or that he did not conſider well what he ſaid himſelf a little after, [g] *It is ſome ſin, but venial, to eat and drink*

f *Quando in ea ultimus finis hominis collocatur.* Eſcobar ſupra n. 58. p. 298.

g *An comedere & bibere uſque ad ſatietatem abſque neceſſitate ob ſolam voluptatem ſit peccatum? Cum Sanctione negativè reſpondeo.* Ibid. n. 103. p. 204.

*drink as much as one will for pleaſure onely, without propoſing to ones ſelf any other end*, of which he renders this reaſon; [h] *That the natural appetite may be ſuffered to go according to its own proper motions, and to enjoy the pleaſure it finds therein.* For according to the common language of Philoſophie, as well as of the Holy Scripture, [i] to love a thing, to deſire it, to look after it, and to rejoyce in it for love of it ſelf, and for it ſelf, is no other thing than to eſtabliſh it for his laſt end.

The Holy Fathers have ſpoken very earneſtly againſt the Stoicks for their impiety, in ſaying that their happineſs conſiſted in the enjoyment of their own ſpirits; and againſt the Epicures, who placed theirs in the enjoyment of their own bodies. They condemned theſe two kinds of Philoſophie, as making their ſpirit and their body, their God. What judgement then would they have made of thoſe who ſay at this day, and teach it to libertines [k] *that to eat and drink to ones fill, for the pleaſure onely which they take therein, and to give themſelves up to their natural appetites, and to enjoy the pleaſure which they find therein, is their contentment and their happineſs.* It is clear that theſe Saints, following the rule of the Church, would have condemned them, as they did condemn the Stoicks and the Epicures, of making their God of their bodies, and of the pleaſure which they have in eating and drinking, and in the actions of their ſences; and in doing this they had followed the judgement which Saint *Paul* had pronounced on perſons which appeared yet leſs criminal than thoſe whom the Jeſuits maintain as innocent, whom notwithſtanding the Apoſtle *Paul* calls *Dogs*, and ſaith expreſſely, [l] that they make their God of their bellies.

h *Quia licite poteſt appetitus naturalis ſuis actibus frui.* Ibid.

i *Frui anima meo mihi bonum eſt. Frui corpore mihi bonum eſt.*

k *Edere & bibere uſque ad ſatietatem, propter ſolam voluptatem: Frui actibus mei appetitus naturalis mihi bonum eſt.*

l *Quorum Deus venter eſt.* Ad Philip. 3. v. 19.

## ARTICLE V. Of Covetouſneſs.

### I. POINT.

760 *That the Jeſuits authorize all ſorts of ways to get wealth; and diſpenſe with reſtitution of what is procured by the moſt unjuſt and infamous ways.*

1. COvetouſneſs conſiſts in loving temporal wealth for its own ſake. *Eſcobar* will not acknowledge this * affection for any vice nor for any fault, if there occure therein no notable exceſſe, nor any other evil end. [m] *What is Covetouſneſs, demands he?* To which he anſwers preſently, *that it is a diſordered love of riches*; That is to ſay, that its irregular either in it ſelf, becauſe it is exceſſive, or in its end, becauſe one refers it to ſome thing that is evil in it ſelf, [n] for without this he
770 pretends that it is innocent and lawfull, as when one loves wealth for its own ſake, without too great paſſion, and without any evil deſign.

2. Whatſoever diſorder there be in the love of wealth, whatſoever paſſion one can have for riches, he holds that it cannot be more than a venial ſin. If to get them or preſerve them, he do no point of injuſtice, [o] *This is certain*, ſaith he, *that the diſordered love of riches is but a venial ſin, if it be not found joyned with injuſtice, and a will to take or retain the goods of another, without his conſent to whom they pertain; or with a hardneſs of heart unſenſible of the miſeries of the poor, which hinders from relieving them in their great neceſſities.*

* *C'eſt à dire en s'arreſtant à luy & au plaiſir qu'on y trouve.*

m *Quidnam eſt avaritia? Inordinatus divitiarum amor.* Eſcobar, tr. 2. ex. 2. c. 2. n. 29. p. 293.

n *Inordinatus quidem amor culpabilis eſt, non ordinatus, ſive ad rectum finem directus.*

o *Certe in optandis divitiis inordinatio niſi conjuncta ſit cum injuſtitia retinendi vel auferendi alienum invito domino, vel cum duritia non tribuendi egeno graviter laboranti, ſolummodo venialis eſt culpa.* Ibid.

Following this principle, not onely covetouſneſs is no mortal ſin any longer, but alſo it cannot at all be any of it ſelf, and for it to become criminal, it behoves that it part from its own proper matter, and that it enter upon that of unjuſtice. So then we ſee the whole crime of Covetouſneſs reduced to injuſtice; but even in this eſtate and in this extremitie it ſhall not want protectors amongſt theſe new Divines; they find inventions to juſtifie injuſtice it ſelf, that they might not condemn covetouſneſs with it.

For it ſeems that injuſtice cannot proceed into a greater exceſs then to ſell and buy the honor of women, the lives of men, and Juſtice it ſelf for money, and yet notwithſtanding *Filliutius*, with many others, juſtifies this gain, which is gathered by this

this infamous and criminal traffique, saying expressely, that [y] *the recompence which one receives for doing any dishoneſt action, whether it be againſt juſtice, as to cauſe a man to be killed, or againſt honeſty onely, as for committing fornication, may conſcionably be retained, if the action be already done.* Whence he draws this concluſion, 780
which he propoſeth as a certain and undubitable truth, that [z] *that which is received for an aſſaſſination committed, for being a pander to the debauched perſons; for defaming ones neighbour; for bearing arms in an unjuſt war, for being a falſe witneſs, is not to ſubject any reſtitution.*

y *Turpiter acceptа ab aliquo pro faciendo actu turpi, qui vel ſit contra juſtitiam, ut pro faciendo homicidio, vel non ſit, ut pro conſentiendo in fornicationem, ſi actus factus ſit, retineri poſſint.* Filliutius moral. 22. tom. 2. tract. 32. c. 4. n. 103. p. 364. z *Ex his ſequitur non eſſe reſtituenda accepta ab aſſaſſinio, à Lenone, ab infamante, à milite pugnante in bello injuſto, à teſte dante falſum teſtimonium.* Ibid. num. 104.

*Leſſius* ſaith the ſame thing, and he ſaith it alſo generally. [a] *If one regard,* ſaith he, *the Law of Nature, that, which one has received in a diſhoneſt affair, or for an action which is a ſin, is not ſubject to reſtitution after that the thing is done, whether it offends againſt Juſtice or not.* And a little after he addeth; [b] *And it is more conformable to the truth, that poſitive right alſo doth not oblige thereunto.*

a *Si ſolum jus naturæ ſpectetur, acceptum ob turpem cauſam, ſeu propter opus quod eſt peccatum, opere impleto non neceſſario eſt reſtituendum, ſive opus ſit contra juſtitiam, ſive non.* Leſſius de juſt. & jure l. 2. c. 14. d. 8. n. 51. p. 145. b *Verius etiam videtur nec jure poſitivo neceſſario id reſtituendum.*

So far is it off that injuſtice hinders Covetouſneſs in theſe affairs, according to theſe Doctors, that on the contrary they hold, that it favoureth it. For if theſe perſons have not executed theſe crimes unto which they were obliged, in taking the money, they will be engag'd, according to them, to render it back, becauſe they gave it them only on condition, that they ſhould accompliſh that which they had promiſed; ſo that the true means to be able to retein conſcionably that which they have taken, without being bound to make reſtitution, is to execute readily this crime and this unjuſtice, which ſerves to cover injuſtice and its traffique.

*Layman* follows this opinion, [c] *If you have promiſed,* ſaith he, *ten crowns to a murderer to kill a man, you are not bound to pay it, untill ſuch time as to oblige you to it he hath done this crime, not without pain and danger; but after he has done the fact, common right obliges you to pay him; and if you have already made payment, you cannot conſtrain him to reſtore that which he hath received.* 790

c *Promiſiſti ſicario darum decem aureos ſi hominem occiderit: nulla naſcetur obligatio niſi poſtquam factum non ſine labore ac periculo ſuo in tui gratiam patrarit. Tunc enim ſpectato jure naturali teneris ſolvere, vel ſi ſolviſti, repetere non potes.* Layman l. 3. tract. 4. c. 6. n. 8. p. 377.

So that, if after you had done a murder by a man unto whom you had promiſed ten crowns for his pains, you had Confeſſed your ſelf unto *Layman* before you had performed your promiſe, he would have ſent you away without Abſolution, if you did not give him aſſurance, that you would ſpeedily diſcharge your promiſe made unto him who killed this man to do him a pleaſure; and he tells you, for his reaſon, that [d] *the law of nature which is undiſpenſable, obliges you to do it.* And to content your mind to engage you yet further to conſider his pains, and to pay for this villany of the murtherer, he adds this ſecond reaſon: [e] *That the pains which he had taken, and the danger that he had expoſed himſelf to for your ſake, deſerves very well to be recompenſed with money.*

d *Spectato jure naturali teneris.*

e *Propterea quod moleſtia & periculum ab illo in tui gratiam ſuſceptum, pretio æſtimabile ſit.* Ibid.

And a little after, purſuing the ſame matter, he propoſes this Queſtion; [f] *If you have drawn a promiſe from a Judge, that he will paſs ſentence for you unjuſtly, with any kind of danger to himſelf; The opinion of* Navarre *is probable, that this judge having performed his promiſe, you are obliged, at leaſt by common right, to ſatisfie him, and he is not at all bound in conſcience to reſtore that which he had received from you.*

f *Si cum Judice pactus fuerit, ut non ſine periculo ſuo, in tui gratiam ſuſcepto, iniquam ſententiam ferat, ea elata, probabilis eſt opinio Navarræ, obligationem ſaltem naturalem exinde oriri: ut quod ob eam cauſam à Judice acceptum fuit, reſtitutioni obnoxium non ſit in conſcientiæ foro.* Ibid. n. 8.

*Leſſius* is alſo of the ſame opinion, and aſſures us that a Judge who hath taken money for an unjuſt judgement, is not obliged to make reſtitution, no more than a murderer who hath taken money to commit a murder. [q] *It muſt be obſerved,* ſaith he, *that* Covarruvias *and* Cajetan *make here an exception, and believe that a Judge is obliged by the Law of nature to reſtore that which he hath taken for an unjuſt ſentence, becauſe that the overthrow of Juſtice and an unjuſt Judgement is a thing that cannot be ſold. But this reaſon is very feeble. For there is no more cauſe to ſay that one is obliged by the Law of nature to reſtore that which he hath received for an unjuſt ſentence, than for an unjuſt murder.*

q *Notandum eſt Covarruviam & Cajetanum excipere id quod acceptum eſt à Judice ut injuſtam ſententiam ferat. Hoc enim putant jure naturæ eſſe reſtituendum. Quia injuſta ſententia & perverſio judicii non eſt res vendibilis. Sed hæc ratio non eſt firma. Nulla enim eſt cauſa cur magis debeat jure naturæ reſtitui quod acceptum fuerit pro iniqua ſententia, quàm pro iniqua occiſione.* Leſſius de juſt. & jur. l. 2. c. 14. d. 8. n. 54. p. 145.

Therefore we muſt conclude by the adviſe of theſe Divines, who are the moſt famous amongſt the Jeſuits, that by the Laws of Juſtice this Judge deſerves a reward for an action of unjuſtice, for which he deſerves not onely to loſe his ſoul, but to loſe his Office if Juſtice be done on him: and by conſequence that he deſerves puniſhment and reward both at once for one and the ſame action, and that ſame alſo an unjuſt action. But it muſt be ſaid to make theſe things agree together, or to underſtand this contradiction, that he deſerves reward according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits, and that he deſerves puniſhment according to the Laws of God, of Men, and of natural equity.

If we conſider the crime of *Judas*, according to this Divinity, who treated with the Jews, to betray our Saviour unto them for money, *Filliutius*, *Leſſius*, and *Layman* would have concluded that he was not obliged at all to reſtore the money which he received, having executed that which he had promiſed, and in this they would have ſhewn the world that they had more large conſciences than that Traitor himſelf.

And to the end that the Doctrine of theſe Jeſuits may ſeem yet more ſtrange, and that we may ſee more clearly that they make ſport and play with the truth and with the conſciences of men, they aſſure us [a] that a Judge who hath taken money to paſſe an unjuſt ſentence is not obliged to reſtore it, and they aſſure us at the ſame time [b] that he who hath received it to paſs a juſt ſentence is obliged thereto. [c] That a falſe witneſs is not obliged to reſtore that which he has taken, but a true witneſs is bound thereto.

a *Nulla eſt cauſa cur debeat jure naturæ reſtitui quod acceptum fuerit pro iniqua ſententia.* Leſſius ſupra. b *Hinc ſequitur 1. Judicem teneri reſtituere id quod accepit ut juſtam ſententiam ferret.* Leſſius ibid. d. n. 64. c *Ex his ſequitur non eſſe reſtituenda accepta à dicente falſum teſtimonium.* Filliutius ſupra n 104. *Hinc ſequitur Judicem teneri ad reſtituendum id quod accepit ut juſtam ſententiam ferret. Idem de teſte qui aliquid accipit ut verum teſtimonium dicat.* Ibid. n. 102.

*Leſſius* obſerves very well that Saint *Auguſtin* is contrary to this ſo ſtrange a maxime; and that he wrote to *Macedonius*, that a Judge who received money to pronounce an unjuſt Sentence, commits a greater crime than he who takes it to do juſtice; But he quotes not this great Saint but onely to refute him, without fear that he ſhould riſe againſt him in the laſt judgement, when he ſhall judge, with God, not onely the unjuſt, but alſo the juſt themſelves, according to the Scriptures.

*Layman* maketh alſo a third queſtion, which he anſwers at the ſame time; [d] *If you have treated,* ſaith he, *with a man and promiſed him money, that he ſhall not accuſe you of a crime which you are to commit, and of which he hath a right to accuſe you; this bargain is indeed ſhameful; but after this crime is committed, you continue both obliged to one and the other, and the money which hath been received ought not to be reſtored before the Judge hath ordained it; becauſe the right of accuſing, wherof he that hath received the money is deprived, may be rated for money.*

d *Si cum aliquo pactus ſis, pecunia promiſſa, ne te accuſet de crimine patrando, qui te jure accuſare poteſt, turpis quidem eſt pactio; Sed poſtquam crimen patratum fuit, utrinque obligatio oritur, & pretium acceptum ante Judicis ſententiam reſtituendum non eſt; Si quidem jus illud accuſandi quo ille ſe privat, pretio æſtimabile eſt.* Layman, ubi ſupra.

It muſt be obſerved, that he ſaith that [c] *he who hath received money to keep ſecret the crime of another, is not obliged to reſtore it before that the Judge hath ordained him to do it.* He preſuppoſes then that if he be accuſed before an equitable Judge, he will condemn him to reſtore it. But how can he do it without injuſtice, if it be true according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits that this man hath a right to the money that he hath received, if he hath got it lawfully, and if he may keep it juſtly?

c *Et pretium acceptum ante Judicis ſententiam reſtituendum non eſt.*

*Leſſius* is of the ſame advice; and after he had made the ſame queſtion, he adds alſo another new difficulty thereunto, ſaying; [f] *And if he who threatned to accuſe him had no intent to do it, but onely to fright him, can he retain that which he had drawn from him by this artifice?* He fortifies this difficulty by reaſons, continuing thus. [g] *It ſeems that he cannot, becauſe he cauſed the contract by fraud. For he who had given him the money, would have reſolved not to have given it him if he had not been deceived. Beſides, he hath given it to oblige this man to quit the deſign, which indeed he never had at all. And for this cauſe the title upon which he founds the receiving of the money, is nul.*

f *Quod ſi ei qui minabatur accuſationem non erat animus accuſandi, ſed ſolum terrendi, poteritne id quod ſic extorſit retinere?* Leſſ. l. 2. c. 17. d. 6. num. 42.

g *Videtur quod non poſſit, quia dolus dedit locum contractui. Non luiſſet enim alter damnum ſi fuiſſet deceptus. Deinde quia dedit ut deponas animum quem non habes. Itaque titulus non ſubſiſtit.* Ibid.

He ſupports this opinion alſo by ſaying that it is *Molina*'s, who otherwiſe is not over-ſcrupulous. But after all this he concludes in theſe terms; [h] *This opinion is probable; but the contrary notwithſtanding is the more true, according to my opinion.* [i] The reaſon is, becauſe this corzenage and diſſimulation whereof this man makes uſe to draw money from the criminal in threating to accuſe him, takes not from him the right which he hath actually to accuſe him. *The reaſon is,* ſaith he, *becauſe, though he had no deſign to accuſe him, he had notwithſtanding power and right thereto, and he might make uſe of this right which may be valued by money, whether he had a deſign to uſe it or not. And for this cauſe, if you give him any thing not to uſe his right, he may detain that which you have given him.* 830

h *Hæc ſententia eſt probabilis, contrariam tamen credo veriorem.* Ibid.

i *Ratio eſt, quia etſi non habeat animum, habet tamen jus accuſandi, eoque jure uti poteſt, quod jus eſt pretio æſtimabile, ſive habeat animum eo utendi, ſive non. Itaque ſi quid det ut eo jure non utatur, poterit id retinere.* Ibid.

He quotes *Sanchez* for this opinion, which *Eſcobar* approves alſo in the Preface of his Moral Divinity, and grounds it upon the reaſon of *Leſſius*, which is the ſame with that of *Layman*; becauſe [k] *the right of accuſing of which he deprives himſelf, is valuable by money.* And he adds, that *the artifice of that deceit of him who made uſe of a ſemblance of intending to accuſe him, to the end he might draw ſome money from him is not unjuſt,* for that he had indeed a right, though he had no will thereto.

k *Jus accuſandi eſt pretio æſtimabile, ſive eo uti intendat, ſive non. Unde accedens dolus non eſt injuſtus.* Eſcobar in præmio Exam. 2. c. 6. n. 36. p. 12.

*Bauny* ſhews himſelf yet more favourable to thoſe who would not make reſtitution. For his brethren diſpenſe from that Duty thoſe who take on them to kill or ruine a perſon in his goods, by taking money to commit theſe crimes: and he diſpenſes alſo with thoſe who give them theſe commiſſions, from the obligation which lies on them to repair the wrong which they have done to their neighbour by theſe violences. See here the queſtion which he propoſes in his ſumme c. 17. q. 10. p. 201. *Whether one be obliged to recompence the dammages which are befallen our Neighbour by an action which a third perſon had done at our inſtance. For example, one hath deſired a Souldier to ſtrike or beat his Neighbour, or to burn the Farm of one who hath offended him.* It is *demanded whether the Souldier failing, the other who had deſired him ought to make good all the evill which hath proceeded therefrom out of his own eſtate?* 840

He alledges at firſt, ſome Doctors who hold that he is obliged to make reſtitution. But he adds in diſavowing them; *My judgement is not according to theirs. For none is bound to reſtore if he hath not violated juſtice. Doth one do this when he ſubmits himſelf to another? When he requeſts a favour; whatſoever deſires he had to obtain it by his means, whatſoever demaunds he makes to have it done for him, he continues ſtill free to graunt or to deny it; to what part ſoever he incline, it is his own will which moves him, whether it be the ſweetneſs or the eaſineſs of his own ſpirit, there is nothing obliges him, but his own good will. If therefore he makes no amends for what he hath*

*done, if he reſtore not things unto their former eſtate, you muſt not compel him to it, at whoſe requeſt he was induced to offend the innocent.*

He will have one believe that it is but demanding a favour of a Souldier to pray him to beat a man, or to burn a Farm, for to revenge himſelf on him, that this revenge is no injuſtice, that ſo he may diſpenſe with him for the reſtitution who is the Author and hath cauſed the thing to be done by another.

Secondly, ſpeaking of the Souldier who outrages a perſon, or burns his Farm at the requeſt of anorher, he ſaith that *nothing obliged him thereto, but the goodneſs, ſweetneſs, and eaſineſs of his Spirit.* If this action ſo cruel and ſo inhumane can paſs among the Jeſuits for goodneſs and ſweetneſs, its hard to judge who will paſs among them for cruel and barbarous, unleſs haply they who will not follow their paſſions.

But if this man who by the counſel of *Banny* finds himſelf diſcharged of the obligation to make reſtitution, be ſo happy as to meet with *Sanchez*, or ſome other who is well inſtructed in his maximes, he may perhaps learn alſo from him that there is no ſin at all in commanding to kill, to burn, or to commit all thoſe other exceſſes, eſpecially, if he be ignorant or ill inſtructed in the things that belong unto ſalvation and conſcience. For the ſame *Sanchez* draws alſo this concluſion from his principles. [l] *That he who knows well that an action is a mortal ſin, but is invincibly ignorant that it is any ſin at all to commandit, is excuſed from all faults in that commandment.*

l *Deducitur ſcientem aliquam actionem eſſe mortalem, ac invicibiliter ignorantem peccare imperando illam, excuſari à culpa imperando.* Sanchez l. 1. op. mor. c. 16. num. 19. pag. 71.

## II. POINT.

### *Divers motives and particular expedients to diſpenſe with reſtitution, though a man be obliged thereto.*

WHen a perſon is obliged unto reſtitution, even by the nature of the action which he hath done, or in the matter in which he hath offended, the Jeſuits will yet find many expedients to diſpence with him therein.

First, If he have acted without any ill intention. [m] *When is it that he who hath done wrong, is obliged to make reſtitution*, demaunds *Eſcobar*, and he anſwers quickly; *If he have not done it expreſſely on purpoſe and with knowledge, he is no wiſe obliged to make reſtitution.* There are therefore, according to him no ſins but thoſe of malice, which bring after them this obligation. Humourouſneſs and ſottiſhneſs which is found in the conduct of a head-ſtrong and raſh perſon are a ſufficient cauſe wherefore an innocent perſon, to whom he hath done wrong, onely becauſe he was not aware of him, muſt bear the puniſhment of his ſottiſhneſs, or his imprudence; It is enough that he knew not, or that he conſidered not the injuſtice that he did, to free him from the obligation of making reparation. And though afterwards he comes to be better informed, he needs not trouble himſelf much thereat, or he may even well pleaſed therewith, he will find theſe Doctors who will at once diſcharge him both of the ſin and reſtitution, by the ſame principle by which they maintain that he who hath killed his enemy by miſadventure, may afterwards be glad of his death; and that he who hath committed fornication or adultery being drunk and out of his wits; may afterward willingly and with delight continue in the thoughts and remembrance, which he doth reſume of thoſe crimes, as we have already ſeen, when we treated of the ſin of impurity.

m *Quodnam damnum inferens ad reſtitutionem teneatur? Si non fecit ex intentione, neque ſcienter, nullam ſubit reſtituendi obligationem.* Eſcobar Tract. 3. exam. 2. n. 8. p. 348.

2. Ignorance alſo, of what ſort ſoever it be, doth excuſe him who hath another mans goods from making reſtitution thereof. [n] *Ignorance of the fact or of the Law, if it be probable, excuſes*, ſaith the ſame man; and when a man doubts that he hath another mans goods, and after he hath well conſidered and examined all things, he finds that it is more probable that the things whereof he doubts are none of his own,

n *Excuſat ignorantia facti aut juris, ſi probabilis ſit.* Ibid. c. 4. n. 37. p. 353.

own, in this very caſe he is not obliged to make reſtitution according to *Palaus* [o] cited by *Eſcobar*.

o *Palaus putat ad nihil teneri: quia poſſeſſio omnibus rationibus contrariis non convincentibus præponderat.* Ibid. n. 105. p. 362.

p *Notabilis jactura decentiæ ſtatus.* Ibid. c. 4. n. 37. p. 353.

3. [p] One of the principal cauſes, whereby to diſpence with reſtitution, according to theſe Doctors, is, the impoſſibility of doing it without diminiſhing ones retinue and expence, ſo as to be taken notice of abroad.

4. Whatſoever wrong one hath done or cauſed to be done, to ones neighbour to hinder his wealth, or to procure him hurt, they diſpence with him for making reſtitution, if he have uſed no violence, but onely prayers, promiſes, preſents to deceive him or cauſe another to deceive him, or wrong him. [q] *I hinder one*, ſaith Eſcobar, *from obtaining an inheritance, an Office or benefice, when it it I am obliged to make reſtitution? He anſwers: you are obliged according to* Vaſquez *when you uſe violence, or deceit to hinder him, You are not bound, according to* Leſſius, *when you have hindred him by prayers, flatteries, preſents; becauſe that prayers, flatteries, preſents are not repugnant unto liberty.* 870

q *Impedio nequis conſequatur hæreditatem, officium, aut beneficium quandonam tenear ad reſtitutionem? Teneris ex Vaſquez quando vi vel fraude impedis. Non teneris ex Leſſio quando precibus, blanditiis, muneribus impedisti, quia preces, blanditiæ & munera non repugnant libertati.* Ibid. n. 160. p. 370.

He had propoſed before in a manner the ſame queſtion, and he had given the very ſame anſwer a little above, nu. 84. [r] *I know well*, ſaith he, *that one is obliged, to compenſate the dammage that comes by unjuſt actions, as the violences of war, of theft, of uſury, of hindring another from obtaining ſome good thing, of murder, of rape, &c. I demande in what caſe he that hinders the good of another is obliged to make him reſtitution?* See here the queſtion; to which he anſwers in theſe terms: [s] *If man do any thing either by fraud, or by lying, &c. for to hinder another, from having that good to which he hath right, he is bound to make reſtitution. If he make not uſe of any evil way, which is againſt Charity, or againſt any other vertue, as if he employed prayers, flatteries, &c. though he do it of hatred againſt him, he is not bound to make reſtitution.* It is upon this principle that Father *Banny* ſupports himſelf principally to maintain that the man who employs a Souldier to burn the Farm of another to whom he bears ill will, is not bound to make reſtitution. 880

r *Scio debere fieri reſtitutionem ex actione injuſta, bello ſcil. furto, uſura, impedimento boni alterius, homicidio, ſtupro, &c. Roge quandonam reſtituere teneretur impediens bonum alterius.* Ibid. n. 84. p. 358.

s *Si quis impedit bonum ad quod alter jus habet, actione injuſta contra juſtitiam, nempe vi, fraude, mendacio, &c. tenetur ad reſtituendum ſi id faciat actione mala contra charitatem, vel aliam virtutem, nempe precibus, blanditiis, &c. Etiam ex odio alterius non tenetur.* Ibid.

This is alſo the principle of *Leſſius*, and *Eſcobar* teſtifies ſufficiently that he took it from him, in making uſe of his authority to eſtabliſh it, and he reports it in a manner in the ſame terms! [t] *He*, ſaith Leſſius, *who without uſing violence or deceit, but onely prayers, flatteries, preſents, hath hindred one from entring into an employment, or benefice, or the like things, that is a worthy perſon, or him that is more worthy, is not obliged to make reſtitution to the one or the other, though he did it upon an evil deſign through the hatred which he had againſt him.*

t *Qui ſine vi aut fraude, precibus, blanditiis, muneribus impediuit dignum vel dignierem ab officio, beneficio, vel ſimilibus, non tenetur illis ad ullam reſtitutionem; etiamſi illud malo animo ex odio faciat.* Leſſius de juſt. & jur. l. 2. c. 12. d. 18. n. 128. p. 128.

In like manner when one would revenge himſelf, or do wrong to his Neighbour in his goods, or undoe him without being obliged to make him any compenſation, he is onely to take heed that he uſeth no violence towards them whom he makes uſe of to be the ſervants of this his paſſion. And the true means to have no need of violence, and to make them reſolve themſelves on this crime, will be to uſe prayers and flatteries; and to add, if need be, thereunto promiſes of good recompence, if he behaves himſelf well in his commiſſion, according to the leſſon of this Jeſuit. I know not if *Leſſius*, *Eſcobar*, and *Banny*, will undertake to anſwer before God, for a man to whom they have given this counſel and this expedient for revenging himſelf on his enemy, as they anſwer for him in their Fraternity within their Schools, and in their books, diſcharging him from the obligation of making reſtitution. 890

But

But I am aſſured that they would never be bold enough, to anſwer for him before any equitable perſon, or defend him in Juſtice. For if they were convinced of having made their neighbour to be beaten, or having their neighbours Farm to be burnt, or to have procured ſumme other wrong or outrage to be done him by a Souldier, or by any other perſon whom they ſhould employ, there would be found no equitable Judge, who would not at leaſt condemn them in the whole dammage charges and intereſt of the violence he cauſed to be done, though he made uſe of no violence, but onely of prayers, flatteries, and promiſes; ſo true it is, as we have already obſerved, and as we ſhall here after alſo ſee very often, that the maximes of the Jeſuits Divinity do not always agree with the moſt common rules of natural equity, and of humane Juſtice, any more then with thoſe of Chriſtian and Divine Faith and Juſtice.

5. But if any Man have been borrowing in all hands to ſupply his debaucheries, *Eſcobar* will furniſh him with a good expedient, to fruſtrate all his creditors, and to continue to live in luxurie, by renouncing his eſtate. [u] *It is demaunded*, ſaith he, *if a man who renounces his eſtate, may with ſafety to his conſcience retain that which is neceſſarie for him, and for his Family to live in honor?* He doth not onely demaund whether he may keep that alone which is neceſſary for him to live on, but to live without honor. [w] And he anſwers, with *Leſſius*, that he may, though he have already loſt both his honor and his conſcience, which *Eſcobar* alſo declares ſufficiently, adding [x] *that his anſwer is true, though that the debts for which this man yeelds up his eſtate, were contracted by ways unjuſt and manifeſtly wicked; as when one borrows money of many perſons, with a deſign never to pay it again, becauſe of the yeelding up of his eſtate which he is about to make.*

u *Rogo an tenedens bona tuta conſcientia poſſit ſibi & familiæ ſuæ ne indecore vivat, neceſſaria retinere?* Eſcobar, ibid. num. 163.

w *Cum Leſſio reſpondeo poſſe.*

x *Quod quidem verum eſt licet debita pro quibus cedit ſint ex injuſtitia & notorio delicto contracta.* Ibid.

6. The Uſurer will alſo find no leſſe favour with the Jeſuit. For among many expedients which they will give him to diſpence with himſelf for the reſtitution he ought to make of what he has ill got, he will find in *Leſſius*, that [y] *if the things he has got by uſury be ſo mingled with others, their like which belong to the Uſurer, that one cannot diſtinguiſh them, it muſt be preſumed that the Uſurer is become a lawful poſſeſſor of them.*

y *Si res illæ nomine uſuræ acceptæ, ita miſceantur rebus uſurarii ſimilibus, ut non poſſint ab eis diſtingui, tunc dominium cenſetur tranſlatum.* Leſſius de juſt. & jur. l. 2. cap. 20. d. 18. num. 135. pag. 354.

*Eſcobar* extends this anſwer ſo far as to reach a Merchant who hath received more than was due unto him, ſaying that after he hath mingled other mens money which he hath received with his own, if he to whom the money pertained demands it back again, this Merchant is not obliged to reſtore it him, according to *Vaſquez*. [z] *A Seller*, ſaith he, *receives in ſimplicity more money than he ought, and he hath mingled it with his own; is he obliged to reſtore it, when he who hath given it him comes to him to demand reſtitution thereof?* He does not ask if this Merchant be obliged to ſee and to certifie himſelf that he hath received more money than he ought, he ſuppoſes without any difficulty that he ought not; he enquires onely, if this being true and known, he be obliged to reſtore this money which is not his, and which he hath already mingled with his own; and he ſerves himſelf of the authority of *Vaſquez* to add weight to his reſolution. [a] *Vaſquez*, ſaith he, *denies it; he is not obliged thereto neither by any unjuſt manner, by which he hath received this money, he having received it in honeſt ſimplicity, nor by the ſubſtance of the thing which he received, becauſe he received it in payment, and ſo took it on a good accompt, and honeſt.*

z *Venditor accepit bona fide pecuniam, & cum ſua commiſcet, tenenturne comparente Domino reſtituere?* Eſcobar. Ibid. n. 107. p. 362.

a *Negat Vaſquez de reſtitutione c. 9. ſect. 2. dub. ult. quia non tenetur ratione injuſtæ acceptionis, qui bona fide accepit: nec ratione rei acceptæ, cum pecuniam acceperit in pretium & bona fida aſſumpſerit.* Ibid.

But if theſe two reaſons founded upon ſimple good meaning, which ſerves for a cloak to the greateſt crimes that are, according to the Divinity of the Jeſuites, as we ſhall ſhortly behold more clearly, content you not, and you anſwer this Caſuiſt, that this Merchant is deſtitute of honeſt ſimplicity, becauſe that he who gave him the

the

the money came again, and made him know that he had given him more then he ought to have done; he will tell you for your laſt anſwer that he is come too late, that the Merchant hath already mingled his money with his own, and by this medley he is become thereof the legal poſſeſſour: ET CUM SUA COMMISCENDO, SUAM FECIT.

I know not what ſecret vertue he aſcribes to the money of a covetous and unjuſt man to convert into his proper goods that which is anothers. This is not according to that which they ſay commonly and moſt truly, that thoſe of another mingled with our own proper goods, conſume them and deſtroy them. He had ſpoken more truly had he ſaid that it was not the mixture, but injuſtice and covetouſneſs that had purchaſed and appropriated the others money unto this Merchant.

Covetouſneſs and injuſtice ſhew themſelves moſt manifeſtly, 1. In doting upon ones own wealth. 2. In the uſurpation of that which is anothers by unlawful ways. 3. When what is ſo obtained, is retained without a will to reſtore it. 920

The Jeſuits teaching their Diſciples to love their own goods, better then their Neighbours lives, ſay that it is lawfull to kill him, when he attempts to take them from us, as we have already made appear, and ſhall diſcover more largely when we come to ſpeak of that commandment of God which forbids murder.

They teach to uſurpe and unjuſtly to invade anothers goods, in maintaining uſury, and in juſtifying or excuſing the moſt part of the treacheries and frauds, which are uſed in Merchandiſe or Traffique. They teach to retain and not to reſtore them as I have made appear already; and by thus much it is eaſie to judge with what exactneſs and fidelity they maintain the cauſes which they undertake; being they have omitted nothing which might favour covetouſneſs, and gratifie the greedy deſire which men have for the goods of this world.

## ARTICLE VI. Unfaithfulneſs.

COvetouſneſs carries to injuſtice, and both the one and the other engage men in infidelity. For as according to Scripture, the juſt man lives by Faith; that is to ſay, that the exerciſe of Faith and fidelity is as it were the bread which nouriſhes us; as the air which we breathe, and which is the continual employment and entertainment of this life: one may ſay, on the contrary, that the unjuſt man lives by infidelity, and that if his life be well examined, and we could pierce into the bottom of his heart, there would nothing be found in his thoughts, in his deſign, and in all the conduct of his life, but diſguiſements, deceits, and infidelity. 930

It is not onely true in the Church, that juſt and honeſt men live by Faith, but one may alſo ſay the ſame thing of all men who live together in any ſort of humane Society. Faith is not onely the foundation of religion and of Chriſtian life, but alſo that of Eſtates, of Corporations, and of civil life. It is not properly to live, to live amongſt diſſemblieg and treacherous perſons, no more than to live among enemies, being obliged to keep our ſelves always upon our guard, and to be in a continual diſtruſt, and diſquiet, for fear of being ſurprized upon every occaſion, and of loſing our goods, honor, and life.

In the mean while we ſhall ſee our ſelves reduced to this point if we ſuffer our ſelves to be conducted by the advice of the Jeſuits, and if we regulate our lives by the maxime of their Divinity, which doth openly allow and teach diſſimulation, deceit, and infidelity, as ſhall make clearly appear by this Article.

Infidelity may be committed firſt of all in things, by the ſale and by the exchange of things. 2. In contracts and promiſes. 3. In diſcourſes, treaties, and generally in words. I will make three Points of this Article according to theſe three ſorts of infidelity.

I. POINT.

## I. POINT.

*Of diverſe ſorts of unfaithfulneſs, and of deceit, which may be committed in things by altering them, ſelling them by falſe weights and meaſures, and taking thoſe which are anothers without his privity.*

VNfaithfulneſs and deceit, of which we ſpeak here, is a true theft diſguiſed and covered with ſome falſe pretence of apparent reaſon. There are many perſons who are diſpoſed to deceive; but they to whom there remains ſome little conſcience, are troubled in doing it; the light of nature alone, which is not intirely extinguiſh'd in them, makes them to ſee clear enough in the bottom of their hearts, that this is not lawfull, they muſt needs firſt deceive themſelves, that they may deceive others. And as for the moſt part, men have not ſpirit and invention enough for this, they want ſome body to aide and furniſh them with reaſons to blinde and perſwade themſelves that they may with a good conſcience do that which even their conſcience it ſelf teaches them they cannot do, when they conſult and hearken to it without preoccupations.

The Jeſuits of all the perſons of the world are moſt capable to do theſe good offices, and ſufficiently inclinable of themſelves to pleaſure the whole world. It muſt needs be a very ſtrange and extraordinary caſe in this matter, if they find not expedients to reſolve it to the content of him who conſults with them. There is no perſon of what condition ſoever he be, who doth prudently make uſe of their adviſe, who may not do all his affairs by deceit, and yet not paſs, for all th at, for a cheat, or unfaithful, according to the maximes of their Divinity.

Firſt of all, if a Child be tempted to take ſomething of his Father and Mothers goods ſecretly, and that the fear of God or Man reſtrain him in any ſort; *Eſcobar* takes away this ſcruple from him, and makes him ſee that he may do it with good conſcience, eſpecially if he do any ſervice to his Father, as there is no child but is obliged to do, and who doth not do it according to his condition, when they are of age and in capacity to do their duties.

He propoſes this queſtion: [a] *A Merchant hath a Son whom he employs in the manage of his eſtate, and who may by reaſon thereof demand of him as much for his ſalary as he would give unto a ſtranger.* See here the theſis ſuppoſed, and upon which he founds the caſe. *If his Father will not give him that which he earns, may he take it himſelf in ſecret?* He anſwers clearly, *that he may, according to the proportion of his labour and his induſtry.* He permits him to eſtimate and rate his own labour and pains, and pay himſelf with his own hands, deducting onely out of his pretended wages what his Father hath laid out in his education and maintenance; in ſuch manner that this eſtimation depends upon his own judgement and will, for that he dare not inquire of his Father how much he hath expended therein.

[a] *Filius mercatoris patris bona adminiſtrat, & poteſt à patre ſalarium exigere quantum alicui extraneo deberet. Si iſtud non poſſit à patre pretium impetrare, poteſtne clam accipere? Poteſt quidem ad juſtam æſtimationem laboris & induſtriæ ſuæ, computatis tamen in dicta æſtimatione expenſis quas pater in ipſo fecit alendo.* Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 10. n. 31. p. 163.

*Bauny* in his ſumme ch. 10. 2. 4. p. 138. ſaith the ſame thing in theſe terms: *When Fathers for whom their children are imployed, and employ themſelves continually, do not content them, as where children being now grown up are employed by them in their Shops and labour in their Trades or in the field for their Fathers affairs, are not obliged to do this for nothing; they may in conſcience exact ſo much as ſtrangers receive of them. And if it happen that through fear or other humane conſideration they dare not take this liberty where there is need, to demand a juſt recompenſe of their Fathers,* Leo num. 81 addeth, *that it is lawful for them by all ſorts of reaſon, deducting the charges their Father hath been at in their education, to take ſo much for their labour and induſtry as they would give to a ſtranger, unleſs they intend to ſerve freely.*

This anſwer is an Oracle and contains a myſtery, which it were not convenient to reveal to all the world; ſaith my Author; and to cover this myſtery, it was needfull, ſaith he, to pronounce it in Latin, (the laſt clauſes are ſo in the Original,) that they

they might be tempted thereby who underſtand not that language, and to oblige them to go and demand the knowledge and practice thereof from them that underſtand it.

b *Advertè furta eſculentorum & poculentorum quæ committuntur à famulis & ancillis, etiamſi ſenſim perveniant ad notabilem quantitatem, non eſſe peccata mortalia, ſi furentur ea, ut ipſimet conſumant.* Leſſius de juſt. & jur. lib. 2. c. 12. d. 8. n. 48. p. 118.

2. *Leſſius* ſpeaking of theft, ſaith in favour of men and maid ſervants: [b] *Obſerve, that theft which men and maid-ſervants commit in meats and drinks are not mortal ſins, though inſenſibly they amount unto a notable quantity, if they ſteal them onely to eat and drink them themſelves.*

c *Coaliſcuntne furta minuta famulorum de rebus comeſtibilibus quæ claudi non ſolent? Minimè ſi non vendenda ſed comedenda abripiant.* Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 9. n. 25. p. 162.

*Eſcobar* ſaith the ſame thing, and takes it of him. [c] *Theſe petty thefts,* inquires he, *which ſervants make of things to eat, and which are not wont to be locked up, can they by accumulation become a great ſin?* He anſwers, *No, if they ſteal theſe things to eat, and not to ſell.* 970

I will not ſtay to make reflections upon theſe petty thefts, nor to reherſe many other caſes in which children may, according to the Jeſuits Divinity, take the goods of their Fathers and Mothers, and Servants thoſe of their Maſter, reſerving that to be done in its proper place, when I ſhall handle that command of God which forbids them, and the duties of children and ſervants in particular. I will onely here reherſe another paſſage of *Leſſius*, which of it ſelf is ſufficient to authorize all ſorts of theft which a child, or a ſervant, or any other ſort of perſon may commit.

d *Crediderim non eſſe peccatum mortale quando ſciret vel bona fide putaret inferior, eum eſſe erga ſe Superioris affectum, ut libenter eſſet conceſſurus ſi ipſum ſciret tali re egere, vel tale quid deſiderare. Tunc enim cenſetur habere ex voluntate Superioris, ſaltem virtuali quæ in affectu illo latet..... Pari modo in furto non eſt peccatum mortiferum quando quis ſcit affectum Domini in ſe talem eſſe, aut certe quando Dominus rem parvi æſtimat; aut ita in aliquem eſſe affectus, ut nollet illum gravi obligatione teneri.* Leſſius de juſt. & jur. lib. 2. c. 41. d. 9. n. 79. p. 496.

First of all, he ſaith, [d] *That he believes not that a religious perſon ſins, at leaſt not mortally, in taking ſomething without asking it of his Superiour, believing that he would have given it him if he had asked it, or if he had known that he had need of it, or onely that he deſerved it.* From hence he draws this conſequence, and this maxime general, in the matter of theft: *So it is no mortal ſin to ſteal, when he knows that his Maſter hath the very ſame affection for him as the Superiour of the Religionary hath for him, or when his Maſter makes no account of that which is ſtoln from him, or when he is of ſuch a diſpoſition that he would not have him who had ſtoln it from him, obliged therefore to any great puniſhment.* 980

f In theſe few words *Leſſius* hath put together three reaſons to excuſe, in a manner, almoſt all ſorts of thefts from mortal ſin, and hath given liberty to commit them without fear of ſinning mortally.

e *Quando quis ſcit affectum Domini in ſe talem eſſe, &c.*

[e] First of all when any one perſwades himſelf that his Father or his Mother, or his Maſter, or his friend or his neighbour, or any one whomſoever, might give that which he ſteals if it were asked, or if he knew that he had need of it. A child may eaſily promiſe himſelf this of his Father, or a ſervant of his Maſter, and generally every one whoſoever of him whom he believes to have ſome inclination or affection towards him.

f *Aut certe quando Dominus rem parvi æſtimat; aut ita in aliquem eſt affectus ut nollet illum gravi obligatione teneri.*

2. [f] *When the perſon from whom ſomething is ſtoln, makes ſmall account thereof; or hath not much affection for it, or gives not himſelf much to it, this gives liberty to rob perſons that are gentle, prodigal, and good people above all, who becauſe they ſit looſe from the things of this world do make no great matter thereof.*

3. When a perſon is of that diſpoſition, that he would be loath that the thief ſhould therefore be ſubjected unto great pains, as to fall into mortal ſin, and by conſequence into eternal damnation.

There are no perſons ſo barbarous as to deſire to engage him to eternal damnation

 who

who hath robbed him of ſome thing, and much leſſe a Father, a Maſter, a Friend, a Neighbour, if he be not bereft of all ſenſe, of Chriſtianity, and altogether unnatu-
990 rall. If then mortal ſin in the matter of theft, depend on the diſpoſition and will of him that is robbed, as this Caſuiſt pretends, it will come to paſſe that no Child, Servant, Friend, or other perſon almoſt can at all offend mortally in theft.

4. [f] They hold that a Treaſurer, a Factor, a Sollecitor, a Servant and ſuch like, may traffique with their Maſters money, without his privity and retain the profit for themſelves.

f *Poteſtne Thesaurarius vel Procurator Principia Domino inſcio, cum ipſius pecuniis in ſuum commodum negotiari? Poteſt ex Doctrina Leſſii, modo nullum incommodum aut periculum domino obveniat.* Eſcobar tract. 3. exam. 4. n. 95. p. 392.

5. They teach that a Vintner who hath better wine then ordinary, for that he may not ſel it by reaſon of ſome politique order above the common price, may recompenſe himſelf therein by mingling water therewith. This is alſo the opinion of *Eſcobar*, who after he had reported the opinion of thoſe who condemn this deceit, he adds that notwithſtanding their opinion and their reaſons, [h] *Leſſius* maintains that it is lawful, becauſe thoſe that buy this Wine have no prejudice thereby.

h *Attamen Leſſius poſſe dolai affirmat, quia nulla injuria infertur emptori.* Eſcobar tract. 3. exam. 6. n. 70. p. 423.

*Amicus* ſaith the ſame thing of grain as well as of Wine; [i] *That a man who ſelleth Wine or Grain which is very good, may mingle ſo much of water with his Wine, and Rie with his Wheat, as will reduce one with the other to the quality of the common Wine and Grain which are ſold at ſame price with his.*

i *Infertur poſſe veaditorem qui vinum vel triticum venale habet optimum, tantum aquæ in vino & ſiliginis in tritico miſcere quantum ſatis eſt ad reducendum vinum vel triticum ad eam qualitatem cujus eſt aliud vinum vel triticum quod eodem pretio venditur.* Amicus de juſt. & jur. diſpen. 21. Sect. 6. n. 87. p. 282.

6. Tailors alſo may find their advantage in *Eſcobar*, who juſtifies that deceit
1000 which is very common amongſt them. [k] *He demands whether a Tailor, who hath been accuſtomed to buy Cloath or Silk by command from another for to make his Cloaths, and goes on this occaſion moſt commonly to a Shop of a Merchant, who for this reaſon ſells him a good penny worth, may retain to himſelf the benefit of his good market?* He confeſſes preſently that *Salas* condemns this as a manifeſt cheat, becauſe the Merchant gives nothing of his own to this Taylor, and that which he makes ſhew of abating him, is effectually paid by him for whom he bought it. But he concludes at laſt for the Taylor, with *Phillintius*. The reaſon upon which they do both ground this is, becauſe *this practice is paſt into a cuſtom:* [l] *For*, ſaith he, *the Merchant is indeed accuſtomed to abate ſomething to the Taylor, becauſe he comes uſually to his Shop.*

k *Sartor cui cura emendi pannos & ſerica pro veſtibus conficiendis committi ſolet, ſi unius mercatoris officinam frequentans invenit pretia mitiora: poteſtne pretii illius exceſſum ſibi remiſſum retinere? Negat* Salas *dub. 45. n. 6. quia mercator revera nihil ei dimittit, ſed dimittere mentitur, ad eum alliciendum. Porro Filliutius tom. 2. tr. 35. c. 6. n. 149 affirmat.* Eſcobar tract 3. exam. 6. n. 60. p. 421. l *Quia revera aſſolet mercator aliquid remittere ob officinæ frequentionem.*

*Filliutius* reports alſo another reaſon in this matter, which is never a whit better. [m] *It doth not ſeem*, ſaith he, *that the Taylor ſins againſt Juſtice in taking this money which comes by the good pennyworth which the Merchant affords him: becauſe the Merchants are greatly concerned that Taylors ſhould rather come to their Shops than to other men's.*

m *Non apparet ulla injuſtitia in accipiendo illo pretio. Revera enim magni refert mercatorem ut ſartores potius ad ſuam officinam veniant, quam ad alias.* Filliutius ſupra.

He pretends that becauſe the Merchant finds his advantage therein, therefore the Taylor ought alſo to have his benefit thereof. It ſeems to him reaſonable that they divide that which comes of this deceit between them, and that the Merchant ſhould give the Taylor that which he hath promiſed, he believes that he is obliged thereto: and this is without doubt by the ſame law that obliges him who hath em-
1010 ployed a man to commit a murder to pay the murderer what he had promiſed him,

as *Layman* maintains. Alſo the Taylor may in good conſcience receive that which the *Merchant* gives him upon *Fillutius* his words, who ſaith, [n] that he ſees no injuſtice therein. Preoccupation hinders him to ſee it, which yet is not ſo ſtrong as to take from him altogether the ſenſe thereof; for the check of his own conſcience makes him ſay after he had approved this traffique, [o] that they muſt notwithſtanding endeavour to break it off, and to counſel Taylors to uſe it no more for the future.

n *Non apparet ulla injuſtitia in accipiendo illo pretio.*

o *Diſſuadenda tamen eſt ejuſmodi res ante factum.*

7. Butchers and Vintners who ſell by falſe weights and meaſures, will find this favourable concluſion in *Amicus*; [p] *If the Magiſtrates have regulated the price and the weights of Fleſh, and the meaſures of Wine, ſo that the price is not ſufficient for the charge, and for their pains, and the ways of thoſe who ſell theſe Merchandiſes, they may diminiſh the weight and the meaſure ſo far, as is neceſſary to ſatiſfie all theſe things,* That is to ſay, that if a Butcher or a Vintner be diſorderly, expenſive, an ill Husband, or an ill Chapman, or ſuffer himſelf to be cheated, or buy too dear, the publique muſt pay for all this; becauſe if a Merchant be an ill buyer, he may be a wicked ſeller, and cheat in ſelling, becauſe he was cheated in buying. [q] *Theſe things,* ſaith he, *notwithſtanding muſt not be told all the world, becauſe of the danger there is therein, of falling eaſily upon injuſtice,* As if that were ſufficient, to remedy the evill which he had done himſelf before in approving it publiquely. It is with the ſame ſpirit *Fillutius* proceeds to ſay, in the other caſe which concerns Taylors, that they ought to be counſelled not to do a thing which he maintains is lawful for them, [r] *and in which he ſaith that he ſees no injuſtice at all.* 1020

p *Si publica lege taxatum ſit certum pondus carnis aut menſura vini, quæ non reſpondeat expenſis, laboribus & juſto ſtipendio venditoribus debito; poteſt ex taxato pondere vel menſura detrahere quantum ſufficit ad hæc omnia compenſanda.* Amicus de Juſt. & jur. d. 21. Sect. 6. n. 87. p. 282.

q *Verum hæc non tam facile evulganda, ob periculum injuſtitias facile committendi.*

r *Nec apparet ulla injuſtitia in accipiendo illo pretio.*

He might much better have ſurpreſſed theſe queſtions and maximes, than to hold them thus in ſecret. And it is no other then to mock the world to give counſell that they be not publiſhed, after they have been made publique by writing them and cauſing them to be printed. One may even ſay, that it were the utmoſt favour that could be done theſe cheats, to conceal that Doctrine which exempts them from ſin; becauſe they could not deceive ſo many perſons, if it were known that it were lawful for them to deceive in that manner. One truſts a Merchant that deceives him, becauſe he believes him to be a man of conſcience: otherwiſe he would not truſt him, and conſequently would not be deceived, if he knew that this Merchant who may be is under the conduct of ſome Jeſuits, or hath conſulted theſe good Fathers about theſe matters; (upon which its morally impoſſible that he ſhould not endeavour to be ſatisfied) may cheat with a ſafe conſcience, and without doing any injuſtice.

*Sanchez* goes yet farther; and maintains that as in theſe occaſions one may ſell by falſe weights and falſe meaſures; he may alſo without wronging truth, deny that he hath done it, when he is queſtioned in juſtice by a Judge, who hath power to examine him. [s] *When a taxe laid on any Merchandiſe,* ſaith he, *is unjuſt, he that ſells too dear or cozens in weight or meaſure, to the end he may ſave himſelf from the injuſtice of the taxe, and bring the Marchandiſe to be equal to the price ordained; being examined by a Judge whether he hath ſold it too dear, or have changed the weight or meaſure, he may ſay that he hath not, and aſſure him that he hath ſold after the ordained price, and that he hath obſerved the weight and meaſure; intending that he hath not done it in ſuch manner as to offend in ſelling too dear, or in not giving weight and meaſure according to the ordinance; becauſe he hath done the one and the other without ſin. And alſo he ſaith true, when he anſwers that he hath delivered all faithfully, becauſe he hath done as much as he was obliged to do therein; according to the money that he had received, and that he doth not depart herein from reaſon and Juſtice.* 1030

s *Quando taxa alicujus rei eſt injuſta ſi pluris vendens aut defraudans in pondere aut menſura, ita ut ſibi ſatisfaciat pro pretii injuſtitia, & reddat correſpondentes merces pretio dicto; poteſt hic regatus à Judice anpluris vendiderit vel defecerit in pondere aut menſura, id negare, aſſereregue ſe pretio taxato vendidiſſe, & integre pondus & menſuram tradidiſſe, intelligendo ſic, ita ut pluris vendens, aut deficiens in pondere aut menſura deliquerit, quippe abſque delicto utrumque fecit, atque ita vere dicit ſe integre tradidiſſe, nempe quantum tenebatur ex pretio accepto, neque exceſſiſſe delinquendo.* Sanchez op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 29. p. 28.

*Eſcobar* who makes profeſſion to know and to chuſe the opinions which are beſt and moſt reaſonable in every matter, out of all the Authors of the Society, has not forgot this of *Sanchez* of which he ſpeaks in theſe terms: [t] *If one thinks and probably believes that the price which is ſet upon any Merchandiſe is unjuſt, and that for this reaſon he who ſells recompenſes himſelf for this injuſtice by ſelling by falſe weights, or by ſome other way; being afterwards examined by a Judge upon theſe facts, he may deny it all upon an Oath.* It is not enough with him to permit men to deceive and to maintain their deceit by a lye; but he allows them alſo to maintain it before a Magiſtrate by perjury, if the Judge compel him to ſwear. And he covers all theſe crimes of cozenage, lying, perjurie, by an equivocation and mental reſtriction which he teaches this unhappy man, to help him with an invention to deceive the Judge after he hath deceived other private perſons; *Intelligendo ſe injuſtè non egiſſe.*

[t] *Si probabilis eſt opinio quod taxa alicujus rei ſit injuſta, & propterea venditor falſis ponderibus, vel aliàs injuſtitiam ſibi compenſet; à Judice poſtea interrogatus poteſt id totum jurejurando negare.*

Eſcobar Tract. 1. Exam. 3. num. 34. pag. 75.

Finally he permits him to make uſe of theſe artifices, provided that he can ground them upon ſome appearance and probability; *Si eſt opinio probabilis.* Which will be always eaſie to do, becauſe in all the moſt odious and unjuſt cauſes, to make an opinion probable according to the Jeſuits, it ſuffices to have the approbation of ſome one who paſſes for an able man, as I ſhall make appear hereafter.

8. The deceits among Merchants are authorized by *Eſcobar* in theſe terms; [u] *A Seller*, ſaith he, *knoweth that there will be ſhortly great ſtore of Merchandiſe, that money will riſe or fall; is he obliged to confeſs it?* He anſwers, *that he may affirm that he knows nothing of it.* And if this diſguiſe ſuffice not to ſurprize him that does deal with him, he holds, [w] *he may openly affirm the contrary to that he knows.* And that in anſwering thus, he may well injure the truth, but not Juſtice. As if a man could injure truth without wronging Juſtice in an action of juſtice, and in the common fellowſhip of men, which is ruined by theſe wickedneſſes and falſities, which by conſequence compriſe under them many injuries againſt all men in general, and againſt every one in particular, who hath a right not to be couſened and not to be deceitfully uſed, not onely when they deal about things of value, but about ſimple diſcourſes, which lyers uſe as traps for thoſe who diſtruſt not their malice.

[u] *Tenetur ne venditor de futura copia mercium, de monetæ accretione aut diminutione conſcius operire veritatem? Poteſt inuuere ſe neſcire.* Eſcobar Tract. 3. exam. 6. num. 74. pag. 423.

[w] *Aut poteſt negative reſpondere, læſa quidem veritate, ſed non juſtitia.*

I know very well that this Author grounds himſelf upon this that he pretends, [x] *that the Merchant is not obliged to tell him the truth.* But I know not what it is that can diſpenſe with him in this caſe if it be not the diſordered adherence to his own proper intereſt, which ſeems ſo favourable to the Jeſuits, that they ſuffer them to conſerve them at the charges of truth and ſincerity; that is to ſay, at the expence of humane Society, ſince without verity and ſincerity the confederacy of thieves and robbers themſelves cannot ſubſiſt. It is many times lawful not to utter the truth; But it is never lawful to tell a lie; and if my Neighbour have not always right to be informed of thoſe things which concern him not, he hath always a right not to be couzened, principally in thoſe things which concern him.

[x] *Quia non tenetur veritatem aperire.*

9. There is another ſort of cheat among the Merchants which the ſame Author Juſtifieth alſo. [y] *A Merchant*, ſaith he, *hinders that others cannot buy Merchandiſe from them who bring them from far, by foreſtalling them and buying them up at firſt hand; ſo that others are conſtrained to buy them of him more dear afterwards; is he obliged to reſtitution;* Rebellius *holds that he is obliged: but* Molina *and others aſſure us that he may be diſpenſed with herein.* This Author ſaith nothing what his particular opinion is herein, he contents himſelf to note that the greater number are thoſe that are of opinion to favour the deceiver; that is to ſay, according to his principles, their opinion is ſafe in conſcience; as if he would ſhelter himſelf under the protection of theſe Jeſuits authority, from the reproach which he ſaw might be caſt

[y] *Alios impedit quis ne merces ab aliis emant qui eas portant, ſed eas emit anticipatè, ita ut alii cogantur poſtea eas de manibus ipſius chariùs emere; obligaturne ad reſtituendum?* Rebellius *obligari docet, licèt Molina & alii eum poſſe excuſari affirment.* Eſcobar ibid. num. 81. pag. 425.

upon him for having advanced the Doctrine which opens a door to all the monopolies which are practiſed this day, which authorizeth the injuſtice of all thoſe who make hoards of Merchandiſes, Grain, Proviſions, and other things neceſſarie for ones life for exhauſting and ruining the Provinces.

10. Courtiers alſo and the favorites of Princes may advance their affairs, by making uſe of the expedient which *Filliutius* hath given them. For ſuppoſing that it is lawful for them to buy a good debt a great deal more cheap than it is worth, of him who is in trouble fearing not to be paid, he draws from thence this conſequence: [a] *That a Courtier who is near unto a Prince may buy a debt of a private perſon due to him from the Prince, for half the value, and yet at a lower rate if he thinks that it is not ſo much worth, becauſe of the little hope that this private perſon had for to be paid,* 1070 *and becauſe it is the opinion of wiſe perſons.*

a Hinc infertur 1. poſſe aulicum gratioſum apud Principem emere creditum privati hominis quod habet adverſus Principem dimidio minoris vel etiam minus, ſi prudenter æſtimetur minus valere; quia in illo privato creditore parva ſit ſpes illud recuperandi, & vere ita arbitrio prudentis judicetur. Filliutius tom. 2. tract. 35. c. 5. n. 107. p. 457.

*Tamburin* in his book upon the decalogue, which was lately publiſhed by the order of the general of the Jeſuits, and with the approbation of the Divines of that Society, holds that one may [b] buy in this manner, even the charity which a King hath granted to an Hoſpital, provided that they be bought before the King give order to pay the ſumme which he hath promiſed to the Hoſpital; adding that *Lugo* allows this purchaſe to be made even after the order is given to pay this intire ſumme.

b Si illam facultatem ſatisfaciendi hoſpitali impetraſſi, poſtquam minori pretio emiſſi ab hoſpitali creditum, licite prædictam induſtriam excogitaſſi. Tambur. in lib. 8. decalogi, tract. 3. c. 7. ſect. 8. n. 7.

11. A Judge that ſells juſtice for money or preſents, is diſcharged from reſtitution by *Eſcobar*, who takes *Leſſius* for his warrant. He preſuppoſes that [c] *the opinions are ſo divided in ſome affair that it is in the Judges power to follow which he pleaſeth. In the mean time one of the parties makes him a preſent to gain him to his ſide; it is demanded, if the Judge ſin againſt Juſtice, in receiving that which is given him to follow one of the two parties rather then the other?* See here the caſe clearly propounded, to which he anſwers as clearly in a few words. [d] *I anſwer, following the advice of* Leſſius, *that he ſins not again Juſtice.*

c Circa litem ea eſt varietas ſententiarum, ut poſſit judex utramlibet partem in judicando ſequi, unus litigantium uti gratum ſibi magis conciliet ei offert munus. Requiro num peccet Judex contra juſtitiam illud accipiens, ut ſequatur hanc partem potius quàm iſtam? d Ex ſententia Leſſii reſpondeo non peccare contra juſtitiam. Eſcobar tract. 6. Exam. 6. n. 44. pag. 743.

It is eaſie to ſee what gap this anſwer opens to the corruption of Juſtice, there being ſcarcely any point ſo clear and indubitable, which may not be made obſcure and doubtful, and whereupon conſequently one may not imagine that he may take money to judge to the advantage of whether ſide he will, without being obliged to reſtore it. 1080

This Jeſuit had before propounded the ſame queſtion, and had reſolved it in the ſame manner in his 3. Tract. [e] *Suppoſe*, ſaith he, *that the right of the parties be equal, may the Judge take any thing for judging?* Fagundez ſaith *that this is Lawfull, not onely to the electors who are to name a man to a majorality, to a Chair, or a Chappel, but alſo for a Judge, when the right ſeems equal on both ſides, if there be no poſitive Law to forbid it; becauſe that in this caſe the Judge may give the advantage to whether he pleaſeth. And this is the reaſon, becauſe he may do a favour, and this favour may be valued by money, becauſe for the moſt part he loſeth the friendſhip of one of the parties.*

e Suppono cauſam eſſe æqualem, poteſtne judex aliquid accipere? Docet Fagundez, dec. tract. 2. lib. 8. c. 26. aliquid poſſe accipi non ſolum ab electoribus ad majoratum, cathedram, capellam, ſed etiam à Judice quando, ut ſupponitur, Sententiam profert in caſu æquali, ſeclusa lege poſitiva in contrarium: quia pro ſuo arbitratu poteſt cuilibet parti dare victoriam, quare datur locus gratificationi quæ eſt pretio æſtimabilis, utpote quæ plerumque cum jactura amicitiæ alterius partis conjuncta eſt. Eſcobar Tract. 3. exam. 2. n. 111. p. 363.

It is in the ſelf ſame manner, and for the ſame reaſon, that *Layman* ſaid before, ſpeaking of a man who had been employed as an aſſaſſinate, [f] *that the pains which he took and the danger whereunto he was expoſed to do this favour, is a thing which may be valued by money.* *Leſſius* and the ſame *Layman* make uſe of the ſame reaſon to juſtifie him who takes money, for concealing the crime of another. [g] *Becauſe that the right which he hath to accuſe, whereof he deprives himſelf, is valuable by money.* So that theſe people ſubject all things to intereſt, and ſet every thing to ſale at a price for money, the lives of men, Juſtice, and even which they that call favour, which ceaſeth to be a favour when it is bought or ſold out. The reaſon for which *Eſcobar* proves that judgement may be ſold is conſiderable. [h] *For*, ſaith he, *it doth commonly make him loſe the friendſhip of one of the parties.* For according to this ſtrange rule of Juſtice, a Judge may almoſt always take money, becauſe it happens almoſt always that he cannot do Juſtice to the one party without offending the other; ſo that he may cauſe himſelf to be recompenſed in money, by him who gains his cauſe, for that which he believes he ſhall loſe by loſing the friendſhip of him whom he condemns.

f *Moleſtia & periculum ab illo in tuam gratiam ſuſceptum pretio æſtimabile eſt.*

g *Siquidem jus accuſandi, quod ille ſe privat, pretio æſtimabile eſt.*

h *utpote quæ plerumque cum jactura amicitiæ alterius partis conjuncta eſt.*

I ſpeak not of theſe injuſtices here, but onely ſo far as they contain unfaithfulneſs in them, and deceit, reſerving it to another place, that is to ſay, to that wherein I ſhall handle the duties of Judges, to make appear that the Divinity of the Jeſuits extends this power, which it gives them for money, to preferre one party before the other in equal right, even unto that caſe alſo wherein the right of him who is to be preferred is leſſe probable.

12. Finally he furniſheth the Eccleſiaſticks as well as others with expedients to cheat men in their profeſſion, and in the exerciſe of their charge. I do lay aſide an infinite of diſguiſements and jugling tricks which they teach and practiſe themſelves in the conduct of ſouls, and in the adminiſtration of Sacraments, of which abundance of examples will be found in this extract, particularly when we ſpeak of confeſſion. I ſhall produce here onely one or two of the moſt ſenſible and groſſe.

[i] Dicaſtillus aſſures us that *it is the opinion of Father* Sa, *Maſter of* Gabriel Vaſquez, *one of the moſt wiſe Fathers of their Society. Doctor of the Univerſity of* Alcala, *to whom Divinity is greatly obliged; that he ſins not at all who ſaith that he is ſo noble as is requiſite for him to enter into certain orders of religion, or to certain dignities and prebendies. Becauſe*, ſaith he, *the cauſe for which perſons ought to be admitted into a religious order, ſhould be the calling of God, and a deſire to be religious. And as for prebends, it ought to be merit in thoſe who demand them.* 1. This great man will have none enter into a religious order for his nobility, as a neceſſary condition, but he conſents well enough that he enter therein by lying and couſenage. 2. If a man may enter into an order of Religion and into Eccleſiaſtick offices by vocation, as he ſaith, which is moſt true; it follows, that if he be permitted to enter thereunto by lying, God calls lyars and cheats into the Eccleſiaſtick ſtate.

i *Sapientiſſimus quondam Pater de Sa noſtræ Societatis Gabrielis Vaſquez Magiſtri, & de re Theologica in Complutenſi Academia optime meritus, dixit non peccare eum qui finxit talem ſe genere ſeu genealogia, qualem requirit Religio aliqua, vel qualem ad præbendas & dignitates requirit aliqua Eccleſia; quia cauſa ad admittendum in Religionem debet eſſe Dei vocatio & deſiderium perfectionis, & ad præbendas merita candidatorum.* Dicaſtillus l. 2. tract. 2. diſp. 6. dub. 5. n. 106.

*Eſcobar* propounds this queſtion; [k] *Whether it be lawfull in adminiſtring the communion, to give to a ſinner not diſpoſed, but who is not known for ſuch an one, an Hoaſt which is not conſecrated, to the end he might avoid ſcandal?* He anſwers, *there are ſome who holds he may do it.* But to make this Invention to ſucceed the better, he adjoyns thereunto another for avoyding a great inconvenience which without that might happen there upon. [l] *There are who ſay that this may be done,* ſaith the Jeſuit, *provided that this Hoaſt which is not conſecrated be ſo well hid that no body ſee it or worſhip it.* But what means is there to put this Hoaſt that is not conſecrated, into the mouth of him who communicates, that neither he nor thoſe who are near him may ſee it. And when none do ſee it, how can you hinder him who receives it, believing that it is the body of Jeſus Chriſt, that he adore it not, ſince none receive the Hoaſt without adoring it.

k *Liceatne peccatori occulto indiſpoſito, ad vitandum ſcandalum particulam non conſecratam miniſtrare? Poſſe aliqui docent.* Eſcobar tract. 7. exam 6. num. 41. pag. 867.

l *Poſſe aliqui docent, modo particula ita occultetur, ut nec videatur, nec adoretur.*

I know not whether *Eſcobar* have ſeen theſe inconveniences which follow upon this new practice. For though he doth not diſapprove it abſolutely, he gives therein another practice, which likes him better. [m] *For me*, ſaith he, *I believe with* Henriquez *that it were better for the Prieſt to make ſhew of putting the Hoaſt into the mouth of the ſinner.* It behoves him to have a ſlight of hand to do this; and he that knows to play this trick without being perceived, may very well do others. But what means is there to hinder him who is mocked in this ſort, and opens his mouth to take nothing, that he ſhould not perceive it, and that he ſhould not complain, and not make any ſcandal? for this is that which the Jeſuits eſpecially fear, to diſcontent men, and to give them cauſe of complaint. Notwithſtanding this *Eſcobar* aſſures us that he hath made uſe of this expedient many times, and that it ſucceeded well with him. [n] *Which I have done*, ſaith he, *oftner than once, without danger of ſcandal.*

m *Aſt ego cum Henriquez l. 6. c. 22. n. 4. ſatius cenſerem ſimulare Sacerdotem ſe particulam in os peccatoris immiſiſſe.* Ibid.

n *Quod non ſemel abſque periculo ſcandali præſtiti.*

I ſtay not to examine this conduct, I onely admire at the cunning and rarity thereof. For ſurely there is nothing like it to be found in the Books of the Saints, who have governed the Church unto our age, though there wanted not ſinners who in their 1120
view preſented themſelves to communicate unworthyly, and they had at leaſt as much zeal for the honor of Jeſus Chriſt, and for the Salvation of ſouls as the Jeſuits; and it may be ſaid that Jeſus Chriſt himſelf knew not of this ſecret, ſince he made not uſe of it in giving *Judas* the communion.

But if this deceit hath been found out onely to hinder that Sacriledge might not be committed, doth the ſinner who is wholly reſolved, and ready to commit it in preſenting himſelf to the communion, ceaſe to commit it before God, when he receives that Hoaſt which he believed to be conſecrated, though it be not at all; as *Herod* endeavouring to put to death the Son of God newly born, committed ſo many murders of God as he made Infants to be killed with a deſign to involve our Lord in the univerſal maſſacre.

But although this ſort of deceit were not criminal in it ſelf; yet it would not ceaſe to be pernicious in the conſequences thereof. Where may we preſume to finde fidelity among the Jeſuits, if we cannot be aſſured of it in the moſt Holy actions? will they make us know by this that there is nothing of proof againſt their wit and ſubtilty, and that there is nothing ſo Holy where their Divinity cannot find place for 1130
deceit, Treachery.

## II. POINT.

### Of Infidelity in Promiſes and Oaths.

### SECT. I.

*Several ways of mocking God and Men without puniſhment, and without Sin, according to the Jeſuits, in promiſing that which they never intend to do, and not doing that which they have promiſed, although they are obliged thereto by Vow and by Oath.*

GOd having brought the World out of nothing by his word, and having eſtabliſhed Religion in the world upon his promiſes; men alſo have not aſſociated themſelves, and do not preſerve the union and peace, either of ſtates or Religion, but by their faith which they give unto one another, and by their promiſes which they make unto God. Without the Word of God there would neither be World nor Religion, and if men were not faithful to keep their words, the Church and the World would ſoon become a deſert and a confuſion; Cities would be without Government, Kingdoms without Laws, and civil and religious Corporations without diſcipline; and for that cauſe there would be nothing but diſorder, diviſion, injuſtice, and treachery. So that one may ſay, in a ſenſe moſt true, that the world ſubſiſts not onely by the Word of God, but alſo by that of men; and that if God ſhould withdraw his bleſſing from his Word, the world would be reduced to no-

thing; in the ſame manner if men were deſtitute of fidelity in theirs, it would fal[l] into ruine and deſolation.

1140 Hereby it may be judged what miſchiefs and miſeries they are capable to cauſe in the world who teach men to fail of their words, and who ſtudy to furniſh them continually with new inventions and new ſubtilties, to banniſh ſincerity from their words, and fidelity from their promiſes, upon which is founded all the commerce and all the fellowſhip which they have one with an other in all ſorts of profeſſions.

All theſe inventions and all theſe ſubtilties of the Jeſuits may be referred to equivocation in words, and want of intention in promiſes; the one is a means to ſay what one will, without lying; and the other, an expedient to promiſe all things, without being obliged.

*Filliutius* to authorize and facilitate all at once the practice of equivocations, amongſt many examples which he brings, ſets this down in the firſt place. [a] *They alledge,* ſaith he, *commonly ſome examples of equivocations, as firſt of all of him that promiſes ſomething outwardly, without intention of promiſing. For if one ask him if he have promiſed, he may ſay no, intending that he had not promiſed by any promiſe that obliged him: and by conſequence he may alſo ſwear, for otherwiſe he ſhould be conſtrained to pay that which he owes not.*

a *Afferri ſolent exempla aliqua, ut primo ejus qui promiſit exterius & abſque intentione promittendi. Si enim interrogetur an promiſerit, negare poteſt, intelligendo ſe non promiſiſſe promiſſione obligante, & ſic etiam jurare; alioquin urgeretur ſolvere quod non debet.* Filliutius tom. 2. tract. 25. n. 323. p. 161.

1150 He pretends that he owes not that which he hath promiſed, and that he lyes not in forſwearing it, becauſe in promiſing and in ſwearing he had no intention to promiſe or ſwear, no more then to perform what he promiſeth. That is to ſay, that becauſe he had covered infidelity and perjury under a ſhameful diſguiſe and hypocriſie, this latter crime juſtifies the other two, and he is innocent, becauſe he hath committed three ſins at once, of which every one apart had been ſufficient alone to make him criminal.

If it be true that men are not obliged neither by their words nor oaths, no more then by the Laws of God and Man, which command them to keep both the one and the other; but onely by the ſecret intention which they have in promiſing and ſwearing; it is clear that we can never be aſſured of any perſon, nor give any perſon any aſſurance by any proteſtations or oaths whatſoever. Libertines and cheats may boldly couzen the whole world, following theſe principles without injuſtice: and they cannot be juſtly condemned to perform their words, becauſe they are obliged to nothing, having had no intention to be obliged.

*Sanchez* hath found another means to diſingage him who hath truly had an intention to promiſe, ſaying that he ſhould be diſpenſed with to retain that which he had promiſed, provided that in promiſing he had onely a deſign to promiſe and not 1160 to perform that which he had promiſed. See how he ſpeaks: [b] *All the difficulty is reduced to this, to know if he that hath ſworn had an intent to ſwear, but not be obliged in ſwearing, if he be truly obliged?* After he had reported the opinions and the reaſons of thoſe who hold that this oath obliges, he adds: [c] *The ſecond opinion, which I hold more probable, holds that in this caſe the oath obliges not at all.*

b *Tota difficultas eo pertinet, quando jurans habet animum juvandi, at nullatenus juramento ſe obligandi, an tunc revera obligetur.* c *Poſterior ſententia, quam probabiliorem puto, ait tunc juramentum non obligare.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 10. n. 7. & 8. p. 42.

*Tambourin* proceeds yet farther. For he believes that it is probable that he who doubts whether he had any intention to oblige himſelf in making a vow or a promiſe is not obliged to obſerve his vow or his promiſe. [d] *If you be aſſured,* ſaith he, *that you have made a vow or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your ſelf, or if the words which you uſed in your oath contained an invocation of God, at leaſt a tacite one, I believe it is probable that you are not obliged to keep it.*

d *Si certo voviſti vel juraſti, aut ambigis an animum te obligandi habueris per illa verba, ſeu per illud juramentum; an tua verba invocationem Dei, quæ eſt de eſſentia juramenti, ſaltem tacite continuerint, ... ? Puto non eſſe improbabile te nequaquam obligari.* Tambur. decal. l. 1. c. 3. ſect. 7. lit. V. n. 6.

g Scio Valentiam 2. 2. d. 6. q. 6. p. 1. cenſere: Si promittas animo quidem te obligandi, ſed cum voluntate rem promiſſam nullatenus exequendi, tunc nullam exurgere obligationem; quia ſi nullam habes voluntatem rei faciendæ, nullum emittis votum. Tambur. decal. l. 3. c. 12. ſect. 1. n. 4.

f *Valentia*, by the relation of the ſame Author, holds that *a perſon even who hath an intention to oblige himſelf, is not obliged, provided he had no intention to execute that which he promiſed.* There is need onely of common ſenſe, to ſee evidently that theſe ſtrange maximes are favourable to cheaters and deceivers, and that they give them all liberty to exerciſe their cheats; ſince, according to theſe principles, all fidelity of promiſes, and obligation to keep them, depends on their intention and on their 1170
will; that is to ſay, upon infidelity its ſelf; ſince infidelity is nothing elſe but an intention and a will not to do that which is promiſed; and it is by this intention it ſelf that theſe Divines ſerve themſelves to juſtifie cheats, and make them faithful, by diſpenſing with them for that obligation which all Laws, Divine, humane, and natural do impoſe upon them to keep their promiſe.

h Illud notâ: Sic ſimulatio etiam in re gravi verbo tenus vovere, non tranſcendere peccatum veniale, quia ſolum eſt mendacium, nec redundans in gravem Dei irreverentiam Tambur. decal. 3. cap. 12. ſect. 1. num. 3.

*Tambourin* gives alſo this rule for vows: h *That to feign in an important matter, and to vow onely with ones lips is but a venial ſin; becauſe it is onely a lye which contains no great irreverence towards God.* This were to deride a man, to promiſe him that which we have no deſign to perform, and the offenſe will be ſo much the greater, if the perſon who promiſes be baſe in condition and merit, and much below him to whom he makes the promiſe; and this Jeſuit pretends that a man, who is nothing before God, may promiſe and vow unto him an important thing, with a formed deſign not to do that which he promiſes him, without committing any great irreverence againſt him. That is, that it is lawful for him to bear a greater reſpect unto a man then God, and to ſcorn him without committing any great ſin.

But if theſe two ſubtilties, to promiſe without intention to promiſe, and to promiſe without intention to do what is promiſed, be not ſufficient to cauſe cheatery to proſper, and that it will not ſo be truſted, theſe Doctors hold that it is lawful to add an oath. And for this effect

i *Juramenta non ſunt: in mea fide, in mea conſcientia, in fide Chriſtiani, in fide Religioſi, in veritate.* Emanuel Sa, Verbo Juram. n. 1. p. 295.

First of all, *Emanuel Sa* ſaith that there are many ways to ſpeak and to affirm, 1180
which paſs commonly for oaths, but indeed are none. i *It is no oath*, ſaith he, *to ſay by my faith, or my conſcience, on the faith of a Chriſtian, on the faith of a Monk, in truth.*

k *Aliot loquendi modos adinvenit deſiderium non pejerandi; Scilicet, poſſum jurare per Deum, per Chriſtum: jurabo per Deum. Si juro per Deum, quare mihi fidem non præſtas.* Eſcobar tr. 1. ex. 3. n. 17. p. 72.

l *Qui quidem loquendi modi licet imperitis vel incautis juramenta videantur, verè cum nihil affirment, ſed ſuſpenſa ſit oratio, juramenta non ſunt.* Ibid.

*Eſcobar* approving the opinion of *Emanuel Sa*, and advancing it yet higher above him, addeth; k *That he who deſires not to ſwear indeed may find other forms of ſpeaking, as I may ſwear by God, by Jeſus Chriſt, I will ſwear by God; if I ſwear by God, wherefore do you not believe me?* This is not to deſire not to forſwear a mans ſelf, but to deſire to deceive others without being diſcovered, which hath cauſed theſe new manners of peech to be found out, which are no other thing but traps to catch the ſimple, and thoſe who are not accuſtomed to diſguiſes, and to the languages of theſe maſtercheats, as he declares himſelf, adding. l *That though the ignorant and thoſe who do not look nearly to them, take theſe ſort of ſpeeches for oaths, it is true notwithſtanding that they are not, becauſe they aſſert nothing, and they are imperfect diſcourſes, and have no determined ſence.*

If theſe expreſſions which paſs in common uſage for true oaths, are not ſuch indeed, as theſe Jeſuits ſay, they who make uſe of them to make believe that they ſwear indeed, are like them who make or put off falſe money to ſurpriſe groſſe witted perſons who receive them for good; or who make uſe of a counterfeit deed in a ſuite, becauſe they are well counterfeited, and may paſſe for true. And in a man- 1190
ner all theſe forms of ſpeech, which *Emanuel Sa* and *Eſcobar* approve, were not invented, but to intrap the ſimple and the ignorant, as they themſelves do teſtifie.

*Sanchez* imploys almoſt a whole Chapter to rehearſe different forms of ſpeech and aſſeveration, which may paſſe for oaths though they be none, according to his judgement; as when one ſays: [m] *It is true, as it is true that I am a Chriſtian, a Prieſt; if this be not, I have no faith in God, I renounce God:* [n] *This is as true as the Goſpel, before God this is ſo: God knows it is ſo.*

m *ut ſum Chriſtianus, Religioſus, Sacerdos, vir bonus, ita eſt. n.* 16.

*non credo in Deum, vel abnego Deum, non eſt poteſtas in Deo ſi hoc non eſt; ita coram Deo ita eſt; vel Deus videt ita eſſe* n. 20. n *Hoc veritas eſt inſtar Evangelii, hoc eſt verum ſicut Evangelium.* n. 19. Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 4. n. 16. 17. 19. 20. p. 8.

Yet he confeſſes that Saint *Auguſtin* aſſures us that theſe forms of ſpeech are true oaths; and that he might not condemn them openly, he ſaith that there is indeed an equivocation in theſe words, and that for this reaſon they may or may not be taken for oaths. He ſaith the ſame thing of this expreſſion, [o] *On my faith, by my faith, the faith of an honeſt man, the faith of a King, a Prieſt, a Religious man*: As alſo of this which is common enough: [p] *God be my witneſſe.*

o *In fide mea, per meam fidem, regiam, viri boni, aut notabilis.* n. 32. p *Teſtis eſt mihi Deus.* n. 21.

He concludes from the principles which he hath eſtabliſhed in the ſame place, that, [q] *when one demands of a man by the name of God, or by his own proper life, if that which* 1200 *he askes of him be true; and he anſwers ſimply yea, this is no oath.* And a litte after he teaches to thruſt together in one propoſition all the oaths that can be made; in ſuch manner that it may appear that one ſwears, yet without ſwearing. See the words: [r] *It is no oath to ſay thoſe words which ſome are accuſtomed to make uſe of when they would not ſwear at all: I ſwear by all that can be ſworn of, by the life of all thoſe things.*

q *Nono deducitur non eſſe juramentum cum quis per Deum vel per propriam vitam interrogatus an ita ſe res habeat, reſpondet abſolute ita ſe rem habere.* num. 22. r 1. *Deducitur non eſſe jusjurandum quod communiter aliqui juramentum vitare volentes dicere ſolent, Per totum id, vel per vitam ejus quod jurare poſſum.* Ibid. n. 23.

Who can be ſubtile enough to apprehend that it is poſſible not to ſwear in ſwearing by all things that may be ſworn by? we muſt then learn this ſecret of *Sanchez*: [s] *For I have learned by experience,* ſaith he, *that thoſe who are accuſtomed to ſay they ſwear by all that may be ſworn, intend to ſay nothing elſe, but that they indeed will not ſwear by any thing, being it is not lawful for them to ſwear by any thing without neceſſity.* Thus it is that one becomes ſubtile by conferences with Jeſuits, and learn to make ſport with all other men as ignorant of the act of deceiving by lyes and perjuries.

s *Nam, ut experientia didici, id tantum volunt dicere, cum per nullam rem liceat abſque neceſſitate jurare per nihil juro.* 76.

In the ſecond place, when one is reſolved to ſwear, one may chuſe words of double meaning, and make uſe of a mental reſtriction, the better to deceive. [t] *The difficulty is,* ſaith Sanchez, *when he who ſwears intends to deceive uſing words that are* 1210 *captious and have double meaning; or reſerving in his minde ſome condition or ſome clauſe to ſurprize him to whom he ſwears, and who takes his oath as ſincerely made.* He firſt reports the opinion of thoſe who hold that this oath obliges in the ſenſe in which he to whom it is made had reaſon to take it; to which he adds the authority of ſome Fathers and Canons which are expreſſe for this opinion. But notwithſtanding all this he concludes, [u] *that this deceiver is not obliged beyond his intention by vertue of his oath*; and he grounds it onely on this reaſon; [w] *That an oath cannot oblige in conſcience beyond the intent of him that ſwears; and by conſequence, he that hath no intention to ſwear, cannot be obliged to any thing at all.*

t *Difficultas eſt quando juransfuit in dolo, utens verbis callidis & amphibologicis, aut conditionem aliquam mente retinuit ad decipiendum eum cui jurat exiſtentem in bona fide. Quibus-*

*dam placet juramentum tunc obligare juxta ſenſum quem debite intellexit is cui juramentum præſtitit. Idem eſt, juramentum non obligare tunc ex vi & religione juramenti, ultra doloſi illius juranti intentionem.* Sanch. op. mor. lib. 2. c. 10. n. 12. 13. p. 49 u *At dicendum eſt, juramentum æquit in foro conſcientiæ obligare ultra jurantis intentionem; atque adeo ſi juranſ non intendat, ad nihil tenetur.* w *Quia juramentum*

All ſorts of perjures, as it ſeems, cannot be authorized more openly, nor can there a more large or eaſie entrance be made to all manner of falſe oaths; and there would be no more perjuries in the world, if the moſt deſperate perſons that give themſelves up to this crime, could believe this maxime as far removed from reaſon and

common ſenſe, as from juſtice and natural equity, and imagine that for them not to perjure themſelves, nor to be obliged in ſwearing contrary to what they know, and what they deſire to do, it were ſufficient to have no intention to ſwear even then when they ſwear indeed.

In the third place, if any one be ignorant in the art of making mental reſtrictions, this Jeſuit will teach him that alſo, and how to uſe them with addreſſe in ſwearing. For having demanded: [x] *If it were lawful to ſwear to give a thing, intending it with this condition reſerved in minde: I ſwear that I will give it, if I be otherwiſe obliged to do it then by my oath.* I muſt plainly avow that there are ſome that hold that this reſervation is but a cozenage, and that it hinders not at all the oath from being obligatory; but he maintains againſt them, [y] *that abiding in the opinion that I have already taken up numb. 15. I muſt ſay that it is lawful; for it matters nothing that theſe words cannot bear that double equivocal ſenſe, neceſſity conſtraining to make uſe of them.* This neceſſity conſiſts in this, that otherwiſe the man would not be deceived. 1220

x *An liceat tunc jurare retinendo mente hanc conditionem; jure me datuum, ſi ſecluſo juramento ſum debitor.* Id ibid. c. 5. n. 38. pag. 29

y *Attenta noſtra ſententia* n. 15. *tradita, dicendum eſt id licere, quia nihil refert verba eam amphibologiam non pati, & cogit neceſſitas ea uti.* Ibid.

And though this oath were made in publique before many perſons who would be ſcandalized ſeeing it not accompliſhed, he holds that this ſhould not trouble any man: [z] *For they ought and might believe that the oath was wreſted to ſome other ſenſe,* by ſome ſlight of wit and mental reſervation; which he confirms by the authority of *Valentia* his fellow Jeſuit, ſuppoſing with him that the whole world hath read and ſtudied their equivocations and maximes of lyes and perjuries, and that there is none who ought not to know the ways to defend himſelf againſt them, as well as to uſe them.

z *Poterunt enim & debebant credere juramentum in alium ſenſum fuiſſe detortum.* Ibid.

In the fourth place, that none may be ever caught unprovided of equivocations, he teaches this, which may be almoſt always made uſe of. [a] *It follows,* ſaith he, *that if a promiſe by oath to pay a certain ſumme of money, be drawn from a man unjuſtly and by force, he that ſwears in this manner may uſe an equivocation in theſe terms, I ſwear to you that I will give this money: intending that he would give it to him to whom he ſwears, or ſome other, becauſe theſe words may receive either of theſe two ſenſes.* 1230

a *Decimo deducitur, ſi per injuriam extorqueatur promiſſio jurata alicui jus pecuniæ dandæ, licere juranti uti hac æquivocatione: Juro tibi me numeraturum pecuniam, intelligendo ut ille caſus tibi regatur à verbo juro, ita ut ſit ſenſus: tibi juro fore ut numerem pecuniam, ſive tibi, ſive alteri, quod ea oratio patiatur utrumque ſenſum.* Ibid. n. 37. p. 29.

If this form of equivocation ſeem not ſubtle enough, behold another: *If in the tongue in which one expreſſes ones oath, the name of God ſignifie divers things, it will be lawful to ſwear by the name of God, taking it in ſome other ſignification,* according to this rule one may without fear ſwear by the name of Jeſus Chriſt, becauſe there are others named Jeſus beſides the Son of God; and that this word Chriſt is attributed to divers perſons in Scripture, and that not onely to Chriſtians, but alſo to Jews.

He adds alſo in the ſame place a third way to ſwear by equivocations, which is very eaſie and very favourable to ſtammerers that cannot pronounce certain letters. [b] *Likewiſe,* ſaith he, *it is but a venial ſin at moſt to ſay,* uro, *which ſignifies I burn, inſtead of ſaying* juro, *I ſwear, to make the propoſition falſe and uſeleſſe, though one burn not at all.* And fearing in ſome ſort that it ſhould be too great a ſeverity to condemn of venial ſin him that made uſe of ſo pleaſant a ſubtilty, he adds: [c] *I believe that it will be no lyes if the word,* uro, *be taken materially, pronouncing it with a deſign to ſignifie nothing in the manner I have opened in the* 10. *number, ſpeaking of other forms which are uſed in ſwearing.* Now in the place whereunto he referres the reader, he ſaith, that when one is required to make oath unto a perſon in a caſe in which he believes that he is not obliged to ſwear, he may nevertheleſſe do it without fear of perjury, though that he ſaith be falſe, and that to cover himſelf from 1240

b *Similiter non eſſet plus quam veniale mendacium dicere, uro, ablato i. cum vere non urat.* Ibid.

c *Ino credo nullum fore mendacium ſi illud verbum, uro, accipiatur materialiter ad nihil ſignificandum, ſicut nunc n. 10. diximus de aliis juramenti verbis materialiter acceptis.*

perjury, he make uſe of one or the other of theſe two expedients. I. To take the words which he uſes in ſwearing, and which are falſe in their true and natural ſenſe, in a quite different ſenſe ſuch as he pleaſes, provided it be true. II. To give no ſenſe at all to his words and to take them materially, that is to ſay as ſounds that ſignifie nothing. He pretends that he that ſwears in one of theſe two ways doth no great evil; though that he ſays be falſe in the ordinary ſenſe.

But if a man have an intention to aſſert that which is falſe, and to confirm it with an oath, he avows, that he ſins mortally. [d] *But if in his own mind he refer not his words to that which is falſe, though that be the proper and natural ſenſe of his words, and others cannot for ſome particular circumſtances reaſonably believe that this is his intention, ſo that thereby they are ſcandalized; and that onely his right, which is to uſe equivocations to deceive, he makes uſe of theſe words to ſignifie ſome other thing* 1250 *which is true, and which he doth conceive in his mind, he ſins not at all mortally.* See here the firſt ſecret, to which he adds another like it, proceeding in theſe terms; [e] *But, if he take theſe words onely materially, without deſign to uſe them to ſignifie any thing at all, he ſins not mortally.* He fears to be yet too exact and rigorous in this point. For which cauſe he corrects and ſweetens his anſwer, ſaying; *I believe that he ſins not at all, no not venially, becauſe there is no lye in that which he ſaith.* Strange reaſoning! This man confirms by an oath words that are falſe, and yet he is not perjured; he expreſſes one thing, and thinks another. And yet notwithſtanding according to theſe Doctors he lies not at all, becauſe that he would not lye, though he lies effectually ſpeaking contrary to his own conſcience.

d Si jurat falſum, velitque illa juramento verba referre ad materiam falſam confirmanda illam in ex externo juramento, eſt mortale. Si autem interiori animo nolit illa ad materiam falſam referre; nec poteſt ob aliquas rei circumſtantias rationabiliter ab aliis putari id velle, ut quod verum ſit, peccat mortaliter; inde ſcandalizentur: ſed tantum jure ſuo utens uſurpat ea verba ad ſignificandum aliud interius conceptum non peccat mortaliter. e Vel uſurpat ea verba materialiter, nihil per illa confirmare volens, non peccat mortaliter; imo credo nec hunc venialiter peccare, quia nullum eſt mendacium. Sanchez op. mor. l. 3. c. 6 n. 10. p. 24.

Theſe ſhifts are ſo groſſe that the moſt ſimple and moſt ignorant may eaſily perceive them. They are ſo baſe and ſo ridiculous, that they are capable to ſurpriſe, and make the moſt ſerious break out into laughter, if Chriſtian charity as well as modeſty do not with hold and rather draw compaſſion from their hearts, and tears from their eyes, to lament the blindneſſe of thoſe who invented them, and the loſt condition of thoſe who follow them.

But if we would believe theſe Maſters of equivocations, there is no need at all of ſo many ſhifts and fallacies, for they declare plainly that thoſe who have not wit enough to underſtand theſe diſquizes and mental reſtrictions, or not to make uſe of them upon occaſion, may ſwear plainly without obliging themſelves in any ſort whatſoever, provided they have no intent to ſwear, nor to promiſe that which they 1260 ſwear. [f] *I have made a fained promiſe*, ſaith Eſcobar, *and I have added an oath thereto, am I obliged to accompliſh it?* After he had cited *Leſſius* alone for the affirmative, he adds; *but others deny it.* He pronounces nothing abſolutely upon this point, but he leaves to his reader his choice of two opinions, teſtifying for all that ſufficiently that the latter is his own; ſince having onely cited *Leſſius* for the former, he attributes this to many others, there is ground to believe that he concludes according to his guiſe by plurality of voices, and for the more ſweet and favourable opinion. And this onely, that it is the more favourable, and that it is followed by the greater part, is juſtitious to make it the more probable, and by conſequence it may be followed with a good conſcience, according to the Jeſuits rules of probability.

f Fictæ promiſſioni juramentum adjecti, teneorne adimplere? Aſſerit Leſſius, at alii negant. Eſcobar tr. 1. ex. 1. n. 37. p. 76.

## SECT. II.

### *The contrivance of the Jeſuits to elude vows made unto God, promiſes and oaths made to a Confeſſors, and to lye and deceive even in confeſſion.*

THeſe Doctors are not content to teach men to deceive men, but to teach them alſo to deceive God in their vows, and the Miniſters of his Church in the declarations and promiſes which they make them. So that if God were capable to be deceived he ſhould not eſcape from theſe ſurpiſes of the Jeſuits.

*Eſcobar* in his great Moral Divinity ſaith, [a] *that one may change by means of a Bull the vow which he hath made not to ſin*, and ſo avow not to commit fornication. He ſaith that even theſe ſort of vows need not be changed into any great things; as if the ſin of fornication were no great matter, and did not greatly diſhonor God, or if it were lawful to deceive him, taking away a great thing which we have promiſed him, for to give him a ſlight thing and of ſmall conſequence. 1270

a *Virtute Bullæ poteſt votum non peccandi commutare.* Eſcob. Theol. mor. tom. 1. lib. 7. c. 20. n. 281.

*Votum non formicandi aut abſtinendi à certo actu venereo, poteſt ex Bullæ indulto commutari.* C. 21. n. 298. *Votum vitandi aliquod peccatum, non eget magna commutatione.* C. 22. n. 318.

The ſame Author in the entrance of his book where he eſtabliſhes the principles of his Moral Divinity propoſes this doubt; [b] *A perſon makes a vow not to commit fornication, upon pain of ſome Pilgrimage; and afterwards not remembring his vow he ſuffers himſelf to go on in this ſin; is he obliged to accompliſh his vow?* He makes *Sanchez* to anſwer in theſe terms; *Sanchez anſwers, that he is not obliged, becauſe this blameleſs forgetfulneſs is equivalent to ignorance.*

b *Vovet quis ſub peregrinationis pœna non fornicari: immemor voti delinquit; tenetur ne ad pœnam voti? Reſpondet Sanch. ſum. tom. 1. l. 4. c. 22. n. 18. non teneri, quia oblivio ſeu inadvertentia inculpata æquipollet ignorantiæ.* Eſcobar in præmio tr. 2. c. 6. n. 24 p. 9.

*Emanuel Sa* propoſes two other caſes touching the continence and chaſtity of married perſons: [c] *A perſon married*, ſaith he, *who hath not made a vow of continence may demand the duty of marriage of another, though the other have made the ſame vow with conſent.* And a little after, *when the Husband and the Wife have made a vow not to demand of one another the duty of marriage, it is lawful for them to accompliſh it effectually, provided it be without demanding it, and the one believes that the other would demand it if at liberty*: He would ſay that the vow was indeed made not to demand this duty, but not, not to uſe it without demanding it; as if this were not enough to demand a thing, to teſtifie to him who can give it us the deſire which we have to receive it. It is in this manner that the Saints do demand from God in the moſt excellent way what they deſire from the bottom of their hearts. It is this deſire which the Scripture teſtifies that God hears and accompliſhes, as the moſt excellent and powerful prayer, where he ſaith; *Deſiderium pauperum exaudivit Dominus. The Lord hears the deſire of the poor.* It is then earneſtly to demand a thing to teſtifie that it is deſired, though it be not demanded in words. And to take and uſe it without demanding is more then to deſire it. 1280

c *Poteſt, qui non vovit, petere debitum ab altero qui etiam ſe conſentiente vovit caſtitatem.* Sanch. ver. debitum conjug. n. 2. pag. 101.

*Cum uterque vovit non petere, poſſunt copulari, non petendo tamen, cum alter intelligit alterum, ſi poſſet petiturum.* Ibid. num. 3.

*Sanchez* treating of an oath, eſtabliſheth certain principles from whence he draws this concluſion. [d] *It follows*, ſaith he, *that if a woman be excommunicate for departing from her Husband, becauſe ſhe knows of ſome ſecret impediment which makes the marriage void, being at the point of death ſhe is obliged, that ſhe may receive abſolution, to ſwear, that if ſhe recover her health ſhe will return to her Husband, ſhe may promiſe and ſwear it, intending it in her mind in this manner; if I be obliged, or if it pleaſe me then.* It is not enough to permit her to retain this condition; *If I be obliged*, of which ſhe

d *Duodecimo deducitur eadem ratione fœminam morti proximam ac excommunicatam, eo quod vivo non cohabitet, quem novit ob impedimentum occultum non eſſe ſuum, evadamque juraſe ut abſolvatur, ſive ut adepta ſanitate ei cohabitet. Poſſe id jurare, intelligendo intra ſe, ſi tenear, vel poſſita placuerit mihi.* Sanchez op. l. 3. cap. 6. num. 40. pag. 30.

will take advice in her health. This were perhaps too much to engage her to, it is
1290 fit alſo to permit her to add thereto: *if it pleaſe me at that time*; that if ſhe found her ſelf obliged, it might be ſufficient that ſhe was not pleaſed therewith to diſpenſe with her, for doing that which ſhe had promiſed and ſworn to her Confeſſor at the point of death.

A little after the ſame Author continuing to ſpeak out of the ſame principle, addeth: [f] *The ſame thing muſt be ſaid of a woman who is ſeparate from her Husband, becauſe ſhe knows that he hath committed adultery, which is a juſt cauſe of ſeparation. For if ſhe be preſſed to ſwear that ſhe will return to her Husband, ſhe may ſwear that ſhe will do it, underſtanding in her minde; if I be bound thereto.*

f *Idem intelligendum de muliere non cohabitante viro, eo quod conſcia ſit adulterii viri, ac proinde juſtam divortii cauſam habeat: quippe jurare compulſa ſe viro cohabitaturam, poteſt id jurare, intelligendo intra ſe; ſi ad id tenetur.* Ibid.

*Eſcobar* propoſes another caſe touching confeſſion. [g] *A perſon*, ſaith he, *is aſhamed of ſome crime committed; he may make a general confeſſion, and accuſe himſelf of this ſin amongſt others, without ſaying whether he have confeſſed it otherwiſe at another time. Becauſe this diſguiſe doth not much change the judgement of the Confeſſor.* This is nothing but a ſleight to deceive a Confeſſor, and to preſerve ones reputation with him, by betraying ones conſcience. But this ſame Jeſuit paſſes yet farther, and ſaith formally, that one may lye in confeſſion. See here his words: [h] *A perſon addreſſeth himſelf to a Confeſſor, and ſaith that he would make a general con-*
1300 *feſſion to him: he is not for all that obliged to declare unto him all the mortal ſins that he hath committed, for although he lye, it is of ſmall concern to the judgement the Confeſſor is to make of him.*

g *Rubore quis afficitur de aliquo crimine; poteſt generalem confeſſionem facere, & illud peccatum ſuum confiteri, non explicando an alias confeſſus ſit; quia id parum variat Confeſſarii judicium.* Eſcobar in proœmio exam. 2. n. 73. p. 19.

h *Dicit quis confeſſario ſe velle cum eo confeſſionem generalem gerere: non idco tenetur omnia mortalia exprimere: quia quamvis mentiatur; id tamen parum refert ad Confeſſarii judicium.* Eſcobar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 118. p. 818.

But if they who have any ſenſe of God and Religion cannot reſolve to uſe theſe kind of ſurprizes and diſguiſements, and theſe lyes in a Sacrament in which they ſpeak to God in the perſon of his Prieſt, who holds his place, the ſame Jeſuit will give them alſo another expedient to deceive the Confeſſor familiarly, that they may continue in his good opinion; which is, not to diſcover to him other then their ſleighter faults, and to have another Confeſſor whom they may choſe at their pleaſure, to confeſſe to him their great crimes.

[i] *A perſon*, ſaith this Jeſuit, *hath two Confeſſors, to whom he applyes himſelf, to the one he confeſſeth his mortal ſins, and to the other his venial, that he may continue in good opinion with his ordinary Confeſſor. The queſtion is, whether he doth ill?* The caſe is important, he muſt take a ſociate to reſolve it, that he may be more confidently believed. [k] *I maintain*, ſaith he, *with* Suarez, *that this perſon doth no evil at all.* His reaſon is not leſſe ſtrange then his anſwer, ſince he pretends that it is neither lye nor hypocriſie to conceal his ſins from his Confeſſor, and to make him believe he hath no great ones, though he hath committed ſuch, to maintain himſelf in good reputation with him.

i *Duos quis adit Confeſſarios, quorum alteri venialia confitetur, ut bonam famam apud Confeſſarium ordinarium tueatur. Rogo num delinquat?*

k *Cum Suario aſſero non delinquere. Quia eſt confeſſio integra, nec eſt vera hypocriſis, nec mendacium.* Ibid. n. 135. p. 821.

*Emanuel Sa* approves this practice, provided it be not common. [l] *There are that hold*, ſaith he, *that it is a mortal ſin to have two Confeſſors in ordinary, to confeſſe to one his great ſins, and to the other his ſmall ſins, that he may paſſe with him for an honeſt man, becauſe this is to deceive the Confeſſor, and to mock him. But there is no ſin in doing this onely once or twice through baſhfulneſs.* That is to ſay, that it is law-
1310 full to deceive a Confeſſor, to mock him and make ſport with him, provided that it be not common, and that it be done onely ſome times, and upon ſome motive ſo good as is that of Pride and Vanity, *ut probus habearis. That thou mayſt be eſteemed an honeſt man.*

l Habere ordinarie duos Confeſſarios, alterum cui gravia dicas, alterum cui levia, *ut probus habearis. Quidam dicunt eſſe peccatum mortale ob illuſum confeſſorem; ſecus vero eſſet ſi ſemel aut iterum fiat, ob pudorem, & verecundiam.* Emanuel Sa, verbo Confeſſarius num. 16 pag. 76.

*Fillintius* who examines and handles this caſe moſt exactly, acknowledges that many condemn it for mortal ſin. Some for hypocriſie, which is a kind of lye, which cannot be a ſmall fault in a matter ſo holy, and ſo important as confeſſion is: others, becauſe at leaſt the cuſtom and will to continue in this practice is a note of great corruption, and a very wicked diſpoſition in him who is in this eſtate, and which cannot be excuſed from mortal ſin. To which may be added the motive which leads to this diſguiſement, which is a Vanity and Pride ſo much more criminal and unſufferable, in that it is practiſed upon deſign, and in an action which ought to be the moſt ſincere and humble of all that are Religious: but notwithſtanding all theſe conſiderations he forbears not to maintain, with his fraternity, that there is no evil to uſe this practice ſo much and ſo often as one will, or that it is no great evil. [m] *You will inquire of me,* ſaith he, *if it be againſt the integrity of confeſſion, to confeſſe onely your ſleight faults to your ordinary Confeſſors, and to have another extraordinary one to whom to confeſſe your great ſins, when you happen to fall into them. I anſwer, that* Sylveſter *ſaith, that though there be nothing herein that is contrary to the integrity of confeſſion; yet there is mortal ſin therein, becauſe of the hypocriſie and virtual lying that is in it. And* Victoria *aſſures us alſo that this is mortal ſin, when it is done with deſign to continue in this cuſtom. But we muſt ſay abſolutely that there is no mortal ſin in it, nor any thing contrary to the integrity of confeſſion.* 1320

m *Quæres an ſit contra integritatem Confeſſori ordinario tantum venialia peccata confiteri, alteri vero extraordinario gravia quæ occurrunt? Reſpondeo, etſi Sylveſter conf.* 1. *q.* 6. *dicat eſſe peccatum mortale ob hypocriſin & virtuale mendacium; & Victoria in Summa, n.* 169. *aſſerat eſſe mortale quando id ſit animo perſeverandi in tali conſuetudine: tamen dicendum eſt non eſſe abſolute contra integritatem, neque peccatum mortale.* Filliutius tom. 1. tract. 7. c. 4. n. 75. p. 175.

He proves by a pleaſant reaſon that he that treats his confeſſor in this ſort is not properly a hypocrite, and that he deceiveth him not at all properly; a lyer, [n] *becauſe he relates no falſity neither to one nor other of his Confeſſors, but onely permits one of his Confeſſors to be deceived, though there be no deceiver.* For he that confeſſes himſelf is none according to him, and the Confeſſor cannot be any, becauſe he could not deceive himſelf; and he muſt have, at leaſt, a gift of Propheſie, to be able to divine that one ſurpriſes him by hiding his principal ſins, and confeſſing onely his ſmall ones. 1330

n *Non eſt proprie mendax, quia dicit falſum, ſed tantum permittit alium decipi.* Ibid.

It would be eaſie to report yet many more examples of like ſhifts, of like fooliſh, childiſh, and ridiculous ſleights, by which the Jeſuits do teach people to mock God, and the Miniſters of his Church, in abuſing the Sacraments, and making void their vows, but an occaſion to ſpeak hereof yet more to purpoſe will be preſented when we treat of confeſſion, and of the vows of Religion.

## III. POINT.

### Of Unfaithfulneſs in converſation, and common diſcourſe.

### SECT. I.

#### *An expedient which the Jeſuits give for to deceive the World, and to take a falſe Oath, even before a Judge, without perjury.*

THe Jeſuits have the reputation commonly to be Maſters of equivocations, and one may ſee it indeed, that it is not without cauſe. For to eſtabliſh this kind of knowledge in the world, and to facilitate the practice amongſt all ſorts of perſons, they do all that an affectionate Maſter can do for his profeſſion, and for his diſciples, to make them perfect in his Trade.

1. Firſt of all they give rules of equivocations, then they note divers forms of making them; and finally, to facilitate the knowledge and practice of them, they make themſelves ſome equivocations which they propoſe as models and examples whereby to teach others to make the like. 1340

2. They determine the occaſions wherein they may be made uſe of; or rather without bounds or reſtraint, they give liberty in almoſt all ſorts of occaſions,

to make uſe of them and ſome times even without any occaſion or reaſon.

3. They ſhew how they are to be made uſe of, and give the method, as well for perſons of diſcretion, as for more ſimple and more groſſe.

4. They give an invention to maintain the poſſeſſion and uſe of equivocation, ſo that there is no ſort of perſon that can by any means whatſoever hinder from making uſe of them, without any ſcruple. Theſe four points ſhall be ſo many ſections of this title, which is of Unfaithfulneſs in words and common diſcourſe.

## SECT. II.

### *Rules and Examples of equivocation taken out of the Books of the Jeſuits.*

FIrſt of all they declare that if one inquire whether the Prince be at Court, [a] it is permitted to aſſure him, without any neceſſity, and even to ſwear without any great ſin, that he is there, though he be not there, intending that he is there in picture. This is the opinion of *Sanchez* and *Eſcobar*, who declare plain enough that one may affirm it ſimply without any ſin, becauſe they acknowledge it not to be other than a venial ſin, to affirm it with an oath without any juſt cauſe, *ſine juſta cauſa*, ſo that a ſmall occaſion would ſuffice them, to diſcharge this oath of all ſin.

[a] *Jurare verbis æquivocis ſine juſta cauſa, v. c. quod Princeps ſit in aula, intelligendo pictum, lethale peccatum affirmat Leſſius, probabilius Sanchez negat.* Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 1. num. 35. pag. 76.

*Filliutius* ſpeaking of mental reſtriction which is permitted according to the rules of Divinity; brings many examples which he took out of *Suarez*, which he gives for a model. [b] *Behold here an example*, ſaith he, *which* Suarez *reports. You may ſay; I have not eaten of ſuch a diſh, intending to day, though the intention of him that asked were to know if you had ever eaten of it.* Another example is this; [c] You may ſay, *Peter* is not at home: *Petrus non eſt domi*, which ſignifies ordinarily that he is not in the houſe, though he be there, taking this word, *eſt*, for to ſignifie, he eats, ſo that you have a deſign to ſay, that he does not eat in the houſe. And we may judge of other like ſorts of ſpeaking equivocally in the ſame manner.

[b] *Talem ait Suarez eſſe illam: Non comedi, intelligendo hodie, cum interrogans putet alioqui non comediſſe rem illam.*

[c] *Item illam: Petrus non eſt domi, cum tamen revera ſit. Verbum enim eſt, ſumitur à dicente pro, comedit. Denique dici poteſt de aliis ſimilibus.* Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 11. n. 327. d. 204.

And a little before, propoſing ſome examples of equivocation in the ſame place whence they were taken, which I reported before, he hath put this foremoſt. [d] *They are accuſtomed*, ſaith he, *to relate ſome examples of equivocations*, (for to make their Doctrine and rules to be better underſtood) *as in the firſt place of him who outwardly promiſes a thing, without an intent to promiſe. For if one asked whether he had promiſed or no, he may deny it, meaning that he had not promiſed with a promiſe obliging, and with this reſtriction he may alſo ſwear.* He preſuppoſes without doubt that perjury cannot be committed more to purpoſe then to ſupport an equivocation, which is made purpoſely to hide ſome deceit and unfaithfulneſs.

[d] *Afferri ſolent exempla aliquot. Et primo ejus qui promiſit exterius aliquid ſine intentione promittendi. Si enim interrogetur an promiſerit, negare poteſt, intelligendo ſe non promiſiſſe promiſſione obligante, & ſic etiam jurare.* Ibid.

*Sanchez* ſaith the ſame thing, and yet more; and for to be better underſtood, he reduces the general theſis to a particular caſe: [e] *So often as*, ſaith he, *a perſon who hath promiſed marriage to another, whether it were made ſincerely, or onely in appearance, is diſcharged by any reaſon from holding his promiſe, being called before a Judge, he may ſwear he hath not made this promiſe, meaning he hath not ſo made it as to be obliged to obſerve it.* And that it may be known what reaſon he requires for this, he holds

[e] *Quoties quis ſive vere, ſive ficte promittens matrimonium, immunis eſt ob aliquam cauſam ab implendi obligatione, poteſt à Judice vocatus jurare ſe non promiſiſſe, intelligendo, ita ut teneatur implere.* Sanchez op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 32. p. 29.

[f] that it is not neceſſary that the pretence upon which he grounds his belief that he is not obliged to marry her to whom he hath paſſed his word, be true or certain; but it ſufficeth that it have ſome appearance of truth, and that it be probable: *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *following a probable opinion, he may perſwade himſelf in conſcience that he is not obliged.* He had reported before an example taken out of other Authors, who teach, [g] *That a perſon who hath payed the money which he borrowed, being examined by a Judge if he borrowed the mony, may ſwear that he hath not, intending, not ſo as to be obliged to pay it.* Which he extends to other caſes, ſaying that it is permitted in many caſes to ſwear before a judge that he owes nothing; and generally ſo often as there is no obligation to pay the debt, when one is preſſed by a plaintiff; whether one have paid it indeed, or one believes he is not obliged to pay it, or that the term of payment is not yet come, or even when he acknowledges the debt and the term is already expired, and he hath no pretence to diſpenſe with the payment, there remains no other excuſe, but that he is poor and hath no money. 1370

f *Non tantùm quando cauſa eſt certa non implendi, & etiam quoties ſapienti is judicio eſt probabile, non teneri ſervare, quia poteſt amplectendo opinionem probabilem exiſtimare ſe tuta conſcientia non obligatum.* Ibid.

g *Qui docent cum qui nummos mutuo acceptos ſolvit, poſſe à Judice rogatum de mutuo, jurare ſe illud non accepiſſe, intelligendo ita ut teneatur illud ſolvere. Atque idem dicendum eſt ſi quacunque alia ex cauſa ab eo mutuo ſolvendo liber eſſet. Atque idem credo ſi tunc non teneretur ſolvere, eo quod terminus ad quem mutuum datum fuit non eſt impletus, vel præ paupertate excuſatur debitor à tunc ſolvendo.* Ibid.

This laſt overture is very favourable to many perſons, who by this rule may deny all their debts, having never any money to pay them: and for them that are poor, to cover by this pretence their ingratitude and injuſtice towards thoſe who aſſiſt them in giving them that which was neceſſary for them. But if theſe people who have againſt their conſciences ſworn that they ow'd nothing, come afterwards into an eſtate able to pay what thy owe, what counſel will the Jeſuits give them? on the one ſide there is no more any pretext which might diſpenſe with them for not paying: and on the other ſide, if they pay after they have ſworn that they ow'd nothing; they declare themſelves perjured, and they ruine their honor and credit after they have ruined their conſcience; and which is more conſiderable, they will diſgrace the Doctrine of equivocations, and the myſtery of thoſe who teach them. It will not be hard to reſolve theſe difficulties by the conſequence of the principles of the Jeſuits Divinity; but becauſe I have no deſign but onely to report things, as they are found in their books, and becauſe I have not yet met with this caſe, I ſhall be content to propoſe it onely, leaving it to the Readers liberty to draw ſuch conſequences as ſeem to them neceſſarily to follow thoſe maximes which we have reported before, or to demand the reſolution of the Jeſuits themſelves. 1380

*Sanchez* propoſes another example and another equivocation upon this very matter. [h] *It follows*, ſaith he, *that if one demands of a man to borrow money, which he indeed hath, but which he will not, and which he is not obliged to lend; he may ſwear that he hath it not at all, meaning not to lend him.*

h *Decimoquinto deducitur, eum à quo mutua pecunia petitur, quam revera habet, poſſe jure jurando affirmare ſe eam non habere, intelligendo intra ſe ut mutuo det, quando non tenetur mutuare.* Ibid.

This clauſe, that this man is not obliged to lend, is not *Sanchez*'s; but of ſome other Caſuiſt more religious then he, and in his judgement too ſcrupulous. Which is the reaſon that he approves it not, adding, [i] *that it matters not as to the truth of the oath, whether he be or be not obliged to lend it.*

i *Quare ad veritatem hujus juramenti nil refert an ille teneatur mutuare necne.* Ibid.

He gives alſo another advertiſement, how to make uſe of mental reſervation on this ſame occaſion, when one is troubled to put off a perſon who aſkes to borrow money, [k] which is to ſay, and even to ſwear, if it be needful, that one hath it not, that is to ſay, *not in another place then in that where it is laid up to be kept.*

k *Similiter dicendum eſt ſi intra ſe intelligat non habere pecunias in alio loco ab eo in quo revera habet.* Ibid.

For that which reſpects examination of Judges, the way to delude and deceive them without oaths which are taken before them, is very eaſie, according to the

ſame Author. [l] *It follows*, ſaith he, *that if a witneſs be interrogated juridically,* 1390 *if he know a thing; provided they ask him not whether he have heard it ſpoken, he may ſwear that he knows it not, having onely heard it ſpoken.* As if it were not true that one knows that which he hath received from perſons worthy of credit; though he have not ſeen it himſelf.

l Tertiò deducitur licere teſti juridicè interrogato an aliquid ſciat, non tamen rogato an audierit, jurare ſe neſcire ſi ſolùm audierit. Ibid. c. 7. num. 5. pag. 31.

Finally to give yet more free courſe to equivocations, he would authoriſe them by the example of Saint *Francis*. [m] *It follows*, ſaith he, *that Saint* Francis *might make uſe of the equivocation which is attributed unto him, when being interrogated by the Officers of Juſtice, if a malefactor whom they ſought after went that way; he anſwered putting his hands in the ſleeves of his Gound, he is not come this way, meaning not that way where he had his hands.* And after he had juſtified this action of S. *Francis* of which there is no witneſs, nor any likelihood to believe that it was ever done by him, he will yet raiſe it higher; [n] *He might alſo have anſwered in this manner*, adds he, *he is not paſſed this way, intending the particular and determined place where his foot or his hand was.*

m 14. Deducitur licitam fuiſſe amphibologiam qua uſus fertur D. Francus, qui à judicis miniſtris interrogatus an illic quidam rem tranſiſſet; minus in veſtis manicas introducens, dixit ſic: Non tranſiit hac, intelligendo de loco in quo manus habebat. Ibid. c. 6. n. 42 p. 30. Itaque ſimiliter poſſet dicere ſic: Non tranſiit hac, intelligendo locum individuum quem pede vel manu tangit. Ibid.

*Layman* who is not ſo paſſionate as *Sanchez*, for equivocations, appears not ſo unjuſt as he againſt S. *Francis*. For he juſtifies him, or at leaſt wiſe if he ſuffers 1400 others to affirm and aſſure us that Saint *Francis* never uſed this equivocation which is aſcribed to him, or if he did uſe it, it was done by ſimplicity, not believing it to be any evil to do ſo. *Either Saint* Francis *is not the Author of this anſwer, which is ſo attributed to him falſely, or that holy man believed that it was lawful*, ſaith *Soto* cited by *Layman*.

The Books of the Jeſuits are full of theſe equivocations, and ſometimes of others farther fetcht and more ridiculous. I was deſirous onely to repreſent ſome few of the more ſenſible and the more common ones, which they do ordinarily propoſe to ſerve for example and model to ſimple and groſſe witted perſons. They who deſire to know more thereof may read their books themſelves.

## SECT. III.

### *When and on what occaſions one may make uſe of equivocations.*

AMong thoſe who teach to make equivocations, there are ſome who ſpeak with leſs paſſion, and who ſay they ought not to be uſed but in neceſſity, ſoberly and with great diſcretion. Others make as it were a party for them, and maintain them indifferently and blindly, giving all liberty to put them in practice, holding that the leaſt reaſon ſufficeth to make uſe of them; and that when they are made uſe of even without reaſon and without neceſſity, there is in a manner no ſin in them, or that it is but very little.

*Sanchez* expounding the opinion of *Soto*, who holds that one may make uſe of equivocations in ſport or drollery, ſaith that it is true, provided that no oath be 1410 added there unto. [o] *When* Soto *holds*, ſaith he, *that it is no ſin to make uſe of equivocations in making merry and drolling, this he underſtands to be when it is done without ſwearing.* But it ſuffices not this profeſſor of equivocations, to ſay that there is no ſin in taking this divertiſement, he will have it alſo to be honeſt; and therefore it is ſufficient to make an equivocation honeſt, to take divertiſement therein. [p] *For then*, ſaith he, *this honeſt ſport and recreation renders the equivocation*

o Dum Sotus dicit Secreto, memb. 3. q. 3. in fine it non eſſe culpam amphibologiâ uti joco & in ridiculis, intelligo quando abſque juramento id fieret. Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 22. p. 27.

p Tunc enim honeſtus ille ludus recreationis juſta cauſa exercitus honeſtum redderet amphibologiæ uſum. Ibid.

q *At ſi juramentum adeſſet, eſt manifeſta culpa propter vanam & indiſcretam divini nominis uſurpationem: at ſolum eſſet venialis.* Ibid.

honeſt. q But if it happen that one ſwear in this recreation with or without deſign, when one ſwears by the name of God, there may well be ſome fault in it, as he avers; but he pretends its but ſmall and venial. But if one ſwears not at all, above all not by the name of God, he maintains that *this honeſt ſport and recreation makes the equivocation honeſt.*

He had already ſaid the ſame thing more at large before, p. 25. 4. where after he had eſtabliſhed this rule: r *That one may without lying make uſe of words which in themſelves are not ambiguous, and which have not the ſenſe which he takes them in, &c.* He adds in the following number, f *That one may make uſe of ſuch words, though they be not ambiguous at all, and that in themſelves and circumſtances preſent they cannot receive the ſenſe that is given them; but that they may learn and have it onely by means of ſome mental reſtriction or addition, ſuch as pleaſes him who pronounceth them: as if any one being alone or in company, whether interrogated, or of his own proper motion; for recreation or for ſome other motive whatſoever, ſwears he hath not done a thing which truly he hath done, intending in his minde ſome other thing which in truth he hath not done, or ſome other day then that on which he did it, or quite another thing, and circumſtance as he pleaſes, ſo it be true, he doth not lye indeed; and he ſhall not be forſworn; but he hath only not ſaid any determined truth, which they could conceive who heard him ſpeak, which was ſignified by his words, but ſome other different truth.* 1420

r *Poſſunt abſque mendacio uſurpari iſti verba ex ſua ſignificatione ambigua non ſint, nec cum ſenſum habeant, &c.* Ibid.

f *Poſſunt quoque abſque mendacio ea verba uſurpari, etiamſi ex ſua ſignificatione non ſint ambigua, nec cum ſenſum admittant ex ſe, nec ex circumſtantiis occurrentibus, ſed tantum eum ſenſum reddant ex aliquo additamento proferentis retento, quodcunque illud ſit: ut ſi quis vel ſolus vel coram aliis, ſive interrogatus, ſive propria ſponte, ſive recreationis gratia, ſive quocunque alio fine juret ſe non feciſſe aliquid quod revera fecit, intelligendo intra ſe aliquid aliud quod non fecit, vel etiam diem ab eo in quo fecit, vel quodcunque aliud additamentum, revera non mentitur nec perjurus eſt, ſed tantum non diceret unam veritatem determinatam quam audientes concipiunt, ac verba illa ex ſe ſignificant: ſed alium veritatem diſparatam* Ibid. num. 15.

Many obſervations may be made on this one paſſage of *Sanchez*, wherein there are many things for them to learn who are curious of the ſcience of equivocations. I will onely paſſe over it curſorily and lightly.

First of all he ſpeaks of an equivocation the moſt ſtrange and diſtant from humane reaſon that can be imagined. t *One may*, ſaith he, *without lying make uſe of theſe words, though in their ſignification they be not ambigious, and which of themſelves, and with their preſent circumſtances cannot bear the ſenſe which is given them.* Whence it follows that theſe words are indeed not equivocal, but openly falſe, ſince they could not bear the ſenſe given them. For an equivocal word is that which hath two ſences, or which may receive two ſences. And therefore he who makes uſe of that as equivocal which is not equivocal, and who would give it a ſence which it will not bear is ſurely a lyar, ſignifying one thing by his words, and thinking another. 1440

t *Poſſunt abſque mendacio ea verba uſurpari etiamſi ex ſua ſignificatione non ſint ambigua, nec eum ſenſum admittant ex ſe, nec ex circumſtantiis occurrentibus.*

Alſo *Sanchez* affirms and teſtifies ſufficiently himſelf that this word is no equivocation, in ſaying that it is not ambiguous, for an ambiguous and equivocal word are one and the ſame thing. So that what he adds, that though theſe words which he ſuppoſes not to be equivocal, could not receive the ſence he gives them; u *yet they will never the leſſe bear it, by adding that which he who ſpeaks them reſerves in his thoughts.* This ſay I is deſtroyed by it ſelf, the thought of a man which is altogether inward and inviſible, cannot at all change the ſence of words, which are altogether outward and ſenſible, nor give them that which they cannot receive: otherwiſe every one may by his will and according to his phantaſie give every ſort of words all ſorts of ſences, and make them ſignifie any thing. And ſo it will be impoſſible for one to underſtand another, and thoſe of the ſame country ſhall be as ſtrangers to one another.

u *Sed tantùm eum ſenſum reddant ex aliquo additamento proferentis retento.*

This Doctor gives the ſame liberty to circumſtances as to the ſubſtance of words, ſaying that one may give them by thought alone ſuch ſence as one will, in ſuch time, and in ſuch manner, and on ſuch ſubject and motive as one will, without other motive

or neceſſity then becauſe he will. [a] *As if one, ſaith he, being alone or in company, whether he be asked or ſpeak of his own accord, for recreation or for ſome other motive whatſoever it be, ſwear that he hath not done a thing, which notwithſtanding he hath done indeed.* It is not ſufficient for him to lye formally, he will alſo joyn perjury to lying, in ſaying that one may ſwear that he hath not done that which he hath done; and he would cover this lye and this perjury by the thought of a man onely in what eſtate and in what circumſtances ſoever he be; *alone or in company, ſpeaking for recreation or for other motive whatſoever it be*, pretending that he may ſwear that he hath not done which he hath done, without fear of taking a falſe oath, provided [b] *that he intend onely in his mind ſome other thing that he had not done.*

a *Tat ſi quis ſolus vel cum alio, ſive interrogatus, ſive propria ſponte, ſive recreationis gratia, ſive alio quocunque fine juret ſe non feciſſe aliquid quod revera fecit.*

b *Intelligendo intra ſe aliud revera facit.*

See here *Sanchez* firſt method, which ſerves for nothing but to learn to lye purely, ſimply, and without equivocation, by uſing words that are not equivocal in themſelves, at all, and which cannot ſignify that which one ſaith, nor that which is in ones mind at all, as he affirms himſelf. So that ſuch words are contrary to the thoughts which he hath, and he ſaith really other things then he thinketh; which is to lye formally and ſimply.

The ſecond method is no better then the former, for he ſaith one may [c] *underſtand (or ſupply out of ones mind)* that he hath not done the thing *on an other day then* 1450 *that on which he did it*; or elſe that he hath not done it in an other place, an other time, or an other company, or with other circumſtances of which he gives him choice, leaving him entire liberty to make uſe of which he pleaſes to deceive without ſcruple. For his words are clear and general: [d] *Or intending, ſaith he, ſome quite other thing, and quite other circumſtance which he pleaſes to add, which is true, of what ſort ſoever it be.* And with theſe precautions, if you will believe him, [e] he lyes not at all in effect; and is not perjured, imagining and pretending to make us believe that he hath ſpoken no falſe thing, and that he hath ſpoken the very truth, though he ſay not that which is demanded of him, nor that which the words he uttereth ſignifie of themſelves, *but an other truth altogether different*; *ſed aliam veritatem diſparatam.*

d *Vel intelligendo aliud quodvis additum verum, quodcunque illud ſit.*

e *Revera non mentitur nec perjurus eſt.*

This is a true way to be able to juſtifie all manner of lyes and perjuries; the greateſt lyar and the greateſt impoſtor may make uſe hereof to juſtify and to maintain himſelf in theſe crimes, in ſaying that his meaning was other than his ſaying; and that ſo [f] *He is really neither lyar nor perjured; but onely did not ſpeak preciſely a truth, which they underſtood who did hear him, and which his words ſignified; but another truth which had no thing ommon therewith.* But that for this they had no cauſe to complain of what he ſaid to them and anſwered in this manner, they having no right to queſtion him. For he preſuppoſeth as a general maxime, [g] *that when one is not obliged to anſwer a perſon, neither is he obliged to anſwer according to his thoughts.* Which he ſupports by a maxime of Logick which ſaith: [h] *That when the general* 1460 *kind of any thing is removed, the ſpecial ſorts are alſo removed.* This reaſoning he ſaith he learned from *Navarre*; who ſaith that when one is not obliged to anſwer a perſon, he may anſwer him in what manner he pleaſes: he is not obliged to give him an honeſt, civil, true, ſincere, faithful one, but that he may make one in all points contrary, for that we may make him none if we pleaſe.

f *Revera non mentitur nec perjurus eſt; ſed tantum non dicit unam veritatem determinatam quam auditores concipiunt, ac verbo illo ſignificant; ſed aliam veritatem diſparatam.*

g *Quia alteri reſpondere non obligatus, nec obligatur reſpondere ad ejus mentem.*

h *A quo enim removetur genus, omnis quoque ſpecies removetur.*

There is none that ſees not clearly what follows from this, that in civil converſation, eſpecially amongſt equals, where one hath no authority over others, nor right to queſtion them nor to oblige them to anſwer to that which is propoſed or demanded of them, every one may ſay what he will, and underſtand what he will by his words without apprehending that he lies, and believing that he ſpeaks the truth, becauſe he repreſents it in his minde though he hide it, or expreſſe even the contrary in his words. But there is great difference betwixt conceiving or thinking the truth and ſpeaking or ſignifying it to others. Thoſe who will follow this Jeſuit, ſhall have the truth in their thoughts, but not in their words; they conceive it well, but they do not ſpeak it at all; and in this they are lyars and perjured, notwithſtanding all their intentions and ſecret thoughts, for to lye is no other thing then to ſpeak otherwiſe then a man thinks, and to ſay one thing having another in his thoughts.

*Filliutius* ſeems at firſt ſight not to agree with *Sanchez* in this point. [a] *It is demanded*, ſaith he, *what ſin it is to make uſe of equivocations without any reaſonable cauſe.* His firſt anſwer is, [b] *It is probable that it is a lye, and by conſequence perjury when it is confirmed with an oath.* But a little after, his inclination which he hath for looſeneſs, and to flatter the luſt and corruptions of men, make him ſay, [c] *That it ſeemeth more probable that in rigour it is no lye, nor any perjury.* His principal reaſon is, [d] *becauſe that he who talks and ſwears after this manner hath no intention, as is preſuppoſed, to ſpeak nor to ſwear falſe*; though he indeed both ſpeak and ſwear ſo. He pretends then, as *Sanchez*, that the inward will of man alone can change the ſignification of words, and give to them ſuch as he pleaſes. It is true that *Sanchez* gives not this power to the intention alone, without joyning ſome mental reſtriction unto it, by which he forms in his mind a true ſenſe, in ſaying in himſelf that he will neither lye nor forſwear. 1470

a *Quinto quæritur quale peccatum ſit uti amphibologia abſque rationabili cauſa?* Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 11. n. 330. p. 204.

b *Reſpondeo & dico primo, probabile eſſe quod ſit mendacium, atque adeo perjurium ſi confirmetur juramento.*

c *Dico 2. probabilius videri non eſſe mendacium nec perjurium.* Ibid.

d *Quia qui ſic loquitur & jurat, non habet intentionem dicendi falſum, vel jurandi falſitatem, ut ſuppoſimus.* Ibid.

*Filliutius* notwithſtanding fails not to approve theſe reſtrictions and mental additions of *Sanchez*. [e] *Becauſe*, as he ſaith, *he who talks thus follows rigorouſly the true ſenſe which he hath an intention to give to his words.* Whence he concludes abſolutely as *Sanchez*, [f] *that by conſequence he lyes not at all.* And he pretends not onely that he lyes not all, but that what he ſays, though it be captious and falſe, [g] *yet nevertheleſs is not repugnant to truth and faithfulneſs; becauſe it is not oppoſite to it by way of diminiſhing it, but onely in concealing it.* So that all diſguiſes, all ſupplyes, all deceits and falſities ſhall be no more againſt truth nor fidelity, becauſe they are not oppoſed unto truth in diminiſhing it, but onely in hiding it. And it muſt be obſerved yet farther, that one may make uſe of theſe equivocations, and alſo confirm them by an oath, [h] *without any reaſonable cauſe.* From which *Sanchez* is not far, when he ſaith that one may do it by *way of divertiſement*, and a little afore, [i] *without any juſt cauſe.* 1480

e *Et quod profertur in rigore habet aliquem ſenſum verum quem talis intendit.*

f *Ergo non mentitur.* Ibid.

g *Non repugnat autem veritati & fidelitati, quia non opponitur illi per defectum veritatis, ſed nimiam veritatis occultationem.* Filliutius ubi ſup.

h *Abſque rationali cauſa.*

i *Etſi nulla juſta cauſa ducatur proferens.*

This leſſon is very proper to fill the world with lyes, deceits, and trecheries, without ſcruple and without fear of lying, or deceiving any perſon: becauſe the Jeſuits aſſure us that a man may do all theſe things without being guilty of theſe crimes, even when there is no reaſon nor neceſſity to make uſe of theſe artifices, and they are uſed onely for divertiſement, and to ſhew the liberty and freedom of ones ſpirit. So that there will be no more lyes nor cheats in the world for them that have once been at School with them, and who will make uſe of the ſtrange priviledges which they give them.

## SECT. IV.

### *The Jeſuits method to frame equivocations, and to uſe them commodiouſly.*

IT is not enough to know the rules of any myſtery, if it be not known how to reduce them into practice. Of all thoſe who have written of equivocations, there is none who hath advanced farther therein then *Filliutius* in the place we have cited already. For he gives two inſtructions and two advices to men of wit, and one to thoſe who are more groſſe and ſimple, to teach them to frame theſe equivocations, and to make uſe of them to purpoſe and with ſincerity. 1490

k *Quarto quæro qua cautela utendum ſit amphibologia.* [k] *They inquire*, ſaith he, *with what precaution equivocations may be made uſe of?* He anſwers: *that two rules may be given, and two methods for perſons of jugement,*

*Reſpondeo & dico 1. aſſignari poſſunt duo modi pro perſonis judicio præditis.* Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 12. n. 328. p. 204.

that they may have change, and make uſe ſometimes of one, and ſometimes of the other.

[l] *The firſt is to have an intention to pronounce the words materially.* That is to ſay, as if they ſignified nothing, and to take from them in his minde their proper and natural ſignification, not deſiring they ſhould have any at all. And to make this method eaſie to underſtand, he propoſes one example as it were a model by which one may ſee the uſe of this marvellous art. [m] *For greater ſecurity*, ſaith he, *when a man begins to ſay: I ſwear that it is good that he add, low to himſelf, this clauſe and this mental reſtriction,* (this day,) *and that he continue after to ſay all aloud, I have not eaten of ſuch a thing,* So that he ſaith indeed, I ſwear that I have not eaten to day, or in ſuch manner. [n] *I ſwear, adding ſecretly as it were in a parentheſis,* (that I ſay) *and after following all aloud, that I have not done ſuch a thing, for ſo all the diſ-*
1500 *courſe will be true.* For he will ſay nothing but that it is true that he doth ſay that he hath not done it, although he hath done it.

l *Primus eſt habere intentionem proferendi verba materialiter.* Ibid.

m *Et ad majorem ſecuritatem, cum incipit. v. g. dicere juro, debet interponere ſubmiſſe reſtictionem mentalem* (*ut hodie*), *& deinde addere alta voce; quod non feci hoc non commediſſe rem illam.* Ibid.

n *Vel jura, & interpone* (*me dicere*), *tum abſolute alta item voce, vel illud. Sic enim veriſſima eſt tota oratio.*

The other method which is alſo for ſubtile perſons, is this. [o] *The ſecond method is to have an intention to compoſe ones diſcourſe, not onely of words which are audibly pronounced, but alſo of thoſe which are ſecretly reſerved in ones mind, it being free for thoſe who ſpeak to expreſſe their thoughts wholly or onely in part.*

o *Secundus habere intentionem non abſolvendi orationem tantum per verba externa, ſed ſimul cum reſtrictione mentali. Liberum eſt enim homini exprimere mentem ſuam totaliter vel partialiter.* Ibid.

One of theſe means to frame equivocations is by addition, and the other by mental reſtriction. I ſtay not to expound them farther, becauſe *Filliutius* propounds them onely to perſons of judgement, who are capable to underſtand them, and dexterous to practiſe them; or rather if they have but a little judgement and good ſenſe, they will in reading them onely ſufficiently perceive that theſe ſubtleties are ridiculous to be practiſed.

He gives but one means for ſimple and groſſe-witted perſons to make equivocations, for fear of confounding them, and he gives one ſo eaſie that there is no perſon who may not make uſe thereof. [p] *But for ſlow-witted perſons*, ſaith he, *who know not of themſelves how in particular to frame an equivocation; it is enough for*
1510 *them that they have an intention to affirm or deny that which they ſay in a ſenſe which contains in effect ſome truth.* That is to ſay, that for thoſe who have not wit enough to find equivocal terms, nor mental reſtrictions it, will be ſufficient to ſay one thing, and think another; or even that thinking nothing at all in particular, they onely have a deſign to affirm or deny ſomething in general that is true. It behoves them onely to know that they may deny all that which is inquired of them, though in conſcience and in their natural light they ſee it is true, believing or ſuppoſing that it may be falſe in ſome ſenſe unknown to them. [q] *And for this it is neceſſary*, ſaith he, *that they be advertiſed, and that they know at leaſt in general that they may deny that about which they are queſtioned, in ſome true ſenſe*, though they know not what this ſenſe is.

p *Pro rudibus vero qui neſciunt in particulari concipere ambibologiam, ſatis eſt habeant intentionem affirmandi vel negandi in ſenſu qui contineat reipſa veritatem.*

q *Ad quod neceſſe eſt ut ſaltem in univerſum ſciant ſe poſſe negare in aliquo vero ſenſu.* Ibid.

After this he muſt be very dull who cannot make uſe of this invention, ſince it is not of neceſſity, no not to know in particular, nor what he doth nor what he ſaith, whether it be true or not indeed, and that it is ſufficient to believe, or ſuppoſe in general that it may be ſo, and that a nimble witted man may finde ſome ſenſe in which he can make the words true, which are falſe in their natural and onely ſenſe, and which by conſequence are not equivocations, though he who pronounces them cannot do it.

SECT.

## SECT. V.

***The method of the ſame Jeſuits, to hinder their equivocations from being ever diſcovered, and that no perſon may be deprived of his liberty to make uſe of them.***

After they have made the uſe of equivocations ſo free, ſo common, and ſo eaſie, that all the world may make uſe of them indifferently on all occaſions, there remains nothing for the Maſters of this art, that is to ſay the Jeſuits, to do, but to eſtabliſh well the practice, and to fortify themſelves in ſuch ſort againſt all oppoſition, that whatſoever precaution they uſe; no perſon may be able to hinder them from making uſe thereof when they will, nor to diſcover it when they have uſed it.

This *Sanchez* hath attempted to do, and in this he hath laboured with great care, and he hath proceeded therein beyond all other who have written on this matter. After he hath eſtabliſhed many rules, given many advices about equivocations and the manner to form and make uſe of them, he concludes with this advice, as the laſt and moſt important: [a] *That ſo often as it is lawful in our own defence to uſe equivocations, they may be uſed, though he who examines us do preſſe us to anſwer him without making uſe of this very equivocation.* That is to ſay, that ſo often as you believe that you may uſe equivocations (which is alway lawful according to this Caſuiſt and his Fraternity, as we have already reported) on all occaſions, and even without neceſſity and reaſon, though you be admoniſhed not to make uſe of it, when it is forbidden you, when you are cauſed to promiſe and even to ſwear that you will make no uſe of it; notwithſtanding all theſe precautions, theſe defences, theſe promiſes, and the oath that you have made, you have always the liberty to make uſe thereof.

a *Tandem id obſervandum eſt, quotiescunque licitum eſt ad ſe tuendum uti aliqua æquivocatione; id quoque erit licitum, etſi interrogans urgeat excludens illam æquivocationem.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 45. p. 30.

None can ſpeak more clearly and more favourably. Notwithſtanding if the practice of this rule ſeem to you too hard or too large, he will help your underſtanding by examples which he brings, and your belief, by the authority of other Caſuiſts whom he cites for you, in theſe terms: [b] *The Caſuiſts ſay the ſame thing, of a man accuſed, who being examined upon any ſecret crime, is preſt to anſwer, whether it be publiquely, or privately, whether it be before a Judge juridically or not. For they hold in this very caſe that he may anſwer, that he hath not done it, intending his anſwer not in that manner as the Judge examines him malicionſly; but in the manner he ought to examine him in the quality of a Judge.*

b *Atque idem docent de reo qui rogatus de delicto ſecreto, urgetur, ut dicat ſive fecerit publice, ſive occulte; ſive ipſe Judex juridice interroget, ſive non, dicentes poſſe adhuc reſpondere ſe non feciſſe, intelligendo, non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogas, ſed ut teneris tanquam Judex rogare.* Ibid.

It is ſufficient that a malefactor or a witneſs form within himſelf a probable opinion that the Judge who examine him juridically, ought not to examine him in the manner that he doth, for to mock him, and to elude his interrogatories by equivocation; or by confidently denying moſt clear and certain things, ſo that this miſchief cannot poſſibly be hindred or prevented by him, what precaution ſoever he uſeth.

The Judge is malicious, and he interrogates this malefactor maliciouſly according to *Sanchez*, becauſe that in examining he uſes the precautions which he believes neceſſary to draw the truth out of his mouth. This malefactor is not malicious, he anſwers not maliciouſly, but reaſonably and wiſely, according to the Divinity of this Father; becauſe he obſerves exactly the rules of the equivocations, and omits no jugling ſlight of mind, to obſcure the truth, and to deceive the Judge who interrogates him by lying and perjury.

He brings alſo another example of the ſame ſubject. [c] *He holds the ſame thing,*

c *Atque idem docet de rogato à cuſtodibus urbis, aliquem locum peſte infectum eſſe falſo ex ſtimantibus, & rogantibus quempiam an ex eo loco venerit: ſive infectus peſte ſit, ſive non, nempe poſſe ipſum reſpondere non venire ex eo, intelligendo, non ut vos rogatus, ſed ut deberetis rogare.* Ibid.

ſaith he, *ſpeaking of* Navarre, *touching him who is interrogated by a Town-guard, who believe falſely, that the Town from whence he comes is infected with the plague, and demands from him if he came from thence; whether it be infected or it be not infected, he may anſwer that he came not thence; making this mental reſtriction in his minde; I came thence not according to the queſtion you make, but according to the queſtion you ought to make.* This method is not very favourable to civil government, nor gives it much weight to the authority of Magiſtrates and their Officers; alſo it is not very favourable for the eſtabliſhment of Laws, and for aſſuring the obedience which people owe unto Princes. When a Soveraign commands any thing to his ſubjects, there is no private man who ſhall receive his orders, who may not promiſe to obey him, though he be reſolved to do nothing of that he ſhall command him, by making uſe of this mental reſtriction, and ſaying in himſelf; [d] *I will do this, not according as you command me, but as you ought to command me.*

d *Non ut tu imperas, ſed ut deberes imperare.*

Alſo in like manner when he is demanded any thing whereunto he imagines that he is not obliged, to anſwer according to truth, he may ſpeak contrary to that which he thinks, and to that which is true, by the favour of this equivocation, and of this ſecret thought which he bears in his minde; [e] *In anſwer*, ſaith he in himſelf, *not to that which you demand of me, but according to that you ought to have demanded of me.*

e *Non ut tu rogas, ſed ut deberes interrogare.*

1550 One may ſay, by proportion, the ſame thing of a child in relation to a Father, of a ſervant in relation to a Maſter, of a Monk or any other inferiour in relation to his Superior: and ſo this rule baniſheth abſolutely truth and ſincerity out of the world, and diſpenſeth with all ſort of perſons for the fidelity and obedience they owe to whomſoever it be.

*Sanchez* joyns a reaſon to the example and authority, that he may yet more confirm the poſſeſſion and uſe of theſe equivocations. [f] *The reaſon of all this*, ſaith he, *is becauſe, though he who interrogates in this ſort reduces his demand to one ſole ſence, excluding all others, and that the anſwer hath in it ſelf a reference unto this ſence; notwithſtanding this is true onely becauſe of the ill intention of him who interrogates, to which ought to be imputed the diſcordance betwixt the Author and the interrogations.* It ſuffices not him to juſtify him who forſwears himſelf before the civil Officers, or before a Judge that examines him juridically: but he caſts this perjury and crime upon the Judge himſelf. He confeſſes that there is falſity, and by conſequence perjury in the anſwer of thoſe who make uſe of theſe equivocations in the manner he teaches them to illude the intergatories of a Judge; and he notes himſelf this falſity and perjury, though he expreſſe it modeſtly enough, calling it [g] *a repugnance and diſcordance from the anſwer* of the perſons that are forſworn, *and the intergatories* which a Judge or other Magiſtrate puts to him. And becauſe he will not have this crime fall on them who commit it by his counſel and his order, he caſts it upon the Officer or the Judge, [h] *to whom muſt be imputed*, ſaith he, *the diſcordance which is found betwixt the anſwer and the interrogation.* Though both the one and the other are in no wiſe acceſſory thereto, and give onely occaſion to commit it by forbidding it expreſſely, and uſing all the precaution they could to hinder it. So that there is nothing to be imputed unto them on this occaſion, but onely that they deſired him to ſpeak ſincerely, and would hinder him from uſing equivocations, of which this Jeſuit believes he hath right to make uſe.

f *Quorum omnium ea eſt ratio; quia etſi interrogans excludat ex ipſo omnem alium modum ſciendi; & reſponſio ex ſe id ſignificet; id tamen verum eſt ex formali iniqua interrogantis intentione; cui imputari debet repugnantia in ipſis verbis & interrogatione.* Ibid.

g *Repugnantia in ipſis verbis & interrogatione.*

h *Cui imputari debet repugnantia in ipſis verbis & interrogatione.*

And this is that, without doubt, for which he imputes the malice to the Judge, that he would hinder the accuſed from uſing his right that he hath, and cauſe him to ſpeak ſincerely, where he hath right to ſpeak equivocally, and by conſequence to condemn him of injuſtice and malice who would hinder him from uſing this right. He then ſets the Judge in the place of the malefactor, and the malefactor in the place of the Judge, making the malefactor Judge of his Judge himſelf, and giving him liberty to judge and condemn him even when he forſwears himſelf in his preſence, by anſwering according to his own fancy, and not according to the Judges interrogatory; and makes him ſay unto his Judge unawares to him: (for this is the ſecret and the *retentum* of the equivocation, which paſſeth inwardly in his minde:) [i] *I anſwer thee not in the manner which thou doſt examine me maliciouſly, but in the manner thou oughteſt to examine me as a Judge.* Which he teſtifies yet more clearly, 1570 when he ſaith that all this diſguiſement, deceit and lying of this man who forſwears himſelf,

i *Non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogas; ſed ut teneris tanquam Judex interrogare.*

himſelf, [k] *comes from the wicked intention of him that examines him, to which ought to be imputed the diſcordance which is found betwixt the anſwer and the interrogation.* But he juſtifies highly the lyar and the perjurer ſaying, [l] *he makes uſe of his right in anſwering his Judge following the lawful thought which he ought to have*, and not following that which he hath *maliciouſly*. That is to ſay, not onely reforming the Sentence of his Judge, but in condemning his judgement, his thoughts, his proceeding, as of a miſchievous or ignorant man, who knows not how to execute his charge, and he doth all this lawfully, if we believe *Sanchez*, as having a particular right which this Jeſuit hath given them; *utitur jure ſuo.*

k *Ex formali iniqua interrogantis intentione, cui imputari debet repugnantia in verbis ipſis & interrogatione.*

l *utitur jure ſuo reſpondendo ad mentem legitimam quæ inſſe debet.* Ibid. pag 31.

From theſe principles and concluſions *Sanchez* draws this concluſion to eſtabliſh theſe equivocations: [m] *For this cauſe I am always of this judgement for this ſame reaſon, whatſoever the Judge urgeth who interrogates unjuſtly, ſo far even as to make the examinant ſwear that he doth not make uſe of equivocations, and that he intends that which he ſaith without any equivocation. For he may alſo ſwear underſtanding ſecretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to ſpeak clearly and to expound himſelf; or by forming ſome other thought which may make his anſwer true.* So that what inſtance ſoever the Judge can make, or other perſon that examines him, and conjures him to ſpeak the truth; although he oblige him to promiſe, and even make him to ſwear that he will anſwer ſincerely, and not make uſe of any equivocation; notwithſtanding after his promiſe, and after his oath, he may yet delude the Judge and him that examines him, and anſwer by equivocation even then when he promiſeth and ſweareth that he will not make uſe thereof; [n] underſtanding always that he ſpeaks and anſwers him as he ought; that is, according to the right he thinks he hath, if he know no other occaſion, or if there come in his mind no other ſence, to which he may ſecretly referre his words, to give them ſome colour and ſome appearance of truth.

m *Quare idem cenſeo ob eandem rationem, quantumcunque reduplicet inquus interrogator ut juret ſe nulla æquivocatione uti, & abſque omni prorſus æquivocatione id intelligere. Adhuc enim jurare poteſt, intelligendo ita ut plane debeat loqui & explicare: vel aliud mente concipendo, quo verum id reddatur.* Ibid. p. 31.

n *Intelligendo ita ut plane debeat loqui & explicare. Vel aliud mente concipiendo quo verum id reddatur.*

His reaſon is the ſelf-ſame which he hath already made often uſe of: [o] *becauſe he is not obliged to anſwer to the intention and the thoughts which he hath who examines him, but to that which he ought to have, his anſwer is true, following this intention and this thought which he ought to have.*

o *Quia cum non teneatur ad formalem interrogantis mentem reſpondere, ſed ad debitam, illa reſponſio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera eſt.* Ibid. pag. 31.

This man doth not ſay that which he thinks, alſo he anſwers not that which he thinks, and which he demands who examines him, but to that which he pretends he ought to ask him, and to the thought which he thinks he ought to have in examining him. And this thought which he imagines that he who examines him ought to have, is his own, and that which he forms in his own minde, to deceive and elude the queſtion of him who examines him. So that he ſpeaks truth in lying, and ſwears falſe without perjury; becauſe although he anſwers contrarily to what he was queſtioned, and to what he hath promiſed to anſwer even with an oath: notwithſtanding he anſwers conformably to his own intention, and to the ſecret thought which he hath formed in his mind, which is that which he ought to have following his own judgement, not that of him who examines him, which makes his anſwer to be true. *Illa reſponſio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera eſt.*

So when one is urged by his Father, his Superior, or by his Confeſſor, to tell ſomething which he would not diſcover unto them, he needs onely to form a thought different from theirs, and to imagine that they ought to have it; and anſwering unto them comformably to this thought, he ſhall be covered from lying and falſhood, *Illa reſponſio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera eſt.*

The laſt counſel which *Sanchez* gives for ſecuring and facilitating equivocation is this:

this; [a] *It behoves him who will make uſe of any of theſe equivocations, which we are about to ſpeak of, to have an intention to give unto his words the ſence which they may truely receive, and by conſequence he muſt know that he may ſpeak them in any ſence which is true, though he know not in particular what that ſence is.* That is to ſay, that a man ſpeaking a falſhood ſo evident, that he himſelf ſees no means to excuſe or cover it under any equivocation, which might give it onely ſome colour of truth, he may nevertheleſs ſpeak it; and for to put his conſcience in ſurety, it is ſufficient for him to believe that which he ſaith may abſolutely be capable of ſome true ſence, though he knows it not.

[a] *At oportet ut atens quacunque ex dictis amphibologiis intendat ſenſum quem verba vera poſſunt habere; & ſic opus eſt ut ſciat ſe aliquo vero ſenſu poſſe dicere, quamvis in ſpecie illum ignoret.* Ibid. n. 46. p. 31.

By this rare Doctrine all deceivers and lyars have gained their cauſe, and this Jeſuit hath given them more than ever they durſt hope for, for according to this
1600 Doctrine they may not onely deceive without puniſhment, and without being diſcovered, which is that which they pretend to, but whatſoever deceit, lye or perjury, they uſe, they lye not nor forſwear themſelves at all, though they may believe themſelves that they do, ſeeing clearly that that which they ſay is not true, and being not able ſo much as to ſee how it can be true, provided onely, that they ſuppoſe and that they believe in general, that it may be ſo abſolutely in ſome ſence which they do not know.

*Sanchez* attributes this expedient unto *Suarez*. But to keep always his advantage, even above his Fraternity, and to hold the rank of a Maſter in this matter, he propoſes alſo another invention, or at leaſt he ſtretches that of *Suarez*, and he expounds it yet more eaſily. [b] *It ſuffices*, ſaith he, *that he hath an intention to give that ſence to his words which a learned man hath counſelled him to give it, or might underſtand it in.* He wills therefore that he ſhould not trouble himſelf ſo much as to know whether the evident falſity which he ſpeaks and which he ſees himſelf, may be covered by any ordinary or eaſie equivocation; and he believes that it behoves him onely to have an intention to ſpeak in ſuch a ſence as a learned man, who is experienced in equivocations, can give him, though it be altogether unknown from common people. So important a matter is it to have the counſel of a man who knows all the ſlights of this myſtery, and who hath proper ones for all ſorts of affairs. For we may not onely make uſe of his counſels when he is preſent, and when we have time to conſult him; but alſo in his abſence when we make our reference
1610 unto him in all ſorts of difficulties which we meet with in this matter, and make uſe of his counſel and direction to deceive all men without ſeeing him or ſpeaking to him, purpoſing onely in our ſelves to do that which he would do or counſel us; ſuppoſing that he would finde out ſome means by his contrivance, to juſtifie the lye and perjury which we are about to fall into; although we ſee not any way at all how this which we are about to ſpeak and to ſwear can be true in any ſence, or warranted from lying and perjury, according to any rules of Truth and Juſtice.

[b] *At ſat erit ut intendat ſenſum quem doctus vir illi conſulit, aut intelligit.* Ibid.

## The laſt ARTICLE.

### *A general proof that the Jeſuitical Authors favour and nouriſh the luſt of men in all things; and the common principle from which they draw all that they ſay in favour of it.*

BEyond all which we have ſpoken hitherto, it may be known clearly, by a general proof, that the Jeſuits nouriſh and favour as much as they can the luſts of men, by conſidering what they ſay to the diſadvantage of charity. For as charity and luſt are two contrary motions and loves which divide our heart, in ſuch manner that it is allways poſſeſſed and moved by the one or the other, and it hath ſo much more of luſt, as it hath leſs of charity; luſt cannot be favoured more nor eſtabliſhed more forcibly
1620 in the heart of man to cauſe it to reign continually through his whole life and all his actions, than by chaſing charity away from thence, for to reduce it to ſuch a ſtreight as that it cannot be more diminiſhed, nor have leſſe extent, without being entirely deſtroyed. And for this reaſon the Jeſuits carry themſelves ſo in this particular, and

with ſuch a conſent of their Authors, that it ſeems that a general conſpiracy and reſolution hath been taken about in, in ſo general aſſembly of all their Society.

There are ſome who pretend that a man is never obliged, upon any occaſion, not at any determinate time, to love God, in all the courſe of his life, nay, nor even at death. The more religious reduce this great and firſt commandment to a certain time, and certain occaſions which are very rare and diſtant. [c] *At what time,* inquires Eſcobar, *doth the precept of loving God oblige a man in it ſelf?* He rehearſes divers opinions, and expreſſes his own in theſe terms; [d] *I paſs by the opinion of* Azor *who alleadges eight times, or eight occaſions; and that of* Sanchez, *who acknowledges but one alone wherein this precept obliges:* (he leaves the one as too large, and the other as too ſevere and too exact;) [e] *But I follow* Henriquez *who obſerves three times in which this precept obliges. The firſt is, when a man begins to have the uſe of reaſon; the ſecond is upon the point of death; the third is all the time of a mans life between thoſe two, at the leaſt from five years to five years. But I ſay farther, following* Filliutius, *that it is probable that this precept doth not oblige in rigour every five years, but at the diſcretion and judgement of wiſe perſons.* 1630

c *Quonam tempore per ſe obligat præceptum charitatis ad Deum?* Eſcob. tr. 5. exam. 4. n. 8. p. 624.

d *Multo ſententiam Azorii ocio temporis aſſignantis, & Sanchez unicum.*

e *Sequor autem Henriquez tria ad hoc præceptum tempora aſſignantem. Primum quidem eſt morale principium rationis. Secundum, mortis articulus. Tertium, tempus vitæ inter medium, ſeptem ſingulis quinque annis. Addo ex Filliutio, probabile eſſe non quinquennio ſingulis rigore, obligare, ſed ſapientum arbitrio.* Ibid.

If a man be obliged to love God but upon one occaſion, as *Sanchez* would have it, or at the beginning of his uſe of reaſon, and at death, and now and then during his life, as Henriquez believes; or from five to five years, and even leſs as *Eſcobar adds*, or at moſt upon eight occaſions onely which may happen during a mans whole life, according to *Azor*, all the reſt of his time, that is to ſay, almoſt all the life of a man ſhall be for luſt, and one may employ it to love any other thing beſides God, that is to ſay, to love the creatures, temporal things, the goods of this world, without being obliged to turn away his minde and his heart from them to love God; it being certain that the heart of man cannot be without ſome love, and that that of the world and of the creatures doth occupy all that which the love of God doth not poſſeſs.

*Amicus* not daring to oppoſe himſelf abſolutely to the opinion of Divines who hold that to ſatisfie the precept of loving God we are obliged to have actually more love for him than for the Creature, expounds this opinion in ſuch ſort that he doth indeed defend it. [f] *The ſecond opinion holds,* ſaith he, *that it behoves to love God above all things, in preferring him above them, and eſteeming him more; but not in loving him with more tenacrueſs. This is the common judgement of Divines, which is true and which ought to be followed.* And for to expound this more clearly, he addeth, [g] *All preference comes from a judgement by which after we have compared two things, we chooſe the one and leave the other. For becauſe I judge that the one thing is worth more than the other, I preferr that which I judge to be the better.* He diſtinguiſhes here two acts; the one is that by which we compare two things together; and the other, that by which we give the preference to that which we judge the better. And he puts appreciative love in the latter of theſe two acts, which is for all that an act of judgement and of underſtanding as well as the former. So that to love God more than all the creatures appretiatively or by preference, according to him, is no other thing then *to judge, that God is better and more perfect then all the Creatures.* But this may be done by the greateſt Sinner as well as by the greateſt Saint, this judgement being more in the head than in the heart, and proceeding more from knowledge and light of minde than from affection. 1640

f *Secunda ſententia docet Deum eſſe diligendum ſuper omnia tantum appretiative, ſeu prælative. Eſt communis Theologorum opinio quæ vera & ſequenda.* Amic. tom. 4. diſp. 29. ſect. 2. n. 15. p. 388.

g *Omnis appretiatio naſcitur ex judicio comparativo unius præ alio. Ex eo enim quod judico unum eſſe melius & perfectius alio.* Ibid. num. 18.

Alſo it is clear that one may eſteem them much whom he loves not at all, and alſo more than thoſe whom he loves. And there is nothing more common then to eſteem thoſe for whom one has no true affection at all, but an intire indifference. So that this eſteem and this judgement cannot be named love but improperly; he he who ſets not his love which is due unto God, above all things, otherwiſe then in in this judgement and in this eſtimation, which makes him preſer him above all things, as deſerving to be beloved above all things, doth not at the bottom

attribute unto him any true love at all, and holds in effect that there is no love due to him at all.

But if theſe Doctors who know to give to their own words, as well as to thoſe of others, ſuch ſence as they pleaſe, even that which they have not, and which they cannot have naturally, as we have made appear in the former Chapter; I ſay, if theſe Doctors that they may not ſeem to aboliſh intirely the commandment of love to God, ſay that although they place this love that is due to God in the eſteem which we ought to make of him above all the creatures; they exclude not for all this from that preference all ſort of affection for God, and that they ſuppoſe we have always ſome love for him. They reduce elſewhere this love, whatſoever it be according to them, to ſo baſe a degree, that they teſtifie ſufficiently that all their explications are rather to diſguiſe their judgement, than to expound it clearly, and that not daring abſolutely to deny the commandment of loving God, they diminiſh and deface, as much as they can, the love which they ſuppoſe to be due unto him.

h *I will prove unto you*, ſaith Amicus, *that although the love of God appretiative above all things be in a very low degree; It ſufficeth for to accompliſh the precept of love towards God.* This is to aboliſh intirely the commandment of loving God, by maintaining that we are not obliged to love him as it doth command, for God doth demand all our love, ſince he demands all our heart. And *Amicus* ſaith and attempts to prove that the loweſt degree of love ſuffices to accompliſh the precept of love towards God. And that he might not leave any place to doubt of his thought upon this point, he repeats the ſame thing in the following number, and he ſpeaks thereof as of a truth which follows from his principles. i *It is manifeſt*, ſaith he, *following the principles which I have eſtabliſhed, that this love of God may be had, though it be weak in the loweſt degree, becauſe we may have ſuch an opinion and eſteem of God, whereupon we may judge him becauſe of his uncreated goodneſs to deſerve to be loved more than all his creatures; and nevertheleſs be but ſlenderly moved to the exerciſe of this act.*

h *Quod autem ſola dilectio appreciativa Dei ſuper omnia ſufficiat ad implendum præceptum charit tu erga Deum, etſi remiſſima ſit, probatur.* Ibid. num. 19.

i *Quod autem talis dilectio poſſit eſſe etiamſi in gradu remiſſiſſimo ſit, conſtat ex principiis, quoniam poſſumus talem æſtimationem de Deo habere, ut propter increatam ſuam bonitatem præfetendum ſit in amore omnibus rebus creatis, & tamen non niſi remiſſe in talem actum tendere.* Ibid. n. 20.

If this be to love God *to judge that he merits to be beloved*, the greateſt ſinners, Infidels, and Devils themſelves be capable of this love, and if to love as he commands, it be ſufficient *to be moved but ſlenderly, and to have for him an affection weak to the loweſt degree*; We muſt raze out or correct the commandment which requires that we *love him with all our ſtrength and with all our heart.*

Thus theſe Divines, deſtroying the love of God in the hearts of men, cauſe the love of the world to reign there; and reducing the love which is commanded us, to the utmoſt point and loweſt degree that it can be in, they give all liberty to luſt, and leave it all the extent of the heart and of the affections.

We need not therefore wonder if they ſtrongly maintain, that it is lawful to love temporal good things, as riches, honor, and pleaſure. k *It is no evil to deſire glory and reputation for a good end, as much as one deſerves*, ſaith *Eſcobar* after *Tolet*. But *Tolet* expounds himſelf better than *Eſcobar*, in the place which he cites, where after he had ſaid, l *The difference which is betwixt Pride and vaine Glory is this, that Pride tranſports men with a deſire and love of their own excellency; and vain Glory hath a deſire to manifeſt his own proper excellency particularly before others*; He adds in favour of vain glory, that m *to deſire it is not a thing bad in it ſelf, but indifferent, as to deſire money.*

k *Licet gloriam & famam ob bonum finem optare quantum quiſque meretur;* Eſcobar tr. 2. ex. 2. cap. 8. n. 92. p. 303.

l *Differt vana gloria à ſuperbia. Superbia enim appetit excellentiam, vana autem gloria manifeſtationem excellentiæ, præſique apud alios.*

They cannot better juſtifie vanity then by avarice, by approving them at the ſame time and in two words. And that which they ſay is moſt repugnant to the judgement of Saint *Paul* writing to *Timothy*, n *That thoſe who would be rich fall in*

n *Qui volunt divites fieri incidunt in tentationem & in laqueum diaboli* 1. ad Timoth. 6. v. 9.

*to temptations and the ſnares of the Devil.* And to that of Saint *John*, who ſpeaking generally of the world, and of the love of temporal goods which are in this world, gives this advice or rather command from God. [o] *Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world: for if any love the world the love of God is not in him.* This language of the Holy Ghoſt is ſufficiently different from that of the Jeſuits. Yet they ceaſe not to pretend that what they ſay, that one may love the goods of this world, is ſupported by the authority of the Saints and their examples, and even of JESUS CHRIST himſelf.

o *Nolite diligere mundum, neque ea quæ ſunt in mundo. Si quis diligit mundum, non eſt charitas Patris in eo.* 1. Joan. c. 2. v. 15.

Saint *Chryſoſtome*, in his VII. *Homily* upon the Epiſtle to the Hebrews, ſaith, that a ſecular perſon ought in all things to live like a Monk, ſave that he may cohabite with his wife if he be marryed. [p] *The ſecular*, ſaith he, *ought he to pretend that more is lawful to him then to a Monaſtick excepting only cohabitation with his wife? It is true that in this point he hath a particular power, but not in other things, in all other things be is obliged to live as the Monaſticks.* 1680

p *Num ſecularis homo debet aliquid amplius habere monacho, quàm cum uxore habitare tantum?*

*hic enim habet veniam, in aliis autem nequaquam, ſed omnia æqualiter ſicut monachi debet agere.* S. Chryſ. hom. 7. in Ep. ad Hebræos.

*Celot* alledging theſe words of Saint *Chryſoſtome*, expounds them, or rather corrects them in this ſort: [q] *When this Prelate writes that it is lawful for a ſecular to cohabite with his wife, he would ſay that it is lawful for him to bring up his children, to take care of the affairs of his Family; to deſire dignities with moderation, and the honours of the world; to follow his own free inclinations, to take pains to hoard no wealth; and to cloſe up all in a word, but which is an hierarchique and a Holy one, to lead his life altogether divided and diſtinct, diſparting his affections and thoughts to many different objects.*

q *Cum uxoris co-habitationem concedit laico ſcribit Antiſtes, educationem liberorum, reique familiaris curam, moderatam dignitatis & ſecularis honoris deſiderium, liberum ſuæ voluntatis uſum, quæſtuoſos labores: uno verbo, eoque hierarchico, dividuam diſtinctaſque vitæ & imaginationes illi permiſſas admonet.* Celot p. 573.

Saint *Chryſoſtom* ſaith abſolutely that a ſecular hath no licence more then a Monk, except that he may co-habite with his wife. And *Celot* ſaith that he may love and deſire the things of the world, though this be not allowed a Monk. *God permits to ſeculars*, ſaith this Jeſuit, *a moderate deſire of dignities and honours of the world.* That is to ſay, in moſt clear terms, that God hath allowed him ambition and vanity ſo it be not exceſſive, *he hath permitted him to follow his own proper will*, which cannot be done without he be delivered from the dependence which he hath on him, and diſpenſing with him from ſaying, with all Saints, *They will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven*: ſo that inſtead of this he permits them to demand that their own will may be fulfilled.

This eſtate of free diſpoſing of our wills was that of *Adam* before he ſinned: but now it is that of ſinners and of the damned, and God hath not a greater judgement to inflict on a man in this world then to give him up unto himſelf, and to let him do what he will. 1690 For this cauſe *Celot* hath happened to ſpeak better then he intended, when he ſaid that God had left to the people of this world, and to the lovers of this world, in favour of whom he ſpeaks, the free diſpoſal of their wills, *liberum ſuæ voluntatis uſum.* But this permiſſion is not, as he pretends, a permiſſion of approbation or diſpenſation which gives them right; but a permiſſion of judgement and of renunciation, which imports and implyes puniſhment and vengeance.

He ſaith alſo that God permits ſecular perſons to labour to gather wealth, *quæſtuoſos labores*; which is the very conſequence of his diſcourſe and opinion. For as the ſervants of God do labour to ſerve him and to gain eternal wealth, which he hath promiſed to thoſe that ſerve him; even ſo the people of the world ſerve the world, and labour for advancement in the world, and to get temporal wealth.

Finally he ſaith [r] *that to conclude all in one word, but which is hierarchique and holy, God hath permitted them to lead a life divided and diſtracted, parting their minds*

r *uno verbo, eoque hierarchico, dividuas diſtinctaſque vitas & imaginationes illi permiſſas admonet.*

*minds and thoughts towards a multitude of different objects.* I am not aſtoniſhed at all that he declares ſo openly, that he who is no profeſt Religious may divide his minde and life betwixt God and the world; that is to ſay, that he may love the world as well as God. This ſaying is worthy him, but not holy nor hierarchique as he aſſures us. This is rather a profane ſpeech and unworthy of a Chriſtian, and oppoſite to the hierarchy, being it is contrary to the order and commandment of God, who ordaines us [a] *to love him with all our heart, and forbids us to love the world and all that is in the world,*

[a] *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo.*

*Nolite diligere mundum, neque ea quæ in mundo ſunt.* 1. Joan. 2. v. 15.

Nevertheleſs he forbears not to take Saint *Chryſoſtome* for warrant of this ſaying, as if he could cover an errour by an impoſture. He makes this great Saint to ſay, or rather he ſaith for him, againſt his will, and contrary to his thoughts and expreſſe words, *that it is lawful for a ſecular perſon to lead a life wholly divided and ſevered, parting his affections and thoughts on many different objects.* Which agrees not with what he himſelf hath related of this Saint; that a Chriſtian who liveth in the world is obliged to the ſame things with a profeſſed Religious, excepting the uſage of marriage: *Omnia æqualiter ſicut Monachi agere debet*; unleſs he pretends that it is lawful alſo for the Monks and Religious, as well as ſeculars, to part their lives betwixt God and the world.

After he had thus abuſed the authority of the Saints, he abuſeth alſo their example, to ſupport his falſe principle, and to eſtabliſh ambition, uſury, and the love of this world and the goods of this world amongſt Eccleſiaſtiques and the Miniſters of Jeſus Chriſt, as well as amongſt the ſeculars. For he is bold to aſſure us that the greateſt perſonages of antiquity, as Saint *Baſil*, have ſuffered themſelves to breake out into paſſions, like thoſe he allows the people of the world, and have appeared vehemently concerned in occaſions ſo important as are the elections and ordinations of the Paſtors of the Church. See how he diſcourſes; [b] *We know that humane reaſons have often tranſported the greateſt perſons, to ſeek to advance their kindred and their friends to the orders and charges of the Church: and the Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory relates that Saint* Baſil *erected an Epiſcopali Seat at* Zazime, *which was but a deſpicable and poor Town, that he might eſtabliſh* Gregory Nazianzen *there, to the end he might make uſe of him as his friend, againſt* Anthemius Metropolitan *of the ſecond Province of* Cappadocia. *In which if he had conſidered the glory of God alone, and had not mingled therewith ſome Earthly deſire, St.* Gregory *had more readily and with leſſe reſiſtance yielded himſelf to the Will of Saint* Baſil.

[b] *Magnis etiam viris humanas rationes ſcimus non raro ejuſmodi parentum aut amicorum ordinationes perſuaſiſſe. Et à Sancto Baſilio Eccleſiaſticæ narrat hiſtoria Zazinis, vili ac deſpecto oppido, erectam Epiſcopatus Sedem, ut in ea conſtitutus Gregorius Nazianzenus amici ſui partes adverſus Anthemium ſecundæ Cappadociæ Metropolitanum tueretur. Quo in facto ſi unicam Dei ſpectaſſet gloriam, neque terreni deſiderii quidquam admiſcuiſſet, facilius ſine dubio ceſſiſſet Baſilio Gregorius.* Celot p. 947.

He is not contented unjuſtly to condemn Saint *Baſil*, he makes Saint *Gregory* to condemn him alſo; ſuppoſing falſely that he had oppoſed him, becauſe he diſcovered ſome worldly deſire in his deſign. But by this rule we muſt ſay that all the Saints who at the firſt reſiſted other Saints, or the Church, or God himſelf, when they were called to Eccleſiaſtique Offices and ſometimes by miracle, have obſerved ſome humane and terreſtrial concern in the conduct and vocation of the Church, the Saints, and God himſelf, upon which they grounded their refuſal, and reſiſtance.

After that *Celot* had impoſed this infirmity and defect upon Saint *Baſil*, he makes application thereof to his deſign, which is to authorize Luſt by the example of ſo great a Saint, drawing thence this conſequence. [c] Saint *Baſil* then might create and eſtabliſh under him new Biſhops, whom they call Suffragans, to augment the dignity and authority of his Metropolitan Church. [d] May not another Saint upon like occaſion give unto his Brother, his Kinſman, his faithful Friend, the conduct of an ancient Biſhoprick?

[c] *Potuit ergo S. Baſilius ut Eccleſiæ ſuæ Metropolitanæ dignitatem ampliſicaret, novos Epiſcopos ſibi ſubditos, quos ſuffraganeos appellamus, conſtituere.*

[d] *Non poterit Sanctus alius ſimili ex cauſa veteri Epiſcopatui fratrem & conſanguineum ſuum, aut amicum fidelisſimum præſitere?* Ibid.

1. We may obſerve in this diſcourſe firſt of all the raſhneſs wherewith he impoſes upon Saint *Baſil*, without any ground, to have acted humanely, and to have been carried by intereſt and a carnal deſire, to make St. *Gregory* a Biſhop.

2. The conſequence he draws from this ſuppoſed fact, ſaying that by the example of Saint *Baſil* others may chooſe their kindred and friends, for intereſt and humane conſideration, to ſucceed them in their charges of their Churches.

3. The concluſion and end of this reaſoning and this example, which is onely to make uſe of it to authorize and juſtify the love of the world and the goods of this world, and conſequently to let looſe the reins to Luſt, and to give men the liberty to follow it without difficulty and without remorſe of conſcience.

*Poza* proceeds farther unto a greater exceſſe in this ſame ſubject, attributing even to Jeſus Chriſt himſelf this manner of acting altogether humane, and altogether from fleſh and blood, in two the moſt Holy and Divine functions which he hath exercized, which are the diſtribution of his grace, and vocation to an Apoſtleſhip. For in that Saint *John Baptiſt* was ſanctified from the wombe of his Mother, he argues that by ſtronger reaſon Jeſus Chriſt hath done the ſame favour to Saint *Joachim* and Saint *Anne*. Becauſe that Saint *Joachim* and Saint *Anne* were his Grand-father and Grand-mother, whereas Saint *John* was but his couſin. See here his words ſpeaking of Jeſus Chriſt. * *For to make himſelf more complaiſant towards* Mary, *who was to be conceived without original ſin, he delivered her Father and Mother from the original corruption more readily then Saint* John. *And I ſee not*, ſaith he, *why the liberality of Jeſus Chriſt ſhould be greater towards Saint* John, *then towards his Grand-father and Grand-mother. Saint* John *being Couſin unto the Virgin; but this proximity being onely in the collateral line, it is leſſe then that of Fathers and Mothers and other Anceſtors who are in the right line: Saint* John *was the fore-runner of our Lord: but this dignity is not ſo proper to preſſe the bounty of Jeſus Chriſt, as that which ariſes from the quality of Father and Mother in reſpect of* Mary.

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* *ut Mariæ adblandiretur abſque originaria macula concipiendæ, illius parentem adhuc velocius quàm Joannem à macula hereditaria liberavit. Neque video quare effuſior fuerit beneficentia Chriſti in Joannem, quàm in utrumque avum. Joannes erat quidem conſobrinus Deiparæ; at multo minor eſt neceſſitudo hæc à tranſverſa linea derivata, quàm quæ recto tramite deſcendit patrum & avorum. Joannes fuit præcurſor Domini, hæc tamen dignitas urget minus clementiam Chriſti, quàm illa quæ ſumitur ex patrio munere per Mariam.* Poza Elucidarii l. 2. tr. 8. c. 3. ſect. 2. p. 547.

This is a great raſhneſs, and a reaſoning altogether carnal and groſſe, to preferre the natural quality of Father and Mother of the Virgin, to the Holy and eminent quality of the fore-runner of Jeſus Chriſt, by which Saint *John* ſurpaſſed all the greateſt Saints, and all the Prophets. But this is yet a greater temerity, and a thought yet more carnal, to attribute the grace of God to natural conditions of fleſh and blood, againſt the moſt clear and certain principles of Faith. Finally this is a third exceſſe, to maintain, Saint *Joachim* and Saint *Anne* had ſo much or more grace and Holyneſs then Saint *John Baptiſt*, ſince it is formally to contradict Jeſus Chriſt, who hath declared that amongſt all the Saints who were born before *John*, there was none greater then he. And the foundation of this imagination is no better then it is it ſelf. For he pretends that Jeſus Chriſt entring into the ſame obligations with his Mother, and making them as his own, ought to give more grace to thoſe to whom the Virgin was more obliged, and more ſtraitly bound according to the order of nature and of birth. See here his words: ‖ *It was reaſonable that Jeſus Chriſt ſhould give grace in more abundance to thoſe to whom his Mother was more obliged by the Laws of nature, and by the particular engagements of her condition.*

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‖ *ut quibus magis ſecundùm naturam & debitum cauſæ tenebatur (beata Virgo) illis abundantiorem gratiam Chriſtus impertiret.* L. 3. tr. 10 c. 5. p. 617.

And ſpeaking of the vocation of the Apoſtles, he ſaith that Jeſus Chriſt ‡ *to ſatisfie the Laws of Fleſh and Blood, did chooſe almoſt half his Apoſtles of the number of his kindred according to the fleſh.* He cannot ſay more openly, that Jeſus Chriſt was acted by carnal affection, and by humane conſiderations, in the diſtribution of his Graces, and in the vocation of his Apoſtles to their office, which are two actions of his power the moſt principal and Divine.

‡ *Hoc carni & ſanguini dedit, ut media fere parte Apoſtolorum ex cognatis ſecundum carnem parareturr.*

The *Pelagians* proceeded in their hereſie no further than this point, to ſay that God diſtributed his Grace according to the rules of fleſh and blood. The Phariſees who looked narrowly into all the actions of Jeſus Chriſt to reprove them, never found in all his life the leaſt occaſion to reproach him that he acted humanely, and with acceptation of perſons, preferring his kindred before others. On the contrary, they found always ſo much indifferency in all his conduct, that they publiquely gave this teſtimony of him; *You reſpect no mans perſon, and you have no regard unto men.*

[ *Non eſt tibi cura de aliquo, non reſpicis perſonam hominis.* Mar. 22. v. 16.

The ſame Author in the ſame place purſuing his diſcourſe, diſcovers more openly yet the thought which he hath of our Saviour in this matter; and makes it more unexcuſable, ſee how he ſpeaks. *But for fear that Jeſus Chriſt ſhould let looſe the reins unto ambition, and that the love which he had to his kindred might not appear too exceſſive, he choſe none of them, to make him Prince and Chief of the Apoſtles: but he choſe Saint* Peter *who was of another Family, and of another Neighbouring Town.* So that, according to the thoughts of this Author, vanity, and the conſideration of men did a little hold back the ambition of Jeſus Chriſt; ſo that if he had not been afraid to diſcover, and make too much to appear that paſſion which he had to make great his kindred, as he had already advanced many to the Apoſtleſhip, he had alſo it may be choſen ſome one of them to make him head of the Apoſtles. But if Jeſus Chriſt could prefer his kindred before other men to make them Apoſtles becauſe of their kindred, as this Jeſuit pretends, why could not he by the ſame reaſon give them the primacy over the Apoſtles? If it had been too great ambition to do the ſecond, as he ſuppoſes, it had been alſo ambition according to him, though leſſe, to do the former. The extremeſt point of impiety of the Jews in the time of the Law, and of Tyrants ſince the coming of Chriſt, hath been to ſet Idols in the Temples, and on the Altars conſecrated unto God. But this is a far greater exceſs to ſet luſt, that is to ſay, the ſpring of all ſins, of all diſorders, of all the evils in the world, in God himſelf, and Jeſus Chriſt.

g *Ne autem in conſanguineos aimia videretur amor, & ambitionis frena laxarentur, nullum ex illis Apoſtolorum Principem elegit: ſed ex aliena familia vicina autem patriæ Simonem Petrum.* Lib. 2. tr. 10. c. 4. p. 614.

The Holy Fathers have obſerved that the Devil never found any artifice of means more efficacious to authorize vice, and give it a free courſe among Pagans, then to let them ſee the examples of it in the actions of the falſe gods, it being eaſie to carry them on to imitate thoſe whom they adored. The Jeſuits do the ſame thing, In a manner more criminal, attributing to the Saints, and even unto Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, humane motions, and earthly deſires, and paſſions of fleſh and blood, and perſwading men alſo that they are not evil, and that they may follow them in their conduct; or rather that they are obliged to do them, ſince the Goſpel teaches us to follow Jeſus Chriſt in all things, in the conduct of our lives, and the regulation of our manners.

We muſt avow, that it is not poſſible more to promote luſt, nor more to debaſe the Son of God.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### Of Sins in habit, or habitual Sins.

*That there is ſcarcely any habitual Sins, according to the Jeſuits; and that* 1770
*cuſtom of ſinning may make a man uncapable of ſinning.*

AS in doing evil we accuſtom our ſelves thereunto, and in following luſts we cauſe them to paſs into habits, which ſtrengthen and increaſe more the inclination we had unto evil; the order of reaſon requires in the deſign we have, to conſider the ſprings and the principles of ſin, to make appear how the Jeſuits nouriſh them, that after we have treated of Luſt, we ſpeak alſo of evil habits.

I propoſe, for example, of habitual ſins ſwearing and blaſphemy: becauſe theſe ſins of themſelves produce neither pleaſure nor profit, its onely paſſion which carries men to them, and evil cuſtom which nouriſheth them. So that to ſpeak properly and according to their peculiar nature, they are ſins of paſſion and habit.

*Bauny* in his ſumme, chap. 4. pag. 60. ſpeaking of a perſon accuſtomed to ſwear, who for this reaſon is always in danger to be forſworn, gives this counſel to their Confeſſours. *The Confeſſor to hinder this evil, ought to draw from his penitent an* 1780
*act of diſlike, or to ſpeak better, of diſavowing this curſed cuſtom. For by this means the oaths which ſhall follow proceeding from ſuch an habit ſhall be eſteemed involuntary in their cauſe. Suarez l. 3. of Oaths chap. 6, Sanchez in his Summe, l. 3. c. 5. n. 11, and by conſequence without ſin.*

This practice is very eaſie and very convenient, if it be ſo that one word of diſowning ſins, which a Confeſſor can draw out of the mouth of a ſinner, may ſerve all at once to be a remedy for all the ſins which he hath committed, and for the juſtification of all the ſins he ſhall be able to commit for the future by the violence of an evil habit. So the ſimple declaration which a man ſhall make of his being ſorry to ſee himſelf ſubject to ſuch a vice, ſufficeth to excuſe him from all the ſins which he ſhall afterwards commit by that habit which he hath of this vice; as the debauches and exceſſes of the mouth, immodeſt ſpeeches, lyes, deceits, theſts, and other ſuch like. And ſo almoſt all vices of this ſort ſhall be innocent, there being few perſons that are not ſorry for being engaged in them, and being unable to avoid them, becauſe of their long accuſtoming themſelves unto them, or who at leaſt do not or will not ſometimes diſallow them, and teſtifie ſome diſpleaſure againſt them in ſome good interval.

And yet if this good Father had been well read in *Sanchez* whom he cites, I am confident he would have been fender'd yet more eaſie and complacent in this point. For *Sanchez* acknowledges no particular ſin in Oaths that proceed of an habit though no diſavowing them be made to excuſe them, as *Bauny* requires. See how he
p *Poſterior ſententia, cui tanquam probabiliori accedo, ait juramenta prolata ſine advertentia formali & per ſe ſufficienti ad peccatum mortale, non eſſe in ſe novum ac propium ac ſpeciale peccatum propter ſolam jurandi conſuetudinem, qualiſcumque ſit, & nedum ſit retracta.* Sanchez op. mor. part. 1. l. 3. c. 5. n. 28. p. 21.

ſpeaks herein: p *The laſt opinion which I follow as the moſt probable, holds that* 1790
*thoſe Oaths which are made without actual application, which of it ſelf were ſufficient to a mortal ſin, are not of themſelves new ſins properly and particularly, onely becauſe of the cuſtom of ſwearing, how great ſoever it be, and though no renunciation or retractation be made of it.*

*Eſcobar* is not far off from this opinion, where ſpeaking of blaſphemy, he demands, q *If blaſphemy be ſometimes a venial ſins?* And he anſwers abſolutely, according to his uſe; *That ſuch a cuſtom whereof one thinks not at all makes ſin not to be*
q *Num aliquando veniale ſit blaſphemia? Conſuetudo quid. ſit* pag 73. *abſque advertentia lethale peccatum non facit.* Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 3. cap. 6. num. 28.

*mortal*; But for the moſt part hinders it from being mortal, as it would be if he did ſwear without being accuſtomed. *Filliutius* ſpeaks the ſame more at large and more clearly. [a] *It is demanded what ſin is it to blaſpheme cuſtomarily? I anſwer, in the firſt place that when a man blaſphemes without having full knowledge thereof, how much ſoever he be accuſtomed thereto, he ſins not mortally.* He takes the reaſon of this concluſion out of a general principle which he preſuppoſeth as aſſured. [b] *The reaſon is, ſaith he, becauſe, as we have ſaid handling free and voluntary actions, to ſin mortally it behoves*
1800 *to have a full knowledge, for want of which on what account ſoever it comes, ſin is thereby hindered.*

[a] Oſtavo quæro de conſuetudine blaſphemandi ordine ad malitiam. Reſpondeo & dico 1. ſi deſit advertentia plena, & ea oriatur blaſphemia, etiamſi adſit conſuetudo blaſphemandi, non committitur peccatum mortale. Filliutius, mor. qq. tom. 2 tract. 25. cap. 1. num. 27. pag. 173. [b] Ratio eſt, quia, ut diximus de voluntario & libero, ad peccatum mortale requiritur advertentia plena, ut indecenter dicatur defectus illius, excuſat a peccato. Ibid.

He demands in the ſame place. [c] *If the cuſtom of ſwearing put a man in the eſtate of ſin?* First of all, he reports the opinion of thoſe who hold the affirmative, afterwards he ſpeaks his own in theſe terms; [d] *I ſay, in the ſecond place, that the cuſtom of ſwearing without neceſſity and without utility, but with verity and without ſufficient knowledge and reflection, is not of it ſelf a great ſin, and puts not a man into a ſtate of mortal ſin.*

[c] An juramenti conſuetudo conſtituat hominem in ſtatu peccati? [d] Dico 2. conſuetudinem juvandi ſine neceſſitate vel utilitate, ſed cum veritate & ſufficiente advertentia, non eſſe peccatum grave ex ſe, nec conſtituere hominem in ſtatu peccati mortalis. Ibid. cap. 10. n. 313.

He demands again on the ſame ſubject; [e] *If perjury, which one commits through natural inadvertence be a mortal ſin, becauſe of the cuſtom he hath to forſwear.* And rejecting the opinion of thoſe who believed it to be a mortal ſin, he anſwers; [f] *I ſay, in the ſecond place, that it is more probable that there is no mortal ſin particularly when one forſweareth himſelf without perceiving it at all, and by a natural inadvertence.* And a little after he adds; [g] *Though he who doth it, doth it willingly addicted to ſin by an evil habit.*

[e] Sitne perjurium cum inadvertentia naturali peccatum mortale ob conſuetudinem perjurandi. Ibid. n. 316. [f] Dico 2. Probabilium eſt non habituali affectu eſſe peccatum mortale ſpeciale, quando eſt ſine advertentia naturali. Ibid. [g] Etiamſi operetur illum ex habituali affectu. Ibid.

So that according to the judgement of this Divine, although he ſwear with full knowledge, provided that it be not againſt truth; although he ſwear againſt the truth and perjure himſelf, if he have not a full knowledge, being tranſported with paſſion, and by the violence of ſome habit, it is no mortal ſin, although he doth
1810 ſwear without neceſſity, without utility, and by an evil cuſtom contracted by many crimes; and which is yet more conſiderable; though he alſo have a will and affection addicted to ſin, becauſe of this evil cuſtom. That is to ſay, that a man may have a will carryed on to ſin, and ſin actually without ſinning, and without being capable of the ſin which he commits.

*Bauny* in the 6. chap. of his Summe, p. 73. ſpeaks of perſons accuſtomed to curſe creatures that are without reaſon, as Gentlemen that curſe their Dogs and Hawks, when they have no good Game; Carters their Horſes when they put them to trouble; Mariners the ſeaſon and the wind when it is contrary to them. And after he had reported the opinion of *Navarre*, and ſome others who condemn theſe maledictions of venial ſin, he adds; *As for me, I believe that I may ſay with truth, that ſetting aſide choler by which ſuch people ſuffer themſelves to be tranſported in ſuch unjuſt exerciſes, it is no fault neither venial nor mortal to curſe Dogs, Horſes, Hawks, or other irrational things.* So that there is nothing but choler, according to him that cauſes ſin in theſe curſes, he that ſhall utter them in cold blood and without tranſport, or who *ſhall make uſe of them onely as ornaments of language*, as he ſaith, ſpeaking of Oaths, chap. 5. p. 66. or who ſuffers himſelf to go on therein by an evil cuſtom, which is become natural, and makes him do it without violence, without tranſportation, and even ſo that he perceives it not, he committeth no ſin in the moſt ſtrange curſes and execrations,

But to hold to theſe principles of the Jeſuits and others, and to follow their arguments; if it fall out that theſe ſame perſons who are accuſtomed to utter theſe curſes, be alſo tranſported with choler, their choler will be no ſin no more then their curſes; eſpecially if it come from a ſtrong habit, and that the emotion be ſo ſtrong that it trouble and blind the minde.

*Layman* comprizes in a few words all that *Bauny*, *Fillintius*, *Eſcobar*, and *Sanchez*, have ſaid concerning the cuſtom of ſwearing and blaſpheming. He ſpeaks alſo more preciſely and more clearly then they, diſcharging abſolutely of all ſin the blaſphemies and perjuries which are made by an evil habit contracted by long uſe, which he aſſures us of as a certain truth, and which follows neceſſarily from the principles of his Divinity. See here his terms: [h] *It follows from that which I have ſaid, that he who from the impreſſion of an inveterate cuſtom, as it were by a ſort of impetuous neceſſity, is tranſported to do evil, as to ſpeak words of blaſphemy, or perjury, ſins not at all; and to ſpeak properly blaſphemes not at all, becauſe a man cannot ſin at all without rational knowledge and deliberation.* Following his principles there are no habitual ſins at all, ſince evil cuſtom not onely doth neither cauſe nor augment ſin, but alſo diminiſheth it, and ſometimes takes it wholly away, and a perſon who blaſphemes, forſwears, and doth every other criminal thing that can be, ſins not according to this maxime, when it comes from *an evil inveterate cuſtom*, which is become natural, *which carryes him on to the commiſſion* of all theſe crimes *by a kind of neceſſary impreſſion*, almoſt without any ſenſible apprehenſion.

[h] *Ex dictis colligitur eum qui ex inveterata conſuetudine, velut quadam neceſſario impetu rem malam agit, v. g. materiales blaſphemias profert, vel perjuria effundit, tunc non peccare, nec proprie blaſphemare, quia nullum peccatum ſine ratione in deliberatione committitur.* Layman l. 1. tr. 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20.

So the condition of this man, altogether corrupt and altogether plunged in vice, ſhall be better then of another leſſe vicious, and exempt from wicked habits. This man by often ſinning ſhall be put into an eſtate of not ſinning any more, and into a kind of for him happy neceſſity, which will give him a power to commit all ſorts of crimes ſecurely, freely and without being more criminal, or even at all guilty. But if it be true that by multitude of ſins a man becomes uncapable of ſinning, and that multitude of ſins make a man innocent; this would be a powerful motive to carry men on to all ſorts of vices and exceſſe, and to ſet men farther from virtues, whoſe exercise is more painful, and never brings that advantage of being uncapable of ſinning, or to have power to commit the greateſt ſins without ſinning.

CHAP.

# CHAP. III.

## Of Sins of Ignorance.

*That Ignorance excuſes ſins committed without knowing them; and even thoſe which are committed afterwards: And that there is properly no ſins of Ignorance, according to the Jeſuits.*

THere is a particular connexion, and as it were a natural conſequence betwixt ſins of evil habits, and ſins of Ignorance. For one of the effects of an evil habit is by little and little to ſtifle the remorſes of ſin, and by conſequence to remove all thoughts of it, and to take away the knowledge of it. For this cauſe, having before viewed what the Jeſuits ſay of habitual ſin, order requires that we repreſent their opinion of thoſe which are committed by ignorance.

Ignorance may be conſidered, either in regard of thoſe ſins which are committed without knowledge of them, or in regard of thoſe which have been heretofore committed, without thinking to do evil. And it may be inquired if the firſt be true ſins: and what is to be done when we come to apprehend that the ſecond are ſo.

As to the latter point, *Bauny* (in his Summe, chap. 40. pag. 650. and 651) holds *that if any one of ignorance and ſimplicity hath confeſſed his faults in groſſe, without determining of any one in particular, it will not be needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of thoſe faults, if it cannot be commodiouſly done, becauſe the Confeſſor is preſſed ſo with penitents which give him not leaſure.* He would ſay, that on the Feaſt-days when the Confeſſors are preſſed it will ſuffice to make a general confeſſion, without ſpecifying any one ſin in particular, as the Hugenots would have it.

After this queſtion he propoſes another: *And what may we ſay of thoſe who in their youth have committed many actions of a vicious nature, which notwithſtanding they did not believe to be ſuch?* He anſwers definitively, that *they are not obliged to confeſſe one word of them, when they know them and underſtand their nature and conditions, much leſſe to reiterate their confeſſions made already.* Whence it follows that Saint *Paul* might have diſpenſed with himſelf to do penance for the ſins he had committed in his youth before his converſion, being he committed them through ignorance, as he tells us himſelf: *Ignorans feci incredulitate*; I did them ignorantly in unbelief; and *David* ought not to ſay: [a] *Lord remember not the ſins of my youth and of my ignorance.* A ſage Phyſitian will not give this counſel to a patient whom he knows to have of a long time laboured of ſome hidden diſeaſe, which now begins to appear, and to make it ſelf known by the pain to him who had it without knowing of it. He will not counſel him to keep it always hid without ſpeaking a word, but that he diſcover it ſpeedily, and that he cauſe himſelf to be cured.

But this opinion of *Bauny* may perhaps be founded upon a principle which *Filliutius* propoſes as probable; to wit, that even criminal ignorance doth not make confeſſion invalid. [b] *It is demanded*, ſaith he, *if when ignorance is not directly voluntary, though it be criminal, it make the Confeſſion invalid; though without due form?* He anſwers that *the opinion which holds it is, is probable.* He would ſay, that provided a man had no former deſign to conceal any thing in his confeſſion, though by a notorious negligence, and which renders him guilty of mortal ſin, and conſequently which renders him uncapable to receive the grace of the Sacrament of Penance, he had forgotten one or more crimes, nevertheleſs his confeſſion is valid. So that if afterwards he call to minde his ſins which he had forgotten, he is not obliged to confeſs himſelf thereof, and it ſuffices that he accuſe himſelf of his negligence. *Such confeſſions, ſaith this Author, are held for valid, and it ſuffices to accuſe ones ſelf of his negligence.*

[a] *Delicta juventutis meæ & ignorantias meas ne memineris Domine.* Pſ. 24. v. 7.

[b] *Decimo quæritur: An quandoignorantia non eſt per ſe intentata, licet ſit culpabilis mortaliter, efficiat confeſſionem invalidam, ſed inſorvem? Reſpondeo & dico probabilem eſſe opinionem quæ id affirmat.* Filliutius mor. qq tom. 1. tract. 7. c. 5. n. 132. p. 183. gigantia. Ibid.

[b] *Tales confeſſiones reputantur validæ, & ſatis eſt ſe accuſare de ne-*

His reaſon is; [c] *For if we regard the intention of him who makes this confeſſion, it is intire there being nothing omitted upon deſign.* As if Sin could not be committed without expreſs deliberation and a formed will.

c *Quia talis confeſſio eſt ex intentione dicentis integra. Nihil enim omittit ſcienter.* Ibid.

His ſecond reaſon is; [d] *For otherwiſe it would be neceſſary to repeat a multitude of confeſſions.* Whence he concludes, *that if we ought to follow the contrary opinion in the practice, this would make the charge and the yoke of confeſſion too weighty.* Without doubt becauſe that he could not confeſs ſo many people, and that he ſhould have therein too much pains, and alſo would give too much trouble to thoſe who are to confeſs if he obliged them to examine themſelves ſeriouſly, or confeſs themſelves over again; when being not well examined they had forgot ſome notorious crimes. So the commodity of confeſſors and of penitents are the rules of conſcience, according to the maximes of this new Divinity.

d *Quare ſi contraria ſententia practicanda eſſet, redderetur onus confeſſionis valde grave.* Ib.

So much for ſins which are forgotten in confeſſion, or which were not known when they were committed; as for thoſe which are committed, or which may be committed every day; *Sanchez* propoſes a caſe which he reſolves in the ſame place in this manner. [e] *If any one ſhoot an arrow by which he kills his enemy, ſuppoſing invincibly that it was a beaſt, he is intirely innocent of this manſlaughter, though he was in ſuch a diſpoſition, that if he had known that it had been his enemy, he would have killed him with more joy.* 1870

e *Si quis ſagittam projiciat, qua hoſtem necet, putans invincibiliter eſſe feram, ab ejus homicidii culpa eſt omnino liber, etiamſi ita diſpoſitus eſſet, ut agnoſcent eſſe hoſtem liberius perimeret.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 13. p. 70.

He propoſes alſo another in the ſame place, and reſolves it likewiſe in the ſame manner: [f] *A man enjoys a woman whom he knows to be not his own; or he knows it not, it is his fault, but if he be invincibly ignorant that ſhe is his Kinſwoman; he is guilty of fornication, but not of Inceſt.* And if theſe two men ſhall afterwards come to know what they did in ignorance, the one may rejoyce in his man-ſlaughter, and the other in his inceſt, without being guilty either of man-ſlaughter or Inceſt.

f *Cognoſcens fœminam quam novit non eſſe ſuam, vel id culpabiliter ignorans, at invincibiter ignorans eſſe conſanguineam, erit fornicationis reus, non tamen inceſtus* Ibid. n. 10.

*Filliutius* will ſerve them alſo for ſecurity, where propoſing the ſame queſtion, he demands, [g] *If the pleaſure which is taken in an action of mortal ſin, which is done in ſleep, drunkenneſſe, or madneſs, or through ignorance, be voyd of ſin?* And two lines after he gives an example of this caſe, [h] *As if any one take pleaſure in ſin which he had committed in his ſleep being drunk or mad, or by ignorance of the perſon whom he ſuppoſed to be his wife.* Of which he reports many opinions, whereof the firſt is that which holds it to be unlawful. But he prefers that which aſſures us that it is lawful, ſaying; *The ſecond opinion ſeems to me more probable and abſolutely ſafe.* And becauſe he ſpeaks of ſome actions which may be done without ſin, he adjoyns for farther explication of his thoughts: [i] *That if one would extend this ſecond opinion to pleaſure which is taken in an action of it ſelf wicked; but, which being done without ſin, in ſuch manner as I have already now explicated it, it ſeems to me alſo probable, even in the practique.* Theſe people give a marvellous force unto ignorance, becauſe they hold, that it does not ſhelter onely the moſt enormous crimes; but it gives alſo the liberty and power to rejoyce, and take pleaſure in them, as good actions, when one comes to know them or call them to remembrance. 1880

g *Quæro 5. an delectatio de mortali, ratione ſomni, ebrietatis, amentiæ, vel ignorantiæ excuſetur?* Filliut. mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 8. n. 290. p. 26.

h *ut ſi quis delectetur de fornicatione habita in ſomnis, vel ebrietate, vel amentia, vel ignorantia, cum ea quam putabat eſſe ſuam uxorem.* Ibid.

i *Dico 3. ſecundam ſententiam, ſi intelligatur de operationibus de ſe malis moraliter, ſed factis ſine peccato modo explicato, adhuc videri probabilem, etiam in praxi.* Ibid. n. 293. p. 31.

*Sanchez* propoſeth alſo this caſe, in the place I have already cited; [k] *If he who*

k *An invincibiliter ignorans actum internum eſſe peccatum, cognoſcens tamen actum externum eſſe peccatum, excuſetur à culpa, actum ſolum externum admittens?* Sanch. ſup. n. 16. p. 71.

*knew that it were a ſin to do an action outwardly, but were invincibly ignorant that it were a ſin to commit it inwardly and in his mind, were excuſed from ſin, committing it onely inwardly?* And that he might make himſelf to be the better underſtood in a matter ſo important, he illuſtrates this queſtion by example: [l] *As if a peſant ſhould hear it ſpoken by a man, reputed to be a pious and knowing man, that it was a ſin to ſteal and commit fornication outwardly; but it was lawful to deſire the one and the other.* He acknowledgeth [m] *that ſome learned Doctors amongſt the moderns believe not that this ignorance doth excuſe at all.* He reports their reaſons, very conſiderable ones, to the number of five. But he concludeth for ignorance in theſe terms: [n] *Though this be probable, I believe nevertheleſs that it is yet more probable that this interiour action is exempt from all ſin, becauſe of invincible ignorance.*

l *Ut ſi ruſticus à viro exiſtimato pio audiviſſet fornicationem & furtum externa eſſe peccata, at licere fornicandi & furandi deſiderium.* Ibid.

m *Qui hujſdam neotericis doctis videtur hanc ignorantiam non excuſare.* n *At quamvis hoc probabile ſit, probabilius tamen credo illum actum internum excuſari omnino à malitia, ratione illius ignorantiæ invincibilis.* Ibid.

And a little after, following the principles which he hath eſtabliſhed to maintain ignorance, and the ſins which are committed by ignorance, he ſaith, [o] *It follows that he who knoweth that it is mortal ſin to commit an action; but knows not that it is a ſin to command an other to commit it, through invincible ignorance, is excuſed from ſin in doing it.*

o *Secundo deducitur, ſcientem aliquam actionem eſſe mortalem, at invincibiliter ignorantem peccare imperando illam, excuſari à culpa imperando.* Ibid. n. 19.

*Filliutius*, as we have ſeen in the former Chapter, ſaith that a man who hath an evil cuſtom of ſinning, for example of ſwearing and forſwearing himſelf, and who is continually in an habitual affection and diſpoſition to commit this ſin upon occaſions preſented to him, *cum habituali affectu ad peccatum*, doth not ſin nevertheleſſe in any manner when he forſwears himſelf without thinking of it, not troubling himſelf if this want of knowledge or advertency comes from an evil cuſtom, which this perſon hath contracted, or ſome violent paſſion which tranſporteth him. *Nec refert*, ſaith he, *quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava conſuetudine aut paſſione.* And makes uſe of all theſe conſiderations and circumſtances, however of themſelves evil, rather to excuſe their ſin then to condemn it, [p] *Becauſe paſſion as well as evil cuſtom takes away the uſe of reaſon.*

p *Quia tum paſſio quam conſuetudo tollit actulem uſum rationis.* Ibid.

After he had reſolved on this manner this caſe ſo well circumſtanced, he propounds another about this evil habite and diſpoſition, and he demands [q] *if it be a ſin when he ſees this evil cuſtom as it were conſummate, and perceives how dangerous and wicked it is*, and notwithſtanding all this he gives way toit, and forſwears himſelf.

q *An ſit peccatum quando videt conſummatam eſſe conſuetudinem, & advertit gravitatem & periculum ejus?* Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 35. c. 16. n. 318. p. 203.

This caſe propoſed in this manner is very clear, and the evil too evident to be excuſed openly. Which is the reaſon that he leaves the queſtion for the preſent indecided, and propounds it onely as problematique, and containing ſome difficulty and doubt on either ſide. *Dubium eſſe poteſt*, ſaith he. But in the iſſue returning to his principles and rights of ignorance, which he undertakes to defend, he adds: *Sed etiamſi tunc dicatur eſſe peccatum, non tamen poſtea quando quis non advertat de novo peccat. But although it may then be called a ſin, yet doth he not ſin afterwards afreſh, when he doth not any longer obſerve it.* That is to ſay, that though this man poſſibly may ſin, for he doth not affirm he doth, when he is forſworn, and actually remembers and ſees the evil eſtate and evident danger whereunto this evil cuſtom doth bring him: yet when he hath this thought no more, for that this evil cuſtom and paſſion hath taken it away, he ſins no more, whatſoever crime he may commit in this darkneſs; though he have reduced himſelf to this miſerable eſtate voluntarily, and that the blindneſſe, which him from ſeeing what he hath done, comes from the corruption which evil cuſtom and paſſion have produced in his minde: *Nec refert quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava conſuetudine, aut ex paſſione.*

So that it is not for nothing that this Jeſuit would not ſpeak clearly at firſt,

[r] *An sit peccatum quando quis videt consummatam esse consuetudinem, & advertit gravitatem & periculum ejus?* ¶ *Advertentia actualis necessaria est ut ignorantia censeatur vincibilis, nec excuset.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 21. p. 72.

[r] *whether a man sins when he sees that the evil custom which he hath is consummate, and he perceives the evil estate and danger whereunto it exposes him*, and it is with some reason that he leaves the thing doubtful: *dubium esse potest.* Because according to his principles and those of his Fraternity, to sin, at least mortally, it is not enough to see the evil that is done, and the danger incurred in doing it: but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledge; and besides this, both time and means to deliberate on it. This is, according as *Sanchez* speaks in this matter; [r] *It behooves*, saith he, *to consider actually that which is done actually, for to judge whether the ignorance be faulty and exempt not a man from sin.* And a little after: *This is not enough to commit mortal sin to consider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done, but this consideration and deliberation must be full.*

*Nec sufficit ad mortale quævis consideratio & deliberatio malitiæ objecti, sed debet esse plena.* Ibid. n. 22.

It is not sufficient, with him, to have a cognisance of the evil; but he wills also that time be had to deliberate whether to do it or not; and he is not contended even with this, but he pretends that this knowledge and this deliberation ought to be full, in such sort that there be no darkness nor clouds. For if you ask him what he intends by full deliberation and knowledge, he makes use, for explication, of an example of a man who is perfectly awaked in his right understanding, and in this estate thinks seriously of a thing. [t] *This full knowledge*, saith he, *is that by which we see clearly and totally the object with consideration and reflection; as when one is perfectly awaked. For it may come to pass that even when one is awake, he may think so little of that which he doth as may not be sufficient to sin mortally.* 1920

[t] *Illa est quando hanc plene advertit instar perfecte à somno excitatorum.*

*Quippe potest in vigilia adeo tenuis consideratio accidere, ut non sufficiat ad mortale.* Sanch. l. 1. op. mor. c. 1. n. 10. p. 2.

His opinion therefore is, that the knowledge which is necessary to most obdurate sinners, to make them consider and see the evil which they do, must be as great and as perfect as it can be in the most virtuous persons, who have not their passions nor their evil habits, and that without this knowledge they cannot sin mortally; that is to say, he will have a man that is in darkness and at midnight to see as clear as he who is at high noon, and a blind man to perceive and judge colours as well as he who hath his eyes sound and intire. For passions and vices, and evil habits are properly the darkness and blindness of the soul: and to pretend farther, as he doth that for want of a full and perfect knowledge, a man given up to vice and accustomed to sin, sins not mortally, is as if he should say, that he could not sin mortally in that estate, and the more this man advances in darkness and blindness continuing this wicked life, by so much he shall be farther off from sin and from power to sin, untill that by the consummation of his evil custom, being also the consummation of his blindness, he be made intirely and absolutely without power to sin.

*Layman* quotes *Sanchez* and *Vasquez* for this opinion, and he embraces it with them: in his first Book, tr. 1. chap. 4. pag. 22. I rehearse not his words for brevity sake. 1930

[u] *Advertentia ad peccatum mortale requisita debet esse plena & perfecta per firmum judicium de malitia actus, vel periculo illius.*

*Amicus* is of the same opinion, and saith, that [u] *the knowledge and reflection which is necessary to mortal sin ought to be full and perfect, with the judgement assured of the evil or of the danger of doing it. Sanchez* demands onely time and means for deliberation with the knowledge of the evil; but *Amicus* will have one go on to do evil with a firm and assured judgement.

Amicus tom. 3. disp. 17. sect. 8. n. 172. p. 205.

[x] *Quidnam ad mortale peccatum requiritur? Plena & expressa adverentia malitiæ, aut saltem dubium.*

*Escobar* follows his brethren, where he demands, [x] *what is necessary to make a sin mortal?* he answers, *that there is requisite, a full and actual knowledge, or at least an express and formal suspition of the evil which is done.* 1940

Escobar tr. 2. Exam. 1. c. 3. n. 8. p. 275.

It is not sufficient, according to these new Doctors, to sin mortally that the know-

ledge which they pretend to be necessary thereunto be full and perfect; but they will also have it to be particular and determinate. So that if in one action there occurre many wickednesses, many sins, or many circumstances, which augment or multiply sin, they must be known all distinctly. [a] *When there occurre*, saith Sanchez, *in one and the same action two sorts of different wickednesses; it is not sufficiente, to perceive one to make himself guilty of both; But we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledge of the other.* Without this he holds that we are not guilty, but according to the proportion of the knowledge we have, as he saith expressly afterwards: [b] *If we know one part of the malice, or if we be ignorant of it by our own fault, it shall be imputed for a sin.* Whence he draws
1940 this conclusion which we have already reported; *When a man sins with a woman whom he knows to be not his wife, but is invincibly ignorant that she is his kinswoman, he is guilty of fornication, but not of incest.*

a *Ad unius generis malitiam advertere non est satis, ad malitiam quoque alterius generis contrahendam, sed oportet ad hanc quoque advertere aut debuisse advertere.* Sanchez supra num. 8. pag. 2. pag. 70.

b *Si pars malitiæ cognita sit, aut vincibiliter ignorata, ea culpa imputatur.* Ibid. cap. 16. num. 10.

He stays not there. For it is not sufficient for them that a man hath heretofore known an action to be wicked, they hold that if he hath forgotten it, or if he yet know it, but doth not actually think of it, and does not make reflection upon it, so as to perceive, at the very time when it is committed, that it is evil, he offends not God at all, at least not grievously.

*Cajetan* retrenches a little the licentiousness of this opinion, declaring that he who by inadvertence or forgetfulness commits a sin, which he knows to be a mortal sin, ceases not to be guilty thereof, if he be not so disposed that if he had thought of it, he would not have committed it. But *Sanchez*, on the contrary, assures us that this condition is not at all necessary. And after he hath faithfully reported the Doctrine of *Cajetan* in these terms; [c] *He that hath made a contract, which he knows to be usurarious, or who doth some other unlawful act, knowing well that it is forbidden, but not remembring it to be such when he doth it,*
1950 *is exempt from mortal sin, provided he were then so disposed, that if he had remembred, he would have abstained from doing it, because he hath a firm resolution to eschew mortal sin.* In the sequel of his discourse he enters into a farther explication of the opinion of this Doctor. [d] *It seems to him*, saith he, *that this resolution is required as absolutely necessary, to render the forgetfulness innocent, and to excuse the person.* But he meddles not with it but onely to refute it, adding [e] *that others hold with great reason that this resolution is to no purpose, and we are onely to consider if when we were obliged to observe the commandment we had any thought thereof. For if we had none at all, and that without considering either the right or fact we violate the commandment by neglect, this forgetfulness is innocent and free from all sin.*

c *Quinto deducitur quid sentiendum sit de doctrina Cajetani, jus* 1. 2. q. 6. art. 8. *ad finem, & in Summa verb. Inconsideratio, vers. Adverte tamen, quem ibi sequitur Anvilla* n. 1. *ubi ait ineuntem contractum quem usurarium esse novit, vel opus quod ita affectum*

*aliquod prohibitum, prohibitionis conscium, facientem: ac tunc cum recolit actu, excusari a mortali erat, ut si recolaisset, vitaret, utpote qui firmum cavendi mortalis propositum haberet.*

d *ubi id propositum exigere videtur quo obtinuit illa censeatur invincibilis, & excusat.* Sanchez oper. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 28. p. 73.

e *At jure optimo id propositum nihil refert bene docet Zumel.* 1. 2. q. 76 *art.* 3. *d.* 2. *diff.* 6. *quippe solum attendendum est an aliqua cogitatio operanti in mentem venit eo tempore quo præceptum implere debeat. Si enim ea non veniente in mentem immemor juris vel facti præceptum transgrediatur, est oblivio invincibilis, & excusat.* Ibid.

*Corduba* approves this opinion no more then *Cajetan*, and would that at least he who acts in so evil a disposition come not voluntarily thereinto, and that the forgetfulness or inadvertency, which hinders him from thinking of the evil which he doth, comes not by his own fault. But *Sanchez* finds this also to be too much, and he can no more approve of this than that of *Cajetan*. [f] *There is no more need*, saith he, *to receive the opinion of* Corduba, *who saith that when forgetfulness comes not by our fault, it ought to be esteemed as one sort of innocent Ignorance; but we think it*
1960 *proceeds of our fault.* For this is not universally true, but onely when we have done some thing which hath caused this forgetfulness, forseeing well the danger where-

f *Nec admittenda est sententia Corduba in q. l.* 2. q. 17. *dub.* 2. *dicentis oblivionem reduci ad ignorantiam*

*invincibilem quando oblivio non contingit ex culpa. Hoc enim ita universaliter dictum non est: sed quando quis initio causam oblivioni dedit cum periculi advertentia. Si enim periculum non advenit, oblivio est inculpabilis.* Ibid. num. 39.

unto we cast our selves. For if we thought not of this danger, the ignorance can not be faulty.

He repeats a little after the same thing, and he makes a decree as it were without appeal, and a principle unremovable. g *It remains certain*, saith he, *that although ignorance comes of some sin as of its cause, it ceases not therefore to be excusable.* To which he adds also, for better explication, h *And in this case, though the cause of ignorance be culpable, yet the ignorance is not.*

g Quare stat ut causa ignorantiæ fuerit aliquod peccatum, & tamen in se ignorantia sit invincibilis. Ibid. n. 31.

h Tunc quamvis causa culpabilis sit, ignorantia tamen erit inculpabilis. Ibid.

And for maintenance of this principle, he undertakes to refute Saint *Thomas*, under pretence of explicating that which he saith; i *An event may be voluntary in its cause.* He expounds and at once overturns this rule of right. k *That ignorance of fact excuses, but not of right.* As also the Doctors, who teach, as he confesseth, l *That ignorance of that which every one is obliged to do according to the rules and Laws of his condition and calling is bleamable, and excuseth not at all.* And generally he rejects it in the point of Law and Right; and he takes to him as on his side the Doctors which expound them in their true sence, but not in his. m *It follows*, saith he, *that we must understand with discretion what the Doctors and Laws say, that to know and to be obliged to know, are one and the same thing: and when they commonly affirm that when we know or consider, or ought to know or consider, ignorance and inadvertency are indirectly voluntary,* 19 1970

i Eventum posse esse voluntarium in sua causa. Ibid.

k Ubi habetur, ignorantiam facti non juris excusare. Ibid.

l Ignorantiam legum ad statum & officium alicujus pertinentem esse vincibilem, nec excusare. Ibid.

m Ex his deducitur 1. esse sano modo intelligenda jura & Doctores dum æquiparant scire & debere scire; passim dicunt esse indirecte voluntarium ignorantiam cum qua vel scivit advertitve, aut debebat scire & advertere. Ibid. n. 24

He witnesseth sufficiently that Saint *Thomas*, with the more part of the School Divines are not for him, in saying that Saint *Thomas* is received by all; *Thomas ab omnibus receptus*, n. 25. and that the Laws themselves and those that expound them are contrary unto him. And he thinks himself discharged herein by saying that they are to be wisely understood: *Esse sano modo intelligenda jura & Doctores.*

But if we demand of him also why he takes the liberty to reject so great and so strong authorities? He can onely repeat that which he hath said already so many times: n *That all this must be understood where we have an actual knowledge, full and sufficient to sin mortally, of the evil we are about to do, or of the danger to which it exposeth us, or that at least we have had thereof some scruple or some doubt.* 20

n Hæc intelligenda sunt quando adfuit actualis, plena & sufficiens ad mortale advertentia, ad malitiam objecti, ejusve periculum, seu dubium aut scrupulus saltem. Ibid. num 24.

*Tambourin* hath also expounded all this Doctrine sufficiently at large, according to the principle of *Sanchez*, establishing two general rules in favour of ignorance. The first is, o *if any one think by ignorance which is not criminal that a mortal sin is but venial, he sins onely venially, this is Saint* Thomas's *opinion. We must say the same if ignorance be but a venial sin.* 1980

o Si quis ex ignorantia inculpabili putet aliquid esse veniale, quod alioqui mortale est, venialiter tantùm peccabit. Ita S. Thomas p. 2. q. 76. & 3. Idem erit si ignorantia sit culpabilis, tantùm venialiter. Tambur. l. 3. Decal. c. 1. sect. 3. n. 35.

I say nothing of the rule which he proposes in favour of ignorance, to observe the abuse he doth to the authority of Saint *Thomas*, I see no way to excuse his visible visible falsity unless by his ignorance, being he cites this Angel of the School in making him say that which he saith not, and whereunto he speaketh the contrary in his quodlibetary questions, where he saith clearly, p *that in what concerns faith and good manners, we must be excused if we follow an erroneous opinion of some Doctor. Because in these things ignorance excuseth not.* 1

p In his enim quæ pertinent ad fidem & bonos mores, nullum excusat error, nec sequitur erroneam opinionem alicujus Magistri. In talibus enim ignorantia non excusat. S. Thomas quod lib. 3: art. 30.

The other rule which he propoſeth is no leſs favourable to ignorance and ſin then the former. For he ſaith that if [a] *you have knowledge of the Law, and that you are ignorant of the penalty which it ordains againſt thoſe who violate it, it is probable you do not incurr the penalty.* He underprops his principle by the authority of three the moſt famous Divines of their Society, *Suarez*, *Sanchez*, and *Coninck*: [b] *For to incurre theſe penalties, the ſinner muſt conſent at leaſt tacitely to that which he is to undergo if he obey not.*

a Si legem ſcias, ſed non pœnam, adhuc probabile eſt à te non incurri pœnam. Ita Suarez, Sanchez, Coninck, apud Caſtrop. Tambor. Decal. Tambur. Decal. l. 1. c. 2. ſect. 10. n. 12.

b Ratio eſt quia ad has incurrendas requiritur delinquentem conſenſiſſe ſaltem tacite in pœnam quàm ſubire debeat ni obediat. Ibid.

But becauſe he ſaw it would follow from hence that thoſe who know not that Hell is the puniſhment of mortal ſins ſhall be in no danger of going thither; and that in this caſe it ſhould be ill done to go to Preach the Goſpel to thoſe people who have never heard of Hell; and who know not that it is eſtabliſhed by Divine Juſtice to puniſh ſins eternally, he adds, [c] *that this is to be underſtood of extraordinary pains: to the end,* ſaith he, *that you may conceive wherefore he that is ignorant perhaps of the pains of Hell, which are the conſequences of mortal ſin, incurre them nevertheleſſe, provided that he know that he commits mortal ſin.* Which ſerves onely to elude the difficulty, and to confirm it rather then ſolve it. For thoſe who know not that there is a Hell, know not commonly that there are any mortal ſins, ſince mortal ſin is not called mortal but becauſe it kills the ſoul, depriving it of ſpiritual life, which is the grace of God; which is altogether unknown to infidels who know nothing of Hell.

c Sed cur dictum eſt (extraordinaria?) Ut intelligas cur is qui forte ignorat pœnam inferni annexam peccato mortali, adhuc tamen illam incurrit, dummodo cognoſcat peccatum ſuum mortale eſſe? Ibid. n. 13.

How many perſons are there alſo even amongſt Chriſtians themſelves who are ſo groſſe and ill inſtructed, that they know neither what mortal ſin nor what Hell is; or if they have heard of it they know not, nor can tell, when they commit ſuch mortal ſins; and think ſometimes that they do no ill in the moſt criminal actions. But according to the rule of theſe Jeſuits, there is no Hell for all theſe perſons, of which notwithſtanding the number is but too great, particularly in the Country. And by conſequence we cannot complain of their ignorance, nor of their Friends and Paſtors for the little care they have taken to inſtruct them: but rather we ought to envie theſe perſons, and bleſſe their ignorance; and advertiſe their Paſtours to be careful not to draw them out of it, for fear of opening unto them the gate of Hell, by giving them the knowledge thereof, and making them fall into ſin by inſtructing them and inlightening them, thereby making them know the ſins whereunto they are ſubject.

*Bauny* acknowledgeth that he who committeth a crime by forgetfulneſs or inadvertency, having fallen into this forgetfulneſs and this inadvertency by his fault, though he be not guilty of the action and ſin which he doth, yet he ſinneth by negligence. *He that knows not,* ſaith he, *though by his own fault, yet that which he ſaith or doth not onely was unlawful for him, but alſo forbidden even under grievous penalties, ſins not againſt the commandment, if he have no knowledge thereof. His ſin is not contrary to the precept; but againſt the diligence which he ought to uſe to know it.* But in this he ſpeaks not according to the principles of his principal brethren, and it is apparent that he would not have advanced thus far if he had well thought thereof, or if he had read *Layman* attentively, who handling the ſame queſtion, makes himſelf this objection. [d] *We may ſay that he who thinks not that that is evil which he is about to do, and forbidden, is notwithſtanding obliged to think thereof; and by conſequence his action ought to be imputed to raſhneſs and imprudence.* This is the ſame thing that *Bauny* now ſaid; and he anſwers in the ſequel, that [e] *forgetfulneſs or negligence, which is the cauſe that we think not of the evil we are about to do, is not imputed for ſin, if it be not voluntary, and it is not voluntary if we bethink us not to conſider that we are obliged to examine what we are about to do.*

d Dicet aliquis: Qui non cogitat de malitia operis prohibiti, debet tamen cogitare. Igitur cogitatio ejus temeritati & imprudentiæ imputatur.

e Reſpondeo quod omiſſio ſive negligentia conſiderationis non imputatur ad peccatum, niſi voluntaria ſit. Non autem voluntaria eſt niſi veniat in mentem cogitare de obligatione examinandi. Layman l. 1. tr. 2. c. 4. n. 6. p. 20.

He avoucheth that he who commits a crime by a faulty heedleſneſs, and accompanyed with neglect, was obliged to conſider of the evil he was about to do; but he

he saith that it was needful for this that he should have had an other thought to represent unto him that he was obliged to consider of his action and to examine it, and because he had it not, neither his inadvertence nor his crime ought to be imputed to him.

But if it be replyed upon him that being he was obliged to examine his own action, he was also obliged to know that he was obliged, and consequently to apply himself to consider that he was obliged to think of what he doth, *Sanchez* will answer for his comrade, that we are not obliged hereunto, for that the first thought that makes us consider that which we do, or that which we are about to do, is not in our power. [f] *To judge,* saith he, *of good or evil of an action, it is required that we first have a natural thought which is not in our power, which may be the beginning of this deliberation, and it depends not on us to have this first thought excited.*

f *ut quispiam circa operis bonitatem aut malitiam consultare possit, opus est ut occurrat aliqua cogitatio naturalis in nostra potestate non existens, quæ talis consultationis possit esse principium; nec erit in nostra potestate primam hanc cogitationem excitare.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 21. p. 72.

This is the second time that he tells us that this first thought is not in our power, that we might take better notice of this principle, and the application he makes of it, which is this: [g] *When no thought comes in our minds which might represent unto us the evil, or the danger which is in that which we are about to do, or which gives us at least some doubt or some scruple, though our Spirit considers the benefit or the commodity of the action, this consideration suffices not to deliberate about moral wickedness, as I have proved, ch. 2. n. 7. and 8.* Whence he draws this conclusion: [h] *And therefore there can be no sin where the thought of the malice of the action cannot be presented unto us.* 2020

g *At quamdiu non occurrit intellectui cogitatio aliqua circa objecti malitiam, & circa illius periculum: aut dubitatio aliqua, aut scrupulus, quamvis de illius commoditate consultus intellectus non est principium sufficiens deliberandi de malitia ipsa morali.* Ibid. h *Ergo non potest esse culpa quamdiu hæc cogitatio circa malitiam non se offert.* Ibid.

But if those who would come out of this ignorance which holds them in sin, inquire of this Jesuit what they ought to do to come to this thought, which they cannot have of themselves, he will send them to *Aristotle*, who believing with him that it is natural, hath attributed it to fortune. *Aristotle,* saith he, *attributes it to fortune, because it is presented naturally to the minde, without mans contributing any thing thereto by his industry and care.*

He might passe onely for a *Pelagian* if he would content himself to say that this first thought, which is the principle of all the good we do, and of all the evil we avoid, were natural, and that a man might acquire it by the powers of nature; but he passes even beyond *Pelagianisme* it self, when he saith that we cannot therein contribute so much as our cares and industry, and that it must come to us without any endeavour, and without any preparation, not by God, but by fortune; falling also into the excesse which the *Pelagians* falsely imputed to the Catholiques, accusing them to attribute grace and good works to fortune and destiny; because the Catholiques maintained that we could not have it by our own proper forces. So that this Jesuit confirms the argument of *Pelagians*, condemned by the Catholiques, and the errour of the Pagans condemned by the Pelagians and Catholiques together. 2030

It would have becomed the piety of a Religious man, and the light of a Christian, to have given at least to God the first thought which is the principle and foundation of all good works, and not to nature, and much less to fortune, whose very name ought to be banished out of the Church, according to the judgement of the Fathers, and left unto *Aristotle* and the *Pagans*, who knew neither the providence of God, nor the perfection of his essence, nor the liberty of mans will, and much less that of the grace of Jesus Christ.

It seems that he suffered himself to be transported unto this extravagance, that he might wholly excuse the sins of ignorance. For if the first thought by which we consider that which we do neither come from us nor God, but from fortune; it follows clearly that we are not culpable neither for not having it, nor for not demanding it of God, being it depends not upon the order of his grace, but on fortune, to which there is no appearance that we ought to addresse our prayers or vows for obtaining thereof. So that we can never sin by ignorance, neither through forgetfulness, nor carelessness.

Which

Which is confirmed by *Filliutius*, who gives many rules to shew what a man is obliged to do to remove ignorance, and to learn that which he ought to know in
2040 his profession: [i] *That we may know whatsoever one is obliged to do to learn that which is necessary for him to know in his condition, therein these rules are to be kept*, of which this is the third: [k] *It happens rarely or never that a man is obliged to prepare himself for grace to come out of ignorance and to render it excusable.* That is, to speak properly, that he who knows not what he is obliged to know, is rarely obliged to prepare himself for that grace which is necessary for him that he may learn it, nor to demand this grace of God, because prayer is the principal disposition unto grace, and the first and the most general means to obtain it. Which accords very well with what *Sanchez* now said, having learned out of *Aristotle* that the first thought which is necessary to know that which we are obliged to do and to know, comes from fortune, and presents it self naturally to us without our troubling our selves, and so that we cannot by our care and industry contribute any thing at all to the attainment of it: so that in effect it were to torment our selves in vain to labour in a thing which depends not on us, and to mock God to demand it of him, being it comes by fortune, and not by his grace and the order of his will.

It may seem that this is the utmost excesse whereunto a man can be transported, to excuse ignorance. For if it be not imputed unto us, even not then when it comes of sin, and which is by consequent criminal in it self, though we endeavour not to get out of it, nor take care onely so much as to pray unto God to deliver us out of it, it can never be sin, whence it will follow according to this new Doctrine, that there is no more any thing to be said properly of sins of ignorance, and that Saint *Paul* and *David* were unlearned, and ill informed in the wisdom of the Jesuits in praying to God to pardon the sins of their youth, and their ignorances.

i *Ad cognoscendum ad quid homo teneatur ut sciat nec ignoria, hæ regulæ servandæ sunt.* Filliutius, qq. mor. tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 10. n. 373. p. 44.

k *Raro aut nunquam tenetur homo se præparare ad gratiam ut tollat ignorantiam.* Ibid.

# CHAP. IV.

## Of good and bad intention.

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THe Jesuits speak very many things touching good and bad intention, to favour mens vices and loosenes; nevertheles they may be reduced to two principal heads; whereof the one is, that to do evil there must be an evil intention; and the other, that to do good it is not necessary to have a good intention. They conclude from hence that the commandments of God and the Church may be satisfied by an outward execution of what they ordain, though it be done without intention to fulfil them, or with an evil intent and contrary to the commandment, and even with an expresse intention not to fulfil it: and on the contrary, to render a man guilty of having violated the commands of God, and the Church, it is not sufficient to violate them, but it is required to have thereof a formed design and expresse intention. For the greater facility, I will handle these two points severally, and divide this Chapter into two Articles.

## ARTICLE I.

### *That the Jesuits teach that we may fulfil the Commandments of God and the Church, not onely without intention, but with an intent contrary and altogether criminal.*

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THis is the expresse opinion of *Bauny*, in his Summe, chap. 20. pag. 335. where after he had said with other Casuists, that the Ecclesiastiques satisfie the precept of receiving their office, when they sing or read their hours, though they do it without inward attention or devotion, provided they observe outward modesty, whereof he gives this reason: *For the outward action*, saith he, *wherewith we attend on God is of the same nature, retinue, and appertaines to the vertue of Religion. Then as he who without intention to Idolize it bends his knee before an Idol, is nevertheles guilty of Idolatry: So we are to believe that they pray who recite the office, although without intention, though not without the outward decence and composement that such an action requires.*

So the outward appearance will be more necessary to prayer, and the actions of Religion then the inward motion of piety, since they can subsist without this inward motion, but not without the outward shew. I wonder that he remember'd not this common maxime of the Schools. [a] *To do good all the good conditions must concurre, but the least defect is sufficient unto evil.* This perhaps might have kept him from concluding so ill, and he might have considered that there is more required to do good then to do ill, and to an action of Religion then to an action of Idolatry. And if to do good all conditions must concurre thereto, by much stronger reason the intent which is the principal and as it were the soul of all the rest.

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[a] *Bonum ex integra causa, malum autem ex minimo defectu.*

But *Escobar* saith yet more then *Bauny*. For he mainrains that it is not onely not necessary for satisfying the precept of reciting the office, to intend it: but also that it is necessarily satisfied in the recital; though the intention be expresse and formal not to satisfie it. For having demanded [b] *if an intention to fulfil it be required?* He answers, that many Divines *do now hold that it is probable that this intention is not necessary; and though in reading the office there even be a formal intent not to satisfie our duty, yet we do not fail to fulfil it.*

[b] *Requiriturne satisfacienti intentio? Alii probabiliter jam defendunt intentionem ejus necessariam non esse: immo satisfieri etiam ab eo qui cum expressa intentione non faciendi pro tunc recitaret.* Escobar tr. 5. exam. 6. c. 13. n. 136. p. 679.

He saith the same thing concerning an Oath in his first Treatise, where after he hath said absolutely that to be discharged of a promise made with an Oath, it is not necessary to intend it; he adds in the sequel, that *Lessius saith moreover that one is discharged of his Oath, though in doing what he swore to do, he have an expresse intent not to fulfil it.* That is to say, that we may satisfie promises made unto God, with an oath in performing outwardly that which we have promised, though we have a formal will not to fulfil, but to elude it.

c *Addit Lessius* l. 2. c. 37. d. 10. n. 59. *juramentum impleri etiamsi res jurata præsertim cum animo expresso non faciendi.* Ibid. tract. 2. cx. 1. c. 7. n. 41. p. 127.

2080 *Lessius* alledges for reason of this opinion, that when God or the Church commands us any thing, the action onely is commanded us, and not the intention. *The reason is*, saith he, *because that which is commanded us is not, for example, to heare masse with intent to accomplish the precept, but simply to attend the Masse with attention and devotion, which is performed though it be done with design not to accomplish the precept.*

So that according to this marvellous Divinity we may heare the Masse with attention and devotion, though we have a formal design not to obey the Church, and to despise its commandment. They must have a strange Idea of devotion, who believe that it can subsist with so great impiety.

*Layman* talks more openly, and more boldly then the rest. He saith not onely with them, that it is not needful that we have a will to obey the Church, in observing her commandments, and that we may do them though we contemn her in our heart, but also that we may accomplish her commands by doing outwardly that which she command, though we have an intention directly opposite to hers. See his words. d *Si aliquis jejunet vana gloriæ causa, aut ut gulam piscibus & mero obsequatur, adeoque intentioni Ecclesiæ repugnet,*

2090 *If a man fast for vain glory, or to content his sensuality in eating and drinking Wine, and so act contrary to the intent of the Church, yet he doth not violate her commands.* And a little after: *He that doth in substance, that is to say, outwardly that which is commanded satisfies truly the commandment, though he have no will to accomplish it, but rather contrary.*

a *Ecclesiasticum jejunii præceptum non violat.* Layman. l. tract. 4 c 4 n. 6. p. 49. c *Qui opus præceptum secundum substantiam præstat, etiamsi non habeat voluntatem implendi præceptum, immo contrariam habeat, revera satisfacit.* Ibid. n. 7.

I know not what Father or Master would be content with such obedience, and that would not take it rather for true disobedience accompanied with contempt, and thereby much greater and more offensive then if by simple negligence that had been omitted which was commanded.

The same Author repeats the example of him who fasted for gluttony, and he adds that of a child who hears Masse by force and constraint, of which he speaks thus: *But what shall we say of a child that goes to hear Masse, on a Festival-day, principally for fear of whipping, and who hath an expresse will not to hear it, if his Master were not with him? the same question respects him also who is induced to fast principally to satisfie the desire he hath to eat fish: so that if he could not have got good fish, he was resolved not to fast: I answer, that this notwithstanding they both fulfil the Churches command.* f *Sed quid dicendum est si metus verberum sit pro causa principali audiendi Missam die festo; ita ut expressam intentionem habeat non audiendi si pædagogus abesset? Et similis ratio est si oblectatio piscium sit causa principalis jejunandi: ita ut si tam boni pisces non haberentur vellet quis jejunium servare. Respondeo tamen talem impiere totum opus quod ab Ecclesia præcipitur.* Ibid. n. 12. p. 54.

*Filliutius* saith in a manner the same thing, concerning the precept of hearing Masse on Festival days and Lords days. *A bad intent*, saith he, *joyned to that of*

2100 *hearing Masse; as an intent of looking on women dishonestly, &c. is not contrary to the commandment. For this cause he who hears with this intent fulfils it, provided he be sufficiently attentive.* g *Prava intentio adjuncta voluntati audiendi Missam, ut aspiciendi fœminas libidinose, dummodo sit sufficiens attentio, non est contraria præcepto: quare satisfacit.* Filliutius, mor. qq. tom. 2. tract. 5. c. 7. n. 212. p. 128.

*Escobar* is of the same judgement. For speaking of a man who goes to Church with an intention to hear Masse, he saith, h *that another wicked intent, as to behold women immodestly, joyned to the first, hinders not.*

h Non obest alia prava intentio, ut assistendi libidinose sanctæ; priori conjuncta. Escobar, tr. 1. exam. 11. c. 3. n. 31. p. 180.

But *Layman* after all this which we have above reported from him, concludes thus: i *wherefore when you do that which is commanded, though by mistake or ignorance you think you have not satisfied the precept, or that you had even a will not to fulfill it at all, it need not hinder you from taking satisfaction in the effect: because the protestation you made, that you did it not willingly, had no force.*

i Quare cum opus quod præcipitur implevisti per ignorantiam vel errorem te non implere existimes, vel etiam notis implere, non potes tamen efficere quoniam implevisti: siquidem protestatio facta contraria vim nullam habet. Layman, ubi supra.

He pretends then that a command of God or the Church is accomplished, not onely without any intention to do it; nor onely with intention not to do it; nor onely with an intention directly opposite to that of God and the Church; but also with an expresse protestation of being unwilling to satisfie it, and with a perswasion that it is not satisfied: that is to say, that we may serve God in despight of him and our selves; and be discharged of the obedience we owe God and the Church in doing that which he would not have us to do, and which we are not willing to do our selves, and which we believe is not sufficient to obedience. This conclusion is without doubt very strange but the principle from whence these Divines draw it, and the examples of which they make use to unfold and establish it by, seem, it may be, no lesse. For they say that as he who bends his knees before an Idol ceaseth not to be an Idolater, though he protest he will be none; and he who smites a man without cause ceaseth not to be an offender, because he protests he hath a contrary design: so he that doth that which God and the Church command him, fulfils the commandment, though he protest that he hath no will to fulfil it. 2110

These are the rare and marvellous reasonings of these Divines, who seem to have undertaken to debase Christians below the Jews, who honored God by outward means, and testified by words and visible actions that they would obey him: notwithstanding God complains of them, and rejects their services as of a treacherous and hypocritical people. In stead whereof these Doctors pretend that Christians may satisfie the commands of God and the Church, not onely with a contrary intention, but also with a protestation that they will not obey, and not honouring God therein so much as with their lips onely, as the Jews to whom it served for reproof of their treachery.

The foundation of all these conclusions is found in *Filliutius*, who speaking of the conformity of our wills with that of Gods, which ought to be the rule of all our thoughts and actions, saith that we are not obliged to will all that which God wills, k *and that is, is not necessary that our will should be conformable to the will of God, but in respecting the same object and the same reason, at least in general.* By which he would say no other thing, then that it suffices us to be induced to will that we will by any honest reason; and herein we are conformable unto God who wills nothing any otherwise. For thus he expounds himself in the proposition. 1213

k Dico 2. in objecto formali, & in ratione volendi in communi, necesse est voluntatem nostram esse conformem cum divina. Filliutius, mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 11. n. 385. p. 45.

But this is to give no more unto God then to all reasonable men, even to Pagans themselves. For to will a thing because it seems honest or reasonable is to will that which *Plato*, *Seneca*, and *Aristotle* have willed, which is to be conformable to their will, and to all those who ever made profession of Philosophie and vertue, even amongst Pagans, because they are all agreed in this general point, that they willed nothing, and that nothing ought to be willed, but for some reason which they judged good and honest, though they knew not one another, and their wills in particular were very different, and many times opposite to one another.

According to this rule one may pretend to be conformable to the will of God in the greatest sins, because many times he is induced thereto by reasons which ap-

pear good unto him, and which he believes to be honeſt; as thoſe who perſecuted
2130 the Apoſtles believed they did a thing well pleaſing unto God; and all thoſe who ſin by a falſe zeal, or by ignorance, and without malice.

Notwithſtanding *Filliutius* doubting to have given too much unto God in his anſwer, he corrects it by this limitation. [l] *I ſayd (in general) becauſe it is not neceſſary that our Will be conformable to Gods in the particular reaſons, which he hath to will that he wills.* That is, that we are not in any thing obliged to be conformable to the will of God, nor to will all that which he wills, in the manner he wills it, and provided we have in general ſome honeſt reaſon, we need not trouble our ſelves farther to know more particularly what God would have us do. And becauſe we ſhould not imagine that he talketh without having well conſidered what he ſaith, he endeavours to prove it by four reaſons in a few words.

l *Dixi (in communi) quia non eſt neceſſe ut noſtra voluntas ſit conformis divinæ voluntati in ratione volendi particulari.* Ibid.

The firſt is, [m] *becauſe this particular will of God is often unknown unto us.* He would ſay that as ignorance, as he hath declared before, doth generally diſcharge us from every ſort of obligation; ſo it diſpenſes with us from following the will of God, when we know it not; whence it follows that Pagans and Infidels, who as St. *Paul* ſaith, know not God nor his will, and live in darkneſs of ignorance, are not obliged to do the will of God, nor to know it; and are to be excuſed when they blindly fight againſt it.

m *Quia ea plerumque ſit incognita.*

The ſecond reaſon is, [n] *becauſe When we do know the will of God, there is no precept Which obligeth us to will things in the ſame manner he Wills them.* Strange Divinity, that we are not onely not obliged to know the will of God; but that we are not obliged to follow it even when we do know it, that is to ſay, that we may reject it without ſin, and preferre our own before his. I wonder that theſe Doctors never had that in their minds, at leaſt, which our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt ſaid in the Goſpel,
2140 [o] that the ſervant who knew not his Maſters will was to be chaſtiſed more favourably: but he that having known it did not do it ſhould be chaſtiſed more ſeverely.

n *Quia ſi eſſet nota (divina voluntas) non extat præceptum quo teneatur velle ſub ea ratione.*

o *Ille autem ſervus qui cognovit voluntatem Domini ſui, & non fecit ſecundùm voluntatem ejus, vapulabit multis, qui autem non cognovit & fecit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis.* Lucæ 12. ver. 47.

The third reaſon is contained in theſe two words, *nec ratio id dictat*, which ſignifie that reaſon doth no more oblige us to conform our will in all things to the will of God, then the Divine command. As if the light of reaſon did not teſtifie ſufficiently, that we ought always to follow the Soveraign Reaſon and wiſdom which is in God, and which is not diſtinguiſhed from his will. And as the light of nature ſhews ſufficiently, that we are to follow at all times this Soveraign Reaſon, as the rule of all our actions, and all our thoughts, it ſhews alſo clearly that we are not to follow our own wills, unleſs we will pretend to be more reaſonable, and more wiſe then wiſdom it ſelf, who hath eſtabliſhed it for a fundamental rule of all our lives, [p] that we ſhould not follow our deſire, and that we ought to turn away from our own wills.

p *Poſt concupiſcentias tuas ne eas, & à voluntate tua avertere.* Eccleſiaſtici 18. ver. 30.

The fourth reaſon is; [q] *becauſe all that God wills, he wills of charity: but we are not obliged to will all of charity.* It ſeems that he would ſay, that God wills, and doth all things in the World for charity; that is, for love of us and our good; but that we
2150 are not obliged reciprocally to do all for charity, that is for the love of God and his honor, whence it will follow that we may at leaſt do one part of our actions for the world and for our ſelves, for other mens and for our own ſatisfaction.

q *Quia Deus omnia quæ vult, ex charitate vult: nos autem non tenemur omnia ex charitate velle.* Filliutius. Ibid.

But after he had maintained that there is no obligation upon us to conform our wills to God in all things, he adds, that he would counſel us notwithſtanding to do it as far as we can, alledging for reaſon, [r] *becauſe a good part of our happineſs conſiſts in the conformity of our will to that of God's.* Preſuppoſing that another part of our happineſs conſiſts in doing what we will our ſelves, or in doing what God hath commanded us in ſuch manner as we pleaſe.

r *Quia bona pars felicitatis noſtræ conſiſtit in concordia noſtræ voluntatis cum Divina.* Ibid.

*Celot* expounding this ſame thing in other terms, and ſpeaking of them that live in the world, and of the priviledge which he pretends God hath given them above the Monaſtiques, he makes it to be ſaid by a great Saint expreſſely againſt his intention, [f] that God hath permitted them to live a life divided and parted, in giving one part of their life to God, and the other to the world, or affairs and pleaſure of it.

[f] *Antiſtes uno verbo, eoque hierarchico divi. duas diſtinctaſque vitas & imaginationes illi permiſſas admonet.* Celot, pag. 573.

If it be permitted to lead in this world two ſorts of lives different and divided, *dividuas diſtinctaſque vitas*, it muſt needs be that one of theſe lives be for God, and the other not for him, elſe they could not be two lives, nor would they be parted and divided if both theſe ways belonged unto God, and had relation to him as to their end. It muſt needs be therefore that one of theſe two ways, which are not 2160
for God, ſhould be for the world. For there is but God and the World, the love of God and of the World, that can divide our heart and our life.

So that, according to this Doctrine, we may divide our hearts and lives betwixt God and the World, and do one part of our actions for the love of God, and another part for the love of the World, and of our ſelves. Theſe two diſorders are in effect but one, and are both contained in this principle of *Fillintius*, of which we have ſpoken; That we are excuſed from conforming our whole will to that of God, in willing all that he wills and commands, and in willing it in ſuch manner as he wills it.

There is none who may not ſee how this principle overthrows the dependance which man ought to have upon God, at leaſt in that which concerns the inward part. For provided that he do that outwardly which God hath commanded, he is little or nothing concerned, in what manner, and upon what motive he do it; they leave this to his liberty, and pretend that God hath given no commandment therein, and even reaſon it ſelf demands it not of him.

If they would abſolutely part betwixt God and Man, they ſhould at leaſt make a more juſt and more reaſonable partition; attributing to God that which is the better and the more noble, to wit, the heart and the intention, inſtead of giving it to man, and leaving unto God nothing properly but the outſide, as if he were not the God of the ſpirit, but onely of the body.

## ARTICLE II.

### *That according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits we ſin not if we have not an intention to ſin.* 2170

IT is one general maxime in the Divinity of the Jeſuits, that to ſin it is not ſufficient to do the evil that is forbidden, or not to do that which is commanded by the Law of God, Nature, or the Church: But it behoves alſo to have a knowledge of the evil that we do, and an intention to do it. By this rule they excuſe the greateſt ſins, under a pretence that they have a good intention in committing them, which commonly is but imaginary, or that we have no evil intention, though commonly we have ſo without knowing it.

*Bauny* makes uſe of this pretence of an imaginary good intention to juſtifie the hatred of our Neighbour, and the good averſion we have from him, ſo far as to wiſh him evil, and even death it ſelf. *Bauny* in his Summe, chap. 6. conc. 4. pag. 73. *We may*, ſaith he, *wiſh evil to our Neighbour without ſin, when we are induced thereto by ſome good motive.* Which he endeavours to confirm by reaſon, and by the authority of the Caſuiſts. *So* Bonacina *upon the firſt commandment, d. 3, q. 4. n. 7. exempts from all fault the Mother that deſires the death of her Daughters, becauſe for want of beauty or portion ſhe cannot match them according to her deſire, or perhaps becauſe by occaſion of them ſhe is ill treated by her Husband, or injured. For ſhe doth not properly deteſt her Daughters through diſlike of them, but from an abhorrence to*

*her own evils.* The good intention which induces this Mother to deſire the death
2280 of her Daughters, is no other thing then ambition, and a deſire to marry them more advantagiouſly then ſhe is able; or her impatience which permits her not to bear the evil uſage and injuries of her Husband, which ſeem unto her more unſupportable then the death of her own children: Nevertheleſſe a good intention of this ſort is ſufficient, with *Bauny*, *to excuſe from all fault this Mother who deſires the death of her Daughters.*

There is no crime in which we may not find ſuch like good intention; and by conſequence which may not be excuſed by this reaſon. For this cauſe he proceeds and ſaith, *that he who ſhould maintain an heretical propoſition without believing it, who ſhould be a communicant or Auditor (amongſt the Hugenots) without having his heart there, but out of pure deriſion, or to comply with the times, and to accompliſh his deſigns, he ought not to be eſteemed an Hugenot therefore, becauſe his underſtanding is not infected with errour.* So that not only ordinary crimes, but hereſie it ſelf and Apoſtacy, and all ſorts of impieties, may be excuſed by the ſecret intention of the Jeſuits School; and we may do all theſe things without being heretiques or Impious.

If he had not a priviledge to propound things quite contrary when he pleaſeth, we might repreſent unto him that what he ſaith here, accords not with what he ſaid above; that he who bows his knee before an Image is an Idolater, though he have no deſign to adore the Idol, and onely feignes to do it. But it was neceſſary he ſhould ſpeak ſo in this place, where the queſtion was how to prove that we might fulfil the commands of God and the Church, in doing outwardly that which they
2290 command, though we intended it not; and here where he is in hand to make it appear, that to ſin and to make a man guilty of the tranſgreſſion of the commandments of God and the Church, it is not ſufficient to violate them indeed, if he have not an intention and deſign for it, it was neceſſary for him to ſpeak in an other manner quite oppoſite to the firſt.

A contradiction ſo formal and manifeſt in a ſubject ſo important to Faith and Religion, as well as to manners, will hardly find ſhelter under the vail and pretence of a good intention, how ſpecious ſoever it may be; and it is certain that at the bottom it could not proceed from any but the Father of lyes and errours, in favour of which he ſeems to have undertaken to ſpeak, as well as of the libertines and profane. For he and his Fraternity who are in the ſame opinion with him, maintain that we may accompliſh the commands of God and the Church, without any inward will, and his opinion is that we cannot fulfil thoſe of the Devil in violating the commandments of God and the Church, if we have not a deſign in our hearts thereto. So that the Devil muſt be ſerved more ſincerely then God and the Church, and he hath more power and more right upon the inward actions and hearts of men then God and the Church have. For he pretends, with other Divines of the Society, that the Church hath no power over the inward motions of our ſouls, and that the commands of God are not extended ſo far as them, and comprize not the intention nor manner in which God wills they ſhould be fulfilled and executed.

2300 But if he who propounds theſe heretical propoſitions and publiquely perpetrates theſe heretical actions, ought not to paſſe for an Heretique, becauſe he believes not that he ſaith and doth amongſt the Heretiques; neither ought he be accounted a Catholick, becauſe he makes not profeſſion of that he believes internally amongſt the Catholicks; but rather makes a contrary profeſſion. He is therefore, to ſpeak properly, neither Catholick nor Heretick. But he is worſe then an Heretick. He is a time-ſerver, a man of no Religion, who derides both Hereticks and Catholicks, complying with both, *for the better managing his affairs*, as *Bauny* ſpeaks, and taking up Religion onely as a matter of merryment. See here the motives and the good intentions whereby he excuſes their crime who maintain Heretical propoſitions, or receive the Supper with the Hugenots, without having their hearts ingaged thereto.

*Emanuel Sa* makes uſe of the ſame pretence of the intention to excuſe an Oath. * *Jurc juramenta non ſunt, in mea conſcientia, in fide Chriſtiani, niſi quis intendat jurare. Quia juramentum pendet ab intentione jurantis.* Sa, verbo juramentum. n. 2. p. 295.

*is no Oath*, saith he, *to say by my faith, in my conscience, on the faith of a Christian, if we have not an intention to swear.* His reason is, *because an oath depends on the intention of him that swears.* They may as well say, that a lye depends on the intention of him that lyes.

And that is very nigh thereto, which *Filliutius* saith, speaking of a man that lyes in using equivocation, without any necessity obliging him thereto, and who swears to confirm his equivocation. For notwithstanding their opinion who hold that this man is to be accounted both a lyer and perjurer as he confesseth, he concludes for the contrary opinion, and saith, [d] *That it seems to him more probable, that in rigour it is neither lye nor perjury.* His principal reason is the same with that of *Sa*; *because he that speaks and swears in this sort hath no intent to speak nor swear falsely*, though he doth both in effect, and doth it without necessity and without reason, as he saith expressely, *absque rationabili causa.* This maxime is very proper to license the lyes and oaths which Merchants do make use of ordinarily to deceive others, and those who forswear themselves before Judges; and I see not for what else it can be good, but to nourish and justifie these crimes and treacheries. 2210

[d] *Dico 2. probabilius videri in rigore non esse mendacium neque perjurium. Ratio præcipua, quia qui sic loquitur & jurat, non habet intentionem dicendi falsum, vel jurandi falsitatem.* Filliutius, to. 2. tr. 25. c. 11. n. 331. p. 305.

That which *Emanuel Sa* and *Filliutius* say of an oath, *Bauny* affirms of blasphemy, having recourse to the intention of the blasphemer to excuse his crime. In his Summe, c. 5. pag. 66. where he speaks of five sorts of blasphemies, and he saith that the *fifth sort of blasphemy is when one names with contumely, reproach and dishonor, the most venerable members of the Son of God. Which yet they seem not to do who use them in their common discourse, as some ornament of their language, saying Death, Head, Belly, and yet are nevertheless guilty.* Bonacina *upon the first commandment d. 3. q. 8. p. 2. n. 2.* It seems at first sight that he dares not justifie these blasphemers, considering the horrour of their crimes; but he afterwards makes use of their intention to excuse them, adding in the sequel: *Nevertheless some whom this Author alledges in this dispute, hold that to call upon these parts (of Christs body) in choler, and not with rage against God, is no blasphemy.*

And two pages after he proposes this opinion to Confessors, that they may follow it in their practice, and that they may know how to deal with them that accuse themselves of blasphemy. *The Confessor*, saith he, *ought to inform himself of the penitent, who accuses himself of blasphemy, whether he did it with a formal intention to blaspheme God.* And a little after; *to assist them herein, we think that it is in every respect to good purpose, that the Confessor know from his mouth his intention, and what moved him to blaspheme; and if he answers that he was not touched with any despite against God, but against Man, or against Beast, to whom they had a pique, the Confessor shall not repute them to be Blasphemers, nor destitute of Grace.* 2220

This man that blasphemeth against God and against Jesus Christ, though he doth it *through transport of choler against Men, or against Beasts*, though he doth it without passion, and in cold blood, *making use of these blasphemies in common discourse, as ornaments of his language*, yet ought not, according to *Bauny*, to be treated in his confession as a blasphemer, though the words and blasphemies he uttereth *be contumelious, opprobrious and dishonourable to the most venerable members of the Son of God*, if he have not truly had *some indignation against God*, if he was not *touched with some despite against God*, if he have not done it *with a formal intent to dishonour God*; and the Confessor ought to referre himself, in all this, to what the blasphemer shall say, after that *he hath been informed of the matter from himself, and hath knowledge of it from his own mouth.*

If this be true, as this Casuist affirms us; we must of necessity avouch that there are hardly any blasphemies, or that to blaspheme we must have the heart of a Devil, or a damned Spirit, and hate God *with a formal will to displease and dishonour him.* 2230 And when a person is so forlorn as to fall into this miserable estate, if he neither resent nor acknowledge it, as it easely befals him, because of that blindness and hardness, which is the ordinary consequence and punishment of these great crimes, and pretends not to have this evil intention *of dishonouring God by despite, and hatred towards him*, which induceth him to blaspheme, his ignorance and freedom from evil intention, will be sufficient to every such person to exempt him from crime, according to the Divinity of these Jesuits; and *Bauny* will absolve him easily, and *not repute* him, for all this, *for a blasphemer, nor as one destitute of grace.*

He

He ſpeaks after the ſame manner of curſings, in the chap. 6. pag. 47. ſaying, that *to make curſing a mortal ſin it ought to proceed of a will deliberately bent upon the ill which is deſired to fall on others.*

From the ſame principle, treating of ſcandal, in the chap. 46. pag. 730. and ſpeaking of a woman who adorns her ſelf proudly, and who pranks and trims up her ſelf to pleaſe her Husband, or to obſerve the cuſtom of the country, he declares that *albeit the ſaid woman know well the evil effect which her diligence in adorning her ſelf will work upon the bodies and ſouls of thoſe who behold her adorned with rich and precious garments; yet ſhe ſins not in uſing them.* And to give a reaſon thereof, he maintains it as a maxime, and general rule, that we are not reſponſible for the evil effects which are adherent to any action, *niſi fuerint intenta formaliter*, that is to ſay, as he expounds himſelf, *unleſs we effectually ſeek, will or procure them.*

*Filliutius* ſpeaking alſo of ſcandal, propoſes the ſame example and caſe, and explicates it in the ſame manner. [e] *Though a woman, ſaith he, knows that a man loves her diſhoneſtly, ſhe ſins not how often ſoever ſhe preſents her ſelf before him, and in his view, ſo that ſhe have not an intention to ſtir up the diſhoneſt love which he hath towards her.*

[e] *Sexto ſi fœmina ſcíat ſe turpiter ab aliquo amari, non peccat quoties ſe offert ejus conſpectui, modo non intendat hanc provocare ad turpem ſui amorem.* Filliutius, tom. 2. tr. 28. c. 10. num. 232. pag. 331.

*Sanchez* having alſo propoſed before this ſame queſtion, namely *whether a woman who preſents her ſelf to the view of a man whom ſhe well knows doth love her diſhoneſtly, do commit a mortal ſin of ſcandal, when ſhe hath no intention to ſtir him up to love her.* He repoets the common opinion, which condemns this action of mortal ſin. [f] *The common opinion, ſaith he, of the Doctors is that ſhe ſinneth mortally, when without any neceſſity, but onely for her own pleaſure and ſatisfaction ſhe goes indifferently into every place.*

[f] *An fœmina conſpectui viri ſe offerens, à quo ſe turpiter amari novit, peccet mortaliter peccato ſcandali, quando nullatenus eum ad ſui amorem provocare intendit?* Sanchez, op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 9. num. 16. pag. 19. [g] *communiter eam mortaliter cenſent, quando nullo neceſſitate ducunt, ſed ſuæ voluptati ſatisfacit, indifferenter hac & illac diſcurrit.* Ibid.

In the ſequel he propounds the opinion of thoſe who excuſe this woman from mortal ſin, though ſhe go abroad without neceſſity, and know the evil which ſhe muſt cauſe by her coming abroad. [h] *There are others, ſaith he, who hold that ſhe ſins not mortally, becauſe he that loveth her diſhoneſtly doth rather take this occaſion of offence and from his own malice, then ſhe gives it him, by the uſe of her own right and liberty.*

[h] *Aliis tamen placet hanc non peccare mortaliter, quod ea occaſio potius ex propria adamantis turpi malitia ſit accepta, quam à mulere data, quæ jure ſuo ac libertate ſibi conceſſa utitur.* Ibid. n. 17.

Finally, after he hath conſidered theſe two opinions, and the reaſons on which they found them, he concludes for this latter, in favour of this woman, whom he declares innocent. [i] *And for that, ſaith he, though I alſo believe the firſt opinion to be probable, but I eſteem notwithſtanding the latter to be more true, which is, that this woman is not obliged to deprive her ſelf of this liberty which ſhe hath, of going abroad from her houſe, to ſtand at her door or window, or to walk in the Town.* He demands no other thing of her, [k] *but that ſhe have no intention* to cauſe him to ſin who loves her. And after this he juſtifies the offence which ſhe gives him out of a frolick and without neceſſity, and which ſhe might eaſily avoid if ſhe pleaſed.

[i] *Et idea quamvis priorem opinionem probabilem credam, exiſtimo veriorem eſſe hanc poſteriorem, ut non ob id teneatur fœmina ſua ſe exvediendi domo, ſtandi ad oſtium domus vel feneſtram, & diſcurrendi per civitatem libertate privare.* Ibid.

[k] *ut nullatenus enim ad ſui amorem provocare intendat.*

So that although this woman knows that ſhe is about to deſtroy a man by an action which is altogether free, and which ſhe may eaſily eſchew, ſhe ſhall not be at all guilty for his death, according to the Jeſuits, if ſhe had not a formal deſign to kill him. If any ſhould talk after this rate of the death of the body, and pretend that he who had voluntarily and without neceſſity done an action which he foreſaw would be followed by the death of a man, ſhould nevertheleſs not ceaſe to be inno-

cent, provided that he had not an actual and expres intention to kill him, such a man would be judged worthy to be hated by all men. And these Divines nevertheless fear not to talk thus of the death of the soul, and to testifie that they fear lesse the justice of God then of men.

The principle of all this Doctrine concerning scandal, may be seen in *Bauny* in the 39. chap. of his Summe, pag. 623. where treating of this matter purposely, he demands: *Whether he who doth some thing from which his action he foresees that others will take matter of offence and sin, ought to accuse himself thereof; and what is this sin to be termed?* He saith frankly, that *Navarre*, and others whom he cites, *say that it is scandal*: But he adds in his following discourse: *This is not my judgement. See upon what I build. Taking scandal properly and for one special kind of sin, such an one is not guilty thereof, save onely when by a formal design he saith or doth some thing for the ghostly destruction of his Neighbours.* This is the general principle upon which his Fraternity build, as well as he, the foundation of all this matter. 2260

He must be utterly forsaken of God, and in the extremity of black and affected malice who falls into this excesse, and into this sort of hatred of his Neighbour, which is proper onely unto Devils; and to reduce the sin of scandal to this disposition is to declare that it is committed no where but in Hell, and to take it quite out of the world; or rather it is to entertain and protect it in the world, by disguising it in such sort as that we may not know when we commit it; and by consequence to give all men licence to commit it freely, and without scruple, in making them believe that they commit it not in doing these actions. 2270

*Bauny* also makes use of the pretence of a good intention, to justifie Usury. For after he had furnished us with an invention, to palliate and cover it before the eyes of men, by means of three contracts, of which he himself prescribes us the form, he endeavours to hide it from God himself if he could, and also to justifie it by a good intention. *For greater surety*, (saith he, in the 14. chap. of his Summe, p. 219.) *it is good that the creditour say to him that is his debtor, that his intention in this contract is not usurarious, though he let out his money to him for profit, with protestation on his part that he would do nothing therein against God and his conscience. For hereby he declares that he is determined onely to that which is good and far off from sin.* Thus he mocks God and Man, intending to surprize them by such grosse contrivances, as if he could change the nature of things by innevating the terms and manner of expressing them.

It is easie to see the contradiction which is in these words; but it will appear yet more clearly, if we compare that which he saith here with what he tells us elsewhere, in his practique, t. 3. chap. 6. pag. 362. where treating of benefices, he saith, *when any one causeth a benefice with cure incompatible with a dignity to be provided for him, he is reputed to renounce it without any expression thereof in words, c. 1. de consult. in 6. although he make protestation that he will not part with it; because this protestation is contrary to his action.* A man that is in a dignity and who causes a cure also to be provided for him, cannot hold them both, although he would, and protesteth that it is his intention; *because this protestation is contrary to his action.* And an Usurer who gives his money to interest *to make profit thereof*, may deliver himself from usury and restitution, *by protesting that it is not his intention to make an usurarious contract*, though in very deed he do make one, *and his protestation be contrary to his action.*

One of the greatest abuses that these Doctors make of the intention, is in the use of the Sacraments, and particularly of that of penance. When a man is altogether overwhelmed with crimes, which he often doth reiterate, and into which he doth fall many times, they pretend that he needs but a moment to reduce himself into good terms with God, and that one onely word uttered with his lips or drawn thence by a Confessor, will suffice to make so great a change: and provided he say he will mend, and promise it unto the Priest, he shall be obliged to repose himself upon this pretended good intention, and upon this promise, *although it may be presumed for the most part that such resolutions proceed onely fro the lips*, as *Bauny* confesseth in his Summe, chap. 46 pag. 717. of which he brings a good proof, and as it were a certain mark, in these following words: *As is will come to passe, if notwithstanding all this which these people have said and promised for the time past to the said Confessor,* 2280

*they do not cease to behave themselves with greater excesse and liberty in those crimes then before.* And though also we see by experience of what is past, that they will not amend, and that their present disposition makes it also sufficiently appear that they have no true will, he forbears not to maintain *that we must believe what they say, cum ipsi sint sui accusatores, defensores & testes; being they are their own accusors, defenders and witnesses; though many times it may be presumed that such resolutions come not from beyond their lips.* Such are the most part of the resolutions, promises, good intentions of the greatest sinners, upon which notwithstanding these direc-
2290 tors ground themselves to conferre on them the Sacrament, though they themselves judge them unworthy; and to justifie the greatest crimes, and which they themselves who commit them, durst not at all take upon them to defend, if these Doctors did not maintain and assure them falsely by this pretended good intention, which they teach them to form in a moment, and by one onely word, in saying onely that they have, or that they would have it.

In which they are so ingenious, that when they cannot find this sort of good intentions in him who hath done amisse, they go to seek it without him in some other accessary to the action. As if that would suffice to clear it of malice and crime. Thus *Bauny* exempts from mortal sin, children who rob their parents; *In as much,* saith he, *as the Parents cannot be supposed to be willing to oblige their children not to meddle with what is theirs upon this penalty; there being good reason to believe that they had rather see all their goods wasted by their hands, then their said children out of grace and favour with God.* As if the commandments of God and the sin of those who violate them, depended on the disposition or will of man; and as if those who were offended together with God in the same action which was committed against him and against his Law, by releasing their interest; and remitting the fault which is committed against them, could also as speedily take away and blot out that which is against God and against his Law, principally when he that hath committed it
2300 doth not take the pains to ask him pardon, nor to give him satisfaction.

If it be true, as saith *Bauny*, that children sin not mortally in taking the goods of their Fathers and Mothers; why say they not also that they should not sin mortally in attempting their lives also? For the reason they bring for the one proves it as well of the other. His reason is that *parents cannot be thought to oblige their children, not to attempt upon what is theirs under this pain* of mortal sin, and eternal damnation; and we may as well believe that they are not to be thought to desire to oblige them not to enterprize upon their lives on the same pain, it being apparent that if Fathers were true Christians, as they suppose them to be, they would rather like to see not onely all their goods wasted by their childrens hands, but their own lives lost also, rather then see their children in disgrace with God, or in eternal pains.

By this same reason, by which they go about to excuse the theft of children, it will follow that the wicked persecuting honest men; Tyrants spilling the blood of Martyrs, the Jews in putting to death Jesus Christ, sinned not mortally; because it is certain that neither Jesus Christ, nor the Martyrs, nor honest men ever had an intention that those who invaded their goods, their honor, or their lives, should fall into displeasure with God, or into eternal damnation. On the contrary there is nothing that they would not do and suffer to hinder them there from, as may be seen clearly in that the Saints and Martyrs prayed unto God to pardon them that persecuted them, following herein the example of Jesus Christ, who prayed upon the Crosse for those who put him to death, and demanded of his Father that he would not impute unto them the sin of his death,

CHAP.

# CHAP. V.

## Of the matter of Sin.

### ARTICLE I.

2320

*That the Jesuits enhanse and debase as they please the goods of this world, which are the usual object or matter of sin; and so nourish vice, and dispense with the Law of God.*

THe object and the matter of sin are temporal things, which God having made for man that he might imploy them for his service, he turns them into a stumbling block, by taking occasion of offending and destroying himself thereby; by suffering himself to be surprized by the pleasure which he finds therein, or making use of them otherwise then God hath ordained.

The Jesuits are wont to judge of sin by its object, and to measure its greatness by the quantity of the matter, and by the value of the things which induce men to commit it. I will not examine this principle, the defect whereof is easie to be perceived. But I am confident, that there is none that will not finde it very strange, that they having established this rule, which ought by consequence be always inviolable amongst them, they yet do not follow it themselves, but do like those who have two different weights and measures, setting what price they please upon temporal goods, making them sometimes much and sometimes little worth, according to the 2320
divers designs they have to gratifie the passions and lusts of men. They debase worldly goods to excuse the sins of those who usurpe them unjustly; and they enhanse their price and represent them as very considerable, for to dispense with the Law of God, when we cannot observe it without suffering some losse and some diminution in these very goods.

It is upon these principles, and with this spirit, that *Bauny* in his Summe, chap. 7. pag. 80. after he had described envie as a monstrous vice, *which sies, saith he, like the Cantharides only on the fairest flowers*, after he had said with Saint *Cyprian*, *that it is as it were the worm of the soul, which makes its own hurt of another's good*; and after he had declared universally, that *the envious man engaged not a little his conscience and honour, since against all sorts of prudence, by a Metamorphosis altogether vicious, he attempts to change good into evil, and good and wholesome actions into poison*; nevertheless he concludes in this sort; *this sin, though Saint* Augustin *testifies that it is contrary unto charity, nevertheless seems not to me to be mortal.*

Although envie be so pernicious and deformed as he represents it; though it *be like the worm that consumes the soul* and ruines the conscience, *like venim* which corrupts good actions and *turns good into ill*; *though it be contrary unto charity, as Saint* Cyprian *and Saint* Augustin *say*, and as he himself avows with them, *yet it seems not to him that it is a mortal sin*; and if we will believe him, it ought not be put into the number of the seven mortal sins. His reason is, *because the good which is found in temporal things is so slender, and of so little consequence in respect of Heaven, that it* 1330
*is of no consideration with God and his Saints.*

By the same reason we may say that theft, slander, and even homicide it self are no mortal sins; because that the goods which are withheld from our Neighbour by theft, the honour we violate by slander, and his very life which we cause him lose by homicide, *are all temporals, in which the good that is found is so small and of so little consequence in respect to Heaven, that it is of no consideration with God and his Saints*: and by consequence could not be matter of mortal sin according to the Divinity of this Father, nor a sufficient subject to put man out of favour with God. See here how this Author debases the price and estimation of temporal goods to excuse sin. But when he hath in hand to dispense with men for their duty, and the Law of God; then he enhanseth their price, to cause that lust may prevail with us above the Law of God on those occasions, wherein to obey and keep it we must suffer some losse in these goods.

In

In the 46. Chap. of his Summe, pag. 711. after he had eſtabliſhed the conditions neceſſary to a penitent to be in an eſtate to receive abſolution, he propoſes many queſtions, whereof ſee here the firſt: *From theſe principles*, ſaith he, *it will be eaſie to anſwer the queſtions which follow: The firſt, thoſe who in their commerce, their traffick, their diſcourſe, their reſort, are obliged to ſee, to ſpeak, to treat with maidens and women, whoſe ſight and meeting makes them oftentimes fall into ſin; if they, I ſay, are capable in this perpetual danger, of being in grace and receiving abſolution?*

He ſaw well enough that this paſſe was dangerous, and that the anſwer he was about to make to this queſtion was of it ſelf odious and ſcandalous: For this reaſon he cauſes to march in his front a good number of Authors, as it were to ſound the ford, and to be his guarde. The firſt he produces is de *Baia*, whom he makes mouth to them all, and to anſwer abſolutely, *yea*. He alledges *Navarre* after, making him to confirm this opinion, and to aſſure us that *we may not conſtrain this penitent to abandon that traffick, which is ſo perillous unto him.* He puts *Emanuel Sa* laſt, ſaying that he declareth *that upon the penitents refuſal to quit his traffique, we may not refuſe him abſolution; provided that he and thoſe others with whom he is accuſtomed to ſin found their refuſal upon ſome good and lawful cauſe; as not to be able to diſpenſe therewith without giving the world ſubject to talk of, or that they themſelves ſhould thence receive ſome inconvenience. For otherwiſe, ſay they,* (he ſpeaks of others whom he cited) *we cannot refuſe them abſolution, dummodo firmiter proponant, ſo that they ſtrongly inſiſt on it.*

After theſe Authors he is more confident, and ſpeaks with more aſſurance, p. 712. ſaying, that though the occaſion of ſin *be as it were certain, nevertheleſſe becauſe it is not affected nor ſought out in a frolick, and without neceſſity, becauſe we cannot avoid the dangers that are joyned thereunto, without ſcandal, without concerning therein our honours and our goods, it follows that to perſevere therein is no fault, by the fourth rule of right, quod non eſt licitum in lege, neceſſitas facit licitum, What is not lawful by law, is made lawful by neceſſity.*

The ſame man, in the 5. q. pag. 715. demands *what is to be done with men-ſervants and maid-ſervants, Couſins of both ſexes, Maſters and Maids, who mutually engage and aid one another in ſin, or ſuch as take occaſion from the houſe where they are, or occaſions they have therein?* To anſwer this queſtion, he makes uſe of the ſame artifice he made uſe of in anſwering the former, which is, to make others to ſpeak and to cover himſelf under their ſhadow. *When the relapſes*, ſaith he, *are frequent and as it were dayly*, Navarre, *in 3. chap. num 31.* Graff. *l. 1. c. 30. num. 23.* Suarez, *part 3. ſ. 4. d. 32. ſ. 2. holds that they muſt be ſent back.* And a little after: *If notwithſtanding, add they, they offend onely rarely together, as once or twice a month, they may be abſolved, concurrentibus quatuor praditis, quorum quatuor ſcilicet cauſa notabilis eſt, quod non poſſint ſine magno incommodo & detrimento ſeparari. Theſe four things concurring, of which four the remarkable cauſe is, that they cannot be ſeparated without great inconvenience and damnage.*

See here the Law of God put in ballance with temporal goods: on one ſide the Law of God forbids ſin, and to avoid it commands to flie from the occaſions of it; on the other ſide, commodity, intereſt, and pretence of honour, ingage in perpetual danger, and in, as it were, certain occaſion of ſin. In theſe occaſions the good which is found in theſe temporal things is no longer ſlender and of no conſequence, as *Bauny* ſpoke before, to remove envie out of the number of mortal ſin; he declares here, on the behalf of *Emanuel Sa*, that it is a good and lawful cauſe; and on the part of *Navarre*, that it is a very conſiderable occaſion; and finally, he doth not onely make uſe of it as of a good excuſe; but he forms thereout a kind of neceſſity which diſpenſeth with the Law of God, abuſing this text of right: [a] *That neceſſity makes that lawful which is not lawful by the Law*, which is to be underſtood onely of things which are indifferent in themſelves, and not of things which are in themſelves, and eſſentially, naught and diſhoneſt, as theſe of which I ſpeak are.

[a] Quod non eſt licitum in lege, neceſſitas facit licitum.

In conſequence of this principle and this rule, the Jeſuits judging alſo of ſin by the object and matter, when this object is ſpiritual and the matter inviſible, or little exteriourly, the ſins can be onely ſlight ones according to their judgement. Whence it comes to paſs that they acknowledge hardly any mortal ſins of curioſity,

idleneſs, pride, vanity, and other ſpiritual vices of like kinde, and theſe vices muſt paſſe unto ſome ſenſible matter, and different from their own, and in ſome notable outward exceſſe, to make them mortal according to them, as we have already remarked ſpeaking of coveteouſneſs, concerning which *Eſcobar* relating the opinions of the principal Divines of the Society, acknowledges no crime if it be not accompanied with ſome circumſtance contrary to Juſtice: and when he treats of pride, and ambition, and of boaſting, he finds alſo nothing which approacheth ſo much as near to mortal ſin, if this vice do not proceed unto ſome great exceſſe againſt the honor of God or our Neighbour, if by a perverſion altogether extraordinary, it do not blinde a man ſo far as to make him ſay, with the King of *Tyre*; *I am God.*

See here the paſſage entire which deſerves to be repreſented alſo here, though we have already rehearſed it elſewhere, becauſe it is very remarkable: [b] *If boaſting do notably offend againſt the honour of God, or the reputation of our Neighbour, it proceeds unto mortal ſin, now the honour of God is remarkably hurt by pride and boaſting, when a man is ſuch a fool, as to ſay, with the King of Tyre, I am God: and when he boaſteth himſelf like the Phariſee in ſaying, I am not like this Publican, he offends grievouſly his Neighbour, namely him whom he ſo ſpeaks of.* 2378

b *Tunc ad mortale accederet, quando aut graviter Dei reverentia læderetur, aut proximi fama. Fit equidem cum gravi Dei irreverentia, cum in mortem Regis Tyri dictum fuit; Ego ſum Deus. proximus autem gravi injuria afficitur quando quis cum Phariſæo jactat; Non ſum ſicut iſte Publicanus.* Eſcobar, tr. 2. exam. 2. num. 9. pag. 291.

Theſe two caſes excepted, and ſome other ſuch like which he obſerves, he holds that ambition, vanity, and boaſting, cannot proceed unto mortal ſin, and that ſo long as theſe vices continue that they are of their own peculiar nature, ſo long as vanity continues ſimple vanity, pride is ſimple pride, and they exceed not their own proper matter, they are ordinarily but venial ſins.

By conſequence of this ſame principle, ſins which are committed againſt vertues purely ſpiritual, and againſt the moſt Divine and elevated things which we enjoy, ſuch as are the Word of God and his Truth, Religion and the moſt Holy Functions of Religion, provided they be not extraordinary, are onely venial, and it is the exceſſe onely that renders them mortal, and this exceſſe alſo muſt not be common.

This made *Emanuel Sa* to affirm, [c] *that it was no ſin to make fabulous relations in Sermons to ſtir up the auditors attention and devotion.* He ſpeaks alſo more clearly in another place where he ſaith, [d] *that there are ſome who hold that it is always mortal ſin to tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal point; but others deny it.* And he relates the opinion of theſe latter, adding onely *that it muſt be underſtood onely when the matter is ſleight.* If to lye in the chair in points of Doctrine, according to this Jeſuit, be but a venial ſin, he without doubt would make no great matter of lyes which a Preacher ſhould ſpeak in other matters; and it may be he might give them in this the ſame liberty that he gives them to tell tales generally, and without exception. 2380

c *Fabellam recitare, ut auditores excitentur ad pie audiendum, non eſt peccatum.* Sa verb. Prædicare. num. 5. p. 378.

d *Mentiri in concione in pertinentibus ad doctrinam, quidam aiunt eſſe mortale, alii non ſemper: quod iſtefuge ſi ſit materia levis.* Sa verb. Mendacium. num. 2. pag. 494.

He condemns them not more rigorouſly who tell lyes in confeſſion: [e] *It is but a venial ſin,* ſaith he, *to lye unto a Confeſſor in confeſſing venial or mortal ſins formerly confeſſed, though after reſolution to confeſſe them truly.* *Eſcobar* ſaith the ſame, and adds ſome thing. [f] *Suarez holds,* ſaith he, *that to lye in confeſſing a venial ſin, is but a venial ſin, provided that this venial ſin be not all the matter of the confeſſion, for in this caſe the abſolution will have no ſubject, and the Sacrament will be null. Others hold the contrary, for that a lye which conſiſts in a ſleight and venial matter is always ſleight.* A lye told in confeſſion, and which makes the Sacrament null in the judgement of 2390

e *Mentiri in confeſſione de peccatis venialibus, aut de aliis confeſſis mortalibus venialiter ſolum peccatum eſt, ſi dicat ſe propoſuiſſet vere confiteri.* Sa, verb. Confeſſio. n. 12. p. 88.

f *Mendacium de peccato veniali, veniale eſt, niſi illud veniale eſſet tantis confeſſionis materia, quia non haberet abſolutio ſine materia, & Sacramentum nullum eſſet. Suarez tom. 4. d. 3. part. diſp. 22. ſect. 10. n. 6. alii negant, quia omne mendacium de veniali eſt res levis.* Eſcob. tr. 7. ex 4. n. 107. p. 816.

this Jeſuit and of thoſe whoſe judgement he reports, ſeems to him a very ſleight thing to furniſh matter for a mortal ſin, though it deſtroy a Sacrament, and turn it into an action profane and ſacrilegious.

It is eaſie to ſee if this be to honour the Truth and the Sacrament of penance, which by a particular reaſon may be called the Sacrament of Truth, becauſe there a man acknowledgeth that which he is truly, confeſſing himſelf a ſinner before God, and confeſſing his ſins before a Prieſt who holds the place of God: nevertheleſs this Divinity teaches that it is no great matter to lye in this Sacrament; and that fault committed herein ought to be conſidered according to the matter of the ſin rather then by the holineſſe of the Sacrament; in ſuch manner, that if the matter about which the lye is told be not an important thing in it ſelf, the ſin is but ſleight, though thereby the Sacrament be profaned, made nul and ſacrilegious.

This Jeſuit commits yet a greater extravagance againſt the truth, when he ſaith that it may be oppoſed, with a reſolution altogether formal, that is to ſay by pure malice, though it be acknowledged in the heart, without becoming guilty of any great fault. [g] *To conflict with the truth,* ſaith he, *which is evident with a formal deſign to oppoſe and contradict it, is great or little according as the truth in hand is of great or little conſequence.* He conſiders not the greatneſs of the Majeſty of God, who is encountred in the Truth, and who is Truth it ſelf; neither doth he any more conſider the wicked diſpoſition of him who impugnes the truth by an averſion or contempt which he hath towards it, oppoſing it by a formal deſign to reſiſt and deſtroy it, though he know it evidently; *animo impugnandi & contradicendi perſpicuam veritatem.*

g *Impugnare perſpicuam veritatem, animo impugnandi & contradicendi, eſt peccatum grave aut leve juxta materiæ gravitatem aut levitatem.* Eſcobar, tract. 2. exam. 2. cap. 2. num. 14. pag. 292.

If when the King ſpeaks, any of his Officers ſhould riſe up and contradict him publickly in a thing which he knew himſelf to be juſt and true, being induced to this exceſſe onely by inſolence, and to oppoſe himſelf againſt the King, and to contradict him without cauſe, it is certain he would be treated as in guilty of high treaſon, and his action would paſſe in the judgement of all the world for an unſufferable outrage and contempt of Royal Majeſty, though the ſubject upon which he thus oppoſed the King were not of great importance. And yet *Eſcobar* would that it ſhould be accompted but a ſleight fault to deal thus with God and his Truth.

One paſſage alone of *Sanchez*, which I will rehearſe here, may ſuffice to prove that which I have ſaid, that in things purely ſpiritual, the Jeſuits find ſcarcely any ſufficent matter for mortal ſin. [h] *To perform of vanity,* ſaith he, *the moſt ſacred actions, as to adminiſter the Sacraments, or to receive them, or to celebrate the moſt Holy Maſſe for vain glory, can be but a venial ſin, though vain glory be propoſed, as the principal end.* He acknowledges that there is diſorder in this action, but he pretends that it is of ſmall conſequence, and that the injury that is done to God and things Spiritual and Divine in making them ſubſervient to vain glory, is not a thing ſo conſiderable as to merit the diſfavour of God, and that it conſerve for a matter to mortal ſin, and a cauſe of eternal damnation.

h *Res quamvis ſacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia miniſtrare vel recipere, ſacram celebrare, non excedit culpam venialem.* Sanchez, op. mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. *Etſi debitus ordo pervertatur, ea tamen perverſio non tanti eſt, ut adeo gravis injuria rebus ſpiritualibus inferatur, ut pœna æterna digna ſit.* Ibid.

It is not an eaſie thing to judge what reaſon he may have thus to diminiſh this ſin, if he acknowledge that there may poſſibly be great ones in Spiritual matters. For indeed it will be a hard thing to find greater then this, conſidered by the light of Faith, then to ſay Maſſe for vanity, as the principal end thereof, this is properly to ſacrifice to vanity, or to the Devil who is the god of vanity, the body of Jeſus Chriſt, which is horrible onely to think. And if the ſacrifice of the Maſſe may be referred unto vanity without any great ſin, ſo as this Jeſuit pretends: then may it alſo be related to all other vices: that is to ſay that we may ſacrifice and offer up the body of Jeſus Chriſt to all vices, which is a kind of Idolatry unheard of, more criminal in every ſort, and more impious then that of all the Pagans, who putting the creatures in the place of God, offer to them other creatures: but he who ſays Maſſe for vanity as his principal end, makes vanity a falſe God, and offers unto

it the true God, in ſacrificing unto it the body of Jeſus Chriſt. And yet this ſin according to *Sanchez* is but a ſleight one, becauſe the matter of it ſeems ſleight unto him, and there appears unto him nothing groſſe in it, that croſſes mens fancies, or hurts their intereſts, there being none but God and Jeſus Chriſt offended and outraged thereby in a manner altogether Spiritual; that is altogether Devilliſh, and by a ſin altogether Spiritual and Devilliſh, which is pride and vanity. 2420

## ARTICLE II.

### *The conſequence and explication of the ſame ſubject by two examples, and two ſequels which the Jeſuits draw from their principles concerning the matter of ſin.*

1. *That God cannot no more than men command or forbid a matter that is in it ſelf ſleight, under the penalty of mortal ſin.*
2. *That he that hath a deſign and will to commit all venial ſins if he were able, ſins onely venially.*

FRom this maxime which the Jeſuits preſuppoſe as a principle of their Divinity, that the object and matter of ſin ought to ſerve for a rule, whereby to judge of its greatneſs; in ſuch ſort that when the matter is ſmall, the ſin cannot but be ſmall, they draw this conſequence: That no Law, civil or eccleſiaſtick, humane or Divine can render men guilty of mortal ſin, when the thing commanded or forbidden them is not great.

*Emanuel Sa* ſaith generally, [a] *When a ſleight thing is commanded, the Commandment engages not unto mortal ſin, though this be the intention of him that commands.* 2430

a Præceptum de re leviſſima non obligat ad mortale, etiamſi qui præcipit id velit. Sa, verb. Præceptum. num. 1. pag. 575.

*Amicus* ſaith the ſame thing with larger extent: [b] *To cauſe that diſobedience may become a mortal ſin, the matter which is commanded or forbidden muſt be great: without this the violation of any humane law is not a mortal ſin.* Whence he draws this conſequence: [c] *Though the intention of a Superiour be to oblige in ſuch manner him who is under his charge, ſo as he ſhould not diſobey him without mortal ſin, it doth not indeed oblige him in this ſort, if the matter of the Law and of the commandment be not great.*

b Ad obligationem ſub culpa mortali neceſſaria eſt gravitas materiæ præceptæ vel prohibitæ, ſine qua nulla lex humana obligat ſub mortali.

c Unde etiamſi ſuperior velit ſubditum ad mortale obligare, de facto illum non obligabit, niſi materio legis aut præcepti ſit gravis. Amicus, tom. 5. A. 5. de lege humana. ſect. 8. n. 194. p. 64.

He paſſes farther, aſſuring us that God himſelf cannot make a man criminal by his command, if that he commands or forbids is not of it ſelf great and conſiderable. [d] *No Law*, ſaith he, *neither humane nor Divine, can make the ſin committed in a ſleight matter, to be mortal.*

d Nulla lex neque humana neque divina juſte obligare poteſt ſub culpa mortali, in materia levi. Ibid. n. 198. p. 63.

It would be hard to prove, by this rule, that *Adam* ſinned mortally in eating the fruit which God had forbidden him; ſince it follows from this principle that God himſelf could not forbid him to eat it under pain of mortal ſin, the matter if this command and ſin being too ſleight a thing.

If the Pelagians had known this maxime, it had been very eaſie to maintain their error, touching original ſin and the puniſhment it deſerves; and if the Church had received this maxime, it could not have condemned them nor maintained, as it hath done, that God puniſheth juſtly that ſin with eternal puniſhment, even in Infants which dye without Baptiſme; ſince beſides that this ſin is much leſſe in 2440

them, then in *Adam*, becauſe they have not committed it by their own proper will; it cannot be alſo but very ſmall in it ſelf, if it be conſidered in its matter which was but an Apple.

It ſeems that *Amicus* was not far off from this opinion, when he drew this conſequence from his principle: [c] *That though God as a Soveraign and abſolute Lord might make him ſuffer an eternal pain, who did diſobey him in a ſlight matter, yet he could not do it as a Judge, becauſe in this quality he is obliged to proportion the puniſhment to the fault which is not greater then the matter of the diſobedience.* That is to ſay in more clear terms, that God may make uſe of his abſolute power to do unjuſtly; it being clear that he who makes uſe of his power without regard of Juſtice, commits unjuſtice; and if men cannot do in this manner, God can do it leſſe; becauſe his power is much more ſtrongly and inſeperably united to his Juſtice then that of men. For it is founded upon Juſtice, and Juſtice is the foundation of his Throne, as the Scripture ſaith. And ſo to remove Juſtice from the power of God, and to make this to ſubſiſt without that, is to take away its foundation and to overturn it. So that inſtead of concluding that it might be ſeparate from his Juſtice, becauſe it is great and Soveraign, the contrary ſhould rather be concluded, it being manifeſt that it would not be ſo great, nor ſo ſoveraign and Infinite as it is, if it were not inſeparable from his Juſtice, ſince to be ſevered from Juſtice is not true power, but an impuiſſance, a feebleneſs and a defect, which by conſequence cannot be attributed to a Soveraign great and infinite power.

[c] *Unde etiamſi poſſit Deus ut ſupremus pœnam æternam infligere pro tranſgreſſione materiæ levis; non tamen poteſt ut Judex, quoniam ut Judex debet illas infligere cum proportione ad culpam, quæ tanta eſt, quanta tranſgreſſio ipſa materiæ.* Amicus, Ibid.

Alſo to ſay as *Amicus* ſaith here, that God can puniſh the faults of his creatures, otherwiſe then in the quality of a Judge, is to teſtifie that he may act without judgement, and not onely without cogniſance of the cauſe; but againſt the cogniſance and light of the truth: and by conſequence to deſpiſe or neglect truth and Juſtice, ſince it is no other then to deſpiſe it, not to conſider it when it is known.

This is finally to make God like thoſe wicked ones, who ſay in the Scripture: Our power ſhall be the Law of our Juſtice: *Sap. 7. v. 7. Sit autem fortitudo noſtra lex Juſtitiæ.* Which is proper onely to violence and Tyranny, it belonging to none but Tyrants to meaſure their Juſtice by their power, and not to be willing that their power ſhould be regulated by Juſtice. This is then to overturn the power of God, and to ruine it utterly to conceive of it in this manner, as theſe new Divines repreſent it, this is to deprive him of his Soveraignity and infinite greatneſs, and to render it defective and like that of the Creatures. Alſo theſe people regard not the intereſt of God, whileſt they advance his authority in a manner ſo unworthy of him; but the upholding of their maximes, and the falſe reputation of their Schools. Whence it comes that when the ſame intereſt of their Schools and of their Doctrine requires it, they abaſe the ſame power of God as unworthily as here they elevate it; as ſhall clearly appear in the ſubject we handle.

For on one ſide they take from God the true power, which he hath to command all things great and little, ſo abſolutely that we cannot diſobey them without ſinning mortally, and without encurring an obligation to an eternal puniſhment: becauſe this is not accommodable to the principle which they have eſtabliſhed, whereby to judge of ſin, by meaſuring its greatneſs by its matter; and on the other hand they attribute unto God the power which he hath not, and which he cannot have, to torment without ſin, and without any cauſe an innocent perſon, and to make him even ſuffer eternal pains for his pleaſure alone, and by his abſolute authority, becauſe it is the ſequel of the ſame principle, and for to defend it and anſwer the difficulties and inconveniencies it draws after it, it is neceſſary that they eſtabliſh this ſecond maxime: that is to ſay, that to defend an errour and impiety, they are forced to advance another greater then the former.

For this is the property of errour, to grow always as it advances, and the extravagancy and the exceſſes thereof are commonly greater and more viſible in its conſequences and concluſions, then in its beginnings and principles, whence they are drawn. Without doubt the Jeſuits would abhorre theſe impieties, and many other which they promote, if they looked on them alone and in themſelves; but when they ſee them to be the neceſſary conſequences of their Doctrine, they believe themſelves engaged in honour to maintain and confirm them rather then to recal

and correct their opinions. Such is the carriage of *Amicus*, when he repeats this the ſecond time, and anſwers with aſſurance that [g] *God as Soveraign Lord may puniſh a venial ſin with eternal pain.* And to diſcover the bottom of this horrible opinion, he proves it by an exceſſe yet greater, ſaying that he may even eternally damn an innocent. [h] *For as in the quality of a Soveraign Lord, he may cauſe his creatures to ſuffer eternal pains, though they have committed no ſin; he may alſo inflict the ſame pain upon one ſole venial ſin.* The more then barbarous injuſtice and cruelty which this opinion attributes falſely unto God, is ſo viſible that this Jeſuit himſelf is forced to confeſſe and acknowledge it. For after he had ſaid the third time, num. 18. that [i] *God might abſolutely torment in eternal pains any perſon whomſoever for venial ſins, and on his part it might be juſtly done, becauſe of the Soveraign dominion which he hath over all creatures, yet confeſſeth that having reſpect to the fault and ſin, he cannot do it juſtly.* And his reaſon is, becauſe the puniſhment of a fault cannot be juſt, if the penalty be not proportionable thereunto. 2489

g *Reſpondeo Deum ut ſupremum Dominum punire poſſe peccatum veniale pœna æterna.* Amic. tom. 3. diſp. 23. ſect. 1. num. 18. p. 237.

h *Nam ſicut ratione ſupremi dominii quod habet in creaturas, eas etiamſi nullum commiſerint peccatum torquere poteſt æternis pœnis: ita iiſdem pœnis torquere poſſet omnes propter veniale tantùm peccatum.* Ibid. i *Concedo Deum juſte quantum eſt ex parte ſua, quemlibet torquere poſſe pœna æterna propter veniale tantum, ratione ſupremi dominii. Nego tamen id fieri poſſe quantum eſt ex parte culpæ. Culpa enim ut juſte puniatur, exigit proportionatam pœnam.* Ibid. n 18.

So that to cover in ſome manner an injuſtice ſo manifeſt, he makes uſe of a marvelous ſubtilty, ſaying that damnation and eternal puniſhment, which God cauſes an innocent perſon to ſuffer, or him who is guilty of venial ſins onely, ſhall not be a penalty but an affliction and a torment. [k] *This pain, ſaith he, ſo far as it exceeds his fault, ſhall not be due unto him.* Whence he draws this concluſion: *And therefore ſhall not hold the place of a puniſhment, becauſe puniſhment is related to a fault as a propriety proportionable thereto.* And that which he adjoyns: *That it will be rather a torment, which God as Soveraign Lord may cauſe every creature to ſuffer though moſt innocent;* ſerves onely to make more appear the injuſtice he attributes unto God. For the word *torment* is more harſh, and more odious then that of puniſhment; becauſe pain cannot be called torment, but when it is extreme and unſupportable. So that if it be unjuſt to puniſh an innocent, it is alſo more to torment him.

k *Talis pœna quatenus excederet talem culpam, non eſſet illi debita; ac proinde non haberet rationem pœnæ quæ ordinem dicit ad culpam, tanquam proprietas illi commenſurata; ſed potius haberet rationem tormenti quod Deus tanquam ſupremus dominus poteſt cuilibet creaturæ etiam innocentiſſimæ infligere.* Ibid.

And if God by his will alone may torment an innocent, it ſhall be no more true which the holy Scriptures teach us, that God takes from himſelf onely the motive to do us good, and from our ſelves onely the ſubject to do us ill; becauſe both the one and the other ſhall come of his own will alone; and even herein he ſhall be the proper Author of evil, and the greateſt evil which a reaſonable creature can ſuffer, which are the torments and eternal pains of Hell, if he make him ſuffer them without having offended him, or for having committed onely ſome ſmall fault; which is againſt the univerſal conſent of the holy Fathers, againſt the Faith of the Church, and againſt natural right and equity.

So the ſubtilty of this Author inſtead of mollifying his opinion and juſtifying it, hath made it yet more unworthy of God and unmaintainable, and teaches us no other thing then that after we are fallen from errour into impiety, to maintain both obſtinately, we fall eaſily into blindneſs and extravagance, renouncing reaſon it ſelf, and the common ſenſe of all men, to follow vain imaginations and trivial and groundleſs ſubtleties. 2490

The ſecond concluſion which we ſaid the Jeſuits draw from this principle: That the greatneſs of a ſin ought to be taken from its matter and object, is this, that he who hath a will and a deſign to commit if he could all venial ſins, ſinneth onely venially, *Eſcobar* makes thereof a probleme; propoſing it in this manner. [l] *It may be held that he who hath a will to commit all venial ſins, ſinneth mortally; and it may alſo be ſaid that he doth not ſin mortally.* The reaſon for this ſecond part (of

l *Habens voluntatem peccata omnia venialia perpetrandi, peccat & non peccat mortaliter.* Eſcobar, Theol. Mor. l. 3. pag. 83.

this probleme) is the very principle that we now ſpeak of: [m] *Becauſe that*, ſaith he, *the malice of an inward action of the will is taken from the object towards which it warps, according as it is repreſented to it by the underſtanding. But the object of this will are all venial ſin, and the malice which the underſtanding repreſents unto it is but venial; and for that cauſe a will to commit all venial ſins can be but a venial ſin.*

m *Non peccat, quia malitia interni actus voluntatis ſumitur ab objecto prout proponitur à ratione Sed objectum hujus internæ voluntatis ſunt omnia venialia, & nulla major malitia proponitur à ratione præter venialem. Ergo interna voluntas perpetrandi omnia peccata venialia, non poteſt eſſe culpa letbalis.*

So that a man may have a will to commit all the venial ſins which he can commit
2502 in the matter of theft; and all thoſe which can be committed by intemperance; and by all other vices, without ſinning otherwiſe then venially; that is to ſay, that without mortal ſin we may have a will to ſteal all the goods of the world if we could, taking it at many times, and every time in ſmall quantity, which according to this rule of theſe Caſuiſts, could not be matter ſufficient for a mortal ſin; and ſo in the other vices and ſins. The ſame *Eſcobar* in the abridgement which he made of moral Divinity in one ſole Book, propoſeth the ſame queſtion, but not any longer as a probleme; but as a reſolution and an opinion conſtantly aſſented to by the Society. For he profeſſes to relate no others, and to advance nothing of himſelf, no more then from ſtrange Authors. [n] *It is demanded*, ſaith he, *whether of many venial ſins one mortal may be made; and by conſequent if one committed all venial ſins, which is impoſſible, if the fault were more then a ſleight one?* He confeſſes himſelf that this caſe is ſo extravagant, that it is impoſſible. Yet he forbears not to propoſe and reſolve it in this ſort. [o] *Then with* Granades, *who holds that he who hath a will to commit all at once; and by one ſole act all venial ſins, ſins onely venially.* There
2510 is ſome cauſe to doubt whether the queſtion be more ſtrange, or the anſwer. For if it be a thing altogether unſufferable, and which would have been grievouſly puniſhed in the Church heretofore to propoſe a caſe and an exceſſe ſo extraordinary, which no man could not onely not commit, but which even could not come poſſibly into the heart of the moſt forlorn in vice; it is not leſs ſtrange to endeavour to make it be believed that he who would commit this exceſſe which paſſeth the corruption of all men; that is to ſay, who would commit more wickedneſs then either he or any other could poſſibly act, and would do this deliberately and out of more malice, ſhould commit onely a ſmall ſin.

n *Rogo, an ex numero venialium exurgat mortale. Unde v. g. per impoſſibile quis omnia peccata venialia committeret, culpam levem non excederet.* Eſcobar, tract. 2 exam. 1. c. 12. n. 57. p. 385.

o *Negative reſpondeo, cum Granado 1. 2. cont. 6. tract. 2. d. 2. ſect. 7. docente volentem uno actu omnia peccata venialia perpetrare, ſolum venialiter delinquere.*

Who can perſwade himſelf that a perſon can be in favour with God, who is reſolved to offend him as much as he can, ſo that he may not be damned, and doing all the evil that he is able againſt him, with reſolution to do yet alſo more if he could do it without deſtroying himſelf.

If a child ſhould deal thus with his Father, or a friend with his friend, or a ſervant with his Maſter, he would make himſelf an object of publick hate, and an abomination to the whole world; and there would be no perſon who would not judge them entirely unworthy of the quality and name of a Son, friend or ſervant. And nevertheleſſe theſe Jeſuits pretend that he who demeans himſelf thus towards God, ceaſes not to be in truth his ſervant, his friend, and his ſon, and that he doth
2520 nothing which deſerves diſpleaſure, and that he may not be taxed of mortal ſin.

*Sanchez* propoſes a caſe which is not far from that of *Eſcobar*: He ſpeaks of a man who entring into a Religious Order, had made a reſolution not to obſerve any rule or conſtitution of that Order, nor of all the counſels or commands of his Superiours, but thoſe things onely which he could not neglect without mortal ſin; and for all the reſt whereto he thought not himſelf obliged under the pain of mortal ſin as vigils, ſilence, abſtinence, Juſtes of the Order, and other ſuch like Religious obſervations, and mortifications of the ſpirit of the body, he would not trouble himſelf at all, and would diſpenſe with himſelf as much as he could. He asks what judgement ought to be made of a Frier who ſhould be in ſuch an eſtate? whether his reſolution and will, which he hath abſolutely to violate all the points of his rule, and all the duties of his profeſſion wherein he believed he ſhould not ſin at all, or but venially,

nially, ſhould be a mortal ſin? whether this would hinder him from being a good Monk, and whether this would be a great fault againſt the obligation which he had to move towards perfection?

The anſwer of this Doctor is, that ſuch a man ceaſed not for all that to be in a good eſtate before God; and that he ſhould be a good Frier though not perfect, and that he ſinned not, at leaſt not mortally, againſt the obligation he had in the quality of a Religious perſon to purſue after perfection. One of his reaſons is, that becauſe he ſins but venially (as he ſuppoſes) in violating ſeverally every one of the points of his rule, and the regular obſervations which he is reſolved not to obſerve, the will which he hath to tranſgreſſe them all, is but a will to ſin venially, and which hath for its object venial ſins onely; and which by conſequence it ſelf could be no other then a venial ſin. 2530

We ſhall conſider more particularly this caſe of *Sanchez* and his anſwer, in handling the duties of Friers, and perhaps elſewhere, ſpeaking of mortal and venial ſin. I was willing onely to mark this here by the by, as a dependence and concluſion of the principle, which is the ſubject of this Chapter, that the greatneſs of the ſin ought to eſtimated from, and according to its matter and ſubject.

SECOND



# THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK.

## Of the eternal principles of Sin.

*That the Jeſuits nouriſh them that they may gratifie the paſſions of men, and by conſequence excite them to Sin.*

HItherto we have ſhewn that the Jeſuits nouriſh ſin, by nouriſhing men in paſſions, in evil habits and in vices, in Ignorance, and in a falſe pretence of good intentions, wherewith they commonly ſhelter themſelves, which are as it were the Fountains and the internal principles of Sin. I muſt now make it appear that they favour no leſs the outward principles of the ſame ſin, which are 1. Humaine reaſon and authority, which furniſh arms and expedients to defend them. 2. With cuſtoms, which produce examples to ſupport them. 3. The next occaſions, which draw men to them, cauſe them to fall into them, and retain them in them. We will treat of every one of theſe outward principles of ſin, apart, as we have done of the inward.

## CHAP. I.

*Of the maximes of reaſon and humane authority.*

FAith is not leſs elevated above reaſon, then reaſon is above ſenſe; and it is no leſs diſorder to regulate the lives of Chriſtians, who ought to live by Faith, by the maximes of humane reaſon, and much leſs of reaſon corrupted, as it now is by ſin, then to deſire to judge ſpiritual things by ſenſe. This were to transform men into Beaſts, and to ſubject them to follow their ſenſes in the regulation of their life, and to treat Chriſtians like Heathens, to give them no other rule for their converſations and actions, then the maximes of Philoſophie and humane reaſon.

Yet this is it which the Jeſuits have done; and all thoſe who read their Divinity, and principally that which treats of manners, will find therein no other principles in a manner but thoſe of the loweſt Philoſophie and humane reaſon, and that corrupted. They hardly know what it is to cite Scripture or Councils, and if they rehearſe any paſſages of the Holy Fathers, it is for the moſt part for form onely or to refute them, rather then to uſe them for foundations or ſolid proofs of their opinions, in relying on the authority of theſe great men who have advanced nothing of themſelves in points of conſequence, which belong to Faith or manners, which they had

not taken from thoſe who went before them in the Church, and which came not originally from the Apoſtles, and from Jeſus Chriſt, by the Tradition of the Church. 2560

But the Jeſuits, far enough from this conduct, make profeſſion to invent and to ſpeak things of themſelves, to follow novelty, to make every thing probable, to leave to the ingenious to chooſe in all opinions. Whence it comes, that making uſe ſometimes of one, ſometimes of another, they accommodate themſelves eaſily to the humours of all the world, and have wherewith to content all; how contrary ſoever they can be. But this alſo makes them fall many times into contradictions which are inevitable for them who have no other rule but their own proper ſence.

Theſe are the things which I ſhall handle in this Chapter, to ſhew what a wound they have given unto Divinity, and by conſequence thereof to good manners, in ſubſtituting reaſon into the place of faith, and particular and novel opinions to that of antiquity, and the tradition of the Fathers, I ſhall make apparent.

1. That their Divinity is novel, and that they make profeſſion to follow novelty.

2. That every thing in it is probable, and that they will have the liberty to follow all ſorts of opinions.

3, That their School is venal and wholly complaiſant to the world, and that they will have wherewith to content all ſorts of perſons, in anſwering every one according to his deſire.

4. That it is full of contradictions.

I will treat every one of theſe points ſeverally, dividing this Chapter into ſo many Articles.

## ARTICLE I. 2570

### *The Jeſuits make profeſſion to follow novel maximes, and to contemn tradition and antiquity.*

NOvelty hath always been odious in the Church; if at any time it were objected unto the Saints, they did always defend themſelves from it as from a calumny, and have had an extream care to advance nothing in the Church which they had not learned in the Church it ſelf; ſo far that they have believed that it was no leſſe crime to introduce or receive new Doctrines then to make or adore Idols. This is the judgement of Saint *Auguſtin*, upon theſe words of the 80. Pſalm. *Non erit tibi Deus recens*, where he ſaith that [a] *this new God is an Image of ſtone, or a falſe imagination.* And a little after, he unfoldeth his thoughts more at large in theſe words: [b] *it is not ſaid, thou ſhalt have no new God without thee: as if he would onely mark the outward and viſible forms: but he ſaith, you ſhall not have a new God within your ſelves. That is to ſay, you ſhall not bear within your hearts, in your imaginations in the illuſion of your errour, a new God, contining your ſelves old and corrupt.*

a *Deus recens aut lapis aut phantaſma eſt* S. Auguſt. in Pſ. 80.

b *Non dixit, à te, quaſi ſimulachrum foris ſecus adhibitum; ſed in te, in corde tuo, in imagine phantaſmatis tui, in deceptione erroris tui; tecum portabis Deum tuum recentem, manens vetuſtus.* Ibid.

All novel opinions contrary to the Tradition and ancient belief of our Fathers, are, to ſpeak properly, nothing but phantaſmes, imaginatins and errours: theſe are as it were ſo many Idols which ſome would introduce into the Church, which they would put into the place of Divine truth, which at once is the rule of our life, the object of our Faith, and of our adoration. 2580

And as thoſe who make Idols, thoſe who ſell, and thoſe who buy them to adore them, are all equally Idolaters: ſo in the ſame manner thoſe who invent novel opinions, thoſe who teach them, and thoſe who follow them, are all complices of the ſame fault: and though theſe laſt may be leſſe guilty, and are more to be lamented then the others, becauſe they do ſin with more ignorance, and wilder themſelves by following blind guides; yet they all find themſelves involved in the ſame miſery,

and subject to the same condemnation, pronounced by the Fathers, and by the Scripture, who condemn this sin, and forbid it as a sort of Idolatry.

According to these principles of the Scripture, and the language of the Prophet and of God himself, we may say there are so many Idolaters as there are writers at this day amongst the Jesuits, there being none of them in a manner who are not jealous of their own proper thoughts, and who have not introduced into Divinity some novel opinion; or who do not make profession to maintain and teach some which have been introduced by their Fraternity, to the prejudice of the ancients who have been always received and followed in the Church until these last times.

*Poza* hath composed a great volumn which he hath intitled *Elucidarium Deipara*, in which there will be found very little, if all that be thrown out which he hath invented himself. It had need to be copied out in a manner whole and entire, to make appear all the ridiculous and extravagant things that it contains, and all the excesses and errours into which he is fallen, pursuing his own thoughts and imaginations; having not taken so much care to given the Verigin true praises, as to produce new and extraordinary, which even in this do dishonour her, and cannot be pleasing to her. Because the praises which are to be given to Saints, as well as the honour which we are to render unto God himself, ought not to be founded on any thing but truth. I will onely rehearse some of the most considerable places of this Author.

He maintains confidently that Saint *Anne* and Saint *Joachim* were sanctified from the wombs of their Mothers, and that there is more reason to attribute to them this priviledge, then to *Jeremy* and Saint *John Baptist*. He confesses, [d] *that there are no persons that are for him or against him in this proposition, because none have spoken of it before himself.* If there be no Author for him, they are all against him, and the silence of the Saints and all the Doctors that were before him, is a manifest condemnation of his presumption, and of his rashness in so declaring himself an innovator, in an unheard of novelty in the Church in a matter of Religion.

*Molina* hath done the same thing, where he hath gloried to have invented the middle knowledge in the matter of Grace and of Predestination, with such insolence, that he is not affraid to say, that if it had been known in the first ages of the Church, the heresie of the Pelagians possibly had never risen.

*Maldonat*, who is one of the Commentators on Scripture whom they esteem, doth often declare himself the Author of new sences, which he gives the Word of God against the consent even of the Fathers, many times in his books we meet such expressions as these: [e] *I would find some Author who was of this opinion*, or: *all Authors whom I remember to have read, expound this text in this manner, but I expound it otherwise.* Which is a manifest contempt of the Council of *Trent*, which forbids to expound Scripture against the consent of the Fathers; and an imitation of the language of *Calvin* and other Hereticks, renouncing the tradition of the Holy Fathers, and all the antiquity of the Church.

If *Escobar* could have condemned this confidence of his Fraternity, he would have condemned them onely of venial sin. [f] *To introduce*, saith he, *novel opinions, and new sorts of habits into the Church, is onely a venial sin.* He hath cause to talk of new opinions, as of new fashions of Garments, for in the new Divinity of the Jesuits who hold all things probable, there needs no more reason to quit an ancient opinion, then to change the fashion of apparel; and if there be any ill in it, it is very small, and that too must come from some peculiar circumstance, as from vanity or ambition.

Though this censure of *Escobar* be very gentle, *Molina* and *Maldonat* as more ancient and more considerable in the Society then he, will not submit thereunto, and *Poza* is so far from acknowledging, that there is any ill in inventing new opinions, that he had a design in his Book not to produce therein any other then the inventions and imaginations of his own mind; and for this reason in the entrance and preface he makes an Apology for novelty, in which he hath forgotten nothing that he believed might be of use to make it recommendable, and to give it admission as well into the Church as into the World, imploying for this purpose authority, examples, and reasons.

d *Nullus est pro me in assertione hac, sed neque contra me, cum non sit ballensis disputata.* Poza in Elucidario l. 2. tr. 8. c. 3. p. 547.

e *Vellem habere Autorem qui ita sentiret. . . . . Omnes quotquot legisse me memini Autores, sic explicant; ego autem aliter sentio.* Maldon.

f *Novas opiniones, novas vestes exponere, venialis tantum culpa est.* Escob. tr. 2. exam. 2. n. 10. p. 291.

*Quia ejusmodi inventione quit gestit aliorum laudem captare?* Ibid.

He rehearses many passages out of *Seneca*, saying [g] *that truth is open exposed to all the world, that none have yet taken possession thereof; that they who were before us were our guides, but we are not therefore their slaves; that there remains yet enough for those who come after us; that every one liking better to believe, then judge, they are always content to believe, and never judge at all how they ought to live.* And a little after, [h] *I addict not my self to any one in particular of these great Stoical Philosophers; I have a right to judge them, and to give my advice upon them. This is the cause why some times I follow the opinion of one, and sometimes I change something in the judgement of another.*

[g] *Patet omnibus veritas, nondum est occupata; quicquid ante nos fuerunt, non dominis sed duces fuerunt; multum ex illa futuris relictum est.* Seneca, Ep. 33.

[h] *Non alligo me ad aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus; est mihi censendi jus. Itaque aliquem jubebo sententiam dividere de beata vita. Dum unusquisque mavult credere quam judicare, numquam de vita judicatur, semper creditur.*

It is clear that these passages go to establish a right for reason above authority: which had been tolerable in an Heathen, who had no other guide but Reason, and who speaks of questions and things which cannot be regulated but by Reason. But a Christian, a Monk, a man who interposes himself to write in the Church in matters of Faith, for the instruction and edification of the faithful, to make use of the maximes and terms of a Pagan to ruine the obedience of Faith, and the tradition which is one of its principal foundations, staving off the Faithful from the submission which they owe to the Word of God, and the authority of the Holy Fathers, 2620
is a thing unsufferable in the Church of God, this is almost to turn it Pagan, and to give every one a liberty to opine in matters of Religion, as the Heathen Philosophers did in matters of science and morality, wherein they followed their senses onely and proper thoughts.

He alledges also some passages of Catholick Authors, as that same of *Tertullian*. [i] *Our Lord Jesus Christ said that he was the truth, and not the custom.* And this other of *Lactantius*: [k] *These deprive themselves of wisdom, who suffer themselves to be led by others like Beasts, receiving without discerning all that which the ancients have invented. That which deceives them is the name of Ancestors. Imagining that they cannot be wiser then they, because they come after them, and because these are called neoteriques.* And in the same place. [l] *God hath given wisdom to every man, according to his capacity, and those who precede us in time do not therefore exceed us in wisdom. For being it is given indifferently to all men, they who came first cannot by their possession eject others from it.*

[i] *Dominus noster Christus veritatem se, non consuetudinem nominavit.* Tertull.

[k] *Sapientiam sibi adimunt qui sine ullo judicio inventa majorum probant, & ab aliis pecudum more ducuntur. Sed hoc eos fallit, quod majorum nomine posito, non putant fieri posse ut ipsi plus sapiant, quia minores vocantur.* Lactant. lib. 2 divin. instit. c. 8.

[l] *Deus dedit omnibus pro virili portionem sapientiæ: nec quia nos illi temporibus, sapientia quoque antecesserunt. Quia si omnibus æqualiter datur, occupari ab antecedentibus non potest.* Ibid.

He considered not when he alledged these passages, that what these Authors say, is for reproof of those who suffer themselves to be carried with humane customs and traditions, to the prejudice of manifest truth, or who are too credulous and timorous in the inquiry after natural things, which depend on reason; and that 2630
they speak not of matters of Faith and Religion, such as those are which he handles in his Book. But if he have perceived this truth, he abuses the authority of these great personages, applying it against their sence, and using it without reason to justifie a thing quite remote from their thoughts, and contrary to their judgements and from that of all antiquity, which were easie to be made appear, if it were not a thing too remote from my subject.

He alledges also these words which he attributes to the Council of *Constantinople*: [m] *Happy is that man who produces an unheard word, that is a new one.* Finally, he cites those words of the holy Scripture: [n] *every learned Doctor is like unto a Father of a Family who brings out of his treasure things new and old.*

[m] *Beatus qui profert verbum inauditum, id est novum.* Syn. Const. art. 1.

[n] *Omnis scriba doctus similis est patrifamilias qui profert de thesauro suo nova & vetera.* Matth. 13. ver. 53.

I passe by this last passage of the Gospel of Saint *Matthew*, which he abuseth manifestly against the sence of the Son of God, and that of all interpreters. But I cannot passe over the remarkable falsity, and visible corruption of the pretended words of the Council of *Constantinople*. For the true words of the Council are: *Beatus qui profert verbum in auditum obedientium. Blessed is he who utters a word into obedient ears.* From which he first cuts off the word *obedientium, obedient.* Afterwards he joins two words into one, and instead of *in auditum, into the hearing*, which were the Councils words, he makes it say *inauditum, unheard.* In the third place adding corruption of sence unto falsification of words, he saith that this word *inauditum* signifies *new.* But there is no cause to marvel that the desire of novelty leads to falsity, and consequently to errours and heresies.

*Azor*, and after him *Filliutius* who doth nothing in effect but follow him, speak also very advantagiously for novelty, saying generally that the Apostolical Traditions are of humane right, and that by consequence they may be changed. [o] *Divine Traditions*, saith Azor, *appertain to Divine right, and by consequence they are immutable: but the Traditions of the Apostles are humane Laws, and for that cause the Church may change them.* He expounds a little above what he means by Divine and Apostolical Traditions in these terms: [p] *Divine Traditions are those which the Apostles have learned from the mouth of Jesus Christ, or which the Holy Ghost hath dictated, and they have written by his Command, or by that of Jesus Christ. The Traditions of the Apostles are those which the Apostles have instituted in the quality of Prelats, Doctors, Tutors, and Governours of the Church.* In such manner that according to them, the Traditions of the Apostles are no other then the Inventions of the Apostles, which they ordained of themselves, and of their own proper motion, without having learned them of Jesus Christ, or the Holy Spirit. This is no more then his words clearly signifie, and the division he makes suffers not any other sence to be given them, since he opposes those Traditions which the Apostles have instituted of themselves; *quas ipsi Apostoli instituerunt*, to those which they have received from the mouth of Jesus Christ, and from those which the Holy Ghost taught them, and which he established by their Ministry; *quas ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli receperunt, vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante & jubente, vel Christo Domino imperante, promulgarunt.*

[o] *Ex quo efficitur ut traditiones divinæ ad jus divinum spectent, ac proinde sunt immutabiles: Apostolicæ verò ad jus humanum, & propterea Ecclesiæ authoritate mutabiles.* Azor, Instit. mor. l. 8. c. 4. q. 4. pag. 743. Filliutius, tom. 2. tr. 22. c. 1. n. 11. p. 65.

[p] *Divinæ traditiones sunt quas ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli acceperunt, vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante vel gubernante, vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt. Apostolicæ sunt quas ipsi Apostoli tanquam Ecclesiæ Prælati, Doctores, magistri & rectores instituerunt.* Azor. Ibid.

He makes then of these two sorts of Traditions, as it were, two opposite members, dividing Traditions into Divine and Humane or Apostolical. He calls the first Divine, because they draw their original from God and his Spirit, who hath instituted them, the Apostles having onely published them by his motion and order; he affirms that the other are humane, and of humane right: *ad jus humanum spectant*, because according to him they proceed from an humane spirit, and not from Gods, and that the Apostles who were men, instituted them, and are become their Fathers and Authors.

If it be true, as he saith, that the Apostles have made these rules in the Church, whether concerning faith or manners, and that they have not received them from Jesus Christ nor the Holy Ghost, he hath reason to say that the constitutions and traditions, which he terms Apostolical, are onely of humane right, because they take their original and their authority from the spirit of man, and which by consequence may be changed by men; and it may follow also from the same principle, that they are subject unto errour; the spirit of a man, how holy soever it be, may always deceive him, when he is the Author and original of his thoughts and actions.

It will follow thence also that the Apostles have governed the Church as Princes, and Politicians govern their estates and their common wealths, by their wit and reason. It would follow likewise that the Church is not governed by the Spirit of Jesus Christ, being they who first governed it, and who are the first modules to all them that followed in that rule, had no other then an humane conduct, in instituting and establishing of themselves that which seemed unto them just and reasonable; not as instruments animated by Jesus Christ, but as the Authors and principals thereof, following their own sences and thoughts.

The Jesuits perhaps will not be much troubled to agree to all those things which are

common enough in their Society, and maintained by their moſt famous Writers, who teach that the Laws of the Church are no other then humane; that its power and conduct extends onely to the outward man, and that the Church it ſelf is onely a politick body, as ſhall be proved elſewhere, when we come to make known how pernicious theſe maximes are to all Religion, and overturn the power and authority of the Church.

After *Azor*[p] had ſpoken ſo baſely and ſo unworthily of the Apoſtles and Apoſtolical conſtitutions, we need not think that ſtrange which he ſaith againſt the Ancients and Fathers of the Church, and would have the opinions of the new writers of theſe times to have as much weight and credit as they, ſo that if the Fathers ſometimes prevail with them againſt the new Authors, the new Authors do as often and more frequently prevail over the Fathers. It is in the ſecond Book of his Moral Inſtitutions, where after he had demanded [q] *whether we ought to hold an opinion more probable, becauſe it is from the ancient Fathers; or whether for this reaſon it ought to be preferred before that of the moderns?* He anſwers in theſe terms: [r] *when the opinions are equal themſelves, thoſe of the ancients are commonly preferred before new writers: but there is neither law nor reaſon ſufficient to oblige us to preferre them always.* This is no great honour to the Fathers, to ſay that we may preferre their opinions before thoſe of modern Authors, when the reaſons appear equal on both ſides, ſince as much may be ſaid of all ſorts of Writers, following the Jeſuits rule of probability. 2670

q *Primo quæritur an opinio probabilior exiſtimetur, ita ut merito præferri debeat, eo quod ſit antiquorum ſententia, & altera ſit recentiorum?*

r *Reſpondeo quondo revera opiniones ſunt pares, ſæpe antiquorum opinio juniorum ſententia præfertur: non tamen legè aut ratione efficaci compellimur ad eam ſemper anteferendam.* Inſt. Moral. l. 2. c. 17. q. 1. p. 127.

But the contempt is more manifeſt in that which he adds, that even in this caſe there is no obligation to ſubject our judgements to the opinions of the Holy Doctors of the Church, who in important affairs ſay nothing but what they learned of it, and that every one hath liberty to follow them, or not to follow them; ſo it ſhall be lawful to follow the moderns always, and never to follow the Fathers, when the reaſons of the moderns are as likely as thoſe of the Fathers, which will eaſily appear ſo to thoſe who judge by humane ſenſe, and natural reaſon, rather then by the light of Faith, as the Caſuiſts of theſe times, and the people of the world commonly do.

It will alſo be lawful to preferre the moderns before the Ancients, even when the ancients are grounded on more ſtrong and ſolid reaſons, according to that maxime of the Jeſuits, who ſay that we may prefer an opinion, which is leſſe, before another which is more probable. For this is an infallible conſequence of this maxime, joyned to that other, which will have the Fathers, and their opinions, conſidered no otherwiſe then by reaſon and conformity to humane ſenſe, as the Parliament of *Paris* conſiders the Laws and opinions of the ancient Roman Lawyers; or rather as the hereticks conſider the holy Fathers, to whom even they render a little more honour and reſpect in appearance: ſaying that they are to be judged, not by reaſon, as all theſe new Doctors, but by the Scriptures, though they regard not Scripture but according to their reaſon, and the preoccupation of their ſpirits. But they both agree in the overthrow they give the authority of the Fathers, ſubjecting them to their reaſon and their fancy, and giving them onely as much force as they pleaſe, following the cuſtom of all thoſe who impugn the truths, and moſt aſſured and inviolable rules of antiquity and Religion. 2680

*Reginaldus* handling the ſame queſtion, whether the ancients or the moderns are rather to be believed, when they are found in contrary opinions. He diſtinguiſhes upon the Point, ſaying that [s] *in reſolving difficulties that ariſe about faith the right thereof is to be drawn from the ancients: but thoſe which regard manners, and the life of Chriſtians are to be taken from the modern writers.*

s *Quæ circa fidem emergunt difficultates, eæ ſunt à veteribus hauriendæ: quæ verò circa mores homine Chriſtiano dignos, à novitiis ſcriptoribus.* Reginald. præfat. ad Lect.

It is ordinary with thoſe who have no right to a thing, for which they conteſt unjuſtly, to endeavour to have it divided, to the end that they may have at leaſt one half, when they cannot carry all for themſelves. It was by this rule that *Solomon*

knew that of the two women who diſputed in his preſence, in the caſe of the Infant, either pretending that it belonged to her; that ſhe who would have had it cut aſunder in the middle ought to have none of it, and was not the true Mother. So the Je-
2690 ſuits cannot better teſtifie that they are deprived of truth, then by their conſenting to divide it, in ſuch manner that one half ſhould be to the ancients, and the other half to the moderns, that is, themſelves.

But if it belong to the ancients to determine on queſtions which ariſe about matters of Faith, it muſt needs be that they alſo decide difficult matters of conſcience and manners, ſince the faithful ought to live by Faith; and if we ought to take from the moderns the rules of manners, and not of faith, we muſt have another rule of life given us then faith, if faith be not the ſource and meaſure of good works, nor the principle of Chriſtian life.

*Celot* undertaking to defend the Caſuiſts of his company, teſtifies that *Reginaldus* hath done as he ſaid, and having taught moral Divinity twenty years, he always made profeſſion to follow the opinions of the neweſt Authors; *& quidem recentiorum.* Which he approves and confirms, relating that very paſſage of the Author which we have juſt now cited in the ſame terms as we have produced them: *Celot, l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. Quia quæ circa fidem emergunt difficultates, ſunt a veteribus hauriendæ, quæ vero circa mores homine Chriſtiano dignos, a novitiis Scriptoribus.* Which ſhews that this wicked Doctrine is not peculiar to one or two, but comes from the genius of the Society. In whoſe name this Author wrote, who ſeemeth deſirous to ſeparate us from the ancients, and to hinder us from acknowledging them for our Fathers, that he might ſet them in their place.

2700 If it be true then that we ought to take the ancients for the rule of faith onely, and not of works, the faith which we receive from them will be dead and barren; and if the moderns give us onely the rules of manners, without thoſe of Faith, our life, how good ſoever it appear, would be no other then Heathen. And if it be pretended that with the rules of manners they give us alſo them of faith, whether they take them from the ancients, or make them themſelves as they do thoſe of manners to give them us, we are more obliged to them then the ancients, or rather we hold all of them, without having any need of the ancients, we receive good life, vertue, holineſs, from thoſe who are no Saints, and we hold nothing from the Saints, from whom we receive onely a dead faith, a Faith of Devils as Saint *Auguſtin* ſpeaks according to Scripture. And to ſpeak truth, the children of the Church receive not their life of the Fathers of the Church, and are not their children, but of the Fathers of this World, and Divines of the laſt times.

*Celot* is not contented to follow *Reginaldus* in this point, but he ſpeaks of himſelf for novelty againſt antiquity, with a ſleightneſs and contempt unſufferable. [a] *What ſhall we do,* ſaith he, *all humane affairs are thus; the ancients lived after their rules, and we after ours. And who ſhall tell us which are the better?* He ac-
2710 knowledges that which is too true, we now live in a manner quite different from that of the ancients, and of the Holy Fathers; and this is that which ſhould oblige us to addreſs our ſelves rather unto them, then unto the moderns, to learn to regulate our manners, and to live Chriſtian-like. For as in all ſorts of profeſſions we ſeek the beſt Maſters to inſtruct us; ſo it is clear that thoſe who have lived holily, and who are acknowledged for Saints in the Church, are more proper to teach holineſs and Chriſtian life, then they that are no Saints, as all the new Divines are not, to ſay no more of them.

[a] *Quid agas? Sic ſe habent humana omnia, vixerunt moribus ſuis antiqui, nos noſtris. utri melius?* Celot in præf. l. 5. p. 240.

There is none but *Celot* who ſeems not willing to confeſs that the ancients are better then the moderns, in ſaying, that we know not whether their conduct and rules be better then that of the moderns. But he ſhould at leaſt have conſidered, that we may well ſometimes give the moderns the name of Fathers, but not of Saints, and that by the Holy Fathers, we underſtand always the ancients, ſo that as well the publick voice of the Church as that of the Society it ſelf ſuffices to convince the blindneſs of his Pride.

But he is not content to equal himſelf and his to the Holy Fathers, and ancient Religious who lived in the primitive times of the Church in a holineſs and purity altogether extraordinary, he hath alſo the confidence to preferre himſelf, in theſe ſtrange

terms. [b] *They do wrong,* saith he, *to our age who would judge of the life of the Religious of our times, by that of the ancients: in such sort that what the ancients have believed themselves to be obliged to do or to avoid, we ought also to command or forbid, without other reason then because the ancients have ordained it, this is as it were to desire them to return to their infancy who are at maturity of age, because that in their first years they had somewhat of pleasant and pretty, which flattered the eyes of their Mother.* He could not have discovered himself more, nor testifyed more contempt of these great Saints and first Religious, then to compare the moderns to men grown ripe and perfect, and the ancients to infants, who have nothing at all of solid, but onely a prettiness proper to content the easiness and foolish affection of women. Whence it follows, we are no more to consider the ancient Fathers, then as children, in regard of the moderns, who must be the venerable Fathers of the Fathers themselves; and by consequence they can be no longer their disciples, since it belongs to perfect men to instruct children, and not children to instruct men.

[b] *Inique de nostro sæculo judicarunt qui nostratum Religiosorum mores ex antiquorum factis expendunt; ut quod illi faciendum sibi committendumve censuerunt, hoc nos confestim pro voluntate amplexemur aut fugiamus. Plane ut si quis maturi ævi hominem ad puritiam redire compellat, quoniam in illo ætatulæ flore vinulum & elegantulum nonnihil habebat quod matri arrideret.* Celot, Ibid.

It seems that it is in this same sence, that *Celot* speaking of Saint *Paul*, the first Eremite, of Saint *Anthony*, and many other Saints, who imitated them in flying the corruption of the world, and retiring into the Desart to serve God there, he saith that the Church hath rather tolerated then approved those great personages, and their manner of life altogether Holy and Evangelical. [c] *The Church,* saith he, *rather tolerated then approved formally, those who being pressed on by the love of God, and contempt of the World, retired as it were in haste, and went to hide themselves in the wilderness, as Saint* Paul *and Saint* Anthony, *in the first ages, and others of whom Saint* Augustin *speaks.* We tolerate onely that which is evil or disorderly, which comes always from evil or weakness. This Jesuit therefore must accuse these great Saints of the one or the other, and that their actions which were all holy passe in his mind for disorders or defects, if it be true that the Church did tolerate them onely, as he saith, and not approve them. But she could not give them a greater approbation then by Canonizing them, and declaring them Saints for that Angelical and admirable life which they led in the Wilderness, as also the Church testifies at this day publickly in its office, and its mysteries, and all the great personages of the Church, the Holy Bishops, the Popes and the Doctors have published their praises, out-vying as it were one another through all ages of Christianity: and *Celot* perhaps is the first amongst Catholicks, that hath had the boldness to debase and dispraise them.

[c] *Alios tulit potius quam expresse probavit Ecclesia homines sæculi fastidio & amore Dei incitatos, statim cursu in solitudinem se abdentes, ut sanctum Paulum, ut in primis annis sanctum Antonium & alios ab Augustino memoratos.* Celot, l. 5. c. 4. p. 257.

But this contempt and insolence will appear yet more unworthy and unsufferable, when he compares them to those who lived in the first ages of the world, of whom the Poets speak as of savages and beasts, living without Laws, without politie, and without conduct; in such manner that those who came after, being formed and regulated by the reason and industry of the more prudent, there appeared betwixt them so notable a difference, that it seemed that it might be said that the former were not men in comparison of the latter. So *Celot* speaks and pretends in the sequel of his discourse, that [d] *as the Heavenly fire of reason had so little vigour amongst the men of the first ages of the world, that comparing it with the beauty and politeness of the spirits of latter ages, it was hard to believe that they were men;* In like manner Saint *Anthony*, Saint *Paul*, and the other Hermits who lived in the first ages of the Church, compared with the Religious of this present, cannot without difficulty passe for true Religious; whereas we have cause to wish that these last might be set in comparison with the former, and were all worthy to bear the name of their disciples and children.

[d] *Quemadmodum in priscorum sæculorum hominibus adeo fuit obtusus divinus ignis mentis & rationis, ut cum posteriorum ætatum politis & legantibus ingeniis comparati, vix homines apparent.* Celot, l. 5. c. 10. p. 314.

In the mean time he is so firm and resolute in his opinion, that he cannot so much as onely suffer that the examples of these ancient Fathers, of the Monks, should be alledged, being not willing they should be otherwise considered then as children.

For see how he bespeaks his adversary:[e] *You are troublesom and importunate, alledging unto us continually the examples of those who lived when the institution of Monks was but yet in its infancy.* Which he bears so aloft that he fears not to say in expresse terms; [f] *That antiquity cannot be attended to without danger.* As if the opinions and the examples of the Holy Fathers, and of the first Religious were not onely unprofitable but also dangerous, and that it were more safe to raze them out of the memories of men, then to regard and consider them.

e *Ne tu durus & importunus, qui ad exempla nascentis monachismi perpetuo provocas.* Ibid. p. 241.

f *Meminerit interim hujusmodi interrogationibus antiquitatem sine periculo respectari non posse.* Ibid.

But if there be danger to attend unto antiquity, and consider those great Saints who lived in the first ages of the Church, it is dangerous also to write and read their lives; without doubt for fear that those who observe and read them, should thereby become affected with them and imitate them, it being manifest that they are not read nor written, but on this design.

We must also condemn the whole Church, who publickly celebrates and honors their memory, and demands of God for her children grace to imitate them, as she declares often in her office. So that it cannot be dangerous to observe these ancient Fathers and first Religious, and to follow their examples, but onely for those who have introduced so many novelties, both into their Doctrine and into their conduct, that the sole view of antiquity, from which they are so prodigiously departed suffices to convince and to confound them.

## ARTICLE II.

### Of the Doctrine of Probability.

A Whole Book may be made of this Article, which is the principal of this Extract, as also the subject which is here handled, is the most general and important of the Jesuits Divinity, in which in a manner all things are probable, as may be seen by *Escobars* six Volumes of Problematique Divinity: which comes to passe not onely by necessity, because they examine and regulate all things by their sense and by their reason, in quitting the authority of Tradition, which onely can quiet the spirit of man, and give him some assurance and certainty in the knowledge of truths, and particularly of those which respect Religion and manners: but also by a particular design of the Society; because desiring to govern all the World, and not being able, without having wherewith to content all sorts of persons, there is no means more easie, nor Doctrine more commodious for this then that of probability, which gives liberty to say and do all that one will, as it shall clearly appear in the prosecution of this Article, where we will first represent the principal opinions and maximes of the Jesuits touching the Doctrine of probability; and in consequence thereof the pernicious effects which it produceth in the Church, and in the world, which shall be the two principal points of this Article.

I. POINT.

# I. POINT.

## *The principal maximes of the Jesuits concerning probability.*

THe Doctrine of probability taken out of the Jesuits Books consists particularly in these following points.

1. That the Jesuits Divinity makes all things probable.
2. That they pretend that an opinion is probable, though it be held onely by one single Divine.
3. That of two probable opinions we may choose that which is lesse probable and safe.
4. That we may even follow sometimes one and sometimes the other though they be contraries. 2770

Because that these points for the most part depend one on another, and are ordinarily handled together, and in connexion by the Casuists, I will not separate them at all. Yet that I may keep some order, and hinder the tediousnes and confusion which would happen if I should amasse in one sole Article all that I have to relate upon every one of these points, I will represent apart the opinions of the principal Jesuit Authors, who treat thereon, beginning with *Layman* and *Azor*, who are the most famous of the Society.

## SECT. I.

### *The opinion of Layman, and of Azor, concerning probability.*

LAyman establisheth fairly, at first, for a fundamental maxime, [a] *that when there are two probable opinions about one question, it is lawful to follow that which is lesse sure.* Of which he renders this reason. [b] *Because in moral actions it is not necessary to follow the rule which is absolutely the best and most safe; and it sufficeth that it be absolutely good and sure.* Now he pretends [c] *that what is supported by a probable opinion is simply good and lawful*, taking *lawful* and *safe*, for the same thing.

a *Ex duabus probabilibus partibus quæstionis, licitum est eam sequi quæ minus tuta est.*

b *Quia in moralibus operationibus necesse non est sequi quod optimum & tutissimum, sed sufficit sequi bonum ac tutum.* Layman, lib. 1. tract. 1. cap. 5. sect. 2. p. 4.

c *Quod autem probabilis opinio tradit, id bonum ac licitum est.* Ibid.

But if they demand what will make an opinion probable, see here the conditions 2780 which he requires thereto, and the definition which he gives thereof: [d] *we may call that a probable opinion, as it is commonly understood, which being not certain and undubitable, is notwithstanding supported by some considerable authority, or some reason which is not sleight.* He afterwards expounds the definition himself in this manner: [e] *that authority which may be judged considerable in this matter, is at least of one learned and honest man, provided that he have not embraced it inconsiderately and rashly, but after he hath weighed and examined the reasons of those who hold the contrary.*

d *Probabilis sententia, uti communiter accipitur, ita definiri potest: Quæ certitudinem non habens, tamen vel gravi autoritate, vel non modici momenti ratione nititur.* Ibid. p. 5.

e *Autoritas gravis hoc loco censeri debet, quæ est saltem unius viri docti & probi, qui tamen talem doctrinam non inconsiderate ac temere, sed post perspecta rationum pondera quæ in oppositum afferri possunt, amplexus est.* Ibid.

In the least temporal affairs we require at least two witnesses, to give a Judge a competent knowledge of what is necessary for him, whereon to form a reasonable judgement; and this Jesuit would have a man to repose himself for eternal salvation upon the word of one man alone, or on an apparent reason. He confesses himself in this place, pag. 8. [f] *that an opinion ought not to be received as probable in Justice, nor*

f *Non est probabilior sententia quæ reipsa debet, cui lex eo loco recepta assistit. Nam Judex in mandatis habet ut secundum leges judicet.* Ibid. pag. 7.

*serve for a rule unto a Judge, unless it be authorized by the Laws which are received in every place, and that the Judge is obliged to Judge according to those Laws.* So that, according to *Layman*, it is not lawful for a secular Judge to follow his own sence, nor that of one or more Consellors in temporal Laws, but he is obliged to attend to the Laws and Ordinances as the true rule of his judgements; and yet according to the same Jesuit, it is lawful to decide difficulties which respect conscience, Salvation and Religion, by the sence of one single man, or by one single reason, without taking the pains to examine and Judge of it by the Law of God, and by the ordinances and rules of the Church.

After this we need not wonder, if the Jesuits believe that the conduct of the Church is altogether humane and politick. For if it be such as *Layman* here describes it, it follows evidently that it is even below the conduct of polity, and is not so much as humane or reasonable.

*Emanuel Sa* and *Escobar*, who have made an extract, as it were, and choice of the principal Authors of the Society, and the opinions which it approveth, also accord in this point with *Layman*: [f] *Sometimes one single Doctor*, saith Escobar, *who is of great estimation may make an opinion probable.* And demanding a little after: [g] *Whether an opinion more probable may be left to follow one that is lesse probable?* He answers *yes, though that also which is left be likewise more safe.*

f *Aliquando unus tantum Doctor gravis admodum opinionem probabilem potest facere.*

Escobar in præmio, Exam. 3. n. 8. p. 24. g *Num liceat opinionem probabilem sequi relicta probabiliori? Licet; immo & tutiori.* Ibid. n. 9. p. 25.

*Emanuel Sa* expounds himself farther, saying that it is lawful to do that which we hear affirmed by a learned man, or what we see done by honest men, although we have cause to fear they are deceived, and believe our selves that the contrary is more safe for conscience. [h] *A man*, saith he, *may do that which he believes by some authority or some probable reason to be lawful for him, all be it the contrary be more safe; and it is sufficient for him to have on his side the opinion of some one Doctor of reputation, or the example of honest men.*

h *Potest quis facere quod probabili ratione vel autoritate putat licere, etiamsi oppositum tutius sit. Sufficit autem opinio alicujus gravis Doctoris, aut bonorum exemplum.* Sa verb. Dubium. num. 3. pag. 183.

But *Escobar* raises the price yet higher above him; and sets the last hand as he pretends unto the Doctrine of probability, and that he might extend the licence which he gives men to do whatsoever they would, to the uttermost point to which it may be drawn, he saith in the Preface of his problematick Divinity, that [i] *an opinion is probable not onely when he that invented it, saith that it is, and when it is supported by some probable reason: but it ceases not to be probable, though neither the Doctor who advances it, nor any other say that it is true: for a Doctrine, which no man ever approved or rejected, may please some who shall read it. I will add that albeit even all Authors do positively reject it, nevertheless if any Doctor find that the reason he make use of to prove it is not sufficiently destroyed, the opinion may be held for probable.* So that there is place to hope, according to this Author, that the most universally condemned crimes may one day become lawful, since it depends upon any one Doctor that shall find that the principles by which worldly men defend themselves are not sufficiently destroyed. There is no need that the Doctrine of probability make any great progresse to go thither; and we may say that the corruption of the manners and minds of men in this age gives cause to fear that there hath been already some Doctor of that opinion.

i *Demum non solum tunc judico opinionem habere probabilitatem, quando ille qui eam suscitavit probabilem esse affirmat, & probabili ratione suffulcit. Verum etsi doctrina adducta à Doctore, nec à se, nec ab alio vera esse affirmetur, sed gratia solummodo argumenti fuit inducta. Et sane Doctrina quæ nulli Doctori placuit negative, hoc est quam nullus usque modo probavit, alteri legenti docto placere poterit.* n. 27. *Addiderim si cæteri Doctores illam reprobaverint positive, si tamen eam non esse sufficienter reprobatam alteri Doctori videatur, nec argumentum pro illa doctrina adductum satis esse solutum, probabilem posse reputari.* Escobar in præfat. Theologiæ problematicæ.

*Tamburin* seems yet to add something more to this opinion, or at least to ex-

pound it in a more plauſible, ſhort, and eaſie way. [k] He ſuppoſes that you are in ſome trouble, how you are to behave your ſelf, when you have a ſtrong deſire to do ſomething, and can find no opinion whereon to reſte, and to aſſure you that it is probable: and to ſet your conſcience in quiet, he anſwers you, that it is *enough that you are probably aſſured, that the opinion is probable.* So that not onely probability is ſufficient to excuſe ſin, but probability of a probability.

k *Abſolute puto cum Salas, Vaſquez, Sanchez, Merolla apud Bardi. de conſc. d. 1. c. 6. quibus adde Paſq d. 18. ſatis eſſe in omnibus caſibus conſtare prob. biliter opinionem eſſe probabilem: ego hic & nunc prudenter operor, quia dum probabiliter puto hoc eſſe probabile, ſatis prudenter illud judicium in praxi ſequor.* Tambur. l. 1. Decal. cap. 3. ſect. 3. num. 126.

There is no appearance that the Jeſuits would make uſe of this doctrine in their temporal affairs. And in effect it is not good ſave onely to give them power to diſpoſe of mens conſciences, according to their fancies, and ſo ſport themſelves with the Salvation of Souls, by ſubmitting them to the inventions of their ſpirits and their judgements, as a ſafe rule for the guidance of conſcience; which is a thing never heard of in the Church before them.

*Azor* handling the ſame point, ſaith [l] *that when two opinions are probable the one as well as the other, we may juſtly preferre in the practice that which is leſſe ſure, though we believe it alſo to be leſs probable.* He is not content onely to ſay, that we may follow the leſs probable: but to heighten the eſteem of it above others, he adds that we may follow alſo the leſs ſafe. And though he confeſſes that none ever advanced it ſo far, ſaying: *Hæc authores non tradiderunt*, he forbears not to propoſe this opinion, whereof he is the Inventor by his own confeſſion, as a probable opinion and ſure in conſcience: becauſe allbeit he want authority, he believes he hath a good and ſufficient reaſon for it: *Ratione tamen efficaci concluditur*, ſaith he, following the maxime of his Fraternity, that to make an opinion probable, it is ſufficient to have one authority or reaſon which we believe to be good. 2830

l *Quando opiniones ſunt æque probabiles jure poſſumus minus tutam in agendo præferre: immo etiamſi qua minus tuta eſt, minus probabilis habeatur.* Azor. l. 2. c. 16. p. 126.

This good reaſon is, that [m] *what is prudently done is well done; and we do that prudently which we do by the counſel of others: by conſequence he that doth follow the opinion of learned men acts prudently.* I leave it to thoſe who make profeſſion of logick, to examine this Syllogiſme according to their rules, whether it be in good form or not. I will content my ſelf to ſay, without digging deeper into this matter, for the clearing up and making it to be better underſtood, that if to act in the manner this Jeſuit ſpeaks of be to act prudently, it muſt needs be that this prudence comes not from the Father of lights, ſince it carries us to preferre ſomething before God and our own Salvation, and not to have ſo much love for him nor for the truth, which we ſee more clear and certain, as for our own ſence, and ſome ſecret paſſion which cauſeth us to embrace and follow that which is leſs true and ſure. 2840

m *Quia id bene agitur quod prudenter agitur: ſed qui aliorum conſilio ducitur prudenter agit: ergo qui in agendo opinionem Doctorum probabilem ſequitur, prudenter rem gerit.*

*Dicaſtillus* extends this prudence ſo far as *to preferre a probable opinion before that which is certain and ſafe, even in the matter of the Sacraments. For that it is*, ſaith he, *to act prudently*: For example, [n] *If any one believeth probably that he hath already confeſſed ſuch or ſuch a mortal ſin, or that he hath not committed it, or that the confeſſion he hath made thereof is valid, or that he is not neceſſarily obliged to confeſſe ſuch and ſuch circumſtances, he will not be obliged to confeſſe it, though poſſible it may be more probable that he hath conſented unto mortal ſin, or that he hath committed it. The reaſon is, that it is lawful for every one to follow a probable opinion, though the contrary be more probable, this principle being ſufficiently received in morality, as* Suarez *ſaith.*

n *Aſſero ſi quis probabiliter credat ſe jam confeſſum de illo mortali, vel ſe non commiſiſſe tale peccatum, vel confeſſionem prius factam de illo, probabiliter putet eſſe validam, vel probabiliter putet tales aut tales circumſtantias non eſſe neceſſario confitendas; non teneri ad confeſſionem, etiamſi forte probabilius ſit conſenſiſſe vel peccaſſe mortaliter. Ratio eſt quia licitum eſt cuique ſequi opinionem probabilem, etiamſi contraria ſit probabilior; quod principium ſatis receptum eſt in re morali. Suarez de p. d. 22. lib. 9. n. 6. Henriq. l. 5. c. 4. Sanchez, ſ. l. 1. c. 10. n. 76.* Dicaſtillus de Confeſſione tract. 4. d. 9. d. 8. n. 134.

If this principle be ſufficiently received in the Morals of *Suarez* and his companions, it is not received by the Saints which governed the Church, or rather by whom the Holy Spirit did govern it; wherefore not to ſpeak of others, Saint

*Auguſtin* ſaith expreſſely that [o] *in things which have reference to the Salvation of the ſoul, a man ſhall ſin grievouſly in this, onely that he preferres that which is uncertain before that which is certain.* And by the ſame rule that which is leſs certain, and aſ-
2840 ſured, before that which is more. For that which is leſs certain, is uncertain in compariſon of that which is more; and the intention of this great Saint as well as of all the reſt, is to teach us that when eternal Salvation is concerned, we ought always to take the moſt certain ways, and that we cannot take too much ſecurity in a matter of ſo great importance: *Nulla ſatis magna ſecuritas ubi periclitatur æternitas. No ſecurity can be enough where eternity is in queſtion.*

o *Graviter peccat in rebus ad ſalutem animæ pertinentibus vel eo ſolo quod certis incerta præponeret.* S. Aug. l. 1. de Baptiſm. contra Donat. c. 3.

Finally, this prudence is not ſo much as humane and reaſonable; and we ſhould not approve of it in the conduct of temporal affairs. For if a Phyſitian give unto his patient of two remedies which he hath, the more uncertain and ineffectual: or if a Conſellor in his inſtructions about a ſuite, or in a Plea of great concernment ſhould make uſe of evidences and arguments which were more doubtful, and ſuppreſſe the more certain for any private intereſt: if an Overſeer or a Tutor who hath money to put out, ſhould not lend it him whom he knew to be the moſt ſure and ſolvent: If all theſe perſons, I ſay, acted on this manner, would they be eſteemed wiſe, or could we ſay they acted prudently; or ſhould we have cauſe to approve or be content with their conduct? It is probable the Jeſuits would not make uſe of ſuch people, nor imploy them in their affairs of importance; they are onely the things of God and of Salvation, wherein they find it good for us to act on this manner, and wherein they believe that it is not to act againſt true prudence.

In purſuance of all theſe maximes which are as it were the foundations of all that
2850 they ſay upon this matter, *Layman* and *Azor* draw diverſe conſequences to decide many particular queſtions and difficulties.

*Layman* aſſures us [p] *that a Doctor may give counſel to him that adviſes with him, not onely following his own opinion, but following alſo the contrary which other Doctors hold probable, if it be more favourable or more acceptable.* He adds, *that he believes that this Doctor ſhould do nothing unreaſonable in ſaying to him who conſulteth him, that the opinion according to which he hath anſwered his caſe, is held by ſome learned perſons, and that by conſequence he may follow it; though he himſelf believes aſſuredly that it is falſe in the theory, and that therefore he may not follow it in the practice.*

p *Doctor alteri conſulenti conſilium dare poteſt non ſolum ex propria, ſed etiam ex oppoſita probabili aliorum ſententia, ſi forte illi favorabilior ſeu exoptatior ſit.*

Layman ſupra pag. 7. *Immo arbitror nihil à ratione alienum fore ſi Doctor conſultus ſignificet conſulenti opinionem à quibuſdam viris doctis tanquam probabilem defendi, quam proinde ſequi ipſi liceat, quamvis idem Doctor ejuſmodi ſententiam ſpeculative falſam ſibi certo perſuadeat, ut proinde ipſemet in praxi eam ſequi non poſſit.* Ibid.

And that we might better ſee his extravagance, he ſaith himſelf in the ſame p. 7.
[q] *That though it were probable that a Medicine might help a ſick perſon, it would not follow thereupon that it were therefore probable that a Phyſitian might give him a dubious remedy: but on the contrary, becauſe that the life of the body, and the danger of loſing it was in queſtion, he is obliged to chooſe the means which is more ſafe.* Whence he concludes that *the Phyſitians and Chirurgions are obliged to follow certain and aſ-*
2860 *ſured opinions, and refuſe them which are doubtful and uncertain.* And to take away from Phyſitians and Chirurgions all pretence and occaſion of failing in a caſe ſo important, he declares that [r] *if they find not a remedy that is certain, they are obliged to make uſe of thoſe they judge moſt probable.* He ſaith ſhortly after the ſame thing of the ſecular Judges: [ſ] *That a Judge is obliged to judge according to the opinion, which, after he hath conſidered all which is alledged and proved on one or other ſide, ſeems to him more probable and more conformable to right.*

q *Etſi probabilis opinio ſit medicamentum infirmo profuturum, non inde ſequitur probabile eſſe quod liceat medico tale medicamentum dubium adhibere; quin potius cum agatur de periculo corporis, ſecurior via eligenda eſt.*

*Quare Medici & Chirurgi ſequi debent ſententias certas & ſecuras, rejectis inventis & dubiis.* Ibid. pag. 7. r *Quod ſi certa curatio non occurrat, tenetur ſectari eam quæ probabilior judicat.* Ibid pag. 7. ſ *Judex judicare tenetur ſecundum ſententiam quæ inſpectis allegatis quibus probabilior, juxtaque conformior eſt.* Ibid. p. 7.

In temporal things we cannot uſe too much precaution, nor take too much ſecurity, according to the Jeſuits; but in thoſe which concern Heaven and Salvation, it is not neceſſary to be ſo exact, and to imploy ſo much care, according to the ſame Jeſuits. *When the health or life of the body is concerned, or where there is danger of loſing that,*

they declare *that we are obliged to chooſe the means that are more ſafe*: but when we deal about the Salvation, or life of the ſoul, and the danger of loſing it, they pretend that we may chuſe the means and follow the opinion which is leſs ſecure. To hold this diſcourſe, and to propoſe theſe maximes to the faithful, as the rules of their conduct, is it not to teach them openly to take leſs care of their ſouls then of their bodies, of their Salvation than of their health, and to preferre the World before God, and life temporal before eternal?

*Layman* concludes alſo, following theſe principles, *that a learned man may give to diverſe perſons counſels quite contrary, according to contrary probable opinions.* Which is very conformable to the prudence of the Jeſuits, though this carriage appear very abominable to the Divine [t] wiſdom, which condems a man with two tongues, and him that makes uſe of two different weights and meaſures for temporal things, and much more for thoſe which reſpect Religion and eternal Salvation. But that which he adds as a ſequel to the ſame principles ſeems yet more ſtrange; that a Confeſſor may not onely follow the opinion of his penitent, though it be contrary to his own; but that he is obliged thereto, though he believes the opinion of his penitent to be falſe, and even not to be probable. [u] *If a penitent*, ſaith he, *follow in ſimplicity in his conduct an opinion which ſome Doctors have maintained as probable and ſure, and on the contrary the Confeſſor, whether he be ordinary or ſubſtitute, thinks it improbable in the theory, he is obliged to give him abſolution, notwithſtanding his perſwaſion.* So the penitent ſhall be the arbiter and guide of the Confeſſor, and not the Confeſſor of the penitent: and whereas the penitent ought to ſubmit to the opinion of the Confeſſor, and thereunto is obliged by all ſorts of reaſon and juſtice, the Confeſſor ſhall be obliged to follow the opinion of the penitent, though he judge that which is falſe and improbable. 2870

t *Os bilingue deteſtor.* Prov. 8. v 13. *Pondus & pondus, menſura & menſura, utrumque abominabile eſt apud Deum.* Prov. c. 20. v 10.

u *Si pœnitens in praxi bona fide ſequitur ſententiam quæ à quibuſdam Doctoribus tanquam probabilis & tuta defenditur; Confeſſarius vero, ſeu ordinarius ſeu delegatus, eandem ſpeculative improbabilem cenſeat; nihil obſtante ſua perſuaſione tenetur abſolutionem conferre.* Ibid. p. 5.

[x] *Azor* draws almoſt the ſame conſequences from the ſame principles, and demands whether a Scholar may rely upon an opinion which he hath learned of his Tutor or Profeſſor, without troubling himſelf with others, and whether he may follow and teach it in ſecurity of conſcience. He anſwers that he may; and he ſaith the ſame thing of him that meets with any favourable opinion in an approved Author, be maintaineth that both of them are exempt from raſhneſs, in following or in teaching that which they have learnt, the one of his Tutor, the other of the Caſuiſt, whom he hath happened upon. Whencehe concludes that it is eaſie to finde a good guide, and a good warrant for our actions, without being deceived at all, ſince the firſt Authour we fall upon is good enough; ſo that the moſt ignorant cannot miſtake, and the moſt learned have therein no advantage over them. [y] On the contrary he pretends that ignorants and groſſe witted perſons are not obliged to examine the reaſons, and the foundations of the opinions they would embrace, and that to act prudently, it is ſufficient unto them to follow the opinion of a man whom they eſteem vertuous and knowing. But thoſe who make profeſſion of learning are obliged to examine, and to weigh the reaſons of the Authors whom they would follow, to act prudently. 2880

x *Quæritur 4. an diſcipulus jure poſſit ſui magiſtri & præceptoris ſententiam ſequi, ita ut eam ſecutus probabiliter ſentire videatur. Reſpondeo poſſe. Et idem dicendum eſt de eo qui operam navat legendis authoribus ut doctrinam ſibi comparet; qui ſi quam legerit apud probatum quempiam Authorem ſententiam ſequatur, probabiliter opinari merito creditur: & proinde tunc hic, tum diſcipulus ſuum magiſtrum ſecutus à temeritatis crimine liber eſt.* Azor. l. 2. c. 17. p. 131. q. 4.

y *Si vero rudis & imperitus, ejus non eſt opinionum fundamenta diſcutere. Quare ut prudenter faciat, ſatis eſt ſi boni ac docti viri opinionem ſequatur. Si vir peritus & doctus, debet opinionum rationes & pondera examinare & excutere ut prudenter agat.* Ibid. q. 5.

But if in this he give the advantage to the ignorant above the knowing, he makes them a recompence a little after, in giving to theſe ſecond all ſorts of liberty above the former, ſaying that a knowing man may form himſelf an opinion, teach it, practiſe it, and cauſe others to follow it, though it be contrary to all that have taught before him, and that no other Author but himſelf alone hath maintained or doth maintain it, provided he believe he have ſufficient reaſon to maintain it. 2890

[a] *We demand*, ſaith he, *if an honeſt and learned man having ſome ſtrong and manifeſt reaſon againſt the common opinion, but yet having no received or approved Author, may by this forceable and evident reaſon form a probable opinion, though it be contrary to the common opinion?* He anſwers, [b] *that before God and in conſcience he is not guilty of any raſhneſs nor imprudence, becauſe he is grounded upon juſt and probable reaſon.*

[a] Quæritur quid dicendum quando vir bonus & doctus contra communem opinionem nullum claſſicum & probabile [illegible] Authorem habet; nihilominus tamen habet rationem manifeſtam & firmam, ut probabiliter teneat diſcretur, ſi contra communem opinionem ſenſerit urgenti & firma ratione permotus? [b] Reſpondeo, in foro conſcientiæ non eſt cur temere & imprudenter agere videatur; ſiquidem probabilem & juſtam rationem & cauſam ſequitur. Ibid q 6.

See here the prudence and the rare and extraordinary humility of the Jeſuits all at once, and the ſecurity they give to their penitents and devouts, making them depend for their Salvation upon the imagination of one ſingle man, though contrary to the judgement of all others, without knowing that in all this they do any thing againſt that prudence or charity which they ought to have towards their Neighbours or themſelves.

Nevertheleſs they are not content to give unto men this ſtrange liberty, to invent new opinions and to follow them againſt the judgement of all others, they will alſo have it lawful for them to quit their own opinion to make uſe of that of another, when it is more profitable and more favourable unto them. [c] *It is demanded*, ſaith Azor, *if it be lawful in conſcience to follow others mens probable againſt our own proper opinion?* He relates two contrary opinions upon this queſtion, and
2900 he concludes with thoſe who hold the affirmative, ſaying that [d] *this opinion is more probable and true.* *Eſcobar* is of the ſame opinion, and he propoſeth this difficulty himſelf: [e] *But it is lawful to accommodate my ſelf with the opinion of another which is probable, quitting my own which is more probable and more ſure?* He anſwers in theſe terms: *Yes without difficulty, and acting thus, I act nothing againſt my conſcience, provided I judge that the opinion of others which I follow be probable.*

[c] Septimo quæritur, an cuique liceat in foro conſcientiæ probabilem alterius ſequi ſententiam contra propriam opinionem? Ibid.

[d] Hæc opinio eſt probabilior & verior. Ibid p. 132.

[e] Poſſum probabiliſ aliorum ſententiæ aptare meam, probabiliore ac tutiore relicta? Ita plane, nec ſic operans contra conſcientiam agam, modo exiſtimem alienam opinionem quam ſequor eſſe probabilem. Eſcobar in procemio exam. 3. c. 3. n. 10 p. 25.

*Pilat* acted in this manner when he put Jeſus Chriſt to death, quitting his proper judgement by which he believed him to be innocent, to follow the opinion of the Jews who maintained that he was worthy of death. And I ſee not how according to theſe rules of probability he can be condemned for pronouncing ſentence of death upon our Saviour: but I ſee that we may rather juſtifie him, by ſaying that his judgement was founded upon a probable opinion and more then probable, becauſe it was not of one ſingle Doctors, but of all the Doctors, and all the Prieſts, and all the beſt learned, and beſt eſteemed perſons amongſt the Jews, who by one common conſent affirmed it both by their own, and by the publick voice of all the people, that he whom he believed innocent, was indeed a malefactor who deſerved death; *Matth.* 25. *v.* 66. *reus eſt mortis.* For although he have not herein given unto the Judges the ſame liberty as to others to follow probable opinions; nevertheleſs there are others who have graunted it unto them, as *Eſcobar* and *Caſtro-Palao*,
2910 who hold that he may even follow the leſſe probable: *May a Judge in his judgement follow a probable opinion, leaving that which is more probable?* He anſwers in two words, that *Caſtro-Palao holds that he may.* And paſſing farther on, he gives him *the power to judge even againſt his own opinion*, as did *Pilate* who condemned our Lord, after he had declared publickly that he believed him innocent.

We may alſo according to theſe principles of the Jeſuits excuſe this Pagan Judge by reaſon of his ignorance, becauſe not knowing the cuſtoms nor the Laws of the Jews, it ſeems that he could not do better in this juncture of affairs, then referre himſelf to the Prieſts and Doctors of the Law, who aſſured him that according to their Law our Lord ought to dye. *Nos legem habemus, & ſecundum legem debet mori. Joh.* 19. *v.* 7.

From this general maxime, That it is lawful to forſake our own proper opinion, and to apply our ſelves to that of another, and to follow it, though it ſeem not ſo

probable. *Azor* draws his anſwer which he gives to this queſtion; [f] *Whether a Prieſt who hears Confeſſions, may reaſonably come over to the opinion of his penitent, when it is contrary to his own?* He propoſes the opinion of divers Authors, who took in hand to unfold this difficulty by many diſtinctions: but he relyes on that of thoſe who maintain that in every caſe, without exception and diſtinction, every Confeſſor may and ought to ſubmit to the opinion of his penitent. [g] *The fourth* 2920
*opinion is of them,* ſaith he, *that hold abſolutely and generally, that it is lawful for a Confeſſor to follow the opinion of his penitent againſt that of his own; and this opinion is more true; becauſe the advice of the penitent being probable, the Confeſſor acts neither raſhly nor imprudently in following his againſt his own proper ſence.*

[f] *Decimo quæritur, an Sacerdos qui pœnitentium confeſſiones audit, poſſit contra propriam ſententiam probabili pœnitentis ſententiæ adhærere?* Azor, Ibid. p. 133.

[g] *Quarta opinio eſt in univerſum affirmantium integrum eſſe Presbyteri vero contra propriam pœnitentis opinionem tenere. Et hæc eſt verior opinio: quia cum pœnitentis ſententia ſit probabilis, imprudenter ac ſolicite Presbyter non agit ſi eam contra propriam ſequatur.* Ibid.

To act in this manner is indeed to deny ones ſelf; but it is not to follow Jeſus Chriſt as the Goſpel hath ordained, but rather to forſake him, becauſe Jeſus Chriſt is truth and righteouſneſs, which he renounceth that renounceth his own light and his own conſcience, to follow the opinion and take the law of a man to whom he ought to give law according to the order of God and the Church.

From this opinion *Azor* infers that being a Confeſſor may always follow the judgement of his penitent againſt his own, that he is obliged thereto when he hath heard his confeſſion, and finds not in it any other private indiſpoſition. [h] *It follows,* ſaith he, *that a Confeſſor having heard the confeſſion of his penitent, is obliged to abſolve him.* And although the Confeſſor believes abſolutely that the penitent is obliged unto reſtitution, and that for this reaſon he ſcruples to abſolve him; he pretends notwithſtanding that if the penitent will not be brought to accord thereto, the Confeſſor is obliged to believe him, and that when even he cannot believe him, he ceaſes not to be obliged to abſolve him. His reaſon is, [i] *becauſe he who hears the confeſſions of penitents is obliged to provide for their Salvation: and as the penitent* 2930
*grounded upon ſome probable reaſon, may with a ſafe conſcience detain another mans goods, and is not obliged to reſtore them; ſo the Prieſt who hath heard his confeſſion is not bound by any law to order him to reſtore that which he is poſſeſſed of by a good title as he ſuppoſeth.*

[h] *Ex quo efficitur ut tunc temporis Presbyter debeat pœnitentem abſolvere, cum ejus confeſſionem audivit.*

[i] *Quia is qui pœnitentium confeſſiones audit, eorum ſaluti proſpicere debet: & ſicut pœnitens probabilem ſententiam ſecutus poteſt tuta conſcientia rem alienam ſibi retinere, nec ad reſtituendum ulla lege compellitur: ſic etiam confeſſionis auditor Presbyter jure non cogitur pœnitenti præcipere ut rem alteri reſtituat quam bona fide poſſidet.* Ibid.

So that when all the Doctors and all the Saints condemn a man to reſtitution, *Azor* believes that if he can but find one ſingle Caſuiſt that exempts him, he may uphold himſelf by his advice, and follow it with a ſafe conſcience as a probable opinion, without troubling himſelf about all the reſt, and conſequently oblige his own judgement. For he imagines that though a penitent declares that he hath anothers goods, and that his Confeſſor with all the Doctors believe that he ought to make reſtitution thereof; yet having one Caſuiſt for him, he is in a probable opinion upon which he may ground his conſcience; and ſo poſſeſſing in ſimplicity anothers goods, he cannot be obliged to quit them. This reſolution is without doubt very Chriſtian and very conſiderable; but the reaſon he brings for it is no leſſe. [k] *Becauſe,* ſaith he, *he who hears the confeſſion of penitents, is obliged to provide for their Salvation.* As if to incite a man to reſtore another mans goods, were not to procure his Salvation, or as if the actions of Juſtice and charity were not for Heaven, but for Hell and damnation.

[k] *Quia is qui pœnitentium confeſſiones audit coram ſaluti proſpicere debet.*

But the contradiction is yet more obſervable in the conceits of this Caſuiſt. For after he had opined in this manner in the affairs of conſcience and eternal Salvation, ſee how he ſpeaks of Phyſick, and of corporal health and life. [l] *It is demanded,* 2940

[i] *Quæritur modo an medicus contra propriam opinionem tuta conſcientia poſſit, aliorum probabilem opinionem ſecutus, medicinam graviter ægrotanti prævere, cum tamen ipſe exiſtimet eam eſſe lethalem? Reſpondeo, manifeſtum eſſe jure non poſſe medicum remedium ægroto adhibere, quando dubitat an ſit profuturum aut nociturum.* Ibid. p. 134.

ſaith he, *whether a Phyſitian may with a ſafe conſcience following the probable opinion of other Phyſitians againſt his own proper judgement, give to a man who is very ſick a medicine which he believes may kill him?* He anſwers preſently, that *it is a manifeſt thing, that it is not lawful for a Phyſitian to give to his patient a remedy whereof he doubts, whether it will ſave or kill him.* He believes then that it is not to be careſull enough of the health and life of the body, to ground it upon uncertain though probable opinions; and on the contrary, that it is not to have care enough of the eternal Salvation of the ſoul, not to be willing to eſtabliſh it upon like opinions. Who ſees not hence clearly, that the health of the body is to him more conſiderable, and more precious then the ſalvation of the ſoul, and that he underſtands well enough that it is a crime to jeopard temporal life contrary to a mans own conſcience, but it ſeems to him to be nothing to hazzard eternal life in that manner. We have ſeen, above, *Layman* to maintain this rare Doctrine.

He avows alſo that [m] *it is evident when there happen two contrary opinions, and there be alſo ſome other aſſured remedy, it is not lawful for the Phyſitian to quit the aſſured remedy, and to uſe the patient according to theſe probable opinions.* Which he proves by the rule of right, which ſaith [n] *that what is uncertain is to be quitted,* 2250 *and what is certain retained.* He had ſaid above in the ſame caſe, [o] *that in doubtfull caſes that is to be choſen which is more ſafe and certain.* He then admits this rule in temporal affairs, and acknowledges it for indubitable and viſible by the light of nature alone, and they are onely Divine things, and ſuch as concern eternal Salvation in which he will not acknowledge them, and in which he believes that it is lawful to act againſt common ſence, quitting the certain for the uncertain, and diſmiſſing that at pleaſure which ought to be preferred before all the world at once, and all the lives of the world; as if he would teſtifie that he is of the number of the children of this world, who are wiſer in their [p] affairs, then the children of light in theirs, as ſaith the Goſpel; he pretends even that theſe latter ought not be ſo wiſe in their conduct as the firſt, and that Heaven deſerves not that we ſhould take ſo much pain for it as the earth.

m *Deinde pervicuum eſt quando ſunt opiniones probables ſibi contrariæ, eſſque aliud remedium certum, tunc non eſſe medico certo poſthabito agrotanti ſecundum opiniones probabiles mederi.* Ibid.

n *Eſt enim regula juris, certum tenendum, & dimittendum incertum.*

o *Quia in dubiis tutior & certior pars eſt eligenda.* Ibid.

p *Filii hujus ſeculi prudentiores filiis lucis in generatione ſua ſunt.* Luc. c. 16. v. 8.

So that this Doctrine is not onely pernicious and corrupt, but alſo entirely unreaſonable, contrary to the light of nature and it ſelf, and proper to deprive men of vertue, piety, and common ſenſe all at once, and to conduct them at length to blindneſs and atheiſme, which may be clearly ſeen, onely by paſſing over what we have already reported hitherto, and repreſenting in an abridgement ſome capital points of this new Doctrine, reſpecting what we have expreſſely proved, and eſpecially handling therein the pernicious effects it produceth in the Church and in the World.

2690 [q] The Doctors of probability teach us that we may ſound an advice of conſcience, upon an opinion that is ſimply probable.

q *Poteſt quis facere quod probabili ratione autoritate putat licere.* Sa, verb. dubium, n. 3. d. 183.

[r] That it is a probable opinion which hath onely one ſingle Author, or one reaſon which we eſteem good, to maintain it.

r *Probabilis ſententia, uti communiter accipitur, ita definiri poteſt: Quæ certitudinem non habens, tamen vel gravi autoritate, vel non medici momenti ratione nititur.* Layman, l. 1. c. 5. p. 5.

[s] That of two probable opinions, it is lawful to follow that which we like beſt.

[t] That we may even follow that which is leſs probable and leſs ſafe, if it be more profitable or more favourable.

s & t *Quando opiniones ſunt æque probabiles, poſſumus minus tutam in agendo præferre; immo etiamſi quæ minus tuta eſt, minus probabilis habeatur,* Azor, lib. 2. cap. 16. pag. 126.

u *Doctor alteri conſulenti conſilium dare poteſt non ſolum ex propria, ſed etiam ex oppoſita aliorum ſententia, ſi hæc illi favorabilior ſeu exoptabilior ſit.* Layman, Ibid. p. 6.

u That we may follow them both in different affairs, and even in the ſame affair alſo, acting and giving contrary counſels, now after the one, and then after the other.

x *Immo arbitror à ratione nihil alienum ſore ſi Doctor conſultus ſignificet conſulenti opinionem à quibuſdam viris doctis tanquam probabilem defendi, quam proinde ſequi ipſi liceat, quamvis idem Doctor ejuſmodi ſententiam ſpeculative falſam certo ſibi perſuadeat, ut proinde ipſemet in praxi eam ſequi non poſſit.* Ibid. pag 7.

x That even when one believes aſſuredly that an opinion is falſe, and that we cannot follow it directly in the conduct of ſome perſon, we may ſend this perſon to thoſe who hold with it, and counſel him to follow their advice.

y *Satis eſt in omnibus conſtare probabiliter opinionem probabilem.* Tambur. 1. pag. l 1. cap. 3. ſect. 3. num. 8.

y That we are not obliged, that we may follow an opinion with a ſafe conſcience, to be aſſured that it is probable; but it is ſufficient to know probability, that it is probable. 2970

z *Quid ſi Confeſſarius falſa videatur opinio pœnitentis? Debet ſe accommodare, ſi à probatis autoribus probabilis reputetur.* Eſcobar, p. 28.

*Idem dicendum, &c. quamvis Confeſſarius falſam eſſe opinionem pœnitentis exiſtimet.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c 9. n. 30. p. 29.

z Finally, that even a Confeſſor is obliged to abſolve a penitent who refuſes to ſubmit to his opinion, becauſe he holds ſome other which is probable, unto which the Confeſſor ought to ſubmit himſelf, though he believe it to be falſe, and to quit his own.

It is viſible that he who can believe theſe maximes, may do, ſay, and counſel all things which he will, and all things that may pleaſe them who conſult with him, and that there can be no affair of conſcience ſo troubleſome and ſo deſperate, for which expedients may not be found, nor crimes ſo black which may not be eaſily excuſed or juſtified.

## SECT. II.

### *The opinions of other Jeſuits conformable to the proceeding for making all things probable, and to give liberty to follow all ſorts of opinions.*

I Have in a manner taken onely out of *Layman* and *Azor* what I have reported in the precedent Article; and though that might ſuffice to know the ſpirit and the maximes of the Jeſuits upon this ſubject; yet becauſe it is very important, I will not omit to repreſent alſo the thoughts of ſome other Jeſuits to make appear yet more clearly the conformity of their Doctrine, and to ſhew exactly that theſe maximes are not peculiar to ſome few amongſt them, but common to the moſt celebrate of their Body, and therefore to all their Society. 2980

a *Quo pacto quiſque gerere ſe debeat inter opiniones contrarias de rebus agendis in foro conſcientiæ?* Filliut. mor. qq. t. 1. tr. 21. c. 4. n. 125. p. 126.

*Filliutius* inquires, a *how are we to behave our ſelves in the guidance of conſciences, when we meet with two contrary opinions?* He anſwers, out of hand, that it is lawful to follow that which is more probable though it be leſs ſafe; and he adds b *that it is lawful to follow that which is leſs probable, though it be alſo leſs ſafe.* A little after he expounds what he means by a probable opinion, concluding in this manner. c *It follows* 1. *that we call that opinion probable; that is ſupported by reaſons ſufficiently conſiderable, provided notwithſtanding there be no convincing reaſon for the contrary opinion, of ſuch ſort as we cannot, nor believe any other can anſwer.*

b *Dico licitum eſſe ſequi opinionem minus probabilem, etſi minus tuta ſit.* Ibid. n. 128. c *Ex his infertur primò, opinionem probabilem dici eam quæ innitur rationibus alicujus momenti; ita tamen ut pro oppoſita nulla ſit ratio convincens, quam vel ipſe ſolvere non poſſit, vel ab alio ſolvi non poſſe ſibi perſuadeat.* Ibid. n. 133.

He requires then two conditions to make an opinion probable. *That it be founded on reaſons in ſome ſort conſiderable.* Which will be eaſie enough to meet with, there being no perſon who having formed an opinion, doth not believe but that the

reason he brings to sustain it, is good and often better then that of those who maintain the contrary.

The second condition is, [d] *that there be no convincing reason for the contrary.* This condition is no lesse easie then the former. For a reason may be convincing in respect of one man, which is not so unto another, and he who favours an opinion may find it good, when he who is of a contrary opinion may think it weak, and an obstinate person will not suffer himself to be convinced by one reason; and at worst he may easily perswade himself, that when he cannot answer solidly the reasons of his adversaries, some other more learned then he may do it. This is that *Tambourin* affirms, upon the Decalogue.

So that by these two conditions all sorts of opinions are easily made probable. For on one side those which of themselves have neither probability nor truth, nay become probable, if we can find any plausible reason to sustain them; and on the other side, a proposition most assured and best established by Tradition, by demonstration, and faith it self, will become onely probable considered by humane reason, which is this Jesuits rule to discern of probable opinions. For what reason so ever you can bring to prove it, they who know the evasions of the Schools may elude it by some distinction, or imagine that it may be eluded by some other, and so it shall not be convincing; and by consequence the proposition shall be onely probable by the definition of the Jesuits.

He pretends also that the [c] *authority of one honest and knowing man makes an opinion probable, because this authority is a foundation which is not of little consideration.* And though his Author be alone in his opinion, they hold that his opinion ceases not to be probable, provided that he believes that he hath reason to sustain it against all others; [f] *Because although we ought not easily divide from the common opinion, yet it is lawful for a learned man, if after he hath poised the grounds of the two opinions, he judge that his own though singular is the more probable.* And by consequence others may follow his advice and repose themselves on him for their Salvation, especially if they have not been Students and made profession of learning. For this Jesuit assures us, that [g] *a man who is not learned may follow the opinion of him that is, though it be a singular one. For prudence wills that he confide in his Doctrine.* He onely would have us to take heed that this Doctor so singular in his opinion be none of the ancients. So that if a man knows for certain that one or more of the ancient Doctors have heretofore held and taught publickly a proposition, it must not prevail so far with us for all that as to believe therefore that it is probable, if it be not approved by the Casuists and Divines of our times. [h] *It is not lawful,* saith he, *for one that is not well verst in moral Divinity, to follow all that he shall find in one or two ancient Doctors, if he do not know that it is also the judgement of the moderns.* He pretends then that a new Divine may make his opinion probable against the judgement of all others by his own sole authority; and that nevertheless many Doctors of the Church have not together the same credit: because as *Reginaldus*, and *Celot* after him, say in the name of all the Society, [i] *the resolution of difficulties which concern faith must be taken from the ancients, but that which concerns the life and manners of Christians ought to be taken out of the modern authors.*

This seems to be the extreamest debasement and contempt of that can be done to them whom all antiquity and the whole Church have honoured as their Fathers and Masters, not onely to defeat them of this quality, but to set them below the meanest Authors, and the last Divines of these times, to whom is given the power and authority to make an opinion probable, by their single approbation and by their single opinion, secluding that of all others, and this right is refused to the Fathers of the Church, though they be many consenting together in the same judgement, submitting them to the new Divines as their Masters and Judges; in such manner as it is not lawful to hear them, if they be not approved by the moderns. I know not

d *Ut pro opposito nulla sit ratio convincens.*

c *Infertur 2. unius Doctoris probi & docti auctoritatem opinionem reddere probabilem; quia non leve fundamentum est ejus auctoritas.* Ibid. n. 134.

f *A communi opinione non facile recedendum; viro tamen docto qui utriusque partis fundamenta perpenderit, licet, si suam, etsi singularem, probabiliorem judicet.* Ibid. n. 135.

g *unus etiam indoctus potest sequi alterius docti singularem sententiam. Confidit enim prudenter doctrinæ ejus.* Ibid.

h *Parum versato in moralibus non licet quodcunque in uno vel altero Doctore ex antiquioribus invenerit sequi, non sciat etiam à recentioribus illam sententiam tideri.* Ibid. num. 136.

i *Quæ circa fidem emergunt difficultates, ea sunt à veteribus hauriendæ: quæ vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos, à novitiis scriptoribus.*

that the hereticks have said any thing more outragious and insolent against the Fathers of the Church.

*Escobar* knows not to be more reasonable in the point of probability then his Fraternity, since he makes profession to report nothing but their opinions. He proposes this question: [k] which a Superiour and those that are under his charge are of different apprehensions, *is the inferiour bound to obey him?* The first opinion he relates is that of [l] *Salas*, *who holds that the inferiour is bound to obey always whilst he may do it without sin.* The other opinion, which he sets latter as the more probable, is that of [m] *Castro-Palao, who saith that when an inferior believes according to a probable opinion, that the command of his Superiour is unjust, or that he exceedeth the bounds of his jurisdiction, he may disobey him; because it is lawful for all men to follow a probable opinion.* 3010

k *Varietas opinionum inter superiorem & subditum adest; teneturne subditus obedire?* Escobar in præm. exam. 3. n. 31. p 30

l *Asserit Salas teneri subditum obedire quoties potest absque peccato.*

m *At Castro Palao; Quando subditus, inquit, nititur opinione probabili quod præceptum sit illicitum, vel extra superioris jurisdictionem, potest non obedire: quia unicuique fas est sequi probabilem opinionem.*

According to this maxime there will be no more Superiours in the Church nor in the World, nor obedience unto them, it being manifest that there is no subject nor inferiour who cannot easily think in himself, that the command of his Superiour is unjust, and find reasons too to perswade himself of it, and others also, or at the least meet some Casuist, who will tell him that it is probable that his Superiour hath gone beyond his power, or hath no reason to command this; and therefore he is not obliged to obey him: So the authority of all sorts of Superiours will depend on the will and the fancy of their inferiours.

He holds not onely that the priviledge of probability may dispense with an inferiour for the obedience which he owes to his Superiour, but also to elevate him above his Superiour, and to oblige the Superiour to obey his subject. He demands [n] *whether a Confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his penitent, and to quit his own which is more probable?* His answer is, *that he is obliged thereto; because the penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion, hath a right unto absolution.* So absolution and pardon of sins is no longer a grace and favour unto the sinner, according to *Escobar*, but a right; and this right is not founded on the Word of God, but upon the word of man, and upon a probable opinion, and even upon the word of a single man, who may be the Author thereof, and stand single in this opinion, according to the Jesuits. 3030

n *Tenetur pœnitentis opinionem probabilem confessarius sequi, rejecta sua probabiliori? Tenetur, quia pœnitens habet jus ad absolutionem opinioni probabili nitens.*

In procem. exam. 3. cap. 6. num. 27. dag. 25.

But as a probable opinion gives right unto a penitent to demand absolution, so it might seem that a probable opinion should give a right to a Confessor to refuse it, if he judged it neither to be his duty, nor to be in his power to give it him: But *Escobar* maintains that he is obliged to give it him, renouncing his own right as well as his opinion, to submit it to that of his penitent: [o] and if it happen that the opinion of the penitent appear not onely not probable to the Confessor, but that he also believes it assuredly false, *Escobar* wills not to refuse to comply with the will of his penitent, and that if the penitent will not submit nor abate any thing of his pretended right, the Confessor must accord to what he demands. For if he pretend to use rigour, and to passe sentence upon this difference, these new Doctors who have established themselves judges in the Church, and of the Church it self; and of the Holy Fathers, will almost all with one voice condemn him to give him absolution; and in case he fail therein; [p] *Vasquez* will declare he sinneth mortally, if he be an ordinary Confessor as are the Parish Priests; or venially, if he be a delegate, as are the Monks. And *Escobar* with others having no regard at all to this distinction, will condemn absolutely them both of mortal sins

o *Quod si confessarius falsa videatur opinio pœnitentis, debet se accommodare illi probantis autoribus probabilia retinetur.* Ibid. n. 27. p. 29.

p *Vasquez 1. 2 tom. 1. disp. 92 a. 7. n. 4. addit Confessarium non posse negantem absolutionem secundum opinionem probabilem, solum venialiter delinquere. At credidere mortaliter peccare si de mortalibus falsa constet.* Ibid. n. 27.

SECT.

## SECT. III.

### *The opinion of Sanchez concerning the probability of opinions.*

WE might produce upon this ſubject almoſt as many Authors as there are of the Society, becauſe they have in a manner all written of it, and they are all agreed in the principal queſtions; ſo important is this point in their Diviuity, of which we may ſay that it is as it were the foundation, and that there upon their Doctrine and their conduct is built. But there is none that hath more enlarged and cleared this matter, nor by conſequence who hath more diſcovered the ſpirit of the Society, then *Sanchez*: For this purpoſe I thought meet to give him a title apart.

Amongſt many maximes which he eſtabliſheth as fundamentals in this matter, this is a principal one. [a] *An opinion is probable when it is founded on ſome conſiderable reaſon; provided there be nothing to convince the contrary opinion.* From whence he draws this conſequence with *Val.* [b] *A man may hold an opinion probable, when he is perſwaded that he himſelf or ſome other can anſwer the reaſons uſed for ground thereof.* And when he is perſwaded that neither he, nor any other can anſwer the reaſons he hath againſt an opinion, [c] *He ought not to believe for all that, if it be held by others, that it is not probable, ſo that he may not follow it himſelf.* Of which he renders this reaſon, which breathes nothing but modeſty and humility, [d] *Becauſe he ought not judge of himſelf alone, that the opinion of others is not probable.*

a *Opinio probabilis eſt, quæ rationi alicujus momenti innititur; ita tamen ut pro oppoſita parte nihil convincens ſit.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 6. p. 28.

b *Tunc manere apud aliquem intra opinionis certitudinem quidpiam, quando ſibi perſuadet rationem illius ſolvi poſſe aut ab ipſomet, aut ab alio.*

c *Licet quis rationem peculiarem habeat contra oppoſitam ſententiam quam ipſe ſolvere nequit, & ſibi ſolvi non poſſe videatur; non ideo cenſere debet oppoſitam aliorum opinionem improbabilem eſſe, ut eam ſequi nequeat.*

d *Quia ſolo ſuo judicio non debet aliorum ſententiam improbabilem judicare.* Ibid.

And to make all men reſolve to paſs by all ſorts of difficulties and reaſons, how ſtrong and inſoluble ſoever they appear, he ſaith that it [e] *happens dayly that new anſwers are found to reaſons which were believed to be invincible.* And ſo although one ſingle perſon or many cannot anſwer the convincing reaſons which are given for an opinion, yet they ought perſwade themſelves that others may do it; and that ſo the contrary opinion ceaſes not to be probable, and by conſequence may be followed in conſcience.

e *Veleo maxime quod ſibi perſuadere debeat quotidie contingere ſubito inveniri ſolutionum rationum quas quis inſolubiles putabat, aut ab alio facile ſolvi.* Ibid.

So that according to this Author it is lawful to put in practice an opinion which we believe falſe and pernicious, thinking that this own judgement made thereon may poſſibly be falſe; ſo there will be nothing which can be capable to retain theſe libertine ſpirits, nor to hinder them from deſpiſing all ſorts of reaſons and lights, how clear and ſtrong indeed ſoever they be, and that by their own judgement, and after that from doing what they pleaſe.

They may extend this liberty much more eaſily to the moſt certain truths of Religion, which have not always convincing reaſons for them, becauſe they ſubſiſt only by authority and faith; and if they had, a libertine [f] *might eaſily perſwade himſwade himſelf that either he or ſome other might anſwer them.* And if he ſhould not happen on any perſon who were able to do it, he might always imagine that it was not impoſſible to meet ſome one hereafter; ſince that, as *Sanchez* ſaith, [g] *It happens dayly that we meet with anſwers unto reaſons which we believed invincible.* So theſe principles and theſe inventions are very proper to overturn all the truths of piety or Religion.

f *Sibi perſuadeat rationem illius ſolvi poſſe ab ipſomet aut ab alio.* Supra.

g *Quotidie contingere ſubito invenirs ſolutionum quas quis inſolubiles putabat, aut ab alio facile ſolvi.*

This ſame Author demands alſo, [h] *whether the authority of one ſingle Doctor who docti & probi reddat opinionem probabilem? Reſpondeo, reddere; poſſe quempiam amplecti opinionem quam à magiſtro audivit in iis quæ ad mores pertinent.* Sanch. Ibid. n. 7.

h *An auctoritas unius Doctoris*

*is learned and honeſt do make an opinion probable.* And he anſwers; *yea*, adding *that in what concerns manners, a man may hold to an opinion which he hath learned of his School-maſter and follow it.* His reaſon is the ſame with what *Azor* and *Layman* have alledged: [k] *Becauſe an opinion eſtabliſhed upon ſome foundation that is not ſleight, is probable. But the authority of a learned and pious man is no ſleight foundation.* Whence it is eaſie to conclude that there is no Jeſuit, eſpecially who are regent, amongſt them, whoſe opinion may not be followed and practiſed, how new and peculiar ſoever it appear, and be indeed: becauſe there are none of them who are not believed to have theſe two qualities of learned and pious, and to whom the Society do not attribute them.

k *Quia opinio probabilis eſt quæ non levi innititur fundamento: ita autoritas viri docti & pii non eſt leve fundamentum.*

So that when *P. Hereau* taught in the Colledge of *Clermont*, that it is lawful to kill a man ſecretly who ſlanders us, or who perſecutes us unjuſtly, his Scholars 3070
may without fear of offending God, make themſelves executors of this horrible Doctrine, though it were ſuſpected by them to be falſe, becauſe it is ſo barbarous and inhumane.

For they hold that though a Doctor or Regent ſhould be deceived by publiſhing errours for truths, we may always in conſcience follow his opinion, even when he erreth againſt Divine right. This is that which *Sanchez* maintains reſolutely againſt them who would reſtrain this liberty to errours againſt humane right or Law. [l] *I cannot approve*, ſaith he, *their reſtriction who would extend this to errours againſt humane but not Divine Law, they build upon this that we are not obliged to inquire with ſo much care the things which are of humane, as thoſe which are of Divine Law. But I cannot approve this reaſon.* And he is not content to ſay it once, but he repeats it oft, to ſhew how much this limitation diſpleaſeth him. And his reaſon is, [m] *Becauſe in theſe ſorts of things the authority of a grave and pious perſon is of great weight.* That is to ſay, that the authority of a Regent Jeſuit is great and ſtrong enough to prevail above Divine and humane right, and to carry us againſt the Law of God. And that ſo we may follow in conſcience the erroneous opinion of a Caſuiſt, though that which he permits and approves be forbidden and condemned by God in the Scripture.

l *Nec limitatio Adriani & Cordubæ, ut hoc intelligatur, ſi ſit error juris humani; ſecus ſi ſit divini: Ducunturque quia in rebus humani juris indagandis non tanta diligentia ac in rebus juris divini exigitur: ſed non placet.* Ibid. num. 7.

m *Quippe in uniſque eſt magni ponderis & momenti virigravis & pii auctoritas.* Ibid.

He alſo enquires [n] *whether it be lawful to diſſent from common opinions?* He 3080
anſwers with *Vaſquez* and *Azor* [o] *that it is lawful for a learned man and well ſtudied, and who hath examined the reaſons of both ſides, to maintain that his private opinion is more probable, and to follow it*, though he be ſingle and alone in his opinion, being otherwiſe it ſhould not be particular: [p] *Becauſe he ſeems not herein to act againſt prudence*, ſince he hath found ſome reaſon that pleaſeth him, and ſeems good unto him: which will eaſily happen to a proud ſpirit, who can have no greater pleaſure then to imagine that he ſurpaſſeth others by his ſubtilty and his wit.

n *An ab opinione communi recedere liceat?*

o *At melius Vaſquez & Azor dicunt licere viro docto qui non parum literis vacarit, & recte utriuſque partis fundamenta expenderit, ſuam ſingularem opinionem probabiliorem judicare & illam ſequi.* Ibid. n. 9. p. 29.

p *Quod in eo eventu non videatur prudenter operari.*

But this Jeſuit ſo learned in this matter, and this wiſdom of probability, diſcovers one of the principal foundations upon which it is eſtabliſhed, and from which many concluſions may be drawn, ſaying [q] *there is nothing which hinders that one and the ſame perſon may judge two opinions, directly oppoſite to be equally probable, or that the one is more then the other.* Whence he concludes in this manner: [r] *Theſe things being thus preſuppoſed, the firſt difficulty is to know whether it be lawful in conſcience, to regulate our actions by the opinion of another, when it is not ſufficiently ſafe, and which we believe onely probable, quitting our own which is more ſafe, and which we believe aſſuredly to be probable.*

q *Nihil repugnat ut duas opiniones è diametro ſibi contradicentes idem intellectus probabiles judicet, aut æque, aut alteram probabiliorem.* Ibid. num. 12. pag. 29.

r *His ita præmiſſis primo difficultas eſt an cuiquam liceat in ſuæ conſcientiæ arctis juxta alterius opinionem minus tutam quam probabilem reputat contra propriam tutiorem, & quam ſibi probabiliorem eſſe perſuadet.* Ibid. n. 13. p. 29.

He at firſt rejects many Authors who ſay that this is not lawful, and

[a] *declares that it is much more likely that it is lawful.* His reaſon is that which he hath already alledged many times, and which he repeats commonly; [b] *That he who believes an opinion probable, acting according to that opinion, ought not be condemned as raſh or imprudent.* And ſeeing it might be ſaid that this man acting againſt his own proper light, and quitting an aſſured opinion to follow one leſs ſafe, puts himſelf in danger to violate the Law of God, and indeed to offend him; which is not to act prudently: He anſwers [c] *that he expoſes not himſelf to danger of ſinning formally; that is in ſuch manner that the ſin which he commits ſhould be imputed unto him*: believing that he need not care if the Law of God be violated, and if God be diſhonoured, provided that we our ſelves be not blamed, and receive no hurt thereby.

a *At multo probabilius eſt ſicere.* n. 14.
b *Exiſtimans opinionem eſſe probabilem, juxta illam operans nec imprudenter nec temere ſe notam incurrere.* Ibid.
c *Nec ſic ſe exponit periculo peccandi formaliter; id eſt ita ut illud peccatum ei imputetur.*

The ſecond concluſion which he draws from his principles, is, [d] *that he who believes that it is more probable that we cannot in conſcience follow that of the two opinions which is leſs probable, may yet follow it himſelf, if he believe that it is alſo probable that he may follow it.* So that a man believing that he ought always follow the more probable opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the leſs probable, may notwithſtanding this perſwaſion do the contrary without ſin; and follow in effect the leſs probable, if he believe that the opinion of thoſe who hold that this may be done, is alſo probable, which will not be hard for him, or rather he cannot chooſe but believe it, if the Authors who are of contrary judgement be not evidently wicked and ignorant, ſince one honeſt and learned man alone is ſufficient to make an opinion probable.

d *Secundo deducitur contra aliquos recentiores, eum qui ita eſſet opinionem ut probabilium reputaret non licere opinionem minus probabilem ſequi, adhuc poſſe illam ſequi, ſi probabile quoque reputet licere opinionem minus probabilem ſequi.* Ibid. p. 17. p. 30.

This Doctrine is very convenient for us that we may do all that we pleaſe, giving us liberty not onely to live after our ſenſe, but alſo againſt our ſenſe and proper light, by following that of another, when it is conformable to our inclinations, that we may follow them without ſcruple, and paſſing ſo from one conduct to another, and making uſe ſometimes of one opinion ſometimes of another, to juſtifie all that which we have a ſtrong deſire to do; this Doctrine I ſay would be very commodious for this, if God had not condemned it openly in diverſe places of Scripture, where he forbids expreſſely, as we have above obſerved, to have two tongues, and to make uſe of two different weights and meaſures.

*Sanchez* declares likewiſe [e] *that it is lawful for learned perſons to give counſels againſt their own proper opinions, following thoſe of others which they believe to be probable.* Whence he by conſequence draws great advantage and great privilege for thoſe who profeſſe learning, that is without doubt for the Doctors of the Society, which is [f] *that they may give counſels one while following one opinion, and another while following the contrary.* Yet he adviſes them [g] *That it were better to follow always the ſame opinion; above all when the anſwer is in writing.* And the reaſon of this charitable advice is, *leſt they ſhould be found out and be convinced of inconſtancy and double dealing.* For the fear of God, who ſees all, is of ſmall conſideration with theſe people, and it is onely that of men which can reſtrain them. They ſcruple it not at all to play faſt and looſe with truth and conſcience, and to make uſe of doubling, and to have double opinions according to which they may give contrary advices. All their apprehenſion is *of being found out and diſcovered* in their doublings; *ne varii deprehendantur.*

e *Quarto deducitur, licite quoque viros doctos poſſe contra propriam opinionem alii conſulere, ſequendo alienam quam probabilem putant.* Ibid. n. 19.
f *Quare poterunt hi modo juxta unam, modo juxta contrariam opinionem conſulere.* n. 20.
g *Quamvis melius ſit ſemper juxta eandem, maxime in ſcriptis; Ne varii deprehendantur.*

But they have an excellent remedy to ſecure themſelves from this reproach which men may caſt upon them, which is, not to give their advice eaſily in writing; and this is alſo the advice which *Sanchez* gives his aſſociates in this matter, in which he may well paſſe for a Maſter.

Hereunto we may alſo in this matter join another, which is to anſwer one who demands counſel according to the opinion which we hold and which we teach, and

if he comply not therewith, and that the contrary opinion be more agreable unto him, to addresse him to others of the Society, who hold it and teach it. But if nevertheless they will make use of the right which they have to follow now one opinion and then another though contrary, and give counsel according to that which is less probable, to oblige those who consult them, the same *Sanchez* will advise them at least to use this precaution, [h] that giving their advice, whether it be by word, or in writing, they declare that *though the contrary opinion be more probable, yet nevertheless that which they have chosen may be followed in surety being also probable.*

h *Hæc veritas facile vitari potest, si consulens sive verbo sive scripto asserat; quamvis contraria opinio probabilior sit, hanc quoque tanquam probabilem posse amplecti.* Ibid.

There are some that affirm at least that when restitution is in debate, or some case which respects Justice, it is not lawful to follow the more large, and withal the 3120
less probable and secure opinion, because this were to do wrong to him unto whom restitution should be made. But *Sanchez* pretends that [i] *without standing upon this exception it is generally lawful, and without distinction to follow the lesse probable opinion, and to counsel others to follow it*, citing *Vasquez*, *who saith expressely that this is true in all sorts of matters.*

i *At jure optimo omnes alii Doctores n. 14. allegati aliique prædicta limitatione indistincte tradunt licere opinionem minus probabilem amplecti, ac eam consulere, ut expresse Vasquez 1. 2. q. 19. a. 6. d. 63. c. 1. initio dicit in omni materia id procedere.* Ibid. n. 22.

k *Sicut Judex fori externi tenetur sententiam juxta probabiliorem opinionem ferre, ita bi consulere.* Ibid.

One of the reasons of them that hold the contrary, is, that [k] *as a judge who exerciseth outward justice, is obliged to judge according to the more probable opinion; so the Doctors are obliged to do the same in giving counsel.* To which *Sanchez* answers, [l] *that there is great difference betwixt him that exercises outward justice, and he who exercises the inward: because the first is judge between the parties, and is established by the commonwealth to judge that which he believes to be most reasonable; but the second is a Judge at the tribunal of penance, to judge, as a Physitian, not betwixt parties, but betwixt Man and God.* All this is more proper to destroy his opinion then to confirm it. For if a Judge who renders Justice before men, be obliged to follow that which he believes to be more equitable, how much more is a Confesser and judge of consciences, who ought to follow justice and verity with so much more care and exactness, because the good of consciences and salvation of souls is without 3130
comparison more important, and ought to be more religiously preserved then all outward things: if the tribunal of men require so perfect Justice, how much more perfect ought that to be of the tribunal of conscience, which is the tribunal of God himself, where the Priest judges as holding the place of God and of Jesus Christ, who is justice and truth it self. But if we consider him in the quality of a Physitian as doth *Sanchez*, this quality it self obliges us by his proper principles to follow the opinions that are more safe and more united unto truth, since he avows that Physi- 31
tians are obliged always to embrace this sort of opinions, and to forsake the less probable and more uncertain.

l *Estque latum discrimen inter Judicem fori externi & interni; quod ille sit Judex inter partes, & ita constitutus à Republica, ut secundum id quod magis æquum reputat, sententiam ferat. At hic est in foro pœnitentiæ Judex, quod judicium est medicinale, nec inter partes, sed inter Deum & hominem.* Ibid.

Finally, if humane Judges be obliged to search out and follow that which is most just, and most safe, because they are Judges betwixt party and party, who sees not that the Confessors and Pastours of souls are obliged to the same thing by the same reason, since being Judges betwixt God and Man, they are also Judges betwixt party and party? For to imagine that God and Man are not true parties in this interiour judgement, were no other then to pretend that the judgement of penance is no true nor proper judgement; nor act of jurisdiction, against the definition of the Council of *Trent*, it being clear that a judgement cannot be but betwixt two parties. So that it must needs be that there are truly and properly two parties in the 3140
Sacrament of penance, or else there is not any proper and true judgement. It is also true by the consent of all Catholicks, that God is both at once Judge and party in this Divine tribunal against the Sinner, and that his infinite Justice is the cause that these two things are not incompatible with him, as they are amongst men, but

they rather are inſeparable, ſince he always in all ſorts of ſins is the firſt offended and the firſt Judge; unleſs haply it be ſo that the Jeſuits think that God is no party at all, becauſe they ſee him not appear before their Tribunals, and becauſe they find no body preſent himſelf to ſpeak for him, and maintain his rights and intereſts againſt thoſe who confeſſe themſelves unto them, and who conſult them. And thence it comes to paſs that they are ſo complacent and ſo eaſie to graunt upon their ſimple petition all that they demand, as if there were no parties, and their affairs were all matters of favour, and abſolutely depending on their good grace and pleaſure whom they take for their Judges.

*Sanchez* ſaith in his following diſcourſe, which we have now examined. [a] *That it is ſufficient for a Confeſſor, and for a Doctor who is conſulted, to reconcile the penitent and reſtore him to good terms with God.* But this ſtands in no ſtead, becauſe he cannot make this reconcilation, but by obſerving the Laws of Juſtice, and condemning the ſinner by an equitable judgement, which according to himſelf ought always to follow that which is moſt conformable to reaſon and equity in humane and temporal affairs, and by much ſtronger reaſon in Divine and eternal, which ought to be without compariſon more juſt and regular.

a Sat eſt Confeſſario & Doctori conſulto efficere ut in ordine ad Deum conſulens recte componatur. Ibid.

*Sanchez* fifth concluſion is, [b] *that a man who is accuſtomed to conſult divers Doctors until he meets ſome one who anſwers him according to his deſire, and who is reſolved to continue this practice, hath his conſcience ſecured ſo long as he doth this with a good intention; that is to ſay, to know if the opinion which favours him be probable.* He would ſay, that if this man had no other intention then ſimply to content his luſt, he ſhould do ill; but becauſe he hath a deſign to do it by way of probability, in finding out ſome one who might tell him, not what he ought, but what he would do, is probable; *donec aliquem ſibi ad libitum reſpondentem inveniat*: he is innocent and without reproach; [c] *becauſe every one, ſaith he, hath a right to maintain his right, and to look out reaſons for it.*

b Quinto deducitur quid in ea quæſtione dicendum ſit; an in conſcientia tutus ſit habens uſum & propoſitum varios Doctores conſulendi, donec aliquem ſibi ad libitum ſuum reſpondentem inveniat?

Quando recta inveſtigandi ratio, an ea opinio ſibi ſequens ſit probabilis. Ibid. n. 24. c Quia unicuique jus eſt jus ſuum protegendi, & ad id rationes quærendi. Ibid.

He pretends then that every one hath a right to deſire that what flatters his luſt ſhould be probable, and to find out ſome one who may tell him that it is probable, or who may make it probable: according to this it ſhall be lawful for all men to ſeek out approvers of their moſt unreaſonable thoughts and motions; and provided they find but one alone, as there are always complaiſant perſons to be found, and eſpecially for the great and rich, it ſhall be lawful for them to do what they will, when they are yet condemned by all others, becauſe according to the Jeſuits one alone is ſufficient to make an opinion probable.

*Sanchez* ſeventh concluſion is the anſwer which he gives to this queſtion, [d] *whether a Confeſſor may abſolve a penitent againſt his own opinion?* To make this queſtion more clear, he propoſes it in this example: [e] *As if a Confeſſor judge a contract to be uſurarious; and the penitent on the contrary believe probably that it is lawful, and will proceed in it.* He ſaith at firſt that there are ſome who hold that an ordinary Confeſſor, as a Pariſh Prieſt, may againſt his own proper opinion abſolve this man, and that it is not lawful for an extraordinary Confeſſor. But he anſwers after that [f] *both the one and the other may do it.*

d Septimo deducitur quid de Confeſſario dicendum: an contra propriam opinionem poſſit pœnitentem abſolvere? Ibid. n. 27.

e ut ſi Confeſſarius judicet contractum eſſe uſurarium: ſi pœnitens probabiliter eſſe licitum, & velit illum inire. Ibid. n. 28.

f Dicendum eſt utrumque poſſe. Ibid.

It is farther demanded whether they be both obliged ſo to do? To which he anſwers with the ſame boldneſs, maintaining [g] *that both the one and the other of theſe Confeſſors is obliged to abſolve his penitent after he hath heard his confeſſion.* His reaſon is: [h] *Becauſe the order of Juſtice requires that as the penitent is obliged to obey the Confeſſor, when he commands juſt and reaſonable things; ſo the Confeſſor is obliged*

g Dicendum eſt, utrumque teneri abſolvere poſtquam confeſſionem audivit. Ibid. n. 24.

h Recta enim judicii ratio petit, ut ſicut pœnitens confeſſori recte præcipienti obedire tenetur: ita confeſſarius recte diſpoſitum tenetur abſolvere, qualis eſt ſequens opinionem probabilem. Ibid.

*to abſolve the penitent, when he is well diſpoſed, as he is when he follows a probable opinion.*

And he believes that the Confeſſor is in ſuch manner obliged to abſolve this penitent, that if he fail therein, he ſins ſometimes mortally; and when that happens not, his fault is always great and dangerous, the thing being of great conſequence, according to the opinion of *Vaſquez* and *Suarez*, [i] *which he approves, being perſwaded by their reaſon, and becauſe the penitent will have juſt cauſe to complain greatly of him, for that being well diſpoſed and confeſſed, abſolution was refuſed him. Neither can this his fault, being contrary to the inſtitution of the Sacraments and Office of a Confeſſor, be little.* 3170

[i] *Et ita credo eſſe, quia ratio propoſita ita ſuadet, ac graviter conqueri jure optimo pœnitens poteſt, quod ſibi bene diſpoſito, auditaque ejus confeſſione, abſolutio denegetur. Nec levis videtur culpa inſtitutionis Sacramenti ac confeſſoris muneri contraria.* Ibid. n. 24.

Upon this account the holy Fathers and the firſt Paſtors of the Church had committed many mortal ſins, in refuſing abſolution to many penitents who could not want probable reaſons to maintain againſt them, that they were well diſpoſed; unleſs perhaps the Doctrine of probability being not yet ſtarted in thoſe times, the penitents were not ſo well inſtructed then as they may be now, to maintain and defend their rights and Priviledges which this Doctrine giveth them againſt their Confeſſors, and to oblige them to renounce their own judgement ſupported by the authority of all the Doctors ancient and modern, to ſubmit to the private opinion of the penitent, provided that it be probable, and to do for them, and let them do themſelves what they pleaſe.

*Eſcobar* is yet more reſolute upon this point then *Sanchez*. For ſaying that *Vaſquez* holds that if the Confeſſor be a Monk or ſome other delegate, and not ordinary, he ſins in this caſe but venially; he is not of his opinion; and he maintains, with others, that abſolutely and without any exception at all, [k] *he ſins mortally, if the penitent in his confeſſion have mentioned any mortal ſins.*

[k] *At crediderim mortaliter peccare, ſi de mortalibus facta confeſſio.* Eſcob. in procem. exam. 3. c. 6. n. 27. p. 29.

If any dared to ſay that a Phyſitian is obliged to follow the opinion of his patient, though he believe his own to be better and more proper to cure his diſeaſe, he would be condemned of folly by all the world. How then dares any ſay that a Confeſſor is obliged to be leſs ſincere and leſs faithful in the conduct of ſouls, whom he ought to heal of their ſins? It muſt needs be of neceſſity that as theſe Doctors aſſure us that ſecular Juſtice ought to be more exact and more fixed to truth in the Judgement, it makes in temporal things, then the ſacred Juſtice of the myſteries of Jeſus Chriſt, in the diſpenſation of Spiritual Wealth and eternal Truths, on which depends the Salvation of ſouls. So likewiſe they muſt aſſert that the Phyſick of ſouls ought not to be ſo rational, ſo juſt, and fixed upon their true good, as thoſe of the body. 3180

*Sanchez* proceeds yet farther, and ſaith, that the Confeſſor ſins mortally or dangerouſly if he abſolve not his penitent in ſubmitting to his opinion, [l] *Though he is perſwaded that it is falſe,* [m] *when the penitent is learned or inſtructed in the probability of the opinion which he maintains againſt him.*

[l] *Imo dicendum eſt contra Manuelem n. 28. allegatum, quamvis Confeſſarius falſam eſſe opinionem pœnitentis exiſtimet,* [m] *Tandem huc uſque dicta locum habent quando pœnitens eſt doctus, vel ab aliis inſtructus de probabilitate opinionis quam ſequitur.* Sanch. l. 1. c. 9. n. 30. p. 31.

But if the penitent be ignorant, and know not that his opinion is probable, ſome believe that the Confeſſor ought not give him abſolution in that eſtate, unleſs he be upon the point of death, in which caſe they think that he ought to inſtruct him, declaring to him that his opinion is probable, for fear that he not knowing it ſhould dye impenitent.

[n] *Tunc enim ait Salas eſſe inſtruendum de opinionis probabilitate, ne in malo ſtatu decedat.* Ibid. n. 31.

But *Sanchez* believes that this is alſo too ſevere and unjuſt, and he repeats it, ſaying: 3190

saying: p *As for me I am perswaded that even when he is not in this extremity, he ought to instruct him, and make him know that his opinion is probable.* He builds upon this that he ought to consider the Salvation and good of his penitent, who otherwise may despise his Confessor, and do contrary to that which he hath ordained, loving rather to follow his own proper sence and passion, then to subject himself unto the advice of his Confessor: or at least take counsel of some other for the savegard of his conscience: which he pretends the q Confessor may redresse by teaching him, that the opinion which he maintains so obstinately and without any reason, since he knows it not to be probable, is yet held by some Divines.

He believes also that the [a] Confessor is obliged by his office, and by the Law of Charity which he owes his neighbour and penitent, to give him this charitable advice, this making one part of the obligation which he hath to procure his weal and Salvation; and that he is not to stay until his penitent himself demand it, but that he is obliged to prevent him, when he sees him in danger to fall into sin; as it would happen in this case, where he sees his penitent wholly resolved to despise his advice by mere obstinacy, and being bent to follow his own judgement, and to do what he list in despight of him; [b] As if seeing the sinner addicted to his own sence, disobedient, and too obstinate in his disobedience, the Confessor ought or could judge that he is in a good estate and well disposed to be reconciled unto God; or as if he
3200 could hope to put him out of this wicked disposition and obstinacy by acknowledging and declaring unto him, that what he maintains against him is reasonable and may be probably maintained, and that he is ready to give way to him. On the contrary it will come to pass that if he comport himself in this manner, in stead of removing from him this indisposition, he will augment it in him, there being nothing more proper to make a man yet more obstinate and more insolent; and to confirm him in his wicked opinions, then therein to approve and follow him: and by consequence this man shall continue to remain in an incapacity of receiving absolution, since he persists in one of the greatest sins, and one of the worst dispositions of sinners, which is a resolution to oppose himself to his Confessor without reason, and of mere obstinacy and blinde passion, if the Confessor do not come over to his opinion.

p *Verùm ego existimo etiam extra hanc fatum eam informandum.* Ibid. n. 31.

q *Quod Confessor vitabit si pœnitentem admoneat.*

a *Tunc quia Confessor tenetur ex officio bonum pœnitentis procurare, illi que consulere illum admonendo: tum quia lex charitatis obligat ad peccatum proximi vitandum.* Ibid. n. 31.

b *Cum in ejusmodi peccati perpetrandi periculo videt Confessor eum constitutum, cum pertinacem eum videat.* Ibid.

*Sanchez* proposeth also another question in the matter of the Sacraments, which he resolveth according to the same principles. The question is, [c] *if in the matter of the Sacraments it be lawful to rule ones self by the opinion which is less probable and less safe, when the validity of the Sacrament is in question.* He answers in reporting the opinion and reasons of them who maintain that this is not lawful; but he pre-
3210 tends [d] *that though what they say is probable, yet it is more probable that in the administration of the Sacraments it is lawful to rely upon an opinion which is less probable, leaving that which is safe and more probable, notwithstanding the danger of rendring the Sacrament null.*

c *Octavo deducitur quid in ea quæstione dicendum sit: An licitum sit in Sacramentorum administratione uti opinione minus probabili & minus tuta, quando de Sacramenti valore agitur?* Ibid. n. 32 p. 32.

d *Quamvis tamen hoc probabile sit, existimo tamen probabilius esse licere in Sacramentorum administratione uti opinione minus probabili, relicta probabiliori ac tuta, non obstante irritandi Sacramenti periculo.* Ibid. n. 33

He requires onely two conditions. The first is, that here in nothing be done outwardly against the custom and ordinary manner of administring the Sacraments. The second is, that it be not prejudicial to the salvation of our Neighbour. For in these cases that more safe opinion ought to be followed: out of these two cases he declares that it is lawful to put the Sacrament in hazzard, and administer it in an uncertain manner, onely to have the satisfaction of putting in practice a probable opinion, making less accompt of the validity of a Sacrament, and of the respect which is due unto the Sacred Mysteries and the blood of Jesus Christ, then of the goods and advantages of private men, and of the customs and outward forms which they observe in the administration of the Sacraments, as if it were more evil to offend the eyes of men, then those of Angels and God himself, who sees the Sacrament made void by the sleightness and rashness of the Minister.

But he makes one exception worth the noting. [c] *We muſt except*, ſaith he, *from this rule the caſe in which the opinions differ about the juriſdiction of a Prieſt for hearing of confeſſions; when one probable opinion holds he hath this juriſdiction, and the other which is more probable, denyeth it. For in this caſe the Prieſt ſins not at all in hearing confeſſions.* It may here be queſtioned whether the ſame charity towards his neighbour, which made him before eſtabliſh the rule which he propoſed, have made him alſo to adjoin this exception to the ſame rule. But if this be not clear enough by his anſwer, it will appear with advantage by his reaſon, which is [f] *that an errour which hath taken its original from a probable opinion, and which in conſequence thereof is become common, is ſufficient to authorize and make valid all that which the Prieſt doth.* That is to ſay, that a falſe opinion and an errour in the fact and practice, may ſerve for a rule and foundation to the conduct of Chriſtians when it is by uſe, or rather by abuſe, paſt into a cuſtom. The Son of God ſaith that it is truth that delivers men, and this Jeſuit will have that errour and falſehood may deliver them from their ſins and ſave them. 3220

[c] *Excipitur tamen ab hac regula quando opiniones circa juriſdictionem Sacerdotis ad audiendas confeſſiones vertuntur: atque opinio probabilis docet illum habere; probabilior autem negat. Talis enim Sacerdos nullo modo peccabit audiendo confeſſiones.* Ibid. n. 35.

[f] *Quia communis error ex probabili opinione ortus, ſatis eſt ad geſtorum per eum Sacerdotem valorem.* Ibid.

He adjoins alſo this other reaſon: [g] *that in confeſſions he that accuſes himſelf of mortal ſins accuſeth himſelf alſo of venial. Now it is certain that every Prieſt hath juriſdiction of venial ſins; and by conſequent the penitent for his part putting no bar, and the Prieſt on his part having an aſſured juriſdiction of one part of the matter, he is aſſured that the confeſſion will be valid; albeit the Prieſt have no juriſdiction over mortal ſins, they ſhall be nevertheleſs remitted indirectly and by accident, in vertue of the abſolution which he ſhall give for venials, and the penitent ſhall be diſpenſed from a new confeſſion, his ignorance ſufficing for his excuſe, becauſe it is juſt and reaſonable, being built upon a probable opinion, which is the cauſe he believes that the Prieſt who abſolveth him, hath a right and true juriſdiction.* 3230

[g] *Tum etiam quoniam in confeſſionibus ſemper quiſpiam fatetur aliqua venialia cum mortalibus. At quilibet Sacerdos certam in venialia juriſdictionem habet: & ideo cum penitens non ponat obicem, & ſit certa juriſdictio in aliquam materiæ partem, erit certum confeſſionis valor. Et quamvis careat ille juriſdictione in mortalia, ea indirecte & per accidens vi tutæ illius abſolutionis remittuntur, atque excuſabitur pœnitens ab eis iterum confitendis ratione juſtæ ignorantiæ, eo quod juxta probabilem opinionem credatur vera Sacerdotis illius juriſdictio.* Ibid.

The Prieſt is in an errour, as he now ſaid, and the penitent ignorant, and yet he believes that the Prieſt gives abſolution, and the penitent receives truly the remiſſion of his ſins, marvellous force of errour and ignorance, or rather of probability, and of an opinion probable in appearance onely, which gives ſuch vertue to errour and ignorance.

Nothing can be ſpoken more to purpoſe to conclude that there needs no approbation nor juriſdiction of Biſhops and ordinaries to confeſſe; and this is that which *Sanchez* regards and pretends in his exception rather then the good and ſalvation of ſouls. For if this be truth, which he ſaith, the Monks without having recourſe to Biſhop or Pope, may of themſelves take liberty to confeſſe in all things and all ſorts of perſons. They need onely command their regents to teach that without this their abſolution may be valid. For ſo this opinion becoming probable, it will become lawful. So that putting themſelves afterwards into poſſeſſion, they will acquire ſome right, and the opinion whereupon this right ſhall be founded, though falſe, continuing to be taught by others ſhall become common as well as the poſſeſſion, and in progreſſe of time this inveterate and publick errour will ſuffice to juſtifie and make valid all that they ſhall do in purſuance of this rule: [h] *That an errour which hath taken its original from a probable opinion, and ſo is become common, ſufficeth to authoriſe and make valid that which a Prieſt doth.* 3240

[h] *Quia communis error ex probabili opinione ortus, ſatis eſt ad geſtorum per Sacerdotem valorem.* Sanchez, op. mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p. 32.

After all this, though their opinion were the falſeſt in the world, and they were aſſured of it themſelves, though they have neither juriſdiction nor approbation, nor priviledges, they would not for all that ceaſe to believe that they have liberty

to confeſſe all ſorts of perſons; becauſe that in the moſt depraved conſciences, and the greateſt ſins that can be confeſſed unto them, they may always find with eaſe ſome one which is venial, for which there will be no need of approbation, every Prieſt having power to abſolve them, and the abſolution which he ſhall give for them will extend it ſelf alſo to the others how great and enormous ſoever they may be. All this is the argumentation of *Sanchez*, which I do onely rehearſe and reduce, to make it the more clear.

After this we muſt acknowledge that the Jeſuits are very ſober and temperate in their learning, that they uſe not all the power which their Divinity gives them, and that they give great teſtimony of their religious modeſty, and of the eſteem they have for the Pope and the Biſhops when they preſent themſelves before them to demand their privileges, or their approbations to take confeſſions, it being in their power to attempt and do it themſelves, without ſpeaking to them thereof at all.

And this licence belongs not onely unto them but unto all Prieſts, whether they be Monks or not. For all Prieſts as well as they having power to give abſolution for
1250 venial ſins, may all alſo abſolve of mortals which are confeſſed with venial, and ſo the abſolution which they ſhall give for the greateſt crimes that are without approbation of the ordinaries, ſhall be valid, and they that have confeſſed them ſhall be thereof truly abſolved, and ſhall not be oblig'd to repeat their confeſſions.

Which is wholly to overturn the order of the Church, and of the Sacrament of Penance, to expoſe it to the moſt profane and ſacrilegious hands of the moſt wicked Miniſters, and to aboliſh abſolutely all the authority of the Biſhops, and of the Pope himſelf, in what concerns the adminiſtration of this Sacrament.

From matters of Divinity *Sanchez* paſſeth to thoſe of Phyſick and Law, applying to Judges and Phyſitians that which we have now ſaid of the probability of opinions. He puts this queſtion about Phyſick. [a] *When the opinions of Phyſitians are divided concerning the remedies which are to be applyed to a ſick patient, ſo that there be not a certain one; it is inquired whether a Phyſitian may make uſe of a Medicine according to a leſs probable opinion?* He propoſeth firſt the opinion of ſome that ſay that a Phyſician may in this caſe follow the leſs probable opinion. But after he had reported the contrary opinion which holds that this is not lawful, he ſaith, [b] *that he eſteemeth this laſt opinion more true; not that the Phyſitian doth any injury, or anything contrary to the obligation of his duty, in making uſe of this probable opinion, but becauſe*
1260 *he fails of the charity which is due unto his neighbour in his need, which wills that we ſhould ſuccour him by the moſt ſafe way and remedy that is poſſible for us.* Which confirms what we ſaid above, that it muſt needs be, according to his opinion, that the health of the body ſhould be a thing more precious then the Salvation of the ſoul, and that he eſteems the Phyſitians to be obliged to be more charitable and more circumſpect then Prieſts and Paſtors of Souls, ſince he believes that Phyſitians ought to follow the more probable opinion, and to give to the ſick the moſt aſſured remedies they can, by the Law of charity to our neighbour who demands it; *qui petit ut certiori medicamento quo poſſumus ei ſubveniamus.* Whereas he pretends that Confeſſors and Paſtors of ſouls are not obliged at all thereto, and that they may conduct men by an opinion which they believe leſs probable and leſſe ſafe, as hath been clearly proved by his own words.

[a] *Quando ſunt dubia & varia Medicorum judicia circa remedia quæ ægro ſunt adhibenda, ita ut non ſit unum certum, ſed varia inter Medicos opiniones verſentur circa medicamenta illo morbo applicando; an liceat medicamento uti juxta opinionem quam minus probabilem credit?* Ibid. n. 40. p. 33.

[b] *Exiſtimo hanc ſententiam veriorem eſſe, non quod ſit contra obligationem juſtitiæ ex medici officio debitam, uti opinione illa probabili, ſed contra charitatem debitam proximo indigenti exhibendam, quæ petit ut certiori medicamento quo poſſumus ei ſubveniamus.* Ibid. n. 41.

As for Judges when the right of the parties is not clear and certain, and when it happens that the Doctors are of different advice about the interpretation and ſence of the Law, the opinion of *Sanchez* is, [c] *that when the one opinion is as probable as the other, it is more apparent that it is in the power of the Judge to chuſe which he*
1270 *pleaſeth, and to follow it in his judgement.* So that, according to this Divinity, the

[c] *Quando utraque opinio eſt æque probabilis, verius eſt integrum eſſe judici quam maluerit opinionem eligere, & ſecundùm eam judicare.* Ibid. n. 45.

Judges shall have great power to oblige their friends, since all affairs almost may easily be made probable in the manner they order and handle them now a days; and he adds that which follows upon his principle, d *That he may, if it give no scandal, judge one while according to one opinion, and an other while according to another opinion.* For if he may choose of two probable opinions that which he pleaseth, It follows thence that he may follow sometimes the one and sometimes the other, according as it shall please him. Which is evidently to make Justice altogether arbitrary, and to expose it to the avarice and passion of wicked Judges, the advice which he gives to avoid scandal, is only to counsel them that they take heed that men do not perceive this unjust licence, because they would thereby be scandalized, fearing more that men should be offended then Justice and Truth.

d Imo cessante scandalo nunc secundum unam, nunc secundum aliam.

He is more troubled to resolve what the Judge is to do when one of the two opinions is more probable then the other. He cites some Authors who in this very case give to the Judge power to pronounce according to what he likes best, and even to follow that which he believes to be less probable; and to prove their opinion he lends them a reason of which he oftentimes made use before in like cases about other matters; e *Because a Judge doth not herein behave himself rashly or imprudently, finding himself as he doth by a probable opinion.* Which obligeth him to approve the opinion of these Authors, though he dares not follow it: f *Because though it be probable, yet he believes it to be more probable, that a Judge is obliged to Judge according to the more probable opinion.* 3280

e Quia nec temere nec imprudenter agit, utpote qui ratione probabili ducitur. Ibid. n. 46.

f Quamvis autem hoc sit probabile; & probabilius judex non tenetur sententiam ferre juxta oppositam probabilem. Ibid. n. 47.

There are none therefore but Casuists and directors of consciences alone that are absolutely exempt from this obligation. It is of them alone that we are to understand that which Filiutius said above; g *It is lawful to follow the less probable opinion though it be the less safe.* And it is to them only that we are to referre all those maximes and conclusions which we have seen him and his fraternity draw from this principle. And though in this they favour indeed also those of other professions, in fixing them more unto truth and Justice, and leaving them less liberty to depart from it, yet it is not this they regard particularly; their principal design is to favour themselves, in giving to themselves a power to dispose of the power of Jesus Christ, of his ministry, of the consciences and Salvation of men according to their fancy, and to do in the Church whatsoever they please, without considering that there is no greater misery then to love licence, and to be able to do what one will against justice and truth.

g Licitum est sequi opinionem minus probabilem, etiamsi minus tuta sit.

ARTICLE

## II. POINT.

### *The pernicious consequences and effects of the Jesuits Doctrine of probability.*

IF the Tree may be known by its fruit, and if a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, as Jesus Christ saith in the Gospel, we may confidently affirm that
3290 the Doctrine of probability is the most dangerous that ever appeared in the Church and in the world, because it overturns all things in them both.

There is no Chapter in this book that proves not this truth; but because it is important, and that there are, it may be, many persons that will hardly believe it, and will not easily observe it, through the whole extent of this treatise; I will represent here some of the principal proofs of the pernicious consequences and unhappy effects of this Doctrine.

1. It favours and nurses up weak and disorderly persons in their mistakes and disorders, sinners and libertines in their bad courses, hereticks in their heresies, and Pagans in their infidelity.

2. It teaches to elude the Commandments of God and the Church, and it overturns Laws Civil, Ecclesiastick, and Divine.

3. It destroys the authority of Princes over their Subjects, of Pastors of the Church over the Faithful, of Fathers over their children, Masters over their Servants, of Superiours in Religious Orders over their Inferiours, and generally of all Superiours over their Inferiours.

4. It introduces independence, and leads to irreligion.

5. It cannot be destroyed nor hindred from having course in the world, if it be
3300 once therein received and taught.

Every one of these points are handled largely enough in diverse places of this Book, where may be seen the passages of the Jesuits Authors which I have cited for their verification. Wherefore to avoid repetitions, I shall often only give a short touch here, as I passe, of what they say upon the most part of these points, relating upon the rest some other new passages of their Authors. I will also serve some out of one of their principal and most faithful disciples and partakers, *Caramuel* by name. This is the onely exception to be found in all this work, of my design which I have to rehearse onely the Authors of the Society; if yet in this it can be said that I depart from my design, since it is still onely the Jesuits that speak by the mouth of one of their disciples, who doth nothing but deduce and explicate their opinions. But if sometimes he seem to be transported, and to expatiate too far in the license of their Doctrine, he draws always his conclusions from their Doctrines, and he often supports them by their very reasons; and in all the liberty of his stile and spirit, he advances nothing but what is comprised and contained in the maximes of the Society, which I have represented in the preceding Articles.

It had not been hard for me to have drawn the very same consequences with him. But besides that I make some scruple to aggravate or publish the mischief before it appeares and breaks forth of its own accord, it goes sometimes to such an excesse that it seems incredible, if they themselves who are the Authors thereof did not
3310 both own and publish it. And this hath caused me to take this disciple of the Jesuits for the interpreter of their opinions, as being proper to represent most clearly and most surely the pernicious effects of their Doctrine of probability. But because the matter is of great extent, I will divide them into several Paragraphs, according to the points I even now observed.

SECT.

## SECT. I.

### *That the Jesuits Doctrine of probability favours disorderly persons, libertins, and infideles.*

1. IT favours weak and disorderly persons, and nuzzles them in their looseness, because, according to the rules of this probability, there is no person of any condition who may not easily be excused of the most part of his duties general and particular, continue to live in his disorder and in the abuse which the corruption of the age hath introduced, and exempt himself from alms, from fasting, and from other good works which he may and ought to do, according to the order of God and the Church, that he might come out of his weaknesses and disorders, since these holy exercises are the strength and nourishment of the faithful soul.

But all these proofs and others also which might be produced upon this point, are contained in one sole maxime of the Jesuits Divinity, reported by one of their chiefest disciples and defendours: "*That all probable opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other, but the more pleasant although they be less probable are always more profitable and more safe by accident.*" That is to say, because of their sweetness which renders them more easie, more proportionable to the inclinations of men, and more favourable to their interest and softness. And it is pretended that they are more safe because they never fail to be received by the men of the world, as more profitable to their lusts and temporal interests, though they ruine their conscience and salvation.

a *Omnes opiniones probabiles sunt pereque tutæ ac securæ; benigniores etsi aliquando sint minus probabiles, per accidens sunt semper utiliores & securiores.* Caramuel, Comment. in Reg. S. Bened. l. 1. d. 67. n. 58. Item Theol. fundam. p. 134.

After this there remains nothing to be added to favour those persons who love their disorders but one, which is, "*that they may be in a resolution to consult many Doctors, until they can find some one who answers them according to their desire.*" Escobar after he had left his Readers at liberty, to follow either the affirmative or the negative, saith, "*that he holds for certain that it is lawful.*"

b *Licet & non licet fovere propositum varios adeundi Doctores, donec inveniam mihi qui ad libitum respondeat.* Escobar. Theol. Mor. l. 2. sect. 2. c. 6. Probl. 7. c. *Idem habet comitum.*

2. This same Doctrine favours and nourisheth sinners and libertines in their wicked estate, securing them that they are not obliged to leave it, and turn unto God but at the point of death; and that at that time it sufficeth to demand pardon of God, and that to obtain it there needs no more then to say that we are sorry for offending him, in endeavouring to stirre up himself to a regret for his sins; but if he cannot have the sorrow which he desires, and which is necessary, it is enough to desire it, that absolution supplyes this default; and that if he have not the convenience even to confess himself, provided he doth what he can, God will supply the want of absolution and all the rest.

d *Cum Confessarius audit confessionem hominis in extremis positi, vel ob ægritudinem, vel quia mox* [illegible] *punitendus à Judice, non curet de proposito non peccandi in posterum, sed solum doleat de contractis peccatis. Difficile est enim ab hujusmodi hominibus in peccatis emeritis verum de cætero non peccandi propositum capere. Cum enim non restet vivendum de futuro, ad quod tempus propositum ordinatur? Nulla est necessitas quæ conscientiam premat ad talem affectum promendum.* Id docet Suarez, tom. 4. disp. 4. sect. 3. a. 5. e. *Sicut enim periculosum est hominibus de rebus humanis affectis & honori deditis, petere propositum non vindicandi ipsis illatam injuriam. ita propositum non peccandi, si vita duraret, haud petendum est ab his qui ad peccandum proclives fuerunt. Restat enim in his qui si scirent duraturam vitam, nec confiterentur, nec mores mutarent.* Petrus Michael de Sanroman Soc. Jesu expeditionum spiritualium Soc. Jesu, l. 5. c. 7. p. 78.

an ambitious perſon not to revenge himſelf; knowing that as the affection which this man hath to the world and to his honour will not permit him eaſily to pardon and forget injuries which are done him, ſo the cuſtom and inclination which that man hath unto ſin holds his will ſo bound and captive, that he cannot ſo much as ſay ſeriouſly and truly that he is reſolved to forſake it, being alſo ſtill ſo diſpoſed, that if he hoped to live longer, he would neither think of confeſſion nor of changing his life.

3. That which conduces very much to nouriſh wicked men in their licentiouſneſs, and weak ones in their ſoftneſs, is, that neither of them will take any pains nor labour to part from evil, or to confirm themſelves in any good; which yet is neceſſary, ſince our Saviour tells us in the Goſpel, that there are none but thoſe who uſe this violence upon themſelves that ſhall obtain Heaven, and that the way which leads thither, as well as the gate which lets in thereto, is ſtrait; ſo that of neceſſity we muſt ſtrive to enter thereinto, and join vigilance unto conſtant labour to run thither faithfully unto the end.

The Jeſuits divert men very far from this way, when they repreſent it very large and ſo eaſie to find and hold, that it can hardly be miſt; becauſe according to them whatſoever a man believes or doth following ſome probable opinion, he always goes on ſafely towards Heaven, and that the moſt pleaſing and large opinions lead men thither more ſafely then others. Which is not onely proper to nouriſh the wicked in their naughtineſs, and the weak in their looſeneſs; but to weaken the ſtrongeſt, and make them indifferent and careleſs, who proceed with the greateſt courage and fidelity in the ſervice of God.

*Eſcobar* conſidering the commodiouſneſs which this Doctrine of probability gives to men to ſave themſelves without labour, and in doing what they will, tranſported with aſtoniſhment and joy, ſpeaks in theſe terms: [f] *When I ſee ſuch ſtore of different opinions in Chriſtian morality, it ſeems to me that the Divine providence doth herein lighten with brightneſs: becauſe that by means of this variety of opinions we may bear the yoke of Chriſt more ſweetly. Is it not more commodious for a Gentleman that would paſs from* Valladolid *to* Madrid, *that he may learn many ways, then if he had had but one onely. For it muſt be either very large, or thoſe who travel therein would hinder one another, and would all have much trouble to hold in it. It is then a manifeſt conduct of the providence of God, which preſents men many ways to regulate their actions, and their manners, ſo that they may always do well whether they follow the one or the other of the two contrary opinions.* Or as he ſaith in another place; [g] *whether they enter into the one or the other of theſe two entirely oppoſite opinions, they will go on directly to Heaven.*

[f] *Profecto dum video tot diverſas ſententias in rebus moralibus circumferri, divinam rem providentiam fulgurare: quia ex opinionum varietate, jugum Chriſti ſuaviter ſuſtinetur. An non melius viatori plures viae à Valliſoleto in Madritum exponi, quam ſi unica reperiretur? Certe vel eam nimis latam eſſe oportet, aut per eam tranſeuntes impediri, peregrare opus eſſet. Ergo divina providentia cursum placitorum moralium operationum vias exponi, rectamque poſſe inveniri actionem, ſive juxta unam, ſive juxta alterom opinionem hominos operentur. Sanchez in ſelect. diſp. 44. n. 40. Caramuel tract. ſupra reg. S. Bened. 60.* Eſcobar, Theol. mor. tom. 1 l. 2. ſect. 1. c. 1. n. 23. p. 54. [g] *Ut quamcunque duarum primo diverſarum (opinionum) inierint, recta tendant ad ſuperos.* In prologo tom. 1. c. 3. n. 13.

It would be very hard to reconcile theſe maximes with thoſe of the Goſpel, wherein Jeſus Chriſt ſpeaks but of one way to Heaven, ſaying [h] that it is very ſtrait; and that there are few perſons that find it, and fewer that enter it, walk in it as they ought, and perſevere therein: that this way is the truth, which can be but one, and that it is himſelf that is this truth, and way.

[h] *Quam arcta porta & anguſta via eſt quae ducit ad vitam, & pauci ſunt qui inveniunt eam.* Matth. 7. v. 13. *Ego ſum via, veritas & vita.* Joan. 14. v. 6.

And the Jeſuits ſay that God hath diſcovered of late times by a peculiar providence many ways to Heaven, that he would have them made the moſt convenient and eaſie that they can be poſſibly, and that the moſt large and moſt eaſie ſhould be the beſt and moſt ſafe: that the world might march in crowds by theſe new ways unto Heaven; and that though there were no other reaſon, this alone would ſuffice ſtill to enlarge and multiply them more, leſt men ſhould be therein too much

*Profecto dum video tot diverſas ſententias in rebus moralibus circumferri, divinam rem providentiam fulgurare.*

*Benigniores etſi aliquando ſunt probabiles per accidens, ſunt ſemper utiliores & ſecuriores;*

*Melius viatori plures vias exponi, quam si una tantùm reperiretur.*

*Certe eam nimis latam esse oporteret, aut per eam transeuntes impediri, ac cum molestia peragrare opus esset.*

*Ergo superna providentia eautum plures moralium operationum vias exponi.*

*Rectamque posse inveniri actionem, sive juxta unam sive juxta aliam opinionem homines operentur.* Layman, sup. *duabus opinionibus probabilibus non sequitur alteram, potest sequenti momento licite tenere alteram.* Caramuel Theol. fund. pag 143.

crowded, for lest they should stifle and hinder one another in walking together in the same way; especially if it were so strait as our Lord representeth it; that to prevent and avoid also yet more this inconvenience, it was fit that these new ways to Heaven should be not onely different and distant from one another, but that they should be also sometimes opposite. For by this means they which follow it will be in no danger of pressing or inconveniencing one another in any kind, since they can never meet one another in the same way. Finally they teach that for fear of pestering one another in walking continually in the same way, or for some other reason which you please, you may change the way and enter some other, and returning by the same path march quite contrary to what you did, and turn your back on that part you pursued before; and yet never wander or part from the way to Heaven and Salvation. Thus they declare that any way is good to walk to Heaven, whether we march on the right hand or on the left: that we may do what we will by following some probable opinion, change our opinion as we please, do quite contrary to what we have done some little time before, without any fear of departing out of the way to Heaven by all these changes, nor to come into the way of perdition. So that according to the principles of this new Divinity, it is not onely very easie to be saved, but it is as it were impossible to be damned.

*Vir doctus diversis secundum diversas sententias opposita consilia dare potest.* *Poterunt hi modo juxta unam, modo juxta contrariam opinionem consulere.* Sanchez lu. *Qui ex*

* Molina in Concord. qu. 23. a. 4. & 5. Disp. 1. memb. ult.

* As *Molina* vaunts himself for having invented that knowledge which he calls the middle knowledge, and affirms that it was unknown to the holy Fathers and to all antiquity, and that none ever mentioned it before him, so far that he hath not scrupled to say that if Saint *Augustin* had discovered it, and the Church in his time had known it, they had not had so great trouble to defend themselves from the Pelagians, and to refute their errour and heresie. In like manner *Escobar* rejoices himself, and attributes it to a particular favour of Gods Providence, that he and his Fraternity have discovered in these last days many new ways unto Heaven, which have been unknown to all the Saints of the ages past, to the Church, and to Jesus Christ himself, who hath not spoken thereof in his Gospel, or if he have, it hath been onely to condemn them, and to advertise men to flye from them as the broad ways which lead unto damnation.

This same Jesuit may also say in the transport of his joy, and in the consequence of his principles, that if his ways to Heaven so sweet and so easie had been sooner discovered, the Church would not have been so severe in its discipline, nor Jesus Christ in his Gospel, and an infinite of persons might have been saved in following them, who are lost and damned eternally; not being willing to enter into that way which Jesus Christ hath taught, because it seemed to them too hard and too troublesome: and so according to this new Doctrine Jesus Christ hath not been in truth the Saviour of men, since he knew not, or hath not taught the most easie ways of Salvation; and the Jesuits may boast in this point also as in many others, and say that they properly, and those who with them have invented these new ways of Heaven so sweet and so easie by the means of this knowledge of probability, are the Saviours of the world.

4. The Doctrine of probability is also very proper to nourish the infidels in their infidelity. For if it be true that of two opinions we may follow that which is less probable with a safe conscience, whatsoever we represent to a Pagan to convert him, he may still abide in his Idolatry: because although we make the Christian Religion very probable unto him, and he see clearly that it is more probable then his; yet it is very hard, and as it were impossible to convince him in such sort that there should remain no doubt of our faith in his spirit, and no reason which may render his Religion probable; and by consequence he may persist always in his paganisme, without being almost at all obliged on pain of damnation to quit it, that he may receive the faith of the Gospel.

This argumentation is certain and evident after the principles of the Jesuits probability: but it will be less suspected, when we shall know that it is taken out of

*Sanchez* and others cited by *Escobar*. *Sanchez* demands when an Heathen is obliged under the guilt of ſin to receive the Goſpel which is preached unto him? And he anſwers 1. that according to ſome it is not enough to make him ſee that the Goſpel is credible, but that it muſt be made alſo more credible unto him than his own Sect, though it do not ceaſe to appear unto him alſo credible. But he anſwers in the ſecond place that this opinion pleaſeth him not at all, and pretends that in this very caſe a Pagan is not bound at all to embrace the Faith: [a] *Becauſe that when an Infidel is perſwaded that his Sect is probable, though the contrary, which is the Chriſtian Religion, appear unto him more probable; it is true that at the points of death when his Salvation is reduced to extremity, and when by conſequence he is obliged to follow that part which he judges to be more ſure and more probable, he is bound to embrace the true Faith which he believes to be more probable. But out of this extremity he is not obliged, becauſe he judgeth prudently that he may perſiſt in his idolatry.* In purſuance of this rule of probability; that he acts prudently who follows a probable opinion, I believe this Jeſuit would not anſwer for the Salvation of a man who dyes in this eſtate, ſince he muſt then believe that he may be ſaved without Faith, and in Idolatry, which is the greateſt of crimes. So that in ſaying he acts wiſely in perſiſting in Idolatry, he ſaith in effect that it is wiſdom to walk in the darkneſs of death, that it is prudence to deſtroy and precipitate himſelf into Hell in perſuance of his rules of morality, and grounding himſelf upon the principles of probability.

[a] *Caeterum hoc non placet ita generaliter dictum; quippe dum Infidelis ſibi perſuaſum habet ſuam ſectam eſſe probabilem, quamvis contraria ſit probabilior: tenetur utique in articulo mortis conſtitutus veram fidem, quam probabiliorem judicat, amplecti, utpote in eo articulo amplecti tenetur.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 2. c. 1. n. 6. p. 86.

*conſtitutus, in quo de extrema ſalute agitur: ac proinde partem quam tutiorem & probabiliorem judicat. At extra eum articulum non tenetur, quod adhuc prudenter exiſtimet ſe poſſe in ſua ſecta perſeverare.*

## SECT. II.

### *That this Doctrine of Probability favours the Heretiques, and nouriſheth them in Hereſie.*

THe Doctrine of Probability is no leſſe favourable to Heretiques then Infidels, in that the ordinary arms whereof the Church makes uſe to defend it ſelf againſt Heretiques, and to aſſail them, being Scripture, Counſels, Fathers, and all that which we have received from the Ancients by Tradition, the Jeſuits and thoſe who with them defend this Doctrine of Probability, find not theſe evidences for their advantages, and are ſo far from making uſe of them, that they fear and fly from them all they can.

They cite in their Schools in their writings in a manner as often the Books of the Pagans, as of the Scriptures; they profeſſe openly to preferre the new Authors above the Ancient; they acknowledge not properly for Maſters and Fathers, any but thoſe of their Society, to the judgement and the cenſure of whom they ſubmit frequently enough the judgements of the Saints which the Church hath always acknowledged for Maſters and Fathers.

Divine or Eccleſiaſtick authority, as well as Faith, have ſcarce any credit in their Schools; all as regulated and reſolved by the authority of men and humane reaſon; and in all conteſts and difficulties which they encounter, if they cannot prevail by diſpute, they have recourſe to thoſe whom they regard as their Maſters and Soveraign Judges in all ſorts of matters. They appeal to *Suarez*, to *Vaſquez*, *Molina*, *Leſſius*, and to others ſuch like, without making almoſt any mention of Jeſus Chriſt, the Apoſtles, or the Ancient Fathers, unleſs for form, and without producing the definitions of the Councils or Traditions of the Church to determine the queſtions, becauſe they find them, not conformable to their Spirit nor their deſigns; ſome can make no uſe of them becauſe they underſtand them not, and even will not give themſelves the trouble to ſtudy them; and the others, becauſe they find not in them what is for their purpoſe.

Beſides they wiſh they could content the whole World, and anſwer all perſons

that conſult them according to their humour and diſpoſition. Which obligeth them to look out for a Doctrine that is flexible and manageable, and which may be accommodated to all occaſions. The maximes of Faith ſeem to them too fixed, and the rules of the Church and the Goſpel too firm, and the opinions of the Holy Fathers too exact and too unmoveable. For this cauſe they being not able to make uſe of them to eſtabliſh the maximes of which they have need, that they may make their deſigns to proſper; and fearing on the other hand that they might be made uſe of againſt them to overturn their naughty maximes, they find themſelves as it were conſtrained by neceſſity to do all that they can directly or indirectly to corrupt them, weaken them, and to take away all credit from them. 3420

In this they imitate and favour the hereticks of whom they have learned to reject the Holy Fathers, eſpecially in the difficulties which regard manners, and the conduct of life; and to deſpiſe Antiquity and Tradition through a blind love of their own novelties and proper imaginations: and they are even in ſome ſort more blameable then the Hereticks; becauſe they renounce the Father and the Tradition upon a pretence of holding to Scripture; and theſe to follow their new Authors, from whom they declare openly that we ought to take Law and rules for Chriſtians Morals, rather then from the Fathers of the Church.

*Quæ circa fidem emergunt difficultates, ea ſunt ex veteribus hauriendæ: quæ vero circa mores homini Chriſtiano digno, à novitiis ſcriptoribus.* Celot, l. 8 c. 16. p. 724.

And indeed there hath never been any hereſie which hath not had at the leaſt ſome ſort of probability; becauſe there hath yet never been any which hath not had ſome appearance of truth, without which it could have found no followers, the ſpirit of man not being capable to follow any thing but truth, nor to be deceived but by the ſhaddow of it. And it often happens that the greateſt Hereſies took for their foundation the greateſt truths, and have built on the ſtrongeſt reaſons. Which ſhews clearly that if to follow a probable opinion be to act prudently, and if an opinion be probable when it is grounded on the authority of ſome learned man, or ſome likely reaſon, as the Jeſuits and thoſe who hold their Doctrine of Probability tell us, there is no heretick who may not maintain againſt them that he acts prudently whileſt he lives in his hereſie. 3430

It is true that the Hereticks have miſconceived the truths of which they would make uſe, and eſpecially thoſe of the Scripture which they have corrupted in their ſence and in their words, that they might fit them to their thoughts and errours.

b *Communis error ex probabili opinione ortus, ſatis eſt ad geſtorum per Sacerdotem valorem.* Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p. 32.

[b] But as according to theſe new Doctors a probable opinion which hath taken its original for an errour, becoming common in proceſſe of time become alſo ſafe, and may be followed in conſcience. So although the Hereticks were convinced to have had their riſe from errour, they might according to this maxime pretend that time and cuſtom have purged away this defect, and have put them in poſſeſſion by a good title, which is ſufficient to quiet their conſciences and juſtifie them before God. And to fortifie them yet more in this their imagination, and to defend it againſt thoſe that would trouble them, they may ſay that though it were true that the Catholick Religion were more probable then the Lutherans or the Calviniſts, they would yet ceaſe to be probable, though they were not ſo much, and that of two probable Religions as well as [c] *two probable opinions we may follow that which is leſſe probable*, according to the Jeſuits Doctrine, *though it were alſo leſſe ſafe*: and with much ſtronger reaſon when that which it the leſſe probable is the more ſafe, as they may pretend theirs to be. 3440

c *Dico 2. licitum eſſe ſequi opinionem minus probabilem, etiamſi minus tuta ſit.* Filliutius, mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 27. c. 4. n. 128. pag. 12.

d *Omnes opiniones probabiles ſunt per ſe æque tutæ; benigniores etſi aliquando ſint minus probabiles, per accidens ſunt ſemper utiliores ac ſecuriores.* Caramuel, ſup.

For conſidering this other rule of the Doctrine of probabilty; [d] *that of two probable opinions the more pleaſant is always the more ſafe though it be leſſe probable*, a Calviniſt or a Lutheran may ſay that he hath more reaſon to continue in repoſe and ſecurity of conſcience in his Religion then the Catholick in his, ſince it is manifeſt

that the Doctrine of *Calvin* and *Luther* is more pleasing and favourable to nature and the inclinations of men then that of the Catholick Church, and by consequence it is more safe.

I should have refrained from reasoning in this sort, and drawing these consequences from the Jesuits Doctrine, though they be clear and evident, knowing how far it is from the Spirit of the Church to raise new difficulties in the matters of Faith, and to meet with the objections of the adversaries, then especially when they notably dishonour the truth, and when they are capable of hurting the weak spirited, if the Jesuits themselves and their disciples had not raised these doubts, and proposed these instances, and if they had not put these reasons in the mouths of the hereticks, to teach them to answer those who would presse them to return to the union of the Church.

They go so far as to confesse that these instances and these reasons, of which they acknowledge, that the Hereticks may make use to nourish themselves in their obstinacy, are taken from their Authors, and are no other then the principles and consequences of their Doctrine of probability, without troubling themselves to change or correct this evil Doctrine, no more then to answer the Hereticks, nor to let them see that they mistake their opinions, and the fundamental Doctrines of their Divinity, whereby they testifie that they disapprove not the reasonings of these Hereticks, and that they are not far from believing that a man may be saved in the Religion of *Calvin* and *Luther*.

It cannot be but from this imagination and observations, that one of their principal disciples, from whom I have extracted all these reasons, and all these consequences favourable unto heresie, which we now above observed to be their product, protesteth, [c] *that he hath taken these discourses from good Authors*, as are all those of the Society, *for the comfort of the Germans and many others, otherwise honest men, whom he is troubled to behold infected with heresie.* For in matter of Religion we can give no consolation nor repose of conscience to any man, but by giving him hope that he may be saved in that whereof he makes profession.

[c] *Ad solamen eorum qui in Germania habitant; & multos viros, aliter probos, infectos dolens hæresi aliquas periodos scribo, & verius ex selectissimis authoribus exscribo.* Caramuel Theol. fund. p. 472.

After this protestation, he represents first of all a Man born in heresie amongst the Lutherans and well instructed in Lutheranisme. He supposes in the second place that this Lutheran is entred into conference with many Catholicks, and, amongst others, with a Capouchin, one of the chief of their Order, who, to presse him to conversion, represents unto him that it is necessary for him either to renounce Jesus Christ, or to return to the *Roman* Church. And in the processe of his discourse, he teaches him to answer this Capouchin, according to the rules of probability which we have represented above, and he furnisheth him with all the reasons and all the instances which I now deduced, being draw from the same principles. See how he makes him speak:

[f] *Christianity is the most probable of all Religions, and it contains in it many Sects, of which some are more ancient, and some others are more novel; some more safe, and some more pleasant; some more diffused, and other more narrow, amongst which the* Roman, *the* Lutheran, *and the* Calvinist *are truly probable. And by consequence being a Lutheran, as I am, it is not true that there is a necessity for me to return to the Roman Church, or to renounce Jesus Christ. For besides the Roman Church, which I acknowledge to be probable, the Lutheran is also Christian and probable, and it is besides more pleasant then the Roman;* And by consequence more safe in conscience, according to the rules of probability.

[f] *Christianissimum probabilissima Religio est, & sub ipso dantur secta antiquiores, juniores, severiores, benigniores, universaliores, minus universales, & præcipue Romana: Lutherana, & Calviniana, quæ si vere probabiles: Ergo mihi Lutherano non est necessario redeundum ad Romanam Ecclesiam, aut secedendum à Christo. Nam præter Romanam Ecclesiam, cui probabilitatem non nego, etiam Lutherana est Christiana & probabilis, & multo Romana benignior.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 472.

After that this Author had made this heretick to speak thus, he interrupts his discourse, that he might himself expound that which he said, or rather that which he

made him say. And to give more weight unto him: [g] *Tanner*, saith he, *the force of his reason, and what it is he pretends. First of all, he holds that it is probable that God cannot lye. In the second place, that he hath revealed the Holy Scripture, and even that he endited it, if you will have me expresse it so. In the third place he holds, that it is probable that the Church of* Rome *expounds the Scripture well.* 3470

[g] *Vim rationis jam penetras. Jam vides quo respiciat hæreticus. Tanet primo probabile quod Deus mentiri nequeat. Secundo esse probabile quod revelarit sacram paginam, & si velis, ut sic loquar, dictaverit. Tertio esse probabile quod eandem Romana Ecclesia bene exponat.* Ibid.

This is no Lutheran that saith this, it is a disciple of the Jesuits that talks thus for him, that expounds and builds his opinions on the principles of the probability. 1. *It is probable*, saith he, *that God cannot lye? It is probable that he hath revealed the Scripture, and that the Church interprets it well.* That is to say, that these Articles are no more points of Faith, or that Divine Faith as well as humane is a simple probability, and that these points and these propositions are in such manner probable, that the contrary ceases not to be also probable.

He dares not say this himself, though it follow evidently from his reasoning and his principles; but he makes it to be said by this Lutheran: [h] *He adds*, saith he, *that notwithstanding all these reasons the contrary ceases not to be also probable.* That is to say, that as *it is probable that the Church interpreteth well the Scriptures*, it is also probable that it doth not interpret them well; that as *it is probable that God hath indited the Scriptures*, it is also probable that he hath not indited them: that as *it is probable that God cannot lye*, so it is also probable that he may lye and deceive men. It is true that this Author is not so bold as to maintain openly that these Antitheses are probable on the one side as on the other: *Harum Antitheses esse probabiles.* This is not the language of a Lutheran neither. For at least he will not say that God can lye. Yet he omits not for all that to make him say it; not because it is the opinion of *Luther*, but because it is a consequence of the Doctrine of probability, which the Jesuits teach, which he lends this Lutheran to maintain his heresie; and he makes him say it, without any testimony that he condemns the impiety of these words. On the contrary he furnisheth him with reasons to support it, making him speak in these words: [i] *The Doctrine of* Aristotle, *which as it is now taught in the Universities of* Italy, Spain, France, *is very probable, and it cannot be objected that* Aristotle *held that the world was eternal, and that the reasonable soul is mortal, because these errours and others such like are at this day banished out of this Philosophy, since it hath been taught by Christians. This same Doctrine and the School of* Aristotle *is devided into three Sects, which are that of the Thomists, that of the Scotists, and that of the Nominals: These are all three probable, all three famous, all three maintainable. If the Dominicans would say that the School of* Aristotle, *which is in their Order more ancient then that of the Scotists and Nominals; and therefore that we must follow them or forsake* Aristotle, *what should they gain thereby. For the Franciscans would deride them, and believe they, had also as good reason to say that they ought to follow the School of* Scotus, *or seperate themselves from the Peripateticks.* And making application of these examples to the matter he hath in hand, comparing the Dominicans in the pretension they have against the Scotists and the Nominals, to teach the true Doctrine of *Aristotle* with the Catholicks, who maintain against the Lutherans and Calvinists, that they alone follow the true Doctrine of Jesus Christ, and are in the Church which he hath instituted, he prosecutes it in these terms: [k] *This form of arguing were very strong and cogent, if there were but one Religion under the* 3480 3490

[h] *Et tamen addit: iis non obstantibus harum antitheses esse probabiles.* Ibid.

[i] *Resolutionem hanc sic ille confirmat & dilucidat: Doctrina Aristotelis, inquit, prout nunc traditur in Academiis Italicis, Hispanicis, Gallicis, probabilissima est: nec contra hanc ipsam probabilitatem militat mundi æternitas, & animæ rationalis mortalitas. Nam isti & similes errores sunt expuncti, nec jam traduntur à Christianis Philosophis.* Hæc ipsa doctrina & schola Aristotelis in tres sectas dividitur, Thomisticam, Scotisticam & Nominalem; omnes probabiles, omnes celebres, omnes plausibiles. Dicant Dominicani: Nostra Schola Aristotelica est antiquior Nominali & Scotistica; ergo redeundum ad ipsam, vel secedendum ab Aristotele. Quid inde? Nam à Franciscanis ridebuntur qui æquo jure reponent vel admittendam esse Scoti scholam, vel relinquendum Peripateticum. Ibid.

[k] *Tunc argumentatio urgeret, cum una sub Christo Religio, vel una sub Aristotele schola demonstrationes produceret. Nam si una secta demonstraretur esse vera, reliquæ demonstrarentur esse falsæ, & in nostro casu ait Barsanomeus; omnes has religiones, Romanam, Lutheranam, & Calvinianam esse christianas & probabiles judico, & omnes hac scholas, Thomisticam, Scotisticam & Nominalem esse Aristotelicas & probabiles censeo: & hanc ob rem ratiocinio illo disjunctivo; vel redeundum est ad Romanam Ecclesiam, vel secedendum à Christo, convinci aut urgeri non possunt.* Ibid.

*name of Jesus Christ, or one School under the name of* Aristotle, *which could prove it self clearly to be the true one; For if it were demonstrated that one Sect were that true one, it would appear by the same means that the other were false. But in our case the Lutheran saith that he holds that the Roman, Lutheran, and Calvinian Religion are all Christian and probable, even as he believes that the Schools of the Thomists, Scotists and Nominals are all Aristotelian, and probable, and that therefore he cannot be convinced or pressed by this dilemma; that he ought either come back to the Roman Church, or depart from Jesus Christ.*

And because this defender of Lutheranisme by the rules of probability, knew that antiquity is a strong foundation of Religion, and a puissant proof to shew that it
3500 is true, he prevents and eludes this reason, saying for the Lutheran, [l] *that he troubles not himself about antiquity, nor the general Councils, because evident arguments cannot be drawn from them, but onely probable ones, since the School of* Aristotle *is more ancient then the Religion of Jesus Christ, and the Academies of the Peripateticks had a greater number of Masters and Doctors, then general Councils.* And he makes all this to be spoken by a Lutheran; but in the progresse of his discourse he becomes his advocate himself, and speaks thus openly in favour of him: [m] *It is lawfull for Father* Valerian de Magnis *the Capouchin, to accuse the Doctrine of the Peripateticks of errour and Tyranny, Why is it not lawful for a Lutheran to take care of himself*, for fear of being deceived by retiring to the Roman Church, and least instead of truth, he find there errour as well as in other Sects. [n] *Wherefore may he not say the Church of* Rome *is as to truth very probable, and for conscience very safe? But this hinders not, but that the Lutheran Doctrine which he professeth may be also probable, Christian and safe, and even more safe, since an opinion less probable is more safe, when it is more pleasant. Wherefore may he not also say that he is in repose of conscience amongst the Lutherans; and by consequence he is not obliged to return to the Roman Church, or to forsake the Religion of Jesus Christ.*

l *Nec antiquitatem ipse & Concilia generalia morabitur. Hac enim, ut ait, probabilia argumenta & non evidentia ministrant. Quoniam schola Aristotelica Christi religione multo antiquior, & schola Peripateticæ multo numerosiores magistros habent quam generalia Concilia.* Ibid.

m *Et si licet Patri Magno doctrinam Peripateticorum de errore & tyrannide arguere, cur non licebit Barsanomes esse cautiori?*

n *Cur non licebit dicere Romanam quidem Ecclesiam probabilissimam, atque adeo in foro interno esse securissimam. Et tamen hoc ipso non obstante Lutheranam quam ipse profitetur esse etiam probabilem atque æque Christianam & securam. Imo securiorem omnino, quoniam minus probabilis sententiæ benignior, etiam securior est. Cur non licebit addere se esse in quieta conscientia apud Lutherum adeoque nec teneri redire ad Romanam Ecclesiam, nec à Christi religione secedere.* Ibid.

3510 It is not the Lutheran that talks thus, but the disciple of the Jesuits who speaks for him, and furnisheth him with answers, whereby he believes that he may defend himself against those that presse him to forsake his Lutheranisme, and with reasons wherewith to comfort himself, according to the design of this whole discourse, and to assure his conscience in his Religion, because it is probable, because therein he finds repose, because being born therein, and having been brought up and instructed therein from his childhood, he hath continued therein and lived in it in simplicity, with intention to serve God and save himself; which are so many principles of the Jesuits Divinity; one that he acts prudently and with a safe conscience in following a probable opinion: the other, that a pretended good intention covers all sorts of crimes; and the third, that to do evil, it is necessary to know that evil is done, and to have a will to do it; so that when we think to do well, as this Lutheran doth, and that following conscience; though erroneous, we accustom our selves to evil, so long till we loose all sense and cognisance thereof, and therein find our repose, we may according to this new Doctrine continue in this estate, without fearing any thing.

And as if this Author kept intelligence with this Lutheran, or as if he were convinced by the strength of his reasons, and could not make answer unto him, he concludes in this manner: [o] *It is thus that this Lutheran also argues at this day; and it were well that some one of them that read this, would undertake to refute him. He hath already heard Father* Valerian *the Capouchin, and he desires to hear others.*

o *Sic discurrit etiam nunc Barsanomes, & debet à te, lector erudite, compesci. Patrem Valerianum Magnum audivit, & alios audire desiderat.* Ibid.

It is his duty who hath done the hurt to apply the remedy; it is their duty who have put arms into the hands of the enemies of the Church to fight with her, and to nourish themselves in rebellion against it: to take them from them, and to break them asunder in their hands; but this man testifies either his malice in declaring that he will not do it, or his weakness in affirming that he cannot, and in discharging himself upon others, *deberet à te lector erudite compesci.*

He doth not condemn even that which he makes the Lutheran himself say; he complains not that he makes evil use of his Doctrine, and of the Jesuits about probable opinions, or that he interprets or applyes it ill. He doth not onely not answer his reasons, but he makes them avail as much as he can. He enlarges them, he expounds them, he adds his own to them, if they be not all his: and though he dare not approve them directly and positively, declaring that all he saith is true, he doth it yet indirectly inquiring why he may not so speak? And leaving the question so without answer, he testifies that he hath no true one, and that he agrees that a Lutheran may in this manner defend himself against them that presse him to leave his Lutheranisme, and return to the Church of *Rome.*

Also before he entred into this discourse, he said plainly that he did it onely to this purpose to comfort the *Germans* and other honest people infected with heresie. He pretends then to comfort them by the discourse of this Lutheran, and he avouches, that in the matter of Religion and Salvation, there can be no consolation but in repose of conscience, and in the perswasion of being united to the true Church, and in an estate of Salvation; making this Lutheran say that he is inrepose of conscience amongst the Lutherans; *se esse in quieta conscientia apud Lutheranos*, and that a Lutheran Church is a probable, Christian and safe Church: *Lutheranam Ecclesiam esse probabilem, Christianam, securam.* And so he testifies openly, that one may be saved out of the Roman Church amongst Lutherans and Calvinists. These are the consequences, and fruits of the Doctrine which makes all things probable.

## SECT. III.

### *That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability destroys the Commands of God and the Church, and teaches to elude all Laws Divine and Humane, even that which forbids to do unto others that which we would not have done unto our selves.*

IT is easie to prove this by reason, and to make it apparent by evident and necessary consequences, that it is a sequel of this Doctrine. But it seems more to my purpose to shew it by the proper words and examples of the Masters and defenders of this very Doctrine.

*Caramuel* proposes this case: [a] *A man hears the clock strike twelve on Saturday at midnight, and presently thereupon he eates flesh. Rising from table after he hath filled himself with meat, he hears another clock strike twelve also. The day following being desirous to communicate he reasons thus: Clocks are as it were probable opinions, I have eaten before this clock struck; It is therefore probable that I did eat before midnight*, that is to say flesh on Saturday; *and therefore by consequence it is probable that I am fasting. For I may regulate my conscience by a probable opinion; and therefore I may communicate.*

a *Proponi alterum casum. Petrus die Sabbati sub mediam noctem, ut primum audivit duodecimam, comedit carnes; & postquam satur excessit è mensa, audivit aliud horologium significans duodecimam. Die sequenti communicare vult, & sic discurrit: Horologia habent opinionum probabilium virtutem: at ego comederam antequam tale horologium sonuerit: ergo probabile est quod sum jejunus. At opinioni probabili conformare conscientiam possum: Ergo potere communicare.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 139.

He finds no difficulty herein. Wherefore concluding for this man, and for the devotion he hath to communicate after he had well broken his fast on the Lords day, whether it were past midnight when he did eat, or after he had filled himself with victuals on Saturday, if he did eat before midnight; he concludes thus: [b] *I would know*

b *Et volo scire cur communicare non possit; nam stando Doctrinæ præcedenti patet. Et ego in hoc toto petii discursu quod possem negare aut reprehendere, nihil invenio.* Ibid.

*know wherefore he may not communicate; for he may according to the preceding Doctrine,* which renders all thing probable: *and as for me I find nothing in this reasoning which I can deny or refute.*

See another cafe of *Escobar* which is no leſſe ſtrange. [c] *You read not,* ſaith he, *an heretical Book, or which treats of matters of Religion, but you hear another who reads it upon your requeſt, and upon your motion, we may ſay,* according to the Doctrine of probability, *that you incurre the danger of excommunication, and that you incurre*
3550 *it not; that you have, and that you have not need of a Bull to be granted for your abſolution.* You may then follow whether of theſe two opinions you pleaſe: but if you be a man of conſcience, you will not fail to follow the more ſafe, which is according to the principles of this learning, that which is more ſweet and more large.

c *Non legis librum hæreticum, ſeu de Religione tractantem, ſed audis alium qui te incitante aut petente illum legit. Incidis & non incidis in excommunicationem; & conſequenter eges & non eges Bullæ indulto ut poſſis abſolvi.* Eſcobar, Theol. mor. lib. 7. ſect. 2. c. 33. probab. 59. p. 289.

Therefore to aſſure you yet farther, yet *Escobar* repeats it again, [d] *that you do not incurre the danger of excommunication, and that you have no need of the favour of a Bull to be abſolved.* And his reaſon is manifeſt: *becauſe to hear read is not to read.* So you are exempt from all cenſure, according to *Escobar*, though you have made this heretical Book to be read by another; and ſo you have read it by his eyes, and have been the cauſe of his ſin and your own. This very ſame thing he expreſſes in theſe following words. [e] *I hold that this is true, though he who heard another read have induced him to read it. For to induce another to read, is not to read.*

d *Non incurris excommunicationem, nec eges Bullæ indulta, ut abſolvaris: quia audire non eſt legere.* Ibid.

e *Hoc verum cenſeo etiamſi is qui audit legere, legentem induxerit ad legendum. Inducere enim alium ut legat, non eſt legere.* Ibid.

And if you would know the principle of this opinion, this is it: [f] *the cenſure which is ordained againſt him who doth a thing, is not againſt him who counſels it onely, if it be not expreſt in the Bull.* Here the queſtion is not of him that counſels onely to read, but of one who cauſeth it to be read before him that he may hear it; and for this cauſe he in effect is the Reader, more then he who lends him his eyes, becauſe he is the Author of the reading, and the other is onely the Inſtrument.

f *Et cenſura contra facientem lata non illigat conſulentem, niſi in Bulla exprimatur.* Ibid.

[g] *As for the ſervant that reads unto his Maſter, he runs the peril of being excommunicated,* ſaith Eſcobar, *if he be not excuſed by ignorance.* So that a ſervant that reads to his Maſter an heretical Book in Latin, or it may be in the vulgar tongue,
3560 without underſtanding more of it then if it were Latin, for want of wit or learning, ſhall be excommunicated; and the Maſter who made him to read it of malicious intent, and ſucks up all the venom of this naughty Doctrine ſhall not, and all the force of the Churches cenſures ſhall be ſtayed at the silly ſervant, who ſerve for a Buckler to his Maſters wickedneſs.

g Incurret vero cenſuram famulus legens, niſi ignorantia excuſetur. Ibid.

The Council of *Trent* pronounces an excommunication againſt thoſe who ſteal Women. [h] *Tambourin* exempts from the curſe, and from all other puniſhment intended by the Decree of the Council, *thoſe who ſteal or carry them away by force to abuſe them and not to marry them.*

h *Reſpondes hoc decretum non habere locum in quocunque raptu, ſed in aliquo duntaxat. Quare ſi quis rapiat mulierem, cauſa libidinis; & non ad contrahendum cum illa matrimonium, non incurrit prædictas Concilii pœnas.* Ita Leſſius, lib. 4. num. 70. Sanchez, lib. 7. m. 85. d. 23. num. 4. Tamen lib. 7 c. 6. n. 11.

*Escobar* propoſes alſo this queſtion about indulgences. [i] *I know,* ſaith he, *that unto indulgences there ought to be joyned certain works, as faſting, alms, confeſſion,* &c. *But I inquire whether when theſe works which are good of themſelves, become by ſome circumſtances venial or mortal ſins, they be ſufficient alſo to gain the indulgences?* He anſwers with *Granado*; [k] *that it ſuffices that the work be good in its kind, though in*

i *Scio debere apponi opera, jejunium ſcilicet, eleemoſynam, confeſſionem, &c. Rogo ſi ejuſmodi opera moraliter bona ex circumſtantiis fiant mala aut venialiter aut mortaliter, ſufficiantne ad Indulgentiæ lucrationem?*

k *Granados diſp. 4. num. 10. ſufficere docet opus eſſe bonum ex ſuo genere, licet in circumſtantia & individuo malum ſit.* Eſcobar, mor. Theol. tract. 7. exam. 5. c. 8. n. 59. p. 850.

*particular it be naught, by reason of its circumstances.* This is a thing unheard of and intirely incredible, that an indulgence may be obtained by a mortal sin. That is to say, that a full remission of all sins may be obtained by a 3570
new sin, and by a sin perhaps as great or greater then the others; and so a man may be absolved and condemned together by one and the same action. The paradoxes of the Stoicks are not more strange, and yet this is probable according to Jesuits, because *Granado* and *Escobar* have held it, and it is lawful to follow their Counsel in rejecting the contrary.

Dispensations as well as indulgences, are the graces and favours of the holy Chair; and as the Pope doth not commonly grant indulgences, but with a condition of doing certain actions, which he prescribes for the gaining them, so neither doth he grant any dispensations but for certain causes, which are alledged to obtain them. But, as *Escobar* holds, that indulgences may be gained by criminal actions, so he saith, also that a dispensation may be gained and used lawfully, though the cause upon which it is demanded be false, and that it be grounded on no reason at all. He demands [l] *whether it be a mortal sin to demand a dispensation without just cause, and to make use of it in the same manner.* He answers that *Granado holds that it is; but* Sanchez *believes that it is probable, that it is not so much as a venial sin, to make use of a dispensation obtained without cause.* His reason is, [m] *because the Law having once lost its force, it obliges no more, and it may be rejected without venial sin.* 3580
That is to say, that because one fault is made, a second may be made without fault. For he affirms that it is a sin at least venial to demand a dispensation without just cause; and he holds that having once obtained it, we may use it even without venial sin. This is as if he should say that having once gotten goods unjustly, we may enjoy them without injustice.

l *Num sit peccatum mortale dispensationem concedere, seu impetrare, eaque uti sine justa causa? Granadus affirmat. At Sanchez de matrimonio, t. 3. disp. 18. n. 10. probabile putat nec esse venialе peccatum uti dispensatione obtenta sine causa.* Escobar. Theol. mor. tract. 1. exam. 16. c. 4. n. 32. p. 236. m *Quia jam lex relaxata est: unde nec ad veniale remanet obligatio.*

He adds [n] *that some believe that it is but a venial sin, to demand or to grant a dispensation without cause, and then onely when the dispensation is of consequence.* It appears therefore, that according to these people that it will be no sin, even venial, when the dispensation is not important. And so all the Laws of the Church shall be exposed to contempt and mens malice, who may procure themselves to be dispensed with therein by lyes and falsities, and after serve themselves with those dispensations, without committing more then venial sin, which passeth for nothing with the Jesuits.

n *Concedere autem aut impetrare sine causa veniale aliis solummodo putant in gravi dispensatione.* Ibid.

After this it will be found less strange which the same *Escobar* saith, that when a dispensation is procured upon any just cause, the cause ceasing, yet the very same dispensation may be made use of. [o] *Doth the dispensation cease, saith he, when the cause upon which it was obtained ceaseth?* He answers, that *Salas holds the negative, but* Sanchez *holds the contrary.* Both these Doctors are capable to make that opinion probable. And therefore we may follow whether we please, according to the Jesuits.

o *Cessat dispensatio in causa num dispensatio cesset? Negative respondet Salas, Sanchez affirmat.* Ibid. n. 36.

From this principle *Granado* and *Diana* draw many conclusions remarkable in the practick. [p] *That a person who hath obtained a dispensation to eat flesh on prohibited days, because he is sick, may continue to eat though he be well recovered.* [q] *That one who hath procured a dispensation from a Religious vow, because of some infirmity, is not obliged to his vow, no not after he is healed of his infirmity.* [r] *That an Ecclesiastick who hath obtained a dispensation from reading his Breviary, because of some infirmity in his eyes, is not obliged to read after he is healed.* 3590

p *Cum qua dispensatum est propter morbum in esu carnium, potest vesci his licet animo convaluerit.*

q *Cum quo propter infirmitatem dispensatum est in voto Religionis, postquam convaluit non tenetur.*

r *Cum qua propter infirmitatem oculorum dispensatum est in officio legendi horas cum convaluerit non tenetur legere.*

All these things are very probable, if that be true, which *Escobar* hath told us above, that a dispensation may be demanded without any reasonable cause, and afterwards be made use of without sin: they are also even certain and evident, if as he hath said with *Salas*, a dispensation determineth not though the cause upon which it was obtained cease. But this is to prove a lesse disorder by a greater, and

practices which are bad, by a principle corrupt and erroneous: this is to open a door to all looſneſs and libertinſme, and to deſpiſe all the Laws of the Church.

He propoſes alſo a like caſe: [s] *There being but one Maſs ſaid in a Church, a man comes there when they are rehearſing the Preface: it is demanded whether he be obliged to hear the remainder of that ſingle Maſs?* Sanchez *and* Suarez *ſay that he is, becauſe this is the principal part of the Maſs: but I hold, that it is probable that he* 3600 *is not obliged, becauſe he cannot accompliſh the precept of hearing Maſs, by hearing that part.* We may conclude by this, that he who cannot pay all his Debt, is not obliged to pay what he can, and that weakneſs diſcharges him of what he can, as well as what he cannot.

[s] *Tempore prædicationis quis venit ad Sacrum audiendum quod unice celebratur. Tenetur illam ſingularis illius Sacrificii partem audire?* Sanch. & Suar. *teneri aſſerunt. Quod illa ſit præcipua ſacri pars: ego autem probabiliter aſſero non teneri; quia per illam partem Miſſæ non poteſt implere præceptum.* De Eſcob. mor. Theol. tract. 1. exam. 11. v. 4. n. 103.

*Caramouel* reports many like caſes, whereupon the reſolutions are ſometimes ſo extravagant, that he is obliged to diſown them, or at leaſt to diſſemble that he approves them; though he affirms that they are conformable to the principles of the Doctrine of Probability, and that they follow neceſſarily from the Doctrine of *Diana*, whom he profeſſes to follow throughout, as they both follow the Jeſuits, *Sequemur agnum, hoc eſt Dianam, quocumque ierit.* Theſe extravagant caſes are theſe: [t] *In Monaſteries where according to the cuſtom and rules of the Office, on ſolemn* 3 *Feaſt dayes, twelve Leſſons and as many Reſponſals are ſaid, which the whole Community rehearſes not, but hears only, there are found 24 Monks in the Quire,* by diſtributing the 12 Leſſons to 12 Monks, and the 12 Reſponſals to 12 others, *and cauſing them read all together, and at the ſame time, every one his Leſſon or his Reſponſal whereof he hath charge, they will ſatisfie their obligation, to read 12 Leſſons and 12 Reſponſals.* The ſecond is; [u] *When two perſons ſay their Breviary together, it is not needfull that they hear one another; but one may begin one verſe, before ano-* 3610 *ther hath ended that which goes before, becauſe he may at the ſame time hear what he ſaith himſelf, and what his companion ſaith. For as to the inward attention, he needs not trouble himſelf for it, becauſe we think not that it is neceſſary.*

[t] *Juxta mores & rubricas Monaſticas in Officio ſolenni habemus 12 lectiones & totidem reſponſoria quæ non recitat Communitas, ſed audit tantum. Ergo ſi ſint 24 in choro, & ſinguli dicant ſimul lectionem & reſponſorium, ſatisfacient præcepto legendi 12 lectiones & totidem reſponſoria.* Caram. Theol fund. p. 225. & ſeq. [u] *Quando duo legunt ſimul, non erit opus ut alter alterum expectet, ſed poterit alter incipere verſum ſequentem antequam alter præcedentem abſolvat; quoniam poteſt ſimul ſe & ſocium audire, nec eſt cur ad auſcultationem recurras, quia attentionem internam non eſſe neceſſariam putamus.* Ibid.

If then inſtead of two perſons who ſay the Breviary together, we take ſo many as there are verſes in the Office, every one ſaying his verſe in the ſame time, they will compleat the Office in as little time as was needfull to rehearſe one ſingle verſe: they need only to ſpeak louder, and cry out if need be, that they may all hear one another at leaſt confuſedly; as the 24 Monks of whom he ſpoke in the precedent caſe, who repeated the Leſſons and Reſponſals of their Matines together. For as to the inward attention and underſtanding of the words, he ſaid but now, that it is not neceſſary.

3. The third caſe is, [x] *When we ſay the* Pater noſter, *and* Ave Mary, *in the beginning of the Office, it is not needfull to repeat it in all the other Hours of the ſame, no more than all that which is repeated divers times in the Office.* The reaſon is, [y] *becauſe we may by one ſole action, ſatisfie divers precepts.* When he concludeth yet further,

[x] *Si ſemel in una hora dicitur Pater, Ave, & ea quæ in horis diverſis repetuntur, non debent in aliis horis recitari.* [y] *unico actu poteſt homo diverſis præceptis ſatisfacere.*

4. That a perſon who hath been ordered to recite the *Roſary*, which conſiſts of 150 *Aves*, and 50 *Paters*, ſatisfies this command by ſaying only once the *Pater* and *Ave*.

Though *Caramouel* be very paſſionately affected to the Doctrine of Probability, and addicted wholly to *Diana*, as well as the Jeſuits, to follow them in all things, 3620 and through all; ſo that he teſtifies after in the cauſe of *Amicus*, that he defends him blind-fold, and againſt his own light, in that which he firſt of all taught, that we may kill a Calumniator, ſaying with another Divine whom he conſulted on that

subject, [a] *That* Amicus *might very well have ſpared to advance that Propoſition; but he having once cauſed it to be printed, he is obliged to maintain it, and he alſo to defend it*: Therefore, ſay I, though *Caramonel* be all for *Diana*, and all for the Jeſuits, yet he dares not declare himſelf intirely for one part of this caſe, which I have now reported, and particularly this laſt. They are ſo ridiculous, and that I may make uſe of his Metaphor, of ſo hard digeſtion for any of but a reaſonable wit, that he believes not that *Diana* himſelf would affirm it, though he declares, [b] *That he muſt of neceſſity ſwallow all theſe things, or renounce the principles of the Doctrine from which all theſe concluſions infallibly follow.*

a *Potuiſſet Amicus hanc reſolutionem omiſiſſe; at ſemel impreſſam debet illam tueri, & nos eandem defendere.*

b *An hæc omnia Diana admittet? Non puto. Quid ergo? Vel hæc omnia debebit deglutire, vel à principali opinione recedere.*

5. *Sanchez* holds, [c] that he hath ſatisfied the Divine Service, who recites only what is the daily Office. And *Sancius* on the contrary holds, that the whole Service which ought to be ſaid, being not in the daily Office, he that hath only the daily Office, is not obliged to ſay any thing at all, becauſe he cannot ſay all that he ought. Theſe two Opinions are ſufficiently commodious conſidered apart: but they will be much more joyned together, as *Caramonel* makes appear in this example. He repreſents to us an Eccleſiaſtick who makes a voyage by Sea, who going on Shipboard, takes only his Diurnal, following the opinion of *Sanchez*, that he may have leſs Service to ſay; a little after, being at Sea, and now out of poſſibility of procuring a Breviary, he quits the opinion of the Jeſuit *Sanchez*, to follow that of *Sancius*, a Jeſuit alſo, and layes aſide his Diurnal, that he may diſcharge himſelf wholly of the Service, and ſay none at all. *Caramonel* approves this conduct, and as a faithfull Diſciple of the Jeſuits, maintains both the opinion of *Sanchez* and of *Sancius* at once. He ſaith, that this Eccleſiaſtick may follow the opinion of *Sanchez*, becauſe it is probable; and that he hath alſo power to quit it, to follow that of *Sancius*, becauſe that is alſo probable; and that he is free to change in this manner, becauſe it is very natural and very reaſonable, a man not being in ſlavery to his own opinions, no more than to thoſe of others. *Homo non eſt ſuarum opinionum mancipium*; but he is rather their Maſter, and may and ought hold his ſpirit elevated above them, how probable ſoever they be, and make himſelf Judge thereof, or rather ſerve himſelf with them as he pleaſeth, or reject them without troubling himſelf ſo much as to judge of them, or examine them. Whence he concludes, that this Eccleſiaſtick hath done well and prudently in all his carriage. 3630 3640

c *Petrus ingreſſus navim majoris commoditatis cauſa contulit ſecum Diurnale, ſubſcribente* Thomæ Sanchez *in Sum. tom.* 1. *l.* 3. *c.* 8. *affirmanti legentem ea quæ continentur in Diurnal, Officio divino ſatisfacere. Poſtquam autem ſolverunt à portu, mutavit dictamen, & ſecutus ſententiam* Johannis Sancii *in ſelect. diſp.* 11. *n.* 2. *aſſerentis in Diurnali non contineri integrum officium divinum, ac proinde carentem Breviario, licet Diurnale habeat, non teneri legere Officium divinum, illud non legit. Sed quomodo hanc difficultatem proponet? Ut exacte reſpondeam, opus eſt omnes circumſtantias expendere, &c.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 138. *Paulus primo* Sanchezii *ſententiam ſequebatur, & bene faciebat, quia eſt gravis author. Ex vi hujus dictaminis potuit ſine gravis culpæ ſcrupulo reinquere Breviarium in terra, & ſolum conferre Diurnale. Secundo aſſeritur Paulus mutaſſe dictamen, & hoc humanum eſt, & rationale: homo non eſt ſuarum opinionum mancipium. Cum probabile dictamen mutat, utitur cuilibet ſibi conceſſa libertate, & bene facit, fidei orthodoxæ dogmatibus demonſtrationibuſque ac principiis per ſe notis ſubeſt ingenium, probabilibus ſententiis ſupereſt. Ideoque quam libere ſententiam* Sanchezii *approbavit, tam libere potuit eam dimittere. Potuit igitur Paulus ſine conſcientiæ ſcrupulo mutare dictamen, & valedicens opinioni unius, ſequi alterius opinionem. Tertio dicitur Paulus noluiſſe uti Diurnali, & defectu Breviarii multis diebus quibus in navi fuit horas non recitaſſe, nec tamen peccavit mortaliter. Operabatur enim juxta conſcientiæ dictamen, quod erat probabile & prudens ſubnixum* Sancii *authoritate. Dices quando Paulus ingreſſus eſt navim voluit mutare dictamen; ergo voluit non legere. Patet, quia ex mutatione dictaminis inferebatur lectionis omiſſio: ergo graviter peccavit, quia mortifere peccat qui vult non legere cum poteſt; & Paulus antequam à portu ſolveret, poterat conferre Breviarium & legere. Reſpondeo concedendo Paulum cum ingrederetur navim, voluiſſe mutare dictamen, diſtinguo conſequens, voluit ergo non legere, hoc eſt omittere horarium lectionem quam nunc judicaturus erat obligatoriam. Nego, illam quam tunc judicaturus erat obligatoriam, Concedo. Ergo peccavit graviter, nego ſubſumptam conſequentiam.* Ibid. p. 144.

He ſaith alſo, that though this Eccleſiaſtick even then when he took his Diurnal, that he might ſay what was contained therein, according to the opinion of *Sanchez*, had an intention to quit this opinion of *Sanchez*, as ſoon as he was got onward at Sea, and to take up and hold that of *Sancius*, that he might diſcharge himſelf of the obligation of ſaying what was in his Diurnal, as well as that which was in his Breviary, yet he did no evil, teſtifying that it is no evil for an Eccleſiaſtick to ſport himſelf with the Church, and its Commands, to elude them, and to perſwade himſelf that he is not obliged at all to ſay any thing of the whole Breviary: and though this have not been lawfull heretofore, becauſe this opinion was not then invented,

it ſhall be lawfull in time to come, according to the maxim of theſe Divines, be-
3650 cauſe *Caramouel* a conſiderable and learned man maintains it. For he is of himſelf alone capable to make an opinion probable; and though he have not of himſelf this credit and authority, *Sanchez* and *Sancius*, whom he cites, and whom he follows, will give it him by a Rule of this Science, which holds, That a Scholar may hold and teach an opinion which he hath learned of his Maſter, and after that, it is probable and ſafe in conſcience; and that the ſame will be alſo ſo much ſafer, as it is pleaſanter, by this other Rule, that [d] *the more ſweet are always the more profitable and more ſafe, though they are leſs probable.*

d *Benigniores etſi aliquando ſint minùs probabiles, per accidens ſunt ſemper utiliores & ſecuriores.*

6. But if you make ſcruple of not ſaying all the Service, and that you deſire only to be diſcharged of ſome part of it, becauſe it ſeems to you to be too tedious, theſe obliging Divines will beſtow on you two Expedients for your contentment.

The firſt is, [e] that you may chooſe the ſhorteſt Office of all the year, as is that of *Eaſter*, and ſay it every day without changing, if you have any the leaſt pretence, which may appear a little reaſonable. It will be, ſay they, no ſin at all; and if you have no pretence, they hold, that it will be only a venial ſin.

e *Sacerdos quidam quotidie recitare conſuevit Officium Romanum feſto Reſurrectionis*

*Dominicæ proprium, & modo quærit an peccaverit; & ſi ſic, qualiter? Reſpondetur 1. Illum Sacerdotem ſi quotidie citra ullam rationabilem cauſam Officium Reſurrectionis recitet, peccare ſolummodo venialiter. Reſpondetur 2. Sacerdotem illum ſi id quod in caſu proponitur faciat quotidie ex mediocri & rationabili cauſa, nunquam ullo modo, ne venialiter quidem peccare.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 520.

So it will be lawfull for an Eccleſiaſtick to overturn the whole Order of the Church, and Divine Service, ſinging *Alleluiah* in the dayes of *Lent*, and on *Good-*
3660 *Friday*, and ſaying before God, that *Jeſus Chriſt* is riſen, whilſt yet he is ſuffering, and nailed to the Croſs; and all this ſhall be lawfull for him for his pleaſure only, and for his convenience, or upon the leaſt pretence in the world.

7. The other is, to ſay Matines and Lauds in the Evening, following the practice that is of late common enough, with intention to ſatisfie at once the obligation of this day, and the following. See here how *Caramouel* propounds this caſe. [f] *I ask, whether he that ſayes the Matines and Lauds in the Evening, ſatisfies the obligation of two dayes? The firſt opinion holds, that bare rehearſing the Matines and Lauds in the Evening, ſatisfies the obligation of two dayes; and it is proved, becauſe that a man may by one ſole action, ſatisfie two different commands, which are directed for the ſame purpoſe, and which fall out at one and the ſame time. There is another opinion quite oppoſite hereunto, which holds, that in ſaying the Service once only, two obligations cannot be ſatisfied.* See there's the caſe, and here's the anſwer.

f *Peto utrùm ille qui Veſperè Matutinas & Laudes recitat, duorum dierum ſatisfaciat obligationi? Opinio prima affirmat ſimplicem Matutinarum & Laudum lectionem ſi fiat ſub Veſperum duorum dierum, obligationi ſatisfacere, & probat, quia una & eadem actione poteſt Philippus ſatisfacere duobus præceptis numero diſtinctis eodem tempore concurrentibus; huic è diametro opponitur ſententia altera aſſerens non poſſe eadem ratione ſatisfieri utrique obligationi.* Ibid. p. 217.

[g] *I have propoſed this queſtion to an excellent Doctor, a Jeſuit,* as a Scholar to his
3670 Maſter, *who hath a long time taught Moral Divinity, and who taught it alſo here at Prague, who told me, that the more pleaſant opinion ſeemed to him probable. I name him not, becauſe I know he had rather live in peace, without being aſſailed by ignorant perſons, than be commended for the greatneſs of his wit. Let this Author then be the firſt for this opinion, and* Caramouel *the ſecond*; as it is reaſonable that the Maſter ſhould go before, and the Scholar follow after. *It may be others will follow hereafter, and as it is probable of it ſelf; ſo it will be one day by the authority of men, and*

g *Propoſui hanc doctrinam eximio cuidam Doctori Jeſuitæ Theologiæ Moralis à multis annis Profeſſori, & hic Pragæ docenti: & reſpondit ſibi videri ſententiam benignorem probabilem. Ejus nomen non exprimo. Scio enim illum malle in pace vivere, quam ab ingenii perſpicacitate collaudari. Ergo prima illa ſit iſte primus author, ſit ſecundus* Caramouel: *forte alii accedent, & quæ probabilis eſt ab intrinſeco, ab extrinſeco erit etiam aliquando probabilis: forte etiam nunc eſt probabilis ab extrinſeco benigna opinio. Eſt enim nova & ſolum à nobis tractata: habet pro ſe duos authores, & contra ſe nullum; & quia hoc verum, cur non erit probabilis?* Ibid. p. 222.

*perhaps it is ſo at preſent; for it is wholly new, and I am alone the propoſer of it, and it hath two Authors for it, and there are none againſt it. And being ſo, why is it not probable?* This opinion diſcharges of one part of the Breviary, and that of *Sanchez*, being well managed, with that of *Sancius*, may diſcharge of the whole in many occurrences.

There is alſo another more commodious and more eaſie, which gives liberty to cut off therefrom what we pleaſe, or to ſay or not ſay it at all abſolutely if we pleaſe. The foundation of this opinion is, that the Church can neither command nor forbid, condemn nor puniſh that whereof it cannot take cogniſance: Upon this principle *Caramuel* reaſoneth in this manner. [h] *Albeit that the action of him who ſaith his Breviary in ſecret, or who faileth thereof in ſecret, may be known by himſelf, yet it cannot be known by any other man; a Superiour muſt be an Angel, and not a man, to know all the ſecret actions or omiſſions of this ſubject. Then this action in the ſame manner is incapable of being judged, and if ſo, of being puniſhed, and then alſo of being commanded. And by conſequence it is thus true, that Superiours cannot forbid ſecret actions or omiſſions.* There is nothing required, but to be ſecret and crafty enough to hide himſelf from men, ſo that they know not whether he ſay his Breviary or no, without thinking of God who ſees all; nor of the command of the Church, who appoints the Office to be ſaid every day; nor by conſequence of the penalties ordained againſt them that neglect it. 3680

h Lectio horarum occulta, vel etiam amiſſio ejuſdem lectionis occulta, per accidens eſt incognoſcibilis. Superior enim qui externas ſubditorum actus vere occultos, & ſecretos cognoſceret, jam non eſſet homo ſed Angelus. Ergo per accidens eſt dijudicabilis. Ergo per accidens eſt impraeceptibilis. Ergo per accidens accidit Superiori quod non poſſit interdicere actiones aut omiſſiones ſecretas & occultas per accidens. Ibid. p. 205.

See how theſe Doctors teach to obey the Church, and to keep its commands; and they believe yet after all this, to have done it great ſervice, and given it cauſe of being well contented with them: [i] *The Church knowing well,* ſaith Maſcarenhas, *that conſiderable Doctors do expound the Laws in this manner, and permit theſe Explications to be taught publickly, and printed, it ſeems that ſhe approves them, and fits her Laws to them.* This is without doubt to explicate the Laws of the Church clearly, and to leave no difficulty therein; but it is to deſtroy the ſpirit of it, and to preſerve only an appearance thereof: ſo that they neither ſay or demand any thing, but what the particular perſons would have. By which it may be judged, what eſteem Jeſuits have for Civil Laws, and Laws of Princes, there being no appearance that they will give more honour to them, than to thoſe of God, and the Church. For this cauſe all they ſay of the one, may eaſily be applyed to the others, and they muſt hold of neceſſity, that they may all equally be contemned with a good conſcience. I will rehearſe only two of their maxims, which contain almoſt all that can be ſaid on this ſubject. 3690

i Cum Eccleſia ferat ſuas leges ita à gravibus Doctoribus explicari, hoc ipſo quod eorum explicationes permittit publice imprimi & doceri, cenſetur ſuum praeceptum ſecundum eas conſiderare. Maſcarenhas tract. 5. n. 491.

1. [k] *It may be ſaid,* according to *Eſcobar*, *that the Subjects of a Prince, who refuſe to receive without juſt cauſe the juſt Laws which he hath cauſed to be legally publiſhed, do ſin; and it may be ſaid alſo, that they ſin not at all.* He ſpeaketh of a lawfull Prince, and he ſuppoſeth that the Law which he cauſes to be publiſhed, is juſt, and that his Subjects have no cauſe to complain thereof: and yet he pretends that they have liberty to obey, or not. In purſuance hereof, he alleadges Authors and Reaſons which they produce on each ſide, to make both the opinions probable, and to give liberty to follow whether we pleaſe. And it is apparent, that if any demanded his advice, he would counſel them to follow the more eaſie, and more profitable, after the rules of his Divinity; that is to ſay, that he would incite Subjects to diſobey their Prince.

k Peccant & non peccant ſubditi ſine cauſa non recipientes legem à Principe legitime promulgatam. Eſcobar Theol. Moral. tom. 1. l. 5. ſect. 2. c. 14. probl. 13. p. 160.

2. This permiſſion to deſpiſe the Laws of Princes, is general for all ſorts of perſons; but it gives alſo a particular licenſe to Eccleſiaſticks, ſaying, [l] *It may be ſaid that Eccleſiaſticks are Subjects, and that alſo they are not Subjects of neceſſity and obligation but only out of reſpect and good example towards Princes Laws, which regard the Government of their Eſtates, and which derogate not from the Eccleſiaſtick State.* The queſtion is then problematical, there being Reaſons and Authors on both ſides; and though there were none, it is enough that *Eſcobar* holds each of 3700

l Clerici non ſunt vi directiva, ſed & vi coactiva ſubjiciuntur & non ſubjiciuntur Principum ſecularium legibus quae ſpectant ad Reipublicae gubernationem, nec cum Clericorum pugnant ſtatu. Ibid. c. 15. probl. 19. p. 162.

theſe opinions, to render them both probable. But as the principles and reſolves of this Science are almoſt all favourable to looſeneſs and diſorder, he concludes with ſome diſcourſes, that, [m] *excepting in the caſe of ſcandal, the Eccleſiaſticks ſin not mortally in violating the Laws of ſecular Princes, becauſe they are not directly Subjects.* He excepts no kind of Laws, ſince he ſpeaks of thoſe which are juſt, and derogate not from the Rights of the Church, not allowing the Eccleſiaſticks to be therein Subjects, no more than the Princes themſelves that make them.

m *Iuſto clericos ſeclusa ſcandalo non peccare mortaliter Principum ſecularium leges violando, quia legibus hiſce directe non tenentur.* Ibid.

This is without doubt to make themſelves conformable to the example of *Jeſus Chriſt*, and the words which he ſpake unto *Pilate*: *Non haberes poteſtatem adverſum me ullam, niſi tibi datum eſſet deſuper*, &c. *Thou wouldſt have no power againſt me, if it were not given thee from above*; and to the conduct of the Saints, who believed they ſhould have diſobeyed God himſelf, if they had diſobeyed Princes, who commanded them nothing againſt the honour of God, and the Church. *Joan. 19. v. 11.*

It were eaſie to relate an infinite of like reſolutions, which the Jeſuits give in all ſorts of queſtions which reſpect Manners and Religion, to make it appear by ſenſible examples, that by their Rules of Probability they confound all things in the World; in Divinity, and almoſt generally in the Doctrine and Diſcipline of the Church. But beſides that this truth is found ſufficiently proved in this Extract, which contains but one part of their corrupted maxims, *Tambourin* will diſpence with me for this labour, having publickly acknowledged that which I ſay, in a Collection which he hath made of the principal deciſions which are drawn from the principles of the Doctrine of Probability, where, after he had reported a great quantity, according to the order of the Alphabet, he declares, that there are an infinite of others which he hath not, nor can report, becauſe that would be very difficult and tedious; and the maxims and uſe of the Rules of Probability, extending themſelves in a manner unto all ſorts of matters, there would need an entire Volume wherein to collect and report them ſimply: *Operoſum id ita eſt & prolixum, quippe per omnes fere materias eſt percurrendum, ut integrum merito volumen expoſcat*; yet I cannot abſtain from reporting here alſo, three taken out of this Author, which ſhew an extraordinary and palpable corruption, and a very peculiar deprivation of reaſon in thoſe who are capable to approve or follow them.

1. [n] *It is probable*, ſaith he, *for example, that an Exciſe is juſtly eſtabliſhed; it is probable on the other ſide, that it is unjuſt: may I, being at preſent eſtabliſhed by the King to raiſe this Impoſt, exact it according to the opinion which maintains that it is juſt, and therefore lawfull for me to levy, without doing any injuſtice: and to morrow, or the ſame day, being I am a Merchant, may I ſecretly defraud this very Impoſt, following the opinion which condemns it of injuſtice?*

n *Probabile eſt v. c. hoc veſtigal injuſte eſſe impoſitum, probabile item eſſe impoſitum juſte; poſſumne ego hodie quia ſum exactor Regius veſtigalium exigere ejuſmodi veſtigal, ſequendo opinionem aſſerentem illud juſte eſſe impoſitum; atque adeo licere mihi ſine injuſtitia illud exigere; & cras, imo etiam hodie, quia ſum Mercator, illud occulte defraudare ſequendo opinionem aſſerentem illud à juſtitia deficere.*

2. [o] *It is probable that the loſs of reputation may, and may not be compenſated with money. May I to day, being defamed, deſire ſatisfaction in money; and to morrow, or this very day, having defamed another, not be willing to allow him the ſame compenſation?*

o *Secundo probabile rurſum eſt ablationem fama pecunia compenſari, probabile non compenſari. Poſſumne ego hodie infamatus velle ab infamante compenſationem in pecunia; & cras, imo hodie, ego ipſe alium infamans, nolle famam proximi à me ablatam compenſare pecunia?*

3. In the third place; [p] *It is probable that a Defendant may uſe equivocations in Juſtice. May I being this day Defendant uſe equivocations, and to morrow being*

p *Tertio probabile item reo licere aequivocare in judicio, probabile non licere. Poſſumne ego reus hodie aequivocare; cras vero creatus Judex urgere reum ut non aequivocet? Hæc & innumerabilia ejuſdem generis hic in controverſiam narrantur. In caſibus relatis num. 1. 2. 3. atque in ſimilibus licitam eſſe ejuſmodi mutationem concedimus.* Tamb. l. 1. Theol. c. 3. ſect. 5. num. 1. 2. 3. 21.

*choſen Judge, conſtrain the Defendants not to make uſe of them?* In the proceſs he anſwers; *In this caſe, and other ſuch like, I grant that it is lawfull to change opinion.*

He believes therefore that theſe perſons may do that juſtly unto others, which they would not have done unto themſelves, and which they would free themſelves from as much as poſſible: and he ſees not that this is to overturn the prime Law of Nature, and the Goſpel, which ordains, That we ſhould do unto others that which we would they ſhould do unto us, and not to do unto others that which we would not they ſhould do unto us; and that this is at once to violate all the Commandments of God, which are founded on this principle of Nature, and all the Law and Prophets, which according to *Jeſus Chriſt*'s ſaying, depend upon this rule, and all the Holy Scripture, which are nothing elſe but an extenſion and explication of this ſame principle. 3730

## SECT. IV.

### *That the Jeſuits Doctrine of Probability, ruines entirely the Authority of the Church, of Paſtors, and Superiors of all ſorts.*

TO make this truth appear, we muſt obſerve, that there are four ſorts of Principles for ruining the Authority of Superiors. 1. By corrupting or deſtroying the principle of it. 2. By bounding it, and encroaching upon it. 3. By rejecting or weakning its commands. 4. By hindring Subjects from obeying.

The Jeſuits by the Doctrine of Probability, corrupt the Authority of the Church in the original of it, in attributing to it no other than a mere humane power. They retrench and deſtroy it, in not conſenting that it may preſcribe the inward actions of vertue; they bound it, and encroach upon it, by the irregularity of their Priviledges, which they abuſe, to the contempt of the commands and Ordinances of Biſhops, and invading their Juriſdiction; they utterly aboliſh ſome of their Laws, and they weaken others of them, and there are hardly any unto which they have not given ſome aſſault, by the multitude of inventions they have found out to defeat and elude them.

Theſe points are entirely verified in the whole proceſs of this Book, and ſome of them in entire Chapters. But that which is remarkable, and very proper to juſtifie what I pretend here, is this, that the means and the armes which they and thoſe who follow their opinion, make uſe of to fight againſt the Authority of the Church in all theſe manners, are the maxims of their Doctrine of Probability. 3740

The Authority of the Church is of it ſelf aſſured and uncontroulable, being ſupported by the firm rock of Gods Word: For this cauſe there cannot be found a means more ready, or more infallible to ruine or weaken it, than to undermine its foundation, and to make it depend on humane reaſon and authority, ſubmitting its Juriſdiction and its power, to the diſputes and conteſts of the Schools, and rendring in that manner every thing probable that reſpects its power, that they may afterwards become the Arbitrators and Maſters thereof.

It is not needfull here to repeat all that is found in the body of this Book, to prove this truth; it is ſufficient only to report ſome paſſages of their Authors, and their Diſciples, in which they avow themſelves, that the Doctrine of Probability doth abſolutely ruine the Authority of the Church, and of all ſorts of Superiors; and they make it ſo clear in the examples that they produce, that after they are read, it ſeems not that any perſon can doubt thereof?

Hereof ſee one manifeſt proof in the caſe which *Caramuel* propounds in theſe terms: [q] *A man relying on an opinion ſweet and indulgent, but probable, diſobeys his Superior in a thing in which it is probable that he is not obliged to obey, but it is more probable that he is obliged. The Superior following the opinion which is more ſafe,* 3750

[q] Petrus ſecutus opinionem benignam probabilem non ſatis facit mandato ſui Abbatis in caſu in quo probabiliter non tenetur obedire, & probabilius tenebatur. Prælatus ſubſcribens ſententiæ ſeveriori judicat illum deliquiſſe obedire, & proinde peccaſſe. Petitur an poſſit contra illum procedere & punire tanquam inobedientem? Caram. in com. in reg. S. Bened. l. 1. n. 65.

*judges that he ought to obey, and therefore that he hath ſinned. It is enquired whether he may act againſt him, and puniſh him as diſobedient?* See here the queſtion propoſed according to the rules of Probability. The Superior hath reaſon to command it; the Inferior hath reaſon not to obey, both founded on Probability. The perſon of the Superior is more conſiderable, and his pretenſion more juſt, beſides it is more probable. Let us ſee notwithſtanding what will be the judgement of the Doctors of this Science. [r] *I anſwer*, ſaith *Caramuel*, *that the Inferior ſins not; and I ſay further, that the Superior may follow which of the two probable opinions he pleaſeth, and by conſequence judge that the other is obliged to obey him; but he having followed a probable opinion, is innocently ignorant of this obligation. But the Superior ſhall be raſh if he judges that he ſins, becauſe it is not probable that he ſins who follows a probable opinion; and ſo it being probable that this private man hath not ſinned, the Superior ſhall be unjuſt if he treat him as guilty; for where there is no fault, there is no need of remedy, nor puniſhment.*

[r] *Reſpondeo Petrum non peccaſſe. Addo poſſe Prælatum ſubſcribere alteruti opinioni, ac propterea cenſere Petrum habuiſſe obligatorem obidiendi. Sed illam invincibiliter ignoraſſe ductum opinione probabili, nihilominus temere judicat Prælatus eum peccaſſe, quia improbabile eſt eum peccare qui ſequitur opinionem probabilem, ut num. 59 oſtendi. Cum ergo improbabile ſit Petrum peccaſſe, injuſtus erit Antiſtes ſi contra illum procedat, quia ubi non eſt culpa nec medicina eſt opus, nec pœna.* Ibid.

There is no perſon who ſeeth not that this anſwer overturneth in a manner all the Authority of Superiors, of what condition or order ſoever they be, ſince the reaſoning of this Author is general, and comprehends them all. For through the extreme licence which they have at this day introduced, to make almoſt every thing probable, and to found this probability upon any likely reaſon, or upon the advice of one ſingle man, as do the Jeſuits, it will hardly happen at all that a Superior can make any command, in which ſome probability occurres not, which may take away his power of cauſing himſelf to be obeyed, and to puniſh the rebellious, who pretend to be innocent, and more juſt and reaſonable than himſelf.

If this Superior be condemned of raſhneſs and injuſtice, in following the more probable opinion, he ſhall be by much ſtronger reaſon if he follows the leſs probable.

So that whatſoever he doth, and on what ſide ſoever he turneth, in any difference which he ſhall have with his Subjects, he cannot avoid condemnation, if he be judged at the Tribunal, and according to the Laws of Probability; and it ſeems that as this Doctrine was not invented but to favour looſeneſs, and diſorder, and vice in all ſorts of profeſſions, it hath alſo for its principal ſcope, to fight againſt and to deſtroy as much as is poſſible, the perſons that are eſtabliſhed by God to hold the Word in duty, and all things in order.

This is evident, that the Doctors themſelves of this new Science are conſtrained to confeſs, that if the principles of their Probability be held to, we muſt ſpeak no more of Scripture, nor of Superiors, and that they do only delude their Inferiors, having no authority or power at all.

*Caramuel* conſidering this principle of the Jeſuits Divinity, of which we ſhall ſpeak hereafter, to wit, that the Church hath not power to condemn inward actions, affirms, that it follows thence not only that the Eccleſiaſtick doth not ill, who ſayes not his Breviary at all, provided he conceal this; but alſo that there is no more Authority in the Church: which appears ſo horrible to himſelf, that he cryes out with aſtoniſhment, [s] *Good God, if this opinion have ſucceſs, there will be an end of almoſt all authority of Superiors; the Inferiors will only obey them when they look on them, and in ſecret they will violate all ſorts of Commandments, Secular or Eccleſiaſtick; none ſhall ſin in eating Fleſh on Fridays, nor in eating three or four times a day on Faſting-dayes, nor in diſpenſing with themſelves ſecretly for Divine Service.* He acknowledges all theſe things, he confeſſes that they are unſupportable exceſſes, but he confeſſes that they are true conſequences of the Jeſuits Probability. [t] *Theſe exceſſes are very great and incredible, but yet they are the legitimate conſequences of the Doctrine of Probability.*

[s] *Bone Deus, ſi hæc opinio ſemel admitteretur actum eſſet de tuta aut fere ſuperiorum authoritate: ſubditi obedirent ad oculos, & privatim omnia mandata Eccleſiaſtica aut ſecularia temerarent. Nemo peccaret ſi ſecreto comederet carnes die Veneris; nemo qui diebus jejunii tertio vel quarto; nemo qui ſecreto omitteret Officium divinum.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 205.

[t] *Nimia omnia & improbabilia, & tamen legitime illata ex doctrina probabili.*

He himſelf makes no difficulty to teſtifie openly, that he ſees well that this Doctrine tends to the withdrawing of all ſorts of Subjects and Inferiors, from the obedience of their Superiors, and [u] *to introduce every where the hereſie of the Independents, which of late years hath infected* England. 3780

u *Ut video ex hac doctrina oriri in noſtris ſcholis poſſit Independentium illa hæreſis quæ ab annis paucis inficit* Angliam. Ibid.

To all this he anſwers but one word, and as it were on the by, at the end of his diſcourſe: [x] *We muſt therefore ſearch out ſome reaſon which is more certain than the more probable, to convict and overturn this pernicious Doctrine. Aſſiſt me,* ſaith he, *Reader, if thou be'ſt a Divine, and ſhew me why the antecedent is not probable, or how the concluſion can be ſo, or at leaſt ſhew me ſome fault in this reaſoning; for I deſire to be inſtructed, and I find no Maſter capable to inſtruct me.*

x *Quærenda igitur eſt ratio probabilitate certior, quæ hanc doctrinam perniciosam debellet. Ergo Theologe Lector me adjuva: ergo vel mihi oſtende cur antecedens non ſit probabile aut cur conſequens ſit probabile, aut tandem oſtende errorem in argumentationis noſtræ forma, quoniam doctior eſſe deſidero, nec apros Magiſtros invenio.* Ibid.

He avows the miſchief of this Doctrine which he himſelf terms pernicious, and alſo that he knows no remedy for it at all; That is, that it is wholly inevitable. Whence it is eaſie to conclude, that by the very rules of Logick, unto which he addicts himſelf, as the principal rule of Truth, the Doctrine from whence iſſues by infallible conſequence ſo great errours, is truly pernicious, and entirely falſe; becauſe it is indubitable in Logick, that from a true concluſion, nothing but truth can follow; and likewiſe that that from whence falſe and pernicious concluſions may be drawn, muſt needs be falſe and pernicious it ſelf; without troubling ones ſelf to ſeek other reaſons to prove it, this ſame being evident and certain by the light of Nature only, and by the acknowledgement of them who are the Authors and Defenders of this Doctrine.

We need no other proofs to make appear, that this Doctrine introduceth Independency, and the ruine of all ſorts of Authority, ſince the principal Defenders of it acknowledge it; and by the ſame reaſon it is entirely oppoſed to the ſpirit and conduct of Faith, and leads to Irreligion. For the true Faith and true Religion being nothing but Obedience, and being given us of God to captivate our underſtanding to revealed Truths, the one and the other keeps our ſpirit under a perpetual dependance, and voluntary ſubmiſſion unto the Word and Will of God. 3790

But the Jeſuits Doctrine of Probability, gives the ſpirit of man a Soveraign liberty, which ſubmits it ſelf to nothing, and reſerves alwayes to it ſelf a power, not only to condemn and approve what it pleaſes, but alſo to condemn that which it approves, and to approve what it condemns, paſſing from one to another, and even from the more probable to the leſs probable, without fearing to engage it ſelf at all in the leaſt ſin; and pretending alwayes to walk in an aſſured way, and more then probable in the midſt of Probabilities, which environ us on every ſide, ſince they have made probable almoſt all the rules of life and humane converſe, and have even elevated mens ſpirits above all theſe Probabilities, to a Soveraign Independance.

*Caramuel* expreſſes this in this manner: [y] *The wit of man is ſubject to the Doctrines of Orthodox Faith, and the evident principles of natural reaſon, which it cannot reſiſt, but it is above all probable opinions.* So that to reduce the ſubſtance of this Article into a few words, the Doctrine of the Jeſuits Probability withdraws the Spirit from all ſorts of obedience; from that which is due to Superiors, by giving it power to reſiſt them upon the leaſt appearance of reaſon; from that which is due unto God himſelf, by permitting to diſpenſe with a great part of his Commandments; and from that which is due to the Church, teaching to deride its Laws, and elude its Ordinances; from that which is due to reaſon, by giving liberty to follow that which is leſs probable, if it pleaſe better, and be more conformable to our intereſts: and alſo attributing unto it an Empire greater than that of God himſelf, who can never depart from that which is moſt juſt and moſt reaſonable; and giving it an incomparable power and Independance in the Kingdom of Probabilities. 3800

y *Fidei Orthodoxæ dogmatibus, demonſtrationibus ac principiis per ſe notis ſubeſt ingenium, probabilibus ſententiis ſupereſt.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 138.

## SECT. V.

***That an opinion probable being once received, all the Prelates of the Church, and all the men in the World, cannot hinder that it should be probable, and safe in conscience, according to the Jesuits.***

3810 THere is nothing more easie, than to introduce into the Schools a new opinion, and to make it probable according to the Jesuits, and their followers; because they hold, that it needs only one reason by which it may be maintained, or one Author that approves it.

There is also nothing more easie than to cause it to be received in the World, because they believe that the most pleasant, which are those that all enquire after, are the best and most safe.

Finally, there is nothing more easie, than to uphold and bring it in credit, its own pleasantness, and the approbation that some give it, being sufficient to acquire unto it new Partizans, and new Defenders, who will publish it, and induce it unto practice: and so it will have for it the approbation of Divines, the example of private persons, and plausible reasons, which are all foundations of Probability. And being once established in this manner, it will as it were be impossible to destroy and discredit it; and consequently there will be no means to hinder the World from following it, or the Authors who have undertaken its defence, to teach and publish it.

For 1. It is well known what trouble it is to undo things that are passed into custom, and evil things rather than good; and amongst evil things, those which are most pleasing and favourable to the corrupt inclinations of nature, give most trouble in rooting them out, and we hardly ever obtain our design therein.

2. When a custom, which hath taken birth from an evil maxim, is also propped up by apparent reasons, and the authority of those that have reputation of being vertuous and learned, the evil becomes as it were incurable, and without remedy.
3820 And this is that which we have seen to happen to the most part of the new and pernicious opinions, under which the Church groans at this day, whilst it endures them.

3. The Authors of these opinions make use of no other armes commonly to defend them, nor admit of others to oppose them, than reason; they submit all to dispute, they examine all by the rules of Logick, by Syllogisms and Subtilties: So that he who is most proper to catch at niceties, and contest about them, carries it commonly, though his cause be the weaker and less reasonable.

4. It is clear, that there is scarcely any that will give way to another in wit and reason, especially in the heat of a dispute; but the opinions which carry men on to looseness and vice, have yet more advantage in this kind of combat, which is made by reason and disputation, that they are there as it were invincible, because of the force which the natural corruption of our spirits give them. It were easie to produce many proofs hereof, if one of the newest, and withall of the most eager defenders of Probability, did not testifie it openly by his words: [a] *He that saith that an action is evil and unlawfull, is obliged unto many things*; 1. *To make appear,*
3830 *that the reasons which prove the malice of the action be demonstrative; that is, that they be such as whereto no probable answer can be given.* 2. *And in the second place, he ought also shew, that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawfull, be not so much as probable: which cannot be done, but by giving to every one in particular a solution which is indubitable and evident.* 3. *In the third place, he is also obliged to make appear, that the opinion which maintains that this action is good, hath not sufficient authority to be held probable. He is obliged to prove these*

[a] *Qui rem dicit esse illicitam, ad multa tenetur. Primo enim debet ostendere rationes quæ malitiam probant, esse demonstrativas, nempe tales quibus dari responsio probabilis non possit.* 2. *Debet etiam ostendere rationes quæ bonitatem probant, ne quidem probabilem esse ostendet si omnibus ad unam dederit solutionem quæ evidenter sit vera.* 3. *Etiam debebit ostendere partem illam quæ bonitatem affruit, non habere sufficientes authoritates ut dicatur probabilis. Hæc omnia tria simul ostendere debet, cæterum causa etsi duo ex illis ostendat, modo unum non ostendat.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 138.

*three things together; and if he fails but in one, though he prove the other two, he will loſe his cauſe.*

There needs nothing more to make invincible all ſorts of wicked opinions, and which lead men unto looſeneſs and vice, it being certain, that it is impoſſible to convince them by the rules and conditions which this Diſciple of the Jeſuits preſcribes. For there being no reaſons ſo evident, which the wit of man cannot obſcure and entangle by his paſſion and artifices, it is clear that if evil maxims muſt be judged by reaſon and diſpute, none will ever be convict, becauſe the animoſity of men may alwayes maintain them by contrary reaſons.

And if we cannot be aſſured of any truth, unleſs we can entirely ſolve all the difficulties which occurre therein, as this ſame Author pretends, it will follow that there ſhall never be any thing aſſured in Morality, nor in Doctrine, nor in Faith, nor in Nature; ſince it is manifeſt, that the greateſt and moſt indubitable Truths, are ſubject to innumerable difficulties, which the moſt learned and the moſt ingenious know not oftentimes how to explicate. And ſo every thing ſhall be uncertain and probable: There ſhall be no difference betwixt good and bad Doctrine, and it ſhall be lawfull for all men to follow what they pleaſe in every kind of matter, which is the proper ſcope of theſe Doctors of Probabilities. 3840

The evil Doctrine ſhall have even all ſorts of advantage above the good, becauſe according to this Caſuiſt, he that maintains it needs prove nothing of that he ſaith, nor anſwer to any thing that can be ſaid againſt him, but by Probabilities. And on the contrary, he that ſpeaks for truth, and who condemns errour, looſeneſs, and vice, is obliged to prove all that he ſaith by demonſtrations, and to anſwer and refute all that which his adverſary can ſay, with reaſons ſo clear and cogent, that he cannot reply any thing that hath ſo much as an appearance of truth.

And when he hath entirely diſarmed him, and deſtroyed all his reaſons, making him ſee clearly that they are of no value, and that they are not ſo much as probable only, he hath yet gained nothing at all. For if you believe this Caſuiſt, he muſt beſides this, take from him all his Authority of every ſort, and reduce him to that paſs, that he may be able to find none ſufficient to ſupport his opinion, and render it probable, which is in a manner impoſſible; becauſe it ſuffices as to this, to have one ſingle Caſuiſt that teaches it; and though none have yet ever taught it, he that invents and firſt maintains it, may make it probable, if he be accounted a man of learning and piety, and there are none but ſuch amongſt the Maſters of this Science. So his opinion ſhall be alwayes probable, and though falſe and pernicious, it ſhall be ſhot-free under probability. 3850

b *Benigniores etſi aliquando ſint minus probabiles, per accidens ſunt ſemper utiliores & ſecuriores.* Caram. Theol. fund. p. 134.

5. This is one rule of theſe great Doctors, that b *the opinion more ſweet, is alwayes better and more ſafe, though it be leſs probable.* By this rule the opinions which favour looſeneſs and corrupt inclinations, will be more ſafe, and their probability alwayes invincible. For if the reaſons which are applyed againſt them, be more forcible and preſſing, they will thereby become indeed leſs probable, but they will not thereby become leſs pleaſing; and conſequently they will become alwayes better and more ſure, according to the maxims of this marvellous Science.

c *Quod omnia quæ pulchre cogitarunt, jam ſunt à junioribus ſummo ſtudio & ingenio elimata.* Ibid. p. 22.

6. But if you oppoſe againſt them the authority of the Saints, and Antient Fathers, they will ſay, that their opinions are very probable, but thoſe of the Caſuiſts of theſe times are no leſs probable; that the Moderns carry it even above the Antients, c *becauſe their beſt thoughts are cleared up, and perfected by thoſe that followed them.* But though the opinion of the Antients be more probable, that of the Moderns being more pleaſant, they conclude by their principles, that it is better and more ſafe. They maintain alſo, that when the queſtion is about Faith, we may well have recourſe unto the Antients, and hold that which they have believed and taught in their Writings; but in matter of manners, and the conduct of life, we muſt take our rules from the new Caſuiſts. 3860

*Quæ circa fidem contingunt difficultates, eæ ſunt à veteribus hauriendæ: quæ vero circa mores homine Chriſtiano digna, à novitiis ſcriptoribus.* Celot. l. 8. c. 16. p. 714.

7. One of the moſt certain wayes to know that an opinion is bad, are the bad conſequences, and pernicious effects which naturally follow thereupon: but this is



not

not capable to ſtay the defenders of the Jeſuits probability. They acknowledge the dangerous conſequences and pernicious effects which iſſue infallibly from many Novel opinions which they teach, and they forbear not to maintain them at all, and proteſt that they will maintain them alwayes, becauſe they ſeem probable, and no perſon can condemn them. [d] *Hereupon follow many inconveniences, ſaith Caramouel, which ariſe from theſe mental reſtrictions, ſecret compenſations, the liberty which ſome give to kill an unjuſt Judge or Witneſs, the opinion which holds that the Church cannot judge of ſecret things, and other like opinions: and yet all theſe inconveniences hinder not but that theſe opinions, ſo as they are taught at this day in the Schools, are at the leaſt very probable, and cannot be condemned by any.*

d *Mille inconvenientia ſuboriuntur ex reſtrictionibus mentalibus, multa ex occultis compenſationibus; multa ex licentia occidendi injuſtum Judicem aut teſtem, quam nonnulli concedunt; multa ex illa opinione quæ docet de occultis non judicare Eccleſiam, multa ex aliis. Quibus tamen non obſtantibus inconvenientibus, illæ ſententiæ in terminis quibus hodie traduntur in Scholis ſunt ut minimum probabiliſſimæ, & à nemine damnari poſſunt.* Caram. Theol. fund p. 549.

8. If it be repreſented unto them, that a good part of theſe Novel opinions are contrary to the Laws of the Church, and ſome of them to the Civil Laws alſo, they pretend that becauſe they be Novel, they are exempt from the cenſure of the Laws more antient than they, and they could not be condemned or defended, when
3870 they as yet were not at all. Thus *Caramouel* talks of the opinion of *Amicus*, who holds, that it is lawfull to kill a Defamer: For enquiring, [e] *Whether this Doctrine may be received without offending againſt the Laws Civil and Eccleſiaſtick?* He anſwers, *That the Doctrine of* Amicus *is Novel, and later than the Common Laws; and conſequently the Popes, Emperors and Kings, have not ſpoken for it nor againſt it.* By this rule all new opinions which introduce errours and abuſes, ſhall be under ſhelter from the Laws of the Church which went before them, though they be condemned therein: They may be taught without puniſhment, and followed with a good conſcience.

e *Anne eadem doctrina admitti poterit ſtando juri Civili & Canonico? Reſpondeo* Amici *doctrinam eſſe novam, & legibus vulgatis juniorem; atque adeo nihil de illa à Pontificibus, Cæſaribus aut Regibus fuiſſe diſpoſitum.* Caram. p. 549.

9. [f] And if a Biſhop ſeeing the evil conſequences which they cauſe in his Dioceſs, would cenſure and forbid the Books which teach them, this Diſciple of the Jeſuits will make no difficulty to ſay, that it belongs not unto him, that if he attempt it he exceeds his power, he will give occaſion to perſons who profeſs this Science to complain of him, *as doing a thing they cannot ſuffer; becauſe it is not lawfull for him to condemn Books which are read, approved and commended by learned men.*

f *Quidam Epiſcopus in Belgio interdixit Antonii Dianæ reſolutiones, juſſitque ut nemo venderet, emeret, legeret aut haberet: & Bibliopolæ ſolliciti interrogabant poſſetne liber ille interdici? Reſpondi illis quod ſi illos condemnant, hic jam haberent docti aliquid quod patienter tolerare non poſſent. Non enim libri damnari poſſunt qui à doctis leguntur, approbantur, laudantur.* Caram. p. 89. *In hunc ſcopulum impegit quidam præcipuc Antiſtes. Sed quid ſcimus aut dicamus homini incapaci doctrinæ,* p. 393. *Invidiæ ignoranti condonas,* p. 89.

But if after this the Biſhop yield not to their remonſtrances and complaints, he ſhall not eſcape their reproaches and injuries, and they will make him paſs in their Schools and Books for *an ignorant*, for *an envious* and *ſtupid* perſon, and *uncapable of being inſtructed*, and who by conſequence deſerves not to be ſpoken to, nor to have pains taken with him to teach him what he underſtands not: and ſo that without regarding his cenſures and his prohibitions, they need not ceaſe teaching and publiſhing the ſame opinions which he condemns.

10. The Pope can have no more power over them in this, than the Biſhops, as the Jeſuits have teſtified many times, cauſing the Books of F. *Bauny*, and F. *Rabardeau*, and others, to be reprinted with approbation of their Superiors, and of the principal Divines of the Society, after they had been cenſured at *Rome*.

And indeed the reaſon wherefore they pretend, that their Books and their Novel opinions cannot be condemned, after they have had approbation by their Superiors, and other able men of their Society, is general, and includes the Pope as well as the Biſhops: For they ſay, [g] *that it is not at all lawfull to condemn the Books which are read, approved, and praiſed by learned men.*

g *Non enim damnari poſſunt libri qui à doctis leguntur, approbantur, laudantur.*

11. And since the Authority of the Churches Laws do not extend to new opinions, which are come after them, since neither the Bishops nor the Pope himself may forbid them, it is necessarily required that all the Church be assembled in a body, to judge of them in a Council. And this also the Authors of this Probability pretend, saying, [h] *That none of their Propositions can cease to be probable, if the contrary become not an article of Faith:* whereupon they defie any man whomsoever, to find another means to condemn a probable opinion, *than by an expresse definition of the Church.* For they hold, that a single Casuist may introduce and authorize in the Church a probable opinion, and that the Pope and all the Bishops cannot exclude it, when it is once received and tolerated: That the whole Church must speak to silence one single Regent of a Classis, must make an Article of Faith to condemn a Probability. 3899

h *Nulla ex prædictis syntheſibus aliter poteſt ſua probabilitate privari, quam ſi contraria transeat in articulum fidei.* Ibid. p. 89.

*Finge quemcunque caſum poſſibilem præter definitionem Eccleſiæ.*

12. And yet after all this it is not known, whether the Authors of this Science would submit to the definition of a Council. For according to their maxims, they are not obliged to it, since the whole Church together, no more than the Bishops and Pope apart, can do that which in it self is impossible. Now this is one of the maxims of these Doctors; [i] *That it is not lawfull to condemn opinions, any more than Books, which are approved and commended by learned persons*; or to speak yet more clearly, [k] *As it is impossible that an opinion which hath the approbation of many Doctors, should not be probable, so it is impossible to reject it.* And this impossibility is universally acknowledged in all Philosophy, and this is the first and the greatest of all impossibilities, because it arises from the thing it self, and from the proper definition of a probable opinion: For [l] *a probable opinion is*, according as the Doctors of this Science define it, *that which many persons renowned for their learning do maintain*; so that if it have the approbation of many Doctors, it is also impossible to hinder it from being probable, and by consequence lawfull and safe in conscience; as it is impossible to cause, that they who have approved it, should not have approved it, or that they who were Doctors, and many in number, should not be many Doctors: [m] *Assemble if you will,* saith *Caramouel, all the men of Europe, learned and unlearned, great and small, they cannot make nor truly judge that* 20 *is not* 20, *or that excellent persons, and the chief of the most famous Universities, should not be excellent men*; which all the powers of the World cannot do, nor the whole Church together, to wit, that 20 should not be 20, or Doctors be no Doctors. 3900

i *Non enim damnari poſſunt libri aut opiniones quæ à doctis approbantur & laudantur.*

k *Cum impoſſibile ſit probabilem condemnare ſententiam, & impoſſibile eam non eſſe probabilem cui multi Doctores ſubſcribunt.* Caram. p. 393.

l *Opinio probabilis eſt quæ à magnis & multis defenditur.* Ibid. p. 89.

m *Congregentur univerſi Europæi, docti, indocti, magni, parvi, non tamen poterunt facere aut vere definire viginti non eſſe viginti, aut viros eximios & ſummarum Academiarum lumina, non eſſe magnos.* Ibid.

He explicates the same thing in another manner, by a comparison, which serves at once both to prove and clear his thoughts; [n] *For to deny,* saith he, *that an opinion which is maintained by many learned men is probable, is to deny that a line hath length, a superficies bredth, and a body thickness: or this is indeed to deny a proposition, wherein the proper definition is attributed to its subject.* This is as much as to say, that none whoever, not excepting God himself, can any more hinder that which two or three Doctors have asserted from being probable, than make a line without length, a superficies without bredth, and a body without depth; it being indeed in the power of God to destroy the being, but not to change the nature of things; and to cause that which is, not to be, but not to be different from what it is. So that according to the principles of this new Divinity, it is no more in the power of the Church, nor of God himself, to hinder that an opinion approved by two or three Casuists should be probable, and by consequence lawfull and safe in conscience, than to hinder that a man should be a reasonable creature. Because that as to be a man, and to be a reasonable creature, is one and the same thing: so to be a probable thing, and to be approved by two or three Doctors, are not different things according to them. [o] But yet if the Church do censure any one of these opinions approved by these Doctors, they will take this censure for a rule of policy, 3910

n *Qui enim propoſitioni à multis viris doctis aſſertæ negat probabilitatem, hic nega: lineæ longitudinem, ſuperficiei latitudinem, & corpori profunditatem: hic negat definitionem definito competere.* Caram. p. 393.

o *Reſpondi ſi Dianæ libros Epiſcopus ille interdixit ut merces, viderint Conſules & Reipub. Patres ad quem pertineat interdicere merces; ſi eoſdem interdixit ut nocivos per accidens, nullam injuriam Dianæ intulit, & ſuo ſunt uſu jure. Nemo enim in ſua domo tenetur tolerare librum etiam bonum, quia ſuis ſit perniciosus per accidens.* Caram. p. 89.

or prudence, by which sometimes good things are forbidden, because they may be hurtfull by accident. This is *Caramuel*'s answer to one who advised with him concerning Books prohibited by a Bishop.

But if the Church pretend to condemn them as wicked, they will oppose themselves thereto, as to an unjust and unsufferable enterprise, or rather wholly impossible, and would say aloud, [p] *That it is not in the power of any one, whosoever he be, to condemn opinions, no more then Books which are approved and commended by learned men.*

[p] *Quod si illas condemnaverit, hic jam habent docti aliquid quod patienter laudarint.* Ibid.

*tolerare non possent, non enim damnari possunt libri (aut opiniones) qui à doctis legantur, approbantur, laudentur.* Ibid.

And after all, when a Council assembled doth expressly condemn them, they will not perhaps submit themselves to their judgement, since they cannot condemn them more expresly than the Council of *Trent* hath condemned the Lutheran errours; and yet notwithstanding this condemnation, a Doctor of these Probabilities abstains not from making a Lutheran to say, that his Sect and his Religion is probable, without opposing him therein. On the contrary he testifies, that he is not far from his opinion, and that it is a consequence of the rules and principles of this Probability, sending the Lutheran to those who hold the contrary, to receive from them an answer unto his reasons, as not finding therein any thing to answer, and believing them to be solid and invincible because probable. For this is the secret and scope of this Science, to make all things probable, that we may do and say what we will, joyning unto Probability a certainty and kind of infallibility, for ensuring this Science, and the consciences of those who follow it; in such manner, that they are secure from the fear of Gods Judgements, the Authority of the Church, and the censure of all the men in the World.

*Cur non licebit Barsanomeno dicere Romanam quidem Ecclesiam esse probabilissimam, atque adeo in foro interno esse securissimam. Et tamen hoc ipso nonobstante Lutheranam quam ipse profitetur esse etiam probabilem atque æque Christianam & securam. Imo securiorem omnino, quoniam minus probabilis sententia si benignior, etiam securior est. Sic discurret etiamnum Barsanomenus, & deberet à te, lector erudite, compesci.* Caram. p. 472.

## ARTICLE III.

### *That the Divinity of the Jesuits is obsequious and mercenary.*

IT will appear sufficiently that the Divinity of the Jesuits is wholly complacent of it self, in that it is proper to give content to the whole World; and they can, following their principles, quiet all sorts of consciences, in satisfying the desires of all sorts of persons. And in this it is servile and mercenary, because there is no servitude more base, than to flatter the passions of others; and so much the more, because this is not done but because such are slaves to their own proper lusts.

This is clear by what I have produced out of their Books in the former Chapter, and it is a consequence so evident and necessary from their principles, that I might forbear to prove it more particularly. Notwithstanding it will not be unprofitable herein yet to produce some more examples, which may serve to give greater light, and greater clearness to the most simple and incredulous.

*Escobar* enquires, [q] *What must be said to a penitent, or other man, who demands which of two opinions is more probable?* He answers, that he to whom this person addresses himself, ought to tell him that which he esteems more probable in his conscience, supposing he demands to know that which is most probable in it self, and in the Theory. [r] *But if he desires only to know what he ought to do in the practice, we may advise him to do that which is less probable, and we shall oftentimes do him better service, by advising him to that which is more easie, and which he may do with less danger and inconvenience.*

[q] *Petit consulens aut pœnitens sibi exprimi quæ sit sententia probabilior?* Escob. in proœmio exam. 3. cap. 6. num. 24. p. 28.

[r] *Quod si solum ex practica obligatione scisciatur; potest consulere quod minus probabile judicat, quod facilius & cum minori periculo seu incommodo præstari potest. Imo meliorem se geret consiliarium sæpe id consulendo.* Ibid.

Greater obsequiousness cannot be desired, since this goes beyond the thought of the man who demanded the best advice. For instead of counselling him that which is absolutely best, according to his demand, this Author would have us counsel him that which is less probable, provided it be more easie and agreeable to his humour. And to remove from his Director the scruple that he might have concerning a conduct so indulgent and soft, he addes, that this counsel will be better than if he should give him the other: *Meliorem se geret consiliarium.*

A little after, having said that the Confessor is obliged to follow, even against his own sense, the opinion of his penitent, he enquires, [f] *What shall the Confessor do, if he believes that the opinion of his penitent is false?* He answers, *that for all this he ought to comply with him, if he have any approved Authors who hold that his opinion is probable.*

[f] *Quod si confessario falsa videatur opinio pœnitentis, debet se accommodare si à probatis autoribus probabilis reputetur.* Ibid. num. 27.

He saith in the former case, that the Confessor ought to shew himself indulgent towards him who comes to enquire of him what is just and reasonable, in granting him more than he demands; and here he obliges him to comply with another, in giving way to him against his own opinion, and granting him that which will carry him against reason and justice. This is to please all men in all things; not to their 3950
Salvation, as St. *Paul*, but to satisfie their desires and their interests, against the rule of St. *Paul*, and the Gospel, who teaches us, that this condescention saves none, and is proper to deceive and destroy as well those who offer it, as those who accept it.

The same Author speaking of a man who would not accept of the penance which his Confessor had appointed him, askes [t] what must be done if he say that he will stay to do it in Purgatory? He answers, that *the Confessor is not to forbear to impose upon him some slight penance, for the integrity of the Sacrament*, and not for the necessity of the penitent. His reason is, [u] *because he well perceives that if he impose on him any greater, he will not receive it.* So that whereas the wicked disposition of this penitent, deserves to be treated more rigorously, he requires that he be treated with more indulgence, as if that would reduce him into a better estate, and remove from him his pride and obstinacy.

[t] *Quid si affirmet se velle Purgatorii pœnas subire? Levem pœnitentiam adhuc imponat ad Sacramenti integritatem.*

[u] *Præcipue cum agnoscat gravem non acceptaturum.* Escob. tr. 7. exam. 4. c. 7. n. 188. p. 819.

*Fillintius* proposes a like instance in the Sacrament of Penance, saying, [x] *What must a Confessor do when some fault is committed in confessing, against the very essence of the Sacrament?* He distinguisheth first of three sorts of sins against the substance of Confession, (these are his words) of which this is the third: [y] *When the penitent for want of sorrow necessary to his sins, or of having made a full confession, is not well disposed, and the Confessor knows it well, and yet for shame or fear dares not refuse him absolution.* In this case he answers, that the Confessor who hath made 3960
this fault, ought to endeavour to make this penitent return to Confession; and after he hath accused himself of the sins which he hath committed since his last Confession, [z] *to demand of him in general, if he be sorry for all his sins past, and if he were not ready to confess them a new if there were need, in the best manner he could,* without troubling himself that he makes him commit another new Sacriledge in confessing himself, as at first, without discovering all his sins, and in wilfull concealing of a part; and yet when he hath drawn these words from his mouth, he wills that he be content therewith, and that he give him absolution: *Quo habito, absolvat. n.* 372.

[x] *Quid agendum Confessori cum defectum aliquem commisit in confessione contra ejus substantiam?* Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 1. tract. 7. c. 12. n. 369. p. 211.

[y] *Tertio quia pœnitens non sit rite dispositus quoad dolorem aut integritatem, & id à Confessario agnoscitur, sed ob verecundiam aut timorem non est ausus negare absolutionem.*

[z] *Generaliter interroget an de omnibus præcedentibus doleat, & quantum potest si necessarium esset denuo paratus sit ad ea confitenda.* Ibid.

He pretends that he is not bound to give himself so much trouble neither, nor his penitent, [a] if he fears not that some scandal will arise thereupon, or some other

[a] *Si sequatur grave incommodum aut scandalum, non tenetur.*

inconvenience. For in that case he gives him an expedient yet much more easie, that is, *that he may be content that he hath regret for his sin*, in saying in his mind or with his mouth, *that he is sorry, and so he shall leave his penitent in his good persuasion.* He pre-supposeth in expounding this difficulty, that this penitent is in a naughty disposition, *quia pœnitens non sit rectè dispositus quoad dolorem aut intentionem*; and that the Confessor knows it, *& id a Confessario agnoscitur*; and yet though no new thing have since happened, besides the absolution which he received in this bad estate, which is made still worse by this Sacrilege, he thinks that
3970 he is become well disposed, and that the Confessor may conceive that he is in good condition, and that he ought to let him rest therein, assuring himself that he shall be justified, and that he shall receive grace by the Confessions which he shall make in time to come; *quia per subsequentes Confessiones justificabitur*, though he continue to make them always in the same manner, retaining those sins which he concealed wilfully the first time. He had need to have an extraordinary strong Faith, that can believe that such a man is in a good estate, and that it is lawfull thus to play with Sacraments, Consciences, and Religion.

*Amicus* proposeth a case almost alike; [b] *It is questioned*, saith he, *if a Confessor, who knows evidently that a penitent hath committed a sin, and hath not confessed himself thereof, ought to admonish him of it?* He addes, to make himself to be better understood, [c] *that the difficulty is only when the Confessor knows evidently, not only that the penitent hath committed this sin, but also that he hath not confessed it.* He acknowledges frankly as a certain principle, that a Confessor cannot absolve a penitent when he believes that he is in mortal sin; And after he answers in these terms, [d] *In this occurrent the Confessor may judge, that the penitent hath concealed his sin for some good or just reason; and for that he may absolve him with a safe conscience.* The reason he makes use of for a foundation to build this answer on, is, [e] *that a prudent Confessor may judge probably, that the sin in question is of it self, and indeed*
3980 *or according to some probable opinion of the penitent, of such a nature, that he is not obliged to tell it in Confession.*

*Satis est Confessi dolore de peccato commisso, & relinquere pœnitentem in bona fide.* Ibid. n. 373.

b *Dubitatur an Confessarius videns aperte pœnitentem commisisse peccatum, & illud non confessum; teneatur illum de tali peccato monere?* Amicus tom. 3. disp. 25. sect. 3. p. 2. c. 2.

c *Solum difficultas est quando Confessario non constat evidenter de peccato non confesso.* Ibid.

d *Cæterum in casu proposito potest Confessarius judicare quod pœnitens commissum peccatum tacuerit justa aliqua ex causa; & conscientia poterit illum absolvere.* Ibid.

e *Probabiliter prudens Confessarius judicare potest pœnitentem non confiteri peccatum illud vel reipsa, vel juxta probabilem opinionem pœnitentis ipse putat non esse in confessione explicandum.* Ibid.

This is not only simply to oblige a Confessor to yield an entire submission to a sinner, contrary to the nature of his charge, which requires that he should receive it from him; but also to yield unto him a blind submission and obedience, without knowing even what he thinks: which is not only shamefull and extravagant for a Director and a Guide, who ought to conduct, and not suffer himself to be conducted, and follow those who are under his charge, without knowing whither they go, nor what way they take; but it is also unjust in a Confessor, who being a Judge, and a Divine Judge, holding the place of *Jesus Christ*, cannot judge in that manner without cognisance of the Cause, but by Sacrilegious rashness and unjustice, concluding that an opinion which he knows not, is probable, and that an action which he hath all the reason in the world to mistrust, is innocent.

*Filliutius* declares openly, that he desires to oblige men, and comply with their humours, when he saith, that the Ecclesiasticks are not obliged under mortal sin, to have any manner of attention in rehearsing their Office: For reporting the opinion of those who hold, [f] *that no man is obliged under mortal sin, to have any inward attention: I answer*, saith he, *this opinion is probable.* He confesseth indeed that the contrary is more probable, but according to his principles it is sufficient that this same is probable, to follow it with a safe conscience, in quitting the more probable. And the reason which induceth him to approve this opinion is, [g] *because it is very accommodant and conformable to mans frailty, and to the difficulty*
3990 *which men have commonly to settle their spirits a long time upon one thing.* He is not content at all that this opinion is indulgent to the softness and fickleness of men;

f *Neminem teneri sub mortali ad attentionem internam. Respondeo & dico primo hanc primam opinionem probabilem esse.* Filliutius tom. 2. qq. mor. tr. 23. c. 8. n. 253. p. 126.

g *Quia satis accommodata est hominum fragilitati & difficultati quam humana intellectus experitur in attendendo diu uni rei.* Ibid.

but he cannot forbear to declare, that it is even for this cause that he approves it, and to testifie that the Jesuits Divinity hath for its scope to flatter and nourish vices, instead of fighting with, and destroying them.

*Celot* having undertaken to defend the Casuists of his Society, saith, that one of the conveniences which may be received thereby is, that it delivers men from scruples which trouble them, that it discharges them of restitutions which they believe themselves obliged to make, and gives them expedients to break marriages after they have been lawfully contracted. [h] *A man*, saith he, *agitated by the remorses of his conscience, and all torn with the wounds it hath given him, addresses himself to you: He acknowledges that he must do that which he fears more than death; he desires it also, but can never obtain force to resolve upon it. He would save himself and his wealth both at once, but this is impossible: The desire to save his Soul presseth him on one side, and that of preserving his Estate, his Honour, his Family, presses him on the other side. What shall become of his Wife, of his Children, of his whole Family great and honourable, for a private one?* See here without doubt a man in a strange estate, and a sick person reduced to extremity betwixt life and death: He had need of some extraordinary medicine to succour him, and above all with that sweetness which is necessary for a spirit that is almost in despair. A learned Doctor may see some little ray of light, after he hath a long time pondered upon an affair so difficult and encumbered. *Omnia ut doctius es versanti tibi radius consilii non incommodi affulget.* But you shall never meet with day, nor entire clearness, untill you seek it amongst the Jesuits, the principal of whom are as the shining Stars and Sun of Divinity, who by their influences will in a moment recover this desperate spirit. *Hunc tibi scrupulum eximant* Suarez, *aut* Lessius, *aut* Molina; *aut omnes tres consulti casum tuum explicent, rationibus stabiliant, securam faciant conscientiam tuam.* After this there is no means, according to *Celot*, to hinder them from kissing their Books, and lifting up their cryes of Joy unto Heaven: *Non erumpes in cœlum? non triumphabis gaudio? Abstinebit cliens ille tuus ab osculo libris salutaribus imprimendo?* 4000

But he confirms this goodly discourse by an History worthy to be rehearsed: [i] *I knew*, saith he, *a certain man who carried a great sum of money by the order of his Confessor; but passing by the Shop of a Book-seller his Friend, he staid there, and asked if he had any new Book? He was presented with a Book of Moral Divinity, printed a while before; which turning over negligently, and without any design, he by accident met with his own proper case, and learned that he was not at all obliged to restitution. Whereupon discharging himself of his scruple, and keeping his Coyn, he returned lighter hearted than he came.* This man was condemned by his Confessor to make restitution: He is resolved thereon: He is upon the point of doing it. He had already taken the money which was necessary thereto, and was in his way to carry it back to him to whom it appertained: A novel Casuist of the Society hindred him. See the fruit of this obliging Divinity. 4010

And *Celot* pretends that this fruit was so great, and the happiness so rare for this sinner to have met this Book, which hindred him from making restitution, that he fears not to take it for a principal effect of his eternal Predestination, saying, [k] *It is true that this happened to him by accident, but this accident was no other than the providence of God, the protection of his Guardian Angel, and the effect of the eternal Predestination of this man.* [l] *God would*, saith he, *that the golden chain of his salvation should be formed not of those eleven hundred links of Gold of which the Poets speak, but of this single occurrent which he happened on in this Book: If this Author had not written, this Reader had not been saved.* And addressing himself to his adversary by a jollity worthy of this Divinity, [m] *I pray you,* 4020

h *Accedit ad te perplexo vir animo, lancinantibus conscientiæ vulneribus cruentatus: videt faciendum quod morte gravius timet: vult quæ ut faciat nunquam inducetur: & suæ omnia salva cupit; sed fieri non potest. Hinc urget animæ salus; hinc honoris, honorum, familiæ. Quid tot liberi? Quid plena, ut inter cives, dignitate domus?* Celot l. 8. c. 16. p. 717.

i *Scimus repertum aliquando qui summam ingentem pecuniæ Confessarii judicio restituendam deferret, atque ex itinere in amici Bibliopolæ officina consisteret. In qua rogatus num aliquid novi? oblatus est recens Theologiæ Moralis scriptor, quem ille negligentius & omnia alia cogitans cum evolvit, in casum forte suum incidit, & restituendi obligationem solutam didicit. Tum tum vero abjecta scrupuli sarcina, recepto auri pondere, levigrem domum repetiisse.* Ibid.

k *Casu quidem, sed qui in Dei providentia, in Angeli custodia, in ultra Prædestinationis effectus erat.*

l *Aureum salutis catenam jam inde ab æterno, non ex illis centum & mille, sed ex hoc uno pendere voluit Deus. Nisi scriberet hic, non salvaretur ille.* Ibid.

m *Annabo te, Petre Aprili, tu qui dives es & nullius eges, ne per Christi viscera pauperibus invide librum unum, quem ipsis æterna Dei electio, sanguis Christi comparavit.* Ibid.

ſaith he, *and conjure you by the bowels of Jeſus Chriſt, being rich as you are, and needing nothing, envy not unto the poor a Book which was prepared for them from all eternity, by the love which God had to them, and which was purchaſed for them with the blood of Jeſus Chriſt.*

He teſtifies that this perſon who went to make reſtitution by the order of his Confeſſor, went to damn himſelf eternally, if he had not been diverted by this new Caſuiſt of the Society; that this was a trace altogether extraordinary, of the providence of God, a particular protection of his good Angel, and an effect of his Predeſtination, that he fell upon this Caſuiſt who recovered him into the way of heaven, by withdrawing him from the obedience of his Confeſſor, and the reſolution he had taken by his advice to make reſtitution: that he had been a loſt man, if the Jeſuit had not written, and cauſed his Book to be imprinted; *niſi ſcriberet hic, non ſalvaretur ille.* That he had no leſs obligation unto God, for having cauſed him to meet this Book, than for having loved him from all eternity, and for giving him his Son *Jeſus Chriſt*; becauſe indeed this Book is one mark of the eternal love of God towards him, and a particular gift thereof; and finally, that *Jeſus Chriſt* had bought this Book for him at the price of his blood, as a neceſſary means unto his ſalvation; *Quem æterna Dei dilectio, ſanguis Chriſti comparavit.*

Theſe whimſies and extravagancies would ſeem incredible, if they had not been printed and repreſented in the Authors own proper words; and it is certain, that if
4030 this diſcourſe were reported, whoſoever ſhould hear it, being only ſound in his wits, without diſcovering unto him the Author, he would quickly ſay, and with juſt reaſon, that this was neither the diſcourſe of a Monk, nor a Chriſtian, and that he muſt be under extreme ignorance, or contempt of God, of Religion, and of the light of Chriſtianity, who could utter ſuch language, which tended only to eſtabliſh libertiniſm and impiety.

Father *Cauſin* in a Book which he intituled, *An Apology for the Religious of the Society of Jeſus*, having undertaken to excuſe the unhappy Doctrine which F. *Hereau* taught in their Colledge of *Clermont* at *Paris*; *He did not conſider*, ſaith he, *that there are Doctrines like unto thoſe trees which do no hurt in one Country, and ſpoil all when they are tranſplanted into another; and there are Diſputations which it may be would be found good in* Italy, *and in* Spain, *which when they come into this Realm, look with clear another face; as alſo certain Maxims that are very good in* France, *which cannot be reliſhed in* Spain. This proves very ſufficiently that which we ſaid, that the Doctrine and Spirit of the Jeſuits addicts it ſelf entirely to the humours of men, and depends on the difference of times and places. For he diſowns not the pernicious maxims of F. *Hereau*, but only his carriage of them: he blames him not for having written contrary to the opinions of the Society, when he taught, that we might attempt againſt the lives of all men generally, without excepting Princes, and cauſe Children yet unborn, to dye in the wombs of their Mothers, as we ſhall make appear in its place; but only to have wanted diſcretion,
4040 and to have offended againſt that rule of the Society which F. *Celot* relates: [n] *When there are opinions of any Author whatſoever, that are not well received in ſome Province or Univerſity, and which offend the Spirits of the Catholicks, that they be careſull not to teach them nor maintain them in thoſe places. For when the Doctrine of Faith is not in queſtion, nor the integrity of manners, ſage and prudent charity wills that ours comply with the humours of thoſe amongſt whom they live.*

n *Quæ opiniones cujuſcunque Autoris ſint, in aliqua Provincia aut Academia Catholica graviter offendere ſcientur, eas ibi non doceant neque defendant. ubi enim nec fidei doctrina, nec morum integritas in diſcrimen adducitur, prudens charitas exigit ut noſtri ſe illis accommodent cum quibus verſantur.* Reg. Prof. Scholaſt. ſect. 6.

The ſame F. *Cauſin* anſwering to that which was objected againſt the Society, that the ſum of F. *Bauny* cenſured at *Rome*, and many other like Books of his Fraternity, teaching pernicious maxims, were again after the cenſure of the Holy Chair, imprinted with permiſſion of their Superiors, and approbation of the principal of the Society, he ſaith, *That the Books of their Writers fall ſometimes into the hands of ſome eaſie Fathers, who out of the high fore-ſtalled opinion they have of the capacity of their Authors, ſuffer their Works to paſs with great facility.*

Indeed it were not reaſonable to expect that they who are ſo gentle and complacent towards Strangers, ſhould be leſs towards their Brethren. For as for juſtice, fidelity, and truth towards our Neighbour, or the Publick, they are not accuſtomed to put themſelves to much trouble in what concerns them, and to cover their intereſts and luſts with the name of charity and ſweetneſs, and a complacency which is in the bottom altogether humane and intereſted.

But he gives alſo more power unto Princes, over their Divines and their Books of the Society, than to the Authors of theſe Books, or their Superiors. *Others,* ſaith he, *to whom oppoſition is made, write either at* Rome *by the commandment of the Pope, or in other Countries at the inſtance of Foreign ſevere Princes, who carry things at their pleaſure, with a high hand; ſo that it comes to paſs oftentimes, that they have no more power over their Books, than over the Winds or Stars.* So the Books of the Jeſuits fall ſometimes *into the hands of certain of their eaſie Fathers,* who let them paſs eaſily, and their Authors, *whatſoever they advance: otherwhiles they fall* into the violent hands of Foreign Princes, who do what they pleaſe with the ſame Books and Authors; ſo that the Superiors *have no more power over them, than over the Winds or Stars.* It muſt needs be that the Spirit and Divinity of the Jeſuits is very manageable, very pliant, and very obſequious, that they may make of it whatſoever they will, or rather whatſoever the Princes and Grandees of the World would have. After this confeſſion they have made themſelves, we may ſay, that they are very near the eſtate which the Jews were in, when the Prophet objected unto them; ° *The Prince demands what he pleaſes, and the Judge ſpeedily grants it him; and the mighty man doth only declare his deſire, and they trouble and intangle his conſcience,* heartning him in wicked deſigns by falſe reaſons, inſtead of oppoſing, or redreſſing and regulating them by the Law of God, and maxims of the Goſpel.

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° *Princeps poſtulat, & Judex in reddendo eſt, & magnus loquutus eſt deſiderium animæ ſuæ, & conturbaverunt eam.* Micheæ 7. v. 3.

This is to acknowledge and declare himſelf a ſlave in an abject manner, *to violent powers and ſtrangers,* as this Jeſuit talks, to ſay as he doth, ſpeaking for the whole Society, *that they carry things with a high hand,* as they liſt, againſt them and their Divines; and this ſlavery is yet in this more ſhamefull, and leſs excuſable, becauſe it is voluntary: ſince many times they ſtay not till they be ſought out and urged, but they preſent themſelves, and offer their pens and their Divinity, which by rendring every thing probable, is capable to maintain and overturn whatſoever they pleaſe; and they muſt engage themſelves in a ſtrange manner, and enter into an extraordinary vaſſallage, ſince they declare, that after they have ſo addicted themſelves to the Grandees of the World, and have devoted unto them their Spirits and Learning, that their Superiors have *no more power over their Books,* which they compoſe, and which they cauſe to be printed, *than over the Winds and Stars,* who receive their motions not from Celeſtial intelligences, but from Terreſtrial and Temporal powers. It is eaſie to judge by this what their fidelity may be, and what reaſon there is to confide in their Diſcourſe and Divinity ſo fickle and voluntary, not only for private perſons, but alſo for Princes, ſince being thus for all, they are for none, and abandoning truth ſo eaſily, they will yet more eaſily forſake men, according as their intereſts ſhall require them.

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## ARTICLE IV.

### *That the Jesuits Divinity is subject to contradictions, and change in opinions.*

THey that are not at all informed of the maxims of the Jesuits, wonder when they hear say that they are so little constant and faithfull in their words, and in their actions: others who have some knowledge of their opinions, report, that ordinarily the cause of this proceeds from the Doctrine of equivocations, of which they make profession. But those who know them better, give thereof a reason more clear and more easie, drawn from the principles of their Divinity: For there is no need to have recourse to equivocations to deceive, if we believe we may lye with a good conscience; and it seems foolish to rack ones wits to find a word with double sense, to cover and disguise his thought, if he be perswaded that it is lawfull to speak and do quite contrary to what he thinks, and to quit his own opinion to follow that of another, when he finds it more favourable for him; keeping still the liberty to resume his own, and to follow it when he shall have occasion for it, and so to pass from the one to the other, giving unto the same difficulties contrary advices and resolves, following his own humour, or complying with theirs who demand his counsel.

These are the certain maxims of the Jesuits Divinity, as I have made appear above; after which it ought not be thought strange, that they are so inconstant in all their wayes, that they believe they may affirm and deny, approve and condemn the same things, and that we see nothing but disguises and contradictions in their words and carriages.

One of their most ordinary contradictions, is to acknowledge Truths in their general Propositions, and to destroy them in the particulars and practice.

This may be seen clearly in F. *Bauny* in many places of his Books, as in his *Summe* c. 3. p. 49. where speaking of Penance, he agrees, *that if we look for heaven and eternal life, without first doing penance for our sins, it is mortal sin.* And in the 43. ch. and 69. p. he declares, that pardon of sin, and correction, are two things inseparable; and that the one is not given, but after the other: *Non datur venia nisi correcto.* And in the 38. ch. p. 589. speaking of a Confessor, and of the cognisance he ought to have of the disposition of a penitent: *In truth,* saith he, *as he holds the place of a Judge in the Sacrament, as saith the Council in the 14. session and 9. ch. he cannot, nor ought pass sentence, but on what he hath a full and perfect cognisance of.* And in the following page he cites the C. *Omnis utriusque sexus*, where the Confessor is spoken of in these terms: [a] *He ought carefully inform himself of the circumstances which respect the sinner, as well as which respect his sin, that he may judge prudently what counsel he ought to give him, and what remedy he ought to prescribe him; making use of sundry experiments to cure his disease.*

[a] *Debet diligenter inquirere & peccatoris circumstantias & peccati, quibus prudenter intelligat quale debeat ei præbere consilium, & cujusmodi remedium adhibere, diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum ægrum.*

And in his Practique, book 1. chap. 14. pag. 121. speaking of the principal things whereof a Bishop ought to inform himself in making a Visitation in his Diocess, he observes this same, which is taken out of the second Council of *Rome*, under *Charlemain*, and *Leo* 3. in the 16. ch. That they should observe, [b] *how the Confessors judged of the sins of the penitents, and what time of penance they prescribed them.*

[b] *Quinto quomodo confitentium peccata dijudicant, & tempus pœnitentiæ constituunt.*

The other Jesuits acknowledge with him the same maxims, as the fundamental rules of Penance: but after they have acknowledged them in general, they overturn and violate them in their conduct: they even condemn those that would observe them, and establish others quite contrary, without fear of falling not only into manifest contradictions, but also into a visible contempt of those Truths which they have acknowledged, and of rendring themselves by this carriage unexcusable before God and men.

So F. *Bauny* saith in the 46. ch. of his *Summe*, p. 717. *That notwithstanding great and frequent relapses, a sinner who resorts to the feet of a Priest to put an end to his sins past*, dignus est absolutione toties quoties, *deserves to have his pardon*, quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio, *when he is not observed to have amended his life at all.* Never troubling himself to agree this with the rule which he established before, *Non datur venia nisi correcto, No pardon without amendment.* For he consents not only that a man deserves pardon for his sin, and that absolution is to be given him though he be not amended, *quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio*; but he pretends also that it ought to be given him as often as he demands it in this estate, *toties quoties*, though it be believed that he will not correct himself in the time to come, though he promise it: *Because*, as he saith, *such resolutions are presumed to come no farther than from the teeth outwards.*

And in the 40. ch. 650. p. he saith, *That if any one of ignorance and simplicity have accused himself of his faults only in gross, without determining any one in particular, it will not be needfull to draw out of his mouth the repetition of such faults.* As if he had a design to recant what he had said above, *That a Confessor who holds the place of a Judge in this Sacrament, as the Council speaks in the 14. sess. and 19. chap. cannot pass sentence but of what he hath an entire and full cognisance.*

In the 5. ch. 68. p. *It sufficeth not*, saith he, *to discharge our duty, to say to a Confessor that we have stolen in notable quanity sufficient to offend mortally, if we do not rate and specifie the sum: because he ought to know the condition of his penitent, which cannot easily be done, unless he unfold unto him the value of his theft.* And yet in the 39. ch. 616. p. he is not afraid to maintain the contrary in these terms: *It is not necessary in Confession to relate the said circumstance*, the quantity of the theft, as whether one stole five, or fifty Crowns. *It will suffice in rigour to say to his Confessor, that in matter of stealth he hath sinned mortally, taking from another the summe which maketh and constituteth that sin.*

In the 3. ch. 46. p. he saith, *That he who receiveth the Supper, or hears a Sermon without applying his heart thereto, ought not to be esteemed an Hugenot.* But in the 20. ch. 336. p. he saith, *That he who without intention of idolizing it, doth bend his knee before an Idol, shall yet be held for an Idolater.* As if to receive the Supper amongst Hugenots, were not as well an action of an Hugenot, as to kneel before an Idol is an action of an Idolater.

In the same 20. ch. p. 332. he speaks thus: *Since true devotion is inward, and not in the demeanour, or without, and in the countenance and other exteriour gestures, and that this pretended devotion, destitute of that which is within, is but a vizor and idol of devotion, the case is resolved, that in voluntary distraction and wandring of the mind in praying by obligation, as do Priests, Deacons, and Subdeacons, and Beneficiaries, there is sin; and so they be obliged to begin the Office again, which they have said with so much indevotion. For the will of the Church is, that by this action which it commands them, they should praise and pray to their Creator. And can they do that, having nothing less whilst they pray than God before their eyes? They ought then for to satisfie their duty, begin their Office again, and if they fail to do it, they ought to make restitution to the Church wherein their Benefice is, or to the poor, the benefit they have received according to the rate of their omissions.*

And on the contrary he saith, *That the Church seemeth to him, in the precept of reciting the Hours, to exact of the Priests and those who are obliged thereto, only to honour and praise God: chaunting Psalms and singing, though with voluntary distraction, wherein they continue, provided that they sing tunably and with reverence.* Of which he renders this reason in the same place: *For the outward action by which we attend on God, is of the kind and appertains unto the vertue of Religion: Therefore as they who without intention of Idolatry bow their knee before an Idol, are notwithstanding guilty of Idolatry; so we must believe that they pray, who recite the Office though without intention, but not without that decency and outward composure which such an action requires.*

And a few lines after he reasons thus, and draws this practique conclusion: *It follows that the Confessor cannot blame the penitent of a mortal fault, for applying his mind to frivolous things, whilst that his tongue sounded in the Church with others the praises of God, if outwardly he did nothing that was incompatible with this attention.*

*tion.* 2. *He shall not oblige him to repetition of any thing he had said, because pronouncing it in such manner, he hath accomplished the precept; neither is he for all that obliged to make restitution of the fruits received from his Benefice, if it be so that he have any.*

And yet he hath not only said the contrary before, but he returns again to it in the 13. ch. 163. p. *The said Beneficiaries shall be obliged to make restitution of the fruits they have received of their Benefices, when they say their Hours but imperfectly, with voluntary distractions which endure the whole Office, or the greater part thereof.* Of which he renders this reason: *Because not to rehearse his Hours at all, and to do it indecently, without respect, attention and reverence, is all one before God, because he is equally contemned and dishonoured in both.*

It would be hard to find in two Authors, who had different designs to contradict and refute one another, opinions so opposite, and contradictions so visible. For these oppose one another in their principles, in their conclusions, and in their reasons, which serve for proofs, saying quite contrary things, drawing quite contrary conclusions, and propping them with reasons quite contrary; as is visible in the passage I now rehearsed, which need not be any further cleared.

And that which is yet more astonishing, is that they make these so strange changes almost in a moment; and they may be met with sometimes in the same page, and sometimes within two or three lines, as may appear in some of the places which I have cited. But I cannot pass by one important and manifest contradiction of the same Author, which is found in his Practique in the 3. book, 44. ch. 727. p. For after he had said in the precedent page, that *the Ordinary may and ought admonish the Rectors to execute their charges themselves; whereunto if they were not obedient, they might be deprived.* He addes in approbation of this carriage: *And indeed the contrary customs seems to me only an inveterate errour, which through length of time becomes greater and more abusive; quia diuturnitas temporis non minuit, sed auget peccatum.*

And yet in the same Book, 43. ch. 715, & 716. pages, after that he had said, that the Rectors are obliged to reside on their Cures, he enquires whether custom may dispense with their Residence? *In this affair,* saith he, *one difficulty is moved, to wit, whether custom not to reside on Cures, can shelter as well from the sin, as the punishment appointed by the Council against those who fail, which is, that they should have no benefit by such Cures?* He answers, that *Layman* and *Navarre* hold the affirmative, and he confirms it by this reason: *Because according to the common axiom, that which the Pope may grant by dispensation or special priviledge to any person, custom gives to all a discharge thereof, and that without fear, especially when it is for a long time observed in the Church.* Citing for this opinion a sentence taken from the *Const. in 6. c. 1. Consuetudo vim habet legis; Custom hath the force of a Law.*

It appears clearly that in one place he saith, that *the use of not residing upon Cures, is no other thing than an inveterate errour;* and in the other place, *that custom of not residing gives a discharge to all.*

In one place he saith, that *length of time renders the errour of Non-residence greater and more abusive;* in the other, that *a custom of Non-residence, frees all from the forfeiture of their Revenue, especially if this custom be of long continuance in the Church.*

It seems that this liberty of maintaining and publishing contrarieties, is granted the Jesuits by their Superiors, with permission to print these Books wherein such contrarieties are found. Therefore it is less strange, that their Superiors pretend to have this right as well as private persons, and make use of it without scruple in occurrents wherein they judge it advantageous to the good of their affairs, as it did appear by the answer of F. *Cotton* to the Gentlemen of the Parliament of *Paris*, upon the matter of *Santarel*'s Book, which is well enough known in *Paris*, and in *France*. For those Gentlemen objecting to him, that *Viteleschi* General of the Society had approved the Book, he answered together with three other Jesuits that accompanied him as their Provincial: *That the General could not do otherwise, because they at* Rome *would have him do so.* The Gentlemen of the Parliament demanded of him, if he were of the same judgement, and approved such proceedings?

ceedings? He confessed that as for *Samarel's* Book, he did not approve it at all; but as to the action of the General, if he had been at *Rome* he would have done as he did. Which gave one of the Commissioners occasion to say to them; *You have then one conscience for* Rome, *and another for* Paris: and to the Gentlemen his Colleagues to say, *God defend us from such Confessors.* 4150

Two or three months after, the Gentlemen of the Parliament having proposed unto them certain Articles, extracted out of the Book of *Samarel*, that they might condemn them, and others contrary to them, that they might approve them; they did both without much trouble. And yet they have since put this Book of *Samarel*, with those of the *English* Jesuits, against the safety of Kings, and authority of Bishops, and against the Discipline of the Church, into the Catalogue of the Books of their Society, though they had declared and protested publickly, that these Books did not proceed from their Society, and that they were falsly attributed unto them. And lately also F. *le Moine* in his Apology speaks thus of these very Books: *We have declared a long time since, that we know not these Authors, which we believe not to be of our Society; and also at this day we may protest in sincerity, that they are as unknown to us as they were before.*

He is not afraid to give the lye to his General *Viteleschi*, and other Divines of his Society, who have approved the Book of the Jesuit *Alagambe*, which ascribes these Books to the very Authors Jesuits, to whom they have been alwayes attributed. 4160 But Father *le Moine*, who knew them not at *Paris*, would have known them at *Rome* it may be, if he had been there; and this same sincerity which made him protest that he knew them not in *France*, would have made him in *Flanders* or in *Italy* have declared quite contrary, by the rule of the Society, which wills that they comply with the times, places and humours of all the World.

This manner of acting and speaking is ordinary enough amongst the Jesuits, and they are already so accustomed to contradictions, that they fear no more the reproach which is cast upon them continually for defending vice and errour; but they are rather ready to glory therein, and shortly to make publick profession thereof, since *Dicastillus* pretends, instead of blaming *Diana* for contradicting himself frequently in his answers, he doth rather praise and thank him, as for some signal service which he would do the publique, in obliging the World, and complying with the necessities and desires of those who consult with him. [c] *You see*, saith he, *that this Author is contrary to himself, which happens unto him not once only; and he deserves not to be reproved for it, but rather to be thanked. This man who labours for the publique good, having compleated himself with great reading, complying to the necessity, and even unto the desire of those who consult with him; 4170 follows sometimes one opinion, and sometimes another, when both are supported by some probable reason, or the authority of learned men.*

c Ecce hic Autor (Diana) *sibi contrarius est; id tamen, quod illi non semel contigit, non reprehensione, sed gratiarum actione dignum est.* *Nempe vir pro communi bono laborans, & communi utilitati serviens, plurima lectione dives & copiosus pro occurrenti consultationum & quæstionum exigentia rationem desiderio, jam huic, jam illi parti adhæret, quando pars utraque probabili ratione, & doctorum virorum auctoritate nititur, & in praxi usuque versatur tutum est. Voluit autem nobis in medium proferre ad hunc ipsum finem quid in una, quid in alia occasione responderit quærentibus. Quid quæso utilius pro praxi. Hæc obiter dixerim, ut fatescere jubeam nescio quos invidos, qui hæc & si quæ sint similia erudito viro non verentur objicere.* Dicastillus de Sacr. Euch. tr. 4. dis. 10. dub. 5. n. 110.

He observes very well, that *Diana* falls into many contradictions, by following and teaching divers probable opinions which were contrary; and that he was induced hereunto by a Spirit of Complacency, and the desire which he had *to comply with the necessity, profit, and even the desire of the persons who consulted with him.* So that by his own confession there is great alliance, and necessary consequence betwixt Probability, Contradiction, and a Spirit of Compliance and Complacency, which to satisfie the desires and interests of men, hath invented the Science of Probability, and that they may make use of it more freely, and more agreeably unto the will of the people of the World, thus trouble not themselves though they fall into contradictions, whilst they follow all sorts of opinions.

In another place speaking again of *Diana*, he saith, [d] *That he cannot read without admiration, because his learning and his obsequiousness contend for the prize, in*

d Nec sine admiratione legi in Diana, *in quo eruditio cum benignitate de humana certat, dum casus resolvit eruditè juxta & benignè, & plures ac varias, imo etiam oppositas sententias rationabiles reperit & admittit.* Dicast. de pecat. tract. 8. disp. 9. dub. 8. num. 351.

*his reſolves which he gives in Caſes of Conſcience, with as great benignity and ac-*
*commodation, as learning: admitting as probable many different, and many times*
*contrary opinions.*

*Tambourin* ſeems to deſign to lay the firſt foundations of this Science, and to diſpoſe mens minds to receive it, when ſpeaking of himſelf, and confeſſing that he happens often to fall into contradictions, yet he will not have [e] *us ſay, nor ſo much as ſuſpect that he is contrary to himſelf, when we ſee him approve an opinion which in another place he hath not received; becauſe he hath not done it, but in that either of them ſeemed probable unto him.*

[e] *Neque me hic contrarium eſſe ſuſpicetur is qui forte animadvertit me interdum aliquam ſententiam approbare quam alias non ſum amplexus. Id enim tunc ſolum facio quando utraque ſententia probabilis à me judicatur, quod non eſt mihi adverſari, ſed docere potius ſententias illas poſſe ad libitum tuto eligi.* Tambor. l. 1. Decal. cap. 3. ſect. 7.

To authorize Uſury, and give it a free courſe in the World, the Jeſuits have found no means more ſhort and eaſie, than to take from it that name which is ſo odious, and to ſay to them who exerciſe it, that they ſhould not call it Uſury any more. *Tambourin* here makes uſe of the ſame expedient to eſtabliſh the Science of Contradictions; he will not have us to call them Contradictions, nor that we ſhould ſay that he contradicts himſelf, when he affirms contrary things, and which deſtroy one another.

## CHAP. II.

### Of Evil Cuſtoms.

*That the Jeſuits allow thoſe which corruption hath introduced into all ſorts of conditions, and make uſe of them to excuſe ſins and vices.*

THE miſchiefs and diſorders which come from evil Examples and Cuſtoms cannot be expreſſed; and we may ſay, that theſe are the moſt ordinary means, and the moſt forcible and puiſſant armes which are imployed at this day to deſtroy Chriſtian Truth and Piety, and to authorize Corruption and Looſeneſs, which abounds ſo much amongſt all ſorts of conditions.

We made it appear juſt now in the former Chapter, that F. *Banny* excuſes by cuſtom, and delivers from all fear and ſcruple the Pariſh Prieſts who are Non-reſident. *The cuſtom*, ſaith he, in his Practique 43. ch. 716. p. 3. book, *gives a diſcharge from all, and this without fear; eſpecially when it hath been long obſerved in the Church.*

*Tambourin* takes this rule from *Caſtro-Palao*, *That in ten years Cuſtom preſcribes againſt Law, or againſt another cuſtom legally introduced: ſo that if they have not been obſerved during that time, they oblige no more: and whether they were not obſerved by right or wrong, on a good or bad account, they may be preſcribed againſt by this number of years.* After this we need not wonder if the Jeſuits trouble themſelves but little about the Laws of the Church, ſince there are none happily againſt which they have not preſcribed on a good or bad account. 4200

*Dicaſtillus* by the ſame principle ſaith, that *the Judges ſin in adminiſtring Juſtice on Feſtival dayes, unleſs the cuſtom have preſcribed to the contrary.*

*Eſcobar* upon this queſtion, [a] *How much ſooner may we begin than the hour ordained for ſaying Matines?* ſaith frankly according to his opinion, and of the principal Doctors of the Society whom he had read and examined, that we may without ſcruple begin Matines at three or four of the clock after noon, for the day following, becauſe it is the cuſtom of many at this day. [b] *The uſage of* Rome, ſaith he, *and the ordinary cuſtom of the Church is favourable unto them.* But he ought to have conſidered, that there are cuſtoms which are abuſes, and not uſages, and that the Church approves not all that it tollerates, and that it is to wrong it to attribute a cuſtom unto it which it hath ſo oftentimes condemned, and which it doth yet daily condemn by the ſame mouth of thoſe who follow it, in the moſt part of the Hymnes which they ſay at Matines and Lauds, wherein the times to ſay theſe two parts of the Office is expreſly marked and determined.

He goes yet further, ſaying, that [c] *he who ſaith Matines an hour or two before noon, ſins mortally*; becauſe this is not the cuſtom. For according to his maxim, if it were once introduced into practice, it were no more ſin, no not venial, no more than to ſay them after noon. See here his words: [d] *But if the cuſtom allow it, Matines may be ſaid at half three, or at three of the clock after noon, without venial ſin.* 4210

a *Quanto tempore poteſt anteverti Matutinum?* Eſcobar tract. 5. exam. 6. c. 9. n. 55. p. 661. & 662.

b *Uſus Romanus, communiſque Eccleſiæ mos ſuffragatur.*

c *Qui autem hora prima aut ſecunda ante meridiem recitaret, mortali crimine fœdaretur.* Ibid.

d *Si autem conſuetudo tulerit, hora tertia aut ſecunda cum dimidia poſt meridiem poterit Matutinum recitari ſine veniali peccato.* Ibid.

Matines may be ſaid without ſcruple, according to this Caſuiſt, at four of the clock, becauſe ſuch is the cuſtom; and might alſo be ſaid at half hour after two, if ſuch were the cuſtom. After the rate then that this cuſtom goes on advancing and gaining time, we may follow it without fear or ſcruple of ſin, and ſay Matines for the next day before dinner, as well as after dinner: we ſhould thence have this commodity, to have our minds more free to ſay them, and all the reſt of the day for whatever we pleaſed to do, without ſpeaking of many other reaſons which may ſerve for inducement to ſo laudable a devotion.

The Jeſuits alſo make uſe of cuſtom to authorize Duels, and pretend that it is not only lawfull to accept, but alſo to offer them. And one of the Caſuiſts of the

Society, who taught publickly at *Caen* of late years, after he had endeavoured to justifie this brutal madness by many reasons, which we shall represent in their place, concludes in this manner: [c] *These who approve not these answers, know not the manner of living, and the ordinary custom of those who are in the world. For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way.*

[c] *Qui hac responsa non probant, ignari sunt communis consuetudinis & vitæ. Licet enim homini hac ratione honorem suum tutari.*

There is no custom more wicked, nor more general amongst people of base condition, than to swear, blaspheme, and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel, men, and every thing that gives them trouble. *Bauny* considering this cursed custom, saith according to his ordinary lenity; *For my part I believe that it may be said with truth, that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported; it is no fault, neither mortal nor venial, to curse Dogs, Hawks, and other such things as are without reason.* Bauny *Sum. c. 6. p. 73.*

The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick, and which yet is very common at this day, is falshood and deceit, whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes, or in selling them dearer than they are worth, or selling them by false weights and false measures. But *Layman* following this custom saith, [f] *That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants, when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds, as Rye amongst Wheat, Water with Wine, and Pitch amongst Wax; provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it, and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs, and proper enough for common usage.*

[f] *Mercatores statim injustitiæ damnari non possunt, si merci substantiam alienam, puta triticio secale, vino aquam, picem cereæ admisceant, modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur, & merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum.* Layman l. 3. tr. 4. c. 17. n. 15.

And he confirms his opinion by that of *Lessius* and *Lopez*, saying, [g] that *Lessius* and *Lopez* assure us, that *if the mixture of the matter, which of it self is of less value, be done with such artifice and industry, that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use, than it would be without this mixture, it may be sold at the ordinary price, and take more than it is worth; because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant, and is no wrong to those that buy it.*

[g] *Addit* Lessius *n. 83. cum* Lopez *loco citato, si additio materiæ secundum se deterioris eò artificio & industria fiat ut merces non sit minus bona & idonea ad usum, quam sine tali admixtione, posse tunc consueto pretio divendi, & lucrum majus reportari; quippe quod industriæ esse censetur, & sine damno emptorum percipitur.* Ibid.

The ordinary vice of women, and principally of those of Quality, is luxury and vanity. They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish, nor a better excuse to justifie themselves in the excess they commit therein, and the scandals which fall out thereupon, than to say that it is the custom, and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition. *Bauny* approves this reason, and makes use of it in his *Summe*, ch. 46. p. 717, & 718. where he proposes this question: *If maids and women, who exceed modesty and duty, and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits, because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates, may be thought capable of absolution, when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning?*

He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity, and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed, and will so continue, are uncapable of absolution; but he declares against their judgement, and concludes in these terms: *Nevertheless we must say, 1. that the Woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband, ought not to be blamed,* though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity, and against modesty, *knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin.*

He saith moreover, *that neither is she more to be blamed,* if she trim her self in this sort with scandal, *when she doth it to satisfie the custom of the Country, and not to be singular, unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex.* He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband, and a disorderly and shamefull custom, should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity, without

being blameable; and that custom hath power to change the nature of things, to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty, that vanity shall be no longer vanity, that luxury shall not be longer luxury, and that scandal shall be no longer scandal.

He continues speaking in this manner 1. 2. *I say, though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes, nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof.* The reason is, *Because to prevent the offence of another, this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Country, and nature it self permits.* That is to say, that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her, so it makes scandal also lawfull for her, and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point, by the corruption of the World, are just and true Laws, and proper to regulate all things in a Country.

I might speak here of Usury and Symony, which are two vices so common at this day, that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others, because that custom hath made them publick. But I referr these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters, that I may avoid repetitions. 4250

# CHAP. III.

## Of the Occasions of Sin.

### *That the Jesuits retain men in them, and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin.*

ONE of the most important, and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin, is that he fly the occasions; and if we observe it, we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation, attain not to a true and solid conversion, or fall back after a while, is because they have not received this advice, or have not been faithfull in the observation of it.

This is such, that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity thereof, but they abolish it in their practice. They acknowledge in general with all Divines, that they who would receive the Grace of God, or preserve it when they have received it, are obliged to depart from the next occasions of sin, which would indubitably destroy them. But when question is made about proceeding to particulars, they grant and accommodate things in such manner, that according to their advice and guidance there are not any next occasions of sin, and there cannot even be any at all; or if happily against their proper rules they be constrained to acknowledge some, instead of withdrawing men from them, they nourish them therein, by furnishing them with store of reasons and pretexts to continue therein with a safe conscience, so that according to them there never will be found any who shall be obliged to quit or avoid them.

It is by this conduct that *Sancius*, handling this point, speaketh in these terms:

[a] *I have said formerly, that no person is obliged to avoid the next occasions of sin, when thereby some great loss will befall him: in this case it cannot be said, that he wills this occasion, but permits it only; because that he withdraws not from this occasion, is not that he would absolutely abide in it, but because he would decline the damage which this withdrawing would bring on him.*

a *Dictum est supra quod nullus teneatur occasionem proximam vitare cum magno suo detrimento; nec tunc dicetur velle occasionem, vel permittere, cum non abigere occasionem non oriatur quia velit penitus in ea permanere, sed quia velit non incurrere damnum quod abjecta occasione obveniret.* Sancius in Select. disp. 10. n. 20.

These words are general, *none is obliged, nullus tenetur*; and they comprehend all sorts of persons, even Ecclesiasticks and Religious, with whom this Jesuit dispenses in the Law of the Gospel, which obligeth them not only to lose all the things in the World, rather than suffer the loss of their souls; but also to cut off their armes and feet, and to pluck out their eyes if they offend them, that is to say, if they be occasions of sin.

The loss for which this Jesuit pretends, that *none is obliged to eschew the next occasion of sin*, how great soever it be, cannot be of things so dear as eyes, nor so necessary as hands and feet: For this cause if our Lord will have eyes pull'd out, and feet and hands cut off, by stronger reason doth he oblige to suffer all other loss to avoid offence, and to withdraw from the occasions and danger of being lost by offending God.

*Tambourin* saith almost the same thing, and attempts to justifie it by the same reason, maintaining that if any one cannot quit the occasion of sin without causing of scandal, or without suffering some damage spiritual or temporal, he is not obliged thereto, because then it may be judged morally, that this is not to seek an occasion voluntarily, but to suffer it. He determines not at all this damage spiritual or temporal, testifying that of what sort soever it be, small or great, it is sufficient to retain a man in the next occasions of sin with a good conscience.

If the reason of these Authors had been good, to wit, that he who to avoid loss, continues in the next occasion of sin, neither wills nor loves this occasion of sin,

but suffers it, because he loves it not for it self alone, but for the benefit that comes to him therein, or for the evil which he would avoid, we must say that we cannot be guilty in any occasion of sin, and that we shall never be obliged to avoid it, but when it is affected and sought out for its own sake: which hardly ever happens, men not breaking out unto evil, but for the benefits which are annexed unto them in deed, or in appearance, or to deliver themselves from other evils which they fear more. 4280

We cannot find a more proper example to clear up this, than that which *Sancius* himself presents us with in these following words: [b] *Hence it comes, saith he, that a man is not obliged to cause his Concubine to depart out of his house, if her company be very advantageous unto him, in regard of his gain by Traffick.* Which he confirms, saying the second time, [c] *That he is not obliged to put her away, if in putting her away he lose any great benefit, and that it suffices him to resolve not to sin any more.*

b *Inde nec tenebitur domo ejicere concubinam, si concubinatio sit nimis utilis ad lucrandum bona temporalia, media negotiatione.*

c *Concubinam ejicere non erit obnoxius, si ex ejectione magnum emolumentum non esset accepturus. Sufficeret enim proponere deinceps non peccare.* Ibid.

This is to justifie one vice by another, and to make use of covetousness and interest to nousle a man up in fornication. But besides this reason he produceth yet another, which is, [d] *If the Concubine be very usefull to the fornicator, to cherish him, and to keep him in good humour, so that without her he lives in melancholly, and hath great distast of the food which is prepared for him, and cannot easily find another Maid-servant who may be proper for him, he cannot be obliged in this case to put away his Concubine, because his satisfaction in these circumstances are more worth than any temporal good.*

d *Imo si Concubina nimis utilis esset ad oblectamentum concubinarii dum deficiente illa nimis ægre ageret vitam & aliæ epulæ tædio magno afficerent concubinarium, & alia famula ad id nimis difficile inveniretur, ejicere illam non erit concubinarius obligandus: quia oblectamentum, dictis circumstantiis consideratum, est majoris æstimationis quam quodcunque bonum temporale.*

We then may say boldly, that if temporal good and profit, pleasure and divertisement suffice to dispense with an Whoremaster to keep his Concubine, there will never be any obliged thereunto, because there will never be any who can want such pretences, which nevertheless appear so just unto this Jesuit, that he doth not only suffer this Whoremaster to keep his Concubine for these reasons, but he maintains also, that [e] *for these same reasons if the Concubine die, or withdraw her self, it will be lawfull for him to take another Maid-servant, what fear soever he have of falling into sin with her, if he cannot find some other who is as capable to assist him in his affairs and conveniencies. For if this reason dispense with him for not putting her away whom he hath already taken, it will also give him a right to take her whom he hath not as yet.* 4290

e *Ob quod fas erit cuique de novo admittere fœminam ad sui famulatum, quantumcunque metuat labendi periculum, si aliam non inveniat paris qualitatis illis in rebus quæ sibi sunt maxime utiles. Si namque ob hanc causam jam receptam expellere non constringitur, eodem jure de novo admittere illam erit concessum.* Ibid.

There remains nothing more now to this sort of Divines, but to pretend that it is lawfull for them to find out and direct themselves some Concubine to some distressed Whoremaster, who cannot live without one, or to exhort him that hath one not to forsake her, for fear least he should be kill'd with melancholly.

*Bauny* is not more severe in this point than *Sancius*, maintaining, [f] *That absolution may be given a woman who entertains at her house a man with whom she offends frequently, if she cannot handsomly send him away, or if she have any reason to retain him, provided she resolve firmly to sin no more with him.*

f *Sequitur ex dictis absolvi posse fœminam quæ domi suæ virum excipit cum quo sæpe peccat, si eum non potest honeste inde ejicere, cum causam aliquam habet eum retinendi, dummodo firmiter proponat se cum eo amplius non peccaturam.* Bauny Theol. mor. part. 1. tract. 4. de pœnit. q. 14. p. 94.

The principle of this conclusion is, that [g] *in exposing her self for so just a reason to the danger of sinning, she doth not directly nor expresly will the occasion of sin; but* 4300

g *Quia cum est justa causa exponendi se peccati periculo, pœnitens nec occasionem vult expresse & actu, nec peccatum ex ea consequens, sed commodum suum, nempe privationem damni in fama, honore, pecuniis; quo bono non frueretur si occasionem perditam omitteret aut vitaret.* Ibid.

*the commodity, that is to ſay, the conſervation of her repute, of her honour, or her wealth, wherein ſhe would have ſuffered loſs if ſhe had quitted or avoided the occaſion of ſin.* This is doubtleſs to have great care of her ſalvation, and to love God very well above all things, to expoſe her ſelf voluntarily to evident danger of offending him for any the leaſt temporal intereſt. This reaſon of *Bauny* is the ſame which *Sancius* expreſſeth in other terms; which teſtifies, that theſe are not the opinions of ſome particular perſons, but that have overſpread the Society it ſelf, and that they are fixed to its ſpirit and conduct.

But *Bauny* diſcovers another principle of this Doctrine, which is, that [h] *it is not a next occaſion, nor which ought to be avoided, but only when it is mortal ſin, or when it is of ſuch nature as cauſeth men fall commonly into ſin; ſo that the Confeſſor* 4310 *may judge prudently by his experience paſt, and the preſent circumſtances and diſpoſitions, that the perſon who addreſſes himſelf unto him can hardly at all, or rarely be found in this occaſion, without offending God mortally.*

h *Occaſiones proximæ ſunt id ſolum quod ex ſe eſt peccatum mortale, vel quod ex genere ſuo & natura ſua eſt tale, ut frequenter homines ſimilis conditionis ad mortale inducat, & experimento conſtat talem effectum in illis habere ut plurimum, unde Confeſſarius contendere prudenter poteſt nunquam aut raro tali occaſione pœnitentem uſurum ſine mortali culpa, habita ratione tam loci, quam temporis & aliarum circumſtantiarum quæ ad peccatum inducunt.* Ibid.

And a little after he ſaith, that [i] *if the occaſion of ſin be not evil in it ſelf, nor unto all ſorts of perſons, but only for ſome one particular perſon, it ought not be put into the number of actions that are evil in their own nature, and forbidden unto all, ſo that they ſhould never be permitted to do them.*

i *Deinde cum occaſio peccandi non ex ſe, nec omnibus ſit mala, ſed huic tantum, non poteſt in claſſem eorum operum redigi quæ ex natura ſua, & à quocunque fiant, ſemper ſunt mala & nunquam admittenda.* Ibid.

He will have it then that there is no next occaſion of ſin, and that it is not to be avoided, if it be not a mortal ſin it ſelf, or at leaſt if it be not evil in it ſelf, and for all ſorts of perſons, and if it do not induce men naturally unto ſin, ſo that it makes them fall therein alwayes, or almoſt alwayes when they meet therewith. So that the places, the treatments, the company, the converſe which induce men to lewdneſs and debauchery, cannot be next occaſions to ſin according to this Divinity: and thoſe who are in wicked places, without giving themſelves over unto evil, ſhall not be engaged in the next occaſions to ſin, and ſhall have done nothing which is forbidden them by the rules of purity, and the Laws of God. So that when he ſaith in the ſame place, [k] *that ordinarily they are not to be abſolved who are in the next occaſion of ſin*; he would ſay nothing elſe, but that he is not to be abſolved who is actually in ſin, or in ſome practice which is commonly inſeparable from it, and from which he never parts without ſin.

k *Quo ſuppoſito, dico primò regulariter abſolvendum non eſſe qui eſt in occaſione peccandi proximâ.*

But he will not have this rule to be ſo general, that it ſhould have no exceptions, 4320 whereof he makes out one in theſe terms: [l] *I ſay ordinarily, becauſe there are that hold, that it is lawfull for all thoſe who will endeavour after the ſalvation of ſouls, to expoſe themſelves unto the danger of ſin.* And he alleadges for example thoſe who would go into naughty places to treat debauched women, that they might there poſſeſs them with ſome horrour of their ſin; pretending that this is lawfull unto all indifferently, *cuique licere, licere ſingulis.* Albeit they expoſe themſelves to evident danger, and that there is all the probability in the world, that they will ſin themſelves with thoſe women, having already many times proved by experience, that they cannot defend themſelves from the force of their temptations, and that they ſuffer themſelves to be drawn unto ſin.

l *Dixi regulariter, quia ex multorum ſententia cuique licet ſe exponere periculo peccandi, cum de aliena ſalute, eaque promovenda agitur.* Ibid. *Aiunt licere ſingulis lupanar ingredi ad odium peccati ingenerandum meretricibus, etſi metus ſit, ac vero etiam veriſimilitudo non parva eos peccaturos, eo quod malo ſuo ſæpe ſunt experti blandis mulierularum ſermonibus ac illecebris flecti ſolitos ad libidinem.* Ibid.

We find not in the Goſpel this marvellous charity, which cauſeth us to expoſe our ſalvation for that of anothers, and which induces us to be damned with them. The Apoſtles and Martyrs were ignorant thereof, having given the life of their bodies to ſave men, but not that of their ſouls; becauſe they had learned of *Jeſus Chriſt*, that it was to no purpoſe to gain the whole World to looſe a mans

foul, and that it is a ridiculous way to go about to withdraw debauched perſons from ſin, by committing ſin with them.

*Bauny* ſpeaks of the ſame point in *French*, as in *Latine*, and he is firm in the ſame opinions, becauſe they could not be more enlarged. For in his *Summe*, c. 46. p. 711. after he had demanded, *If they who in their Truffick, Commerce, diſcourſe, reſorts, were obliged to ſee, to ſpeak, and treat with Maids and Women, whoſe ſight and treatments do cauſe them frequently to fall into ſin, were capable in this perpetual danger of being in grace, and receiving the Sacrament?* He anſwers with *Baia*, *they may, ſo that the cauſe which draws and induces them at ſuch times into evil, be not of it ſelf a mortal ſin*, non eſt de ſe peccatum mortiferum; *and therefore cannot be held to be of the quality of a next occaſion diſpoſing unto evil, ſuch as the penitent ought then neceſſarily avoid, to poſſeſſe and receive grace in the Sacrament.*

It muſt be conſidered, that it is preſuppoſed that *the danger is perpetual*, that it *cauſes often to fall into ſin*, that this ſin is of that ſort which is committed by men *with maids and women*; and yet *Bauny*, who himſelf aſſerts and advances theſe things, maintains at the ſame time, that we are not *to hold a danger of this nature to be in the quality of a next occaſion diſpoſing unto evil.*

This ſame F. in the 717. page, demands, *What muſt be done with Men and Maid-ſervants, Couſins of both ſexes, Maſters and their Maid-ſervants, who mutually draw and aſſiſt one another in ſin, or take from the houſe wherein they are motives thereunto, from the opportunities they have therein?* To which he anſwers, *that if they offend but rarely together, as once or twice in a month, they may be abſolved.*

It were eaſie to relate many like caſes which the Jeſuits reſolve in the ſame manner; but I omit them for fear of being too long, to come to a point more important, which diſcovers the principles whereupon they found their anſwers, and the conditions they require unto a next occaſion of ſin. See here the Principles which *Bauny* relates in this manner.

1. *The occaſion is the next, when it is of it ſelf of a vicious nature, as are all mortal ſins.* In his Summe, 46. ch. 709. p. *It is not ſuch*, ſaith *Baia*, whom *Bauny* alledges for his warrant, *quando non eſt de ſe peccatum mortiferum, when it is not of it ſelf a mortal ſin*; p. 711.

2. In the ſecond place, though a thing be evil and vicious in it ſelf, and ſerve for a next, and as it were certain occaſion of ſin; yet according to *Bauny*, *it is not ſuch in effect*, that is to ſay, it is not the next occaſion to ſin, *when it is not ſought, and the will is not bent thereupon*: 710. p. Which he expounds more clearly, when he ſaith a little after, that albeit the precept of flying the occaſions of ſin is negative, and that by conſequence it obligeth alwayes, *this is only with this condition, not to affect and ſeek humerouſly, and without neceſſity that which induces unto ſin*; 712. p.

3. In the third place, he maintains, that a thing is no next occaſion to ſin unto a man, if it be not ſo forcible that it raviſheth him in ſome ſort, and cauſeth him almoſt every time it preſents it ſelf, to fall into ſin; *ſi non adſit aſſiduitas peccandi.* Which *Bauny* tranſlates and explicates in this manner: *If the ſaid occaſion do not force, as I may ſay, the ſinner to fall at every ſeaſon, alwayes, and at all times*; 711. p.

4. In the fourth place, although a perſon be engaged in ſome place, company, exerciſe, which cauſeth him often to offend God, they ſay he is not for that obliged to leave it, if he be retained by any temporal conſideration, as that of wealth, of honour, and even of pleaſure it ſelf; *ſi adſit aliqua notabilis cauſa non ſe ſeparandi*, ſaith *Baia*, and which *Bauny* tranſlates better than he thought for, when he rendred it in theſe terms: *Provided he have ſome ſpecious cauſe which obligeth him to continue in the ſaid occaſion*; 710. p. It matters not, whether this cauſe be juſt or not before God, ſo it be *ſpecious* before men. For ſpeaking of this *ſpecious cauſe* which may oblige men to continue in the neareſt, and as it were certain occaſions of offending God, he expounds it thus: *As when they cannot diſpence therewith without giving the world matter to talk of, or that it would be an inconvenience to them*; 712. p.

5. In the fifth place, they assure us that a man may with a safe conscience abide in the most certain, most ordinary, and most violent occasions of sin, when any temporal interest or commodity engageth him therein, provided he form within himself a resolution not to offend God in that estate. *Dummodo firmiter proponat non peccare*; p. 712. *provided that he is displeased with what is past, and purposes not to fall thereinto again for the future*; 715. p. though he have often made the like resolutions and protestations which have been vain and without effect; *quandocunque nulla ponetur emendatio*, as *Sanctius* speaks in *Bauny*, p. 717. *and though even in deed there be no appearance*, that he who made these promises and these resolutions, *will do what he promises, and hold to what he resolves*, as *Bauny* saith after *Diana*, p. 716. *and though many times it may be presumed that such resolutions come no farther than from the lip outward*, as saith the same *Bauny*, 717. p.

*Sancius* agrees very well with *Bauny* in all these points, or rather *Bauny* with *Sancius*, from whom he seems to have taken the greatest part of what he hath said about these next occasions of sin, as having found none more large upon this matter, as appears clear enough in what we have related of this matter from him.

*Layman* also establisheth the same principles, and requires the same conditions in the occasions of sin. And after he hath declared, that by the command of God we are obliged to fly the next occasions, he adjoyns these restrictions and exceptions: [m] *Unless*, saith he, *the evident danger, and next occasion of sinning mortally, cannot be removed without some notable damage to body, goods, or reputation. For in this case God counsels indeed to suffer this loss, to secure the salvation of our souls, but he commands it not.*

m *Excipe nisi proximum periculum, seu occasio mortaliter peccandi sine gravi incommodo corporis, famæ, aut fortunarum, tolli non possit, tunc consilium quidem est minorem illam jacturam majori bono securitatis animæ postponere, sed nec præceptum.* Layman l. 5. tract. 6. cap. 4. num. 9.

Whence he draws this conclusion for the resolving of this very case, which F. *Bauny* had already propounded as above: [n] *That they are to be absolved who will not quit a charge, an imployment, a traffick, or an house wherein they are in the next and imminent danger of sinning, because they cannot do it without difficulty.* His reason is, *because the next occasion of sin being not sin, neither doth it impose any necessity of sinning, and takes not away liberty.* That is to say, that if a man be not in danger to lose his wits and liberty, he is not obliged to avoid and fly from occasions of sin, how powerfull or evident soever they be. So that it is folly that is to be feared in these occasions, rather than sin, which also cannot be committed when wit and liberty is lost. So that it is clear, that by this Divinity there can be no next occasion of sin had, wherein we may not engage and abide with a good conscience, and without fear of sin; for how violent soever it be, if it leave only wit and liberty, these Doctors hold that it is no sin to continue therein, because we are not obliged to forsake it; and if it takes away wit and liberty, we cannot sin though we continue therein, because sin supposes liberty.

n *Quæ absolvendi sunt qui officio, negotiatione, domo in qua peccandi periculum propinquè imminet, discedere nolunt, quia sine maxima difficultate non possunt; quia occasio peccandi in se peccatum non est, neque necessitatem infert, aut animi libertatem aufert.* Ibid.

*Escobar* who boasts to be the mouth unto 24. of the most antient and prudent of the Society, speaking of the next occasions of sin, saith, [o] *That he calls that the next occasion of sin, whereupon it arrives rarely that a man abstains from sin, the circumstances considered.* And as if he apprehended that he should be accounted too scrupulous and too severe, if he would hereby withdraw persons from venial sin, he gives this advertisement: [p] *But yet the sin which arises herefrom must be a mortal one.* For a venial sin is accounted as nothing by this Jesuit, and by the most part of the rest of them.

o *Proximam illam occasionem appello, quæ circumstantiis spectatis, raro quis à peccato abstinere assolet.* Escob. tract. 7. ex. 4. cap. 8. num. 226. p. 836.

p *Certe peccatum ex hujusmodi occasione exurgens debet esse mortale.*

[q] *Furthermore*, saith he, *the occasion ought to be such, that it happen never or seldom that he sins not when it presents it self.* So that to put or hold ones self into such an occasion, is not so much to be exposed to the danger of sinning, as to cast himself into sin it self, since he is engaged into a necessity of falling thereinto, which he hardly ever avoids. Which agrees very well with what *Bauny* saith, that

q *Præterea talis debet esse occasio, quæ nunquam aut raro non delinquatur.*

that that is the next occasion of sin, which is of it self and of its own nature vicious, as all mortal sin is; and with that which *Layman* saith also on the same subject, that we are not obliged to quit a Society, or Occupation, which is the cause that we do frequently offend God, [1] *when the occasion of sin is not sin of it self, or when it imposeth no necessity, nor taketh away liberty.*

[1] *Quando occasio peccandi in se peccatum non est, neque necessitatem infert, aut animi libertatem aufert.*

# *An* ABRIDGEMENT *of the Doctrine of the* JESUITS, *about the next occasions of Sin.*

1. ACcording to the Divinity of these Jesuits, a thing is not the next occasion to sin, unless it be vicious, and a sin of it self. 1. *Quando occasio peccandi ex se peccatum non est.* Layman. *Quand elle n'est pas de soy & de sa nature vicieuse, comme seroit tout peché mortel.* Bauny.

2. Though it be such, none are obliged to forsake or fly it; it is sufficient that it be not sought of humour, and with a formed design to offend God. 2. *Si le precepte de fuïr les occasions du peché oblige, dit* Bauny, *ce n'est que sous condition de n'affecter & rechercher de gayeté de cœur & sans necessité ce qui porte au peché. Intelligendum est præceptum ne quis ultro ac voluntarie se in peccandi periculum conjiciat, aut in eo persistat.* Layman.

4390 3. To continue therein in quiet and safety of conscience, it is sufficient to be engaged by some temporal interest of wealth, honour, pleasure, and ones own satisfaction. 3. *Pourveu qu'il y ait quelque cause specieuse, comme seroit de ne pouvoir s'en dispenser sans bailler sujet au monde de parler, ou qu'eux mêmes en receussent quelque incommodité.* Bauny. *Nullus tenetur occasionem proximam vitare cum magno detrimento. unde nec tenebitur domo ejicere concubinam, si concubinatio sit nimis utilis ad lucrandum bona temporalia media negotiatione.* Sancius. *Imo si concubina nimis utilis esset ad oblectamentum concubinarii, ejicere illam non erit concubinarius obligandus.* Sancius.

4. Resolving to continue and to engage therein upon so good motives, it is sufficient so say with ones self, that he will not offend God, and that he form this resolution, though he knows by his own experience that he cannot contain himself. 4. *Concubinam ejicere non erit obnoxius, si ex ejectione magnum emolumentum non esset acquisiturus. Sufficeret enim proponere dilinceps non peccare.* Sancius. *Dummodo firmiter proponat non peccare; quandocumque nulla notetur emendatio.* Sancius *cité par* Bauny.

5. How strange an impression soever the places, company, and persons who give occasions of sin, do bring upon the Spirit of a man, holding him continually, and causing him almost alwayes to fall into sin, provided this occasion force not, nor bring to the point of necessity; so it do not absolutely deprive of wit and liberty, there is no obligation to fly it, or withdraw from it, though we have often fallen under it in time past, and believe not we shall be able to defend our selves in time to come. 5. *Quia occasio peccandi ex se peccatum non est neque necessitatem infert, aut animi libertatem aufert.* Layman. *Si elle violente, pour ainsi dire, le pecheur à tomber à toutes heures, tous les jours & en tout temps.* Bauny. *Talis debet esse occasio qua nunquam vel raro non delinquatur.* Escobar.

He that would or can hold to these principles, and guide himself by these 4400 maxims, shall alwayes find with ease reasons and pretences with a safe conscience to continue in all companies, occupations and practices, even the most dangerous and wicked that are, which offend God continually, without being obliged by any person to forsake them. And it is sufficiently manifest, that according to these principles it will be hard, and even morally impossible to meet with any next occasions of sin, there being none at all more evident, than those which these Doctors excuse and justifie.

# THE LAST CHAPTER.

## Of the Acceſſaries of Sin.

IT cannot be doubted, but that the help which ſinners have one of another in the execution of their wicked deſigns, is one of the outward principles of ſin.

There are few crimes which are committed without the aſſiſtance of others, and which can proceed without a Servant, a Friend, a Merchant, or ſome perſon who favours and furniſheth with money for their execution. Though the Holy Scriptures, and all the moſt common rules of Morality, do condemn all theſe voluntary inſtruments of ſin, the Divinity of the Jeſuits nevertheleſs forbears not to excuſe them. I will only rehearſe ſome of the principal deciſions of *Tambourin*, becauſe he is the laſt Author that I know of, who hath written on this, and who hath taken care to collect almoſt all that is corrupt in their Morality.

1. For Servants, he excuſeth thoſe of Uſurers, Diſhoneſt, and Duelliſts, who 4410
ſerve them in the execution of their ſins. [a] *If a Servant,* ſaith he, *by the command of his Maſter, who is an Uſurer, tells the money, carries it, receives it, Books it; if by command of his Maſter, whom he knows to be going to commit adultery, he ſaddles his horſe, attends at the gate, makes the bed, makes ready meat, ſerves at the table of his whore, accompanies her and conducts her to the place where his Maſter is, to commit this ſin, if he opens her the door, if he reverence this proſtitute, if he carry Letters and Meſſages which contain Civilities only, if he carry Preſents to her with a Collation, and perform all other ſervices which a Servant commonly doth for his Maſter, —— he is not only to be excuſed, becauſe of his ſervile condition, but alſo becauſe of the fear of loſs; if for example he fear that his Maſter will be angry, or turn him out of his houſe. He is to be excuſed, if he go to tell the woman with whom his Maſter goes to commit adultery, that he will be found at home at ſuch an hour: or to his Maſters enemy, that at ſuch an hour he ſhall find him at ſuch a place: If by the command of his Maſter, he follows a Damſel to ſee or enquire where ſhe lives; if by his command, he not only open the door, but ſhew her where his* 4420
*Maſter is; if he aid his Maſter to get up by the window, to enter into the place where he is to commit that ſin.* Wherefore takes he ſuch pains to particularize ſuch infamous actions, if it be not for fear leaſt a Servant ſhould make any ſcruple upon any one of theſe circumſtances, and that the Maſter not being well ſerved, ſhould fall ſhort of executing his deſign, or for fear this poor Servant ſhould put himſelf by his ſcruple in danger of being frown'd upon by his Maſter, for having hindred him from committing this crime.

[a] *Si juſſu heri uſurarii pecuniam numeret, deferat, recipiat, referat in libros; ſi ejuſdem juſſu quem ſcit ire ad adulteraudum ſternat equum, ipſum mere comitetur, mereque expectet ante fores, ſternat lectum, cibos condiat, miniſtretque concubinæ, eandemque mere aſſociet ducendo ad locum ubi dominus peccaturus eſt, januamque aperiat eidem ingreſſuræ: ſi honoret ſuam heram meretricem, ſi deferat ſcripta & interruntia ſolius urbanitatis plena; ſi deferat munuſcula & eſculenta, præſtetque alia officia quæ alius famulus æque præſtaret. num. 18. Non ex ſola famulatus ratione, ſed metu detrimenti, V. G. torvis aſpiciatur oculis, domo expellatur, excuſatur: ſi referat adulteræ vel inimico tali hora ad domum heri vel ad dictum locum accedat; ſi juſſu heri inſequatur puellam viſurus vel requiſiturus ubi ea habitet; ſi juſſu ejuſdem non aperiat modo januam, ſed doceat ubi herus ſit: ſi dominum adjuvet ad aſcendendum per feneſtram quo ingrediatur in locum ubi peccaturus ſit.* num. 19.

But if you be not ſatisfied with the excuſe of this Servant, this Father will furniſh him with another, founded on the direction of his intention, which may ſerve him as he ſaith himſelf, [b] *to diſcharge many perſons of ſin, at leaſt of mortal ſin; which is that in the caſes propounded, the ſervant pleaſeth not himſelf in the ſin of his Maſter, and that he do him the ſervices whereof we have ſpoken, for ſome good end, as for the juſt reward which he expects.* It is not very neceſſary to advertiſe ſervants to have this good intention; and if it be capable to excuſe them, it is true that they need fear nothing on this part, if this anſwer will ſerve them: that their Maſters ſins pleaſe them not, but ſo far as they receive ſome profit and benefit thereby.

[b] *Ratio deſcendi multos à peccato ſaltem mortifero, modo, ut in caſu proponitur, non placeat eis peccatum, & faciant obſequia prædicta ob aliquem bonum finem, puta eo quod exhibeant illa officii ſui cauſa.* Tambur. l. 5. Decal. cap. 1. ſect. 4. n. 30.

But what this Father makes uſe of to excuſe a ſervant, he alſo allowes as lawful to a friend. [c] *If my friend, ſaith he, will have me carry preſents, to be given on the account of diſhoneſt Love, unto his Concubine, to whom he ſends them, I may carry them without ſin, if I have an eſteem for the love of this man, and that I would not loſe it, becauſe in this caſe I have a juſt cauſe of fearing a conſiderable loſſe.*

c *Si amicus meus velit ut ego feram munuſcula & ſimilia tempis ſcilicet amoris ſui mota, quæ ipſe mittit ad ſuam concubinam, poſſum ſine peccato deferre . . . . ſi tibi magni ſit ejuſmodi amicitia, ac vere timeas amittere, quia tunc notabilis memoti juſtus metus accedit.* Ibid. n. 18, 19, 20.

The friendſhip of an Adulterer is very conſiderable in the judgement of this Divine and this Jeſuit, and preferrable to that of God himſelf, being he wills that againſt the command of God a friend may contribute to his crime, for fear onely of putting himſelf in danger of loſing his favours, he may by the ſame motive carry on the behalf of this friend preſents to a Murderer, or to an Impoſtor, to ſtir them up by falſe witneſſes to diſhonour or kill whom he pleaſeth; and it will not be eaſie, according to this deteſtable Doctrine to condemn him, that gives his friend a Sword to kill himſelf, if he intreat him; if it be not that perhaps the life of the Body is more precious, and more conſiderable than that of the Soul, and that it is more lawful to co-operate to this then to that, or to contribute to an adulterie then to an homicide.

As for the Merchants, they may according to this Author co-operate as much as their vocation, or rather their Luſt and Intereſt will permit them, to the ſins of Idolatry, Whoredom, unlawful gains, and of all ſorts of debaucherie. [d] *We may, ſaith he, ſell an Infidel a Lamb which we know he will uſe in Sacrifice to an Idol; we may ſell a woman Paint, which we know ſhe will uſe to draw young men to unchaſt Love; we may ſell Dice and Cards to them we know will abuſe them to unlawful gaeming; Cooks may provide meat to be eaten on Faſt days, whether they believe that they who demand it, are lawfully exempt from faſting, or not: we may ſell or hire a Houſe to women of bad lives, and to publique Uſurers, and even according to* Sanchez, *without any cauſe that may excuſe this action. They that ſell victuals to thoſe that would break their faſt, if they fear upon their refuſal to loſe their cuſtom, are excuſed; becauſe it is ſeldom that theſe perſons are induced to faſt by your refuſal, to ſell Wine to thoſe who drink drunk with deliberate purpoſe. There are that require a more conſiderable cauſe than that of having the price of their Wine; to wit, that their Cuſtomers will be diminiſhed very much by this refuſal.* [e] *If you ſell to thoſe, whom you know will ſell again fraudulently, by mingling Water with the Wine, or diminiſhing the meaſure, you may do it lawfully when it would be trouble to ſell it to others, or when you ſhould ſuffer dammage thereby.* We may do all things, ſaith this Father, and others alſo more criminal, and more deteſtable, which he mentions afterwards, when we have any reaſon, and ſome of them even without any reaſon. And the ſtrongeſt reaſon, or rather the onely reaſon which he alledges is Intereſt, which is the moſt general principle of the Jeſuits, as it is the ſubject and moſt univerſal retainer of all humane paſſions, which they have undertaken to excuſe and flatter.

d *Poteſt quis vendere agnum infideli, quem ſcit uſui fore ad ſacrificium idoli, fucos mulieri, quas ſcit emi ut ad turpem amorem illis pennicta juvenes alliciat: aleas & taxillos eis qui in ludo illicito ſunt illis abuſuri: exponens poſſunt miniſtrare cibos in die jejunii, tum quando dubitant an ad ſe divertentes à jejunio excuſentur, tum quando putant eos non excuſari. n. 34. Poteſt quis vendere, vel etiam locare domum meretricibus vel uſurario publico: immo id poteſt fieri ex Sanchez l. 1. in d. c. 8. n. 20. etiam nulla excuſante cauſa, n. 35. Qui vendunt eſculenta ſoluturis jejunium excuſantur ſi timent diminutionem emptorum, cum rayo ex tua denegatione jejunio ſint vacaturi. n. 36. Ad vendendum vinum ſcienter ſe inebriantî, cauſam majorem aliquam præter ipſum vini merum pretium expoſtulant Caſtropal. Sa, Sanchez, timorem ne multum ſic diminuantur emptores.* Tambur. l 5. Decal. c. 1. ſect. 4. n. 33, 34, 35, 36. e *Si vendas iis quos ſcis per fraudem miſcendo aquam vino, vel demendo de menſura, aliis eſſe revendituros, tunc licite poteris quando tum niſi iis venderes difficulter, vel cum tuo damno aliis vendere cogereris, aut ſi aliis ſine tuo damno aque poſſes, cur ex charitate non deberes.* Sanch. Caſtrop. Diana, Meroll. num. 37.

After the Merchants, we muſt not forget the Artificers, who may ſerve very much the ſins of other men. [f] *In a great and preſſing neceſſity, ſaith* Tambourin, *ſuch as is the great poverty of an Artificer, he ſins not in building the Temple of an Idol, or in ſelling an Idol it ſelf.* Joyn hereunto, that he ſins not in providing alſo a ſacrifice, and ſelling a Lamb to be ſacrificed to an Idol, as he ſaid before: That is to ſay, that he may provide for an Idolater, every thing that is neceſſary for him to ſacrifice unto

f *Urgentiſſima exiſtente cauſa, ut eſſet magna paupertas artificis, peccatum vitaretur fabricando, vendendo idolum, templum.* Caſtrop. Tann. num. 38.

unto the Devil; ſo that there remains nothing, but to cut the throat of the ſacrifice, and to burn it; farther, he may reach him the knife to cut its throat, and help him, and hold the Torch whileſt he puts fire to it; by the ſame reaſon, that a ſervant may according to this Jeſuit, hold the Ladder and Foot of his Maſter, when he gets up at a Window to commit Adultery, for the onely gain which he gets in helping him, and which he loſes if he fail him.

After this it may be judged what theſe Artiſans may do to ſerve other ſins, if it be lawful for them, to furniſh with the object it ſelf of the greateſt ſin, which is the Idol and Temple where it is adored, without fearing the curſe, that the Scripture 4460
pronounceth againſt thoſe who do theſe things, as well as thoſe that put their truſt in them: to wit, *that they ſhall become like unto their works*: *ſimiles illis fiant qui faciunt ea.*

It is not to be wondred at any more, if they ſay as this very Author in favour of other ſins; [g] that *thoſe who Paint filthy things, and thoſe Comedians who repreſent them, though they be morally aſſured that many will take occaſion from thence to ſin; yet if they have need of the gain which this exerciſe brings them, they may continue it with a good conſcience.*

g *Pingentes turpia, hiſtriones eadem repræſentantes, ex quibus moraliter ſcitum multos peccaturos, ſi ea lucro indigeant ad victum, non recuſarem licere.* Tambur. l. 5. c. 1. ſect. 4. n. 28.

It is always gain and intereſt that rules in the School of the Jeſuits, which preſides in all their deciſions, which concern manners, and makes them favourable to all the moſt corrupt and infamous profeſſions.

Finally for fear leſt Sinners ſhould want perſons to lend them money, to furniſh them in their debauches, they permit them to borrow of the Uſurers. [h] *If you require to borrow money of an Uſurer, though you have no occaſion for it, but to expend on your vice, it is probable that this is lawful for you.*

h *Posse ab uſurario pecuniam mutuam, ſi mutuo non indigeat, ſed eam pecuniam poſtulet ut illicite expendat, licere probabile dicimus.* Ibid. num. 44.

He ſaid before that we may without any reaſon, let out our Houſe to an Uſurer, to exerciſe Uſury therein; and here he ſaith, that the crime for which we would imploy the money we borrow of him, is a good reaſon for him to exerciſe his Uſury. Who can after this ever want a reaſon to do whatſoever he would, and for committing the greateſt exceſſes; ſince after this Divinity one crime may ſerve for reaſon to commit an other.



## *The end of the Firſt Book.*

20010

# THE SECOND BOOK

Of the Inward and Outward

# Remedies of SIN.

## THE FIRST PART.

### Of the Inward Remedies of Sin.

*WE have hitherto obſerved how the obſequious Divinity of the Jeſuites favoureth, and nouriſheth all the Cauſes of Sin; whether they be inward, as Luſt, Ignorance, and ill Habits; or outward, as ill Cuſtoms, the Occaſions of committing it, and the Maxims of the World, and of corrupted Reaſon, which authorize and juſtifie it. We come now to behold how they oppoſe, and (as far as may be) overthrow all the Remedies thereof; whether they be inward, which deſtroy it in the Soul when it hath committed it, and which hinder from committing it; as the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt, Penitence, the Sacraments, and good Works; or outward, which of themſelves make only a Diſcovery thereof, as the holy Scripture, and the Commandments of God, and the*
20020 *Church, which may alſo hinder us from committing them outwardly, by reſtraining and binding Concupiſcence in ſome ſort by the threatnings and puniſhments appointed by God againſt Sinners. According to this Diviſion this Book ſhall have two Parts; the one ſhall be of the inward Remedies, and the other of the outward.*

### CHAPTER I. *Of the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt.*

#### ARTICLE I.

*That the Jeſuits deſtroy the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt by their Divinity.*

I Shall be ſo much the ſhorter in this Chapter, as the Subject thereof is more large and boundleſs, it being moſt true, that the Doctrine of Chriſtian Manners depends on the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt, and refers unto it as its Principle, as S. *Auſtin* ſaith, that the whole Scripture is nothing but Charity, and relates thereto as its end.

I will not enter upon the Diſputes which they have raiſed above theſe ſixty

years upon this Subject, troubling the Church with their Intrigues, and by their paſſion in maintaining the Novelties which they acknowledge and boaſt they have invented. My mind and my deſign too do equally eſtrange me from it. I ſhall only, as I paſs by them, touch upon ſome points which do more viſibly teſtifie, that their Divinity and their Carriage are entirely oppoſite to the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt and the Goſpel.

The Grace of God is given us, either to do good, or to defend us from ſin, and withdraw us from it when we are fallen thereinto.

1. To fight againſt the Love of God, is to fight againſt the Grace of God, which cauſeth us to do good; for that good is not done but voluntarily and by love, not by the love of the world, nor of our ſelves, which is always vicious; but by that of God, which is the ſpring of all the good which we receive and do.

Father *Ant. Sirmond*, *Molina*, and other Jeſuits maintain; ſome, That we ſatisfie the love we owe unto God, by loving him three or four times in our life: and others, That we may paſs over our whole life without any thought of loving him, and be ſaved after all this; as I ſhall make appear in handling the command of loving God.

2. This is to fight with the Grace of God that withdraws us from ſin, to teach that he who is fallen into ſin, is not obliged to ask grace of God, or to ſeek out means to riſe again from it with ſpeed, nor even to accept them when preſented and offered. Yet this is aſſerted by *Amicus*, *Eſcobar*, and *Celot:* and (1) this laſt expounding himſelf more clearly then the reſt, proceeds ſo far as to ſay, that when God himſelf firſt ſeeks him out that hath offended him, and endeavours to draw and cauſe him to return unto him, by preventing and ſtirring him up by inſpirations and good motions which he beſtows on him, he may refuſe them without rendring himſelf guilty of any ſin, though he believe that his eternal Salvation depends on theſe good thoughts and good apprehenſions which he ſo inſolently rejects.

1 Qui animæ confeſſionis præceptopoſtquam ſatisfecit, in peccatum letale præcipitatus eſt, ſi conſcientiæ ſtimulos ad Sacramentum pœnitentiæ extra ordinem urgentis (quod conſilium eſt) neglectu retundi & hebetat; eoque in ſtatu decedit è vita: ignis ſempiterni præda fiet, non quod omiſſa confeſſione peccatum contraxerit, ſed quod alterius peccati reum mere invenerit. In refundendis communibus illis conſiliorum moribus, id tantum Chriſtiano perit meriti, quod opere conſulto acquiſiviſſet, & ſolo minor apud Deum, quod major eſſe noluit. Fateor ſane in hujuſmodi acceptatione uſuque conſilii ſalutis cardinem non rarò verſari quo tempore dicas oportet graviſſimo ſe obſtringere peccato, ego nullum præciſe agnoſco. *Celot. l. 9. c. 7. Sect. 7. p. 816.*

3. This is alſo to fight againſt or deſtroy that very Grace which withdraws us from ſin, to pretend that a ſinner may re-enter into a ſtate of Grace, and diſpoſe himſelf to receive it by the Sacrament of Penance (which is particularly inſtituted to that end) by means of diſpoſitions and actions altogether natural, which come not from Grace, which only can prepare her ſelf a ſeat and ſubject, and diſpoſe the heart of man to receive it. And for all that the principal Divines of the Society are of this opinion, as *Eſcobar* teacheth us, who pretends to be but the Interpreter, as we ſhall ſee in the Chapter of Penitence.

4. This is finally all at once to combat both theſe ſorts of Graces, whereof one cauſeth us to do good, and the other withdraweth us from evil; and to oppoſe them in a manner injurious unto Jeſus Chriſt, who is the Author of all Grace, and to the Law of the New Teſtament, which God hath made choice of to give his Grace abundantly unto men, to pretend that Chriſtians under this new Law are leſs obliged to love God, and to be ſorry for their ſins with all their heart and above all things, than the Jews under the old Law, as (1) *Molina* and (2) *Amicus* teach: as though we owed leſs unto God then the Jews, ſince we receive more from him, and that we were diſpenſed with for loving him as much

1 Ante legem gratiæ & antequam magna Dei miſericordia in ea inſtituerentur Sacramenta quæ attritos juſtificarent, illiſque vi Sacramentorum conferretur charitas ſupernaturalis; ſicut ſine Sacramentis confertur contritis; ſane longè frequentius ſub letali culpa tenebantur homines Deum ex charitate naturali diligere, quàm Chriſtiani in nova lege, dum ex charitate ſupernaturali diligere tenentur. *Molina tom. 6. de juſt. & jure tr. 5. diſp. 59. p. 3166.* 2 Hoc autem præceptum contritionis lege Evangelica commutatum eſt in præceptum confeſſionis. *Amicus tom. 8. diſ. 9. ſect. 3. n. 68. p. 96.*

as they, becauſe he loves us more than them: or that the exceſs of his mercies towards us, and the excellent means which he hath given us to convert us, ought to make us leſs ſenſible of the ſins we commit againſt him, and to cauſe in us leſs diſpleaſure againſt them.

I note only theſe four points as I paſs, to make it appear how the Jeſuits Divinity overthrows the foundations of the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt, becauſe I ſhall ſpeak thereof more largely afterwards when I come to handle theſe points in particular; and I will inſiſt at preſent only upon ſome paſſages which are more formal and proper for this matter.

*Amicus* compriſeth in one ſole paſſage all that can be ſaid againſt the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt, in not acknowledging the wounds and weakneſſes which original ſin hath brought on us, without which this Grace is unprofitable and ſuperfluous. 20060 For comparing our Nature, ſuch as it is now corrupted with ſin, with the ſame as it would have been if God had created it without grace, in its purely natural condition, He ſpeaks in theſe terms: (1) *The powers of Nature are now the ſame that they would have been then, becauſe that original ſin*, which is now in fallen Nature, and had not been in pure and ſimple Nature, *hath not at all diminiſhed the natural powers of man, but hath only taken from them the ſupernatural powers of grace, by means whereof nature might more eaſily have exerciſed thoſe honeſt actions which would have been natural unto them, though in that eſtate* (where he ſuppoſeth that it had been pure, that is to ſay, without grace and without ſin) *it had not had greater facility to exerciſe theſe ſame natural actions, which it hath at preſent with original ſin; becauſe original ſin hath not diminiſhed the powers of Nature, as hath been ſaid already; but they remain ſound and entire from ſin, and it hath not introduced into Nature any inclination unto ill, which man ſhould not have had in the eſtate of pure Nature.*

1 Vires naturæ ſunt nunc quæ fuiſſent tunc, quia per peccatum originale quod natura lapſa ſupra puram naturam addit, nihil virium naturalium ſublatum eſt in homine, ſed tantum ſublatæ ſunt vires ſupernaturales gratiæ, quibus natura facilius exerciſſet ſuos actus honeſtos naturales, quos tamen non facilius exerciſſet tunc ſine peccato originali, quàm illos exerceat nunc cum eodem peccato originali: quia peccatum originale nec diminuit vires naturales, ut dictum eſt, cùm illæ integræ manſerint etiam poſt peccatum, nec ponat in natura poſitivam aliquam inclinationem ad malum, quam homo non habuiſſet in pura natura. *Amicus tom. 6. diſp. 5. ſect. 6. n. 253. p. 33.*

It is clear, that if nature be not hurt by ſin, as this Jeſuit ſaith, it hath no need of the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt, ſince as Jeſus Chirſt himſelf ſaith, they that are not ſick have no need of the Phyſitian, nor of his Grace; and the prayers of the Saints and of the whole Church, which demand of God inceſſantly by Jeſus 20070 Chriſt to deliver them from their evils and infirmities, would be falſe and unprofitable; and ſo they ſhould be no more prayers, but crys and mockeries, and and deridings of God.

*Amicus* doth not abſolutely deny that we have inclinations unto evil, and in this he teſtifies himſelf to be a man; but in denying that this inclination comes from original ſin, he neither ſpeaks as a Monk nor a Chriſtian. If it come not from original ſin, but from the foundation of nature, as he pretends, in as much as he ſaith, that it had been in the eſtate of nature, if it had been created without ſin: *Peccatum originale non poſuit in natura aliquam poſitivam inclinationem ad malum, quam homo non habuiſſet in pura natura*; it muſt come from God who is the Author of Nature; and by conſequence God ſhould be the Author of evil and of ſin, and this inclination unto evil ſhould have been in Jeſus Chriſt, becauſe he took our nature with all its natural properties: for whatſoever is not contrary to God as Creator, neither is it contrary to him as Redeemer; and nothing of that which comes immediately from the hand of God alone is unworthy of Jeſus Chriſt.

So this Jeſuit deſtroys with one daſh of his Pen Original ſin, the Incarnation and Grace of Jeſus Chriſt. But he doth it no leſs openly when he ſaith a little before, that (1) *man created in the eſtate of pure nature*, that is to ſay, ſimply without ſin, *had been able to ſatisfie ſimply and in rigour of Juſtice for venial ſins*, by

1 Potuiſſet homo in pura natura conditus condignè pro ſuis venialibus ſatis facere. *Amicus ibid. n. 249. p. 32.*

1 Et quidem perfectius quam nunc.

one act of natural love, (1) *and that he had done it more perfectly then now.* To make his comparison hold, he must presuppose that a man may at present satisfie fully and in rigour of justice for venial sins without grace, as he saith he might have done in the estate of pure nature, in which he had had no grace, or else he ought to pretend that in this estate of pure nature a man might have been able to satisfie God more perfectly without the help of grace, then he can at present with grace; which is not only false and erroneous, but also extravagant. 20080

2 Potuisset Deus conferre gratiam & gloriam hominibus dependenter ab actionibus honestis virtutum naturalium, qui nullam ex se connexionem habent cum gratia & gloria ordinis supernaturalis.

He dishonours it also when he saith, that (2) *God might give grace and glory unto men, because of the honest actions of natural vertues, though they had not of themselves any relation to grace or glory, which are of a supernatural order.* That is to say, that God could save men by actions purely natural: and so that man could deliver himself from sin and misery, without having need of Jesus Christ, and that by consequence his labours and death were superfluous and exacted from him without any necessity. And as S. *Paul* saith, that if Justification might have been by the Law, Jesus Christ had dyed in vain; we may also say, that if man might be justified and made happy without Jesus Christ, and have grace and glory by his own powers, and by natural actions and vertues, Jesus Christ hath dyed in vain.

*Amicus de Incar. disp.* 13. *n.* 16. *p.* 201.

He declares yet more openly his thoughts upon this Point in the Treatise which he made of Merit, where speaking of the Pagans morally honest actions, he maintains that they were pleasing unto God, and true dispositions unto faith. (1) *The difficulty is greater,* saith he, *when these actions are done by a Pagan, who hath neither actual nor habitual faith; yet we must answer, according to what I have said already, that these actions done by a Gentile are pleasing unto God, in that they are remote dispositions unto faith.* He is not content to say that these natural actions of Heathens are remote dispositions unto faith, but he affirms that they may also be the next dispositions unto Justification. (2) *Not only good actions which proceed from actual or habitual faith are pleasing unto God; but those also which dispose, and serve for near or remote dispositions for receiving the same faith, and consequently of justifying grace,* as the actions of Pagans of which he speaks. 20090

1 Nam est difficultas de hujusmodi operibus factis à gentili sine ulla fide tam actuali quam habituali, nihilominus juxta ea quæ supra diximus dicendum est ejusmodi opera à gentili facta placere Deo tanquam dispositiones remotas ad fidem. *Amicus tom.* 3. *disp.* 35. *sect.* 4. *n.* 107. 2 Non enim solum Deo placent opera bona quæ ex fide sive actuali, sive habituali procedunt; sed etiam quæ proximè vel remotè ad eandem fidem disponunt, eaq; mediante, ad justificationem. *Ibid.*

3 Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. *Hebr.* 11. *v.* 6.

He expounds himself yet more clearly on that passage of S. *Paul*: (3) *Without faith it is impossible to please God.* For seeing that he evidently condemns his opinion, he eludes it by expounding it in this manner: (4) *We must extend these words of* S. Paul *unto that complacency which is founded on perfect merit, which we call commonly of condignity: or else when he saith, that no action can please God without faith, he understandeth not only that faith which is the principle of this action, but also of that which is its term or effect.* 20100

4 Cæterum Paulus vel intelligitur de complacentiæ affectu qui fundatur in merito de condigno: vel cum negat sine fide aliquid placere Deo, intelligit de fide, non tantum per modum principii, sed etiam per modum termini. *Ibid.*

And because these expressions, *per modum principii, & per modum termini* are not common, he expounds them in the sequel, applying them unto his subject: (1) *Though good works which go before faith cannot please God, as arising from faith which as yet is not in him that doth them, yet they please him as the next dispositions, or the remote at least for obtaining faith.* He then openly declares that the moral and natural actions of Heathens and of Infidels may be the next dispositions unto Faith and Justification; that is to say, that a sinner may be justified or disposed unto Justification by actions purely natural. *Escobar* saith it also

1 Bona autem opera fidem præcedentia, licet nequeant placere Deo tanquam procedentia ex fide, quam nondum in subjecto supponunt; placent tamen ei ut dispositiones proximæ, vel saltem remotæ ad fidem consequendam. *Ibid.*

openly when he puts that amongſt probable opinions which holds, (2) *That it is ſufficient for Baptiſm that attrition be natural and conceived by the powers of nature*; that is to ſay, that we may be ſaved without actual grace, and that contrary to the formal words of the Goſpel, *we may come unto Jeſus Chriſt without the Fathers drawing us.* According to theſe Authors ſuch actions are pleaſing unto God, though they proceed not from faith as their principle, becauſe they end in faith as their effect, and it ſufficeth that good works be joyned unto faith in one of theſe two ſorts, to make good this paſſage of S. *Paul*, (3) *That it is impoſſible to pleaſe God without faith.*

2 Sufficit ut naturalis ſit, ſeu viribus naturæ concepta. *Eſcobar. tom. 1. lib. 11. Problem.* 80.

3 Sine fide impoſſibile eſt placere Deo. *Hebr. 11. v. 6.*

The Pelagians and Semipelagians have never ſaid more, and they have not declared it ſo openly, being content that the natural motions of the Will ſhould
20110 be only remote diſpoſitions, or conditions for obtaining faith, though moral and natural works had not alſo the ſame priviledge; which notwithſtanding this Jeſuit doth attribute unto them, and even the quality of the next diſpoſitions alſo. Which is to grant the Pelagians more then they ever demanded, and to make the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt unprofitable and ſuperfluous, overturning the Scriptures, and declaring that mans nature is ſound and without ſin, and to have no need of Phyſitian nor Redeemer, ſince it may by it ſelf and by its natural actions have the Grace and the Faith by which men are ſaved.

Though the Jeſuits diſhonour Jeſus Chriſt ſufficiently in fighting in this manner againſt his Grace by which he ſaves men, they diſhonour him yet incomparably more in himſelf and in his perſon, in taking from him all the qualities which conſtitute him a Saviour, and attributing unto him others quite contrary, ſo as to make him capable of ſin, as we ſhall ſee preſently.

## ARTICLE II.

### *That Jeſus Chriſt might have ſinned, might have been ſubject unto vices, might have fallen into errour and folly, according to the Jeſuits Divinity.*

JEſus Chriſt being God and Man both together by an ineffable Union of the Divine Nature with the humane in the perſon of the Word; as man he is reaſonable; as God he is Reaſon it ſelf, and by his perſonal propriety he is uncrea-
20120 ted and eternal Wiſdom; and ſo we can find nothing more unworthy and remote from him then folly, by reaſon of the particular oppoſition it hath to humane and divine nature, and to the perſon of the eternal Word, which make JeſusChriſt God and Man. *Amicus* forbears not to ſay, that the Son of God might have taken the nature of man in an eſtate of folly, or have ſuffered it to fall into folly after he had aſſumed it.

He propounds the queſtion: (1) *Whether the Son of God could have taken on him the nature of man without wit, or have ſuffered it after he had taken it to fall into folly?* He at firſt reports ſome reaſons to prove the opinion which holds, that this cannot be done; but afterwards he declares his own judgment, which is, (2) *That the opinion which holds it poſſible is not only probable, but altogether true according unto him.* And he builds upon this Reaſon, (3) *That the Word might take humane nature deſtitute of all outward ſenſe.* In which caſe it would alſo be deprived of all uſe of reaſon, which as he proves by *Ariſtotle* depends on Phantaſie, and on outward and inward ſenſes.

1 An Verbum potuerit naturam humanam dementem aſſumere, vel in ea aſſumpta amentiam permittere? *Amicus tom. 6. diſp. 24. ſect. 4. n. 128. p. 361.*

2 Affirmans tamen pars non modò probabilior, ſed omnino vera eſt mihi. *Ibid. n. 129.* 3. Quia Verbum poſſet aſſumere naturam humanam ſpoliatam omni ſenſu externo. *Ibid. n. 130.*

This Reaſon is not very worthy of a Jeſuit who ſhould be concerned in the Grandeurs of Jeſus Chriſt, as in thoſe of his own Society who have taken their
20130 name from his. But this is not much to honour Jeſus Chriſt, to take ſenſe from him that they may alſo take reaſon from him, and to debaſe him below the beaſts, that ſo they might ſet him below the moſt inferior of men, who had no

more reaſon than was neceſſary to make him not to be a beaſt.

And, building upon this Principle, he concludes in the proceſs of his Diſcourſe, (1) *That there is nothing this way that can hinder the Word from taking the nature of a fool, or after he hath taken our nature to ſuffer it to fall into folly, as he cannot only take a nature deprived of all outward ſenſes: but alſo ſuffer it to fall into this privation after he hath aſſumed it.* He is not content only to ſay, that the eternal Word might ſuffer under folly; but he ſaith alſo, that he might have aſſumed it voluntarily, as he aſſumed humane nature. That is, that this propoſition, the impiety and blaſphemy whereof is horrible only to be thought, might have been true: God is a fool, and that with a voluntary folly, which is accounted the worſt of all.

1 Ergo non eſt cur ex hoc capite repugnet Verbum amentem naturam aſſumere, aut amentiam in natura jam aſſumpta admittere: ſicut non ſolum poteſt aſſumere naturam omni ſenſu externo privatam, ſed etiam talem ſenſuum privationem in aſſumpta jam natura admittere. *Ibid. n.* 130.

He ought to have conſidered, that folly is a diſorder of the body and the Soul, and of the higheſt part of the Soul, which is Reaſon, and that all diſorder is inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God, as well as ſin is inconſiſtent with it, becauſe it is a voluntary diſorder and a true folly according to Scripture: and if the reaſon of Jeſus Chriſt had been diſorderly, it is manifeſt that his Will might have been ſo too; and that as his Will could not be ſo by ſin, which is the folly of the Will, neither could his reaſon be ſo by folly, which is, as we may ſay, the ſin of the Underſtanding, as ſome Philoſophers eſteem.

Errour is yet a greater evil than folly, becauſe folly takes away reaſon, but errour is the cauſe it is ill uſed. Now it were better to be wholly deprived of any thing, then to abuſe it; as it were better not to have wit, then to abuſe it in deceiving; not to have ſtrength, then to abuſe it in committing violences and murthers; and yet *Amicus* forbears not to maintain with others, that Jeſus Chriſt was capable of erring, and that he might erre in deed. 20140

2 De ſecunda non eſt dubium quin potuerit eſſe in Chriſto. Nam ſicut potuit Verbum aſſumere naturam irrationalem incapacem omnis ſcientiæ; ita & rationalem omni ſcientia ſpoliatam, tam actuali quam habituali. *Amicus tom 6 diſp. 24. ſect. 4. n. 114. p. 359.*

For the explication of this opinion, he diſtinguiſheth two ſorts of errours, whereof one reſpects the things we are obliged to know, and which he calls *Error pravæ diſpoſitionis*, becauſe it includes a wicked diſpoſition, from whence it proceeds as from its cauſe: the other reſpects ſuch things as we are not obliged to know, which conſiſts in a ſimple privation of knowledge; *error ſimplicis negationis*. He ſaith (2) *of this ſecond ſort of error, that there is no doubt but it might be in Jeſus Chriſt. For as the Word might have taken the nature of a beaſt incapable of all ſort of rational wiſdom and knowledge, ſo it might in like manner have taken a reaſonable nature deſtitute of all wiſdom and knowledge, as well actual as habitual.*

He is not content only to maintain a propoſition ſo ſtrange and impious; but he would alſo have it paſs as undubitable, as if it were not lawful only to doubt of it, *non eſt dubium*. But behold his blindneſs! we need only conſider what he ſaith of the other ſpecies of errour, which conſiſts in being ignorant of that which is our duty, or to have an apprehenſion of it contrary unto truth. He dares not abſolutely affirm, that this ſort of errour might have been in Jeſus Chriſt; he contents himſelf to relate the opinion of *Vaſquez* and ſome others (3) *Who hold*, ſaith he, *that this ſort of errour might have been abſolutely in Jeſus Chriſt; and this opinion is that of* Vaſquez. 20150

3 Tantum de prima eſt controverſia. Prima ſententia affirmans potuiſſe de potentia abſoluta talem errorem eſſe in Chriſto—eſt Vaſquez diſput. 60. &c. *Ibid.*

Certainly he doth great wrong to doubt of this ſort of errour, after he had ſaid, that we may not doubt of the other. For if it be certain, as he pretends, that the eternal Word might have taken a reaſonable nature deſtitute of all kind of knowledge and wiſdom actual and habitual, it follows manifeſtly that he might have taken it deſtitute of all that knowledge of things which every reaſonable nature is obliged to know, as of the knowledge of God and of the firſt principles of Reaſon; ſince this ſort of errour is neceſſarily contained in the other.

Which follows alſo clearly from the other opinion of the ſame Jeſuit, that Jeſus Chriſt might have taken on him the nature of a fool. For folly is not only an ignorance of principal duties, but of all truths alſo, according to the very definition of the Philoſophers who ſay, that it is a general blindneſs of mind in all things, *mentis ad omnia cæcitas*. So that if Jeſus Chriſt might have been a fool in humane nature, he might have been generally ignorant of all the duties of humane and reaſonable Nature, and of all the principles of Reaſon. And *Amicus* ſhews himſelf as weak a Logician as Chriſtian, in doubting of this laſt Article,

after he had ſaid, that we might not doubt of that general Maxime, whereunto it is inſeparably and viſibly annexed.

20160 One of the Reaſons of the Jeſuits who teach that Jeſus Chriſt was capable of that errour which hath reſpect unto his duty, which they call an Errour of a depraved diſpoſition, *error pravæ diſpoſitionis*, and whinh is not only a ſimple ignorance and ſimple privation of light, but an oppoſition to the truth, and an apprehenſion contrary to its Rules and Laws; is, That Jeſus Chriſt might according to them have taken the nature of an Aſs, as they expreſs it in theſe very words: (1) *The Word might have taken upon him the ſottiſh and blockiſh diſpoſition of the nature of an Aſs; and by conſequent he might have taken the errour of humane nature.* Which can ſerve for no other thing then to make this opinion more incredible, whether we regard the impiety of theſe ſtrange words: *Potuit Verbum aſſumere ſtoliditatem naturæ aſininæ*; or we regard the conſequence which is ridiculous: *Ergo & errorem naturæ humanæ.* For the blockiſh diſpoſition of an Aſs is not an ignorance of his duty, becauſe it hinders not an Aſs to know and perceive all that which he ought to know and perceive according to his nature, and much leſs it is an apprehenſiou oppoſed unto truth, which the nature of an Aſs is uncapablet to know. And ſo though it were true that Jeſus Chriſt might have been united to the nature of an Aſs, it would not have followed, that he might have been united to a reaſonable nature ingaged in errour, and in errour contrary to his duty.

1 Potuit Verbum aſſumere ſtoliditatem naturæ aſininæ: ergo & errorem naturæ humanæ. *Amicus ib. n.* 116.

20170 The ſecond Reaſon of *Vaſquez* related by *Amicus*, is, (2) *That it is no more repugnant to the divine Word to erre or to ſpeak a thing falſe in it ſelf by the nature which he hath aſſumed, then to be tormented and dye in the ſame nature.* I will not ſtay to examine this Reaſoning, nor to tell what the difference is betwixt dying and erring or ſpeaking falſhood, to make appear that the one is unworthy and impoſſible in regard of Jeſus Chriſt, and not the other. I ſhall do no other thing but briefly repreſent, according to my deſign, what theſe Jeſuits ſay.

2 Non magis repugnat Verbo per naturam aſſumptam errare & falſum materialiter dicere, quam in eadem aſſumpta natura cruciari & mori. Igitur ſi potuit in natura aſſumpta cruciari & mori, poſſet per eandem errare & falſum materialiter dicere. *Ibid. n.* 116.

*Vaſquez* ſaith, that as Jeſus Chriſt might ſuffer and dye, ſo he might likewiſe erre and ſpeak falſe, even in the things he was obliged to know, and which appertained, as *Amicus* expounds himſelf, to his condition and duty. This is to ſay plainly enough, that Jeſus Chriſt might ſin, not only in his humane nature, but in his God-head it ſelf. For though a man may ſometimes erre and ſpeak falſe through ignorance, this ignorance excuſes him not in things which he is obliged to know, ſince it is of theſe that the Goſpel ſaith, that the ſervant who knows not his Maſters will ſhall not go without puniſhment, though he ſhall not be ſo rigorouſly puniſhed as he who hath known and neglected to do it. Now theſe Jeſuits ſay, that Jeſus Chriſt might have erred and ſpoke falſely in the things which appertained to his duty, and which he was obliged to know, and by conſequence according to them he might have ſinned and deſerved chaſtiſement according to the Scripture.

20180 But though it were ſo, that Jeſus Chriſt as man and in his humanity might erre and ſpeak falſe without ſin in ſome thing which he was not obliged to know, this could not be ſaid of his God-head which knows all things, and which ought to know all things; and ſo could not be exempt from ſin, if it erred or ſpoke falſe by the humanity of Jeſus Chriſt, ſince all the words, thoughts, and actions of this humanity are truly and properly the actions of the Divinity and of the Word who produces them by it as by its inſtrument, according to the Fathers. So that if the humanity of Jeſus Chriſt could erre, it would be the Word that ſhould erre, and ſhould be the Author of this errour and falſhood, and ſhould truly ſin ſpeaking againſt his light and lying voluntarily: which the Jeſuits would not be much troubled to conſent to according to their Principles, though it be a thing horrible to imagine only.

3 Major eſt difficultas de habitibus vitioſis à tali natura antea contractis; an illi perſeverare potuiſſent in natura aſſumpta? *Ibid. ſect. 2. n.* 42.

For in effect they maintain that Jeſus Chriſt is capable of ſin, as well as errour, as alſo that he might have been ſubject unto vice. *Amicus* ſaith well, that the Word could not have aſſumed an humane nature that was in an eſtate of actual or habitual ſin; but he adds (3) *That there is more difficulty in what concerns the vicious habitudes which this nature might have contracted before it was united to the Word; to wit, to know whether they might yet continue in it after its union with*

*the Word.* And to clear up this difficulty, he saith that, (1) Vasquez *affirms that also, and that though he be of the same opinion with himself concerning the habitual sin which the humanity might have contracted before that it was united unto the Word; yet he believes, that the Word in assuming this humane nature, might also have assumed the vitious habits which had been found therein* 20190 202

But I see not that it would be less dishonour to Jesus Christ, to hold him capable of vitious habits, then of actual or habitual sins. For vitious habits are the springs of sin, and consequently contain in them a greater corruption then the sins themselves, and the sins are comprised in them, as in their spring and principle; so that he who is capable of the one, is necessarily and infallibly capable of the other.

Thus the Jesuits do formally attribute sin unto Jesus Christ: also they declare him capable thereof, when they demand, whether the humanity of Jesus Christ, being become a sinner, Jesus Christ could have satisfied for that sin, either in the same humanity, or by laying that down, and assuming some other. The propounding only of these questions is so strange and injurious to Jesus Christ, that it offends the faith and ears of the faithful. *Amicus* fails not to answer them as seriously as if they were very important, and of great edification. (2) *I hold*, saith he, *that the Word taking another humane nature, might in rigour of justice satisfie for the sin of the humanity he first took, and after laid down.* And a little lower, he saith that, *In this case Jesus Christ could have satisfied in rigour of justice for the sin of his humanity.* 20200

And as if these questions were much for the advantage and glory of Jesus Christ, before he speaks his apprehension upon them, he protests (3) *That he proceeds to handle the question in both the senses which he supposed; but that he doth it, that the vertue and efficacy of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ may appear with more splendour.* He believes then, that to make the satisfaction of Jesus Christ more apparent, he ought to make him a sinner; and that to give more splendour to his vertue, he ought to engage him in crimes of his own, as if it had not been sufficiently great and illustrious by his infinite innocence and purity. 202

I will not speak at all of the blasphemous and impious suppositions which they make on this subject, when they say, (4) *That if by way of an impossible supposition it were granted, that Jesus Christ might have slain himself, this murther and this crime would have been of the same order with the satisfaction of Jesus Christ.* There is no need that I insist on these so abominable imaginations and expressions, since that which they affirm of him absolutely is no less.

To prove that Jesus Christ might have sinned effectually, they say, that he might have had of himself and in himself an obligation to undergo the punishment of sin. (5) *Some new Doctors*, saith Amicus, *answer that the obligation to punishment, not only temporal but eternal, is not inconsistent with the nature assumed by the Word.* 20210

Obligation unto punishment is a propriety and necessary consequent of sin, and the obligation to eternal pain, the propriety and necessary consequent of mortal sin. For it is impossible, that he who sins mortally, should not be obliged to eternal punishment; and it is also impossible, that he should be obliged to eternal punishment, who hath not sinned mortally: both the one and the other being equally contrary to Justice, and by stronger reason to the Justice of God. Whence it comes, that they who say, that an obligation to eternal punishment might befal the humanity of Jesus Christ, suppose of necessity that this humanity hath sinned mortally, and that it may even be actually engaged in mortal sin whilst united to the Word in Jesus Christ, it being impossible, that he to whom sin is remitted, should be lyable to eternal punishment, and that God can punish him eternally to whom he is reconciled, and to whom he owes eternal life, as he owes it to all the just, and much more to the Man-God who is his eternal Son.

This opinion is maintained by some Casuists, as saith *Amicus*, but it seems to him very rude, and especially to *Suarez*, taking it generally, and in its whole extent.

1 Affirmat Vasquez *disp.* 61. *cap.* 6. qui, quamvis nobiscum sentiat quoad peccatum habituale antea contractum, quoad habitus vero vitiosos, putat eos assumi potuisse cum natura humana. *Ibid. sect.* 2. *n.* 42.

2 Dico 1. potuisset Verbum in alia humanitate assumpta condignè satisfacere pro peccato prioris humanitatis à Verbo dimissæ? *Amicus tom.* 6. *disp.* 6. *sect.* 5. *n.* 137.

In tali casu potuisset Christus condignè pro peccato suæ humanitatis satisfacere.

3 In utroq; sensu proposita hypothesis disputanda est, ut vis & efficacia Christi satisfactionis eluceat. *Ibid. n.* 133.

4 Occisio Christi ab ipso Christo sibi per impossibile illata, fuisset ejusdem ordinis cum satisfactione Christi. *Ibid. n.* 17.

5 Respondent docti aliqui recentiores non repugnare in natura assumpta remanere reatum pœnæ, non solum temporalis, sed etiam æternæ. *Ibid. disp.* 24. *sect.* 2. *n.* 56.

extent. For this cauſe, that he might ſweeten and moderate it, he makes a diſtinction betwixt pain temporal and eternal, ſaying, that Jeſus Chriſt might
20220 well be lyable to temporal puniſhment, but not unto eternal: (1) *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *eternal puniſhment is neceſſarily remitted with the ſin and the guilt.* Whence it follows, that if Jeſus Chriſt were obliged to eternal puniſhment, he ſhould be actually in mortal ſin by the aſſertion of *Suarez* himſelf, who for this reaſon durſt not ſay, that the Humanity of Jeſus Chriſt could be obliged unto eternal puniſhment.

1 Reſpondet Suarez *diſ.* 33. *ſect. ult* verſus finem, concedendo de reatu pœnæ temporalis, negando de reatu pœnæ æternæ, quoniam pœna æterna neceſſariò tollitur cum ipſa culpa. *Ibid. n.* 57.

But he is at leaſt conſtrained even by this ſame reaſon to affirm, that Jeſus Chriſt might ſin venially, ſince they hold, that he might be lyable on his own account unto temporal puniſhment, and that the obligation to temporal puniſhment cannot come but from venial ſin, as the obligation unto eternal puniſhment cannot come but from mortal ſin.

Which agrees well with that which *Amicus* ſaith, that Jeſus Chriſt might abſolutely ſin (2) *by a phyſical and next power of ſinning, which would not be incompatible with the union which the humanity of Jeſus Chriſt had with the Word whereof he was partaker, if the repugnance came not from the decree of God.* And if you would know what he means by a phyſical power of ſinning, *potentia phyſica peccandi*, he expoundeth it himſelf, ſaying, that it is (3) *that which proceeds from the internal principles which are ſimply neceſſary unto action*; that is to ſay, unto ſinning. So that according to his opinion, Jeſus Chriſt had in himſelf a power of ſinning, and the internal principles neceſſary to ſin, and if theſe principles had not their effect in him; that is to ſay, if Jeſus Chriſt did not actually ſin, it was not becauſe there was any thing in him that was repugnant thereunto; *non repugnaret ratione unionis & ſanctitatis à Verbo participatæ in humanitate.*
20230 But this came to paſs purely and ſimply from the will and protection of God, and from his Decree which he had made not to permit Jeſus Chriſt to fall into ſin: *ſi non repugnaret defectu divini decreti.*

2 Dico 4. potentia phyſica proxima peccandi, ſi non repugnaret defectu divini decreti, non repugnaret ratione unionis & ſanctitatis Verbo participatæ in humanitate Chriſti. *Amicus ibid. n.* 43.

3 Quæ conſtituitur ex principiis intrinſecis ad operandum ſimpliciter neceſſariis. *Ibid.*

In this manner *Molina*, *Suarez*, and ſome others expound the Impeccability of Jeſus Chriſt, as *Amicus* ſaith, (4) *maintaining that the Impeccability of the humanity of Jeſus Chriſt is the ſame with that of thoſe who are confirmed in grace, which is not phyſical, but moral.* That is to ſay, that Jeſus Chriſt was not properly impeccable, but by the grace and mercy of God, as the Saints might have been in this world as well as he, and are alſo now in Heaven by the ſame mercy. And by conſequence that Jeſus Chriſt was of himſelf capable to ſin even as they, and that he had ſinned effectually without the extraordinary ſuccours and graces he received from God.

4 Qui docent impeccabilitatem humanitatis Chriſti fuiſſe eandem cum impeccabilitate quam habent confirmati in gratia, quæ non eſt phyſica, ſed moralis. *Ibid. n.* 70. *p.* 352.

It is from this ſame Principle that *Amicus* ſaith with *Vaſquez* and many others whom he nameth not, that it were no inconvenience to affirm, that this propoſition is true: The Word was capable of ſin. For making himſelf this objection: (5) *It cannot be ſaid without contradiction, that the Word by the very communication of the properties of the two natures which are in Jeſus Chriſt, ſhould be naturally capable to ſin. Now this may be ſaid, if a phyſical and natural power to ſin may ſubſiſt in the humanity which the Word hath aſſumed.* He anſwers to this objection, (6) *by denying the major, becauſe there are many, and amongſt them* Vaſquez, *who hold, that it is no abſurdity to ſay, that the Word by the mutual communication of the two natures, is capable of ſinning.*
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5 Objicies 4. implicat Verbum etiam per communicationem idiomatum denominari phyſicè peccabile. Denominaretur autem per communicationem idiomatum phyſicè peccabile ab ipſa potentia phyſica peccandi, ſi ea poſſet cum humanitate unita Verbo manere. Ergo, &c. *Ibid. n.* 102. 6 Reſpondeo 1. negando majorem. Multi enim, inter quos Vaſquez *diſ.* 61. *cap. ult.* non reputant abſurdum Verbum per communicationem idiomatum denominari peccabile. *Ibid. n.* 103.

And by conſequence we might ſay according to this Divinity, what is horrible and dreadful only to think, that the Word had or might have been miſchievous and wicked, and that the Devil might have had him under his power as his

Captive and Slave, becauſe the Devil is the Prince and Maſter of ſinners according to Scripture.

There have been Hereticks that have maintained that Jeſus Chriſt was not God; and others, that he was a man of the ſame nature as we; but there was never any that acknowledging that he was God and Man both at once, imagined that he was capable of ſinning, and falling under the power of the Devil, as the Jeſuits affirm and teſtifie, by attributing to him a next and natural power of ſinning, of being in errour, and even of that which proceeds from a wicked diſpoſition and deordination, *error pravæ diſpoſitionis*: to retain and keep wicked habits; of being ſubject unto vices, of being obliged to temporal puniſhments, and even of eternal for his own ſins, as we have now ſeen in their own proper words.

1. If Jeſus Chriſt might have ſinned, he could not have been the Saviour of 20250
men, nor delivered them from ſin, becauſe hereunto it was neceſſary that he ſhould be himſelf uncapable of ſin, according to the Doctrine of the Church and of the holy Fathers.

2. If ſin might have been in Jeſus Chriſt, then ſin is no more ſin; becauſe ſin being no otherwiſe ſin then as it is againſt the will of God, if Jeſus Chriſt, who is the Son of God, and God as well as his Father, could ſin, ſin would be voluntary unto him, not only according to his humanity which did or ſhould commit it; but alſo in regard of his Divinity and divine perſon who ſhould permit it, or take it unto him voluntarily in the Humanity which ſhould be perſonally united unto him, as well as the other qualities and actions of this humanity which are proper to him, and appertain unto him in ſome ſort more than unto the humanity it ſelf.

3. But if God could will ſin, or be partaker thereof by aſſuming it, or permitting it voluntarily in a nature which ſhould be united unto him; God ſhould be no more God, becauſe he ſhould be no longer the ſupream Truth, which is more inconſiſtent with ſin, which is nothing elſe but errour, injuſtice, and malice, then light is with darkneſs.

4. This is not the way to withdraw men from ſin, to attribute it unto Jeſus Chriſt. But to move them unto horror and deteſtation of ſo ſtrange an opinion, it is ſufficient to conſider, that it tends to deſtroy both the Incarnation of Jeſus Chriſt, and even his Divinity it ſelf. For as in dying voluntarily in his humanity, he did put ſin to death, and deſtroyed the Empire of the Devil, who was the Author of his death, becauſe he ſuffered this death unjuſtly, being innocent, and having no ſin at all; this opinion on the contrary attributing ſin unto him, makes him dye at once both in his Humanity and Divinity, and ſubjects him to the power of the Devil to favour and revive ſin. 20260

## CHAPTER II.

### *Of Repentance.*

REpentance is a remorſe and ſorrow for offending God; and herein it is the proper and natural Remedy of Sin; ſince as it is committed by pleaſure, ſo it muſt be blotted out by ſorrow. This ſorrow is a vertue which appertains to Religion; and it is alſo one part of the Sacrament of Penance ſo neceſſary and ſo conſiderable, that it hath given even its name thereunto. We ſeparate not here theſe two conſiderations; and that we may treat more largely of Penance, we will conſider it as a Sacrament: and becauſe that in this quality, beſides grief for ſin, it contains alſo Confeſſion, Abſolution, and Satisfaction, we will treat here of every one of theſe by way of preocupation of what ſhould have been ſaid in the Chapter of the Sacraments, diſtributing them into ſo many Articles.

ARTICLE

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## ARTICLE I. Of Sorrow for Sin.

***That according to the Jesuits we may be justified by the Sacrament of Penance by a natural sorrow, and even without any true sorrow for sin.***

THE first step of a Soul that returns unto God, is the knowledge and remorse it hath for offending God: (1) *I will arise and go unto my father, and say unto him; Father, I have sinned against Heaven and before thy face*, saith this child after he had departed from the obedience and guidance of his father, when he began to resolve himself to return unto him. The Jesuits consent well unto this Catholick Truth; they do truly affirm, that we cannot absolutely obtain pardon of sins without acknowledging with sorrow that we have committed them; but when they would expound what sorrow this ought to be, they speak of it in such manner as destroys it in effect. For they are not content to say, that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient to blot out all the sins in the world; but they do also maintain, that this sorrow ought not of necessity to be supernatural; and some proceed so far as to say, that without any true sorrow for offending God, we may be reconciled unto him, by being only grieved that we have not the sorrow which we ought to have.

*Filiutius* demands, (2) *If there be any particular degree of sorrow necessary unto contrition?* 20280 And he answereth, (3) *That there is no certain particular degree which is necessary.* His reason is: (4) *Because that the Scriptures and holy Fathers allow remission of sins to him that is truly converted unto God, without limiting the degree. Whence it follows, that we ought not to limit it.*

God wills and demands oft in Scripture, that for obtaining pardon of sins, we should be converted unto him with all our hearts. Whence the holy Fathers have taken occasion to say, that we ought not to limit or bound the grief of a sinner who is converted, since it ought to be with all the affection of his heart, and that it cannot be too great nor equal the demerit and indignity of sin. And this Jesuit on the contrary saith, it must not be limited, because it cannot be too little, and that it is always great enough to blot out sin. See the conformity of his spirit with that of the holy Fathers and Scripture.

It seems that he would correct his errour in the answer which he makes a little after to this question: (5) *Whether the sorrow of contrition ought in degree to surpass all other sorrow?* For he answers, (6) *Yes, as to appretiation at least.* But he doth only hide his errour under the obscurity of his words, as will appear by the explication he gives himself to this word *Appretiation.* For he saith that, (7) *This appretiation or estimation proceeds not from any high degree of charity or love.* 20290 That is to say, that this sorrow needs not be great in it self, nor arise from any great charity; but it is said to be great by reason the cause of it is great, since it is God, or which is the same thing, because of the excellency of the Motive thereof; *propter excellentiam motivi*, or in more clear terms; because God who is the Object and Motive thereof is great, though it be in it self very weak and small, as is also the Charity from whence it proceeds.

And when he saith, that the sorrow for offending God ought to be *appretiatively* greater than all other grief which we can have for any temporal loss, he intends to say no other thing then that it ought to be greater in the thought and esteem of the sinner, in such manner that he judge and acknowledge that God is greater than all other things, and that by consequence the loss of God is more considerable than all other losses; though indeed this sorrow be much less and more feeble in his heart than that which he hath for other losses and evils. Whence he draws this consequence which clears up his thoughts yet more.

(8) *This is the reason why he may have more trouble and grief of mind for the loss of his father or of his son*, then for having offended God. For this hinders not but that he may believe, that God deserves to be more loved than a father

1 Surgam & ibo ad patrem meum, & dicam ei: Pater, peccavi in cœlum & coram te. *Luc.* 5. 18.

2 Quæro: an requiratur certa intentio ad contritionem? *Tom.* 1. *tract.* 6. *cap.* 9. *n.* 231.

3 Dico 3. non requiri certum gradum intentionis. *Ibid.* 234.

4 Tum quia Scripturæ & Sancti Patres conversioni in Deum promittunt remissionem peccati absque limitatione intentionis: ergo neque nos limitare debemus. *Filliut. mor. qq. to.* 1. *tr.* 6. *c.* 9. *n* 234.

5 An contritio debeat esse intentior?

6 Respondeo & dico 1. debere esse intentiorem, saltem quoad appretiationem. *Ibid. n.* 237.

7 Dico 2. ejusmodi appretiatio sive existimatio non sumitur ex intentione graduali charitatis vel dilectionis. *Ibid.*

8 Quare poterit dolere magis de morte parentis aut filii. *Ib. n.* 238.

father or a ſon; and by conſequence to be more reſented when he is loſt by ſin, though in effect he have more affection for his father or for his ſon, and he be more moved by the loſs of them than by offending God: and yet in this diſpoſition, according to this Jeſuit, he ceaſes not to be in a good eſtate, and to obtain the pardon of his ſins, how great and in how great number ſoever they be, provided he have the leaſt diſpleaſure that he hath committed them: (1) *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *the leaſt grace is ſufficient for the remiſſion of all ſins, and the leaſt contrition is a ſufficient diſpoſition for the leaſt grace.* 20300

1 Quia minima gratia eſt ſufficiens ad remiſſionem omnium peccatorum; & ad minimam gratiam ſufficiens minima contritio tanquam diſpoſitio.

He demands alſo concerning the ſorrow which is neceſſary to obtain pardon of ſin in the Sacrament of Penance; (2) *Whether this ſorrow ought to be true and real*; or it be ſufficient we are perſwaded that it is, *though it be not at all*? His Anſwer is, *That it is probable that it is ſufficient that we believe it to be ſuch.* That is to ſay, that to obtain pardon of God in Penance, it is not neceſſary to have a true ſorrow for offending him, ſo that we believe we have this ſorrow.

2 Quæro an hic dolor debeat eſſe verus & realis? Reſpondeo probabile eſſe dolorem exiſtimatum ſufficere. *Tr. 7. de Confeſſ. cap. 6. n. 150.*

*Eſcobar* alſo demands in the ſame matter, (3) *If it be needful that ſorrow be ſupernatural*? And he anſwers, *That it ſuffices to be natural, ſo we believe it to be ſupernatural.* As if a Creditor were obliged to diſcharge his Debtor, when he had given him Braſs money for Gold, provided he imagined that he gave him good Gold.

3 Num neceſſarius ſit dolor ſupernaturalis? Sufficit naturalis, qui tamen ſupernaturalis exiſtimetur. *Eſcobar tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 39. p. 805.*

He ſpeaks yet more clearly upon this Point a little after, ſaying, (4) *That if a man be touched with remorſe for his ſin, becauſe God, to puniſh him for it, hath brought on him ſome temporal evil, this remorſe is ſufficient; but if it have no reſpect unto God, it is not ſufficient.* It is clear that this grief is altogether natural, and common to good and bad, or rather proper unto them that love the world, who are ſo much more touched with regret and diſpleaſure when God takes from them their temporal goods, as they love them more: whereas good men have little or no reſentment thereof, becauſe they love them not, if their vertue be ſolid; as appears by the Example of *Job* and many others. So that this grief comes properly from the love of the world, and the adherence we have to the goods of this world: and yet according to the opinion of *Hurtado* the Jeſuit reported by *Eſcobar*, it is ſufficient to blot out ſins, though it be it ſelf a diſorder and a ſin. 20310

4 Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in pœnam illius malum temporale immiſit, ſufficit; ſi autem doleat ſine ullo reſpectu ad Deum, non ſufficit. *Ibid. c. 7. n. 91. p. 813.*

But if any object unto him what *Amicus* doth to himſelf; (5) *That he who deteſteth ſin becauſe of puniſhment, doth indeed deteſt the puniſhment more than the ſin, the puniſhment being the motive and reaſon that incites him to deteſt the ſin*: which is to love himſelf more than God, and to prefer his own intereſt before the honour of God, ſince he is touched more by the loſs which he makes, or the temporal puniſhment that he ſuffers, than the ſin which diſpleaſeth and diſhonoreth God; He will anſwer without doubt as the ſame *Amicus*, (6) *That he cannot agree that this act is not good and honeſt*; and he will ſerve himſelf of this reaſon: *That we are not always obliged to deteſt actually the fault more than the puniſhment.* From whence he will conclude, as he hath done already, (7) *That if a man be touched with remorſe for his ſin, becauſe God, to puniſh him for it, hath brought on him ſome temporal evil, this remorſe ſuffices* to blot out his ſin, if it be true, as the ſame *Amicus* pretends, that we are not always obliged to do otherwiſe; and this ſorrow be good, honeſt, and regular. 20320

5 Qui peccatum deteſtatur propter pœnam, plus actu deteſtatur pœnam quam culpam, cum pœna ſit ratio deteſtandi culpam. *Amicus tom. 8. diſp. 3. ſect. 1. n. 5.*

6 Nego hujuſmodi actum non eſſe honeſtum, quia non tenemur ſemper actu plus deteſtari culpam quam pœnam. *Ibid.*

This being ſo, we muſt ſay, that the world is at this day filled with perſons of great vertue and true Penitents; ſince amongſt ſo frequent and common miſeries, there are hardly any that are not afflicted with loſs of their goods, their happineſs and their repoſe, and who will not eaſily confeſs, that their ſins are the cauſe. So that according to the Rule of theſe Jeſuits, the moſt covetous, moſt ambitious, and moſt voluptuous will be the greateſt Penitents, becauſe they are more touched with regret than others for the loſs of their goods, and for having deſerved it by their ſins.

7 Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in pœnam illius malum temporale immiſit, ſufficit.

*Eſcobar* might well have ſeen theſe conſequences from his and his Maſter *Hurtado's* opinion, ſince they are ſo evident, but they have not ſtartled him, for without

out ſtanding upon them at all, he inſiſts only upon one Rule of *Suarez*, whom he affirms to be of the contrary opinion, and to reject his; (1) *Becauſe it would follow thence that the ſinner might diſpoſe himſelf to receive the Sacrament and the benefit of the Sacrament by the powers of nature only.* But he confeſſes he makes no great account of this reaſon. For he anſwers only in ſaying with *Hurtado*, (2) *That if the ſinner grieve for his ſin without any regard of God, it is not ſufficient.* That
20330 is to ſay, provided the ſinner have ſome thought of God, and regard him in ſome manner as the Author of his puniſhment which he is apprehenſive of; that grief he hath for offending him will thereupon immediately become ſupernatural, and a ſufficient diſpoſition to blot out his ſin.

1 Quia aliàs ſequeretur peccatorem poſſe ſe diſponere ad Sacramentum & illum affectum, ex ſolis naturæ viribus. *Ibid.*

2 Si autem doleat ſine ullo reſpectu ad Deum, non ſufficit. *Ibid.*

But if this be true, not only perſons that are moſt addicted to the world; but alſo Devils and damned Spirits will always be in a diſpoſition to be converted For in their greateſt pains, as they are troubled to endure them, ſo are they alſo for having offended God; not becauſe their ſin is diſpleaſing unto God, but becauſe it is the cauſe of their torments. So that knowing that it is God who torments them, but that it is ſin only that makes way for him to torment them; they hate not ſin otherwiſe then as they hate God, and they have the ſame averſion for them both, as being the intire and total cauſe of their puniſhment, which is the principal motive of their grief. Such is the diſpleaſure of thoſe of whom *Eſcobar* ſpeaks, who are troubled that they have offended God becauſe of the puniſhments he ſends them for their ſins; and yet he pretends that this diſpleaſure is ſufficient to juſtifie a ſinner in the Sacrament of Penance.

3 Quæro an dolor hic verus debeat eſſe ſupernaturalis; an vero ſufficiat naturalis ad valorem Sacramenti. *Filliut. mor. qq. t. 1. tr. 7. c. 6. n. 153. p. 185.*

*Filliutius* alſo demands particularly, (3) *If this true ſorrow ought alſo to be ſupernatural, or whether indeed it be enough that it be natural, that the Sacrament may be effectual?* He relates after his uſe two contrary opinions, of which the one ſaith, that this ſorrow ought of neceſſity to be ſupernatural; and the other
20340 maintains, that it ſuffices that it be natural. He concludes for the latter, ſaying, (4) *That it appears to him more probable.* One of his reaſons is, that if it were neceſſary to have ſupernatural ſorrow for the obtaining pardon of ſin, it would ſo fall out, that many confeſſions at this day would be void, for want of this ſorrow, and which for that cauſe ought to be repeated: which would be troubleſom to Confeſſors, and the Penitents are not to be obliged hereunto, if the obligation be not indubitable and evident.

4 Dico 2. probabiliorem videri ſecundam ſententiam. *Ibid. n. 154. p. 185.* Quia mihi non conſtat de obligatione evidenter, non ſunt homines obligandi ad iterandas confeſſiones. *Ibid.*

But though a perſon were aſſured that his grief is purely natural, yet he holds that the Sacrament would not ceaſe to be valid, though it were uſeleſs and ineffectual to him: (5) *For this grief*, ſaith he, *is not that which Jeſus Chriſt hath inſtituted as a neceſſary diſpoſition to receive the fruit of the Sacrament, according to the Council of* Trent, *though it be ſufficient for the eſſence of the Sacrament: Becauſe Jeſus Chriſt would not ſo rigorouſly oblige us to reiterate the Confeſſion, when that which is eſſential unto the judgment which the Prieſt is obliged to exerciſe may be found therein, as it is found in effect when the Confeſſion is entire and the ſorrow true, though it be only natural.*

5 Non enim pertingit ad eum gradum quem Chriſtus inſtituit ut neceſſariam diſpoſitionem ad fructum, ex Tridentino. Eſt tamen ſufficiens ad valorem Sacramenti, quia Chriſtus noluit obligare ut tam rigide teneremur ad iterationem, quando adſunt neceſſaria eſſentialia judicio: adſunt autem omnia cum eſt integer & verus dolor. *Ibid. n. 154. p. 186.*

So the Sacrament of Penance ſhall not be only altogether humane, being compoſed of parts all natural, as are confeſſion and ſorrow: but we may alſo fulfil the Command which Jeſus Chriſt hath given us to receive the Sacrament
20350 of Penance by actions meerly humane, yea, and unprofitable, ſince they make the Sacrament without effect, and diſordered ſince they prophane it; for it is certain, that he who knows his ſorrow for his ſins is only natural, as this Jeſuit ſuppoſes, and who confeſſeth them by a motion meerly humane and natural, tranſgreſſes the inſtitution of Jeſus Chriſt, as the ſame Jeſuit himſelf acknowledges, and ſins in prophaning the Sacrament, and rendring it unprofitable. So that he ſhall be acquitted of the obligation of receiving the Sacrament by a voluntary impenitence, and by the prophanation of the Sacrament of Penance. And by conſequence the Commandments of Jeſus Chriſt as well as of the Church

may be accompliſhed by Sacriledges according to the Jeſuits, which they boldly affirm, as we ſhall ſee more at large in its place; but it is not for all that leſs horrible and incredible.

After he hath reduced ſorrow for ſin to an imaginary or meery natural being, he demands, (1) *Whether it be neceſſary that this ſorrow be extended to all the ſins that are confeſſed?* He anſwers preſently, according to the common opinion, that grief as well as confeſſion, ought to be extended to all ſins. But he adds to temper this Anſwer, that if the Penitent be ſorrowful only for ſome part of his ſins, and do this purpoſely, or by an ignorance that is criminal and entirely unexcuſable, and that knowing his own indiſpoſition, he forbears not to perſiſt therein voluntarily, the confeſſion will be null. (2) *But if he be not guilty of this ignorance or inadvertence, or that he be not fallen into it but by ſome venial fault, or even mortal, but common and ordinary, the confeſſion ſhall be valid.*

1 An requiritur ut dolor ſit de omnibus peccatis confeſſis? *Ibid. n.* 156.

Reſpondeo 1. requiri ut ſit de omnibus.

2 Si verò ignorantia vel inadvertentia ſit inculpabilis, vel culpabilis venialiter tantum, aut etiam mortaliter, ſed communi modo, erit valida. *Ibid. n* 157.

If we conſider *Baunys* diſcourſes, he will ſeem at firſt to reject this Doctrine. For in his Treatiſe of Confeſſion in his Sum, *Chap.* 42. *pag.* 674. After he had ſaid in the entrance, (3) *That by the word Contrition, we underſtand one of the eſſential parts of the Sacrament, which in the propriety of its ſignification contains two things, remorſe for ſin, and a purpoſe to amend,* he declares in the following page, *That to the end this remorſe may be ſuch as it ought to be to make it an act of contrition*; and by conſequence an eſſential part of the Sacrament, as he ſaid at firſt, *It ſhould incline him to the hatred of ſin, not for any ſhame he hath for committing it, (as the Philoſophers did heretofore) for this motive is temporal, and unprofitable to eternal life, as may be ſeen in* Antiochus, 2 Maccab chap. 9. *nor yet for having loſt his goods. For to be thus touched with reſentments of what is paſt, is one ſort of avarice, and very ſhameful avarice; not for having deſerved by ſinning the flames of Hell, this ſorrow is ſervile, and though it be good, though it be religious and holy, it takes its original from ſelf-love which edifies the City of* Babylon, *and not of God, as S.* Auguſtine *in* 4. *of the City of God, chap.* 28. *and therefore not compatible with this action whereof we now ſpeak.* Which he confirms in his Chap. 45. pag. 193. *ſaying, that attrition reſpects properly his own intereſt, and the particular good of him that acts it.*

It may ſeem that he could not ſpeak more ſtrongly, nor more clearly againſt the Maxims of his Fraternity; but he will quickly return to them, and he hath teſtified already little conſtancy in this very paſſage, wherein he falls into a contradiction which manifeſtly deſtroys that which he ſeems to eſtabliſh, and eſtabliſheth that which he ſeemeth to deſtroy.

For he declareth, *That the grief we have for deſerving by ſin the pains of Hell,* is not only *ſervile,* but doth alſo *take its original from ſelf-love which edifies the City of* Babylon, ſo that *it comes not from God*; as alſo it regards him not at all, *becauſe it regards properly private intereſt, and that of him who acts it.* Whence it follows evidently, that God hath not inſtituted it as an eſſential part of the Sacrament of Penance, it being impoſſible that that which comes not from God at all, and which reſpects not God at all, ſhould be inſtituted by God to ſerve to compoſe a Sacrament: that what edifies the City of the Devil, ſhould be proper to edifie the City of God, as the Sacraments do; and that what takes its riſe from ſelf-love, ſhould give and produce the love of God and his grace, as the Sacraments produce it, according to all Catholicks. Which is ſo clear, that this Jeſuit himſelf hath concluded, *That this ſorrow is not compatible with this action whereof we ſpeak*; *that is to ſay, with contrition or ſorrow, which is an eſſential part of the Sacrament,* according to his own words.

But all this hinders not but that he ſaith at the ſame time in the ſame place, that this ſort of grief which he ſo much debaſes and rejects as an inſtrument of the City of the Devil, is good, religious, and holy, without coming from God who is the Spring of all Holineſs, all Goodneſs, and of all Religion; that it may be *good, holy,* and *religious,* taking its riſe from ſelf-love, which is the ſpring of all ſin and vices; and finally that it can be *good, holy,* and *religious,* edifying not the City of God, but *Babylon,* which is the City of the Devil, in which there is nothing but confuſion, corruption, and impiety. But this is not yet enough for this

this good Jeſuit, he will make a more ample reparation to the fear of the pains of Hell, after he hath ſo much diſhonoured it. He declares in the ſame Chapter pag. 687. *That the grief which hath for its object the deſerved pains of Hell is ſufficient with the Sacrament for a mans juſtification.* He is not content to make it holy: but he makes it ſanctifying and juſtifying, and even in the Sacrament; which appertains not to many the moſt excellent and moſt perfect works. So that according to his Divinity, the fear of Hell, and the ſorrow which proceeds from it, is one of the moſt marvellous and moſt prodigious things in Chriſtianity, containing in it ſo many contrary qualities, whereof ſome debaſe it to the City of the Devil and to Hell, and the other elevate it unto Heaven, and give it one of the firſt ranks in the City of God, which is the Church; ſome make it prophane, and others make it religious; ſome make it impure and contagious, and the others divine and ſanctifying.

He proceeds yet farther on in favour of this ſorrow which he hath repreſented in ſo monſtrous a manner, ſaying, that even thoſe who have it not, may receive grace in the Sacrament of Penance, provided only that they deſire it, and that they are grieved that they have it not. Fourthly, ſaith he in the ſame Chapter, pag. 685. *To ſettle a Soul in peace, who apprehends that he hath not the contrition which is neceſſary to the expiation of his ſins, he muſt be told that he may ſupply that by his will to have it, or by the remorſe he hath for not poſſeſſing ſuch as he deſires to have, and ſuch as he ſhould have, perfectly to ſatisfie God.*

He hath taken this Maxime from *Emanuel Sa*, who ſaith, (1) *That the ſorrow which we have for not having ſorrow enough, is ſufficient with the Sacrament; as alſo diſlike of ſin with a reſolution to avoid it for time to come, though this diſlike come from the fear of puniſhment.*

*Eſcobar* follows him alſo in this Point, as he affirms, he asks, (2) *Whether ſorrow for not having ſorrow enough be ſufficient with the Sacrament?* He anſwers, (3) Sa *following* Navarre, *aſſures us that it is ſufficient.*

Whence it follows, that the fear of the pains of Hell, and the grief which it produceth, is ſo privileged and ſo powerful amongſt the Jeſuits, that though it ariſe from a corrupt fountain of ſelf-love and the confuſion of the Devils City, yet it cannot only purifie the greateſt ſinners, and conduct them to the City of God and to Heaven; but that the wiſhing only and deſire to have it, though indeed it be not had, hath the ſame efficacy, and produces the ſame effect; not in a feeble and uncertain manner, but in the Sacrament of Penance, wherein the vertue of the blood of Jeſus Chriſt operates with an advantage which is not to be found in the moſt holy exerciſes and beſt works.

He who grieves for his ſins for fear of damnation, if he love not God, at the leaſt he fears him: but he that hath not this grief neither, teſtifies that he hath neither love nor fear for him; and yet he will have it, that in this eſtate he may be reconciled unto God: that is, that he may return unto God without any good motion, and come to him without making only the firſt ſtep, ſince the fear of God is the beginning of wiſdom and of a good life.

*Bauny* in the ſame place relates another opinion of ſome Caſuiſts in theſe terms: (4) *If a man being at the point of death, endeavours to do what he can; and having in his mind only an act of attrition preſent, he ſaith unto God theſe words: Lord, have mercy on me, with deſign to pacifie him, he ſhall be juſtified, God himſelf ſupplying the want of abſolution.*

This is the true thought of Libertines and debauched perſons, who are accuſtomed to ſay when they are preſſed to be converted, and to think on death, that they need only one good *Peccavi* to obtain pardon for all their ſins. It is true that *Bauny* ſaith, that he approves not this opinion, *Becauſe it is founded only on the mercy of God, and not on any good or ſolid reaſon.* But it is enough to vent it into the world, that he propoſeth it as being maintained by ſome Caſuiſts; ſince that he thereby teſtifies that it is probable, and may therefore be followed with a ſafe conſcience, according to the Principles of the Divinity of his Society.

Father *Anthony Sirmond* hath been yet more bold. For he makes no bones to ſay, that attrition alone, when more cannot be done, ſufficeth to deface all ſins,

1 Dolor ſufficiens eſt cum Sacramento dolere quod non ſatis doleas: itemque diſplicentia de peccato, cum propoſito cavendi, etiamſi diſpliceat ob timorem pœnæ. *Sa verbo contritio. n. 5.*

2 Num ſufficiens cum Sacramento dolor eſt, dolere quod non ſatis doleas?

3 Sa ex Navarro aſſerit ſufficientem eſſe. *Eſcobar tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 122. p. 819.*

4 Quod ſi quis in articulo mortis conatur facere quod in ſe eſt, & nihil aliud occurrat quam actus attritionis quo dicit: *Domine miſerere mei*, cum animo placandi Deum, hic juſtificabitur ſupplente Deo abſolutionis neceſſitatem.

be it at the point of death, or when the Sacrament is to be received or administred. *There are*, saith he, *who refer this to the extremity of life*; He speaks of the obligation to exercise the love of God; *Whereunto is opposed the small appearance that so great a Commandment should be given us not to obey but so late. Neither am I of opinion to be perswaded, that upon every reception or administration of the Sacrament, that we ought of necessity excite in our selves that holy flame of love, to consume therein the sins of which we are guilty; attrition is thereto sufficient with some strong endeavour after contrition, or with confession when there is convenience for it.*

We must not dispute after this, whether attrition be sufficient to receive the Grace of the Sacrament of Penance. This Jesuit gives no place for this difficulty, pretending that attrition alone is sufficient to restore a man unto grace, provided only, *That he endeavour after contrition, or that he confess himself when he hath convenience.* So that for him who hath not this convenience being in mortal sin, he maintains that attrition is sufficient, and that he may himself all alone blot out his sins, be it at the point of death, or when he comes to receive some Sacrament. And that he may leave no cause to doubt of his opinion, nor of the vertue he ascribes to attrition, he saith, *That it alone is sufficient to take away sin.* For he establisheth, as it were, two ways to return from sin to grace; attrition alone with endeavour for contrition, and attrition with confession; giving, as it were, the choice unto the sinner of which he please. He will have it then that attrition alone without the help of contrition, will suffice to take away sin. He believes indeed that confession is good with attrition; but it is to him *that hath convenience for it.* He affirms also, that a strong endeavour after contrition is commendable; *but he is not of opinion to believe that we ought of necessity excite in our selves this holy flame of love, to consume therein the sin whereof we are guilty.* He confesses that this is the best expedient, the most safe and perfect; but he pretends that we may dispense with it, *and that attrition is sufficient thereto.* 20420

It is remarkable that he speaks of attrition in the self same sense as Father *Bauny*, though it be not entirely in the self same terms. For he speaks of attrition which ariseth from self-love, and which is without any love of God, as his words evidently testifie: *I am not of opinion to believe that we ought of necessity excite in our selves this holy flame of love, to consume therein the sin whereof we are guilty.* He excludes then the obligation and necessity of exciting in us the love of God to destroy mortal sin. So that when he saith, that attrition is sufficient, he intends that attrition which is without the love of God: the attrition and regret for offending God, which takes it rise from love of ones self, and not of God, as *Bauny* saith.

*Dicastillus* extends also the effect of this attrition yet farther. For he saith, that this alone is sufficient to cause that one may suffer Martyrdom; that death and torments undergone, not through a Principle of Charity and Love of God; but only through fear, are capable to justifie and make everlastingly happy the greatest sinners. There is not then any remedy more universal than attrition, by the opinion of these Fathers; since, as we have now made appear, it hath so many different effects, Martyrdom it self not being excepted, which we hitherto believed to have been an effect of love, and that not of any sort neither, but strong and powerful; *majorem charitatem.* We must not only say of this fear altogether earthly and servile, what the Scripture saith indeed of the most noble: *Initium sapientiæ timor*: *Fear is the beginning of wisdom*: but we ought also to add; *Consummatio sapientiæ timor*: *Fear is the compleating of wisdom*; since it causeth us to produce the most Heroick act of Christian Religion, and conducts us even into Glory; *ad conferendam gratiam & gloriam*: and contrary to what the Apostle saith; When my body is in the midst of flames, if at the same time my heart be not inflamed with this heavenly fire of divine love, all these torments are unto me unprofitable: *Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habeam, mihi nihil prodest*: *If I give my body to be burnt, and have not charity, it profits me nothing.* This Jesuit would have it that death which the Philosophers call *terribilium terribilissimum*, sufficeth with attrition only; that is to say, by the motive of fear alone, and without any mixture of love, 20430

it is capable to purge away all blemiſhes, and to beſtow glory on the moſt criminal perſon of the whole world ; *ad conferendam gratiam & gloriam.*

## THE SUM

*Of the Doctrine of the Jeſuits related in this Chapter, concerning the ſorrow which is neceſſary to blot out ſins in the Sacrament of Penance.*

THey hold that the leaſt degree of ſorrow is ſufficient for it.

That it were better this grief were ſupernatural ; but if it be not, it is enough that we believe it is ; when we know that it is only natural, we ceaſe not for all that to be ſufficiently diſpoſed to receive the Sacrament of Penance, and to fulfil the command for receiving it, though we receive no fruit thereby.

That though it be true that we have no real remorſe for ſins, if we only think we have, we may obtain pardon and receive grace by confeſſing in this eſtate : That for greater aſſurance we ought always put forth a ſtrong endeavour to excite this contrition ; but if we cannot bring our heart unto ſorrow by any other way nor by other motive than that of the apprehenſion of the pains of Hell, or the loſs of temporal goods ; the one or the other of theſe motives, though they reſpect only our own intereſt, and come not at all from God, but take their original from ſelf-love which edifies the City of *Babylon*, is ſufficient to diſpoſe us for abſolution and juſtification.

That if after we have done what we can, we ſee we have laboured in vain, and that we cannot draw from our hearts that ſincere and neceſſary diſlike of our ſins, we muſt be ſorry that we cannot have it, and ſay at leaſt with our mouths, if we cannot ſay it with our hearts ; *Lord, I have ſinned, have mercy on me ; Peccavi Domine, miſerere mei*: that this ſuffices for a right receiving of the Sacraments, or even for to dye well without Sacraments, if we have not convenience to receive them, that God will do the reſt, and ſupply the want of Prieſt and of abſolution.

And finally, that this very fear ſufficeth to conduct a Soul right into Heaven by the way of Martyrdom.

See here the Maxims of the Jeſuits, according to which there is no need neither of the Grace of God, nor of the Spirit of God which is charity, nor of true ſorrow for offending, nor even of the Sacrament of Penance it ſelf to have remiſſion of ſins.

Non requiritur certus gradus intenſioris. *Filliutius.*

Minima gratia eſt ſufficiens ad remiſſionem peccatorum ; & ad minimam gratiam ſufficit minima attritio tanquam diſpoſitio. *Filliutius.*

Sufficit dolor naturalis, qui tamen ſupernaturalis exiſtimetur. *Filliut. & Eſcob.*

An hic dolor debeat eſſe verus & realis, an vero ſufficiat exiſtimatus. Reſpondeo & dico 1. probabile eſſe dolorem exiſtimatum ſufficere. *Filliut.*

*L'attrition eſt ſuffiſante pour conſommer le peché.* Sirmond. Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in pœnam illius malum temporale immiſit, ſufficit. *Eſcob. Eſtre touché de reſſentiment du peché pour avoir perdu ſes biens, c'eſt une eſpece d'avarice & avarice tres honteuſe. Pour avoir en pechant merité les flammes d'enfer, c'eſt crainte ſervile qui prend ſon origine de l'amour propre, qui edifie la cité de Babylone & non de Dieu, comme témoigne S. Auguſtin au 4. liv. de la Cité de Dieu chap. 28.* Bauny. *Et toutefois il ne laiſſe pas de dire en ſuitte que cette même douleur, laquelle a pour ſon objet formel la peine meritée de l'enfer, ſuffit au Sacrement pour la juſtification de l'homme.* Dolor ſufficiens eſt cum Sacramento, dolere quod non ſatis doleas. *Sa & Eſcob. Pour loger la paix dans une ame qui apprehende de n'avoir pas la contrition neceſſaire à l'expiation de ſes pechez, il luy faut dire qu'elle y peut ſuppléer par la volonté de l'avoir, & le regret de ne la pas poſſeder telle qu'elle en a deſir. Bauny.* Qui in articulo mortis conatur facere quod in ſe eſt, & nihil aliud ſibi occurrit quàm actus attritionis quo dicit : Domine miſerere mei, cum animo placandi Deum, hic juſtificabitur, Deo ſupplente abſolutionis neceſſitatem. *Opinion rapportée par Bauny : il cite Victoria & Leſſius. L'attrition avec effort pour la contrition, ou avec la confeſſion qui en a la commodité, eſt ſuffiſante pour conſommer le peché dont nous ſerions coupables, ſoit avant la reception ou collation des Sacremens, ſoit à l'extremité de la vie.* Le P. A. Sirmond.

Cc ARTICLE

## ARTICLE II. Of Confeſſion and Accuſation of Sins. 20460

### *That the Jeſuits do deſtroy the integrity thereof.*

THe ſinner in Confeſſion is as a ſick Patient, who preſents himſelf to the Prieſt as to his Phyſitian, and diſcovers unto him his ſickneſs, that he may appoint him the remedies which he ſhall judge neceſſary for the healing and Salvation of his Soul. For this cauſe he ought to be faithful, and make him ſee the bottom of his heart, not contenting himſelf only to tell him his ſins piece-meal, and to ſpecifie as much as he can their number and their circumſtances; but alſo by noting out to him the paſſions unto which he is ſubject, and the evil habits which have been the ſources of theſe diſorders. The Divinity of the Jeſuits diverts men from acquitting themſelves ſincerely in this duty, and from fulfilling the integrity of confeſſion in all points.

1. *Bauny* ſaith, *That if any one of ignorance and ſimplicity confeſs his faults only in groſs, without determinately expreſſing any one in particular, there's no need to draw from his mouth the repetition of thoſe faults, if it cannot conveniently be done, becauſe [the Confeſſor] is preſſed with Penitents that give him not leiſure for it.* In his Sum, Chap. 40. pag. 650.

1. Interdum tamen ſi appareat magna hominis ruditas, confeſſarius contentus eſſe poteſt enarratione peccatorum à proxima confeſſione commiſſorum, præcedentium autem rudi aliqua cognitione, præſertim ſi aliorum pœnitentium copia adſit. *Layman. l. 5. t. 6. c. 9. n. 4. p. 117.*

*Laymin* propoſes the ſame caſe; and though at firſt he propounds that this blockiſh perſon, who through ignorance accuſeth himſelf only of his ſins in general, is obliged to confeſs himſelf anew, if he comes to know the obligation he hath to declare them in particular; yet he maintains afterwards, (1) *That if the* 20470 *Confeſſor ſee that he is a man very ignorant, he may content himſelf to cauſe him tell thoſe ſins which he hath committed ſince his laſt confeſſion, and to receive of him the imperfect and general knowledge of the time paſt; eſpecially if he have many other Penitents.*

The Confeſſor then, as often as he finds himſelf preſſed with Penitents, muſt preſently become a Prophet, to diſcover of himſelf the ſins which are not declared to him but in general, and to preſcribe the true remedies by a light extraordinary, and which comes immediately from God; or elſe he muſt deal with his Penitent at adventure, as a Phyſitian that being not at leiſure to conſider his ſick Patient, diſpatches him in haſte, and appoints him the firſt thing that comes in his mind; without having taken ſo much pains as to inform himſelf of the particularities of his ſickneſs, becauſe he hath many other Patients to viſit, who will not ſuffer him to ſtay with this, and look to him more nearly; and in the mean time he would perſwade him that he is cured, and that he may return to his ordinary employments.

*Bauny* propoſes a ſecond caſe like to the former. He demands, *What is fit to be ſaid to them who in their youth have done many actions vicious in their own nature, which notwithſtanding they believed not to be ſuch?* He anſwers, *That they are not obliged to ſay one word of them when they apprehend and know their nature and conditions; and much leſs to repeat their paſt Confeſſions:* He ſeems to have a deſign to oppoſe himſelf to the word of the Prophet, who beſeeches God not to remember the ſins of his youth and of his ignorance, acknowledging them to be 20480 true ſins, and that he ought to ask pardon for them of God, though he had committed them by ignorance: and this Jeſuit on the contrary wills that they be not confeſt, nor pardon asked for them from God, as if they were innocent actions.

*Dicaſtillus* propoſes one caſe very like this: (2) *When a Penitent in Confeſſion declares one of his ſins being mortal as venial through ignorance, and the Confeſſor by like ignorance believes it to be ſuch; whether after the certain knowledge of this ſin,*

2 Qui confeſſus fuit peccatum quod nec ipſe nec Confeſſarius ſciebant eſſe mortale, vel certe de eo dubitabant. Poſtea—novit eſſe mortale, non tenetur iterum confiteri—quia adſunt omnia neceſſaria ad ſubſtantiam Sacramenti, ad cujus valorem non requiritur quod Confeſſarius manifeſtè noverit peccatum eſſe mortale. *Dicaſtillus n. 353. & 354. d. 12. d. 10. tr. 8. de Pœnit.*

*he be obliged to confeſs it anew?* He reſolves this caſe without fear, and ſaith, (1) *That he is not obliged, becauſe it is not neceſſary that the Confeſſor know the quality of the ſin, whether it be mortal or venial.* Ignorance amongſt Jeſuits is a moſt advantagious thing. If you know not that an action is not a ſin, though in proceſs of time you do learn to know it, you are not at all obliged to confeſs your ſelf of it; and knowing that it is a ſin, you know not of what nature it is, mortal or venial, you are in no wiſe obliged to declare it to a Prieſt.

It is in favour of this ignorance ſo advantagious and ſo profitable, (2) *That he frees Penitents from examining their conſciences, at the leaſt ſo exactly, although it may well fall out,* ſaith he, *that by examining your ſelf more exactly, you may diſ-*
20490 *cover ſome new ſins, you are not thereunto obliged for all that.* It were even to be wiſht for Penitents, that they had bad memories, that they might before God be diſcharged of their ſins without the Sacrament of Confeſſion. If you ſay to this Jeſuit, that the Penitent may relieve his memory by ſetting down his ſins in writing, he will anſwer you, that he is not obliged thereunto. If you add, that having often cauſe to diſtruſt his memory, he may go frequently to Confeſſion, he will give you the ſame anſwer: and ſo it may oftentimes come to paſs, that a Penitent of this ſort covered with ſins, may caſt himſelf at the feet of a Prieſt as an innocent, without accuſing himſelf of any crime, though he have indeed a Soul altogether polluted therewith, becauſe he hath been ſo happy as to have a wretched memory.

*Filiutius* takes the thing yet higher, and propoſes the queſtion more generally. He aſks, (3) *Whether when ignorance is not abſolutely voluntary, though it be criminal, the Confeſſion continue to be valid, though it be out of form?* His anſwer is, *That it is probable.* And he adds, that if the omiſſion come only from this, that we are not prepared nor examined before we preſent our ſelves to Confeſſion, *it is not neceſſary to repeat what we have omitted; and the Confeſſion is valid notwithſtanding.*

It is true that he ſaith after, that the contrary opinion is the ſafer; but he forbears not for all that to prop up this as much as he can by authorities & reaſons, that he may make it more probable, and to give more liberty and more repoſe to the conſciences of thoſe that will follow him. He makes uſe of two conſiderable reaſons.

20500 The firſt is, *That otherwiſe many Confeſſions muſt be refuſed.* That is to ſay, that we are not to trouble our ſelves to remedy a miſchief, becauſe it is too great, and that if it were not ſo univerſal, it were good to oppoſe it, by obliging thoſe who had forgot their ſins to confeſs them the firſt time; but that this is not now neceſſary; though the forgetfulneſs or ignorance which is the cauſe of this omiſſion of ſins, and which cauſeth them to commit this ſin, be malicious and criminal: *licet ignorantia ſit culpabilis mortaliter.* In regard that this abuſe is become ſo common, that the greater part of thoſe who confeſs themſelves, doing it without great reſentment and without much preparation forget frequently one part of their ſins; and ſo there would be too much trouble to the Confeſſors and Penitents to repeat their Confeſſions ſo ill made. This is that which he ſaith clearly in his ſecond reaſon, with which he concludes in theſe terms. *Wherefore if we were to follow the contrary opinion in practice,* which obliges to repeat an imperfect Confeſſion, *this would make the burden of Confeſſion too heavy.*

2. They teach, that it is not always neceſſary to declare the circumſtances which change the kind of the ſin. *Dicaſtillus* brings for Example of this Doctrine a calumny. (4) *It ſeems to me,* ſaith he, *that he who hath hurt his neighbour notoriouſly in his reputation by publiſhing falſities, and againſt all manner of juſtice, is not obliged to accuſe himſelf to have publiſhed lyes; but it is ſufficient to accuſe himſelf to have unjuſtly taken away his reputation.*

1 Ex quo ſit ut poſt mediocrem diligentiam non teneatur quis, licet fortaſſe conjiciat fore ut tandem per prolixiſſimam aliquod aliud peccatum occurrat. *Dicaſt. n.* 869. *d.* 10. *d.* 9. *tr.* 8. *de Pœnit.*

2 Quod autem non teneatur quis ſcribere, etiamſi lubricam habeat memoriam, jam alibi diximus, præſertim d. 7. num. 244. *Ibid.*

3 An vero qui lubricam habet memoriam teneatur peccata ſcribere, verius puto non teneri..... Non obligatur quis ad utendum mediis quæ non ſunt ordinaria & communia, unde inferunt quod etiamſi ſit mortale periculum oblivionis, ſicut non tenetur ſtatim confiteri ne memoria excidant peccata, ita nec illa ſcribere. *Idem n.* 244. *d.* 14. *d.* 6. *tr.* 8. *de Pœnit.*

4 Utrum qui læſit alterum in fama graviter injuſtè dicendo falſum aliquid quod illius famam denigraret, teneatur circumſtantiam mendacii explicare, vel ſufficiat dicere, ſe injuſtè infamaſſe alterum? Videri poteſt hoc ultimum ſufficere. *Dicaſt. n.* 172. *d.* 3. *d.* 9. *tract.* 8. *de Pœnit.*

3. (1) They hold alſo, that we are not obliged to relate in Confeſſion the circumſtances which aggravate the ſin, though they agree that for this reaſon a Confeſſor cannot make a faithful judgment of the greatneſs of the crime, and that theſe kinds of circumſtances make the moſt deep and dangerous wounds in the Soul. *Bauny* ſpeaks thus in his Sum, Chap. 39. pag. 616. *It is not neceſſary in Confeſſion to relate the ſaid circumſtance: it is ſufficient in rigour to ſay unto the Confeſſor, that in the matter of theft he hath ſinned mortally; taking ſuch a ſum as makes and conſtitutes this ſin.* *Eſcobar* is alſo of the ſame opinion, he declares that it is alſo the opinion of the moſt famous Caſuiſts of the Society, of whom he pretends to be only the Tranſcriber. (2) *It is altogether certain*, ſaith he, *that in confeſſion thoſe circumſtances are neceſſarily to be expreſſed which change the kind of the ſin; becauſe they joyn there to a new moral wickedneſs.* Heasks, *If the ſame thing muſt be affirmed of them which aggravate and augment it notably?* He anſwers, *That ſuch is the opinion of Suarez.* But he holds the contrary with *Vaſquez.* His reaſon is, becauſe we are not obliged by the Precept of Confeſſion but only to declare all mortal ſins; which may be done without diſcovering theſe circumſtances, though they make the ſin notably greater. So that according to him, whatſoever theft a man have committed, it ſuffices unto a good confeſſion thereof to ſay: (3) *I have ſinned ſo often in the matter of theft, without expreſſing the quantity of the theft.* I might here inſiſt a little upon this, to repreſent how this Maxime deſtroys the integrity and ſincerity of confeſſion, and at the ſame time cheriſheth theft, not obliging him who hath ſtoln ten thouſand Crowns to accuſe himſelf otherwiſe than he who hath ſtoln ten. But he that propounds this deſtroys it himſelf, teaching the quite contrary, and proving it by a ſolid reaſon in Chap. 5. of his Sum, pag. 68. where he ſaith, *That it ſufficeth not the Penitent to acquit himſelf of his duty, to ſay to his Confeſſor, that he hath ſtolu in a notable quantity to offend mortally, if he do not rate and ſpecifie unto him the ſum, becauſe he ought to know the eſtate of his Penitent; which he cannot eaſily do, if he unfold not to him the quantity of the theft.*

1 Quamvis non explicatis circumſtantiis aggravantibus, non poſſit Confeſſarius judicare de ea gravitate aut levitate. Et quamvis concedamus aliquando peccata mortalia ob circumſtantias notabiliter aggravantes....gravius ſauciare animum & periculoſiora fieri. *Dicaſtill. num.* 213. *d.* 3. *d.* 9. *tract.* 8. *de Pœnitent.*

2 Certum planè circumſtantias mutantes ſpeciem neceſſariò exprimendas, cùm addant novam malitiam moralem. Rogo an idem afferendum ſit de circumſtantiis notabiliter aggravantibus? Affirmat Suarez 3 *part. tom.* 4. *d.* 22. *ſect.* 3. Negativæ tamen ſententiæ cum Vaſquez 3 part. tom. 4. q. 91. d. 3. num. 3. *Eſcobar in præmio examin.* 2. *num.* 39. *pag.* 12. *&* 13.

3 Commiſi furtum mortale toties, non exprimendo furti quantitatem. *Ibid.*

But if any would object unto this good Father this ſo manifeſt contradiction, he will believe that he is diſcharged thereof by ſaying that both the opinions are probable, becauſe there are Authors for the one and for the other; and as we may follow both, ſo we may teach both.

4. They hold alſo, *That it is not neceſſary to the validity of the Sacrament, that the Penitent in his confeſſion count the number of vicious deſires, thoughts, and diſhoneſt affections which he hath had and reiterated ſince the time that he was addicted thereunto*, Chap. 40. pag. 667. And fearing more to offend the ſenſe and imagination than the conſcience of thoſe who have any fear of God, he addeth in Latine, *Sufficit dicere, toto menſe, v. c. amavi Mariam; etiamſi poſſit numerus exprimi.* It ſufficeth to ſay, for a whole month, for example, I loved *Mary*; though the number might be expreſſed. Which is ſo ſtrange, that he dares not abſolutely anſwer for this opinion, *confeſſing that the practice hereof is dangerous.* But he refers himſelf to *Leſſius* and *Sulas who approve it*, ſaith he, *as probable*; and by conſequence he declares that it may be followed in practice, ſeeing he believes that we may follow every probable opinion in our practice; and ſo we may do that in conſcience which he dare neither warrant, nor ſo much as expreſs in French, for fear of offending chaſt minds and ears.

*Tambourin* is of the ſame opinion. (4) *Though it be very probable*, ſaith he, *that the aggravating circumſtances, becauſe they change notably the judgment of a Confeſſor, ought to be unfolded, it ceaſes not for all that to be probable that we ought not*

4 Quamvis probabiliſſimum ſit..... circumſtantias notabiliter aggravantes, quia mutant notabiliter judicium Confeſſarii, eſſe in confeſſione aperiendas; tamen probabile etiam eſt..... fidelibus hanc neceſſitatem minimè imponendam. *Tambur. n.* 111. *ſect.* 18. *cap.* 1. *lib.* 2. *meth. confeſſ.*

*not impoſe this neceſſity upon the faithful.* And it is by means of this liberty of following the leſs probable opinions, that he ſaith, (1) *That he who denies the Articles of the Faith, or doubts of them voluntarily, is not obliged to ſpecifie the Article which he denies or doubts of; but that it is ſufficient to accuſe himſelf* (2) *of being fallen into Hereſie: that neither is he obliged to diſcover whether it was before* 20540 *or ſince his Baptiſm; but it ſufficeth to ſay, that he is fallen into Hereſie.* (3) *A Blaſphemer*, ſo the ſame Father goes on, *is not obliged to unfold the nature of his blaſphemy, it is ſufficient that he make known the number; and it is not needful to expreſs whether it be againſt God, the Virgin, or the Saints. Neither is he obliged to unfold the cuſtomarineſs of it, how inveterate ſoever it be.*

1 Negans vel deliberatè dubitans de articulis Fidei ſufficienter confitetur, ſi dicat ſe prolapſum in hæreſim, nec neceſſe explicare articulos in quibus contra fidem ſenſit. *Idem n. 2. ſect. 1. cap. 2.*

*He who takes pleaſure in the ſins which he hath committed, and* (4) *whereof he is confeſſed*, ſaith Emanuel Sa, *is not obliged to ſpecifie theſe ſins, it is enough for him to accuſe himſelf to have had complacence in his ancient crimes.* And this deciſion was found ſo wicked, that by the report of *Tambourin, in the Edition publiſhed at* Rome *of this Jeſuits Works, this paſſage was cut off.* (5) *You have wronged your ſingular benefactor; I ſee nothing that can oblige you to declare this circumſtance which offends only againſt gratitude directly; ſo I believe*, ſaith Tambourin. (6) *He that ſins mortally by deſiring to abuſe a woman whom he knows to be married, or to have made a vow of Virginity; who entertains himſelf with filthy thoughts, and takes pleaſure in theſe diſhoneſt entertainments, is not obliged to declare that this woman who hath been the object of his ſin, was married or a Nun; it ſufficeth that he* 20550 *accuſe himſelf to have ſinned againſt Chaſtity.* Theſe are *Dicaſtillus* words: *Tambourin* is of the ſame judgment: *nec explicandum an cum nupta vel Moniali.* (7) The ſame is to be ſaid if this man be married. *Hurtado* aſſures us probably enough, that he is not obliged to diſcover this circumſtance.

2 Incidens in hæreſim, non tenetur declarare an fit ante vel poſt baptiſmum; quare ſatis eſt fateri ſe in hæreſim fuiſſe prolapſum. *Ibid. n. 6.*

3 Satis eſt ſi in confeſſione aperiatur numerus blaſphemiarum, nec explicare opus eſt fuiſſe contra Deum, vel beatam Virginem, vel Sanctos. *Idem n. 17. ſect. 1. cap. 3. lib. 2. meth. confeſſionis.* 3 Qui ex inveterata conſuetudine jurat, excuſatur communiter à conſuetudine confitenda. *Ibid. num. 29. ſect 3. lib. 2.* 4 Sa verbo Confeſſio, num. 16, qui declaratus eſt de peccatis præteritis alias confeſſis, id ſolum oportet confiteatur, non autem exprimere quænam fuerint illa peccata. Verum id fuit in editione Romana deletum. *Idem num. 8. cap. 3. lib. 10. partis decalog.* 5 Injuriæ contra inſignem tuum benefactorem, cum ſolum ſint contra gratitudinem..... non apparet unde hæc ſola afferre debeat diverſitatem ſpecificam quæ ſit ex obligatione gravi ſubdenda confeſſariis. *Idem n. 13. ſect. 2. cap. 6. lib. 2. meth. confeſſ.* 6 Qui delectatur ſimplici actu de copula cum ea quam videt aut ſcit eſſe conjugatam, etiamſi poſitiva quadam repulſa non regeret rationem conjugatæ, ſed circa illam abſtractivè ſe habeat..... ſolam tunc malitiam contra caſtitatem contrahit, non vero malitiam adulterii. *Dicaſt. n. 630. d. 8. d. 6. tract. 8. de Pœnit.* 7 Conjugatus ſi morosè delectetur, non obſtringi in confeſſione explicare ſe eſſe conjugatum affirmat Hurtado..... hæc Hurtado ſatis probabiliter. *Tamb. n. 4. ſect. 1. cap. 7. lib. 2. meth. confeſſ.*

If from ſimple complaiſance, and thought only you paſs on to execution, and you do commit Inceſt; (8) you are not bound to declare in what degree, whether it be with a Mother or a Couſin German.

8 An cum matre vel cum conſobrina non eſt ſpeciatim ex neceſſitate patefaciendum. *Idem 48. ſect. 7. c. 7. l. 2 meth. confeſſ.*

The ſame is to be ſaid (9) of a Whore; when ſhe hath had commerce with a Prieſt, Profeſt, or Novice Jeſuit.

(10) He that hath prepared poyſon to rid him of his enemy, or who hath drawn upon him with a deſign to kill him, is not obliged to ſay: I have killed or poyſoned my enemy; but it is ſufficient that he ſay, I have prepared poyſon for him, I have drawn upon him to kill him. *Secunda ſententia probabilior negat eſſe neceſſarium explicare effectum ſecutum.* (11) *A ſon who robs his father, and hath taken from him a conſiderable ſum, is not obliged to declare whom he rob'd; it is ſufficient in general to accuſe himſelf to have taken the goods of another.* As if this Wretch had offended againſt Juſtice only, and had not ſinned againſt the reſpect which all Laws oblige him to render unto him from whom after God he 20560 holds all. (12) *It is not neceſſary at all*, amongſt the Jeſuits, *to know the quality or the greatneſs of the ſinner*, though it be even neceſſary to underſtand the quality or the greatneſs of the ſin whereof he accuſeth himſelf. If a Prelate, if a Superior

9 Fœmina ſoluta peccans cum Sacerdote, Diacono, Subdiacono, vel Profeſſo, vel habente vota biennii Societ. Jeſu, ſufficit ſi dicat ſe cum eo qui voto obnoxius erat, peccaſſe. *Idem n. 31. ſect. 5. c. 7. l. 2. meth. confeſſ.* 10 *Dicaſt. n. 19. d. 1. d. 6. tr. 8. de Pœnit.* 11 Hinc eſt ut etiam quando tam gravis eſt materia, ut peccet erga patrem peccato furti, non teneatur id explicare in confeſſione, ſed ſatis eſt ſi ſe accuſet de furto gravi. *Idem n. 564. d. 8. d. 9. tr. 8. de Pœnit.* 12 Abſolutè aſſerendum eſt non debere eam circumſtantiam explicari *Id. n. 378 d. 8. d. 9. tr. 8. de pœnit.*

of a Monaſtery, ſin againſt Chaſtity, they are not obliged to make known their dignities. If a Governour of a Province, or a Magiſtrate eſtabliſhed for hindring robberies, favour them, take part with them, or is the chief himſelf that pillages and robs the people; If a man who hath the charge to preſerve publick goods, commit the crimes which he himſelf ought to repreſs; none of theſe perſons ought to declare the obligation which is on them to hinder and puniſh theſe crimes, it is ſufficient that they accuſe themſelves when they find themſelves guilty of committing them in their own perſons. *Dicaſtillus* reaſon is pleaſant. (1) *A Magiſtrate*, ſaith he, *or any other perſon intruſted for the publick ſafety, is indeed obliged by vertue of his Charge to hinder the evil which others might commit; but not that which he may do himſelf; quæ doctrina mihi placet.* That is to ſay, that he who is eſtabliſhed to ſee the Laws of the Church or of a Prince obſerved, and to puniſh thoſe who violate them, may himſelf without being wanting to his Commiſſion, or rather by vertue of his Commiſſion, violate the very ſame Laws. (2) *Diana aſſures us that a Prieſt who hath ſmitten ſome Laick, ſo as to ſhed his blood, or kill him, is not obliged to declare his quality of a Prieſt. Diana adhæreo, ſaith the ſame Jeſuit.* 20570

1 Licet Gubernator conſtituatur ad hoc ut impediat furta, non tamen ut impediat ſua, ſicut fiſcalis debet ex munere ſuo denuntiare delicta contra bonum publicum, non tamen ſua, ſed aliorum, & cuſtos vineæ debet manifeſtare fures, non tamen ſeipſum; quia hi homines conſtituuntur in ordine ad alios in officio continendos, non in ordine ad ipſorummet delicta impedienda. Quæ doctrina mihi placet. *Ibid.*

But ſee here an Example which ſurpaſſeth all the reſt, and which tends to hide from a Confeſſor the moſt enormous Sacriledges, without ſparing the reſpect which all the faithful, and eſpecially Prieſts, ought to have to the body and blood of Jeſus Chriſt. (3) *If a Prieſt whilſt he carries the holy Sacrament, calumniate and defame his neighbour, or rob him, and take from him his goods, it is not neceſſary that he declare this circumſtance in Confeſſion.* And ſee here his reaſon: *I ſee not herein*, ſaith he, *any great irreverence*; and in the mean time it had been great and criminal, if he had done the ſame thing in the Chamber of a King, or in his Preſence, the King looking on, and certainly knowing his crimes.

*Dicaſtillus* is not more reſpective to this divine Sacrament, (4) *The irreverence and the ſin of him who approacheth unworthily to the Euchariſt, are ſo much greater*, ſaith Vaſquez, *as his ſoul is charged with more enormous and greater number of mortal ſins; and nevertheleſs the ſame* Vaſquez *teaches, that he is not obliged to declare in Confeſſion the number of theſe crimes. And this Doctrine pleaſeth me*, adds Dicaſtillus; *For it is enough to accuſe himſelf that he did participate of the Euchariſt, being in the eſtate of mortal ſin.*

n. 381. 2 Utrum Sacerdos vel ſacris initiatus percutiens aliquem Laïcum, debeat explicare eam circumſtantiam, quando ſaltem eſt percuſſio cum effuſione ſanguinis. Negat Diana p. 2. t. 7. r. 8. etiamſi ad mortem ſit percuſſio..... Dianæ adhæreo. *Idem n.* 382. *ibid.* 3 Si Sacerdos portans ſanctam Euchariſtiam, infamaret, furaretur, tam gravem irreverentiam non video *Tambur. n.* 42 *ſect.* 5. *c.* 7. *l.* 2. *meth. confeſſ.* 4 Obſervant Vaſquez & communiter Doctores eò gravius eſſe peccatum ſuſcipiendi indignè, quò quis pluribus & majoribus peccatis eſt irretitus. Non tamen putat Vaſquez eſſe neceſſario explicandum in confeſſione an cum multis vel cum paucioribus quis acceſſerit. Quæ doctrina mihi placet. Sufficit enim ſi explicet ſe in ſtatu peccati mortalis acceſſiſſe. *Dicaſt. n* 37. *d.* 2. *d.* 9. *tract.* 4. *de Euch.*

For what concerns evil habits and relapſes into the ſame ſins, *Bauny* inquireth, *Whether frequent and ordinary relapſes be circumſtances whereof the Confeſſor ought to be inſtructed by the Penitent in his Confeſſion?* And after he had related the opinion of thoſe who hold, that the Penitent is obliged to tell theſe circumſtances, and that *in ſuch caſe it is expedient to defer the abſolution*; he anſwers, that nevertheleſs according to his apprehenſion, *the contrary opinion, as being more conformable to reaſon, and favourable to the Penitent, ought to be held and followed in the practice*, Chap. 59 pag. 621, 622 The reaſons upon which he foundeth his reſolution are conſiderable. The firſt is, that *this is more agreeable to reaſon*: as if humane reaſon, eſpecially in an eſtate wherein it is corrupted by ſin, were the Rule of a Chriſtian who ought to live by faith. The ſecond; *that it is more favourable to the Penitent alſo*: That is, that it is more favourable for entertaining his pride and his vanity, as he expounds it himſelf ſufficiently. Afterwards he brings for his third reaſon; *That a Penitent cannot inform his Confeſſor concerning his lapſes proceeding from an inveterate habit, without manifeſting unto him his paſt offences with ſhame for his weakneſs*, and pronounces definitively, concluding in theſe terms: *Therefore he is not bound.* 20580

But one part of Repentance consisting in the confusion which a Penitent resenteth for having offended God; this is not to be too favourable to him who hath a true design to do Penance, and to be converted, but to dispense as much as is possible with repentance, by delivering him from the pain and confusion which he might have had in discovering his weaknesses to his Confessor.

He saith the same thing in his Moral Divinity, save that writing in Latine, he
20590 talks also more freely and boldly. For he is not content to say, that although frequent relapse into the same sins is a very notable circumstance; the Penitent is nevertheless not obliged to declare it, whether it come from an evil habit, or from the next occasions in which he is engaged; but he maintains also (1) *That a Confessor hath not so much as a right to interrogate the Penitent touching the custom of sinning, if he be not obliged thereto by some important reason, which happens seldom; that he hath not a right neither to put the Penitent to confusion, when he knows he is accustomed to commit some sin; but that he ought forthwith to absolve him if he put forth some act of sorrow for his sins past, with a resolution to amend.*

1 Dubitatur 12. an circumstantia recidiva sit confitenda? Teneri pœnitentem consuetudinem peccati confiteri si à confessario interrogatur. Tamen Vasquez, Henriquez, &c. maximè si hæc oritur ex proxima peccandi occasione quam pœnitens tenetur reserare. Contrarium docet Sanctius in selectis disputat. 9 num. 6. Et hæc opinio priore videtur esse probabilior & sequenda in praxi, quia Confessarius jus non habet interrogandi pœnitentem de consuetudine peccandi, nisi ejus rei gravem causam habeat, rarò accidit. Deinde non est in ejus jure afficere pœnitentem dedecore cognita ejus peccandi consuetudine; sed debet eum statim absolvere, si dolorem de peccatis concipit cum proposito futuræ emendationis. *Bauny Theol. mor. p. 1, tract. 4. de pœnit. q. 15. pag. 137.* 2 *Dicastillus n. 194. d. 3. d. 9. tr. 8. de pœnit.*

So that if a Confessor demand of some person who accuseth himself of some great sin, if he have formerly committed it; whether he have fallen therein often and whether his relapses come from the next occasions, or from the habit he hath of this sin; the Penitent according to *Bauny* may elude all these interrogations, if he had not rather lye according to some others, or say openly that he is not obliged to answer to these Articles, and if his Confessor press him very sore thereto,
20600 he may say that he is grounded on a probable opinion; and his Confessor shall be obliged to rest satisfied therewith, and to give him absolution readily, according to the words of this Casuist; *debet eum statim absolvere.* How horrible is this Divinity!

And which is altogether admirable in the Doctrine of these Fathers, in the very same time that they say that the Penitent is not obliged to answer unto these Articles; (2) *Non tenetur ei dicere illam circumstantiam*, and that the Confessor cannot constrain him thereto; *& tunc non potest cogere illum Confessarius*; he assures us that the Confessor who is of contrary judgment to that of his Penitent, may examine him on these very Articles. *Respondetur posse Confessarium interrogare de iis circumstantiis.* The one then may interrogate, and the other may refuse to answer; the one hath a right to take cognizance of these Articles, and the other hath a right to refuse it him; the one in asking performes his office, and the other in being unwilling to answer, doth nothing against his duty: In a word, they are both in equal safety of conscience; the Penitent in disobeying his Confessor, who holds the place of a Father unto him and of God himself; and the Confessor in neglecting his Charge, and betraying his own conscience to follow that of a sinner whom he sees to be both in errour and obstinacy.

The end and principal care of these Fathers, as it appears by their discourse, is to excuse the Penitent as much as they can from punishment and shame; that is, to hinder him from repenting truly, which consists particularly in the punishment and confusion which he receive from his sin, for repairing the pleasure which he hath had, and the dishonour which he hath done to God in committing it.

20610 It is also for this end, and upon this design, that *Dicastillus* furnisheth his Penitents with this new Method, to make Confession by dividing one and the same sin into many parts, and to accuse himself thereof at several times. (3) *He that hath made a vow to observe the Commandments of the Decalogue; may in the same Confession say apart, that he hath fallen into fornication; and a while after, not to have observed a vow which he made in a matter of consequence.* By this way the very great confusion which the Penitent might have by the enormity of his crime, is diminished.

3 Qui fecit votum v.g. servandi sextum decalogi præceptum, potest separatim in eadem confessione dicere se fornicatum fuisse, & subinde in decursu fateri se fregisse votum in re gravi. *Dicast. n. 171. d. 2. d. 9. tract. 8, de pœnit.*

5. There is another caſe in which, according to theſe people, a Penitent may alſo retain and conceal his ſins, to wit, *If he can reaſonably apprehend that telling all to his Confeſſor without concealing any thing, his friends, or himſelf may at any time be concerned in their goods, their bodies, or their honour, I believe that in this caſe,* ſaith *Bauny* in his Sum, Chap. 4. pag. 655. *It would be lawful for him to ſuppreſs and conceal the offence, which being known of his Confeſſor, might cauſe unto the Penitent ſuch effect as he imagines ought to follow the confeſſion thereof.* And a little after he *gives the ſame liberty to him who fears that by declaring his ſins, his Confeſſor will be made to uſe him hardly, to hate him therefore, to be offended at him, cauſe him to remove from the place where he dwells, or deprive him of ſome convenience he receives by him.*

This man ſhews himſelf here alſo very *favourable to the Penitent*; he is not contented to excuſe him from the ſhame which he might have had in diſcovering all his faults and his weakneſſes; *he would not that for this he or any of his friends might one day, that is, at all be concerned in their goods, bodies, or honour.* And if 20620
he can *have but ſome reaſon to fear* that this may fall out, or that his Confeſſor after the knowledge that he hath given him of his conſcience and of his ſins, *will uſe him ill, and hate him, or be offended with him*, that is to ſay, will uſe him with more ſeverity, or ordain him to do ſomething that may be diſpleaſing to him, though it be for the Salvation of his Soul, *or will remove him from the place where he dwelleth*, becauſe perhaps it is the next occaſion of ſin unto him, *or will deprive him of ſome commodity that he may receive from him*; in all theſe caſes, and for all theſe reaſons, *it ſhal be lawful for him*, according to the opinion of *Bauny*, *to ſuppreſs and conceal the offence which known to the Confeſſor, might cauſe unto the Penitent the effects which he imagines ought to follow from his confeſſion thereof*, if he chuſe not rather to ſatisfie the duty of his confeſſion, and at the ſame time avoid all the inconveniences which may arrive upon the knowledge of his ſin which he gives unto the Prieſt, by making uſe of *Dicaſtillus*'s expedient, (1) *And tell his ſins in general without particularizing their kind, adding that he remembers not of what kind his ſins were.* And all this he may ſay without any lye, making uſe of the Doctrine of mental Reſervation. For *it is true that he knows not the kind of his ſin to declare it unto him upon this preſent occaſion*, and he will not declare it, and he believes that he hath a right not to do it, becauſe he would not that the Confeſſor ſhould know his eſtate and his bad diſpoſition, to avoid correction, 20630
penance, and the confuſion he might have ſuſtained thereby. So that the pride and vanity of this man, give him a right to a twofold prophanation of the Sacrament of Penance, in concealing his ſins voluntarily, and in covering this criminal ſilence and diſguiſement with an affected and artificial lye.

1 Si dicat in genere aut ſpecie non completa tacendo illam circumſtantiam, ſic ergo poſſit dicere ſe feciſſe peccatum mortale, & fortaſſe dicere in tali genere, ſed non recordari cujus ſpeciei, quod verum eſt intelligendo de notitia quæ poſſit tunc deſervire ad confitendum in ea occaſione. *Dicaſt. n.* 180. *d.* 11. *d.* 9 *tract.* 8. *de pœnit.*

It is eaſie to perceive that it ſufficeth to imagine that ſome one of theſe effects may ariſe from confeſſion, to have liberty to conceal ſins from a Confeſſor, or not to diſcover them but very generally, the greateſt ſinners, and perſons moſt addicted to the world, will always find ſome one of theſe reaſons and pretences, to ſpeak noething but what they pleaſe in confeſſion, and to ſuppreſs their moſt notable crimes.

My deſign obliges me only to repreſent theſe exceſſes; but if I had undertaken to refute them, and to make theſe good Fathers ſee their extravagancies, I ſhould not deſire to make uſe of other reaſon or authority againſt them, and eſpecially againſt *Bauny* than his own. For ſpeaking of the Confeſſor, and of the Cognizance which he ought to have of his Charge, and of the conſcience of his Penitents, in Chap. 38. pag. 589. *Of a truth*, ſaith he, *as he holds the place of a Judge in this Sacrament, as ſaith the Council in the* 14. *Seſſion and* 9. *Canon, he neither can nor ought paſs ſentence but upon that whereof he hath a full and entire cognizance.* And a little after making uſe alſo of the Authority of the Council, he adds: *In the Canon omnis utriuſque ſexus, he is called a Phyſitian of Souls: if he know not their wounds, how can he heal them, and after the manner of a Phyſitian, pour oyl into the wounds of the wounded? more medicorum ſuperinfundere vulneribus ſauciati.* Whence he draws this conſequence of the Council and with the Coun- 20640
cil it ſelf: *He ought therefore, ſaith the Council* cited in the Chapter we laſt mentioned,

tioned, *omnis utriuſque ſexus, diligently enquire after the circumſtances of every ſin and ſinner, whereby he may underſtand what counſel to give, and what remedy to uſe, proving divers experiments to heal the ſick; diligenter inquirere, & peccatoris circumſtantias & peccati, quibus intelligat quale debeat ei præbere conſilium, & cujuſmodi remedium adhibere diverſis experimentis utendo ad ſanandum ægrotum.* And in the ſequel from the expreſs Authority and Reaſoning of the Council, he concludes his diſcourſe by way of an Interrogation. *In the ignorance of ſo many infirmities of the Soul, and remedies to be applyed for healing it, who can reaſonably promiſe himſelf the happineſs to be able to relieve the ſick?*

If according to *Bauny*, the Confeſſor *in quality of a Judge, whoſe place he holds in the Sacrament of Penance, neither can nor ought paſs ſentence but on what he hath full and entire cognizance of.* If in the quality *of a Phyſitian of Souls, he cannot reaſonably promiſe himſelf to relieve his Patient*, that is his Penitent, *nor to heal his wounds, if he know them not, if he know not his diſpoſition, his infirmities, and the circumſtances of his ſins and of the eſtate wherein he is.* It muſt needs be that when the ſame *Bauny* hath ſaid, *That it is ſufficient to confeſs ſins in groſs, without determining any one in particular, that it ſufficeth in rigour to make the Confeſſor underſtand that one hath ſinned mortally in the matter of theft*, without declaring how much hath been ſtoln: *That it is not needful to tell the number of vicious thoughts and diſhoneſt affections*, though he could do it if he liſt: *That a Penitent may in Confeſſion conceal his ſins and his relapſes which proceed from an inveterate habit, for fear of manifeſting his paſt offences, with ſhame for his weakneſſes: That he may ſuppreſs and ſilence the offence, which known by the Confeſſor, would cauſe the effects*
20650 *which he imagines might follow the confeſſion thereof.* Since, I ſay, *Bauny* hath ſaid all theſe things, it muſt needs be that according to the Principles which he hath eſtabliſhed, or rather according to thoſe of the Council which he hath alledged, he cannot pretend that the ſinner confeſſing himſelf in this ſort, can hope from the Confeſſor a remedy or relief for his wounds, or remiſſion for his ſins; and by conſequence we muſt ſay, that he plays with confeſſion and conſcience, and that he teaches ſinners and worldlings to commit Sacriledges inſtead of Confeſſions, and to deride the Confeſſor and God himſelf, whoſe place he holds.

*Eſcobar* is not content to ſay, as *Bauny*, that ſins may be concealed in confeſſion, he maintains alſo that it is no great ſin to lye unto a Confeſſor when he examines the Penitent; ſee how he ſpeaks: (1) *Is it a mortal ſin to lye in confeſſion?* He anſwers; *If the ſin in queſtion be only a venial ſin, the lye is but venial.* He doth indeed ſay, that there are ſome who make a diſtinction, believing that if the ſinner accuſe himſelf but of one only venial ſin which he hath not committed, he ſins mortally. (2) *Becauſe for that time there being no matter for abſolution, it would be given in vain, and the Sacrament would be null.* But he adds, that there are who receive not this diſtinction: and the reaſon he brings for it, is: (3) *Becauſe every lye which is made in the matter of a venial ſin is a ſlight thing, and hurts little or not at all the judgment of the Confeſſer.*

1 Mentiri in confeſſione eſt peccatum mortale? Mendacium de peccato veniali veniale eſt. *Eſcobar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 107. pag. 816.*

2 Quia tunc daretur abſolutio ſine materia, & Sacramentum nullum eſſet.

3 Quia omne mendacium de veniali eſt res levis, & parum lædit Confeſſoris judicium. *Ibid.*

20660 He teſtifies that it would be more difficult to exempt him from mortal ſin, who ſhould lye in a mortal ſin: nevertheleſs he gives an expedient, and he relates ſome caſe in which he thinks it may be done. He asks, (4) *If it be neceſſary that a general confeſſion be entire?* He anſwers in theſe terms; *It is not neceſſary ſo to be in regard of the ſins which have been confeſſed before. A perſon, for example, ſaith unto a Confeſſor, that he hath a deſign to make a general confeſſion; it is not needful for this purpoſe to tell all his mortal ſins; for though he lye, this concerns not at all the Judgment the Confeſſor is to make thereof, becauſe it is not of his Juriſdiction.*

4 An Confeſſio generalis integritatem requirat? Quoad peccata alias confeſſa non requirit. Dicit quis Confeſſario ſe velle cum ipſo confeſſionem generalem gerere; non ideo tenetur omnia mortalia exprimere. Quia quamvis mentiatur parum tamen refert ad Confeſſarii judicium, cum ad ejus forum non pertineat. *Ibid. p* 818. *n.* 118.

*Dicaſtillus* ſeems more nimble and ſubtle on this occaſion than *Eſcobar*. For allowing the ſame liberty to Penitents, not to declare other than venial ſins, or ſome part of the mortal ſins they have committed, he maintains that confeſſion ought always of neceſſity to be entire: ſee here how he intends it: Confeſſion at that time, though imperfect and maimed, ceaſeth not to have all requiſite integrity, which exacts nothing but a declaration of the ſins which may be diſcovered to the Prieſt who hears them, and not of thoſe which you conceal from him upon ſome ground. So that a Penitent who accuſing himſelf of ſome ſins omits the reſt, either becauſe they have been confeſt already, or becauſe he remembers them no longer, that he may tell them to the Confeſſor, or becauſe the 20670
cognizance of them is reſerved to the Biſhop, (1) *ceaſes not to make an entire confeſſion; not indeed as to an integrity* which they call *material*; *but as to a formal integrity, which alone is neceſſary for the Sacrament.* That is to ſay, provided I perſwade my ſelf that I have ſome reaſon to hide my ſins from the Prieſt, it is ſufficient for me to make a good confeſſion, to declare ſome unto him: and who is it that may not imagine that he hath ſome reaſon? See the Spirit of the Society, to allow God the names, and to give men the things: it is by this means that they agree Religion and the World, the obligations of Chriſtianity with the luſts of men. So they furniſh means to obey the orders of Jeſus Chriſt, and at the ſame time to flatter the concupiſcence of ſinners, and to entertain them in the greateſt crimes, by diſcharging them of that ſincere confeſſion which ought to be their true remedy.

1 Objicies confeſſionem debere eſſe integram de jure divino. Reſpondetur integritatem confeſſionis debere eſſe integritatem formalem, non materialem; nempe ſolum debere dici omnia quæ poſſunt explicari coram legitimo judice abſque cauſa quæ id excuſet. *Dicaſt. n.* 115. *d.* 7, *d.* 9, *tr.* 4, *de confeſſ.*

*Fillutius* had before *Eſcobar* taught that which he ſaith of lyes made in confeſſion about venial ſin. (2) *To lye*, ſaith he, *in a thing which is no neceſſary matter of confeſſion, as are venial ſins, in denying that which is done, is only a venial ſin.* *Emanuel Sa* is of the ſame opinion, and he maintains that the caſe is the ſame in mortal ſins which have been confeſſed already. (3) *To lye in confeſſion*, ſaith he, *in matter of venial ſins, or of mortal which have been already confeſſed, is but a venial ſin, though the deſign were at firſt to confeſs them.*

2 Mentiri circa materiam non neceſſariam, ut ſunt peccata venialia, negando quod factum eſt, ſic non eſt mortale. *Fillut. t.* 1. *mor. qq. tr.* 7. *cap.* 4. *num.* 112. *pag.* 180. 3 Mentiri in confeſſione de peccatis venialibus, aut de aliàs confeſſis mortalibus, veniale tantum peccatum eſt, etiamſi ille antea propoſuiſſet apud ſe vere confiteri. *Sa verb. Confeſſio. num.* 12. *pag.* 88.

I might here relate alſo other expedients which the Jeſuits give to ſurpriſe and deceive a Confeſſor; but I ſhall do it more commodiouſly in an expreſs Chapter ſpeaking of Penitents, and the advice neceſſary unto them for their confeſſing themſelves aright. I will conclude this Article by a reſolution which *Eſcobar* gives to a difficulty which he propounds. (4) *I have already taught you*, ſaith he, *that the confeſſion which was null and invalid ought to be repeated; is it alſo to be repeated when it is made upon ſome other principal deſign, then to obtain pardon of ſins?* His Anſwer is, *No, provided that remiſſion of ſins be propounded at the leaſt as the leſs principal, and herein is no mortal ſin, becauſe there is always an intention to receive the Sacrament, and all that which is neceſſary to make it valid.* 20680

4 Dixiſti debere repeti confeſſionem quando fuit invalida. An iteranda ex eo quod facta fuerit alio fine principaliter quam ob remiſſionem peccatorum? 5 Non dummodo, remiſſio intendatur ſaltem ut finis minus principalis, & in eo non peccetur mortaliter: quia in eo caſu eſt intentio recipiendi Sacramentum, & omnia ad ejus valorem requiſita. *Eſcob.* 7. *ex.* 4. *num.* 119. *pag.* 818.

He believes then that it is but a ſmall ſin to preſer ſome humane and temporal conſideration to Salvation and pardon of ſins; that it is not to prophane the Sacrament to refer it principally to a temporal end; that this is not to diſhonour God much, to teſtifie the little reſpect which is had for his grace and friendſhip, even then when it is demanded, by preferring ſome temporal thing before it, which is reſpected as principal deſign, propounded and deſired to be received by means of the Sacrament of Penance much rather than his amity and reconciliation with him, which he makes a ſhew to deſire after he had ſo deſpiſed it, pretending

tending to repair this contempt by another contempt, and to return into favour
20690 by a motion ſo little ſincere, and ſo injurious to his infinite greatneſs elevated above all Creatures. If a Malefactor guilty of high Treaſon, ſhould preſent himſelf before a King in this manner, confeſſing that he was more moved with ſome petty intereſt, than with his crime; and ſo much as not ſpeaking to him, nor demanding of him his grace, but only after he hath teſtified his paſſion for this particular intereſt, he would be judged of all the world unworthy to obtain the grace which he demands, and worthy to be chaſed from the Kings preſence, and puniſhed for this inſolence as much or more than for any other fault. Yet they would have this treatment, which is unworthy of man, to be worthy of God, and that God ſhould be content with a kind of honour which a man would hold for an injury.

## ARTICLE III. Of Abſolution.

### *That the Jeſuits make it depend on the Opinion and the Will of the Penitent, rather than the Diſpoſition and Judgment of the Confeſſor.*

ABſolution is a Judgment which the Prieſt pronounceth on Gods behalf in favour of the Penitent, by which he forgives him his ſins, after the cognizance which he hath received from himſelf, of the remedies which he hath applyed, and the good effects and holy diſpoſitions which they have produced in him to eſtabliſh him in the Grace of God.

The Divinity of the Jeſuits ruines this part of the Sacrament of Penance, as well as the other, taking from the Prieſt the authority and quality of a Judge and Superior, and ſubjects him to the Penitent, in ſuch manner, that he muſt follow
20700 him in the Judgment that he ought to make of his ſins and of his eſtate, and of his diſpoſition to receive abſolution, and obliging him to bear himſelf according to what he ſays and wills, and to give him abſolution as oft as he demands it, though the Confeſſor judge him unworthy and intirely uncapable thereof.

From theſe Maxims it is that *Bauny* in his Sum, Chap. 45. pag. 702. ſaith, that the Confeſſor before he abſolve the Penitent, ſhall examine him if he have no more to ſay; if he be ſorry with all his heart for offending God; if he purpoſe to ſerve him well and faithfully for the time to come, by avoiding all mortal ſin, which being ſaid thus univerſally and in common, is ſufficient for receiving Sacramental abſolution.

Nay, we may be excuſed from examining him in this manner. *Dicaſtillus* eaſeth the Confeſſor of this trouble. (1) *It is not always neceſſary*, ſaith he, *to put theſe queſtions to him, eſpecially if they be perſons well inſtructed, and who come freely and without conſtraint to the Tribunal of Confeſſion.*

So all the diſpoſition requiſite for receiving abſolution, is reduced to words, and thoſe alſo univerſal, and to reſolutions made in general, upon which the Confeſſor ſhall be obliged to relye and to believe all thoſe who ſhall offer him ſuch diſcourſe, and make him ſuch promiſes, becauſe they are their own accuſers, defenders, and witneſſes; *cum ipſi ſint ſui accuſatores, defenſores, & teſtes*; though *oftentimes it be ſuppoſed that ſuch reſolutions come but from the teeth outwards*; as the ſame Father *Bauny* hath written a little after, pag. 717.

20710 *Emanuel Sa* ſaith the ſame thing, and more alſo: (2) *We may abſolve*, ſaith he, *him who reſolves to abſtain from ſin, though he himſelf believe that he ſhall not hold his reſolution*, though he be aſſuredly perſwaded of it; *certè ſibi perſuadeat*, (3) ſaith *Tambourin*. How then can the Confeſſor believe that the Penitent is well diſpoſed, and that he hath a true reſolution to correct himſelf, which is ſolid and capable to produce its effect, ſince the Penitent himſelf believes it not, and is rather perſwaded of the contrary, even with certainty? And this being ſo, how can he be abſolved in this eſtate?

1 Pœnitenti affirmanti ſe habere retractationem & propoſitum non peccandi, credendum eſt, nec tamen neceſſe eſt id ſemper ab illo interrogare, maxime quando perſonæ ſatis alioquin inſtructæ ſunt, & accedunt ad confeſſionem nullo modo coactæ. *Dicaſtill. de Pœnit.* 2 Abſolvi poteſt qui proponit abſtinere à peccato, etiamſi credat ſe propoſito non ſtaturum. *Sa verb. Abſolutio. num.* 12. *pag.* 5. 3 *Tamb num.* 753. *cap.* 1. *lib.* 1. *meth. confeſſ.*

Neither do they require any greater aſſurance on the part of the Confeſſor than of the (1) Penitent, and they would have abſolution given to the ſinner, how inveterate and habituate ſoever he be in his ſin: *non obſtante conſuetudine*, though he knows certainly that the Penitent will relapſe thereinto; *etiamſi certo ſciret eum lapſurum.*

1 *Dicaſt. n.* 362. *d.* 21 *d.* 6. *tr.* 8 *de Pœnit.*

*Emanuel Sa* aſſures us alſo, (2) *That he may be abſolved who for ſome juſt and reaſonable cauſe will not quit the occaſion of ſin, provided he make a firm reſolution not to ſin any more; though he have already relapſed thereinto many times.*

2 Item abſolvi poteſt qui ex rationabili & juſta cauſa non vult amittere peccandi occaſionem, modo proponat firmiter non peccare, etiamſi aliquoties ſit relapſus. *Ibid.*

*Dicaſtillus* goes yet farther. For without taking a pretence from any juſt or reaſonable cauſe, he ſaith generally, that a ſinner may be abſolved who hath fallen frequently into ſin, without obliging him to quit the occaſion, and without his taking up of himſelf any reſolution to do it. 20720

2 Qui ſæpius quidem in ea occaſione lapſus & non deſeruit occaſionem, jam vero extraordinario propoſito & dolore tactus accedit ad confeſſionem, & poſſit abſolvi, licet non proponat deſerere occaſionem. Solet dici ſatis eſſe tunc quod poſſit ſperari emendatio quin cogatur deſerere. *Dica. n.* 335. *d.* 19. *d.* 6. *tr.* 8. *de Pœnit.*

*Emanuel Sa* ſpeaks of a perſon that is reſolved to continue in the occaſion of ſin, not by neceſſity and againſt his will, but voluntarily, becauſe he hath ſome ground which ſeems juſt unto him, and which he will not forgo, as if he [illegible]red to receive thereby ſome prejudice in his goods or honour. He believes that in this eſtate he may receive abſolution, provided only he take up a reſolution to ſin no more; that is, that he ſay only ſimply, that he will not ſin any more, as he ſaith himſelf a little after; (3) *That he may be abſolved that ſaith, that he is ſorry for his ſins, and deſireth to abſtain from them*; though notwithſtanding all theſe reſolutions he frequently fall therein, becauſe he continues near that occaſion which he will not forſake, and that ſo he cannot promiſe himſelf reaſonably more from this laſt proteſtation than from the precedent, and he ſeeth clearly by many experiences, that his reſolutions are without foundation, and have only an appearance, by which they have often deceived him; and yet this Jeſuit pretends that he and his Confeſſor alſo may truſt therein, and eſtabliſh thereon the foundation of his Salvation, without offending againſt the Rules of the Wiſdom and Prudence of the Spirit of God, which ought to guide an action ſo important.

*Bauny* ſpeaks in the ſame manner, alſo more clearly and more freely of thoſe who are engaged in the occaſions of ſin, and in the wicked habits which make them fall and relapſe many times into the ſame ſins. He inquires in his Sum, Chap. 46. pag. 717. *If notwithſtanding all that they have ſaid and promiſed in times paſt to their Confeſſor, they cannot forbear to break out into exceſs and greater liberty in the very ſame faults as before, they ought to be admitted to the Sacrament, and may be abſolved?* He ſaith firſt, that there are ſome who hold, that abſolution ought to be deferred for ſome time: but in the proceſs he makes this queſtion: He who ſhould do the contrary, ſhould he ſin? To which he anſwers clearly in two words: *That is not my opinion.* And at laſt he concludes in this manner: *That the Penitent purpoſing with true affection, and reſorting to the feet of the Prieſt to put an end unto his ſins, dignus eſt abſolutione toties quoties, deſerves to receive pardon, quantumcunque nulla notetur emendatio, though he amend not.* He is not content to ſay, that abſolution may be given to this man, he pretends that it may not be refuſed him, ſince he deſerves it. *dignus eſt*; and that though he relapſe every day into the ſame crimes, in caſting himſelf only at the feet of the Prieſt, and ſaying to him, that he hath a deſire to be reformed, he ſhall deſerve to receive abſolution every day and, more frequently, if he deſire it, *toties quoties*, though he relapſe immediately, without ever being amended; *quantumcunque nulla notetur emendatio.* 20730

3 Abſolvi poteſt qui dicit ſe dolere de peccatis & velle abſtinere *Ibid. n.* 13. *p.* 6.

4 Adhuc poſt ullius emendationis experimentum.....abſque voluntate tollendi occaſionem..... poteſt abſolvi. *Dicaſt. n.* 354. *d.* 19. *d.* 6. *tr.* 8. *de Pœnit.*

This deciſion is one of the moſt common of the Society. *Dicaſtillus* teaches it clearly, and ſaith, (4) *That after it is experimented that he amends not at all*, and after it is known that *the Penitent hath no will to quit the occaſions, abſolution may be given him.* (5) *And when there is ſome reaſonable cauſe why the Penitent ſhould not ſeparate himſelf from the occaſion of ſin, though the Penitent have relapſed into it very frequently, he is not to be obliged to avoid it, nor to be deprived of abſolution*; 20740

5 Quando juſtæ & rationabiles cauſæ non tollendi prædictam occaſionem ſubſiſtunt, etiamſi ſæpius reincidat pœnitens, non cogendus eſt illam tollere occaſionem, nec privandus abſolutione, etiamſi ſæpiſſimè recidivus; quin potius hortandus ut ſæpè veniat ad confeſſionem. *Ibid. n.* 576. *d.* 29. *d.* 10.

*though his relapſes be very frequent: he ought on the contrary be exhorted to come frequently to Confeſſion.* *Tambourin* who takes up this fancy alſo, renders this reaſon capable without doubt to convince every reaſonable Spirit. (1) *Abſolution may be given him the firſt time; therefore*, concludes he, *it may be given him alſo the ſecond time.* And ſo infinite times, *toties quoties*, ſay others.

1 Quia ſi potuit prima vice abſolvi, poterit & ſecunda. *Tamb.* 3. 10. *ſect.* 4. *c.* 3. *lib* 3. *meth. confeſſ.*

If theſe people be well diſpoſed to receive abſolution, or deſerve it, I know not where to find any one unworthy of it, and who may be refuſed it, becauſe all thoſe who demand it after Confeſſion, would, or at leaſt ſay to their Confeſſors, that they have a will to mend.

See here without doubt a great eaſe for ſinners. But if they break out with ſo much more liberty, giving themſelves up unto ſin, as they ſee there is facility of remedy, what muſt be done? May abſolution be refuſed them, or for ſome time deferred? *Dicaſtillus* ſaith, *No*, (2) *and that it may be given them, though they fall into ſin through hopes of obtaining abſolution.*

2 Poteſt abſolvi, etiamſi peccaverit ſpe obtinendæ abſolutionis. *Dicaſt n.* 254. *d.* 16. *d.* 11. *tr.* 8. *de pœnit.*

Another Maxime altogether common in the Jeſuits Schools, is, that a Confeſſor is obliged to give abſolution to a Penitent who demands it of him upon ſome probability that he is ſufficiently prepared to receive it, though the Confeſſor
20750 be perſwaded of the contrary. (3) *He may be abſolved*, ſaith Sa, *who follows a probable opinion, though contrary to that of his Confeſſor.*

3 Abſolvi poteſt qui contrariam opinioni Confeſſoris opinionem ſequitur, ſed probabilem. *Sa verb. abſolutio. n.* 15. *pag.* 6.

*Layman* ſpeaks alſo more clearly, more abſolutely, and more univerſally in theſe terms: (4) *If a Penitent follow in his practice with ſimplicity an opinion which ſome Doctors hold to be probable and ſafe, and his Confeſſor, whether ordinary or delegate, believe that this opinion conſidered in it ſelf and in the Theory hath no probability, notwithſtanding this perſwaſion he is obliged to give him abſolution.*

4 Si pœnitens in praxi bona fide ſequatur ſententiam quæ à quibuſdam Doctoribus tanquam probabilis & tuta defenditur, Confeſſarius vero ſeu ordinarius ſeu delegatus, eandem ſpeculativè improbabilem cenſeat, non obſtante ſua perſuaſione, tenetur abſolutionem conferre. *Layman l.* 1 *tr.* 1. *cap.* 5. *ſect.* 2. *n.* 10. *pag.* 7.

And becauſe he ſees the confuſion that it would make to put the Malefactor into the place of the Judge, he repreſents himſelf this inconvenience which follows upon his Principles, and makes this objection himſelf (5) *The Confeſſor is the Penitents Superior; and by conſequence the Penitent is obliged to quit his opinion to follow what his Confeſſor ordains.* He anſwers in this ſort: (6) *I anſwer that he is not abſolutely his Superior, and that he hath not a right to command him in all things; but only in what hath reference to the ſins wherewith he charges himſelf at the Tribunal of Penance.* To ſpeak this in more clear terms, the Confeſſor ought indeed to pronounce the Sentence of Abſolution on the Penitent; but he is to take it from the mouth of the ſame Penitent, like a Cryer that publiſhes
20760 the Decree of ſome Court. Becauſe the Penitent who appears before the Tribunal of Penance as the Malefactor, is alſo the witneſs in his own affair, and his own chief Judge: that it belongs to him to inquire after his ſins, to examine them, and to judge of their greatneſs and of the puniſhment which they deſerve: that having done this, there remains nothing for him to do but to preſent himſelf before the Prieſt, and to caſt himſelf down at his feet to confeſs himſelf, and that accuſing himſelf for his ſins, he hath nothing elſe to do but to preſent unto him his proceſs already made up with his Judgment, to the end that he may follow it, as it is already concluded and decreed.

5 Confeſſarius eſt pœnitentis ſuperior; ergo pœnitens depoſita propria opinione, Confeſſarii præcipientis opinionem amplecti tenetur. *Ibid.* 6 Reſpondeo non eſſe ſuperiorem ſimpliciter, neque jus præcipiendi habere in omnibus, ſed ſolum in ordine ad peccata quæ ad tribunal pœnitentiæ deferuntur. *Ibid.*

I ſee very well that the Confeſſor is not abſolutely nor in all things ſuperior to the Penitent, as this Jeſuit ſaith, but only in what reſpects the ſins which he hath confeſſed. But in what conſiſts this ſuperiority, if the Penitent having diſcovered his faults, he ought not to refer it to the light of the Confeſſor to judge of the quality of his ſins, the convenient remedies, and the time neceſſary to heal them, and of his diſpoſition to receive abſolution? For if in every of theſe points, and particularly in that which preſuppoſeth and contains them all, which is abſolution, the Confeſſor ought to ſubmit to the opinion and will of the Penitent, he is no more his Superior in what reſpects even thoſe ſins of which the Penitent hath accuſed himſelf. It is the Penitent who is true Superior, and the Confeſſor holds the place of an Inferior on his part, ſince he is bound to obey him and follow

his opinion againſt his own. Which comes all to one with what I have already obſerved, that upon this ſuppoſition that the Confeſſor pronounceth Sentence of Abſolution, taking it from the mouth of the Penitent, as a publick Cryer doth from the mouth of a Chief Juſtice of ſome Court; and by conſequence the 20770
Confeſſor is not the Judge but the Cryer, and abſolution is only a ſimple declaration.

1 *Sanchez l. 1. in Decal. c. 9. n. 28. apud Eſcobar l. 2. Theol. mor. ſect. 2. prob. 28.*

The opinion of *Layman* were probable, if it might be ſaid, that a Judge were obliged to refer himſelf to the judgment of the Malefactor, ſending him back abſolved when he pleaſes, though according to the Laws he deſerved death; or a Phyſitian that of his Patient, treating him as a ſound man becauſe he deſires it, and becauſe he is not ſenſible of his diſeaſe, though the Phyſitian believe he is in danger of death. For this is in effect that which *Layman* pretends, when he ſaith, that a Confeſſor who is truly a Judge and a Phyſitian, is obliged to give abſolution to a Penitent, becauſe he demands it, though the Confeſſor be perſwaded that he is not in an eſtate to receive it: (1) *non obſtante ſua perſuaſione tenetur abſolutionem conferre.* *Sanchez* obliges him even unto this under the pain of mortal ſin.

2 Ex dictis deducitur Confeſſarium ſemper poſſe & debere contra propriam opinionem pœnitentem abſolvere, quando ille probabili opinione ductus putat aliquid ſibi licitum eſſe, quod Confeſſarius juxta ſuam opinionem putat eſſe illicitum. *Amicus tom. 3. diſp. 15. ſect. 2. n. 90. p. 212.*

*Amicus* ſaith the ſame thing in other terms: (2) *It follows*, ſaith he, *from what I have ſaid, that a Confeſſor may always, and that he is even obliged to abſolve the Penitent againſt his own proper opinion, when the Penitent following the Maximes of a probable opinion, believes that he may do that which the Confeſſor believes he may not do according to his.* He relates for it this reaſon a little after: (3) *For otherwiſe he would oblige the Penitent by too great rigour to confeſs his ſins alſo to ſome other.* And to confirm his Anſwer, he gives this example (4) *of a Phyſitian who* 20780
*according to him may follow the opinion of others, and give to a Patient a medicine, which he believes may hurt in his particular caſe.*

3 Alioquin graviſſimo onere pœnitentem obſtringeret ad iterum ſua peccata alteri confiteri. *Ibid.*

He could not have choſen a more proper example to make the exceſs of this Doctrine appear. For who will believe that it is lawful for a Phyſitian to cauſe his Patient to dye, by giving him for a remedy that which he believes to be poyſon, that he may render this obſervance to other Phyſitians that are not of his opinion, or even to content the ſick who deſires and demands this remedy which the Phyſitian believes is not proper for him, and may cauſe his death; like as this Jeſuit pretends that a Confeſſor may and ought to give abſolution to his Penitent, becauſe he demands it, and believes he hath reaſon to demand it, though the Confeſſor be perſwaded that he is not in an eſtate to receive it, and that he cannot give it him but to his condemnation. But if this opinion which this Penitent hath contrary to that of his Confeſſor be prejudicial to a third party, wherein for example the making reſtitution is in debate, may the Confeſſor abſolve him, permitting him to act according to this opinion? *Eſcobar* after he had made a Problem of this Queſtion, ranks himſelf on their ſide who ſay, that the Confeſſor is obliged to abſolve his Penitent, and judges even that the contrary opinion *is hardly at all probable.*

4 Deducitur 2 poſſe medicum aliorum opinionem ſecutum dare ægroto medicinam quam ipſe privata ſua opinione probabiliter putat illi nocituram. *Ibid.*

*Tambourin* a faithful Scholar of the great Maſters of the School of the Society, makes uſe alſo of the Example of a Phyſitian and a Judge; but in a different manner, and quite oppoſite to *Amicus*, and more proper to evidence the exceſs of their Doctrine. (5) *The Confeſſor*, ſaith he, *may and ought to follow the probable opinion of his Penitent, againſt his own judgment, although it be more probable.... And though in the world a Judge and a Phyſitian be obliged to follow the more probable opinion, it is not ſo with a Confeſſor; becauſe it is ſufficient for him that his Penitent have the diſpoſitions which are for receiving grace, which he may have following a probable opinion; and by conſequent a Confeſſor is obliged to give him abſolution by conforming himſelf to his opinion on pain of mortal ſin.* After this the Confeſſor will take heed not to be wanting therein, and the Penitent needs fear nothing.

5 Poteſt, imo debet Confeſſarius ſequi opinionem probabilem pœnitentis contra propriam ſententiam ſive probabilem, ſive probabiliorem..... Et quamvis in rebus humanis ſive judex, ſive medicus deberet opinionem probabiliorem ſequi; tamen Confeſſario..... ſatis erit ſi pœnitens rectè ad prædictam juſtificationem diſpoſitus appareat, id quod ſatis habetur ſequendo opinionem probabilem. *Tambour. n. 1. ſect. 1. c. 9. l. 3. meth. confeſſ* Debet id ſub mortali. *n. 2.* Obligatur ſub mortali conformare ſe opinioni probabili. *Ibid.*

But to oblige him under ſo great a pain, of what ſort ought the Penitents probable opinion to be? See the Rule this Jeſuit preſcribes him: (1) *That the Confeſſor may be obliged to follow it, it muſt be probable, either becauſe of the reaſons on which it is built, or becauſe of the authority of thoſe who follow it. If the opinion of the Penitent have none of theſe probabilities, but only ſeem probable to the Penitent, the Confeſſor ſhall take heed that he neither do nor reſolve any thing raſhly, that he examine it diligently, to ſee if he can find any Author who hath approved it, and if he find any, that he conform thereto,* and give him ſpeedy abſolution. He cannot herein uſe more precaution, ſo fearful the Jeſuit is, leſt his Penitent ſhould be ſent back without abſolution.

1 Opinio debet eſſe probabilis in ſe ſive tamen per rationes intrinſecas, ſive per autoritatem extrinſecam autorum—ſi ergo opinio pœnitentis nullam ex his probabilitatem habeat, ſed ſolum ipſi pœnitenti appareat probabilis, diligens fit Confeſſarius in examine talis ſententiæ, an fortè ſit probabilis ſaltem extrinſecè propter autoritatem alicujus autoris, & ſi invenerit eſſe talem, illi ſe conformet. *num.* 4.

*Amicus* propoſes alſo a difficulty about Abſolution. (2) *It is doubted whether a Confeſſor who knows evidently that his own Penitent hath committed a ſin which he hath not confeſſed, ought to adverti ſe him of this ſin?* He anſwers and concludes, *That in this adventure the Confeſſor may judge that the Penitent hath ſome juſt reaſon to conceal his ſin, and for this he may abſolve him with a ſafe conſcience.*

2 Si dubitas an Confeſſarius qui evidentiam habet quod pœnitens peccatum commiſerit, illudque non ſit confeſſus, debeat illum de tali peccato monere. *Amicus tom.* 8. *diſp.* 13. *ſect.* 13. *n.* 331. *p.* 235.

*Filliutius* propoſes the ſame caſe: (3) *If the Confeſſor,* ſaith he, *be entirely aſſured that his Penitent hath forgotten ſome ſin, he is obliged ſpeaking generally to examine him thereof to make his judgment entire and perfect.* He ſaith not that this is for the benefit and Salvation of the Penitent, that he might make him confeſs his crime, and make him capable to receive pardon, but becauſe of the integrity of the judgment, that it may have all its parts; that is to ſay, that he may have an examination and anſwer of the ſinner upon which judgment may be made; becauſe all judgment ought to be compoſed of the hearing of the guilty and ſentence of the Judge, who cannot pronounce ſentence before examination. He requires not then that he ſhould examine, but to obſerve the forms of judgment, what anſwer ſoever the ſinner make: (4) ſo that if he deny his fault, and will damn himſelf, he declares that the Confeſſor is bound to abſolve him, and make ſhew to believe him: That if he cannot abſolutely believe him, (5) *becauſe he is aſſured that he lyes; he maintains that notwithſtanding this aſſurance, if he knows the ſin of the Penitent only by ſome ſecret way, he is obliged, having examined him prudently, to judge according to what is ſaid and proved in this inward Juſtice of Confeſſion.* That is to ſay, that he is obliged to abſolve him, though he ſee that in abſolving him, he accumulates to the higheſt his fault and his lye by a Sacriledge. Strange abſolution, which doth more effectually condemn! Cruel and dreadful charity, which caſts a Soul into Hell for fear of offending againſt carnal prudence and the intereſſed complacency of wicked Confeſſors! The ſame propoſes another caſe. He ſuppoſes an Uſurer to have many times promiſed his Confeſſor to make reſtitution, and hath always deceived him. He falls ſick, and ſeeing himſelf in danger of death, he makes again the ſame promiſes, but without ſetting upon the duty of reſtitution, though he have means, and may do it at that very ſame hour. He asks what ought the Confeſſor do in this extremity? And he anſwers, (6) *That the man being at the point of death, though it were better not to abſolve him if he do not firſt make reſtitution according to his ability: yet the Confeſſor is not obliged hereunto, provided that he probably believes that his heirs will do it.* It is by this Maxime then men are abſolved daily, and all ſorts of perſons deceived at the point of death and during life in ſuch manner as aſtoniſhes and offends all honeſt perſons. For to what uſe to a dead Uſurer is the reſtitution made by his Heirs, if he had no will to do it himſelf? and how can it be ſaid that he had a will to do it, if he would not do it when he might eaſily, and it was only his own fault? Certainly as the Confeſſion which his Heirs ſhould make for him would be unprofitable to him, if he were not willing to confeſs himſelf

Cæterum in caſu propoſito poſſet Confeſſarius judicare quod pœnitens commiſſum peccatum tacuerit juſta aliqua ex cauſa, ac proinde tutâ conſcientiâ poterit illum abſolvere. *Ibid.*

3 Si conſtet Confeſſori pœnitentem oblivi ſci alicujus peccati, per ſe loquendo, tenetur interrogare ob integritatem ipſius judicii. *Filliut. tom.* 1. *qq. mor. tract.* 7. *cap.* 12. *num.* 360. *pag.* 210. 4 Quod ſi interrogatus neget, regulariter tenetur illi credere. *Ibid.* 5 Quod ſi evidens illi ſit pœnitentem mentiri, ſi tantum Id ſciat via ſecreta, poſt prudentem interrogationem tenetur judicare ſecundum acta & probata in illo foro. *Ibid.* 6 Si eſſet in articulo mortis, etſi præſtat non abſolvere niſi reſtituat cum poſſit, tamen ad id non tenetur Confeſſarius, modo ſit illi probabile hæredes id facturos. *Filliut. t.* 2. *qq. mor. tr.* 34. *cap.* 8. *num.* 155. *pag.* 549.

ſelf before death, when he might: ſo the reſtitution made by them would be unprofitable for him; if he had no will to do it himſelf, when he might without difficulty. And the Confeſſor that relyeth on what the Heirs will do, though it be uncertain whether they will do it or nor, ſeeing he contents himſelf with a ſimple probability; *modo ſit illi probabile hæredes id facturos*, and diſtruſts not the will of the dying man, though it be clear & viſible, teſtifies evidently that he cares no more for the conſcience and the Salvation of the ſinner, than for the holineſs of the Sacrament, and that he ſubjects and abandons both to the complacence of men, and the intereſts which engaged him thereunto.

*Sanchez* having put the queſtion, whether abſolution ought to be given to perſons who by their negligence and fault knew not the Myſteries and things neceſſary to Salvation, firſt relates the opinion of *Azor* in theſe terms: (1) *When they have been advertiſed once or twice, and they have been able to learn that which they know not, and by conſequent cannot be exempt from fault, he holds that abſolution cannot be denied them nevertheleſs, provided they repent of their paſt negligence, and take a firm reſolution to cauſe themſelves to be therein inſtructed.* But he after gives his advice, and concludes yet more favourably and more generally, ſaying: (2) *I believe that in the practice we may ſeldom or never deny abſolution becauſe of ignorance of the Doctrine of Chriſtianity.* This would alſo be without all reaſon and againſt all manner of Juſtice, if the Confeſſor ſhould be ſo raſh as to refuſe abſolution, ſince that, *Tambourin* ſaith, after *Azor* and *Vaſquez*, (3) *If the Penitent be a blockiſh perſon, not knowing that he was hereunto obliged, his ignorance is without fault.* 20830

And to make it appear that the anſwer of theſe Fathers is univerſal, and that they except no Myſteries how neceſſary ſoever they may be unto Salvation, (4) *Tambourin* teſtifies unto us, that *Sa* extends it unto the Myſteries that are publickly exerciſed in the Church, and which St. *Thomas* hath aſſured us ought to be believed explicitely. And *Sanchez* propoſes unto us the caſe of a man who at the point of death is entirely ignorant of the things which appertain to Religion and Faith; and noting out to a Confeſſor what he ought to do, and how he ought to carry himſelf towards him, he ſaith, (5) *That it is enough that the Confeſſor propoſe unto him the things which he is to believe formally, as means abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation, ſuch as are the Myſteries of the Trinity, and that of the Incarnation, to the end that they may believe them actualy, at the leaſt in this manner.* That is to ſay, that it is ſufficient for him to make him ſay that he believes, without knowing either what theſe Myſteries are, or what it is the Confeſſor ſaith to him; and the reaſon why he ought not ſay more unto him is, (6) *Becauſe the ſick is not in an eſtate to endure to be put to more trouble in endeavouring to inſtruct him.* *Sanchez* ſpeaks of a man that is at the point of death; and when he ſaith, that it is to no end to importune and put him to trouble in inſtructing him in what is neceſſary to his Salvation, he would not ſay, that we were to fear to increaſe his ſickneſs, or to ſhorten his life, becauſe that is deſperate and in extremity; but only to diſquiet him, and that we ought to let him dye pleaſantly, and fall more pleaſantly into Hell, preferring in ſuch manner his convenience and eaſe to the Salvation of his Soul, and chuſing rather to ſuffer it to be expoſed to eternal pains, than to give him a ſlight trouble of a quarter of an hour. Such is the prudence and charity of theſe Divines. 20840

1 Quod ſi ſemel & iterum admoniti ſunt, & diſcere potuere, ac proinde culpa non liberentur, ait abſolutionem adhuc deneganda non eſſe, dummodo præteritæ negligentiæ eos pœniteat, & firmiter proponunt fore ut diſcant. *Sanchez oper. mor. l. 2. c. 3. n. 21. pag. 92.*

2 Et quidem in praxi exiſtimo nunquam aut rariſſimè denegandam abſolutionem ob doctrinæ Chriſtianæ ignorantiam. *Ibid.*

3 Vel ex rudibus — & ſupponuntur inculpabiliter non advertere ad tale onus. *Tamb. n. 3. ſect. 1. cap. 5. lib. 3. meth. confeſſ.*

4 Inſtar omnium ſit Sa, verbo, fides, qui ſic habet neceſſe eſſe explicitè credere fidei myſteria quæ publicè in Eccleſia celebrantur, ſentiunt multi cum S. Thoma, alii excuſari inultos ignorantia. *num.* 4. 5 Satis eſt ſi ei proponantur à Confeſſario ea myſteria quæ tenetur explicitè credere neceſſitate medii ſeu finis, ut ſunt myſteria Trinitatis & Incarnationis, ut vel ſic actum ea explicitè credendi eliciat. *Ibid. num.* 23. *pag.* 93. 6 In eo enim ſtatu non ita volet æger, ut procurando eum addiſcere, defatigandus ſit. *Ibid.*

ARTICLE

## ARTICLE IV. Of Satisfaction.

### *That the Divinity of the Jeſuits deſtroys this part of Penance.*

IF the Jeſuits be very indulgent to the pride of men, as we have already ſeen, in doing all they can to ſpare them in the ſhame and confuſion they have i
20850 diſcovering their ſins by Confeſſion, they are no leſs to their lazineſs and effeminacy, in diſcharging them of the penalty they ought to undergo in Penance, which is impoſed on them to make reparation for their faults, by ſupplying them with divers expedients, either to elude or not accompliſh them after they are impoſed on them, or to refuſe them when they are impoſed.

(1) *Dicaſtillus* advances this Propoſition as a general Principle; that it is not neceſſary that Penance ſhould be proportioned to the crime, and that it may be greater or leſs according to the qualities of the ſins. If you oppoſe to him the Councils and the Fathers, (2) *He will affirm after* Vaſquez, *that they would have a proportion held therein, and that it was the uſe of their times; becauſe Chriſtian charity then ruled the hearts of the faithful, they aſſigned different penalties according to the different qualities of crimes, following the fervour and piety of thoſe primitive times.* If you reaſon againſt him, that the Confeſſor having the quality of a Judge, ought to proceed by the ways of Juſtice, which puts ſome kind of equality betwixt the fault and the puniſhment; (3) *He will agree with you that it is ſo in humane Tribunals; but he will pretend that it is not the ſame thing in the judgment which the Prieſt exerciſes in the Tribunal of Penance, which without this proportion ceaſeth not to be juſt and true.*

20860 It is not then of ignorance that this Jeſuit oppoſes ſo openly the Oracles of the Holy Ghoſt, and the deciſions of the Church. The firſt Preacher of Repentance made a Precept for it, which hath not been preſcribed againſt by following Ages: (4) *Bring forth then fruit worthy of repentance*; and a Jeſuit in theſe laſt times which we may well call the dregs of all Ages, comes to tell us, that we need not bring forth fruit worthy of repentance. S. *Paul* ſaith, (5) *That he preached to Jews and Gentiles that they ſhould turn unto God, and bring forth fruit worthy of repentance*; and a Jeſuit tells us at this day, that this is not neceſſary. The Council of *Trent* ordain, (6) *That Confeſſors ſhould impoſe penances agreeable and according to the quality of their crimes*; and a Jeſuit aſſures us, that this is not the ſeaſon; that this practice had been good in the primitive times of the Church. After this exceſs there is no bar can ſtop the ſpirit of a Jeſuit any longer, when he takes in hand to flatter ſinners, Scripture it ſelf and the Church aſſembled have not force enough for this, and notwithſtanding all their Ordinances, a Penance, be it what it will, always ſuffices to obtain pardon for the greateſt crimes.

*Amicus* demands, (7) *Whether he on whom it hath been impoſed for penance, to hear two or three Maſſes, may ſatisfie his obligation by hearing them all at once upon different Altars.* He anſwers with *Sanchez*, that this is lawful, and that this
20870 opinion is probable; (8) *Becauſe the Confeſſor hath not commanded any thing but to hear two or three Maſſes.* He never troubles himſelf about the intention of the Confeſſor, which in this caſe he cannot reaſonably doubt of; he neither obliges the Penitent to inform himſelf of it; perhaps out of diſcretion and for the honour of the Confeſſor, for fear that learning it of his own mouth, and being not diſpoſed to obey him, ſince he can without that diſcharge himſelf of his Penance,

1 Præcipitur imponenda diverſa pœnitentia pro gravitate majori aut minori intra eandem ſpeciem. *num.* 196.

2 Rectè ſolvit hanc objectionem Vaſquez reſpondens olim quidem ita fuiſſe in uſu..... fervente charitate..... Ex quibus ſatis conſtat non neceſſitate Sacramenti, ſed ſecutos ſervorem illorum temporum, ejuſmodi pœnitentias aſſignare illorum Canonum & pœnitentiarum autores. *Dicaſt. n.* 197. *d.* 3. *d.* 9. *tr.* 8. *de pœnit.*

3 Et quidem in humanis judiciis, quamvis nequeat eſſe juſta & delicto proportionata ſententia qua reus damnetur ad aliquam pœnam, niſi cognoſcatur culpa: tamen ſententia abſolutionis & remiſſionis rei ſe præſentantis & deferentis & petentis veniam, eſſe poteſt remittendo quicquid illud fuerit, in quo non eſt ſervanda proportio qualis eſſe debet inter culpam & pœnam, ut judicium ſit verum & juſtum. *Dicaſt. n.* 747. *d.* 9. *d.* 9. *tr.* 8. *de pœnit.* 4 Facite ergo fructus dignos pœnitentiæ. *Mat.* 3. *Luc.* 3. 5 Judæis & Gentibus annuntiabam, ut pœnitentiam agerent & converterentur ad Deum, digna pœnitentiæ opera facientes. *Act.* 26. 6 Pro qualitate criminum convenientes ſatisfactiones. *Trid. c.* 8. *ſeſſ.* 14. Condignam pro modo culpæ pœnitentiam. *c.* 8. *ſeſſ.* 24. 7 An qui pro pœnitentia debet duas aut tres Miſſas audire, ſatisfaciat ſi omnes in diverſis altaribus eodem tempore ſimul audiat? 8 Affirmat Sanchez in Summa l. 1. c. 14. in fine. Quæ ſententia probabilis eſt, quia præceptum Confeſſoris non eſt niſi de duabus aut tribus Miſſis audiendis. *Amicus t.* 8. *diſp.* 16. *dub.* 14. *n.* 112. *p.* 272.

nance, according to the probable opinion of *Amicus* and *Sanchez*, he might not offend yet more by a manifeſt diſobedience; he chuſes rather that the Penitent ſhould diſſemble and not acknowledge to underſtand the intention of his Confeſſor, that he might without ſcandal elude his Commandment.

1 Dico 1. actus ſatisfactionis Sacramentalis ex pravo fine etiam peccati mortalis elicitus, valet ad implendum præceptum à Confeſſario injunctum de ſatisfaciendo pro peccatis confeſſis, modo per talem actum impleatur ſubſtantia ipſa ſatisfactionis.

The ſame Jeſuite in the ſame place ſaith, that Penance given for ſatisfaction of ſins may be diſcharged, by an action which is in it ſelf a mortal ſin. (1) *The work of Sacramental Penance*, ſaith he, *when it is done with a wicked intent and even to commit a mortal ſin, ceaſes not to be good enough to diſcharge the command of a Confeſſor about ſatisfaction for ſins confeſſed, provided the ſubſtance and body of it be performed.* *Dicaſtillus* is of the ſame judgment, being he ſaith that Penance enjoyned may not only be performed by accompliſhing it in an eſtate 20880 of mortal ſin, (2) *without committing the leaſt ſin, even Venial*; but alſo *for an end which is Criminal*; which is to ſay, that it may be ſatisfied by a ſin and by a Sacriledge. It would be a ſtrange diſcourſe amongſt men if it ſhould be ſaid that ſatisfaction may be done to a man for injuries done him, by acting new ones againſt him, and that old debts might be paid by running farther in debt to the ſame perſon. But this which ſeems extravagant towards men, appears reaſonable to the Jeſuites towards God; and they believe that he will take that for good money, which paſſes for falſe and ridiculous in the world.

*Ibid. n.* 37. *p.* 262. 2 Verum puto non eſſe peccatum mortale—imo abſolute nullum peccatum exiſtimo eſſe. *Dicaſt. n.* 150. *d.* 10. *d.* 14. *tr.* 8. *de pœnit.* Tandem concedunt communiter Doctores per pœnitentiam in peccato mortali impletam, adhuc ex fine mortali ſatisfieri præcepto Confeſſarii. Efficitur enim opus quoad ſubſtantiam quod Confeſſarius præcipit, & eo ipſo eſt Sacramentalis pars. *Ibid. n.* 154.

*Bauny* after he had concluded according to many Doctors, that *he who refuſed at the Sacrament to accept a Penance, at leaſt a ſlight one, impoſed on him for his faults, was not in an eſtate to be abſolved*; after he had repreſented the reaſons of theſe Doctors, of whom there are ſome who hold this Doctrine ſo aſſured, that they ſay, that it is a point of Faith that a perſon in this eſtate is incapable of Abſolution; he ſaith, to ſweeten this apparent rigour, that he *who is of a contrary opinion, may yet give it him*; though the other opinion were a point of Faith. In effect he obliges us not to follow it, and it being ſufficient that the other according to him is probable, and that ſome Doctor holds it; yea, though no body hath yet propoſed it, a Learned and Pious Confeſſor, as all thoſe of the Society are, may render it probable enough by holding and practiſing it.

It is true that after all this Father *Bauny* declares, *that nevertheleſs he dares not counſel the practice of it.* Not but that he believes that may be practi- 20890 ſed, and that he would not be backward to adviſe it, ſince he approves it openly when he ſaith, that he who were of an opinion contrary to the firſt which he hath related, might give abſolution to a perſon that would not accept of any Penance; and that which he dares not adviſe, he makes other Caſuiſts to ſay, whom he cites, who believe it probable, of which he relates the reaſon, and fortifies it the beſt he can, ſpeaking for them in theſe terms: *ſince all may, ſay they, delay to ſatisfie for their ſins till another life, they are not obliged to prevent that time, as they ſhould be if to avoid ſin they ought to accept that which the Confeſſor appoints them for ſatisfaction unto one part of their faults.* But if of complaiſance and not to diſpute againſt their Confeſſor, they will ſubmit themſelves freely to that which he ordains, they may afterwards do nothing at all, according to that which *Tambourin* ſaith; (3) *That it is probable that a ſlight Penance, for great ſins, obliges not the Penitent at all to accompliſh it.* That is to ſay, that a Penitent of the Jeſuites may either openly reject all that his Confeſſor ſaith to him, and impoſeth on him by way of remedy and ſatisfaction for his ſins, or he may make himſelf ſport with it in private, neglecting to do it after he hath promiſed it.

3 Pœnitentia Sacramentalis ſi levis ſit, licet pro peccatis gravibus impoſita, non obligat ex probabili opinione.

*Tamb. n.* 1. *Sect.* 5. *c.* 7. *l.* 3. 1. *p. decalogi.*

*Escobar* is of the same opinion, though he temper it a little. He speaks of a Penitent that refuseth the Penance which the Confessor would give him, and he makes this question in favour of the Penitent: (1) *What shall he do if he say* 20900 *he will submit to the pains of Purgatory?* He answers in giving this advice to a Confessor: (2) *That he should not forbear to impose some slight Penance to salve the integrity of the Sacrament.* That is to say, to keep the outward Form and Ceremony; so that he make thereto some satisfaction though ineffectual, and which may be rejected by the Penitent; and nevertheless he wills that care be taken to observe this rule, above all when it is perceived that the Penitent is not in humour to do Penance. *Præcipuè cum agnoscat gravem non acceptaturum;* (3) *Or when the Confessor knows that he hath not done what was appointed him and which he hath accepted of, because it seemed unto him too painful.*

1 Quid si affirmet se velle Purgatorii pœnas subire? 2 Levem adhuc pœnitentiam imponat ad Sacramenti integritatem. *Escobar tract. 7. exam. 4. n. 188. p. 824.* 3 Si

Confessarius ex circumstantiis confessionis advertat pœnitentem sæpe alioquin acceptatam pœnitentiam gravem non impleviſſe, posse aliquando vel levem satis, vel minus gravem quam alioquin oporteret, injungere, *Dicastil. n. 17. d. 2. d. 14. tract. 8. de pœnitent.*

*Tambourin* is not so rigorous; he would not have any at all imposed on him, how slight soever it may be; on the contrary he gives this advice to the Confessor: (4) *That he should send away without Absolution him who refuseth the Penance which is appointed him, desiring to submit himself to the pains of Purgatory; for being it was the opinion of so great men, it is not credible,* saith he, *that the Council of Trent did intend to condemn an opinion followed by so great Personages reported by St.* Anthony Sanctarel. It is not probable, saith this Jesuite, that the Council of *Trent* would condemn so great Authors; but these great Authors find probability enough in their Divinity to condemn the Council of 20910 *Trent*, by authorizing that which it expressly forbid.

4 Opinio quæ docet pœnitentem non teneri acceptare pœnitentiam, etiam post Tridentinum videtur probabilis; quia non videtur Tridentinum damnare voluisse opinionem quam doctissimi viri sequebantur, citati à Patre Antonio Sanctarel. Ex qua opinione sequitur quod si esset pœnitens aliquis qui nollet acceptare, paratus in Purgatorio solvere, non esset hoc præcisè censendus indispositus, nec propter hoc solum esset sine absolutione dimittendus, quia sequitur opinionem quam tanti viri sequuntur. *Tambour. n. 7. Sect. 1. c. 2. l. 4. meth. confess.*

So that the Confessor instead of removing from this hardned and insensible man, his disobedience and presumption which he hath when he should be in the greatest Humiliation and Obedience, shall be obliged on the contrary to cherish and confirm him in this pride and impenitence.

If this imagination of this Jesuite be reasonable, we must say that the Saints who governed the Church heretofore, understood nothing in the Administration of the Sacrament of Penance, since by a reason quite contrary to his, they diminished not the Penance and satisfaction of Penitents, till they found them extraordinarily touched with the sense of their sins, and ready to do all that they ordained for their expiation, and even when they were already engaged and advanced in the exercises of Penance, and resolved to go on to their uttermost extent.

The rule of these Saints was to diminish sometimes the rigour of Penance on them who believed that they could not be too rigorous towards them: and the rule of these Jesuites is on the contrary, to give some slight Penance to those who refuse to receive one that comes any thing near to what they deserve for their crimes.

This is indeed to favour the impenitence and obstinacy of sinners, since according to *Dicastillus*, because of the evil disposition wherein they are found, the Confessor is obliged to require of them a very slight satisfaction, and (5) 20920 *that it is even expedient for the more enormous crimes to impose a Penance much be-*

5 Expedit quando gravitas peccatorum est magna, leviorem adhuc pœnitentiam imponere quam facultas aliàs pœnitentium exigeret, ut ad frequentandam confessionem alliciantur, vel ab ea frequentanda non deterreantur, id totum cedit in utilitatem pœnitentium, quibus longè utilius est frequentius confiteri, quam alia opera pœnalia exercere; imo moderanda est multum pœnitentia, quando prudenter timetur fore ut ejus difficultate deterriti, vel prorsus omittant, vel deserant inceptam. *Dicast. n. 49. d. 3. d. 14. tract. 8. de Pœnit.*

*low what they might do according to their eſtate and condition, that by this ſweetneſs and benignity they might more frequently attend the Sacrament of Penance, or at the leaſt not withdraw themſelves from it, and all this for their benefit: becauſe it is incomparably more profitable for them to confeſs frequently, than to accompliſh painful and laborious ſatisfactions.* (1) *As for me,* ſaith this Jeſuit, *I have found by experience that a ſweet treatment cauſes the Tribunals to be frequented, and this multiplication of Confeſſions is more profitable for ſinners, than burdenſom ſatisfactions which the Penitents do not execute for the moſt part. For by little and little by the multiplied force of the grace of the Sacrament of Confeſſion, they retire from ſin, wherein without this they would have always continued.*

1 Ego experimento didici plerumque lenitate conciliari animos pœnitentium, & allici ad frequentiam confeſſionis, in qua frequentanda efficacius inveni remedium pro pœnitentibus recidivis, quàm onerando illos pœnitentiis quas magna ex parte non implent. At paulatim repetitâ Sacramenti gratiâ, tandem emergunt unde alias nunquam videbantur emerſuri. *Ibid. n.* 53.

This way without doubt is very ſweet, but it is alſo very dangerous, in flattering ſinners it eaſily deceives them, and by inducing them to confeſs frequently, it expoſes them evidently to commit as many Sacriledges as they make Confeſſions, with a contempt of Penance which they therein betray, and in the diſpoſition and reſolution which they take not to make any ſatisfaction unto God, or not to accept any but very ſlight for the greateſt crimes which they have committed. 20930

This ſhews that it is not without reaſon and deſign, that the Jeſuits have changed the name of the Sacrament of Penance into that of Confeſſion, being after they have deſtroyed inward Penitence, which is a ſincere and ſupernatural ſorrow for ſin, as I have elſewhere made apparent, they alſo entirely aboliſh exterior penance, which is ſatisfaction as they declare here, and reduce all the Sacrament ſo far as concerns the Penitent, to confeſſion and declaration of ſins only.

They declare alſo with ſufficient evidence, wherefore they labour with ſo great care to ſweeten and multiply Confeſſions, in ſaying, that their Tribunals are more frequented, that is to ſay, that their Authority and Empire which they aſſume over conſciences, eſtabliſhes and extends it ſelf by this ſweet way contrary to the Laws of the Church and of Repentance, and opens them an eaſie way to uſurp upon the Jurisdiction of Biſhops, without ſpeaking of other advantages and profits may thereby ariſe unto them.

2 Si irrationabiliter gravis pœnitentia fuit? Non tenetur implere, quia nec Confeſſarius ligare eum potuit, nec pœnitens intendit ſeſe illigari. *Ibid. n.* 191.

*Eſcobar* is ſo little inclined to condemn the wicked diſpoſition of an impenitent ſinner, that on the contrary he approves and juſtifies it, in demanding, (2) *What is to be done if the penance be too great and unreaſonable?* For he anſwers, *That the Penitent is not obliged to accompliſh it, becauſe the Confeſſor could not oblige him thereto; and it was not the intent of the Penitent neither to oblige himſelf in that ſort.*

He pretends that the ſinner may ſet bounds to the power of a Confeſſor as he pleaſeth, and to make void his opinions, and render them unjuſt by his fancy only, cauſing all his penances to paſs for unreaſonable and exceſſive, which are impoſed by him againſt his liking and humor: which is the moſt clear and moſt dangerous of all injuſtices. For if it be unjuſt that a man ſhould be Judge in his own proper cauſe, how much more unjuſt is it that a guilty and criminal perſon ſhould be ſo, and that his judgment ſhould be preferred before that of a learned, juſt, prudent, and diſintereſſed perſon, ſuch as a Confeſſor is ſuppoſed and ought to be, who is not only a humane Judge, but a Divine, holding the place of God himſelf, and exerciſing the power of Jeſus Chriſt? Who ſees not then that to prefer the judgment of a Criminal in his own cauſe before that of ſuch a Judge, is not to deſpiſe a man, but Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, and the power of God, and to juſtifie a contempt which is unſupportable by the meaneſt Judge amongſt men, and will paſs for extravagant in the judgment of all? 20940

3 An poſſit per alium impleri pœnitentia? Poſſe aſſerit Suarius, modo juſta adſit cauſa. *Eſcobar tr.* 7. *ex.* 4. *n.* 182. *p.* 828.

They are not content to give unto Penitents alſo the liberty to do what they will in the Sacrament of Penance, and to receive for juſt, or reject for unjuſt, as they pleaſe, the judgment of the Confeſſor, and the penance which he impoſes; but they will alſo that even after they have accepted and have acknowledged that it is juſt and neceſſary, it is lawful for him not to perform it, and to transfer it on to others. For *Eſcobar* puts the queſtion, (3) *Whether may my penance be accompliſhed by another?* And he anſwers, *That this is the opinion of* Suarez, *provided*

20950 *vided there be ſome juſt reaſon for it.* As if ſpecious reaſons and pretences on theſe occaſions, wherein it is eaſie to deceive others after we are deceived our ſelves, would ever be wanting. This is alſo to relieve thoſe who commit the greateſt crimes; that is, the rich and delicate perſons and carnal, who would have Confeſſors to ſearch out for them agreeable penances, and which hurt and trouble the leaſt that may be the repoſe and eaſe of their body. (1) *For theſe perſons are very delicate,* ſaith Dicaſtillus, *and cannot reſolve to afflict their bodies by the auſteritie of a ſevere penance: wherefore it is to good purpoſe to ordain unto them alms and Maſſes for a full ſatisfaction.*

1 Sic etiam Miſſas & eleemoſynas præſcribere conſultum fuerit divitibus aliquin nimis delicatis qui non habent animum ſubeundi alias corporis afflictationes. *Dicaſt. n* 78 *d.* 5. *d.* 14 *tr.* 8. *de pœnit.*

And for a yet greater diſcharge of the Penitent, they will that the Confeſſor give Penance to him by way of counſel, without abſolutely obliging the Penitent to accompliſh it. (2) *Ought penance,* ſaith Eſcobar, *be impoſed with an obligation to accompliſh it?* He anſwers, *That* Suarez *holds that penance is alway Sacramental, though it be impoſed by way of counſel.* And that the ſame Author propoſes alſo another accommodation which is very eaſie, and which no man can refuſe, to wit, to give for penance ſomething formerly commanded; ſo that penance for ſins may be accompliſhed by doing that which we ſhould have done however, though we had not ſinned, and which the moſt innocent are obliged unto.

2 Eſtne imponenda pœnitentia ſub obligatione? Sufficienter eſſe Sacramentalem, ſi per modum conſilii imponatur, docet Suarius. *Ibid.* Qui addit opus alioqui præceptum poſſe aliquando in pœnitentiam injungi. *Ibid.*

Finally, the laſt ſweetning of penance is to advertiſe the Penitent only to do ſome ſatisfaction for his ſins, without determining any thing in particular, and
20960 leaving him to his choice to do what he will. (3) *Is it lawful for a Confeſſor,* ſaith Eſcobar, *to leave it wholly to the liberty of the Penitent to do what penance he pleaſeth?* He anſwers with *Suarez, That it is not always neceſſary to impoſe upon him any particular work, and principally to ſpiritual perſons; but it is ſufficient to ſay I impoſe on you for penance all that which you ſhall do of good or ſuffer of bad this day or this week.*

3 An poſſit Confeſſarius pœnitentiam omnino liberè faciendam arbitrio pœnitentis imponere? Ex Suarii ſententia affirmat non ſemper requiri ut aliquod opus in pœnitentiam imponatur, præſertim ſpiritualibus perſonis; ſed ſufficere ſi dicat: Impono tibi pro pœnitentia quicquid hodie vel hac hebdomada boni feceris, vel mali paſſus fueris.

It is hard not to be a Penitent in this manner, and not to do penance for the greateſt ſins, unleſs we will renounce the common life of Chriſtians, and reſolve to trample under feet all the Commands of God and the Church, ſo as to do no good in a whole day or week. And though it ſhould happen that we could do no good, yet could we not be exempted from receiving ſome diſpleaſure and ſuffering ſome evil. So that following this Method, it is impoſſible for thoſe very men who would do no penance, to be impenitent.

*Filliutius* contains in one ſingle queſtion all thoſe of his Fraternity we now related, and alſo thoſe which may be made in this matter, and he reſolves them in two words in favour of impenitent ſinners. His queſtion is concerning the precept of Satisfaction: (4) *Whether it be true that there is any ſuch precept?* And
20970 the better to make the difficulty to be underſtood, and the anſwer which he ought to make, he ſaith firſt, (5) *It muſt be obſerved that this is a queſtion which riſes upon an obligation that comes from a natural and not a poſitive precept, as that which the Confeſſor impoſeth in the Sacrament of Penance; for of that we ſhall ſpeak when we treat of Satisfaction.*

4 Quæro de præcepto ſatisfaciendi, an tale præceptum detur.

5 Pro reſponſione notandum, quæri obligationem ex vi præcepti naturalis, & non ex vi poſitivi à Confeſſario impoſiti in Sacramento pœnitentiæ. De hoc enim cum de ſatisfactione. *Filliut. t.* 1. *mor. qq. tr.* 6. *cap.* 9. *n.* 213. *pag.* 159.

He declares that he intends not to ſpeak of the command which a Confeſſor may give his Penitent in impoſing penance. For neither he nor his Brethren make any great account of that, as we but now made appear: but he inquires only whether there be any natural command or obligation to ſatisfie God; that is to ſay, which ariſes from the duty of a reaſonable creature that hath offended God, and deſpiſed his Commandments, and that reſpect and love which he owes him.

1 Dico 1. non videri datum esse tale præceptum de satisfaciendo in hac vitâ pro pœna

After this he answers clearly and without any fear, that (1) *in his judgment there is no such precept which obliges to satisfie for temporal pain in this life*; his reason is, *because there is neither reason nor convincing authority from whence this precept may be collected.*

temporali; quia tale præceptum nec colligitur ratione necessaria, nec autoritate. *Ibid.*

2 Cum Deus puniat in Purgatorio peccata quandiu in hac vita non est satisfactum, poterit peccator sine injustitia differre satisfactionem in alteram vitam. *Ibid.*

But if it be objected unto him, that God remitting sin and eternal punishment, will at the least that some temporal satisfaction be made to his justice. He answers, that (2) *God punishing sins in Purgatory, when satisfaction is not made in this life, the sinner may without injustice refer satisfaction unto the other life.*

3 Lex charitatis propriæ vel divinæ non violatur; quia licet differat in alteram vitam, non propterea perdit beatitudinem, nec divinum amorem; & licet aliquantulum retardet, tamen est damnum reparabile. *Ibid.*

And if you press him farther by the obligation that is on a sinner towards God, and by the acknowledgments he owes him for pardoning his sin, or by the law of Charity wherein he is bound to God and to himself; he will say 20980 that (3) *this law of Charity which is due to our selves or God, is not violated herein: for though the sinner defer satisfaction until the next life, he loses not by this, neither bliss nor the love of God; and though he retard the enjoyment thereof, yet the loss made by this delay may be repaired.*

So that none are obliged to do Penance in this world, and Jesus Christ ought not to threaten them who do it not with a death like unto theirs, who were overwhelmed and pressed to death by the fall of a Tower, because it is lawful to defer it till after death; and so they who will not do it here being not guilty, they have no cause to fear any thing because of this from God who doth not punish the innocent.

4 Dico 1. non videri datum esse tale præceptum de satisfaciendo in hac vita pro pœna temporali.

I stay not here to examine the reasons of this Jesuite, that I may not be too tedious. I say only that the principle which he establisheth that, (4) *according to his judgment there is no natural precept which obliges us in this life to make satisfaction for temporal pains*, without doubt takes away all footing for all doubts and difficulties which might arise on this subject; but withal it entirely abolisheth satisfaction and Penance by taking away the obligation to do it in this life; which is that I have affirmed to be amongst those points of the Jesuits Divinity which I have undertaken to discover.

I adde that by destroying Penance, he ruines at the same time the whole Gospel which began by Preaching Penance, and contains in effect no other thing, since the whole life of a Christian is nothing else but a continual Penance, according to the Council of *Trent*, and all the Fathers.

So we see that all the places of the Scripture and of the Fathers which speak 20990 of Penance are addressed to the living; and it would be very hard to find any directed to the dead, and which commands or counsels them to do Penance for their sins; the Scripture and the Church having always taught until this time that it is impossible, because it is impossible to fast after death, to weep, to wear Sackcloth and Ashes, and to do other like Exercise, in which the Scripture it self and the Church it self have established the Penance and satisfaction which we owe unto God for our sins: *Emandemus in melius quæ ignoranter peccavimus, nè subito præoccupati die mortis quæramus spatium pœnitentiæ, & invenire non possimus. Let us amend and correct those things in which we have ignorantly offended, lest being suddenly surprized by the day of death, we seek space for Penance and cannot find it*, saith the Church at the entrance of Lent, which is the time which it proposes to all men, sinners and innocent, perfect and unperfect, great and small to do Penance in this life; and for it to be remittable to the other world, is to abolish it entirely, and ruine together with it the whole Gospel and all life of Christianity.

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## ARTICLE V.

### *Rules of Conduct for a Confeſſor according to the Jeſuits.*

THE principal Rules of a Confeſſor towards a Penitent according to them are; 1. To examine him, if it be needful. 2. To give him neceſſary advices. 3. To ſound as much as they can his inward diſpoſition, and to ſee if he be grieved for his ſin. 4. To ordain wholſome Penance for him. 5. To give him Abſolution if he be in an eſtate to receive it.

From all the maxims of the Jeſuits Divinity which we have but now related concerning the Sacrament of Penance and all the parts of it, it is eaſie to judge in what manner they would have a Confeſſor demean himſelf in the Adminiſtration of this Sacrament, and what Rules they ought to obſerve for diſcharging every of theſe Duties.

## I. POINT.

### *Rules to examine Penitents according to the Jeſuits.*

THOSE that need to be examined are, 1. Children. 2. Ignorant and Blockiſh People. 3. Great Sinners.

21010 1. For Children, the Jeſuits would not that they ſhould be ſcared, nor any ſcruple made about the ſins of their youth, though they be great, and they have never yet confeſſed them; whether it be becauſe they have forgotten them, or becauſe they knew not that they were ſo great as they learnt afterwards. For they hold that they are not obliged to confeſs them even after they have received this inſtruction.

1. What is meet to be ſaid to thoſe who in their youth have committed many actions of a vitious nature, and which nevertheleſs they believe not to be ſuch? That they are not obliged to ſpeak one word of them when they underſtand and know their nature and conditions, and much leſs repeat their paſt Confeſſions. *Bauny in his ſum, Chap. 4. P. 150.*

2. If a Peaſant or a groſly Ignorant Perſon knowing not how to confeſs himſelf, ſay that he hath never accuſed himſelf but in groſs without noting out any ſins in particular; the Jeſuits will not that he ſhould be made to repeat his Confeſſions, and accuſe himſelf anew by unfolding his ſins by parcels, eſpecially when they have other perſons to confeſs, who give them not leiſure, though the ignorance which hinders them from knowing and confeſſing their ſins be criminal, and renders them guilty of mortal ſin, or the ignorance of the Confeſſor himſelf be the cauſe. Likewiſe they teach generally, that when the Penitent hath made an imperfect Confeſſion, he is not obliged to repeat it, and he fails not for all that to receive the Grace of the Sacrament by vertue of the following Abſolution and Confeſſion.

2 That if any by ignorance or ſimplicity have not confeſſed himſelf of his faults but only in groſs without determining any one in particular, it is not needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of thoſe faults, if it cannot be done conveniently, becauſe we are preſſed by Penitents which give not leiſure for it. *Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 4. pag. 150.*

Licèt ignorantia ſit culpabilis mortaliter non eſt neceſſitas repetendi confeſſionem, ac proinde valida eſt. *Filliutius tom. 1. mor. qq. tract. 7. cap. 6. num. 132. pag. 185.* Henriq. Fagund. addunt ruſticos omnes, qui confitentur aliquando ſine explicatione numeri & diligentia, cogendos non eſſe repetere confeſſiones factas antea cum indoctis Confeſſariis. *Dicaſtillus tract. 8. de pœnit. d. 9. d. 2. num. 57.* Pœnitens qui priorem confeſſionem fecit informem, non tenetur repetere..... certiſſimum & abſque controverſia eſt ipſum conſequi per poſteriorem abſolutionem gratiam. *Idem tractat. 2. de bapt. d. 1. d. 8. n. 203.*

21020 3. When a great ſinner confeſſeth himſelf, they hold that he needs not give himſelf the trouble to inform of all the particularities of his life and crimes, and that the more he is laden with ſins, he is the more ſlightly and leſs exactly to be examined. And behold the reaſon: The examination muſt be ſuch as may not beget

3 Levius & minus exactè interrogandus eſt circa ſingula qui plura

habet peccata quam qui pauciora; quia cum solum requiratur diligentia & examen humanum; hoc autem sit illud quod non generat ex se fastidium & tædium hujus Sacramenti, consequens est ut minus distincta notitia requiratur ab eo qui vel propter peccatorum multitudinem, vel alium eb causam difficilius posset exactam noticiam reddere. *Tambur. lib. 3. method. confess. cap. 9. sect. 5. num. 11.*

beget a disgust of the Sacrament. Whence it follows that we must exact a less perfect knowledge of him, who for the multitude of his sins or some other cause can difficultly render an exact account: That if he be a Thief, it is sufficient for him to say, I have sinned mortally in the matter of theft, without expressing any farther the sum which he stole: If he be a debauched and wicked person, it is not needful to press him to tell the number of the dishonest thoughts and desires which he hath had, though he might do it easily, that it sufficeth that he say for example; *I loved* Mary *a whole month, toto mense amavi Mariam*: That it belongs to the Confessor to supply and divine the rest; and that he ought to observe this rule in other sins: That if the Penitent have omitted in his Confession 2103.
any sin which he believes probably to be no sin, the Confessor cannot oblige him to discover it, because of two probable opinions the Penitent may chuse whether he pleaseth: and if the Penitent believes more than probably, if he be assured that it is a sin, provided he believe probably that he hath confessed it, the Confessor cannot oblige him to accuse himself of it; and all this is true, though he believe more probably that he hath sinned mortally, or that he hath not confessed it at all,

If this sinner signifie that he would make a general Confession, he is not obliged to declare the sins he hath already confest, and those which he hath committed since his last Confession; and if his Confessor pretend to oblige him thereto, this would be very frivolously done, for he might receive his answer from the Penitent in these words: I accuse my self of this sin, whether I have or have not confessed it already, I am not obliged to confess more unto you. And this is 21040
true, though he make such a medley of new and old sins, with design to hide from the Confessor the time when he committed these new crimes, because he hath a right to do so. The Confessor is not obliged to examine him whether he have told him all, and whether he have forgotten any sin; because the Penitent, though he have declared that he would make a Confession of all the sins of his life, may omit what he pleaseth without any lye; and if this be any kind of lye, it is but a venial one. This opinion is certain and commonly received in the Schools.

Commisi furtum mortale toties, non exprimendo furti quantitatem. *Escobar in proem. ex. 2. num. 39. pag. 12. & 15.*

It is not needful in Confession to tell the said circumstance of the quantity of the theft: it suffices in rigour to cause the Confessor to understand that we have sinned mortally in the matter of theft, by taking from another such sum as constitutes that sin. *Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 39. pag. 616.* It is not needful for the validity of the Sacrament that the Penitent in his Confession tell the number of vicious desires, dishonest thoughts and affections which he hath had or reiterated during the time he hath been addicted to them. Sufficit dicere toto mense v. c. amavi Mariam, etiamsi possit numerus exprimi. *Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 4. pag. 667.*

Si utrique parti probabiliter adhæret, non tenetur confiteri. Potest enim sequi probabilem partem quam maluerit. *Dicast. tr. 8. de pœnit. d. 9. d. 7. num. 277.* Si quis probabiliter putet se jam confessum fuisse, non tenetur confiteri, etiamsi certo sciat se mortaliter peccasse. *Ibid. num. 292.* Qui habet rationes probabiles quod non peccaverit mortaliter, & similes, imo probabiliores rationes quod peccaverit, non tenetur ad illud confitendum. *Tambur. lib. 2 method. confess. cap 1. sect. 3. num. 9.* Qui probabiliter, imo certo scit se mortaliter deliquisse, habet tamen rationes probabiles, imo & probabiliores se illud non esse confessum..... nec tenetur ad illud confitendum. *Ibid. num. 10.* Asserendum non esse obligationem prædictam, sed posse omnia peccata simul dicere non explicando, an antea fuerit illa confessus..... Si Confessarius id interroget quando nulla est obligatio ex parte pœnitentis, non tenetur respondere Confessario interroganti; sed dicere, ego hoc peccatum confiteor, quidquid sit an confessus fuerim, aliud non teneor explicare. *Dicast. tract 8. de pœnit. d. 9. d. 2. num. 146.*

Qui generaliter confitetur, potest sine alia explicatione admiscere nova cum antiquis, etiamsi id de industria ad tegendum tempus quo peccatum commisit, ne Confessario id innotescat, faciat, quia utitur jure suo. *Tamb. lib. 2. meth. confess. cap. 1. tract. sect. 1. num. 2.* Asserendum est posse omittere quæcunque velit. *Dicast. tract. 8. de pœnit. d. 9. d. 2. num. 162.* Non tenemur atque adeo possumus omittere aliqua peccata etiam mortalia, sed aliàs rite manifestata, est communis & certa Theologorum opinio..... Quod si pœnitens dixerit se velle generaliter confiteri, & deinde non omnia proponat, respondeo nec tunc mentiri..... Imo etiamsi mentiretur, peccaret solum venialiter. *Tambur. lib. 2. meth. confess. cap. 1. sect. 2. num. 7.*

II. POINT.

## II. POINT.

### *Of the Advice which a Confessor ought to give his Penitent according to the Jesuits.*

1. THey will not that he speak to him or advise him of any thing, if he thinks he will not believe him.

2. If he knows that the sinner is in an ill estate, as for example, that he lives in Whoredom because his Marriage is null, they say he is not to speak to him of it, if he thinks that it will be to no purpose.

21050 3. Though he be assured that his Penitent hath committed a crime which he hath not at all confessed, they permit him to dissemble it, and to absolve him, in a pious persuasion that he hath some reason wherefore he doth not confess it.

4. Yet they accord that he may examine him upon this sin, provided he do it prudently, and press him not too much, for fear of making him lye; and if it fall out, that being examined, he lye and deny this sin which the Confessor knows evidently, they will that he forbear not to absolve him notwithstanding his sin and his lye.

5. That he do not make things too difficult for him, and that he do not propose to him the pains and the difficulties which he foresees will happen to him in correcting himself; but that it is sufficient to entertain him with a general dis-
21060 course of the filthiness of sin. See here an advice worthy to be observed, and of utmost consequence for the comfort of Confessors unto such as are most engaged in affairs, and especially of Kings, which renders their condition much less perillous than it hath been believed to be hitherto. When a Penitent is obliged under the pain of mortal sin to something so hard, that we have cause to believe that he will not think well of it, it belongs to the prudence of a wise Confessor to omit it, and to refer his advice to some more proper time, fearing lest the Penitent being terrified thereby, withdraw himself from Confession. *HOC NOTETUR PERMAXIME, PRO CONFESSARIIS PRINCIPUM.* This is most of all to be noted for the Confessors of Princes.

6. Though a Penitent have only a general and ineffectual will to amend, and the Confessor cannot judge probably that he will refrain from relapsing quickly into his sins, he ought not to forbear to absolve him, according the Jesuits.

1 Quando Confessarius nullum sperat fructum ex admonitione, sed potius animi inquietudinem, rixas vel scandalum, dissimulare debet. *Escobar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 155. pag. 825.*

2 Cum pœnitens est in statu de se malo, ut invalidi matrimonii, si quidem de veritate hujus rei dubitet pœnitens, illum debet Confessarius aperire: quod si non profuturam speret admonitionem, vel in proprium damnum vertentem, potest & debet reticere. *Escob. ib. n. 74 p. 810.*

3 Confessarius evidentiam habet quod pœnitens peccatum commiserit, illudque non sit confessus; possit judicare quod pœnitens commissum peccatum tacuerit justa aliqua ex causa: ac proinde tuta conscientia poterit illum absolvere. *Amicus tom. 8. disp. 18. sect. 13. n. 331. p. 285.* 4 Si constet Confessori pœnitentem oblivisci alicujus peccati per se loquendo tenetur interrogare; quod si interrogatus negat, regulariter tenetur illi credere: quod si evidens sit pœnitentem mentiri, si id Confessarius scit tantum via secreta, post prudentem interrogationem tenetur judicare secundum acta & probata in illo foro. *Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 7. cap. 12. n. 360. pag 210.* 5 Ad explorandum propositum, non præponat Confessor difficultates multas in peccatis vitandis, unde pœnitens constituatur in periculo non habendi efficax propositum in futurum. *Filliut. ibid. num. 356.* Idem est dicendum quando pœnitens sub peccato mortali tenetur ad aliquid adeo difficile ut non credatur tunc æquo animo recepturus .... Poterit enim tunc prudens Confessor relinquere illum in sua bona fide quæ à peccato excusat, & monitionem in tempus opportunius differre, ne scilicet territus pœnitens à confessione se abstineat, majusque detrimentum patiatur. Hoc notetur permaximè pro Confessariis mercatorum & Principum. *Tambur. lib. 5. meth. confess. cap. 4. num. 7.* 6 Non est necesse ut Confessor sibi persuadeat aut probabiliter judicet futurum ut pœnitens à peccato abstineat; satis est quod existimet pœnitentem quando est absolvendus habere propositum illud generale quod diximus. *Filliut. ibid. num 356. pag 210.*

7. If a sinner have been a bad liver of a long time, and because he hath been bred up in and accustomed unto sin, he cannot easily withdraw from it, nor even make a true and sincere resolution to do it; but confess himself for fashion or rather of necessity than of any true sense of his sins, seeing himself in danger of death,
21070 and if he believed he could live any longer, he would never think any more of so much as either confessing or amending, the Jesuit confessing him in this estate and this disposition, shall not so much as speak to him only of a resolution to amend and live better for time to come, believing that this is not necessary for him, since there remains not time for him to live in, and that he cannot so much as promise

7 Cum Confessarius audit confessionem homicidæ in extremo positi vel ob ægritudinem, vel quia fit modo punitendus à Judice, non curabit de proposito non

to change his life, being accuſtomed and addicted unto ſin, but he ſhall content himſelf to give him abſolution after he hath heard his Confeſſion.

8. That he be careful never to ſpeak to his Penitent out of Confeſſion of what paſſed betwixt them in Confeſſion, though they were neceſſary to the Salvation of the Penitent, believing that it were better to leave him in danger of perdition.

9. That if it happen that the Confeſſor make any fault in confeſſion, as if he have not ordained reſtitution of anothers goods, whether he did it of forgetfulneſs or of fear, they believe that he may not ſpeak any more unto him of it, when he is once retired out of his preſence, without his expreſs leave. And certainly this would be a thing very harſh and inconvenient for a Confeſſor to be obliged to advertiſe the Penitent to his own ſhame, giving him to know that he was miſtaken.

10. That if he knows that the Penitent hath not told him all his ſins, or if he 21080
ſees clearly that he hath no ſorrow for them at all, and that he is incapable to receive abſolution, which nevertheleſs he hath not refuſed to give him for fear or ſhame, and that after conſidering in himſelf he apprehends his fault, they pretend that it is not lawful for him to ſpeak to him about it to endeavour reparation therein.

11. That all which may be done in theſe and other like occaſions, is to demand permiſſion of the Penitent, and to intreat him that he would be pleaſed to allow him to ſpeak one word to him concerning a certain thing which paſſed in the confeſſion he made to him; and if the Penitent declare that he is not pleaſed therewith, they forbid him to proceed farther or ſpeak any more of it.

peccandi in poſterum.....Difficile eſt enim ab hujuſmodi hominibus in peccatis enutritis verum de cæteroquin peccandi propoſitum capere.. . Cum enim non reſtet vivendum de futuro, ad quod tempus propoſitum ordinatur? Nulla eſt neceſſitas quæ conſcientiam premat ad talem effectum promendum. Ita docet *Suarez tom* 4 *diſp*.4. *ſect* 3. *n*. 5. Ceſſat quidem his..... qui quidem ſi ſcirent duraturam viram, nec conſiterentur, nec mores mutarent.

8 & 9 Confeſſarius commiſit defectum in confeſſione, quia vel pœnitentem ad reſtitutionem non obligavit: poteſtne cum ipſo loqui de ſupradicto defectu? Minimè ſine expreſſa ipſius licentia. *Eſcobar tr*. 7. *exam*. 4. *num*. 194. *pag*. 850. Grave cenſetur incommodum cum meo rubore, & offendendo me erraſſe monere pœnitentem. *Tamburin*. *lib*. 3. *method confeſſ*. *cap*. 8. *ſect*. 2. *num*. 2. 10 Quid agendum Confeſſori cum defectum aliquem commiſit in confeſſione contra ejus ſubſtantiam, cum pœnitens, v. c. non eſt rectè diſpoſitus quoad dolorem aut integritatem, & id à Confeſſario cognoſcitur, ſed ob verecundiam aut timorem non eſt auſus negare abſolutionem? Satis eſt Confeſſori dolere de peccato commiſſo, & relinquere pœnitentem in bona fide, quia per ſubſequentes confeſſiones juſtificabitur: quod ſi defectus fuit ex parte pœnitentis; & conſequenter ſit in mala fide, cogitare poterit eum per alias confeſſiones quod bono faciet, juſtificatum iri: Item tunc pœnitentem excuſatum fuiſſe ab integritate ob infamiam vitandam aut ſcandalum. *Filliut*. *tom*. 1. *mor*. *qq*. *tr*.7. *cap*.12. *num*. 369. *pag*. 211. 11 Quod ſi pœnitens extra confeſſionem à Confeſſario rogatus ut licentiam ſibi concedat ut ei defectum in confeſſione commiſſum aperiat, & ille nolit licentiam concedere; an poſſit tunc Confeſſarius illi defectum aperire? Negat Diana, tr. 4. de Sacr. reſol. 87. & alii apud ipſum, & ſane probabilius, cum in nullo caſu abſque expreſſa licentia pœnitentis liceat de peccatis in confeſſione auditis extra confeſſionem non ſolum cum aliis, ſed etiam cum ipſo pœnitente loqui. *Amicus tom*. 8. *diſp*. 14. *ſect*. 4. *num*. 29. & 30. *pag* 239.

## III. POINT. 21090

### *Of the inward Diſpoſition of the Penitent, and of ſorrow for ſin according to the Jeſuits.*

AS it is neceſſary that the Confeſſor know as much as lyes in him the inward diſpoſition of his Penitent, and the regret which he hath for his ſins, that he may give him abſolution, he muſt alſo learn of the Jeſuits:

1. That the leaſt grief is a ſufficient diſpoſition to this Sacrament.

2. That it matters not whether it be natural or ſupernatural, true or apparent only, and provided the Penitent perſwade him ſelf that it is as it ſhould be, it ſuffiseth.

1 Minima gratia eſt ſufficiens ad remiſſionem omnium peccatorum; & ad minimam gratiam ſufficit minima contritio tanquam diſpoſitio. Ergo, &c. *Filliut*. *tom*. 1. *mor*. *qq*. *tr*. 6. *cap*. 9. *num*. 234. 2 Quæres 7 an hic dolor debeat eſſe verus & realis, an vero ſufficiat exiſtimatus? Probabile eſt dolorem exiſtimatum ſufficere. *Filliut*. *trakt*.7. *de confeſſ*. *cap* 6. *num*. 151. *pag*. 185. Num neceſſarius ſit dolor ſupernaturalis? Sufficit naturalis, qui tamen ſupernaturalis exiſtimetur. *Eſcob*. *tr*. 7. *exam*. 4. *num*. 39. *pag*. 805.

3. That if any Penitent be much addicted to ſome crime; that he preſs him not to exert ſome act of ſorrow for this ſin in particular. For it is to be feared that he will not deteſt it ſincerely when it is repreſented ſingle and alone; whereas he will find little or no difficulty to deteſt it in general and with others.

3 Unde quando advertis pœnitentem tuum valde alicui criminis addictum, ne inculces doloris actum circa illud peculiare peccatum. Periculum enim ſuberit ne illud ex animo deteſtetur, dum ejus ſpecialis memoria refricatur, quod in univerſum & ſimul cum aliis deteſtandi difficultatem vel nullam ſentiet, vel exiguam. *Tamb. lib. 1. meth. confeſſ. cap. 1. ſect. 2. num. 5.*

4 That if the Confeſſor can find in his Penitent no mark of ſorrow, he may demand of him only if he be ſorry that he hath offended God; and if he anſwers that he is, he ought to believe him, and give him abſolution upon his word.

1100 5. That though the Penitent himſelf tell him that he feels no ſorrow in himſelf, and that he cannot have any, he ought to encourage him, and to quiet his mind, to tell him that it is enough that he deſires to have this ſorrow, and that he is grieved that he cannot grieve: and after this give him abſolution. That if it be his fault that he ſorrows not for ſin, and that he hath not ſo much as a deſire for it, he ought not be apprehenſive for that neither, the Sacrament will always have its effect, and if not preſently, yet in proceſs of time when the Penitent ſhall remove this impediment, and endeavour himſelf to produce ſorrow for his ſins.

4 Quando Confeſſarius non habet ſigna ſufficientia doloris, debet interrogare, an ex animo deteſtetur; & ſi affirmat, poteſt & debet credere. *Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 7. cap. 12. n. 353 pag 410.* 5 Sufficiens cum Sacramento dolor eſt dolere quod non ſatis doleas. *Sa verb. contritio pag 118.* To repoſe a Soul in peace which apprehends that he hath not that contrition which is neceſſary to the expiation of his ſins in the Sacrament, he muſt be told that it may be ſupplyed by the will he hath to have it, or the regret he hath for not poſſeſſing ſuch as he deſires, which might perfectly ſatisfie God. *Bauny in hk Sum. Chap 42. pag. 685.* Aſſerendum omnino eſt Sacramentum pœnitentiæ informe cauſare tempore ſequenti ſuum effectum ſi tollatur indiſpoſitio quæ cauſa fuit ut in principio eſt ſtus non ſequeretur. *Diaſtill. tr. 8. de panit. d. 6. d. 6. n. 115.*

## IV. POINT.

### *Rules for impoſing Penance or Satisfaction according to the Jeſuits.*

1. THey declare unto the Confeſſor that the Penitent may refuſe the penance he ordains for him, and therefore that he ought not be ſevere, but ſweet and obſequious, by impoſing on him one which is ſweet and ſlight.

1 Si irrationabiliter gravis pœnitentia fuit, non tenetur implere, quia nec Confeſſarius ligare eum potuit, nec pœnitens ſeſe intendit illigari. *Eſcob. tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 191. pag. 289.*

1110 2. That if he abſolutely refuſe penance, ſaying, that he will ſuffer the pains of Purgatory, he may abſolve him; that he omit not for all that to impoſe upon him ſome ſlight thing by way of penance to preſerve the integrity of the Sacrament.

3. That to avoid the difficulties and conteſtations he may have with his Penitent, he may appoint him for penance ſome ſlight thing which he is already obliged to do.

4. That he may alſo content himſelf to ordain for ſatisfaction what good or evil he doth or ſuffers on the week or day of his confeſſion.

5. That it ſufficeth to ſay to him in general, that he do ſomething for ſatisfaction for his ſins, and leave him in liberty to do what he pleaſeth, without ordering him any thing by commandment, but only by counſel.

2 Quod ſi affirmet ſe velle Purgatorii pœnas ſubire, levem adhuc pœnitentiam imponat ad Sacramenti integritatem, cum præſertim agnoſcat gravem non acceptaturum. *Ibid.* He that refuſeth at the Sacrament to receive any penance at all, the very ſlighteſt that may be impoſed upon him for his faults, is not in an eſtate to be abſolved: but he that is of the contrary opinion, may give it him, becauſe all may attend to ſatisfie for their ſins in the other life. They are not then obliged to prevent that time as they ſhould be, if to avoid ſin they were obliged to accept of what their Confeſſor hath ordained for ſatisfaction for one part of their faults. *Bauny in hk Sum; Chap. 46. pag. 708. & 709.* 3. Docet Suarius opus alioqui præceptum poſſe aliquando in pœnitentiam injungi. *Eſcob. tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 180. pag. 828.* 4. Impono tibi pro pœnitentia quidquid hodie vel hac hebdomada boni feceris vel mali paſſus fueris. *Ibid. n. 181.* 5. An poſſit Confeſſarius pœnitentiam omnino libere faciendam arbitrio pœnitentis imponere? Ex Suarii ſententia affirmo non ſemper requiri ut aliquod opus in particulari imponatur. Sufficienter eſſe Sacramentalem ſatisfactionem ſi per modum conſilii imponat, docet Suarius. *Ibid. n. 180. & 181.*

6. Decimo quæro de præcepto ſatisfaciendi pro pœna temporali, an tale præceptum detur? Dico 1. non videri datum eſſe tale præceptum de ſatisfaciendo in hac vita pro pœna temporali. *Filliut. tom. 2. mor. qq. tract. 6. cap. 8. num. 213. pag. 214.*

6. That if he have any ſcruple by reaſon of this ſo great condeſcenſion, and 21120
have apprehenſions that he ought not to uſe it, he muſt learn for quieting his conſcience that there is no precept divine or natural which obliges to do penance in this life for the ſins which we have confeſſed.

## V. POINT.

### *Rules of the ſame Jeſuits for giving Abſolution.*

1. Quando Confeſſarius non habet ſigna ſufficientia doloris, debet interrogare an ex animo deteſtetur; & ſi affirmet, poteſt & debet credere. *Filliut. tom. 2. qq. mor. tr. 7. cap. 12. num. 355. pag. 210.*

1. WHen the Confeſſor ſees no true marks of repentance in the Penitent, and believes he is not diſpoſed to receive abſolution, the Jeſuits aſſure us that it is ſufficient to ſtir him up to ſay, that he is ſorry for his ſins, and that after that word he ought to be abſolved.

2. That though he hath frequently promiſed amendment without any effect; yet if he promiſe again to do it as formerly, he muſt be abſolved.

3. That if he relapſe again, and add alſo new faults to his firſt, breaking out unto the greateſt exceſs and liberty, ſo that he hath leſs hopes of his converſion than at the beginning; yet if he promiſe barely to amend, abſolution ought not be refuſed him.

2. Abſolvi poteſt modo proponat firmiter non peccare, etiamſi aliquoties ſit relapſus. *Emanuel Sa verbo abſolutio n. 11. pag. 5.*

4. When the Confeſſor knows that the promiſes of the Penitent are fraudulent 21130
and hypocritical, and come only from his teeth outwards, he may nevertheleſs abſolve him ſo often as he repeats unto him the ſame promiſes.

5. That if it happen that after ſo many faults and relapſes the Penitent acknowledging his own weakneſs and the ſmall diſpoſition he hath to be truly converted, do freely acknowledge to his Confeſſor that he believes that he hath not the power to refrain from relapſing, or to perform what he promiſes, this ought not to hinder the Confeſſor from giving him abſolution, if he demand it.

6. That if he be engaged in occaſions of ſin, which are the cauſes of his relapſes, and his Confeſſor repreſent unto him the danger hereof, and induce him to withdraw himſelf from them: but he will not part from them, and he hath ſome reaſon to abide in thoſe occaſions themſelves, he ſhall not forbear to abſolve him.

3. Si nonobſtant tout ce qu'ils auroient dit & promis pour le paſſé au Confeſſeur, ils n'auroient laiſſé de ſe porter avec excés & liberté plus grande dans les mêmes fautes que devant: on les doit recevoir au Sacrement? C'eſt la queſtion que *Bauny* propoſe en ſa *Somme, chap. 46. pag. 717.* Et aprés avoir dit qu'il y en a qui tiennent qu'il faudroit differer l'abſolution à ces perſonnes, il ajoûte. Qui ſeroit le contraire, pecheroit-il? Ce n'eſt pas mon opinion. 4. Bauny dit encore au même lieu que le penitent, *vero propoſito affectu*, qui ſe reſout aux pieds du Preſtre de mettre fin à ſes pechez paſſez, *dignus eſt abſolutione, toties quoties*, merite d'en recevoir pardon, *quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio*, bien qu'il ne s'amende, & bien ſouvent qu'il eſt à preſumer telles reſolutions ne paſſer pas le bout des levres. 5. Abſolvi poteſt qui proponit abſtinere à peccato, etiamſi credat ſe propoſito non ſtaturum. *Sa verbo abſolutio num. 11. pag. 5.* 6. Abſolvi poteſt qui ex juſta & rationabili cauſa non vult omittere peccandi occaſionem, modo proponat firmiter non peccare, etiamſi aliquoties ſit relapſus. *Sa verbo abſol. n. 11. p. 5.*

7. That he ought not to make any difficulty to abſolve them that know not the Faith nor things neceſſary for their Salvation.

7. Et quidem in paxi exiſtimo nunquam aut rariſſime denegandam abſolutionem, ob doctrinæ Chriſtianæ ignorantiam. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 2. cap. 3. num. 21. pag. 92.*

## VI. POINT.

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21140

### *The Jeſuits Advice to Penitents to make the yoke of Confeſſion ſweet and eaſie.*

IT is eaſie to obſerve many very favourable advices for ſinners amongſt thoſe which we have but now diſcovered the Jeſuits to have given unto Confeſſors. But to take from them all the pain and apprehenſion which they may have of confeſſing their ſins, they declare in expreſs terms:

1. That if they have any diſtruſt of their Confeſſor, or fear that after they have diſcovered their conſcience, he ſhould uſe them ill, would look on them with a bad eye, would deprive them of ſome good which he hath been accuſtomed to do them, they may hide from him one part of their ſins.

2. That if a ſinner fears that in confeſſing ſome ſin, he ſhall draw on himſelf or on ſome of his friends ſome evil at preſent or in time to come, they diſcharge him of the obligation of confeſſing it.

21150 3. When the Penitent ſignifies that he will make a general Confeſſion, if he apprehends that the Confeſſor would have an evil opinion of him, if he ſhould repreſent his whole life unto him, they pretend that he may tell him only one part of his ſins, and hide from him the other, and even lye if he examine him of thoſe which he is not willing to diſcover unto him.

4. That if he fall into any great fault which he is aſhamed to accuſe himſelf, for fear of diminiſhing the good opinion which the Confeſſor hath of him, he may by the advice of theſe Doctors ſignifie to him that he will make a general Confeſſion; and ſo mingle this laſt ſin whereof he is in trouble with thoſe of his life paſt, as if he had committed it a long time before.

5 They ſay alſo, that we may make a general Confeſſion eaſily enough by ſaying one part of our ſins to one Prieſt, and another to another, and ſuppreſſing a third part, provided they have been already confeſſed.

1. None is obliged to tell that which probably the Confeſſor will reveal unto others, or which will occaſion him to uſe him ill, hate him, be offended with him, remove him from his haunt, or deprive him of ſome commodity which he receives thereby. *Bauny in his ſum Ch. 40. pag 635.*

2. If the Penitent can with reaſon apprehend that by telling all unto his Confeſſor without concealing any thing, his friends and he

may one day thereby be concerned in their goods, bodies, or honour, and believe that in this caſe it will be lawful for him to ſuppreſs and silence the offences, which known unto the Confeſſor, would cauſe unto the ſaid Penitent the effects which he imagines would follow upon the confeſſion of it. *Bauny in the ſame place.* 3. An confeſſio generalis integritatem requirat? Quoad peccata aliàs confeſſa non requirit. Dicit quis Confeſſario ſe velle cum illo confeſſionem generalem gerere: non ideo tamen tenetur omnia mortalia exprimere. Quia quamvis mentiatur, tamen parum refert ad Confeſſarii judicium, cum ad ejus forum non pertineat. *Eſcobar tract. 7. exam. 4. num. 107. pag. 816.*

Addo facientem confeſſionem generalem, & nolentem manifeſtare ſe aliquod peccatum ab ultima confeſſione commiſiſſe, poſſe illud per alia peccata prius confeſſa aperire. *Ibid. num. 136. pag. 821.* 4. Rubere quis afficitur de aliquo crimine, poteſt generalem confeſſionem facere, & illud peccatum ſimul confiteri, non exprimendo an aliàs confeſſum ſit: quia id parum variat Confeſſarii judicium. *Eſcobar in proam. exam. 2. n. 75. pag. 19.* 5. Confitens generaliter de peccatis aliàs confeſſis & abſolutis, poteſt per partes abſolvi, ſcilicet nunc de parte peccatorum quæ dixit, poſtea de alia parte cum dixerit; & partem uni, partem alteri explicare, & partem omittere. *Sa verbo abſolut. n. 2. p. 10.*

21160 6. Beyond all this they have found out an expedient for ſpiritual perſons and Votaries, who would preſerve their reputation with their ordinary Confeſſor, which is to have a ſecond Confeſſor, of whom the firſt knows nothing, on whom to diſcharge themſelves of their groſs ſins which they would be aſhamed to diſcover to their Ordinary. *Eſcobar* ſaith not only that we may take this expedient, but he even praiſes alſo thoſe who make uſe of it, and reproves thoſe Confeſſors who think it not good that their Penitents ſhould ſometimes go to confeſs themſelves to others then they. He places this amongſt the opinions which are out of controverſie, and in his Problems he holds that it is no ſin to do this many times.

6. Duos quis adit Confeſſarios, quorum alteri mortalia, alteri venialia confiteturus ut bonam famam apud ordinarium tueatur, rogo num delinquat? Cum Suario aſſero, non delinquere; quia eſt confeſſio integra, nec eſt vera hypocriſis neque mendacium. *Eſcobar tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 135. pag. 821. Filliut. ſaith the ſame thing, tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 7. c. 4. n. 75. p. 175.* Habere ordinarie duos Confeſſarios, alterum cui gravia dicas, alterum cui levia, ut probus habearis, quidam dicunt eſſe peccatum mortale ob illuſum Confeſſorem: ſecus verò eſſe, ſi ſemel & iterum fiat ob pudorem & verecundiam. *Sa verbo confeſſor n. 16. pag. 105.*

7. There

And immediately after he cites some Casuists who say: Id peccatum mortale esse, cum hoc tit in finem mortiferum; & bonum esse si bonus sit finis; unde leviora, alteri graviora explicare ad retinendam existimationem. Qui Confessario ordinario levia solum peccata manifestat, prius alii Confessario gravia exponens, confessionis non læsit integritatem. Ex. gr. fœmina carnis piaculo maculata, pudore detinetur ne Confessarium ordinarium adeat; laudabiliter incognito Confessario grave peccatum rederat, ne subeundi criminis periculum subeat, graviter subtraxerim confessarios qui suos ordinarios alumnos alienam aliquando dictionem ineuntes, imprudenter quidem objurgant. *Escobar tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 4.* Nullum esse peccatum existimo vel sæpè confessarium extraneum adire. *Ibid. problem. 21.*

7. There is yet herein another very subtle expedient to hide sins in confession, which hath some reference to the former, which is, that as you may hide them by parting your confessions to many Confessors, so you may also hide a sin by parting it into two. See here the case: *He that hath sworn chastity or poverty,* saith Escobar, *may satisfie the precept of Confession, by saying apart that he hath committed fornication or theft, and then adding that he hath twice violated his oath in things of importance.* For unless the Confessor suspects that he intends to deceive him, he will not understand by this that he hath violated the vow of Chastity. 21170

8. If this be not enough, you are permitted to tell as many lyes as you need to deliver you from the shame which confession of sins might procure unto you. *Escobar* avouches that it is a probable opinion that it doth not offend against the integrity of Confession, if one having committed a mortal sin immediately after he hath made his Confession, whereupon he hath not yet received absolution, he say that he hath some other time committed this sin, and hath been absolved thereof. H adds at length, that this opinion about which he is in suspense, will become more probable, if we content our selves to say the Penitent may speak in this manner: *It is many years ago that I committed this sin, but I have not confessed it, because I forgot it innocently.*

9. For venial sins, they hold that we are not only not obliged to confess them: but that being examined by a Confessor we may lye, and say that we have not committed those which we have indeed, and that the fault which may be in this lye can be but slight. They say the same of mortal sins which we have confessed already; so that if the Confessor examine us, we may lye, and say that we never committed them, without sinning but slightly. 21180

10. That when different opinions arise about any thing which appertains to Confession, as concerning restitution, the disposition necessary for receiving absolution, the obligation to quit the occasions of sin, and other such like, the Penitent may chuse that which is most large and more favourable to his corrupt interests, though it be less probable and less safe, and that he may oblige the Confessor to follow this opinion which he chuses, or at least to leave him to his liberty to follow and act according to this very opinion, though the Confessor be of a contrary opinion, and believe that which the sinner demands to be dangerous and unlawful.

7. Videtur eum qui juravit aut vovit castitatem aut pauperatem præcepto posse sati facere confessionis, si separatim aperiat fornicationem & furtum, addatque se bis juramentum in re gravi violasse. *Escobar lib. 4. Theol. mor. sect. 2. problem. 1. tom. 1.* 8 Commisit quis mortale piaculum non longè à confessionis hodiernæ tempore à quo absolutus non est: ac ut minuat pudoris instantiam, dicit dum confitetur peccatum illud quondam fuisse commissum etiam confessum: hæc simulatio confessionis integritati obest & non obest. Integritati confessionis non obest, &c. Primam sententiam sine scrupulo admitterem, ac probabiliorem pænè esse judicarem, si pœnitens solam temporis simulationem gereret, satus multis abhinc annis hæc aut hæc peccata commisi, quæ quidem ex oblivione inculpabili falsus non sum.

9. Mentiri in confessione de peccatis venialibus, aut de aliis confessis mortalibus, veniale solum peccatum esse, tamen ante illa propositum apud se confiteri *Sa verbo confessio n* 12. *pag* 88. In confessione mentiri de peccato veniali non licet. *Escobar tr. 7. ex. 4 n. 107. pag.* 816. 10. Si pœnitens uni probabili sententiæ adhæreat, Confessarius vero contrariam probabiliorem existimet, quid? Pœnitentis sententiam probabili probabiliori relicta se debet Confessarius conformare. *Escobar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 7. p.* 810. Si pœnitens in praxi bona fide sententiam sequatur quæ à quibusdam Doctoribus tanquam probabilis ac tuta defenditur; confessarius vero seu ordinarius, seu delegatus eandem speculativè improbabilem censeat, non obstante sua persuasione tenetur absolutionem conferre. *Layman lib. 1. tr. 1. cap. 5. sect. 2. n* 10. *pag.* 7. Ex dictis deducitur Confessarium semper posse & debere contra propriam opinionem pœnitentem absolvere, quando ille probabili opinione ductus putat aliquid sibi licitum esse quod Confessarius juxta suam opinionem putat illicitum. *Amicus tom. 3. disp. 15. sect. 4. num. 90. pag.* 212.

11. Imperfectiones, quales est divinis inspirationibus non correspondere, queis excitabantur ad ni- 11. That it is not needful to confess that we have not conformed our selves to those divine inspirations, by which we have been excited to flye the too great care of bodily commodities, promotions unto dignities, &c. That these things are no matter of penance, because they are not sins: That the Penitent is not to be permitted even to accuse himself for not being sufficiently examined, nor for not having had so strong grief for his sins as he might have had, nor for not 21190

loving God ſo ſtrongly as he might have done, becauſe theſe things and ſuch like are no ſins. This is the Doctrine of *Tannerus* reported by *Eſcobar* in his Problems, and by conſequence put in the rank of probable opinions, which ſerves not only to abridge Confeſſions, but to take away many ſcruples, by permitting us to have as much care as we pleaſe of our bodies; and if God would turn us from it by his grace, to reſiſt it without fear of offending him.

miam circa corporalia commoda ſolicitudinem fugiendam, ad fugiendas dignitatum promotiones &c. non ſunt Sacramenti pœnitentiæ materia, quia peccata non ſunt.

See here one part of the Jeſuits Rules about the Sacrament of Penance, and the Duty of Penitents and Confeſſors, by which it is eaſie to judge whether ſinners by following them may become great Saints, and Confeſſors Martyrs, and whether the one or the other will work any great miracles.

21200 Certainly if theſe Rules ſo looſe and ſoft be followed, it is no matter of wonder to ſee at this day ſuch throngs of people crowding ſo frequently to Confeſſion, we ſhould rather wonder there are ſo many Prieſts who will undertake the Office of Confeſſors. It is true that if the condition of ſuch become contemptible and ſervile by a conduct as ſo baſe and ſo diſhonourable as that which the Jeſuits have preſcribed them, their duty alſo, as well as that of the Penitents, is in amends become ſo eaſie, that following the Maxims of theſe new Doctors, there needs nothing elſe but to know, to ſpeak, to confeſs well, and to have good hearing and a clear apprehenſion to perform worthily the Office of a Confeſſor.

Sic Tannerus l. 2. d. 4. q. 1. d. 4. n. 70. Sanctus in lect. d. 1. n. 4. & d. 6. n. 4. & d. 7. n. 4. & 11. aſſerens quidem haud permittendum eſſe pœnitentem ſe accuſare quod examen ſufficiens non præmiſerit, quod intente non doleat de peccatis prout poſſet, quod Deum non dilexerit tota quâ valet intentione; quia cum hæc & ſimilis peccata non ſint, non debent in confeſſione exponi. *Eſcobar tom.* 2. *lib.* 140. *problem.* 5.

## CHAPTER III. *Of Prayer.*

***That the Jeſuits deſtroy Prayer, in teaching that the Laity and the Eccleſiaſticks themſelves may ſatisfie their obligation to Prayer by praying without attention, without reverence, and even with voluntary diſtraction, and diverting themſelves with all ſorts of wicked thoughts.***

MEn fall into ſin by being induced thereto by temptation, temptation cannot be ſurmounted but by the aid of God, the means to obtain his help is Prayer; ſo that if the life of man, according to the Scripture, be nothing but a continual combat againſt temptations, it follows that it ought alſo be a continual prayer to obtain neceſſary help and ſtrength for the combat. This obligation is natural, becauſe it is founded on the infirmity of nature, and the Son of God hath made thereof an Evangelical Precept: (1) *That we ought always to pray, and never to ceaſe*; which he ſaith, not only by way of counſel, but by way of *precept which obligeth of neceſſity*, as is obſerved by the Catechiſm of the Council of *Trent*. But Father *Tambourin* tells us, (2) *That it is in the precept of prayer as in that of faith, hope, and charity, that there is no certain time wherein this precept obligeth directly, but that there is ſome wherein it obligeth indirectly, to wit, when it is neceſſary to acquire ſome good, or to remove ſome evil, which we obſerve that we cannot acquire or avoid without the help of God: that thence it follows, that he who prays not to God in a temptation againſt chaſtity, ſins only againſt chaſtity, becauſe he ſins not in omitting prayer, but becauſe of the danger he is in to violate chaſtity,*

11210

1 Oportet ſemper orare & nunquam deficere. *Luc.* 18. 1. *Catechiſmus Conc. Trid. de neceſſitate orationis.*

2 Quandonam obligat naturale præceptum orandi vel adorandi? Ego hic ſentio quod ſupr. *cap.* 151. *num.* 8. de præcepto fidei, ſpei & charitatis, non dari ſcilicet certum tempus & determinatum in quo directè obligat; ſed eſſe illud in quo obligat indirectè neceſſitas boni acquirendi, aut mali avertendi, quæ acquirere aut avertere ſine Dei auxilio nos non poſſe tunc animadvertimus. Sequitur omittentem tempore tentationis orare, non peccare, niſi contra caſtitatem, quia ſolum ex periculo violandi caſtitatem culpabilis eſt talis orationis omiſſio. Leſſius lib. 2. Tametſi ſentiremus hoc præceptum obligare, non eſt nobis in eo explicando diu immorandum, cum illud facilè ab omnibus impleatur. Quis enim tam perditus eſt, ut aliquando Pater & Ave non recitet? *Tamb. lib* 2. *decal. cap.* 4. *ſect.* 2. *num.* 5.

He thinks not that we are at any time directly obliged to pray unto God any more then to love him, to believe on him, to hope in him; but indirectly by adventure, and as it were by accident. That is to say, that according to him, God hath not commanded us Prayer, Faith, Hope, and Charity for their own 21220
sakes, but only to help us in the exercise of some other vertue, or to surmount some temptation, when they are absolutely necessary thereunto: as a good Physitian appoints not purging, bleeding, and other remedies for themselves; but only when they are necessary against the diseases and incommodities which we cannot be freed from but by their assistance.

So that Faith, Hope, Charity, and Prayer according to this Divinity, have no more part in the conduct of a Christian life, than purgation and blood-letting in the conservation of the natural life and health; and that as a Physitian who hath prescribed a Purge, obligeth not the Patient to love it, nor to take it for its own sake, but simply to take it for the need he hath of it; in the same manner God commanding Prayer, Faith, Hope, and Charity, obligeth not Christians to love these vertues, and to exercise them for their own sakes, but only for necessity sake, and as it were by force upon such occasions in which they cannot dispense with them, without putting themselves in danger of losing life and Salvation, by sinning against other vertues. And as a man of a strong complexion who is not subject to be sick, though he be subject to some slight infirmities, may pass over his whole life without purgation or phlebotomy; so a Christian who is of a good and moderate natural disposition, and hath no violent passions, and is not subject to strong temptations, may pass his whole life without ever being obliged to pray unto God, to love him, to believe on him, nor hope in him; and yet he shall 21230
not for all that cease to be a good Christian, according to this new Divinity, nor to live well, nor to go to Heaven, and to deserve it by a good life.

The Prophet saith, that the just man lives by Faith: S. *Paul*, that we are saved through Hope; and S. *John*, that he who loves not abides in death; and that to obtain and preserve life and Salvation, we ought to pray without ceasing. And the Jesuits maintain on the contrary, that we may live justly, avoid death, and obtain Salvation without loving God, believing or hoping in him, and without ever or rarely praying to him in all our life tim:

It suffices to relate these excesses barely which are unheard of in the Church, and as it were Monsters of errour and impiety, and neither Comparisons nor Expressions can be found capable to represent them, neither can we call them otherwise than the universal overthrow of the whole Christian Religion, since they destroy Prayer, Faith, Hope, and Charity, which are its foundations, support, and perfection.

There is nothing which the simple light of Nature doth better make known unto all men, than the attention they ought to have to whatsoever they say, especially when they treat of important affairs, and with persons eminent in dignity and merit: but they redouble their respect and their attention when they beg any singular grace or favour from them, and there is no prudent man who would not condemn him of extravagance and folly, who should therein speak in any other manner, and who would not judge that he merited not only to be refused, but also to be punished for his rashness and insolence.

In the mean time the Jesuits hold that this carriage which appears so unsup- 21240
portable towards men, is good enough and sufficient towards God, and that the prayers which he ordains to be made unto him may be without affection, reverence, attention, and even with voluntary thoughts the most criminal that can be. Which is yet so much the more strange, because men may be deceived and not know the secret wandrings and irreverences of those who speak unto them: but all is visible to God, and he sees better the most secret dispositions of hearts, than we see the outward motions of bodies and faces. So that the insolencies which are committed inwardly before him, are no less known unto him, and are no less criminal, than those which are externally committed before men. Which yet hinders not the Jesuits to hold, that prayers made without sense of piety, without inward reverence, and attention, and even with a wandring spirit, voluntarily

luntarily diſtracted, and wholly repleniſhed with impure and prophane thoughts, ſufficeth to fulfil the obligation unto prayer.

*Filliutius* demands, if (1) *to accompliſh the Law which commands us to pray unto God, it be neceſſary to have attention, and what kind of attention this ought to be?* Before he anſwers, he advertiſes the Reader, (2) *That he intends to ſpeak only of Canonical hours, which are recited upon obligation, and not of prayers which are made by private devotion. For in that caſe we are no more obliged to attend to what we ſay, than to any other ſort of vocal prayers, and this obligation goes not farther than to venial ſin.* That is to ſay, that whatſoever diſtraction we may have in the prayers which we make upon devotion, and not by particular Commandment, it can be no more than a venial ſin; and for thoſe which are rehearſed upon obligation, as are thoſe which Beneficiaries and Religious perſons ſay in reciting their office, this Author ſaith, that there are two opinions, the firſt which holds, (3) *That none is obliged upon pain of mortal ſin to an inward attention in ſaying his office, provided he rehearſe it outwardly and entirely.* And though he follows not this opinion abſolutely, yet he paſſes it for probable, adding thereto in the proceſs for his firſt Anſwer, (4) *That according to his judgment this firſt opinion is probable.* But if it be probable, then we muſt conclude, according to the Jeſuits, that it may be followed with a good conſcience, and it will become alſo more probable by the approbation which this Author beſtows on it.

*Eſcobar* expounds himſelf yet more upon this point. (5) *I know well*, ſaith he, *that it is only a venial ſin through negligence to ſuffer ones ſelf to fall into diſtractions during the office. Now it is demanded, whether it be a greater ſin to indulge ones ſelf therein voluntarily, and whether he be obliged to ſay the office over again.* His Anſwer is, (6) *That according to* Azors *opinion, which is alſo his own, it is a mortal ſin when it is done through contempt; but the command of the Church is nevertheleſs thereby fulfilled, and we are not obliged to repeat the office, as hath been ſaid above.* So that whatever diſtraction there be in rehearſing the divine office, though it be voluntary, if it come of negligence and not of contempt, it is but a venial ſin; and when it proceeds from a deliberate will and formal contempt, though it be a mortal ſin, we fail not of ſatisfying the Church, and diſcharging our duty; that is to ſay, that the Church may be contented by deſpiſing it, and God ſatisfied by mortally offending him.

*Coninck* ſaith in a manner the ſame thing, ſpeaking of the Maſs and the manner it ought to be heard. (7) *If there be no ſcandal nor contempt*, ſaith he, *diſtraction is not of it ſelf a mortal ſin, though it appear outwardly.* And a little after he diſcovers the principle of this concluſion, ſaying, (8) *That to ſatisfie the Commandment of the Church it is not neceſſary to have any inward devotion.* Whence he draws this other concluſion more expreſs than the former: (9) *Hence it follows that he who is even voluntarily diſtracted during the whole time of the Maſs, ſatisfies the Precept of the Church, provided he have ſuch preſence of mind as ſufficeth him to aſſiſt at the Maſs with ſome outward reſpect, as he ought.*

1 Quæro an & quæ attentio ſit neceſſaria ad præceptum?

2 Pro reſponſione ſio tandum agere nos de horis canonicis, quando recitantur ex obligatione, non autem de privata devotione. Tunc enim non eſt major obligatio attendendi quàm in quacunque oratione vocali, & ad ſummum obligat ſub veniali. *Filliut. mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 23. cap. 8. n. 252. pag. 126.*

3 Prima neminem teneri ſub mortali ad attentionem internam, modo integrè recitet externè. *Ibid.*

4 Reſpondeo & dico 1. primam ſententiam probabilem eſſe. *Ibid.*

5 Scio vagari mente ex negligentia in officio, veniale ſolum peccatum eſſe. Rogo an ſi ex propoſito id fiat, graviter delinquam, & ad repetendum officium tenear? *Eſcobar tractat. 5. exam. 6. num. 157. pag. 679.*

6 Azorium ſecutus aſſero peccare ex contemptu mortaliter; ſatisfacere tamen Eccleſiæ præcipienti, nec teneri iterum recitare, ut diximus ſupra.

7 Si abſit ſcandalum aut contemptus, diſtractio ex hac parte non eſt peccatum mortale, etiamſi exterius appareat. *Coninck 3. parte q. 83. art. 6. n. 247. pag. 186.*

8 Non eſt neceſſarium ut quis ſatisfaciat præcepto Eccleſiæ, ut habeat internam aliquam devotionem. *Ibid. n. 301.*

9. Hinc ſequitur eum qui etiam voluntarie eſt toto tempore Sacri diſtractus, modo ſufficienter ſibi præſens ſit, ut Sacro cum externa reverentia debitè aſſiſtat, ſatisfacere præcepto Eccleſiæ. *Ibid. num. 302.*

And becauſe he perceived that it might be replyed againſt him, that there was no apparent ground to believe that we might ſatisfie the Church by offending God, or that inſtead of a religious action which it commands when it ordains Maſs to be heard, or the divine office to be recited, it would accept of a crime, and that alſo ſuch a crime as is an irreverence and kind of contempt of Religion, he prevents this objection, and ſaith, (10) *That though the exterior act without the interior be not a true action of vertue, and may have reference unto ſome wicked end,*

10 Nec refert quod actus externus ſine interno non poteſt habere rationem veræ virtutis cum poſſit fieri ob malum finem; quia poſſumus præceptis Eccleſiæ ſatisfacere per actum qui non ſit vera virtus, imo qui ſit peccatum. *Ibid.*

*end, this matters not; because the Commandments of the Church may be satisfied by an action which is no act of true vertue, but which is in it self a sin.*

But if this Answer content not, and it augment the difficulty instead of resolving it, he adds, not to clear up this difficulty, but to shew how firm and setled he is in this opinion, (1) *That the outward act of prayer, which is done with the outward circumstances which it ought to have, is a true exterious action of the vertue of Religion*, though it be done with voluntary distraction, and which is it self a sin, *imo qui sit peccatum.*

1 Respondeo actum externum orationis quoad externas circumstantias debitè factum, esse verè actum externum virtutis religionis. *Ibid.*

According to this Maxime, if *Herod* had secretly killed Jesus Christ whilst he adored him, as he contrived his design when he learnt of the Wise-men that he was born, and if he had observed all the Forms and all the outward Ceremonies of adoration, at the same time giving only some signal unto his people to murder this Infant, as *Judas* saluting and kissing the same Jesus Christ with outward respect, and ordinary testimonies of affection which he ought him, marked him out to the Souldiers who were come to take him; this Jesuit might have said of this Tyrant killing Jesus Christ in the very act of adoration, and of *Judas* betraying him by a kiss, that which he saith of Ecclesiasticks and Christians offending God mortally in prayer; (2) *That the act of adoration and salutation, as well as that of prayer, which is done with all the outward circumstances which ought to be had, is a true outward action of Religion.* 21280

2 Respondeo actum externum adorationis, orationis, & salutationis quoad externas circumstantias debitè factum, esse verè actum externum virtutis religionis.

And because such a religious action was never heard of before, and that it is a difficult thing even so much as to conceive this sort of adoration, he expounds it by an example quite contrary. (3) *Altogether the same*, saith he, *with the outward adoration which is rendered to an idol, and as it is a true and outward act of adoration and of Idolatry, though he who makes this adoration outwardly, hath no intention to adore the Idol*; so he who prays unto God, or who adores him outwardly without intention to pray or adore; but rather on the contrary with an intention to dishonour and offend, *imo qui sit cum peccato*, doth exercise according to this Jesuit a true outward action of prayer and adoration appertaining to the vertue of Religion.

3 Sicut adoratio externa in Idolo facta, est verè actus externus idolatriæ, etsi illum exercens interius non intendat adorare Idolum. *Ibid. n.* 196. 3 *Bauny in his sum, Chap.* 13. *pag.* 176.

It might seem at first sight that this is the utmost point of disorder whereunto it were possible to fall in this matter; but Father *Bauny* descends yet lower. He demands, *if the Chanons fulfil their duty, and earn their dividends, who being assistants in the Quire during holy Service, pass their time in scandalous discourse, and in employment altogether vicious, as in laughing, scoffing, &c.* That is, in doing and saying other things which we dare not express openly, and which yet is comprehended in what he saith, *that they pass their time in an employment altogether vicious.* Though he concludes not for the affirmative, yet for all that he testifies sufficiently that it rather shame and fear of men that hinders him from declaring himself, and he makes it well appear that he is not far off from this opinion, in that he contents not himself only to report and propose it as probable, and to say, that we may follow and advise it with a safe conscience; which is truly to approve it: but he approves it yet more formally by supporting it with all the reasons he can. See here how he talks: *Because we are not assured of the intention of the Church, and that the Texts of c. 1. de Cler. non res.....of c. Licet 32. of the title de Prebend. make no mention save of their assistance in the Quire, and because the custom every where received exacts of the Chanons no other thing that they may receive their dividends, but that they be present, I esteem them without blame and reproach, who in favour of their Penitents hold this second opinion.* 21290

Here are four reasons to be observed, upon which he concludes that they are not reproachable, who maintain that the Chanons satisfie their duty as far as the Church obligeth them therein, and earn their dividends by assisting in the Quire with irreverence, and that even outward also, *by laughing, scoffing, and spending their time in employments altogether vicious.* 1. Because it is enough *that they are present.* 2. Because *the custom every where received requires no other thing of them.* 3. Because *this opinion is favourable to Penitents.* The Jews and Pagans themselves who have any knowledge of God, will perhaps be ashamed to speak 21300

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in this ſort, and to ſay that we may pray to him and ſerve him in ſo prophane and unworthy a manner.

His fourth reaſon is, *becauſe we are not aſſured*, ſaith he, *of the intention of the Church.* It is apparent that he hath taken this reaſon from *Filliutius*, who to confirm the opinion which he holds, that whatſoever voluntary diſtractions we can have in prayer, and in the divine Office, there is therein no more than venial ſin, makes uſe of this very ſame reaſon. For after he had brought for proof of this opinion, (1) *that it is ſufficiently accommodate to mens frailty, and to the difficulty of holding the ſpirit of man a long time attentive to one object*; he adds, (2) *That for this cauſe it is likely that the Church had no intention by its precept to oblige men to a thing ſo difficult, that the greateſt part of men cannot obſerve.* He would ſay that when the Church commands the faithful to pray unto God, and to the Eccleſiaſticks to recite the divine Office, and to both of them to be aſſiſtant at Maſs on Feſtival days, *we are not aſſured*, that it forbids voluntary diſtractions and wicked thoughts wherewith they voluntarily pleaſe themſelves: *we are not aſſured*, that it would that we ſhould at leaſt demean our ſelves with ſome outward reverence, or whether indeed it have not left to all a liberty to *laugh, ſcoff, and paſs their time in ſcandalous diſcourſe, and in an employment altogether vicious.*

1 Quia ſatis accommodata eſt hominum fragilitati & difficultati quam humanus intellectus experitur in attendendo diu uni rei.

2 Veriſimile eſt autem Eccleſiam noluiſſe ſuo præcepto obligare ad rem arduam, ita ut major hominum pars eam ſervare non poſſit. *Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tract. 23. c. 8. num. 253. pag. 126.*

21310 Now if theſe Jeſuits had ſaid as ſome of their Fraternity, that the Church had not power to forbid the greateſt part of theſe things, which reſpect the thoughts; though their opinion had been falſe, it had for all that been leſs criminal and leſs injurious to the Church. For to ſay, that it cannot command us to pray to God with reverence and attention, is to hurt its Authority: but to ſay, that it is not its intention, or that it would not, or only to doubt whether having power it would, and whether it deſires we ſhould bear that reverence and attention which God demands in prayer, is to violate its Holineſs, to give it an intention far diſtant from that of God, to deny that it is guided by the Spirit, and to make it accomptable for all the crimes which are committed in this kind; becauſe having power it forbids them not, as *Filliutius* and *Bauny* ſuppoſe. For otherwiſe it were in vain that they ſhould trouble themſelves to know its intention and will in a point which depends not at all on its will.

But though there were ſome one to be found who might doubt of this, or who of groſs ignorance knew not the intention of the Church in this matter, it is not lawful for Father *Bauny* to make uſe of this pretence to favour an opinion which leads unto Libertiniſm and Irreligion, and we need not ſeek more clear teſtimony to deſtroy this errour than his own, ſince he declares in Chap. 20. of his Sum, pag. 332. *That being true devotion is in the heart, and not in the carriage, or without, in the faſhion and other outward geſture, and that this pretended devotion without is but a vizor and an Idol of devotion; it is a reſolved caſe, that in the voluntary diſtraction and wandring of the mind in praying by obligation, as do Prieſts, Deacons and Subdeacons, and Beneficiaries, there is ſin; and ſo they ar obliged to repeat the* 21320 *Office which they have ſaid with ſo great indevotion. For the will of the Church is, that by this action which it commands them they ſhould praiſe and pray unto God their Creator. And do they this whilſt they have nothing leſs during their ſinging, than God before their eye? They ought then to fulfil their duty begin the Office again, and in default thereof, if they be Beneficiaries they are bound to reſtore either to the Church where their Benefice is, or to the poor the fruits they have received, according to the rate of their omiſſions, as may be collected from the Bull of* Pius V.

He purſues the ſame matter, and declares once more in the ſame place what is the intention of the Church in the Command which it give Eccleſiaſticks and Beneficiaries to recite the Office. *The Church intends not*, ſaith he, *to make the Eccleſiaſticks, Poſſeſſors of the fruits of their ſaid Benefice, if they earn it not by their labour. The diſpoſure thereof is conditional, if they perform the prayers with which they are charged, doing them to the praiſe and honour of God. And can we ſay with truth that they deſerve to be his ſervants, or put into the rank of thoſe who render him the worſhip which his Majeſty requires of them, when they have their lips only occupied in his ſervice, and not their heart, becauſe it is filled with unprofitable thoughts*

*and very remote from the greatneſs of his Majeſty to whom they ſpeak?* pag. 333.

He had already ſaid the ſame thing in Chap. 13. pag. 165. where he makes of it a concluſion, promoting it not only as his opinion, but alſo as a manifeſt and certain thing. 2. Saith he, *The ſaid Beneficiaries are obliged to make reſtitution of the fruits received from their Benefices when they ſay their hours, but imperfectly* 21330 *with voluntary diſtraction which endures throughout the whole Office or the greater part thereof.* And after he had cited many Authors who are of this opinion, he gives this reaſon for it: *Becauſe that not to recite their hours at all, or to do it indecently with out reſpect, attention and reverence, is all one before God, ſince he is equally deſpiſed and diſhonoured in both,* pag. 165.

Can we ſpeak more clearly or more abſolutely on this ſubject? *It is a reſolved caſe,* ſaith he, *that prayer which is made without attention is but a vizor and an Idol of devotion; that the Eccleſiaſticks and Beneficiaries who recite the Office with voluntary wandring and diſtraction of mind are obliged to begin it anew, and in default of doing this they are bound to reſtore the fruits received: that the will of the Church is, that by this action which it commands them they ſhould praiſe and pray unto their Creator: That the Church doth not intend to make the ſaid Eccleſiaſticks Poſſeſſors of the fruits of their ſaid Benefices, but on the condition that they pray unto God, praiſe and honour him: that they honour him not at all, but rather diſhonour and contemn him when they have only their lips occupied in his ſervice, and not their hearts, becauſe it is filled with unprofitable thoughts.*

Who would not ſay after this, that this Father is ſo perſwaded of theſe things, that he holds them almoſt for Articles of Faith, or at leaſt for indubitable truths, whereto the whole world ought to conſent? And who would believe that he could ſay at the ſame time, *That we are not aſſured of the intention of the Church upon the ſame things: that he could imagine that they were without reproach and* 21340 *blame who hold, that Beneficiaries and Chanons ſatisfie their duties, and earn their dividends, who aſſiſting in the Quire during the holy Service, paſs their time in ſcandalous diſcourſe, and in an employment altogether vicious, as in laughing, ſcoffing, &c.*

To which of the two opinions of this Jeſuit ought we to hold; or rather how ſhall we know which is his opinion, what he ſaith, and what he thinks? He ſaith all, and he ſaith nothing, becauſe he unſays and contradicts himſelf. He is of what opinion you pleaſe, and he is of none. But if mens laſt words be more conſiderable than their firſt, and if we may rely on them as their laſt reſolution, there is cauſe to believe that this Father hath related ſo clearly the judgment and intention of the Church concerning the abuſe of thoſe who pray and recite the Office without intention and without reſpect, only to overturn it, and to teſtifie the little account he makes of it, becauſe he hath confidence a little after to ſay, that we may prudently preſume that *it was not the will of the Church to oblige Prieſts, Beneficiaries, and others to the divine Office with ſo great ſeverity, that they ſin mortally, if they have not an inward attention thereunto; ſince it ſeems not in its precept for reciting the hours, to erect any other thing of the Prieſts and others who are bound thereunto, but to honour and praiſe God; which they do in ſinging Pſalms and chaunting, though with voluntary diſtraction, and in which they continue, provided that this be done, and they ſing tunably and with reverence,* pag. 534.

But the Argument he makes, and the Example he brings to eſtabliſh his Diſ- 21350 courſe, and to confirm this ſtrange Opinion, is remarkable. *For the outward action,* ſaith he, *wherewith we attend on God, is of the Dioceſs, and an appurtenance of the vertue of Religion. Wherefore as he who without intention to commit Idolatry, bends his knee before an Idol, is held for an Idolater nevertheleſs: ſo we muſt believe that they pray who recite the Office, though without intention, yet not without outward decency and compoſure, ſuch as that action requires,* pag. 335.

*Coninck* makes uſe of the ſame Reaſoning and the ſame Example in this ſame matter, as we have ſeen above, and there is cauſe to believe that Father *Bauny* hath only copied and tranſlated him: but the one and the other ought to have called to mind that it is much eaſier to do harm than good; and that what is evil in it ſelf is always evil, to what intention ſoever it be done. But to do good

it is not ſufficient to do a thing which is good in it ſelf, if it be not well done, that is, with good intention, according to this Rule: *Bona bene agenda.*

The Reaſoning which Father *Bauny* takes up at length upon this Point, is as falſe and ridiculous as his Example. *And that this is true*, ſaith he, *may be collected from this, that it imports not a little to the glory of God, that we addreſs our ſelves to him with outward reſpect, which edifies the people, and obtains his favours from Heaven, whereto prayers are uſeful, though ſaid without attention.*

We need not ſeek Reaſons to make appear the extravagance of theſe words; it is ſufficient to make it known, to repreſent what the ſame Jeſuit, puſht on by the force of the truth, ſaith, Chap. 16. pag. 165. *That not to recite the hours at all, and not to do it decently, is all one before God, ſince he is equally diſhonoured and contemned in both.*

After he hath advanced theſe ſo ſtrange Maxims which overturn Religion and Prayer, which is as it were the firſt-fruits and moſt common exerciſe thereof; and after he hath eſtabliſhed theſe Maxims by ſuch Reaſons and ſuch Examples, he draws from thence practical Concluſions as pernicious, which he beſtows on Confeſſors and Directors, to ſerve them as a Rule in the conduct of Souls, and in the reſolution of all doubts and difficulties which may be propoſed unto them in this matter.

*According hereunto*, ſaith he, *the Confeſſor ſhall not reprove his Penitent as for any mortal fault, for having applied his mind to frivolous things, ſo long as his tongue reſounded the praiſes of God with others in the Church, if in outward appearance he did nothing that was incompatible with this action*, pag. 335.

*He ſhall not oblige him to the repetition of any thing ſaid in that manner, ſince in pronouncing them in that ſort he hath fulfilled the precept, nor yet to make reſtitution of the fruits received from his Benefice, if he have any.*

Which very thing he himſelf condemns but two pages before, ſaying, *That Eccleſiaſticks who pray with voluntary diſtraction and wandring minds, ought for the performance of their duty, begin their Office anew; and in default of ſo doing, if Beneficiaries, they are bound to reſtore unto the Church where their Benefice is, or to the poor the fruits received according to the rate of their omiſſions, as he collects from the Bull of* Pius V.

So his mind appears floating betwixt errour and truth, which dazles his eyes, and conſtrains him to acknowledge and confeſs it; and it would be hard to judge what may be concluded of Propoſitions ſo different and contrary, if he did not himſelf diſcover throughout his Book a deſign he hath to let the Reins looſe unto the corrupt inclinations of Nature, and to give men liberty to follow their deſires and luſts, as well in Civil as Religious matters. For there is nothing but the conſideration of men, and the fear of ſcandal that holds him back a little, and hinders him from doing it ſo openly; and this fear and this carriage engages him continually in theſe manifeſt contrarieties which are inevitable unto thoſe who would flatter men and corrupt the truth.

Here would be a proper place to ſpeak of the Diſpenſations which the Jeſuits give Eccleſiaſticks from reciting the Office upon Reaſons ſo ſlight, and oftentimes ſo ridiculous, that they themſelves unto whom this obligation ſeems moſt grievous and troubleſom, durſt not demand them, if they did not by offering them unto them, prevent them, and in ſome ſort force them to receive them, by aſſuring them, that they may make uſe of them with a ſafe conſcience, though their own, altogether corrupt as it is, reproach them for it, and that the light of Nature only ſuffices to diſcover that they ought not do it. But becauſe we have already produced ſome in the Treatiſe of Probability for Example ſake, I will content my ſelf to add only one more here in this place out of *Tambourin*, who ſaith, (1) *That he who is purblind, or any other who hath any diſeaſe in his eyes, if he fears to loſe his ſight by little and little in reading, is not obliged to read his Breviary. But if this purblind, or otherwiſe of weak eyes, do voluntarily read Fables or Hiſtories whilſt he diſpenſes with himſelf for reading his Breviary, doth he ſin? I anſwer, that he ſins not againſt his obligation of ſaying his prayers. But I am aſſured he ſins in reading theſe Fables to the prejudice of his health; which yet will*

1 Hinc luſcus & quicunque ex oculis laborat, ſi timet legendi vim ta legendo paulatim deperdere, horas canonicas non legat. 14. Quid ſi hic luſcus, vel ille valetudinarius legat voluntariè fabulas vel hiſtorias, omittit autem officium, peccabitne? Reſpondeo non peccaturum contra obligationem recitandi officium, peccaturum non ambigo illum, quia fabulas cum ſanitatis detrimento legit: quod tamen detrimentum ſaltem notabile raro eveniet, quia biſce lectionibus quantum ex hoc capite recreatur animus, non multum opprimitur. *Tambur. l. 2. decal. c. 5. ſect. 8. n. 14.*

*will rarely happen; becauſe that ſort of reading is recreative, and hurts not much.* This Eccleſiaſtick who hath eyes to read Fables, and hath not to read his Office, will eaſily be confirmed in ſo good a diſpoſition by *Tambourin.* This Jeſuit is not troubled at all to diſpenſe with the obligation of rehearſing his Office, becauſe of the weakneſs of his ſight: and though after that he durſt not openly juſtifie him that weakens it yet more by reading of Fables: yet to leave him this liberty nevertheleſs, he pretends that he will not weaken it by this reading, as by that of the Breviary, or at leaſt that this will rarely happen; *quod detrimentum ſaltem notabile rarò evenit.* And the reaſon is, becauſe he recreates his ſpirit, and finds pleaſure in reading Fables, ſuppoſing that he cannot take any in that of his Office. Which agrees very well with what he and his Fellows do commonly call the Divine Service, the Charge, the Burthen, the Drudgery, *onus diei*, the load of the day. Whence it comes, that they teach the Eccleſiaſticks, to diſcharge themſelves thereof the moſt they can, as of ſome burthenſom and odious thing; aſſuring them, as we have made appear, that they ſufficiently ſatisfie their 21390
obligation and the intent of the Church, in reciting them externally without any attention, with voluntary diſtraction, and buſying themſelves with all ſorts of extravagant, diſhoneſt, impious thoughts, and even with deſign not to ſatisfie the Precept of the Church.

## CHAPTER IV. *Of Good Works.*

### *That the Jeſuits Maxims deſtroy them.*

GOod Works may be deſtroyed two ways; either by inclining men to do them ill; or by diverting them from doing them at all. It would be eaſie to prove that the Jeſuits teach to do them ill, in this that they maintain, that ſuch may be done as are truly good without any ſuccour of Grace, and that we may do thoſe which are meritorious of eternal life without reſpect had unto God or eternal life, and without once thinking thereof, provided that in doing them, we be not under mortal ſin. But becauſe this Point is more ſubtle, and I have ſpoken thereof already before, I will not inſiſt on it here, contenting my ſelf to make appear, that they excuſe and juſtifie thoſe who do no good Works at all, though they be able, teſtifying unto them, that they are not bound thereunto; and by this means they divert men from the practice of them, removing from them the obligation, and aboliſhing the Commandment as much as in them lyes.

1 Quandonam hoc obligat præceptum? Reſpondeo quæſtioni, teneri nos eleemoſynam exhibere in neceſſitate extrema ex rebus vitæ ſuperfluis, licet ſtatui ſint neceſſariæ 3 quia proximi vitæ ſuperat mei ſtatus decentiam. *Eſcob. tr. 5. ex. 5. n. 43. p. 632.*

2 Qui vero & ſtatui habet ſuperfluos, tenenturne communibus neceſſitatibus ſubvenire? Probabile eſt teneri, probabilius non teneri. *Ib. n. 47. p. 633.*

3 Alias enim pauci divites ſalutem conſequerentur. *Ibid.*

*Eſcobar* after he had acknowledged, that there is a Commandment which obligeth us by divine and natural light to do alms, inquires, (1) *When this Pre-* 21400
*cept obligeth?* He anſwers, *That in extream neceſſity we are obliged to do alms of ſuch things as are not neceſſary unto life, though they be needful to ſupport us in our condition.* His Reaſon is; *Becauſe the life of our neighbour ought to be preferred to the decency of our condition.* He preſuppoſeth, as he expounds himſelf before, that by extream neceſſity we are to underſtand that on which the life of man depends. So that if he be not aſſiſted, he will ſurely dye; and in this eſtate he believes that we are obliged to give of what we have ſuperfluous, and which may help him to live more commodiouſly. This is no great exceſs of Charity to give for ſaving our neighbours life what is not at all neceſſary unto us.

But he extends not this Charity much farther, demanding concerning the ſame ſubject, (2) *If he that hath more than he needs for to live according to his condition, be obliged to help the common neceſſities?* He anſwers, *That it is probable that he is obliged thereto; but it is more probable that he is not obliged.* That is to ſay, that a perſon that hath abundance, and who after he hath ſatisfied all his own neceſſaries and thoſe of his family, hath yet a ſuperfluity, is not obliged in a publick Famine to give unto the poor, nor to any one whomſoever, if he ſee him not in evident danger to dye with famine: (3) *For otherwiſe,* ſaith this Jeſuit, *there would be very few rich men ſaved.* As if he had a deſign by this reaſon to oppoſe the judgment,

judgment, and expreſs the word of Jeſus Chriſt, who ſays by way of admiration, (1) *How hard is it for them who have wealth to enter into the Kingdom of God!* Obſerving how few rich men were ſaved, by reaſon of the great difficulty of their Salvation, things ſo difficult are always rare: and on the contrary this Jeſuit pretends that there are many ſaved, and that it is not hard for them to be ſaved, which they may do according to him, without making uſe of the principal means which God hath given them, which is the exerciſe of Charity, ſince he diſpenſeth with them in the obligation of doing, except in extream neceſſity, which is very rare.

Nor will he have them always bound thereunto even in extream neceſſity; as when it is needful that they retrench ſomething of what is of uſe unto them for to live commodiouſly, and in honour and reputation in the world. For he demands, (2) *If a rich man be obliged to aſſiſt his neighbour who is in extream neceſſity with a notable diminution of what belongs unto his condition?* And to anſwer with more aſſurance in ſo important a Point, wherein the life of a man in extremity is concerned, and who is in danger to give up the Ghoſt for want of aſſiſtance, he makes uſe of the Authority of two of his Fraternity. (3) *I have already anſwered*, ſaith he, *that he is not obliged according to* Coninck, *to whom he adds* Tolet *who gives this important advice upon this ſubject, we muſt not eaſily condemn rich men who do no alms, ſince the Doctors accord not when it is mortal ſin not to do them.* (4) *Tambourin* adds thereto a reaſon which ſecures Confeſſors, if it be good, and which makes that abſolution can never be refuſed to a rich man becauſe of his hard-heartedneſs towards the poor. *So it is*, ſaith he, *that rich men bring always ſome apparent reaſon for which they refuſe to do alms.* An apparent reaſon is ſufficient to this Father to elude the Law and the Word of God, as if God were to be contented or deceived as well as men by vain appearances.

*Eſcobar* a little above, *n.* 154. doubts not at all, but conſtantly aſſures us, that rich men commit no mortal ſin at all in not giving even of the ſuperfluity of their wealth unto the poor who are in a great and preſſing neceſſity. (5) *I am aſſured*, ſaith he, *that a rich man ſins not mortally in not giving alms to the poor of what he hath ſuperfluous in their great neceſſity.*

*Tolet*, whom he alledgeth, ſaith, (6) *That when there is no great neceſſity, when we can aſſiſt our neighbour without notable diminution of our wealth, honour, or life, we are thereunto obliged under mortal ſin; but if we cannot do it without notable diminution in theſe things, we are not obliged.* He would have the rich do their alms at a ſmall charge, and without incommodity, or at leaſt without feeling the inconvenience which they may receive in doing them.

He ſpeaks yet more clearly in *lib.* 8. where he inquires, (7) *Whether in common neceſſities, we are obliged by the Commandment to do alms of our ſuperfluities?* And after he had ſaid, that this is the judgment of S. *Thomas* and of *Cajetan*, he adds: (8) *For all this the common opinion holds the contrary, and there are that ſay even that we are not obliged thereto under mortal ſin, even in a great neceſſity.* Whence he takes his foundation to eſtabliſh this general Concluſion. (9) *That none is obliged under mortal ſin to give of his ſuperfluities, unleſs it be in extream and very great neceſſities.* All his reaſon is, the Authority of the Caſuiſts of that time, as he ſaith himſelf. *I am of this opinion, becauſe this is the common opinion of the Doctors, and I dare not declare them guilty of mortal ſin whom ſo many great Doctors do excuſe.*

1 Quam difficile qui pecunias habent in Regnum Dei introibunt. *Luc.* 18. *v.* 24.

2 An dives teneatur proximo ſubvenire, etiam in extrema neceſſitate conſtituto, cum gravi proprii ſtatus detrimento: *Tract.* 5. *cx* 6. *n.* 155. *pag.* 652.

3 Ex Conincksaffirmavi. Addo ex Toleto, cum Doctores non conveniant quando peccet mortaliter qui non facit eleemoſynam, non facile condemnandes divites qui non largiuntur. *Ib.*

4 Quamvis Confeſſarius abſolutionem à peccatis diviti non facile negare debeat, quod communes pauperum miſerias per eleemoſynam ſublevare monitus recuſet; tum quia de obligatione hac an & qualis ſit, Doctores non conveniunt; tum quia ſemper dives aliquam cauſam in ſpecie profert cur recuſet *Tambur. lib* 5. *decal. c.* 1. *ſect.* 1. *n.* 18.

5 Scio in gravi pauperum neceſſitate divitem non dando ſuperfluo, non peccare mortaliter. *Ibid. n.* 154. 6 Extra extremam neceſſitatem ſi quis ſine detrimento vitæ, honoris, aut rei, aut cum parvo detrimento poteſt alium juvare, tenetur ſub mortali: ſi vero abſque notabili prædictorum detrimento non poteſt, non tenetur. *Tolet. lib.* 4. *Inſt. ſacerd. cap* 10. *num.* 5. *pag.* 635. 7 Anex ſuperfluis teneamur facere eleemoſynam in communibus neceſſitatibus ex præcepto? *Tolet. lib.* 8. *cap.* 85. *num.* 2. *pag.* 1242. 8 Tamen communis opinio tenet contrarium. Imo aliqui aiunt nec etiam in gravi obligari ſub mortali. 9 Sit ergo altera concluſio. Nullus ſub mortali tenetur diſtribuere ſuperflua extra extremas & graves neceſſitates. *Ibid. n.* 3.

*Dicaſtillus* ſaith, (1) *That this Author holds that we may fulfil this Precept of Alms, by lending only without giving any thing*; another may add, that it may be ſatisfied by lending upon uſury, and there are ſome who ſay it already in effect, though they expreſs it not in the ſame terms. For to authorize Uſury, they teach them that make profeſſion thereof, to ſay to thoſe who borrow money of them, that in lending unto them their intent is not uſurarious, but altogether deſigned to do them good; that they pretend that it is only to do them a pleaſure, and to exerciſe Charity that obligeth them to lend to them.

*Emanuel Sa* ſaith the ſame thing, and almoſt in the ſame words. (2) *The Doctors being not agreed when we ſin mortally in not doing alms, we muſt not eaſily condemn the rich who do them not at all.* And a little after citing *Tolet* in the place before alledged with ſome other Caſuiſts, and reporting that Judgment, he concludes thus: (3) *They ſay, that unleſs in caſe of extream neceſſity, alms is* 21440 *not commanded under mortal ſin.* That is to ſay, that unleſs we ſee ſome perſon that hath his Soul in a manner hanging on his lips, or who is in evident danger of death, it is no great ſin for him that is able to aſſiſt him to abandon him. This is, to ſpeak properly, to diſcharge men from the obligation of giving alms, theſe extream neceſſities never falling out in a manner, and there being few perſons who ſee any ſuch in many years, or not at all in their whole lives: and when ſuch an one by great accident is preſented, we are not obliged any farther to provide for them, according to theſe Doctors, if we have not wealth to ſpare, and riches that are ſuperfluous; and there being hardly any perſon who believes he hath ſuch, or who indeed hath ſuch, ſo much doth Covetouſneſs, Luxury, Houſe-keeping rack men at this day, and makes all men in a manner neceſſitous; ſo the obligation of giving alms ſhall be aboliſhed, and there ſhall hardly be any perſon found who ſhall think himſelf obliged to aſſiſt his neighbour to what neceſſity ſoever he be reduced.

But the words of *Tolet* are conſiderable, and diſcover alſo with advantage the ſolidity of this Doctrine. (4) *I am*, ſaith he, *of this opinion, becauſe it is the common judgment of the Doctors; and I dare not engage him in mortal ſin whom ſo many great Doctors excuſe.* He calls the Caſuiſts of theſe laſt times great Doctors, and he dares not depart from their opinion, though he avows after that they are themſelves departed from that of the holy Fathers, who were the Doctors and Maſters of the Church before them, which hath propoſed them as ſuch to all the faithful of latter Ages, and by much ſtronger reaſon to Prieſts and Divines who 21450 ought to be the moſt perfect amongſt the faithful. For he acknowledges, that although the Scholaſticks diſcharge the rich from the obligation they have to give alms of that which they have ſuperfluous; the holy Fathers for all that, and the common judgment of Antiquity obligeth them thereunto. (5) *Though the common opinion of the School-men excuſe them*, ſaith he, *yet the holy Doctors condemn them. So that it is very probable that they are obliged thereunto by Precept.*

He is not content to ſay in general, that this is the Judgment of the holy Fathers: but he cites many paſſages of S. *Ambroſe*, S. *Jerom*, S. *Auſtin*, S. *Baſil*, and of S. *Chryſoſtom*, who place in the rank of thoſe who rob or detain unjuſtly the goods of others, all them who give not to the poor what remains of their wealth after they have provided for their juſt and true neceſſities. *You ſee*, ſaith he after he had named all theſe Fathers, (6) *ſo many of the Saints who condemn them that do not their alms of what they have of ſuperfluity. There is therefore herein much cauſe to fear.* He might have added to the Authority of theſe Fathers that are the moſt illuſtrious and the moſt famous of the Church, that of all the reſt, for they all agree in this Point, ſo that there is not one found to ſay the contrary.

So that if there be one Point of Doctrine eſtabliſhed on the ancient and univerſal Tradition of the Church, this is as clearly as any other; and if that which is eſtabliſhed upon this Tradition, ought to paſs for indubitable amongſt Catholick Divines, and amongſt all the Faithful, as it hath always certainly been until this preſent, we cannot call this Doctrine into doubt, without wounding the Authority of the Church and the foundations of the Faith; and to ſay it is



1 Illam teneo propter communem Doctorum ſententiam, nec audeo obligare ſub mortali eos quos tanti Doctores excuſant.

2 Cum inter Doctores non conveniat quando peccet mortaliter qui non facit eleemoſynam, non facile condemnandi ſunt divites qui non faciunt. *Sa verb. Eleemoſ. n. 2. pag. 201.*

3 Extra extremam neceſſitatem eleemoſynam ſub mortali peccato non eſſe præceptam dicunt. *Ibid.*

4 Illam teneo propter communem Doctorum ſententiam, nec audeo obligare ſub mortali quos tot & tanti Doctores excuſant.

5 Etſi Scholaſticorum communis ſententia eos excuſet; tamen Doctores Sancti eos damnant, ita ut profecto ſit ſententia probabilis illos obligari ſub præcepto. *Tolet. l. 8. c. 35, n. 3. pag. 1242.*

6 Vides tot Sanctos damnare ſuperflui retentionem, multùm ergo timendum eſt. *Ibid.*

probable, as *Tolet* ſaith: *Profecto ſententia probabilis eſt*, is not of much better effect than to ſay thatit is falſe, becauſe this is to hold always for doubtful the ancient and univerſal Tradition of the Church, and to give men liberty to decide Points of Divinity, and to expound Scripture againſt the conſent of the Fathers; which is expreſly forbidden by the Council of *Trent*.

Another that hath not read the Fathers, might be excuſed by his ignorance. But this excuſe hath no place in *Tolet*, who forſakes them after he had cited them: and which is yet more unſupportable and more injurious to theſe great Saints, he renounces their Judgment after he had acknowledged it, to follow that of the new Divines of our times. (1) *If the School-men*, ſaith he, *did not agree ſo unanimouſly as they do in this very Judgment, by which we may in ſome ſort excuſe theſe perſons* who give not in alms what they have of ſuperfluity, *we muſt without doubt have condemned this ſparingneſs*, ſo as the holy Fathers condemn it, as he ſaith himſelf: *Vides tot Sanctos damnare ſuperflui retentionem.* He pretends then that the holy Fathers on one ſide condemn thoſe who give not in alms what they have of ſuperfluous; and on the other hand the new Scholaſticks excuſe them, we muſt hold to the Judgment of theſe later, if we will believe this Jeſuit, and follow his Example.

1 Et niſi eſſet tam unanimis Scholaſticorum ſententia qua poſſunt excuſari modo aliquo tales homines, abſque dubio damnanda eſſet talis retentio. *Ibid.*

But if it be lawful in this manner to oppoſe the new Divines to the ancient Tradition in this Article, and in this oppoſition to prefer the Judgment of the Caſuiſts before that of the holy Fathers, inſtead of judging and correcting the Moderns by the Tradition of Antiquity; it will be lawful to do the ſame thing in all other Points which concern Manners or Religion; and ſo there ſhall be nothing fixed in the Doctrine of the Church, and Antiquity ſhall be no more a mark of Truth and Faith; but Novelty ſhall be more conſiderable, though until this preſent it hath paſſed for a Vice and a mark of Errour.

But for all that he hath over-reached in ſaying that this new Opinion which he holds is the common and unanimous of the School-men, he having himſelf acknowledged at his firſt ſetting out, that S. *Thomas* and *Cajetan* were not for it, who are not of the leaſt conſideration; and no more is it that of others, the more ancient School-men eſpecially; which doth the more heighten his exceſs. For if all the School-men had been of one and the ſame advice upon this Point, that of the holy Fathers being contrary to theirs, it would without doubt be a great raſhneſs to quit the Fathers to follow the new School-men. But theſe being divided upon this Point, and the Saints on the contrary being all of one and the ſame Judgment, ſo that there is not one ſingle one who therein contradicts the reſt, the inſolence and preſumption appears yet more inſupportable, to prefer the opinion of one part of the new Divines to the common and univerſal Judgment of the holy Fathers, and one part alſo even of the moſt famous School-men.

The Jeſuits then hold, that the Rich are not obliged to give alms but only of their ſuperfluity, and they will not oblige them thereunto neither but in caſe of great neceſſity. But if you demand of them what they underſtand by ſuperfluous things; *Tambourin* will anſwer you, (2) *That there are ſome who maintain with probability, that the things which are neceſſary to advance and exalt us unto a better condition are not ſuperfluous. After this opinion it will rarely happen that we can have ſuperfluous goods.* He might have ſaid even that this would never happen at all, obſerving the corruption which reigns at this day in the world, where we ſee that the ambition of men is inſatiable as well as their covetouſneſs, and that deſiring always to advance themſelves, they labour alſo perpetually to enrich themſelves; ſo that theſe two paſſions grow always together, and have no bounds, how great wealth ſoever they poſſeſs, their greedineſs cannot be filled nor ſatisfied, but they travel continually to heap up more, perſwading themſelves that they never have ſufficient to furniſh them or their expences and deſigns, ſo far are they from believing they have any ſuperfluity to give in alms. And ſo they ſhall not be obliged to give alms according to this Divinity which obliges them not even in extream neceſſity, but in caſe they have ſomewhat ſuperfluous.

2 Aliqui contendunt probabiliter ea quæ ſunt neceſſaria ad acquirendum melioris ſtatum non eſſe ſuperflua. Granad. 22. controv. 4. d. 2. ſ. 4. n. 18. lege Lugo, &c. Ideo raro quis in hac ſententia dicetur habere bona ſuperflua. *Tamb. l. 5. Decal. c. 1. ſect. 1. n. 14.*

After this if you ask what ſhall become of the Poor, *Tambourin* gives them an expedient to get out of neceſſity, which is to ſteal from the Rich. (1) *All this which I have related*, ſaith this Father, *makes us ſee that a man extreamly poor may ſteal precious things, and that by conſequence the Rich is obliged to give him them. But becauſe the contrary opinion is alſo probable, the Rich may purſue him, and not give his Riches to the Poor: not that this war can be juſt on both ſides ſpeaking abſolutely; but it is ſo by vertue of two probable opinions; which is no inconvenience, as we do all teach.* He calls the combat which is betwixt the cruelty of the Rich who refuſes to give alms unto the Poor, and the infidelity of the Poor which prompts him to ſteal from the Rich, a war. I confeſs that he hath reaſon for this, as well as for that he acknowledges that this war cannot be abſolutely juſt on both ſides, ſince cruelty as well as theft is a kind of injuſtice. And he gives alſo teſtimony to the truth without thinking thereof, and deſtroys his own proper cauſe by adding that this war between the Poor and the Rich, or rather betwixt cruelty and theft, being unjuſt of it ſelf, is nevertheleſs made juſt by vertue of two probable opinions which maintain it; one, that the Rich is not bound to give alms to the Poor, and the other, that the Poor may ſteal from the Rich. This is the uſe and particular advantage of this marvellous Science of Probability, according to this Jeſuit, who is one of its principal Defenders, to be able to juſtifie crimes by aboliſhing the Commandments of God and the Exerciſe of good Works. 21490

After this exceſs we ſhall be leſs ſurpriſed with that which *Leſſius* ſaith, though it be very ſtrange; (2) *It ſeems that amongſt Chriſtians there are few who are damned for not having exerciſed bodily mercy, none being obliged thereunto under mortal ſin, unleſs in the utmoſt and greateſt neceſſity of his neighbour, which happens very rarely, ſo as to impoſe any great obligation on any particular perſon.* 21500

*Tolet* and others ſay, that there is no obligation to aſſiſt a neighbour but in ſome great and extream neceſſity; and *Leſſius* adds, that this great and extream neceſſity cannot happen but very rarely; *in extrema & gravi neceſſitate quæ rarius ita contingit.* Whence it follows, that we are not obliged to do alms and other works of mercy, but in extream neceſſity, that is to ſay in effect, that we are ſeldom or never obliged; ſince this neceſſity doth ſcarce ever happen. Beſides to ſay even in this caſe, that there is no great obligation upon us to aſſiſt our neighbour, and to ſay that there is none at all, is the very ſame thing; becauſe the matter being very great, in regard that the lives of men in great extremity are therein concerned, the obligation to aſſiſt them muſt needs be great, or none at all. Alſo it will appear leſs ſtrange to ſay, that we are not at all obliged to hinder the death of a man when we can conveniently, than to ſay that we are indeed obliged thereunto; but it is only a venial ſin to fail in this obligation, and to ſuffer him to dye.

So that theſe Jeſuits ſay in effect, that we are not abſolutely obliged to ſuccour our neighbour, even in the extreameſt neceſſity, what convenience ſoever we have to do it; and being not obliged in ſuch neceſſity, it follows thence by ſtronger reaſon, that we are not bound thereunto upon any other occaſion. And by conſequence the obligation to give alms is entirely aboliſhed in all ſorts of perſons, times, and occaſions. 21510

But *Leſſius* doth yet farther diſcover this pernicious Doctrine of his Company, adding that even then when this ſo extream and rare neceſſity doth happen, no perſon is particularly obliged to provide againſt it: for that the obligation to aſſiſt our neighbour in this eſtate of extream neceſſity being general and common to all thoſe who have means to do it, every one may put it off from himſelf unto others; in ſuch manner that we cannot ſay, that this man or that man in particular is obliged thereunto: *quæ rarius ita contingit ut hunc vel illum in particulari graviter obliget.* That is to ſay, that the Commandment to aſſiſt our neighbour in extream neceſſity is general to all thoſe who are of ability: but it doth ordinarily oblige none in particular. And ſo according to *Leſſius* Divinity a poor man being in extremity may dye of hunger in the view of many perſons who may and ought aſſiſt him, whilſt they expect and attend one another, no one of them being

1 Hæc etſi probabile faciunt poſſe extremè indigentem ſurripere pretioſa, & conſequenter ex vi hujus opinionis debere ea divitem elargiri. Sed quia contraria opinio prob bilis eſt, ideo poterit dives illam ſequi, & illa non tradere. Nec datur bellum juſtum ex utraq; parte abſolutè, ſed ex vi duarum opinionum probabilium, quod non eſſe inconveniens omnes docemus. *Tamb. l. 5. Decal. c. 1. ſect. 1. n. 12.*

2 Fortè inter Chriſtianos pauci ſunt qui propter defectum operum miſericordiæ corporalium damnentur, cum nemo ad illa teneatur ſub peccato mortali, niſi in extrema & gravi neceſſitate proximi, quæ rarius ita contingit. ut hunc vel illum in particulari graviter obliget. *Leſſius l. 2. de perfect. div. v. 22. n. 142.*

being particularly bound to satisfie an obligation which is common unto them all together.

And it is from this Principle that he concludes, (1) *That it is apparent, that amongst Christians there are few who shall be damned for failing to exercise the works of corporal mercy*; notwithstanding that the Scripture in divers places, and Jesus Christ in the Gospel testifie expressly, that the greatest part of men, and even of Christians shall be damned for not giving alms and assisting their neighbour in his necessities. For having declared, that there shall be few Elect and few saved even amongst those that are called, that is amongst Christians; he declares also, that in condemning them at the day of Judgment, he will only reprove them for the default in alms and works of mercy, saying unto them: (2) *Depart from me ye cursed into eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels, because I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, I was thirsty, and ye gave me not to drink.*

*Lessius* observed this difficulty, and he represents and objects it to himself; but a consideration so powerful taken from the express word of Jesus Christ, and from the sentence of eternal death which shall be pronounced against those who shall fail of performing the works of mercy, was not sufficient to divert him from his opinion. For without troubling himself with what Jesus Christ saith, he replies in a way and expression which contains more of contempt than respect due unto the Word of God. See here his terms: (3) *It is to no purpose to alledge that our Lord in the 25. Chapter of S.* Matthew *representing the form of the last Judgment, speaks rather of works of mercy than of others. For he doth it only to stir up men, and particularly those of the common sort who are not capable to comprehend spiritual things, to exercise these good works in this life. Now this reason cannot have place in the last Judgment, because then there will be no need to stir up men unto works of mercy.* He declares plainly, that the Gospel is false, and speaks false things to deceive the people and ignorant. For if it be lawful to have this opinion of what Jesus Christ himself saith concerning his last Judgment, and the circumstances, and the words of that Judgment which he will pronounce concerning mens eternal life and death, it will by stronger reason be lawful to have the same thoughts of other places of the Gospel which are not so important, and generally of all, since one cannot be more true than another. So we may elude the whole Word of God, when we meet therein any thing that doth not agree with our opinions, and we shall give occasion particularly in this Subject to those, who will conceive with *Origen*, that the pains of the damned shall not be eternal; to say, that Jesus Christ hath not said that they shall be so, but only to divert men from sin, and to cause them to fear by proposing unto them infinite punishments, according as this Jesuit saith, that he neither threatens nor condemns those who fail to do works of mercy, but only to intimidate men, and particularly those of the Commonalty, and to stir them up to employ themselves therein, being incapable of other more elevated actions.

Being all good works are comprised and contained in alms, fasting, and prayer, according to the Scripture, it seems that having here treated particularly of alms, I ought also to speak of fasting and of prayer, because I have said that the Jesuits destroy and corrupt all good works in general.

But because I have spoken expressly of Fasting in the explication of the Commandments of the Church, of Supplication in the Chapter of Prayer; and also in that of Ecclesiastick Duties, and the obligation which we have to say Divine Service, I will be content to send the Reader thither, to avoid tediousness and repetitions. In reading those places we may find that the Jesuits are no less favourable to mens effeminacy than to their interests, and that they are as large and indulgent in freeing them from all the pains of fasting and prayer, as in exempting them from the obligation of giving their goods and doing alms; testifying by this so obsequious Doctrine, and so base and loose a conduct, that all their study and care in a manner tends to the establishment of the Kingdom of Lust, by favouring the corrupt passions and inclinations of men, and in consequence thereof to destroy true Christian piety, both in its fountain which is Charity, and in its effects and fruits which are good Works.

1. Fortè inter Christianos pauci sunt, qui propter defectum operum misericordiæ corporalium damnentur.

2 Discedite à me maledicti in ignem æternum qui paratus est diabolo & Angelis ejus. Esurivi enim & non dedistis mihi manducare; sitivi & non dedistis mihi bibere, &c *Mat.* 25. v. 41.

3 Nec refert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii describens meminerit potius operum misericordiæ quam aliorum; id enim fecit ut homines præsertim plebeios qui ad majora & spiritualia parum sunt comparati, in hac vita ad ea excitaret. Hæc autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio; quia tunc homines nec erunt amplius ad opera misericordiæ excitandi. *Lessius ibid.*

## CHAPTER V. *Of the Sacraments.*

AS the principal Queſtions which reſpect the Sacraments, depend on the Inſtitution of God and the Church, and ought by conſequence be reſolved 21550
by Authority and Tradition, the Jeſuits who follow moſt uſually their own ſenſe and reaſon both in Divinity and Philoſophy, make almoſt as many faults as ſteps in this matter.

My deſign is not, as I have already declared, to report generally all their Errours, no more than to refute any one in particular fundamentally; but only to repreſent ſome few of the more viſible and more extraordinary in every matter, that by theſe, Judgment may be made of others which are more in number and many times greater than thoſe which I report.

I will beſtow the greater part of this Chapter on Confirmation, becauſe I ſhall not meet with other occaſions to ſpeak thereof as of other Sacraments, of which for the ſame reaſon I ſhall here ſpeak only ſome few things.

### ARTICLE. I. Of Baptiſm and Confirmation.

### I. POINT.

#### *That the Jeſuits take away the neceſſity of Baptiſm; and deſtroy the diſpoſitions required thereto.*

1 Præceptum Baptiſmi obligat & non obligat adultos ad eum recipiendum quamprimum commodè poſſunt. *Eſcobar lib.* 11. *probl.* 109. Qui hoc tempore Baptiſmi legem ignorant, ſed tamen legis naturalis præſcripta obſervant, poſſunt & non poſſunt ſine Baptiſmo ſalvari.

2 Gravis metus excuſat & non excuſat à præcepto divino reciplendi Baptiſmum aut pœnitentiam.

3 Ego quidem aliquando putabam inſtante divino præcepto reciplendi Baptiſmum aut pœnitentiam, & tyranno prohibente receptionem ſub mortis comminatione, adhuc eſſe recipienda, ut certa quoad poſſit ſalus redderetur. 4 Ac jam primæ hæreo ſententiæ dum video ſuſcepto Sacramento omne damnationis periculum non ceſſare, cùm omnino certum non ſit fuiſſe ritè ſuſceptum ſeu miniſtratum. *Eſcob. lib.* 1. *Theol. mor. ſect.* 2. *cap.* 7. *probl.* 29.

*Escobar* in his firſt Book of Theological Problems propoſes theſe queſtions as Problematical; that is to ſay, in which the two contrary opinions are probable and ſafe in conſcience. (1) *Whether the Precept of Baptiſm obligeth thoſe who are of age to demand it, to receive it as ſoon as they can conveniently? If now* 21560
*they who know not the Law of Baptiſm, but live according to the Rules of the Law of Nature, may be ſaved without Baptiſm?* He propoſes this alſo: (2) *Whether great terrour may excuſe from obſerving the Divine precept which obliges to receive Baptiſm or Penance?*

After he hath concluded after his ordinary manner that it doth, and doth not excuſe him: that is, that herein you may follow what opinion you pleaſe; he adds: (3) *As for me I ſometimes thought that the divine Precept which commands us to receive Baptiſm or Penance urging us, and a Tyrant forbidding us to receive it upon pain of our lives, we ceaſe not to be obliged to receive it, that we may make our Salvation certain ſo far as in us lyes.* So that if God on one hand command Baptiſm on the pain of loſing eternal life, and a Tyrant on the other hand forbid it on the pain of loſing temporal life, the Jeſuit permits us to obey the Tyrant rather than Jeſus Chriſt, againſt the very word of Jeſus Chriſt who ſaith in the Goſpel, that he who would ſave his Soul, that is, his life, ſhall loſe it; and contrary to that of S. *Peter*, which being an explication of that of Jeſus Chriſt, is alſo more expreſs and more clear in our caſe; that we ought to obey God rather than men even in peril of our lives; according as this Apoſtle did indeed expoſe his by preaching Jeſus Chriſt againſt the prohibition of the chief Jews.

The reaſon for which this Jeſuit ſaith that he adheres to this opinion, which 21570
denies the precept or obligation of Baptiſm when one cannot receive it without being expoſed to the danger of death, is very conſiderable: It is (4) *Becauſe I ſee*, ſaith he, *that after this Sacrament is received, all peril of damnation ceaſeth not, ſince it is not altogether certain that the Sacrament hath been well received or well adminiſtred.*

He grounds then the neceſſity and obligation to receive Baptiſm on the effect it worketh rather than on the Command which ordaineth it to be received: and becauſe that this effect which is to be delivered from ſin and damnation is not always entirely certain, ſo that we may in ſome ſort doubt thereof, even after we have received the Sacrament, the obligation to receive it according to him is alſo not entirely evident and aſſured, but uncertain; which ſuffices him to make the obligation of the divine Precept to receive Baptiſm queſtionable when a Tyrant forbids to receive it on pain of life; and to form two probable opinions both ſafe in conſcience, whence he follows and maintains that which diſpenſes in theſe incident caſes with the precept and obligation of Baptiſm.

He ſaith the ſame thing of Penance, and by the ſame Principle and ſelf ſame Reaſon which he makes uſe of to aboliſh the obligation to theſe two Sacraments, it will be eaſie for him to ruine alſo when he pleaſes not only the precept and obligation to other Sacraments, as that of Confirmation and the Communion; but alſo generally of all the Commands of God and the Church, or the obligation to obey them when a Tyrant ſhall forbid them on pain of life, there being no
21580 Command ſo important, nor whereof the effect is more aſſured than that of Baptiſm. So that if becauſe the effect of Baptiſm is not always ſo certain, that we cannot abſolutely doubt thereof at all, this Jeſuit pretends that the Precept of Baptiſm though divine, obliges us not at all when we are menaced with death if we receive it; it is clear that any other precept whatſoever it be ſhall never oblige us, ſo that we ſhall not have liberty to diſpenſe with it in this ſame circumſtance: and ſo the Doctrine of Probability, as we have already obſerved on divers occaſions, overturns and ruines in divers manners all the Commands of God and the Church.

The diſpoſitions neceſſary for worthy receiving Baptiſm cannot be more deſtroyed, than by putting them amongſt Problematick queſtions, as doth this Author with others whom he cites of his Company: (1) *Whether contrition be neceſſary to Baptiſm, or attrition ſuffice? Whether we ought to believe that this attrition is true contrition? Whether this attrition ought to be ſupernatural, or natural be ſufficient? If it be enough that we believe that we have attrition; and that it be only ſupernatural outwardly?* That is to ſay, that it be ſupernatural only in that it comes from God who excites it, though it be natural in it ſelf. If theſe queſ-
21590 tions be Problematick, that is to ſay, doubtful and probable. It is probable that a man may ſave himſelf by the powers of Nature only, becauſe a man may demand Baptiſm upon the laſt gaſp of life by a purely humane motive, according to that probable opinion which maintains that this motive is ſufficient.

After ſo groſs an errour againſt Faith, that which the ſame Author ſaith concerning Witneſſes will ſeem little conſiderable: but yet I cannot omit it, becauſe it ſhews that the Jeſuits accommodations go ſo far as to give Heretick̃s a part in the Ceremonies of the Church. He propoſes this Queſtion: (2) *When we cannot find a Catholick to be a witneſs, may we take an Heretick?* He anſwers, (3) *That the opinion which permits this*, for which he cites *Layman*, *appears unto him probable enough*; *for*, ſaith he, *this Heretick may be converted unto the Faith: and though he be not converted at all, he may teach the Catholick Religion to his God-ſon, as a vicious Preacher may perſwade unto vertue. So an Heretical God-father receiving a Child from the Font may promiſe to inſtruct him as he ought. Which is eſpecially true, if the Prieſt do admoniſh as he ought the Father and God-father of their obligation to inſtruct him that is baptized in the Catholick Faith which he hath received*
21600

1 In adulto ad baptiſmum recipiendum, requiritur & non requiritur contritio de peccatis præteritis, ſufficit & non ſufficit attritio. *Eſcobar t. 2. l. 11. problem. 78.*

Attritio quam habet adultus peccator ad fructum baptiſmi recipiendum, debet eſſe & non debet eſſe exiſtimata contritio. *Probl. 79.*

Attritio ſufficiens ad recipiendum gratiam baptiſmi, debet & non debet ſupernaturalis eſſe. *Probl. 80*

Ad effectum baptiſmi ſufficit & non ſufficit attritio exiſtimata. *Probl. 81.* Attritio naturalis quoad ſubſtantiam, & ſupernaturalis extrinſecè, ſufficit & non ſufficit ad baptiſmum cum fructu ab adulto peccatore recipiendum. *Problem. 82*

2 Quando Catholicus reperiri non poteſt, qui ſuſceptoris in baptiſmo munus obeat, hæreticus poteſt & non poteſt admitti.

3 Fateor primam ſententiam ſatis eſſe probabilem, quia eſto regulariter in quantum eſt hæreticus, non tamen eſt ſimpliciter docendi alumnum incapax, tum quia poteſt ad fidem converti, cum ejus ſit alumnum inſtruere; tum quia licet in hæreſi perſeveret, fidem Catholicam docere poterit, ſicuti poteſt peccator concionator perſuadere virtutem, licet ipſe ſit à virtute alienus; ergo poteſt Patrinus hæreticus levando de ſacro fonte baptiſmatum legitimam promittere inſtructionem: quod maximè verum habet, ſi Sacerdos ut debet parentes ac patrinum de obligatione inſtruendi baptizatum in fide Catholica per baptiſmum ſuſcepta moneat. *Eſcobar tom. 2. lib. 11. Probl. 130.*

*by Baptiſm.* We muſt have very much faith, or rather none at all, and as little reaſon, to believe and imagine that the Faithful may be made believe that an Heretick who hath loſt the faith may be received and be proper to communicate it to an infant in Baptiſm: ſo that the Church may or ought receive him as a ſurety of the promiſes which the infant is to make by his mouth, who hath ſatisfied his own; and that this is not to treat unworthily the moſt holy things and to prophane them, to commit them to an excommunicated perſon.

1 Probabilius eſt ex Sanch. l. 4. m. d. c. 1. n. ult. in baptiſmo nullum fieri votum aut promiſſionem de obedientia fidei. *Tamb meth. confeſſ. lib. 2. cap. 2.*

*Tambourin* may pretend himſelf exempt from one part of this reproach, becauſe he maintains, (1) *That it is more probable that in Baptiſm there is no vow nor promiſe made to obey the Faith.* But I know not whether he pretend that thoſe who receive Baptiſm or thoſe who anſwer for them to whom it is adminiſtred, do therein make uſe of the Art of Æquivocations. For there is no other means not to oblige ones ſelf to obey the Faith when one proteſts ſolemnly to believe in God, and for ever renounce the Devil his Works, and Pomps.

## II. POINT.

### *That the Jeſuits divert the Faithful from Confirmation, by diſcharging them from the Obligation to receive it.*

2 Olim ob frequentes perſecutiones videtur fuiſſe præceptum divinum obligans vel ſemel in vita, vel in neceſſitate confeſſionis fidei habita opportunitate.

AS for what concerns Confirmation, *Filliutius* treating of the Obligation to receive it, ſaith, (2) *That it ſeems that heretofore becauſe of the Perſecutions* 2.1610
*which then were frequent, there was a Commandment from God which obliged to receive this Sacrament once in the time of life, or at leaſt when there happened any neceſſity of confeſſing the Faith, if convenience were had for it.* He forbears not to ſay a little after that according to his advice; (3) *The neceſſity being paſt, the Commandment hath been abrogated and extinguiſhed by cuſtom.*

3 Ceſſante neceſſitate, videtur expiraſſe præceptum & abrogatum conſuetudine. *Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 3. c. 2. n. 40. & 41. p 55.*

He believes then that cuſtom, that is to ſay, the will and negligence of men is capable to aboliſh the Commands of God, without regard to the proteſtation which the Son of God himſelf makes in the Goſpel, that Heaven and Earth may change ſooner than his Word, and that one ſole letter or ſingle point of the Law ſhall never be defaced. The Jeſuits may well deſpiſe this Word, and eraze this Law out of their Writings and out of their Books, but it ſhall abide eternally in the Book of God which is the Goſpel, who ſhall condemn them at the day of Judgment who have taught as well as thoſe who have done contrary to what he ſaith.

The Errour of this Jeſuit is a Principle for the deſtruction of the Goſpel and all Religion. For if cuſtoms of men and length of time may deſtroy one Commandment of God, it may alſo deſtroy all the reſt, and Chriſtian Religion ſhall depend upon the times and the fancies of men; it ſhall be altogether voluntary and temporal, and not eternal, and founded on the unmoveable Rock of Gods Will, but on the moveable ſand of mans.

But as theſe people play with the Word and Commandments of God, making them depend on the Creatures, they alſo ſport themſelves with their own opi- 2.1620
nions by overturning them as ſoon as they have eſtabliſht them. For the ſame *Filliutius* who acknowledges that there was at the beginning in the Church a divine Command to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation, teſtifies a little after that there was never any ſuch. So there is nothing certain according to theſe Doctors, neither in the divine Law and Word, nor in their own imaginations. (4) *I ſay in the third place,* ſaith he, *that ſpeaking abſolutely it is probable that there never was any Precept to receive this Sacrament.*

4 Dico 3. probabile eſſe per ſe loquendo non fuiſſe datum præceptum hujus Sacramenti. *Ibid. n. 42.*

He ſpeaks generally of any Commandment whatſoever, acknowledging none neither from God nor the Church for the Sacrament of Confirmation, making us ſee alſo that the Doctrine of the Engliſh Jeſuits who took away all ſort of obligation to receive this Sacrament, came not from themſelves only; but from the Spirit and School of their Society, as well as the other errours of their Books condemned by the Faculty of *Paris*, and by the Authority of the Clergy of *France*.

*Escobar* discovers yet more clearly this Doctrine of his Company in his Problems, amongst which he places these, (1) *Whether there be a Divine Precept to receive Confirmation*? where having reported the two contrary Opinions, he tells his own in these terms: (2) *I believe there is no Precept neither Divine nor Ecclesiastick to receive Confirmation.* And as if it had not been sufficient to have said it once, he repeats it the second time also, confirming his errour. After
21630 which he proposes this other Problem: (3) *Whether it be a Venial sin to fail of receiving Confirmation*? He concludes that (4) *Except in the case of scandal or contempt it is not of it self any scandal to omit it.* He contents not himself with this neither; but that he might have occasion to repeat this scandalous Proposition, he makes this other question: (5) *Whether the faithful are obliged under the pain of Venial sin, to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation before that of the Eucharist or of Marriage?* And he answers that they are not at all obliged. In his other work wherein he hath collected the Opinions of the 24 Elders who represent the Society, he demands, (6) *What Obligation have we to receive Confirmation?* and he answers, *that there is none that comes either from any Commandment, or from any necessity of this Sacrament it self.* He generally takes away all sort of obligation and necessity from this Sacrament, reducing it into the rank of things free and indifferent. And to testifie this yet more, he adds that one may without sin, at least without any great one, have a formal will not to receive it at all, *sponte omittere*, provided it be without scandal and contempt.

1 Datur & non datur recipiendæ Confirmationis præceptum divinum.

2 Existimo nullum dari nec divinum, nec Ecclesiasticum præceptum Confirmationis recipiendæ. *Escob. tom. 2. lib. 12. Pr 31.*

3 Datur & non datur ullum recipiendæ confirmationis præceptum. *Probl. 32.*

4 Omittere Confirmationem peccatum veniale est, neque peccatum est veniale.

*Probl. 33.* 5 Sub veniali fideles tenentur & nec sub veniali tenentur ante Sacramenti Eucharistiæ & matrimonii susceptionem Confirmationem recipere. *Probl. 34.* (6) Quænam suscipiendi obligatio? Non est necessarium necessitate medii, neque necessitate præcepti. *Escob. tr. 7. ex. 3. n. 3. n. 11. p. 794.*

As if it were not enough to despise so great a gift of God as that of this Sacrament to refuse it voluntarily without cause. There is no King nor Man of quality who would not hold it for a contempt to refuse in this manner any gift
21640 though much smaller, especially if he offer it to some person of low condition, who should shew so little regard of the honour he doth him.

*Mascarenhas* who wrote after the rest, follows in this point the opinion of his Brethren, and speaks also more clearly and resolutely then they, supposing himself to be fortified by their Examples and supported by their Authority. (7) *There is not absolutely*, saith he, *any sin, no not a Venial one, in neglecting to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation: because amongst the common Laws of Christian Religion there is none that commands it; and it cannot be any sin, no not a Venial one, which is not against some Commandment.* He acknowledgeth neither obligation, nor precept, nor any sort of necessity for receiving Confirmation, which is hard to reconcile with the Faith we ought to have in this Divine Sacrament, which contains so great an abundance of Grace and fulness of the Holy Ghost. For if one should say that he might withdraw himself from it through honour and respect, not esteeming himself worthy of so great a gift
620 and bounty of God, he would therein testifie at the least some esteem for this Sacrament of the Holy Ghost. But to maintain that one may withdraw from it of his own will only, and without any reason, and without troubling himself about the Graces and Blessings which he might receive therefrom, is to testifie manifestly that we make no great account of it, and that we would reduce it to the rank of things indifferent. And how can men be diverted from it more openly then by making them believe that they may overlook it, and neglect even the occasions that are convenient for receiving it, without making themselves guilty before God of the least sin?

7 Omittere hoc Sacramentum absolutè loquendo, nec etiam peccatum veniale est; Et ratio est, quia nullum de hoc datur præceptum de jure communi, & nullum datur peccatum nec veniale, nisi sit contra aliquod præceptum. *Mascarenhas tr. 1. de Sacram. in genere, disp. 4. c. 5. p. 47.*

But because this wicked Doctrine is entirely opposite to the consent of the Holy Fathers and Councils who acknowledge the necessity of Confirmation,
21650 the Jesuits have found out a new invention to defeat their Authority herein. They answer that the (8) *Popes and Councils which are alledged against their*

8 Pontifices & Concilia

in contrarium adducta loquuntur de necessitate non præcepti, sed utilitatis. *Escobar supra n. 22. p. 796.*

*Opinion, ſpeak not of a neceſſity of command, but of a neceſſity of benefit.* There is no Commandment ſo expreſs, nor ſo clearly expreſſed neither in the Scripture, nor in the Books of the Church which may not be eluded by this new unheard of and ridiculous Diſtinction. For hitherto none ever ſpoke of a neceſſity of benefit, it being clear that what is only beneficial (as is Confirmation with the Jeſuits) is not neceſſary: and that to joyn in this manner *a neceſſity to utility or an utility to neceſſity*, is to form a kind of Monſter compoſed of two contrary parts, whereof the one deſtroys the other. According to this diſtinction we may ſay that whatſoever is in the Church and in the Scripture, is neceſſary, becauſe there is nothing there which is not profitable; and all the moſt free Counſels themſelves being profitable may be ſaid to be neceſſary.

But to ſhew yet more clearly that this neceſſity of utility is but a vain word which they have invented to obſcure the light of the Ancient Doctrine of the Church, it is manifeſt that according to them it is impoſſible there ſhould be any true neceſſity of any kind for the Sacrament of Confirmation, ſince they hold that it is not commanded by any law of God or the Church, and that the Grace which it confers may be obtained not only by other Sacraments, but alſo by every ſort of good works and exerciſes of Religion, as appears by the Books of Engliſh Jeſuits condemned by the Clergy of *France*, and ſince publickly owned by the Jeſuits in the Book of *Alegambe* approved by their General. 21660

*Eſcobar* alſo expounds his thought more openly, demanding; (1) *If he who hath convenience to receive this Sacrament, which he cannot eaſily another time obtain, being not willing to receive it ſin by contempt?* And he anſwers in one word, *No.* Which is ſo much more conſiderable, becauſe a little after he ſaith of this Sacrament, after the opinion of one of his Brethren, that where (2) *the diſpoſition is equal it confers more Grace then Baptiſm or any other Sacrament, except that of Orders.* So that according to the principles of the Jeſuits we may without any conſiderable neglect, indifferency, or contempt, refuſe all the Graces that are contained in all the Sacraments of the faithful, when God offers them by his extraordinary mercy, and we may receive them without any inconvenience, ſince they will that we may refuſe in that manner the Grace of Confirmation which they hold to be greater then that of all the Sacraments.

1 Qui data copia recipiendi hoc Sacramentum quam poſtea non facile eſt habiturus, non recipit, deliquitne ut contemptor? Minime. *Ib. n.* 23.

2 Aſſerit præpoſitus cæteris paribus majorem gratiam per illam conferri quam per Baptiſmum & quodvis aliud Sacramentum, excepto Ordine. *Ib. n.* 24.

There are two occaſions upon which the Sacrament of Confirmation ſeems to be moſt neceſſary, that of perſecution and peril of death, and that of receiving holy Orders. *Eſcobar* ſpeaking of the firſt, ſaith: (3) *I think that it may happen ſometimes by accident that a man may ſin Venially through raſhneſs, in expoſing himſelf unto mortal danger without receiving Confirmation, when it may eaſily be had.* He will not that we are obliged to receive Confirmation even then when we are expoſed to danger of death during perſecution and being in danger to 21670 loſe the Faith through Torments, though we might eaſily recieve it, and ſo fortifie our ſelves by the incomparable Grace of this Sacrament.

3 Puto eſſe aliquando per accidens peccatum veniale temeritatis ſine confirmatione facile ſuſcipienda periculis mortis tradi. *Ibid. n.* 23. *p.* 796.

But he cannot hinder truth from ſpeaking by his mouth againſt himſelf. For being conſtrained to avow that there is at leaſt Venial ſin in refuſing or neglecting to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation in this extremity, he is obliged by the ſame means to confeſs that this ſin is greater, ſince it is a conſtant maxim with him and his Fraternity, that we ought to judge of the greatneſs of an obligation and ſin by that of their matter. And ſo Confirmation and the Grace of Confirmation being ſo great that according to him it ſurpaſſeth that of all the Sacraments of the Faithful, and the neceſſity of receiving it in the caſe he propoſeth being ſo great that therein ſalvation and peril of renouncing the Faith are concerned, if we be not fortified with the Grace of this Sacrament, it muſt follow of neceſſity that the ſin which we commit in voluntarily neglecting and rejecting it will be great, or none at all.

And *Maſcarenhas* makes uſe of this very reaſon to prove that there is neither any neceſſity nor precept which obligeth us to receive Confirmation. (1) *This matter*, ſaith he, *being of great importance, if there were any Commandment for it, it would oblige under mortal ſin; and there being no ſuch obligation, as we have ſaid before, there is then no precept in this point:* And conſequently it is no ſin at all not to receive this Sacrament.

1 Confirmatur, quia cum hæc res in ſe ſit gravis, ſi de illa daretur aliquod præceptum obligans ſub mortali: ſed non obligat ita, ſicut dictum eſt ſupra; ergo ſignum eſt de hoc nullum dari præceptum. *Maſcarenhas tract. 1. de Sacram. in genere, diſp. 4. cap. 5. pag. 47.*

1680 It muſt be obſerved here, that the Jeſuits have acknowledged at firſt a precept for receiving Confirmation, and have contented themſelves to confine and reſtrain it to the firſt ages of the Church, in which perſecutions were frequent, pretending that it is expired in theſe our times. Afterwards they have ſaid that if this precept did yet oblige at preſent, it was not with ſo great rigour as that it ſhould be any great ſin to go againſt it; and that the Fathers and Councils that had ordained the Faithful to receive this Sacrament, had ordained it only by way of Counſel and not of Precept. 3. From thence they have inferred that it can be at moſt but a Venial ſin to omit Confirmation and neglect the Precept of receiving it. 4. They alſo at length wipe out even that Venial ſin, that they may entirely aboliſh the Commandment for this Sacrament, and perhaps the Sacrament it ſelf if they could, ſo much paſſion and injuſtice do they expreſs in fighting againſt it.

It is by this way and by theſe degrees that they have introduced many Novelties, Errors, and looſe Principles, both into the manners and doctrine of the Church, which they maintain publickly at this day as Truths and Rules of Chriſtian Piety.

As for the other caſe in which it ſeems that we are yet more obliged to receive Confirmation, to wit, before we preſent our ſelves to take Orders; *Eſcobar* demands, (2) *If it be neceſſary to take Confirmation before Orders?* He ſaith at firſt that there are ſome who hold it a crime to fail herein, but he
1690 afterwards expreſſes his own opinion in theſe terms: (3) *I am not afraid to ſay that to receive the raſure without having before-hand received Confirmation, is but a Venial ſin a very ſlight one; and that it is a greater, but yet ſtill a ſimple Venial one, thus to receive the leſſer Orders.*

2 Num Ordinibus neceſſario præmittenda Confirmatio? *Eſcobar Ibid. n. 25 p. 796.*

3 Aſſerutrim receptionem prius Tonſuræ abſque prævia Confirmatione, non excedere culpam venialem levem; Ordinum verò minorum veniale commiſſum gravius. *Ibid.*

He puts the ſame queſtion again a little after in a Chapter which hath for its Title: (4) *The practice in the matter of the Sacrament of Orders, drawn out of the Doctors of the Society of* Jeſus: in which he demands, (5) *whether he who is to be ordained, ought firſt to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation?* He acknowledges that *Tolet* judges that they who do otherwiſe ſin mortally, and are irregular becauſe of the expreſs command of the Council of *Trent*, which is conceived in theſe terms: (6) *That thoſe who have not received the Sacrament of Confirmation be not received unto the raſure:* which hinders not *Eſcobar* from declaring that (7) *that others ſay that the words of the Council are not to be taken rigorouſly; but that it only counſels Biſhops not to promote unto Orders thoſe who have not been Confirmed.* Whence he concludes with them who hold this opinion, (8) *that it is then probable that both he who confers and he who receives Orders before Confirmation ſin only Venially.*

4 Praxis circa materiam de Sacramento Ordinis ex Societatis Jeſu Doctoribus. *Ibid. p 888.*

5 An Ordinandus debeat prius Sacramentum Confirmationis accipere? *Ibid. n. 32.*

1700 This is ſufficiently to deſpiſe the Sacrament of Confirmation, not to vouch-

6 Prima Tonſura non initietur, qui Sacramentum Confirmationis non ſuſceperunt. *Concil. Trident. ſeſſ. 22. cap. 4.*

7 Alii negant adeo ſtrictis verbis uti Concilium Tridentinum, ſed ſolum conſulere Epiſcopis ut non confirmatos non promoveant. 8 Probabiliter ergo tam ſuſcipiens quam conferens Ordinem ante ordinandi Confirmationem ſe venialiter delinquit. *Ibid.*

ſafe to take the pains to receive it for preparation to holy Orders, then when it may ſo eaſily be given by the ſame Biſhop who confers the Orders. But this is alſo a greater contempt of the order of the Church, of the Authority of an Oecumenick Council, and of all Eccleſiaſtick Tradition and Diſcipline, not to fear at leaſt to violate it by a voluntary withdrawing from, and neglect of theſe ſo formal words of the Council of *Trent*; *Primâ Tonſurâ non initientur, qui Sacramentum Confirmationis non ſuſceperint.* As if theſe words did not contain an Ordinance, but only a counſel and ſimple propoſition. Which is a very eaſie way to overthrow all the Decrees of Councils and the Church, and to render them entirely unprofitable.

Here we muſt take notice of the ſpirit of theſe Divines, and the licence which they take to play with Sacraments and Conſciences. They debaſe Confirmation as much as they can, and carry themſelves with viſible paſſion to the diminiſhing of the vertue of this Sacrament, which is the accompliſhment of Baptiſm, without which the grace of Baptiſm continues imperfect, and Chriſtians are not ſuch but only imperfectly, according to the Fathers; and on the other hand we ſee them carry indifferently all the world to confeſſion and the Communion with ſo much ardour and importunity, that they make it the head point of their direction, as the greater part of thoſe who follow their conduct make it the principal part of their devotion.

Which thing is ſo much the more conſiderable, for that if we pre-ſuppoſe even with them that there is no command which obliges us to receive Con- 21710
firmation, ſo alſo neither is there any that obliges us to confeſs oftner then once a year; and this precept of Confeſſion is not at all for Venial ſins, which notwithſtanding are the matter of the Confeſſions which they reiterate and cauſe to be reiterated ſo often by devout perſons and thoſe who deſire to live Chriſtian-like; and nevertheleſs if they knew any one who ſhould divert Penitents from their Tribunals, or who ſhould only ſay to them that it was not neceſſary for them to confeſs ſo often when they have only Venial ſins which may be blotted out by other ways, they would doubtleſs condemn him, and hold him more to blame, then if he had committed ſome great crime; and yet they make no ſcruple to turn away all the faithful indifferently from Confirmation, by this reaſon only, although a falſe one, that there is no obligation nor neceſſity on them to receive it.

But if any will ſay, that the cuſtom of confeſſing and communicating frequently is received in the Church, and thoſe who make a ſpecial Profeſſion of Piety ought to follow it, and cannot neglect it without teſtifying that they contemn it with pride; we muſt confeſs by this reaſon that we are much more obliged to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation, and we cannot neglect the opportunities thereof without diſcovering greater pride and contempt againſt this Sacrament, ſince it is manifeſt that the order, cuſtom, and uſe of receiving it, is much more ancient, more authorized, and more generally and religiouſly ob- 21720
ſerved in the Church, than that of frequent Confeſſion of venial ſins, this practice becoming common only of late times; and that of Confirmation having been generally received and holily obſerved from the beginning of the Church and in all latter Ages, ſo that there hath never been found any one Saint, pious Perſon, or Chriſtian living Chriſtian-like who hath dared to reject it, or who hath withdrawn himſelf voluntarily from it until our times, wherein the Jeſuits have begun to introduce this new Doctrine and new Practice of Devotion.

But it is eaſie to ſee by the Spirit and ordinary Carriage of the Jeſuits, that that which carries them on to aggravate with ſo great care the obligation and neceſſity of Confeſſion and of the Communion, and on the contrary to diminiſh that of Confirmation; to puſh on Chriſtians indifferently to theſe two firſt Sacraments, and to keep them at diſtance from the laſt, is this, that they are not Biſhops to confirm men, as well as they are Prieſts to confeſs and communicate, and that in recommending with ſo much importunity Confeſſion and the Communion, they make themſelves neceſſary; and in diverting the Faithful from Confirmation, they advance the deſign which they have to make Biſhops unuſe-

ful, and to withdraw the people from their guidance, that they may be their Maſters therein, and reign in the Church without any hindrance.

## ARTICLE II. Of the Euchariſt and Penance.

### *What ſort of Diſpoſitions the Jeſuits demand for theſe two Sacraments, and that they teach men to prophane them by Sacriledge.*

AS the Jeſuits incline all ſorts of perſons indifferently to confeſs and communicate, it behoves them that they may bring them on thereunto to make the practice and uſe of theſe two Sacraments very eaſie. We have already ſeen in the Chapter of Penance that they have ſo ſweetned the yoke of Confeſſion, that to confeſs well there needs in a manner nothing but to know how to ſpeak and declare ones ſins, though in many caſes they give liberty alſo to conceal one part, and though one do accuſe himſelf in general, without ſpecifying any in particular, they oblige him not abſolutely to repeat his Confeſſion.

And as for their Penitents who confeſs frequently, they permit them almoſt any thing, even to deceive them and lye in Confeſſion, without believing they commit any great fault, provided it be only in a matter of venial ſin: that if they have committed mortal ſins which they are aſhamed to diſcover, they may by the advice of theſe directors confeſs them to other Prieſts to preſerve their reputation with their ordinary Confeſſor. They will alſo make their Penance as eaſie as their Confeſſion if they pleaſe. For if they be not in a humour to perform it, that they may give them neither trouble nor ſcruple, they will impoſe it on them only by way of counſel, or without preſcribing them any thing in particular, they are content to ſay unto them; *Impono tibi pro pœnitentia quicquid hodie vel hac hebdomada boni feceris, vel mali paſſus fueris. I impoſe upon you for Penance whatſoever good you ſhall do, or evil you ſhall ſuffer this day or this week.*

If a perſon over-run with crimes addreſs himſelf to them, and be troubled to make known the bottom of his Conſcience and to diſcover the corruption of his Heart, by declaring his wicked inclinations and habits, they will not preſs on him in this point, no more then to tell them in particular the number of his wicked deſires, impurities, and ſecret crimes which move in his ſpirit and in his heart, though it were eaſie for him to do it if he would; they content themſelves if he ſay, *Amavi Mariam toto menſe, toto anno. I have loved* Mary *a whole month, a whole year.* But if he alſo ſtartle at Penance, they will give him ſo ſlight an one that he cannot refuſe it; they will even leave him to his choice, if it be needful, and they will remit him to do his Penance in the other world.

After this they muſt wholly renounce all devotion, who will not go to confeſs themſelves to the Jeſuits; and it ſeems that he who refuſes can have no other pretence then to ſay that he hath no devotion; and he may adde that he cannot have any for Confeſſion as the Jeſuits repreſent it, and that he cannot believe that he confeſſes himſelf as he ought, if he confeſs as they ſay he may.

But after all this, though one will not be devout, if he be a Catholick he muſt at leaſt confeſs himſelf at *Eaſter*, that thereupon he may communicate: the Command of the Church is expreſs, and to fail herein were to decry and declare himſelf to be a man of no Religion. The Jeſuits have therefore provided for this alſo; they have made the obſervation of this Precept ſo eaſie, that the moſt debauched and moſt impious may diſcharge this duty according to them, without being obliged not only to change their lives, but to interrupt the courſe of their debauches for the time only while they go to Church, and return after they have preſented themſelves to a Prieſt to whom they may tell only what they pleaſe of their ſins, and do alſo what they liſt of all that he ſaith to them. For it is a common opinion amongſt theſe Doctors, that we may ſatisfie the Command

which ordains that we ſhould at leaſt confeſs our ſelves once a year by any manner of Confeſſion whatſoever it be, provided that we can ſay that it is a Confeſſion, though it be a Sacriledge.

They ſay the ſame thing of the Communion, and hold that we may ſatisfie the Command of the Church in communicating unworthily and receiving the Body of Jeſus Chriſt after we have confeſſed in the manner now related, or without any Confeſſion at all, though we believe we are in mortal ſin, and overrun with crimes. But becauſe I ſhall handle theſe two Points in their proper place, expounding the Commandments of the Church according to the Maxims of the Jeſuits, I will not ſpeak thereof here at all, and I will reſt ſatisfied only in repreſenting ſome of the diſpoſitions with which they hold, that we may communicate worthily and receive the fruit of the Communion. They grant indeed that our conſcience muſt not be charged with any crime, but they hardly require any thing farther.

It is from this Principle that *Filliutius* ſpeaking of diſpoſitions for this Sacra- 21760
ment, ſaith at firſt, that we ought to be in a ſtate of Grace, and free from mortal ſin, but in the ſequel he declares that there needs no other preparation. (1) *Firſt*, ſaith he, *it is not neceſſary to have actual devotion.* Whence he draws this conſequence: (2) *That he who is voluntarily diſtracted in the Sacrament, provided he contemns it not, puts no obſtacle to the effect of the Communion, becauſe he ſins not mortally.* Suppoſing there is nothing but mortal ſin alone which makes a man indiſpoſed for the Communion, and to receive the effect of the Euchariſt. He adds a little after, (3) *That it is not alſo neceſſary to be without venial ſin*, whatſoever it may be, even voluntary, wherewith one actually and deliberately imploys himſelf at the holy Table; and when even after he hath received the Body of Jeſus Chriſt, and holds it yet in his mouth, inſtead of adoring it, he diſhonours and offends him expreſly by ſome venial ſin whereunto he caſts himſelf at that very ſeaſon, this ſhall not be incompatible with the Communion, and ſhall not give any ſtop to its effect, according to this Jeſuit. (4) *As to actual ſin*, ſaith he, *which is committed in the very Communion it ſelf, it hinders not at all from receiving the Grace of the Communion, becauſe this ſin makes not the perſon unworthy of* the participation of the Body and Blood of Jeſus Chriſt, becauſe, according to him, there is nothing but mortal ſin that is capable of cauſing this unworthineſs.

1 Non requiritur autem neceſſariò: primò actualis devotio:

2 Ex quo etiam colligitur voluntariè diſtractum ſecluſo contemptu, quia culpa non eſt mortalis, non ponere obicem. *Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 4. c. 6. n. 163. 164. pag. 87.*

3 Non requiritur carentia peccati venialis. *Ibid.*

4 De actuali peccato veniali quod committitur ipſam communionem, etiam probatur non ponere ob eam; quia tale peccatum non facit indignum. *Ibid. n. 165.*

He may ſay by the ſame reaſon, that he who ſhould be ſo rude as of meer hu- 21770
mour to juſtle the King, and loſe all the reſpect he owes him, whilſt he ſits with him at his Table, ſhould not thereby render himſelf by this inſolence unworthy of the honour which he had done him; or that a Child who was reſolved to do his Father all the diſpleaſure he could, and ſhould actually do it, Parricide only excepted, ſhould not be ſo unworthy but that he might receive him to his Table, and give him the utmoſt teſtimonies of paternal affection. For this is in effect that which he maintains when he declares that there is nothing but mortal ſin which renders a man indiſpoſed for the Communion; and that no venial ſin, though voluntary, nor even that which is purpoſely committed whilſt the Body of Jeſus Chriſt is actually received, can render him who commits it unworthy of the Communion nor of the fruit of the Grace which it confers; he thinks alſo that he hath found a good reaſon to ſupport his opinion, when he ſaith, (5) *That otherwiſe he who communicates in this diſpoſition ſins mortally, becauſe he who receives unworthily the Body and Blood of Jeſus Chriſt, eats and drinks his own damnation.* As if we could not communicate unworthily without ſinning mortally. This is on one ſide too rigorous to think that all indiſpoſitions in the Communion ſhould be mortal; and on the other ſide too large to believe that all ſorts of venial ſins, even voluntary and affected, ſhould not be indiſpoſitions to this Sacrament. All that which renders the ſtomach incapable of receiving food or of di- 21780
geſting it, is not mortal; and yet though the food received in this eſtate kills not the perſon, yet it ceaſes not to weaken him, and to cauſe in him thoſe diſeaſes which ſometimes bring him to his end.

5 Alioquin talis peccaret mortaliter: quia qui indigne ſuſcipit, judicium ſibi manducat & bibit. *Ibid.*

But foreſeeing that it might be juſtly objected unto him, that his opinion is univer-

univerſally condemned by the Holy Fathers and Councils, there where they repreſent the great purity wherewith the Body of Jeſus Chriſt ought to be received in the Communion; he ſaith to prevent this objection: (1) *That if the Holy Fathers ſeem to demand more, we muſt take that which they ſay as a counſel, or as an exhortation to communicate with more fruit and benefit.* There is nothing more eaſie than in this manner to defeat all Authorities and all the Ordinances of the Fathers and Councils. There is nothing ſo formal in the Scripture it ſelf which may not be eluded by this diſtinction, making every thing paſs for counſel which appears contrary to our ſenſe, and too rigorous to the fleſh, that ſo we may diſpenſe therewith without ſcruple.

He relates amongſt others the Council of *Trent*, daring even to pretend that it is for him in this Point: (2) *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *we can collect no other thing from Scripture and from Councils than that he who communicates ought to try himſelf. Now the Council of* Trent, *ſeſſ.* 13. *teacheth us that this proof conſiſts in this, that no perſon who believes himſelf guilty of mortal ſin, ought to approach unto the Euchariſt without being confeſſed firſt of all.* It is indeed true that the Council demands 21790 this. It ordaineth that they who perceive themſelves guilty of any crime ſhould purifie themſelves from it by the Sacrament of Penance, before they approach to the Communion; but it declares beyond this, that every man penitent or innocent ought to be informed of the dignity and holineſs of this heavenly Sacrament, and to take heed (3) *not to approach unto it to receive it without profound reverence and great holineſs.*

This is not to be in great holineſs, but ſimply without great evil, to be exempt only from mortal ſin; and none can ſay that this is to have a profound reverence for Jeſus Chriſt, to offend him voluntarily in receiving. And yet though the Council forbids to communicate without very great holineſs and profound reverence, *Filliutius* ceaſes not to pretend that we may communicate worthily in committing venial ſins whilſt we do communicate, and perſiſting in them voluntarily.

And to remove all ſcruple from them who are fallen into crimes, and yet have a deſire to communicate, he puts this queſtion: (4) *For how long time ought he to forbear to communicate who hath ſinned mortally?* His anſwer is, (5) *That he who hath remorſe for his ſins, and who hath confeſſed them, may abſolutely communicate, though the very night before, or even a little before the Communion he have ſinned* 21800 *mortally.* He demands no other interval between the crime and the Communion, than that which is neceſſary unto Confeſſion, into whatſoever diſorders and abominations we be plunged before, pretending that we may paſs in an inſtant from the moſt enormous ſins to the Altar and participation of the Body and Blood of Jeſus Chriſt: that is to ſay, from Hell into Paradiſe, and from the eſtate of a Devil to that of an Angel, ſince he that eats the bread of Angels ought to participate of the eſtate and purity of Angels.

1 Quod ſi Sancti Patres videantur plus exigere, intelligendi ſunt vel in ordine ad uberiorem & magis fructuoſam ſumptionem, vel quoad conſilium. *Ibid.* num. 165.

2 Quia ex Scriptura & Conſiliis tantum colligitur debere eum qui communicat ſe probare. Tridentinum autem ſeſſ. 13. docet hanc probationem in eo conſiſtere, ut nullus ſibi conſcius peccati mortalis abſque confeſſione ad Euchariſtiam accedat. *Ibid.* num. 164.

3 Ne abſque magna reverentia & ſanctitate ad percipiendum accedat. *Conc. Trid.* ſeſſ. 13. *cap.* 7.

4 Quæro quanto temporis ſpatio tenetur communionem differre qui peccavit mortaliter? *Ibid. tract.* 4. *cap.* 8. n. 214. pag. 94.

5 Reſpondeo eum qui contritus eſt & confeſſus poſſe per ſe communicare, etiamſi præcedente nocte vel aliquo ſpatio ante mortaliter peccaverit. *Ibid.*

He muſt be both a bad Divine that holds Maxims ſo oppoſite to the judgment and perpetual diſcipline of the Church, and a bad Philoſopher who imagines that the ſpirit of a man can ſo eaſily paſs in an inſtant from the moſt violent deordination of paſſions, to the peace and purity of contrary vertues; and he muſt alſo be a far worſe Chriſtian to be ſo little touched with reſpect and love to Jeſus Chriſt and his neighbour, as to expoſe the one ſo raſhly to ſo great contempt and ſo unworthy uſage, and the other to ſo viſible a ruine and damnation. And if he be not abſolutely impious and a Libertine who holds an opinion ſo horrible, he muſt be at the leaſt more bold and impudent than the impious and Libertines themſelves, who without doubt, dare not maintain publickly what this Jeſuit maintains, and have not the confidence at any time to talk thus before conſiderable perſons who have any ſenſe of piety, but that they know theſe diſcourſes are found amongſt the Books of the Jeſuits.

*Maſcarenhas* propoſes the ſame caſe with *Filliutius*, but with much greater extent, and confidence, and clearing of all the difficulties which may ariſe from

his reſolution. (1) *He*, ſaith he, *who is fallen into voluntary and mortal pollution,* 21810
*be it that he have committed this crime all alone or with ſome other, may communicate the ſame day, confeſſing himſelf firſt of all with neceſſary grief.* That is to ſay, with a ſorrow natural or ſupernatural, true or held for true, though it be not, the one or the other being ſufficient with the Sacrament, according to this Divine, as we have made appear when we ſpoke of Penance and Confeſſion; and he holds himſelf ſo well aſſured in his anſwer, that he doubts not but that a man may with this diſpoſition alone communicate worthily. (2) *All the difficulty in this caſe*, ſaith he, *is to know if the Confeſſor ought to counſel theſe perſons that are thus fallen into mortal and voluntary pollution, to abſtain from communicating the ſame day, not becauſe of the Precept, becauſe there is none that forbids it, as we have now ſhown; but by way of advice, becauſe of that reverence which is due unto ſo great a Sacrament.* He acknowledges, (3) *That the common opinion of the Doctors is that the Confeſſor ought to give this counſel.* But he declares at the ſame time that it is not his, and that *the opinion of* Sancius *pleaſes him better, to wit, that this counſel ought not to be given theſe perſons; but rather to incline them to communicate, provided they be well diſpoſed thereunto by Confeſſion.*

1 Qui habuit voluntariam & mortaliter peccaminoſam pollutionem, ſive cum complice, ſive ſine illo, ſi habeat debitum illum dolorem, præmiſſa confeſſione poterit in eadem die communicare. *Maſcarenhas tr. 4. de Sacr. Euchar. diſp. 5. cap. 7. pag. 239.*

2 Tota difficultas eſt utrum Confeſſarius debeat conſulere his ſic voluntariè & mortaliter pollutis, ut illo die à communione ſe abſtineant, non ex præcepto, quod ut dictum eſt nullum datur, ſed ex conſilio propter reverentiam debitam tanto Sacramento? *Ibid.* 3 Ordinariè reſpondent authores affirmativè; nihilominus tamen mihi magis placet opinio Joannis Sancii in ſuis ſelectis, diſp. 23. n. 30. aſſerentis hoc non eſſe conſulendum, imo potius conſulendum quod communicent, dummodo ſint per confeſſionem ritè diſpoſiti. 4 Deinde etiam conſulendum ne pœnitentes defraudentur gratiâ hujus Sacramenti & aliis plurimis effectibus, Ideo reus erit qui dignum pœnitentem communione defraudat, & ille talis dignus eſt.

And he would not only that a Confeſſor ſhould not divert them from the 21820
Communion; but he pretends alſo, (4) *That he is obliged to incline them to it, that he may not deprive the Penitent of the Grace of this Sacrament and many other effects.* And this obligation, according to him, is ſo ſtrict, that *the Confeſſor makes himſelf guilty*, reus erit, *if he deprive a Penitent of the Communion who is worthy of it, as he is of whom the queſtion proceeds.*

If a Confeſſor is guilty for not inclining unto the Communion thoſe who are fallen the ſame day into voluntary and mortal pollution, S. *Paul* will be much more ſo in the judgment of this Divine when he counſels married perſons to abſtain from the uſe of Marriage, which though lawful, renders married perſons indiſpoſed unto prayer; which will be falſe: And by conſequence the counſel which he gives them upon this Principle, to live in continence that they may pray, will be ill founded and raſh, if the crimes of Luxury hinder not thoſe who have committed them, from going the ſame day to the Communion, and gives not power unto a Confeſſor to counſel them to abſtain from it, it being manifeſt that the Communion requires a greater purity and preparation than prayer.

The Church alſo muſt have been many Ages in errour, when it did not only counſel, but alſo command by many expreſs Canons, that thoſe who were fallen into mortal ſins of impurity and others, ſhould be deprived many years of the Communion, what remorſe ſoever they teſtified for their crimes.

The reaſon of this Jeſuit is, that wrong would be done unto this ſinner by de- 21830
priving him of the grace and fruits of the Sacrament: *Ne defraudetur gratia hujus Sacramenti & aliis plurimis effectibus.* He ſuppoſes that he is truly converted in a moment, being one ſtep out of his debauches, and that he is entred all at once, without doing any thing elſe but confeſſing himſelf, into the diſpoſitions neceſſary for receiving the grace and effects of the Communion: which is notwithſtanding at the leaſt very doubtful, there being cauſe to fear rather that the Communion might turn to his condemnation, than to preſume that he ſhall receive the fruits and bleſſings which it communicates unto thoſe who receive it worthily.

This conſideration for all that and this fear touches not nor aſtoniſhes this Jeſuit. For though it were manifeſt that this ſinner were not re-entred into the Grace of God by Confeſſion, and that he ſhould commit Sacriledge by communicating in an eſtate of mortal ſin; he pretends that however, though he received

not at the preſent the grace and other effects of the Communion, he yet ſhould not for all that wholly loſe them; but they ſhould be held in reſerve and kept for him until ſuch time as he ſhould receive more purely. This is that he teſtifies when he ſaith: (1) *That he who approacheth unto the Euchariſt with ſome hindrance contrary unto Grace, hath a right to receive it when the hindrance is removed; and by conſequence the Sacrament produces its effect ſo ſoon as the hindrance ceaſes.*

Whence it follows that a man by Sacriledges acquires right to the Grace of the Sacraments inſtead of drawing down the curſe of God upon him, and that the more Sacriledges and Profanations he commits, the more treaſure of Grace he
21840 heaps up, inſtead of heaping up treaſures of wrath, and depriving himſelf more and more of the rights of the Children of God, by withdrawing himſelf farther from him.

But we need not mark more particularly the incredible abſurdities and impertinences of this Doctrine, ſince he who produced it himſelf avows a good part of them, and confeſſes freely, (2) *That it follows thence that if a man after he have communicated many times in a bad eſtate come to be converted, he ſhall receive in an inſtant all the Grace that was due to ſo many Communions, though they were celebrated in an unworthy manner.* This is an horrible way to become a Saint in a moment by ſacrilegious Communions, and a puiſſant reaſon to incline the greateſt ſinners frequently to commit and reiterate them, becauſe they will be ſo many proviſions of Grace, which will produce an abundance capable to repleniſh the Soul in all parts as ſoon as it is pleaſed to turn it ſelf; ſo that they ſhall ſurpaſs in Holineſs many of thoſe who have lived in innocence, when they were plunged in vices.

He alledges for one reaſon of ſo many impieties and impertinences, (3) *That herein will appear with more advantage the mercy and clemency of Jeſus Chriſt, and the vertue and efficacy of ſo great a Sacrament, which will in conſequence thereof become more frequent and honoured.* It is without doubt that the Communions will be more frequent, if the greateſt ſinners be admitted and even invited thereto, by
21850 making them believe that though they commit Sacriledges, they acquire a right unto the Grace of the Sacrament which they prophane. But to pretend that Jeſus Chriſt is honoured by theſe kinds of Communions, is to pretend that he is honoured by Sacriledges: and to place his mercy in this, is to imagine that it conſiſts in the prophanation of the moſt holy Myſteries and in the loſs of Souls. It appears indeed therein very great as well as his patience; but it is in that he ſupports thoſe who commit theſe Sacriledges, and thoſe who authorize and provoke men to commit them by their wicked Doctrine.

He farther affirms, (4) *That it follows from this Doctrine, that a man may become moſt holy in an inſtant becauſe of many Sacriledges which he hath committed; and ſo much the more holy as he hath committed more of them; and yet more holy, if he have communicated or ſaid the Maſs ten or an hundred times a day contrary to the Rules of the Church, which appears in it ſelf incredible.* It is true that this is incredible, ſo extravagant and impious is it. But this Jeſuit attempts to make it credible and reaſonable by a Chimerical and imaginary diſtinction, ſaying, (5) *That this man will not become in an inſtant moſt holy by having committed many Sacriledges, but for having communicated many times.* As if many Communions made in mortal ſin, and many Sacriledges were not the ſame thing. He adds that
21860 (6) *If he become ſo much more holy, by how many more Sacriledges he hath committed, this proceeds not directly from the Sacriledges, but by accident. For this increaſe of Grace and Holineſs comes properly from the great number of Communions which he hath celebrated; and it happened by accident that theſe Communions were Sacriledges.*

1 Ille qui cum obice accedit, habet jus ad gratiam ſublato obice. Ergo ablato obice hoc Sacramentum producit effectum. *Maſcarenhas tr. 1. de Sacr. in gen. diſp. 4. cap. 5. num. 211.*

2 Non obſtat quod ſi aliquis qui multoties cum peccato communicaret, poſtea converteretur — acquiret ſubito totam illam gratiam debitam tali Sacramento toties ſumpto ſi bene & licite communicaret.

3 Nam in hoc ipſo magis apparet miſericordia & clement a Chriſti Domini, & virtus & efficacia tanti Sacramenti, quod maxime per hoc extollitur & amplificatur.

4 Dices cum P. Lug. diſp. 9. ſect. 6. n. 208. in fine 5 Ex hac doctrina ſequeretur quod homo fieret repente ſanctiſſimus propter plura ſacrilegia, & eo ſanctior, quò plura fuiſſent ſacrilegis, & multò ſanctior ſi ſingulis diebus contra leges Eccleſiæ decies vel centies celebraſſet; quod ex ſe incredibile apparet. 7 Reſpondeo in tali caſu non fieri hominem repentiſſimè ſanctiſſimum propter plura ſacrilegia commiſſa, ſed propter plures communiones. 6 Et ſi eò ſit ſanctior quò plura fuiſſent ſacrilegia, hoc non ſequi per ſe, ſed per accidens. Per ſe enim tale augmentum gratiæ & ſanctitatis provenit ex pluribus ſumptionibus Euchariſtiæ; & per accidens eſt quod tales ſumptiones fuerint ſacrilegæ. *Ibid.*

If we may not ſay according to him, ſuppoſing that theſe ſacrilegious Communions produce Grace, that they are the Sacriledges, but only the Communions that produce it, neither according to him may we ſay that this man hath ſinned in communicating, but only in committing Sacriledges, nor that any Communions do hurt ſinners, but only the Sacriledges which they commit in communicating: for the Communion of it ſelf hurts none, and is not evil of it ſelf; but only the abuſe and the Sacriledge which they adjoyn to it by their fault.

The reaſon by which he props this rare ſubtlety is ridiculous. He ſaith that it is by accident that theſe Communions become Sacriledges. But although it be true that the Communion in it ſelf and in general contains not Sacriledge therein, and that it comes by accident which befals it; nevertheleſs it is true that theſe particular Communions made with theſe particular circumſtances, and in this eſtate of mortal ſin, contain Sacriledge therein, in ſuch ſort, that it is impoſſible to ſeparate them; and it is the ſame thing in this particular Communion, to be a Communion and to be a Sacriledge. And ſo it is not by accident that it is a Sacriledge; but of it ſelf and of its proper nature. And by conſequence as it may be ſaid truly that this Communion makes a man guilty and kills him, 21870
though it kill him not as a Communion in general, but as a Communion ſacrilegious in particular: ſo we may ſay with truth that this Sacriledge ſanctifies not the man, if it be true that this ſacrilegious Communion gives him right unto Grace, though it give him not this right as Sacriledge, but as a Communion.

I ſpeak not here of Extream-unction; for that my deſign being only to repreſent the Maxims of the Jeſuits Morals, the exceſs which they commit in the matter of this Sacrament doth reſpect the Doctrine and Diſcipline of the Church rather than Manners.

I might very well treat here of Orders and Marriage, and thereby make the corruptions and abuſes appear which they have introduced and cheriſhed in married perſons and Eccleſiaſticks: but becauſe this may be done more conveniently and more to purpoſe, as in its proper place, when we ſpeak of the Duties of theſe two Eſtates, I will ſpeak here only a few things concerning Prieſts, ſo far as they are the Churches Deputies to adminiſter the Sacraments and Word of God unto the Faithful, and to offer unto him in the name of the Faithful the publick Sacrifices and Prayers. Where I ſhall make appear particularly the corruption which the Jeſuits introduce into theſe eſtates.

## ARTICLE. III. Of the Sacrament of Marriage.

WE may conſider in Marriage the diſpoſitions that precede, the conſent of 21880
the Parties, the bleſſing of the Church which eſtabliſheth it, and the uſe which follows thereupon. We may ſin many ways in theſe three things; but the Jeſuits know how to take away or diminiſh theſe ſins by their obſequious Divinity.

The firſt diſpoſition unto Marriage is to have no impediment which may make it null or unlawful. Concerning this *Tambourin* eſtabliſheth theſe Rules.

1 Si facta diligentia dubites de impedimento dirimenti ad ducendam aliquam, potes illam ſine diſpenſatione ducere. Ita Merolla, Sanch. Si dubites an indigeas aliqua diſpenſatione in impedimento dirimenti ad contrahendum matrimonium cum aliqua, & in ſimilibus, potes tibi perſuadere eâ non indigere, & conſequenter poſſe te matrimonium inire 5. Si vero certus es te indigere diſpenſatione, ſed dubius an illam obtineris, prævalet indigentia certa contra dubiam diſpenſationem. At ſi certus es de indigentia ſeu impedimento, & item certus quod obtineris diſpenſationem, ſed ambigis an diſpenſatio ſit valida, quia dubitas an cauſa in petitione diſpenſationis tacitò vel falsò expreſſa, ſit finalis, hoc eſt ut ſine illa adhuc fuiſſet conceſſa; vel quia dubitas an Superior qui eſt in certa poſſeſſione ſuperioritatis in aliquem, ſit Superior legitimus necne, validane erit judicanda diſpenſatio? Præſumendum eſſe validam——Utraque opinio ſaltem propter authoritatem extrinſecam probabilis eſt. *Tambur. lib.* 1. *cap.* 3. *ſect.* 6. *verbo diſpenſatio num.* 1, 3, 5.

*(1) If after things are well conſidered, you are in doubt of ſome diſſolving impediment which makes you incapable to marry ſome perſon, you may marry her without diſpenſation. When you doubt whether you have need of a diſpenſation to contract Marriage, you may perſwade your ſelf that you have no need: but if you be aſſured that you have need to be diſpenſed with, and you doubt whether you have obtained it,*

*the assurance of the need which you have prevails above the uncertainty of the dispensa-*
21890 *tion. But if you be assured that you have need of a dispensation, and that you are engaged in some impediment of Marriage; as also that you have obtained a dispensation, and you doubt whether this dispensation be valid, because you doubt whether a cause which hath not been expressed in your demand of the dispensation, or which hath been falsely alledged therein, is such that without it the dispensation had not been granted; or because you doubt whether the Superiour who hath granted it, and who is in possession of the superiority be legitimate; may we judge in this case that the dispensation is valid? Some believe that it ought to pass as null; others on the contrary that it ought to be held for good: The one and the other of these opinions are probable because of the authority of those who hold them.* That is to say, that there are none but those who would put themselves to fruitless trouble, who will take any care to see whether they obey the Church, and to demand of it permission to do that which it forbids; since in the most important commands, and most assured obligations, the least suspicion and the least doubt we can have of being acquitted thereof, whether it be of having had a dispensation, or of having had a just and reasonable one, suffices to put the conscience in repose, without taking care of any other thing.

According to these Maxims and this reasoning of our Jesuit, a man who doubts whether he owe a sum of money or a rent, or who being assured that he owes it, doubts whether he have paid it, or who knows certainly that he doth owe it and hath not paid it, and doubts only whether he to whom he owes it hath gotten it well, or whether there were not some defect in the contract, in all these cases and in all these doubts, shall not be obliged to pay.

21900 I know not whether the Jesuits observe these Rules or this Conduct towards their Creditors: but I cannot believe that they would have their Debtors observe them towards themselves; and yet they teach men to demean themselves in this manner towards God, assuring them that upon a simple probability and doubtful conjecture they may transgress the Commandment of God and the Church, without troubling themselves about the faults which they may fear they have committed in failing therein of their duty, no more than about the dispensations for their exemption for the future.

A Rape is one impediment of Marriage, according to the Council of *Trent*, which excommunicates and condemns unto a perpetual infamy those who have committed this crime, or who have been accessories thereto. (1) *Dicastillus* following the opinion of *Sanchez*, believes that the Canon and all the Penalties it ordains, respect the men only and not the women who are guilty of this crime of Rape; because in the Council it is *Raptor*, and not *Raptrix*, and *this odious Decree ought not to be enlarged.* For it is an odious thing in the Divinity of the Jesuits to condemn crimes. *Tambourin* hath taken the same care to restrain this Decree. (2) *If any one*, saith he, *steal a woman to abuse her, and not to marry her,*
21910 *he incurs not the penalty of the Council. The reason*, saith this Father, *is because the Council pretends only hereby to provide for the freedom of Marriages.* He must be therefore less punishable who is more criminal, since to commit a Rape to abuse a woman is an action more lewd and more criminal than to steal her to marry her, it being impossible to expose her to greater extremity than to abandon her after she hath been abused. As if he who steals a woman and abuses her, did not hinder a woman from being married, as she might have been before, and did not reduce her to a necessity of being married to him that will accept of her.

1 Sanchez referens Basil. & Rebell. putat illud decretum Trid. non se extendere ad fœminam rapientem virum, quia Tridentinum tantum loquitur de raptore, non de raptrice, & odiosum & fœminale non est ad rapticem extendendum. *Dicastil. de matrimonio tract. 10. disp. 7. d. 58. num. 660.* 2 Quare si quis rapiat mulierem causa libidinis, & non ad contrahendum cum illa matrimonium, non incurrit prædictas Concilii pœnas— Ratio est quia Concilium nil intendit præterea nisi libertati matrimonii providere. *Tambur. lib. 7. decal. 6. sect. 2. num. 11.*

This Author finds also another means to exempt from the condemnation of the Council of *Trent* those who steal women. (3) He saith that if any carry away a woman whether she will or no to cause her to be married unto his friend, his friend knowing nothing thereof, neither the Ravisher, nor he for whom the woman was stolen, incurs the pains ordained by the Decree of the Council, *which*

3 Ignorante Cæsare adolescente abducta est ab ejus amico quædam inviro puella, ut

eidem Cæsari illa puella in matrimonium traderetur— Si neque per se, neque per alium Cæsar puellam rapuit, ipse raptor non est, atque adeo pœnas non incurrit ex Sanchez :

*being odious, ought not be extended beyond its words. And thereby you see,* saith he, *in this case as well the friend who hath committed the Rape, as the young man for whom the woman was stoln, may lawfully contract Marriage with her, without having need to be separated from her afterwards.* So that he who hath a friend of some competent understanding may marry by force what woman he pleaseth; and if he for whom she was stoln make some scruple because of the Rape, he who hath stoln her may upon his refusal take her himself and marry her without fear of the Excommunication of the Council. 21920

amicus etiam nec incurrit, quia non est raptor pro suo matrimonio, de quo loquitur Tridentini decretum; quod cum sit odiosum, non est extendendum ultra verba. Unde vides in hoc casu, tum amicum hunc, tum adolescentem illum pro quo rapta est mulier, valide posse matrimonium inire cum eadem mulliere etiam non separata. *Tambur. lib. 7. cap. 6. sect. 2. num. 16.*

Children have an obligation upon them by the Law of Nature not to marry at least without demanding the consent of their Fathers and Mothers. *Dicastillus* saith, (1) *That he finds it hard to admit that children are obliged under the pain of mortal sin to advertise their fathers and mothers of their Marriages; and to demand their advice: he sees not the foundation of so strict an obligation.*

1 Quod sit obligatio monendi parentes & petendi consilium sub mortali, non facile admiserim, nec satis assequor fundamentum hujus tam gravis obligationis & peccati in non petendo consilio ab eis quorum petitum & datum omnino libtrum est rejicere. *Dicast. de matr. tr. 1. disp. 4. d. 17. n. 176.*

For what respects Marriage considered in it self, though the Council of *Trent* ordain that for the future clandestine Marriages shonld be null, and assures us that the Church hath always detested them, *Dicastillus* ceases not to be favourable unto them. (2) He saith, *That it is no sin to make clandestine Contracts of Marriage, and that they are not comprised in the prohibition made by the Council against clandestine Marriages.*

The Church declares sufficiently its intent and the thoughts of the Council of *Trent* upon this Point in the Ceremonies which it prescribes and would have observed in the Betrothing for the Publication of the Bains, he saith, (3) *That we are not obliged to observe them, when any notable damage would follow thereupon; that we are not obliged to demand a dispensation, though we might conveniently demand it of the Ordinary, and he were ready to grant it——That this is not only lawful then when the damage is certain, but also when we have some probable suspicion.* 21930

2 Oppositum satis constat, nullum scilicet esse peccatum. Prohibitionem vero matrimonii clandestini non extendendam esse ad sponsalia. *Ibid. tr. 10. dist. 1. dub. 24. num. 351.*

The Order of the Church for the Bains is express, as for the Betrothing; this Jesuit would abolish the one and the other, which are as it were the Preparatives unto lawful Marriage, and the Precautions against the clandestine, that he might better favour and authorize them against the prohibition of the Council which condemns them. In which he doth like them who seize on the Suburbs and Avenues of a City which they would carry by force. For after what he lately spoke thus for abolishing the Bains and authorizing clandestine Contracts of Marriage, he maintains, (4) *That not only clandestine Marriage is valid even amongst the Inhabitants of a Country where the Council of* Trent *is received, when they go into another Country where it is not observed, that they may marry in secret; but that this Marriage is lawful, provided that in other things they observe the ancient Laws, though they have purposely changed place, that they might be discharged from the Law of the Council of* Trent *by which they were obliged in their own Country.* We must say then according to this Casuist, that it is lawful to make Marriages which the Church doth nullifie, and which it never approved in those very times in which it suffered them. For these sorts of Marriages have been heretofore indeed valid, but they were never lawful, on the contrary they have been always censured in the Church.

3 Præceptum de denunciationibus non obligat quando ex illius observatione notabile damnum sequitur. Quapter in talibus occasionibus nulla requiritur dispensatio, etiamsi ordinarius posset commode adiri, sitque paratus dispensationem concedere— non solum quando est certum, sed etiam quando est probabilis suspicio. *Ibid. disp. 3. dub. 27. num. 212.* 4 Addendum verum esse valide, etsi matrimonium ab incolis loci in quo Tridentinum viget, in loco, in quo non viget, etiamsi eo transierit eum ob finem clandestine contrahendi— & non solum valide, sed licite posse fieri, servando in aliis jus antiquum, quamvis eum ob finem transierit, ut non obligaretur Tridentini decreto, quo obligabatur in proprio loco cujus erat incola. *Ibid. dub. 6. num. 42.*

But

21940 But if the Jeſuits make Marriages good which are null, on the contrary they make thoſe null which are good. (1) *I ſay*, ſaith Tambourin, *that it is probable that a Marriage contracted by ſome ſlight fear unjuſtly induced, is null in conſcience; and even ſome fear juſtly raiſed probably may nullifie the Marriage.* It muſt then be affirmed, that Marriages to which perſons are condemned by the Judges; which Fathers cauſe their Children to make; which Maſters make of their Servants, and Princes of their Subjects, are null, becauſe commonly theſe Marriages are made with ſome ſort of fear. And the ſame thing muſt be ſaid of the Profeſſions made by Monks and Nuns, and conſequently of all ſorts of Engagements and Contracts. Nevertheleſs it is apparent that the Jeſuits make uſe of fear as well as hope ſometimes for a motive to engage young perſons in their Society, and they would not refuſe a donation or foundation which ſhould be made to them with ſome fear, without doubting whether it might be null.

1 Dico eſſe probabile matrimonium metu levi injuſte ad hoc incuſſo celebratum nullum eſſe in foro conſcientiæ. *Tamb. lib. 1. decal. cap. 2. ſect. 6. n. 12.* Ex metu quoq; juſtè incuſſo hujuſmodi matrimonium nullum eſſe non puto improbabile. *ſect. 7. n. 3.*

For what concerns the uſe of Marriage, albeit the bodies of married perſons are not in their own power, according to the words of Scripture, (2) *Dicaſtillus* forbears not *to permit a married woman to retain to her ſelf the price of her Adultery.* The reaſon *Tambourin* brings for it is conſiderable. (3) *The Husband,*
21950 ſaith he, *is not ſo maſter of the body of his Wife that he hath a perfect dominion over it, but he hath only the power to uſe it according to the Law of Marriage with excluſion of all others: which certainly takes not from the woman power to gain ſomething, though not without ſin, by proſtituting her body.* This reaſon is worthy the Propoſition which it is brought to prove. For it is a manifeſt contradiction to ſay that a husband hath a right to uſe the body of his wife with excluſion of every other, and that nevertheleſs the woman may ſell the uſe of the ſame body unto another, if in ſelling this uſe ſhe ſell not that which belongs unto her husband, ſhe doth no injuſtice, and ſhe doth not properly commit adultery, and her ſin will not be more than a ſimple fornication.

2 Non ſolum publica mere rix, ſed etiam occulta & maritata poteſt retinere pretium fornicationis & adulterii. *Dicaſtill. lib. 2. tr. 2. diſp. 6. dub. 1. n. 18.*

3 Ratio mihi videtur eſſe quia vir non eſt ita dominus corporis uxoris, ut in illud perfectiſſimum dominium habeat: ſed ſolum ita ut illo uti queat in debito conjugali omnibus aliis excluſis; quod certè non tollit uxori facultatem requirendi, licet cum peccato, ex turpi ſui corporis conceſſione. *Tambur lib 7. decal. cap. 3. ſect. 3. num. 22.* 4 Expreſſe excludere finem multiplicandæ prolis, imo etiam cupere filios non procreare, veniale eſt. *Tambur. lib. 7. cap. 3. ſect. 5. num. 7.*

This Author makes no difficulty to ſay, (4) *That it is no more than a venial ſin expreſly to exclude from the uſe of Marriage the end of having children, & to deſire even to have none at all*; without conſidering that the begetting of children being the end of Marriage, to uſe it without this end, and even againſt this end, excluding it poſitively by a contrary deſire; is to abuſe Marriage voluntarily, is to profane a Sacrament, is to reject and contemn the bleſſing which is eſpecially given to obtain children: it is finally to live with a woman in Marriage as out of Marriage, abuſing her to ſatisfie a brutal paſſion, and for ſenſual pleaſure alone, as debauched perſons abuſe women ſingle or married who abandon themſelves unto them; and yet all theſe exceſſes are but a Peccadillo according to this Jeſuit.

21960 When we doubt of the validity of a Marriage, and have cauſe to apprehend that it is null, *Dicaſtillus* gives an invention unto perſons whom the fear of God withholds, from the uſe of Marriage until ſuch times as they are cleared of their doubt. (5) *If a woman*, ſaith he, *believes that it is probable that there is ſome impediment to her Marriage, becauſe it is probable for example, that her firſt husband is yet alive, and it is alſo probable that he is dead, ſhe may give and require the duty of Marriage, becauſe it is lawful for her to follow a probable opinion..... and even though it be more probable that the Marriage is null, becauſe none is obliged to follow the more probable opinion, and it ſuffices to follow a probable one.* Therefore the Judges ought to take good heed that they condemn not eaſily husbands who have two wives, or wives who have two husbands, for they need only ſome probable reaſon to juſtifie them, and there is nothing ſo eaſie as to find one, eſpecially for things which we paſſionately deſire and love; and when the Magiſtrates will

5 Si conjux putet probabile quod ſit impedimentum, propterea quod putet v. g. probabilem opinionem vitæ prioris viri, & ſimiliter probabilem opinionem mortis, atque adeo probabilem aſſenſum valoris, poteſt reddere & petere: quia licitum eſt ſequi opinionem probabilem— Imo etiamſi probabilius ſit matrimonium non valere. Neque enim tenetur ſequi opinionem probabiliorem, ſed ſatis eſt cum probabili operari. *Dicaſt. de matrim. tr. 10. diſp. 8 dub. 14. num. 174.*

not take theſe Maxims of Probability for Rules in their Judgments, nor the Doctors of this new Science for their Maſters, the Confeſſors nevertheleſs will be obliged to follow them in their direction of Conſciences by the ſame Law that theſe Cenſors, or rather Corrupters of Manners, impoſe upon them to ſubmit themſelves to the fancy and pleaſure of their Penitents when they have ſome probable authority or reaſon to ſupport them.

This Jeſuit continues to advance and extend the marvellous vertue of *Probability*, whereby to introduce diſorders into Marriage-affairs, giving reaſons to juſtifie them, of which the moſt brutiſh could never have had any imagination. He ſaith, (1) *That he who hath a probable opinion of the nullity of his Marriage, and alſo a probable one of the validity of it, may demand the duty of Marriage, and alſo it is as probable that he may deny it; ſo that when he ſhall refuſe it, he ſhall follow the opinion of thoſe who hold that his Marriage is null; and when he demands it, he ſhall follow that which holds that his Marriage is good.* If the wife as well as the husband would make uſe of the right which *Probability* gives her in this doubt concerning the nullity of their Marriage, they ſhould live in very good intelligence during this diſorder of Marriage, whilſt each of them for their own part refuſeth that which the other demands, and would take by force, grounding themſelves on a probable reaſon. The ſame debate will hereupon happen betwixt a man and his wife through the conduct of this Science, which the ſame Jeſuit ſaith it may cauſe in another caſe betwixt a poor man and a rich, whilſt the rich refuſes upon a probable opinion to give alms unto the poor, and tells him that he is not obliged thereunto, and the poor ſteals from the rich upon another probable opinion, which maintains that he may do it in his neceſſity. Theſe are the productions and the fruits of the Doctrine of Probability, which confounds all things both in Religion and in the World. 21970

1 Qui habet probabilem opinionem nullitatis matrimonii——ſi ſimul habeat probabilem opinionem valoris, poterit etiam petere: imo ſatis probabile eſt poſſe etiam negare; ita ut quando negat, ſe accommodet opinioni quæ dicat nullum eſſe matrimonium; quando vero petit, ſe accommodet opinioni quæ dicat eſſe validum. *Ibid.* num. 175.

It is not neceſſary to report here all the Caſuiſts filthy Queſtions and ſhameful Reſolutions about the Uſe of Marriage, by which they teach and approve the profanation of this Sacrament. It may be ſeen ſufficiently by what I have now related, how far their impudence may go. They who would ſee ſome Examples thereof, need only to caſt their eyes upon the Chapters that treat of Impurity and the Duties of married perſons. 219

## ARTICLE IV. Of them who adminiſter the Sacraments.

***That the Jeſuits permit Prieſts to adminiſter the Sacraments, to ſay Maſs, and to preach, principally for vain glory or lucre of money, and in an eſtate of mortal ſin.***

E *Scobar* in his Problems demands, (1) *If it be lawful to ſell the obligation of adminiſtring the Sacraments, and performing other holy Functions?* He ſaith at firſt that *it may and may not*, according to the different probable opinions of Caſuiſts whom he cites. And afterwards he ranks himſelf on their ſide who ſay that it is lawful. (2) *I approve*, ſaith he, *and am of the former opinion. If a man take on him to adminiſter the Sacraments, and to diſcharge other holy Functions with bodily pain and labour which doth accidentally accompany them, as to adminiſter them in a place far diſtant, for ſo long, at ſuch an hour, and in ſuch ſort as gives him a particular trouble.* This is to expoſe to ſale all ſpiritual Power, and all the ſacred and divine Functions of the Juriſdiction which Jeſus Chriſt hath given his Church, being there is hardly any which can be exerciſed without ſome action and labour of the body.

1 Obligatio adminiſtrandi Sacramenta, aliaſque ſacras functiones peragendi poteſt ac non poteſt vendi.

2 Primam ſententiam approbo ſequorque, ſi ſuſcipiatur obligatio adminiſtrandi Sacramenta, aliarumque ſacrarum functionum perficiendarum cum oneribus corporalibus accidentaliter annexis. v. c. quando Sacerdos obligatur ad miniſtrandum tali in loco diſtanti, tanto tempore, tali hora, ut ſpecialem ſit moleſtiam paſſurus. *Eſcobar Theol. mor. tom. 1. lib. 8. problem. 86.*

When

21990 When the Jeſuit-Authors ſpeak of Prieſts who officiate in Pariſhes, ſuch as are Chaplains, Vicars, and Rectors themſelves, who ſometimes ſay Maſſes of Devotion for thoſe who deſire them, one of the terms they make uſe of to expreſs the eſteem they have for them, is to call them hireling Prieſts, *ſtipendiarios Sacerdotes*. And as they give them this goodly name of Servants and Mercenaries, ſo they inſpire them with the conduct and ſpirit of ſuch, in teaching them to ſet price on their Maſſes, and to make thereof a kind of traffick, by treating with thoſe for whom they ſay them, or with thoſe at whoſe charge they are procured to ſay them, in ſuch manner as a Servant treats with his Maſter for his wages, or an Handicraft for his ſalary with him that employs him.

*Filliutius* ſpeaks of Prieſts in theſe terms, and with as much reſpect when he puts this Queſtion: (1) *If a Rector who hath received pay for many Maſſes, may retain any part thereof for himſelf, becauſe of the care he hath taken thereof, and for ſome other reaſons, diſtributing the reſt to the hireling Prieſts, whom he procured to ſay the Maſſes?* In the ſequel he anſwers, (2) *That he ſhall do nothing againſt Juſtice, if he retain ſome part unto himſelf, by reaſon of the care and pains he takes, or becauſe the payment ſurpaſſeth the ordinary rate, or becauſe it is the higheſt degree of the juſt price.* That is to ſay, that a Parſon may receive the money from all perſons who will give it him for ſaying Maſſes, and then cauſe thoſe Maſſes to be
22000 ſaid by other Prieſts, wherewith he had charged himſelf, and take ſomething from every of them for the care and pains he takes to cauſe thoſe Maſſes to be ſaid in that manner, and to receive the money for them; *ratione ſollicitudinis & laboris*. And ſince it is not uſual to preſent ſo little to a Rector as they would give to an ordinary Prieſt, the Rector may give to every Prieſt that is under him as his wages, according to the language of this Jeſuit, ſo much as they uſually get for ſaying Maſs, and keep the reſt for himſelf, without being blamable herein for committing any injuſtice or unfaithfulneſs. In a good Town a Parſon that were in reputation, and who would exerciſe this pious traffick, might make himſelf rich.

*Emanuel Sa* gives and approves this ſame expedient ſaying: (3) *He to whom a ſum of money is given to ſay Maſſes, may hire other Prieſts the beſt cheap he can to help him ſay them, and retain the over-plus to himſelf.* *Filliutius* ſaith we may keep Prieſts at hire, *Emanuel Sa* affirms that if we have none, we may hire others to ſay the Maſſes which we have undertaken, and make the beſt bargain we can with them, and retain the reſt to our ſelves.

This is alſo *Amicus* his opinion, when he ſaith, (4) *That a prieſt who hath received great ſalaries to ſay Maſſes, may cauſe them to be ſaid by other Prieſts, to whom he may give the juſt price only which is uſually given, and withhold what is*
22010 *over and above for himſelf.* If this be not to raiſe an Exciſe upon Prieſts and their Maſſes, it is at leaſt to make a traffick like Undertakers of Work or Merchants who ſet Labourers at work, putting it out unto them at as low a rate as they can, and taking what remains unto themſelves; and yet there is nothing in this which is not juſt and honeſt according to the counſel of theſe Jeſuits.

*Amicus* gives another expedient to Prieſts, that they may not loſe their Maſſes. He puts this Queſtion: (5) *If a Prieſt may take money for a Maſs which he hath ſaid already, but reſerved the application thereof to himſelf?* He reſolves this difficulty by a diſtinction. He will not allow that a Prieſt who hath ſaid a Maſs for no body, ſhould have power to keep the merit of it in reſerve to be applied when he ſhall be deſired to ſay one; but he holds it good, that when he ſaith Maſs, he actually apply the fruit thereof to the firſt who ſhall preſent himſelf to demand a Maſs of him. This is a good Maxime to husband Maſſes ſo well that you may never loſe any one at all, and to engage mercenary Prieſts to ſay Maſſes every day without fear of loſing their labour, by having ſome always laid up in readineſs for thoſe who ſhall firſt preſent themſelves unto them. It is thus that the Jeſuits

1 An Parochus qui multa ſtipendia ſcepit pro Miſſis, poſſit, ſi ea diſtribuat in ſtipendiarios Sacerdotes, partem aliquam ſibi retinere pro ſollicitudine vel aliis cauſis?

2 Reſpondeo & dico 1. non eſſe contra juſtitiam, ſi ratione ſollicitudinis & laboris, vel quia eſt pingue ſtipendium, vel quia eſt ſummum intra latitudinem juſti, aliquid ſibi retineat. *Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 5. cap. 6. num. 186. pag. 125.*

3 Cui datur ſumma pecuniæ pro Miſſis à ſe dicendis, poteſt alios pro minori pretio conducere qui adjuvent, & reliquum ſibi retinere. *Sa verbo Miſſa n. 45. pag. 516.*

4 Poſſe Sacerdotem qui pinguia ſtipendia pro Miſſis dicendis accepit, procurare per juſta ſtipendia minora per alios Sacerdotes Miſſas celebrari, retinendo ſibi quod ſupra juſta ſtipendia ſuper-

eſt. *Amicus tom. 7. diſp. 33. ſect. 8. num. 284. pag. 466.* 5 An poſſit Sacerdos accipere ſtipendium pro Miſſa quam jam celebravit. cujus tamen applicationem ſibi in futurum reſervavit? *Ibid. num. 285.* Poteſt Sacerdos de præſenti applicare effectum Sacrificii illi qui de facto ab illo Sacrificium petiturus eſt. Quo pacto licitum eſt *Ibid.*

remove Covetousness from Priests, and cherish in their Souls the piety and reverence they ought to have towards the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ.

*Emanuel Sa* offers us a third expedient, of which he would not be accounted the Author, but proposes it as coming from other Casuists, who hold, saith he, (1) *That we may take two alms for one and the same Mass*; or at least, which comes to the same thing, *that a Priest may with one and the same Mass discharge the obligation he is under unto many persons for whom he hath promised to say one.* He speaks also of others who teach, (2) *That a Priest, though he be rich, may take two alms for one Mass, if they be necessary to him for maintaining his honour.* And though he doth not positively approve all these opinions, yet neither doth he condemn them, and he leaves men at liberty to follow them, by proposing them as probable and maintained by some Doctors. 22020

*Filliutius* speaks also of this expedient, but he condemns it. (3) *We cannot*, saith he, *receive more than one entire payment for one Mass.* Nevertheless he teaches us another in this case more subtle and ingenious, which is, (4) *That the Priest may apply that part of the Mass which belongs to himself, to those for whom he is obliged to say the Mass.* Which thing *Tambourin* confirms by this excellent Reasoning: (5) *The Priest may appropriate that part of the Sacrifice which by custom is applied to the Faithful. He may therefore apply to the Faithful the fruit of the Mass which is reserved for himself.* *Fillintius* in the process of his discourse examining with another Casuist what is the value of that part of Sacrifice which belongs to him who saith the Mass, that the Priest may not take for it more than it is worth, saith: (6) *That he ought to give his part in three for one entire Mass.* Whence he draws this practick Rule which he bestows on those he calls hireling Priests: (7) *That those who are hired to say more Masses than they can discharge, may make use of this expedient.* See here a pretty way for mercenary Priests to get money, by selling their part in the Sacrifice and participation of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ, which they receive in saying Mass, for lucre of getting more, chusing rather not to participate of the vertue of the Sacrament, and to have a little more silver. 22030

As the Jesuits do thus teach Priests to say Mass out of covetousness; so they do not much condemn those who say it of vain glory. *Emanuel Sa* tells us, (8) *That there are some who hold that it is mortal sin to preach or say Mass principally for vain glory, and that there are others who deny it.* He repeats almost the same thing in another place, where he saith only, (9) *That there are some who hold that it is no mortal sin to preach principally for vain glory or for money*, never mentioning them who hold the contrary opinion, that he might render that which he propoundeth more probable, and give more liberty to follow it.

*Sanchez* and *Tambourin* speak more generally yet, and withal more precisely where they say, (10) *That it can be no more than venial sin to perform the sacred actions, as to administer or receive all the Sacraments and to celebrate the Mass, for vain glory as the principal end, or for some sordid and dishoneſt gain.* It seems that as there are in the world some sorts of commerce which persons of honour may exercise without derogation to their quality, so they would introduce some into the Church which should not be incompatible with piety nor the quality of the most considerable and dignified persons. For those who account that it will not become them to sell the Sacraments or the Mass for money, may yet according to the advice of these Jesuits give them away for worldly honour and reputation amongst men. 22040

1 Duas eleemosynas pro una Missa accipi posse. Unica Missa potest Sacerdotem multis quibus promisit satisfacere. *Sa verbo Missa, n. 44. pag. 516.*

2 Etiam à divite Sacerdote posse duas eleemosynas honestæ sustentationi necessarias accipi. *Ibid.*

3 Ratione unius Missæ non posse sumi nisi unum adæquatum stipendium. *Filliut. tom. 1. qq. mor. tr. 5. c. 6. n. 181. p. 124.*

4 Sacrificantem posse partem Sacrificii sibi debitam applicare iis pro quibus tenetur. *Ibid.*

5 Fructum mediæ Missæ qui dari solet aliis sibi potest applicare Sacerdos; ergo etiam fructum specialissimum quem sibi applicare solet, poterit applicare aliis. *Tambur. l. 3. meth. Missæ cap. 1. sect. 3. n. 6.*

6 Quia nescitur quanta sit, addit arbitrari partem trium Missarum posse suppleri uni. *Ibid.*

7 Quod servare poterunt, qui cum receperint multa stipendia, non possunt pro omnibus satisfacere. *Ibid.*

8 Vanæ gloriæ causa præcipue prædicare, aut Missam celebrare peccatum esse mortale quidam aiunt, alii negant. *Sa verbo vana gloria, num 2. pag. 693.*

9 Non esse autem peccatum mortale, si quis ob gloriam aut pecuniam principaliter prædicet, aiunt nonnulli. *Sa verbo prædicare, num. 4. pag. 578.*

10 Res quantumvis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere, Sacrum celebrare, non excedit culpam venialem. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 3. num. 1. pag. 9.* Vel lucrum. *Tambur. lib. 2. meth. Missæ cap. 1. sect. 1. num. 6.*

But whether we refer the Sacraments to money or honour, it is always a true traffick; and if thoſe who ſet a price of money on them ſeem to vilifie and debaſe them much, thoſe who make them ſerve their vain glory, do uſe them more unworthily, and profane them much more; becauſe it is certain that vain glory is a vice and a ſin greater and more odious in the ſight of God than Avarice, and this crime is yet more inexcuſable when it is purſued voluntarily, and when the glory of the world and eſteem of men is propounded as our principal end; and yet *Sanchez* pretends, and *Tambourin* alſo, that herein no other than venial ſin can be committed. *Res quantumvis ſacra, principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia miniſtrare vel recipere, Sacrum celebrare, non excedit culpam venialem*, ſaith Sanchez, *ſi propter finem venialiter peccaminoſum quis principaliter celebraret, v. g. ob vanam gloriam, vel lucrum venialiter malum, ſolum venialiter peccaret.* Theſe are *Tambourins* own words, who rehearſes this paſſage out of *Sanchez*.

*Tambur. meth. Miſſ. lib. 2. cap. 1. ſect. 1. num. 6.*

V. g. ſi quis propter vanam gloriam jejunet, oret, Sacramenta recipiat vel miniſtret, Sacrum faciat: quia quamvis aut ſimilia principaliter gerat propter vanam gloriam, dummodo tamen in hac vana gloria non inſtituat finem, ejuſmodi ſacris rebus levem injuriam inferat. *Eſcob. l. 4. Theol. mor. cap. 3.*

1 Poteſt Sacramentum peccatori publico exhibere, dummodo non ex conemptu Sacramenti vel Religionis, ſed ob alium finem velit etiam publice Sacramentum recipere, & mortem vel infamiam, vel grave fortunarum detrimentum minitetur.

2 Item aſſero. Eo enim in caſu permittit potius alterius peccatum ex juſta cauſa. *Eſcobar tom. 1. lib. 7. probl. 93.*

3 Licere miniſtrare hoſtiam non conſecratam pro conſecrata. *Dicaſt.*

*Eſcobar* who cites the ſame *Sanchez* and follows him, puts his opinion not amongſt the problematick, but amongſt thoſe which are received without diſpute. *If any one for example*, ſaith he, *faſt, pray, adminiſter or receive the Sacrament by a motive of vain glory, though he do theſe things or other their like principaly for vain glory, he doth only ſlightly injure holy things.* It is but a ſlight wrong unto Jeſus Chriſt to make him ſerve vain glory, thence it follows that Sacriledges are no more crimes, but ſmall offences; it being clear that to refer the moſt ſacred actions of Religion, even the Sacrifice of the Maſs it ſelf unto vain glory as its principal end, is, it may be, the greateſt profanation that can be committed, and the greateſt Sacriledge, and not only a Sacriledge, but an horrible Idolatry, ſince this is not only to eſtabliſh a creature, but a vice for ones ſupream end. It is properly to ſacrifice unto vanity, and to refer the Sacrifice of the Maſs to the Devil as to his chief end. For we ſacrifice not unto God but by offering and relating the ſame Sacrifice unto him in the ſame manner. A ſtrange kind of Sacrifice and unheard of amongſt the Heathens! For this is not to ſacrifice one creature unto another, as they did: but it is to ſacrifice unto a creature and even to a vice God himſelf and the Son of God, by offering and referring thereto Jeſus Chriſt as to the principal end. Where we muſt obſerve what *Eſcobar* addeth: *Provided*, ſaith he, *that he place not his end in this vain glory*, this is an exception wholly abſurd and which deſtroys it ſelf. For it is a contradiction to ſay that an action is done principally for vain glory, and that nevertheleſs vain glory ſhould not be its end; the end of an action, and that for which it is principally done being one and the ſame thing.

If it be not enough to permit them who adminiſter the Sacrament to celebrate it with an evil intention, *Eſcobar* will alſo give them leave to cooperate with the ſins of thoſe who receive it unworthily. (1) *We may*, ſaith he, *adminiſter the Sacrament to one that ſinneth publickly, provided he do not receive it publickly through contempt of the Sacrament or of Religion, but for ſome other end, and that he threaten us with death or loſs of reputation, or to do ſome great wrong to us in our goods.* He adds to confirm this opinion, (2) *That this is rather to permit ſin in another for ſome juſt cauſe, than to cooperate therewith.*

I know not whether *Pilate* followed this probable opinion when the fear of falling into diſgrace with *Caſar*, wherewith he was threatned, obliged him to deliver Jeſus Chriſt unto his enemies: but I know very well that we cannot ſay that he cooperated not to the ſin of them to whom he abandoned him.

*Dicaſtillus* ſaith that this is the opinion of *Suarez*, and that it pleaſeth him entirely, *tota prædicta doctrina mihi placet.* But becauſe he ſaw well that the whole world would not follow *Suarez* his advice herein, he furniſheth thoſe who find themſelves engaged to adminiſter the Sacraments to ſuch as ſin publickly, and yet have ſome reſpect for holy things, ſo as not willingly to proſtitute them with other ways that are no better than the former. He takes them from *Sanchez*: (3) *To give an Hoſt not conſecrated for a true one.* Sacriledge is very common amongſt the Jeſuits who permit theſe cheats and tricks in all the Sacraments,

*tr. 4. de Sacr. Euch. d. 9. d. 21. num. 491.*

no one excepted, and whereof they relate many examples, to which they give their approbation.

Finally the Jeſuits teach very commonly, that we may adminiſter and receive our ſelves the Sacraments, and perform the moſt ſacred Functions being in an eſtate of mortal ſin, without committing any new crime. (1) *It is not neceſſary,* ſaith Dicaſtillus, *that he who finds himſelf guilty of mortal ſin, ſhould confeſs himſelf before he adminiſter the Sacraments.* He is not content to lay now this Propoſition thus in general, he eſtabliſheth it by many particulars which he propoſeth. (2) *A Biſhop in performing the functions of his miniſtry,* which are all holy, *being in an eſtate of mortal ſin, ſins not ſave venially.* (3) *He that adminiſters the Sacrament of Baptiſm, be he Prieſt or Laick, ſins not mortally.* His reaſon is: (4) *Becauſe in the judgment of the prudent there is not herein any great irreverence.* (5) *A Confeſſor may alſo hear Confeſſions in an eſtate of mortal ſin, without crime and without offence, provided he produce ſome act of contrition before that he give Abſolution.* This Jeſuit yet may in ſome ſort be excuſed on this occaſion. For though 22080 he permit a Prieſt to hear Confeſſions with a conſcience wholly laden with ſins, without producing ſo much as any act of ſorrow at all, yet he will not permit that he give Abſolution in that eſtate, at leaſt not without endeavouring to exert this act. See the reaſon he brings for it: (6) *The Prieſt doth not properly adminiſter the Sacrament of Penance, ſave when he gives Abſolution,* and not when he barely heareth what the Penitent ſaith.

I know not whether this diſtinction be allowable or not, and I would willingly demand of him whether a Judge be only then a Judge when he paſſeth Sentence, and whether he execute not his Office when he receives, for Example, the depoſitions of Witneſſes? Alſo *Tambourin* without having regard to this Chimerical diſtinction, decides the caſe clearly, (7) *That he ſins not in adminiſtring the Sacraments; becauſe that otherwiſe a Confeſſor ſhould be in a ſtrange perplexity in this caſe; he ſins if he gives Abſolution; if he refuſe to give it he ſins alſo againſt juſtice, becauſe he wrongs his Penitent who hath a right to Abſolution. Now all the Doctors are of judgment that no ſuch perplexity is to be acknowledged.* (8) Tambourin *alſo permits a Prieſt to ſay Maſs in this eſtate on an Holy-day, that others may participate therein. Not but that he may lawfully abſtain if he follow the contrary* 22090 *opinion which is alſo probable.* And after he had induced Prieſts to approach unto the Altar ſo unworthily to celebrate the Sacrifice, *Dicaſtillus* will not yet oblige him thereupon to betake himſelf to ſome Confeſſor ſo ſoon as he can. And for that he perceived well that the Council of *Trent* might be objected againſt him, which in the 7. C. of the 15. Seſſ. ordains that he who hath ſaid Maſs without confeſſing himſelf, ſhould confeſs himſelf ſhortly after; he expounds the Council to ſave his Doctrine by ſaying, (9) *That it obligeth only Prieſts who have ſaid Maſs in ſome great and urgent neceſſity.* If then he ſay Maſs being in mortal ſin without neceſſity, he ſhall not be obliged; yea, though *he alſo did it maliciouſly,* he ſhould not be obliged; *ex mera malitia.*

1 Conveniunt communiter (Doctores) opus non eſſe ut miniſter conſcius peccati mortalis præmittat confeſſionem Sacramentalem ante adminiſtrationem Sacramenti. *Dicaſtill. tr. 1. de Sacr. d. 3. d. 10. n. 200.*

2 Nec Epiſcopum conſecrando Chriſma, Eccleſiam, aut calices, aut concionando — in peccato mortali, ſecluſo ſcandalo peccare mortaliter, imo nec venialiter. *Ibid. n. 207.*

3 Sacerdos aut alius quivis miniſtrans Sacramentum in urgenti neceſſitate, non peccat mortaliter; imo nec venialiter. *Ibid. n. 214.*

4 Tunc ergo qui ſic baptizat, probabile eſt non peccare mortaliter, etiamſi ſit in peccato mortali, quia à viris prudentibus non cenſetur gravis irreverentia. *Ibid. n. 220.* 5 De audiente confeſſionem in peccato mortali cum animo ſe conterendi antequam abſolutionem impendat, docet Dian. p. 1. tr. de circ. R. 47. cum Henriq. l. 6. c. 18. n. 6. & ex utroque Lugo n. 18. non eſſe mortale. *Idem tr. 1. de Sacr. d. 3. d. 10. n. 243.* 6 Ratio vero eſt quia tunc Sacerdos non adminiſtrat Sacramentum, ſed quando abſolvit. *Ibid.* 7 Peccaret tunc Sacerdos tum abſolvendo, quia abſolveret in mortali, tum non abſolvendo, quia negaret jus pœnitentis, id quod eſſet pati perplexitatem, quam omnes Doctores nunquam concedendam eſſe fatentur. *Tambur. lib. 3. meth. confeſſ. cap. 5. ſect. 3. num. 15.* 8 Ut in die feſto alii Miſſam audiant, ſive Parochus ſive non Parochus..... Nam quamvis opinio contraria ſit probabilior, quia non apparet in relinquente tunc Miſſam notabile damnum, & aliunde præceptum de audienda Miſſa non obligat niſi debito modo, hæc tamen ſaltem propter auctoritatem extrinſecam Doctorum eam approbantium..... probabilis eſt: non obligatur autem in tali caſu Sacerdos celebrare, quia poteſt tenere prædictam opinionem quod non poſſit. *idem.* 9 Qui ex mera malitia celebrat ſine confeſſione, an non comprehendatur illo præcepto, & teneatur ſtatim confiteri? Reſpondetur negative. Ita Lugo num. 150. & eſt communis ſententia, quia Concilium ſolum loquitur de eo qui ob urgentem neceſſitatem ſine confeſſione celebrat. *Dicaſtill. tract. 4. de Euch. d. 9. d. 9. num. 155.*

And

And they find so little irreverence and so little evil in administring the Sacraments, and offering Sacrifice in this manner, that they even permit the Faithful to exact of them these Functions without any necessity, although they also know that they are in an estate of sin. (1) *It is lawful for every one,* saith Dicastillus, *to demand and receive the Sacraments of a Priest who is in the estate of mortal sin, though he be not his Parish-Priest, nor be designed for it,* nor so much as disposed to administer them unto him, *if he find it more for his convenience and benefit than to demand it of others.* It is as easie a matter to receive the Sacraments as to administer them, there is no more preparation for the one than for the other. And if these Maxims were well grounded, we might complain of the rigour and severity of the Jesuits, seeing the Sacraments are not yet so frequented as they ought to be, since in what estate soever we receive or give them, there is so much to gain, and nothing to lose.

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1 Licet cuicunque petere & recipere Sacramentum Sacerdote existente in mortali, etiam non Parocho, nec præsumpto aliàs ipsum conferre, si petenti ea receptio futura sit commodior vel utilior, quam si ab alio peteretur. *Idem tract. 1. de Sacram. d. 3. d. 13. num. 296.*

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# THE SECOND PART OF THE SECOND BOOK: Of the Outward Remedies of SIN.

## *That the Divinity of the Jesuits aboliſhes or corrupts them.*

THE Phyſitian labours for his Patient when he preſcribes what he ought to do, as well as when he preſents unto him what he ought to take for his Cure. Whence it comes that they ſay commonly that he hath given him a good Remedy, when he hath given him good advice how to remove the Diſeaſe whereof he is ſick. So that not only the things which he preſcribes, but the preſcriptions themſelves are remedies; but with this difference, that what he preſcribes, as Purges and Medicines, are the inward remedies, becauſe they act upon the diſeaſe it ſelf, and have an internal vertue proper to deſtroy it when they are taken effectually: but the preſcriptions are as it were external remedies, becauſe they act not immediately upon the diſeaſe, but only upon the mind of the diſeaſed by the knowledge they give him of his diſeaſe, and of what he ought to do for his cure.

We muſt ſay the ſame thing, holding the Rules of Proportion, of our Souls diſeaſes and remedies. We have already obſerved that Grace, Penance, good Works, and the Sacraments are the internal remedies of ſin, becauſe they have a divine and internal vertue which the Spirit of God hath impreſſed upon them to 22120
expel ſin from the Soul, or to prevent its entrance thereinto. And we ſay here that the holy Scripture, the Commandments of God, and thoſe of the Church are the external remedies of the ſame ſin; becauſe though they act not immediately upon ſin, they act upon the mind of the ſinner; and if they change not his will internally, they touch his mind and conſcience externally by the knowledge they give him of ſin, and by the fear which they impreſs upon him of the puniſhments with which God hath threatned thoſe who commit them.

We have ſeen in the former Part of this ſecond Book, that the Jeſuits deſtroy the internal remedies of ſin; we ſhall ſee here in this, how they aboliſh or corrupt the external: and ſo it will appear that they favour and cheriſh ſin as much as they

they can. This ſecond Part ſhall have three Chapters. The firſt ſhall be of the Corruption of Scripture. The ſecond of the Commandments of God. And the third of the Commandments of the Church.

## CHAPTER I. *Of the Corruption of Scripture.*

### *That the Jeſuits corrupt the Scriptures divers ways.*

THere are only three things to be conſidered in the holy Scripture; the Letter, the Senſe, and the Authority. And accordingly we may diſtinguiſh three different manners of corrupting holy Scripture. 1. In the Letter, by adding, taking away, or changing ſomething in the ſacred Text. 2. In the Senſe, by falſe Expoſitions. 3. In the Authority, by debaſing the Author, and diminiſhing the belief that is due unto him. Now let us ſee in what manner the Jeſuits have corrupted and yet do every day corrupt the holy Scripture.

We might compoſe great Volumes of Paſſages which they have altered by falſe Interpretations, yea, may be of all places wherein Canonical Writers and Jeſus Chriſt himſelf have ſpoken with any vehemence and vigour concerning the Holineſs of our Myſteries, the Duties of a Chriſtian, and the narrow way to Salvation, we ſhould be troubled to find one whereunto they have not given ſome blow, haling them from their natural ſenſe by Expoſitions falſe and contrary to the general Conſent of the Fathers and Tradition of the Church, that they might accommodate them to the reliſh and luſts of worldly men. I will relate only ſome few to ſerve for Example.

S. *Paul* ſaith, writing to the *Corinthians*: (1) *Though I had faith to remove mountains, and had not charity, I were nothing. And though I ſhould diſtribute all my goods to the relief of the poor, and though I ſhould give my body to be burnt, if I had not charity, it would avail me nothing.* But Father *Celot* being reſolved to maintain the contrary, ſaying that we may ſuffer Martyrdom profitably, and do thoſe other works whereof the Apoſtle ſpeaks like a Chriſtian, without any motion from Charity: to defend himſelf from this paſſage ſo ſtrong and ſo manifeſt, he corrupts and ſubverts it in this manner.

He ſaith that this muſt be extended to the habit, and not to the act and motion of Charity, meaning that the actions of which S. *Paul* ſpeaks, may be meritorious, holy, and perfect, though they be done without love to God, and though we never think of him, provided we be in an eſtate of Grace. So that he maintains that a man who is in the eſtate of Grace, cannot act otherwiſe than by this Charity whereof the Apoſtle ſpeaks. See his words: (2) *I ſay that the Apoſtle in this place demands only the habit of Charity*, Petrus Aurelius *on the contrary holds that it ought to be extended unto the act.* And a little after: (3) *It is true that the Scripture commends the act of Charity, that it directs and adviſes us to it, and prefers it before all other things; but it commands the habit as being continually neceſſary.*

1 Si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil ſum. Et ſi diſtribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas; & ſi tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodeſt. 1 *Cor. cap.* 13.

2 Eo loco habitum charitatis poſtulari ab Apoſtolo aio ego; negat Petrus Aurelius, & actum vult intelligi. 3 Actum profecto laudant, ſuadent, & omnibus præferunt Scripturæ; at habitum charitatis tanquam rem ſempet neceſſariam expetunt. *Celot. lib.* 3. *cap.* 3. *pag.* 125.

If S. *Paul* ſpeak in this place only of the habit of Charity, he requires it in vain of the *Corinthians*, ſeeing they had it, as he himſelf ſuppoſes, calling them juſt and holy; it is in vain that he exhorts, that he advertiſes them, that when they ſuffer any perſecution, when they give alms, when they perform any other good work, they ſhould do it of Charity, ſince they, having the habit of Charity, could not act otherwiſe than by Charity, this habit having neceſſary influence upon all their actions, as *Celot* pretends.

*Coninck* ſpeaks alſo more clearly to this Point. For he ſaith that to be a Martyr, it is not neceſſary to have an actual will, nor ſo much as a virtual one; but that it ſufficeth to have an interpretative and habitual one according to the language of the Schools. And he explains this term of an interpretative and virtual

one by these Examples: (1) *Such an one as that of a person flying from a Tyrant who would force him to some impiety, is slain unexpectedly in his flight: or at least of him who being sollicited to renounce the faith, is killed in his sleep, because he refused to do it.*

And because it may be said that these persons had a will to maintain the faith, and to dye for it, since the one fled for fear to lose it, and the other refused to renounce it, and so they are faithful in their will to dye for the faith; he declares that neither is this at all necessary, and that (2) *it sufficeth that they be killed out of hatred to the faith, though they had not formerly so much as a thought of confessing it, as it happens when in sudden Eruptions of* Barbarians *one is killed in his sleep through hatred of faith.*

So that he believes that one may be a Martyr, and merit the reward of Martyrdom, not only without any act of Charity, but also without any act of Faith, and without so much as any natural and reasonable act, dying without any apprehension and without any thought had before-hand of dying for the Faith.

Perhaps it may be imagined that he grounds himself on the preparation of the heart of this man, believing that God regards the good disposition which he had unto Martyrdom. But neither doth he demand so much as that. And he presupposeth on the contrary, that if it had been put to his choice either to dye or renounce God and Jesus Christ, he would rather have been ready and in more danger to abandon the Faith. (3) *It matters not,* saith he, *though if death had been proposed unto this man, the fear it would have brought on him would possibly have forced him to forget God, because this conditional supposition produces no real thing in this man; and so it cannot hurt him.* 21920

He believes then, that to be a Martyr it is not at all necessary to have so much as a conditional will to dye for God, if occasions were presented, that the contrary disposition rather to forsake God than to lose his life on this occasion cannot hurt him; and by consequence that it is not bad, nor hinders a man from being in an estate to receive the Crown of Martyrdom if he dye without ever thinking of it in this disposition by the hand of a Tyrant.

But he discovers the ground of this Doctrine when he saith, (4) *That a man may resolve with himself in this case to dye rather than forsake Jesus Christ by fear of Hell only.* That is to say, that without charity or love of God, the fear of the pains of Hell only, may make a true Martyr, contrary to S. *Paul*, and contrary to the consent of all the Saints, Scripture, and Church, who declare publickly when the Feasts of the Martyrs are celebrated, (5) *That it is because they shed their blood for the love of God and Jesus Christ, that they rejoyce eternally with him.* And by consequence that he who sheds not his blood for the love of God, shall have no part in the joy of Jesus Christ, and loseth his labour, as S. *Paul* saith: *(6) Though I give my body to be burnt, and have not charity, it profits me nothing.* 21930

The Father *Anthony Sirmond* eludes also these very words of the Apostle, by maintaining that he means only to say that *if a man be in mortal sin, all these things*, that is to say, Faith, Alms, and Martyrdom, *are of no benefit.* Whence he concludes, *That S.* Paul *requires not nor could require any thing but habitual charity, only exempt from all mortal sin.* 3 part. p. 51. of the Treatise of the Defence of Vertue.

He is not content to say that S. *Paul* requires no other disposition to Martyrdom, than *to be exempt from mortal sin*, though there be no motion of charity, nor any will to dye for God; but he adds also, that *the Apostle could not require any other thing.* And as if to require any other thing were rigour or unreasonable injustice, he concludes with this exclamation: *What! would you oblige the Martyrs going unto Martyrdom unto some act of Charity?* That is to say, that according unto him it is a thing not only far off from justice and reason, but also without all appearance thereof, to imagine that the will to dye for God should be necessary unto true Martyrdom.

This same Jesuit hath corrupted another passage of the 3. Chap. of S. *John*, whereof the Council of *Trent* makes use to explicate the Nature of meritorious

1 Qualis est in eo primo qui fugiens tyrannum à quo compellitur ad impia, in fuga subito occiditur. Secundo in eo qui sollicitatur ad defectionem fidei, quia hanc recusavit, dormiens occiditur. *Coninck* 3. p. q. 66. *de baptis.* d. 12. n. 136. p. 80.

2 Imo videtur sufficere ut in odium fidei occidatur, etsi de confessione fidei nihil prius cogitaverit; v. c. si subito hostium incursu deprehendatur dormiens, & in odium fidei occidatur. *Ibid.*

3 Nec refert quod talis forte si ei mors proponeretur præ timore negaret Deum; quia hæc conditionalis propositio nihil ponit in re, atque ita nihil obest. *Idem* pag. 139.

4 Potest quis magis eligere mori quam negare Christum impulsus solo metu gehennæ. *Idem* d. 1. num. 118. pag. 77.

5 Et quia pro ejus amore sanguinem suum fuderunt, ideo cum Christo exultant sine fine.

6 Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. 1 *Cor.* cap. 15.

*Father Anthony Sirmond in a Treatise of the defence of Vertue, part* 3. pag. 54.

good Works, saying they are such, because they are wrought in God; *quia in Deo sunt facta.* By which words the Holy Fathers and the best Interpreters of the Holy Scripture and of the Council of *Trent*, have understood works done by the motion of Gods Spirit, which is that of Charity. But he will not endure it,
2218 and is so far transported as to tax them as weak men, and subject to imaginary visions who are of this opinion. *As to that which some represent*, saith he, tr. 3. pag. 45. *that the Council doth include herein the motive of Charity, because that it demands that they be wrought in God, it is a meer imagination.* It may be he never read the Council, or it is likely he took no notice that it expounded it self, in saying that good works ought to be wrought by a vertue and grace which Jesus Christ inspires continually into his Members; in such manner as the Vine continues life and vigour to its branches. (1) *For Jesus Christ*, saith the Council, *communicating vigour continually to those who are justified, as the head communicates unto its members, and the Vine unto its branches, and this vigour preceding, accompanying, and following always their good works, which without it could not in any sort whatsoever be pleasing unto God and meritorious, we must believe that there is now nothing more wanting unto persons justified which might hinder us from judging reasonably that the works which are thus wrought in God, have satisfied his Law so far as the condition of this present life may permit, and that they have merited eternal life, which they shall in due time receive, provided they dye in this estate of Grace.*

1 Cum enim ipse Jesus Christus tanquam caput in membra, & tanquam vitis in palmites, in ipsos justificatos jugiter virtutem influat, quæ virtus eorum bona opera semper antecedit & concomitatur, & sequitur, &c. Sine qua nullo pacto grata & meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis justificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quoniam minus plene illis quidem operibus quæ in Deo facta sunt, divinæ legi pro hujus vitæ statu satisfeciisse, & vitam æternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratia decesserint, consequendam, vere prometruisse censeantur. *Concil. Trid. Sess. 6. cap. 16.*

2190 It is clear that this vertue and this vigour which the Council saith that Jesus Christ communicates incessantly to those who do good works, is not an habitual vertue, or a simple habitude, as this Jesuit pretends; but that it is actual, and it is a motion by which he applies unto them, and causes them to act. For it is actual Grace, as is manifest by the expression of the Council, saying that it prevents, accompanies, and follows all good works; which is properly the description of actual Grace according to the Scripture, the Judgment of the Fathers, and even of the School-Divines themselves; and appertains not to a habit which prevents not good works, but leaves the will in an indifference to the production of them, and it must be the will which prevents and applies this habit, in such manner that without this the other cannot move of it self, and abides always without acting. And so the Council agrees very well with S. *Paul*, the one saying that our good works should be done in Charity; and the other, that they ought to be wrought in God, that is to say, in the Spirit and by the Spirit of God, who is no other than the Spirit of Love and Charity, and the words of the one expound the words of the other. But I see no means to reconcile them to this Jesuit, for he can no longer pretend that the Council and S. *Paul require only habitual Charity with an exemption only from all mortal sin.* The terms of the Council by which it expounds it self, may also serve for exposition unto S. *Paul*, being so clear, that it is impossible to obscure them.

2200 He corrupts also a third passage, which is in the second to the *Corinthians*, whereof the Apostle speaks in these words: (2) *For the tribulations which we endure in this life being momentary and light, produce in us a far more incomparable, full, solid, and eternal glory.* And Father *Sirmond* pretends that he calls the tribulations and afflictions of this life light, *because they have not in them the weight of the love of God to command them.* That is, that they are light then when they are undergone without love: by consequent weighty and burthensom when they are born for love to God. These words of S. *Paul* were never thus expounded in the Church; and it is to fight with common sense to say, that love is a weight and load which makes things heavy and burthensom which are done upon the motion thereof.

2 Id enim quod in præsenti est momentaneum & leve tribulationis nostræ, supra modum in sublimitate æternum gloriæ pondus operatur in nobis. 2 *Cor.* 4. 17.

All the Saints and Interpreters who have spoken of this passage, have conceived that S. *Paul* calls these present afflictions light; because that the grief they cause

is light in compariſon of the Joys which they merit, as he ſaith that they endure but a moment in compariſon of the Eternity of Glory which is the recompence thereof. But that they ſhould be called light, when they are born without love, as if love did hinder them from being ſo, is that which never entred into the thought of any Interpreter ancient or novel. And if it were ſo, the afflictions of S. *Paul* could not be light, or we muſt ſay that he ſuffered them without love: The afflictions of the greateſt Saints alſo could not be light, but rather they muſt 22216
have been more weighty and burdenſom, when they have been entertained and ſupported with moſt Charity; and on the contrary theirs who ſuffered without love or without thoughts of God, and againſt their wills, ſhould be light and eaſie, which doth equally contradict Faith and Reaſon.

It is needleſs to loſe time in refuting theſe Paradoxes and Extravagancies. There is no Divine nor prudent man that ſees not even by natural reaſon and experience, that on the contrary it is love and the motions of the affection which renders things light, eaſie, and even ſweet and pleaſant, though they be in themſelves troubleſom and difficult. Which is yet more true of the love of God than of that of the Creatures, that being infinitely exalted above this in vertue and force, as well as in dignity.

This Jeſuit contents not himſelf to abuſe the words of S. *Paul* in this manner; but he aſpires unto the fountain, and attempts to corrupt it alſo as well as the ſtreams. The firſt of the Commandments which God gave in the old Law, and which he hath repeated in the new, is: (1) *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart.* And Father *Simond* is not afraid to maintain that we are not obliged by this Commandment to love God. *For God*, ſaith he, tr. 2. p. 16. *commanding us to love him, is ſatisfied in the main that we obey him in his other Commandments.* And as he ſaith alſo, pag. 28. A *God ſo loving and lovely, commanding us to love him, is ſatisfied that we obey him without loving him.*

1 Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo.

It is eaſie to deſtroy all the Commandments by this Method; there being none 22220
more important, nor more clearly explained, nor oftner repeated in the Old or New Teſtament than this. When God ſaith: *Thou ſhalt love me with all thy heart*, if it be lawful to ſay that he intends ſomething elſe than what he ſaith, and that he would not oblige us to love him, though he ſaith it with an expreſſion ſo clear and ſtrong, there can be nothing certain in the whole Word of God, and we may in this manner elude all the Commandments, pretending that he deſires not that of us which he demands, or that he would not oblige us in good earneſt to that which he teſtifies to be his deſire.

But the reaſon of this Father, why God would not have us to love him, is excellent, *becauſe he is loving and lovely*, as if love deſired any thing ſo much as reciprocal love, or could be otherwiſe acknowledged and ſatisfied than by this love. He ought alſo at leaſt to conſider that God is not only *amiable and loving*, but alſo a great lover of truth and ſincerity: and that ſo there can be no apparent ground to make him a lyar or diſſembler, in commanding men to love him without deſiring to oblige them thereunto.

This Jeſuit corrupts alſo this ſame paſſage and Commandment in another manner, ſaying: *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, &c.* ſignifies no other thing, than; thou ſhalt love him if thou wilt without being obliged thereto: *becauſe the Commandment to love God is a Command of pleaſure in reſpect of affective love; but a Command of rigour in reſpect of effective love and the execution*, p. 21. He would ſay that God by this Commandment demands the outward actions, and not the affection; that he commands us to produce the effects of love without obliging us to have this love, and that he is content, provided we 22230
do the things which he commands, though they be done without loving him or thinking of him. No wiſe man would be ſerved in this manner of his children or of his friends, nor of his ſlaves themſelves, and who would not ſcorn ſuch ſervices?

He hath alſo invented a third gloſs, which is no other than a conſequence of the former, ſaying: *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, ſignifies, thou ſhalt love him freely and without any obligation. *For God*, ſaith he, *the*

*God of love will be loved freely and without any obligation; and if he threaten, it is that he may be obeyed.* But if we love not them freely whom we love of duty and upon obligation, we must say that a Son loves not his Father freely, because he is obliged to love him by the Law of God and Nature: and if that which is done of duty be not freely done, it follows that the Religious Orders keep not their vows freely, nor the Faithful any of the Commandments of God, because they are thereunto obliged.

*But if he threatens*, saith he, *it is that he may be obeyed*, and not that he may be beloved. We must believe then that there are no penalties nor threats against them that never love God. Which neither agrees with what S. *Paul* saith: *He that loves not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be accursed*, 1 Cor. 16. nor with
22240 that which S. *John* saith: *Qui non diligit manet in morte*, 1 John 3. *He that loveth not abideth in death.* The one threatning them with death, and the other with a curse who love not Jesus Christ.

There remains yet his last corruption of this very word of God of Jesus Christ: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart.* That is to say, thou shalt not hate him at all. *For albeit his sacred love be not kindled in our hearts*, saith he: *Pag. 19.* though we love him not at all, and the motive of Charity do not incline us to do that which he commands us, *yet we cease not for all that to obey the Commandment of Love, in as much as we do the works of Love. So that herein we may see the goodness of God; he hath not so much commanded us to love him, as not to hate him; either formally by an actual hate, which were indeed devillish; or materially by the transgression of his Law.*

This excess is visible enough of it self, and needs not be represented more particularly, and it might easily be apprehended to be the extreamest that can be committed on this subject, if there were not found another yet greater in this little Book, which is as it were the foundation of all the rest. For he talks of the love of God as a thing odious and servile; and he represents the Commandment of loving God, as a yoke and servitude unsupportable, attributing it to the particular favour and grace of Jesus Christ that he hath delivered us, as he pretends, from the obligation of serving God in love, that our services might be pleasing to him, and meritorious unto eternal life. And to justifie this his imagination,
22250 which scents strong of impiety, he abuses these words of Jesus Christ: (1) *If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed*: which speak manifestly of freedom from sin, as appears by what goes before. See here how he expounds this passage. *If the Son make you free*, saith he himself in S. *John*, *you shall be free indeed. Yea, I hope, we shall by his own proper testimony, yea even from that very strait obligation wherewith some would charge us, which is to love God in every point which hath any reference unto merit.* He pretends then that Jesus Christ hath not only delivered us from sin, as is formerly affirmed in this place; *but also from the obligation even of loving God himself*, and of serving him in love, *which appears unto him too rigorous.* Which hath reference to what he saith, tr. 2. p. 24. that God neither could nor ought command us to love him, but only to serve him. *See here*, saith he, *how God hath right and might command us his sacred love, he hath right to command us so far as concerns the effect, but not in what concerns the inward affection.* It must needs be therefore that according to the opinion of this man the love of God, or the Commandment to love God is some evil or unreasonable thing, if he could not command us it, since it is certain that God may command every thing that is not evil, unjust, and unreasonable.

1 Si vos Filius liberavérit, verè liberi eritis. *Joh.* 8. v. 36.

*Tr.* 3. *p.* 60.

To so many remarkable corruptions of divers passages of Scripture, he adds also one to justifie the rest. For amongst many objections which he propounds, and makes to himself, drawn for the most part out of the Scripture which injoyns us to do all things for the love of God, if we expect any recompence from him
22260 for them; he relates this taken out of S. *Matth. cap.* 10. *vers.* 41. *He that receiveth a Prophet in the quality of a Prophet, and a righteous man in the quality of a righteous man, shall receive therefore the reward due unto a Prophet and to a righteous man. Also he that giveth a glass of cold water to the meanest Disciple of Jesus Christ, shall not lose his reward, provided he give it to him as a Disciple of Jesus Christ.*

*Christ*. That is to say, for respect unto Jesus Christ, and for his love, as these words do signifie sufficiently of themselves, and as the Holy Fathers and Interpreters do understand it.

See here his objection which he resolves magisterially, and by an interrogation, as it were for instruction rather than answer. *I agree it*, saith he, tr. 3. pag. 71. & 72. *But what is it, think you, to treat a Prophet, a righteous man, and a Disciple of the Son of God, as a Prophet, a righteous man, and a Disciple of the Son of God? It is to honour him, invite him, do him good, and give him entertainment, whether it be to receive some instruction from him, or to imitate his good example, or to learn his Oracles, or for other good consideration*, of which yet not one is so heightned as to reach the purity of the love of God.

He afterward makes this his opinion and answer more clear by an example and by a comparison. *I would gladly know of these Interpreters*, (saith he, he speaks of those who say that to receive a Disciple in the name of a Disciple, is to receive him for love of Jesus Christ) *whether a man who is prosecuted by his Creditor, and who seeing one of his Agents coming to demand payment of the debt, goes to meet him, invites him, makes much of him, that he might win him over to him, and obtain some forbearance; I would gladly know whether this Debtor receive this Sollicitor as coming to him on the behalf of his Creditor, and whether the good entertainment he makes for him comes from a good heart and pure love which he hath for him who sent him*, pag. 73.

Without doubt he hath reason to say that a poor man who seeth a Sollicitor 2227
or a Serjeant coming to him to demand money of him on the behalf of his Creditor, *goes readily out to meet him, and receives him as coming on the behalf of his Creditor*, for otherwise he would not have regarded him at all; he hath also reason to say, *that if he invite him, use him kindly, and make any entertainment for him, this proceeds not from any good will*; but rather as from force and constraint, and that he doth not this *for the love of the Sollicitor, nor for his sake who employed him*; but for love of himself and respect to his own interest, to try *to gain the Sollicitor and win him* by his means. He could not have expresst his opinion better, and I should have been troubled to find a more apposite comparison and clearer words to express the excess thereof, than those whereof he himself makes use. He would have us say then that when Jesus Christ saith in S. *Matthew*, c. 10. (1) *That he who receives a Prophet in the quality of a Prophet, shall receive a Prophets reward; and he that receives a righteous man in the quality of a righteous man, shall receive a righteous mans reward; and whosoever shall give only a cup of cold water unto the least Disciple in the quality of a Disciple, verily he shall not lose his reward*; he intends to say no other thing but that we should receive Prophets, righteous men, and Disciples, and all those who come on his behalf, in such manner as a poor man receives Serjeants, Pursevants, and Sollicitors who come to demand money on the behalf of his Creditors.

1 Qui recipit Prophetam in nomine Prophetæ, mercedem Prophetæ accipiet; & qui recipit justum in nomine justi, mercedem justi accipiet; & quicunque potum dederit uni ex minimis istis, calicem aquæ frigidæ tantum in nomine discipuli: Amen dico vobis non perdet mercedem suam. *Matth.* 10. *v.* 41.

Finally he concludes his answer in these words: *Some for want of a right understanding have taken these words and such like from the mouth of our Lord in the Gospel*, in nomine meo, propter me, *as if they could signifie no other thing in our tongue, than for the love of me, and to please me. What an absurdity is this! how can they take them in that sense in the* 16. *of S.* Mark, *where it is said*, In nomine meo dæmonia ejicient, *In my Name shall they cast out devils: and in the* 5. *of S.* Matthew, *where the words run thus*: Mentientes propter me, *Lying for my sake. It is our Lord who speaks.* 2228

Since it is our Saviour who speaks, he ought to have heard him with more respect; and if he did not understand his words, he should at least not have made him speak the quite contrary to what he saith. But he wants yet more humility than understanding. For if he had never so little submissiveness and docility, we might send him to the Holy Fathers and Interpreters of Scripture, to learn the sense of this passage. But there were cause to fear that seeing they all

take it in that manner which he condemns, and hold that this which our Lord ſaith *in nomine meo & propter me*, ſignifieth *that which he doth for the love of God and to pleaſe him*, his zeal would tranſport him againſt ſo many Saints and great Perſonages, and make him exclaim; *What abſurdity is this!* or as he doth elſewhere: *This is a meer viſion.* For theſe are his common anſwers when he hath no better. So expunging out of Gods Law all command and obligation to love him, he reduces all Religion to this, to ſerve him in keeping the other Commandments and doing good Works outwardly.

22290 But *Leſſius* will not have Chriſtians obliged to external good works themſelves, nor unto thoſe which are the principal and moſt recommended in the Scripture, to wit, the works of mercy. And perceiving this ſtrange Doctrine to be condemned by the mouth of Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, who in the 25. of S. *Matthew* brings no other reaſon for the ſentence of life or death eternal which he will pronounce at the end of the world upon the Elect and Reprobates, than the accompliſhment or omiſſion of theſe works; he choſe rather to contradict and elude this laſt and dreadful ſentence, than by correcting his errour to ſubmit himſelf thereunto, for he is not aſhamed to ſay that the reaſon which Jeſus Chriſt alledges, and whereupon he grounds his judgment is not true, and takes not place in the matter wherein he alledges it, that is to ſay, in the laſt Judgment. *It is not to purpoſe,* ſaith he, *to alledge that our Lord in the 25. of S. Matthew, repreſenting unto us the form of the laſt Judgment, ſpeaks of the works of mercy rather than others. For he doth it only to ſtir up men, and eſpecially the common people who are not capable of comprehending ſpiritual things, to exerciſe theſe works in this life. Now this reaſon cannot take place at the laſt Judgment; becauſe then there will be no need to excite men unto works of mercy.*

1 Nec refert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii deſcribens meminerit potius operum miſericordiæ quam aliorum. Id enim fecit ut homines, præſertim plebeios, qui ad majora & ſpiritualia parum ſunt comparati, in hac vita ad ea excitaret: hæc autem ratio ceſſat in extremo judicio: quia tunc homines non erunt amplius ad opera miſericordiæ excitandi. *Leſſius de perfect. divin. lib.* 13. *tract.* 22. *pag.* 142.

22300 I will not ſtay here to examine this exceſs, which will appear ſtrange enough of it ſelf to them who are not void of the common reſentments of Chriſtianity; becauſe it will be more proper to do it elſewhere. We will only obſerve in this place, that one Jeſuit hath undertaken to fight and deſtroy Gods firſt Commandment, and another his laſt Judgment.

They who can have the patience to behold a multitude of Expoſitions of Scripture, Councils, and Holy Fathers, falſe, extravagant, unheard of, and many times impious, need only read *Poza's* Book which he entituled, *Elucidarium Deiparæ*. A Volume as big as his would be needful to repreſent all his exceſſes. I have related ſome of them in the Chapter of Novelty and elſewhere, which I repeat not here, to avoid tediouſneſs.

Father *Adam* hath ſurpaſſed all his Brethren in the ſame exceſs. For he deſtroys not only the letter and the ſenſe of Scripture, he fights with the Authors themſelves whom God hath made uſe of to impart them to us. He decrys them and deprives them of all that authority and credit which is due unto ſacred Writers, and who were no other than the hand and tongue of the Holy Ghoſt, by attributing unto them weakneſſes and extravagancies; and affirming by an horrible impiety, that following their own imaginations and paſſions, they are ſometimes tranſported beyond truth, and have written things otherwiſe than they were, and that they did neither conceive nor believe them themſelves in their conſciences.

22310 It will not eaſily be imagined that this conceit could ever come into the mind of a Monk I will not ſay, but of a Chriſtian who had not entirely renounced the Faith and Church, if this Father had not written it in manifeſt terms, and more forcibly than I can repreſent it, in a Book whereto he gives this Title: *Calvin defeated by himſelf.* In the third Part of this Book, Chap. 7. he ſaith, *That it is not only in criminal matters that zeal and hate inflame a Soul and tranſport it unto exceſs and violence; but that the Saints themſelves acknowledge that they are not exempt from this infirmity: And flagrant paſſions ſometimes puſh them on to actions ſo*

*ſtrange, and ways of expreſſing themſelves ſo far removed from truth, that thoſe who have written their lives have called them holy extravagancies, innocent errours, and Hyperboles more elevated than their apprehenſions, and which expreſſed more than they intended to ſay.*

He adds alſo in the ſame Chapter, and in the progreſs of the ſame diſcourſe, *That this infirmity is not ſo criminal, but that God did tolerate it in the perſon of thoſe Authors whom he inſpired, and whom we call Canonical, whom he left to the ſway of their own judgments, and the temper of their own ſpirits.*

He compares the Saints and Fathers of the Church to perſons full of paſſions and violence, he excepts not the Canonical Authors themſelves, and he makes them all ſubject to the ſame infirmities, and the Canonical Authors alſo to the greater and more inexcuſable. For if they be vicious in others, they are yet more in theſe, in whom the leaſt faults and the leaſt removes from the truth, which in ordinary perſons were but marks of infirmity, would be as notorious 22320
and criminal as the greateſt, becauſe they would be imputed unto God whoſe words the Canonical Authors have only rehearſed: and it is as unworthy of God, contrary to his nature and power to depart a little as much from the truth.

It is therefore manifeſt, that what this Jeſuit ſaith tends directly to deſtroy all Holy Scripture, Faith, and Religion. *For if the Canonical Writers could exceed and depart a little from the truth* in one ſingle point, they were ſubject to do it in all the reſt. So their diſcourſe is not of divine Authority, neither are their Books the Books or Word of God, becauſe God is always equally infallible, and can never go beyond or depart from the truth in the leaſt, whether he ſpeaks himſelf or by the mouth of his Prophets.

# CHAPTER II.

## Of the Commandments of God.

### ARTICLE I.

### *Of the firſt Commandment, which is that of Love and Charity.*

THis firſt Commandment of Love contains in it, and requires of us three things; to wit, that we love God above all Creatures; our ſelves for God; and our neighbour as our ſelves. Theſe three coming from one and the 22330
ſame trunk and root, ſhall make three Articles of this Chapter; and I will handle all three ſeverally, that I may more diſtinctly repreſent the Jeſuits opinions upon every obligation of the firſt Commandment, and to make it evidently appear that they deſtroy it in every part.

### I. POINT.

### Of the Command to love God.

I will relate nothing here ſave only from Father *Anthony Sirmond*, becauſe he ſeems particularly to have undertaken to deſtroy this Precept, and becauſe he hath ſaid upon this Subject alone all that may be found in the worſt Books of his Fraternity. 1. That he aboliſhes the Command of loving God, and reduces it to a ſimple counſel. 2. That according to him the Scripture hardly ſpeaks at all of divine Love and Charity, and that our Lord hath very little recommended it. 3. That he declares that the love of God may very well conſiſt and agree with the love of our ſelves. 4. And that it is nothing elſe but ſelf-love.

## SECTION I.

### *That there is no Command to love God, according to the Maxims of the Jesuits Divinity.*

OUr Lord speaking of the double Commandment of Love saith, *That all the Law and the Prophets do depend thereon: In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet & Prophetæ*, Matth. 22. He saith not that the command to love God doth depend on, and is contained in the rest; he saith on the contrary, that other Precepts are contained in this of love, and depend on it. He saith not that to love God is to serve him, and do what he commands in any sort, though it be without love; he testifies rather, that to love him with all our heart is to serve him and fulfil all his Commandments; because the desire to discharge our duty which is contained in love, supplies the place of all outward services which we cannot but would perform if we were able.

The Jesuits on the contrary teach that the Command to love God depends on, is comprised in, and confounded with the rest. They say that to love God, so much as we are or can be obliged by God himself, is only to obey him in his other Commands, though it be done without love: That it is sufficient love of God to do nothing against him: That to discharge our duty and what the Holy Scripture ordains in this point, it suffices not to hate him: As to what remains, it is left to every ones liberty in particular to love him if he list, and when he pleases, so that no person in the whole course of his life can ever be obliged by the Precept of loving God above all things: so that he should not sin at all against this Commandment, *who never put forth any inward act of love*, as Father *Sirmond* affirms in his Book of the Defence of Vertue, tr. 2. pag. 15. So that though indeed it would be *a happiness to love God actually more than all things, yet provided we offend him not, he will not damn us*, pag. 16. And finally *that it is in this manner that God might and ought command us his holy love*, pag. 24.

These passages and many others besides which I have related in the former Chapter which treats of the Corrupting of Holy Scripture by the Jesuit-Authors, are so clear, that there needs no explication for understanding them. They are so expres and formal, that without drawing any consequences from them which they do contain, they that read or hear them only, may easily perceive that they tend directly to abolish the Command of loving God. Nevertheless because we have to do with a people who pretend to measure all by, and attribute very much to their own reason, I will also make use of it as they do, and I will imploy their own against them or rather with them, that I may the better detect their opinions upon this Point, and make appear more clearly the false Principles whereupon they teach that there is no absolute Command to love God.

The first Discourse of Father *Anthony Sirmond* is this: *If there be a Command to love, it obligeth to the observation thereof, by its own Authority*, I mean, it obligeth us to love God.

Now during the whole life of man there is neither time nor occasion wherein we are obliged to love God; because as he saith, pag. 16. *God commanding us to love him contents himself, as to the main, that we should obey him in his other Commands: and that because God hath not obliged us absolutely to testifie our affection to him otherwise than by yielding obedience unto him*, pag. 18. And because though we have no love for him *effectually, we cease not for all that to fulfil in rigour the command of love by doing good works: so that we may see here the goodness of God. He hath not commanded us so much to love him as not to hate him*, pag. 19. And because a *God so loving and lovely commanding us to love him, is finally content that we obey him*, pag. 28. And by consequent, according to this Jesuit, there is no absolute Commandment to love God, *since we are not bound to the observation of it by any Authority of its own*, as he pretends.

Another Argument taken also out of Father *Sirmond* is this: Every Com-

mand carries ſome threatning with it, to keep them in their duty to whom it is made, and then ſome penalty or puniſhment againſt thoſe who violate it. Now the Commandment which God gave us to love him, contains neither threat nor puniſhment, at leaſt no grievous one. And by conſequence we cannot ſay that this is a Commandment truly ſo called.

The firſt Propoſition of this Sylogiſm is certain and evident of it ſelf. But beyond this you ſhall find alſo in Father *Sirmond*, tr. 2. pag. 20. & 21. where he diſtinguiſhes of two ſorts of commands; the one *of indulgence*, which requires ſomething without ſtrict obligation thereto; the other *of rigour*, which abſolutely obligeth to what it hath ordained. And to expreſs himſelf more fully, he adds afterwards, *that he commands as much as is poſſible, but without threats, without adding any penalty, at leaſt any grievous one to him who diſobeys. His command is all honey and ſweetneſs*: or to ſpeak more properly, this is only an advice, *when he adds a penalty or commination of death, then it is given in rigour.*

The ſecond Propoſition is his alſo, and more expreſly than the former in the 22370
14. page of the ſame Treatiſe, where after he had ſaid by way of inquiry: *If there be any command to love God, it muſt oblige by its own Authority to its obſervation.* He puts this Queſtion: *And ſome one may demand: And to what is he obliged by his tranſgreſſion? Sins he mortally againſt this Precept, who never exerciſes this inward act of love?* And he anſwers thereupon in theſe terms: *I dare neither affirm nor deny it of my ſelf.* Indeed the anſwer he was about to give to this queſtion was too impious to proceed from the Mouth or Pen of a Jeſuit. He had need to uſe or rather to abuſe the Authority of ſome great Saint to cover it, and to make him ſay by force and againſt his judgment, what he durſt not propound of himſelf. S. *Thomas*, ſaith he, 22. *q.* 44. *a.* 6. *ſeems to anſwer no: and to be content for avoiding damnation, that we do nothing otherwiſe againſt ſacred love, though we never in this life produce any formal act thereof.*

S. *Thomas* ſpeaks not of this in the place he quotes, but ſpeaks rather the contrary. And how could S. *Thomas* ſay that no man is ever obliged to love God at all in his whole life, ſince the whole world knows that he held, That all men are obliged to turn unto God and to love him as ſoon as they begin to have the uſe of reaſon.

Notwithſtanding this he forbears not to repeat the ſame thing and to confirm it alſo in theſe terms ſpeaking, of Charity and the Love of God: *He commands us not, as we have ſaid, if* S. Thomas *may warrant us, to love God under pain of damnation. It is ſufficient for him to ſave us that we habitually cheriſh it in us by* 22380 *the obſervation of his other Laws*, pag. 77. and in the 24 pag. God would *be loved freely; if he threats, it is that he may be obeyed.* And alſo, pag. 16. *To love God actually more than all, O the felicity! If not* (that is to ſay, though we never have the felicity to love him actually) *provided we do not otherwiſe offend him, he will not damn us.*

Whence we muſt conclude according to theſe Principles and Reaſonings, that there is not abſolutely any true Command which obliges us to love God, ſince that which he hath given us himſelf contains neither threat nor penalty, at the leaſt no grievous one againſt them who fail therein, if you will believe in him rather than S. *John*, S. *Paul*, and the Son of God himſelf, who ſay the contrary in ſo many places of Scripture.

## SECTION II.

### *That according to Father* Sirmond *the Goſpel ſpeaks hardly any thing at all of Divine Love and Charity, and that Jeſus Chriſt hath not much recommended it.*

After Father *Sirmond* had reduced this great and firſt Command of God to a ſimple advice and no more; this advice is alſo of ſo little conſequence in his Judgment and according to the mind of Jeſus Chriſt himſelf, if you will

believe this Jeſuit, that he hath ſcarcely mentioned it in the whole Goſpel. *You will be troubled to find*, ſaith he, pag. 162. tr. 2. *that he hath ſpoken manifeſtly of this divine practice, if it be not at the converſion of* Magdalen, *and in his Sermon at his laſt Supper, where he exhorts us to love him.*

In theſe two places, which he obſerves as thoſe alone wherein our Lord hath
22390 ſpoken *of the practice of the love of God*, he will not have him therein to recommend it as neceſſary, but only that *he commends it and exhorts us to it*, as a good thing; that is to ſay, that he adviſes, but commands it not.

And in this he teſtifies that he hath read the whole Goſpel very exactly, and that he hath very well dived into the ſenſe of the words of Jeſus Chriſt, ſaying to his Apoſtles at the laſt Supper: (1) *The commandment which I give you, is that you love one another.* He diſcovers alſo by his diſcourſe, that he underſtands perfectly well what the Goſpel and new Law is, which according to the Divines after S. *Thomas* is no other thing than the Law of love and love it ſelf. So that when he ſaith that *love is ſcarcely ſpoken of through the whole Goſpel*, it is as if he ſhould ſay that the new Law is not ſpoken of in the new Law, nor the Goſpel in the Goſpel.

1 Hoc eſt præceptum meum ut diligatis invicem. *Joan.* 15. v. 12.

But to ſhew that he ſpeaks not hereof without having conſidered it well, he obſerves that *of* 32 *Parables, which is the moſt frequent manner of Chriſts diſcourſe, he applies but one for the recommendation of the love of our neighbour, in the perſon of that diſtreſſed poor man abuſed by thieves betwixt* Jericho *and* Jeruſalem, pag. 121.

After he hath read the Goſpel ſo exactly as to number the Parables contained
22400 therein: as he hath obſerved only two places wherein our Lord ſpeaks of divine love, ſo he hath found but one wherein he ſpeaks of the love of our neighbour. So that S. *Paul* had no reaſon to ſay, writing to the *Romans*, (2) *That love is the fulfilling of the law, and that he who loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the law.* For if love be the accompliſhment and fulfilling of the Law, it will follow that love is extended through the whole Law, otherwiſe it could not fulfil nor comprehend it all. And ſo it would neither be the fulfilling nor accompliſhment of it: and if the love of our neighbour fulfil and accompliſh the Law, the love of our neighbour muſt contain and be contained in all the Law, as the Soul fills and contains and is filled and contained by the body; which cauſed S. *Auſtin* to ſay, (3) *That the whole Scripture old and new is, and commends nothing but charity.*

2 Plenitudo legis eſt dilectio; qui diligit proximum, legem implevit. *Rom.* 13. v. 10.

3 Non præcipit Scriptura niſi charitatem, nec culpat niſi cupiditatem, & eo modo informat mores demittit.

If we will not ſubmit to the Authority of S. *Auſtin* and S. *Paul*, we ſhould at leaſt give way to that of Jeſus Chriſt, and acknowledge his error, or raze out of the Goſpel ſo many paſſages wherein he recommends ſo expreſly and clearly the love of God above all things, and that of our neighbour, by making thereof an expreſs Commandment which he calls his, and the Commandment proper to the new Law, as when he ſaith in the 13. of S. *John*: (4) *A new commandment give I*
22410 *unto you, that you love one another as I have loved you.* And in Chap. 15. (5) *This is my commandment that you love one another.* And a little after: (6) *I command you to love one another*; and many other places there are wherein he ſpeaks of charity and of the command to love God and our neighbour as a Commandment which is not only proper to the new Law, but which contains alſo the whole Law new and old; as he expreſly declares in S. *Matthew*, where ſpeaking of the double Commandment to love God above all things and our neighbour as our ſelves, he ſaith, (7) *That all the Law and Prophets depend on theſe two Commandments.*

4 Mandatum novum do vobis, ut diligatis invicem ſicut dilexi vos. *Joan.* 13. v 34.

5 Hoc eſt præceptum meum ut diligatis invicem. *Joan.* 15. v. 12.

6 Hoc mando vobis ut diligatis invicem. *Ibid.* v. 17. 7 In his duobus mandatis univerſa lex pendet & Prophetæ. *Matt.* 22. v. 40.

SECTION

## SECTION III.

### *The mixture and agreement of Self-love with the Charity invented by Father* Sirmond *the Jeſuit.*

IT ſuffices not Father *Sirmond* to have taken away and daſht Charity as much as he could out of the Law of God, the ſacred Scriptures, and the heart of man; he ſets upon it in its own nature, and he ſeems to deſire to drive it from it ſelf, firſt in mingling it with, and ſecondly in changing it into ſelf-love.

He mixes it with ſelf-love when he ſaith tr. 2. pag. 47. *The more that charity poſſeſſeth it, the leſs doth the Soul think of any other thing than to love; and the more it takes to heart the intereſts of God, the leſs it cares for its own peculiar: but all this is accidental unto charity, whereof the higheſt perfection may ſubſiſt in a heart altogether inclined to and concerned to the utmoſt for it ſelf, without falling ſhort of what* 22420 *it owes unto the principal object of its affection, as it comes to paſs among the Bleſſed, who eſchewing all ſorts of evil, provide for all that which concerns them, and yet are not the leſs belonging to God.*

If it be true *that to lay to heart the intereſts of God, and to care for them more than our own be accidental unto charity*, as this Jeſuit pretends; S. *Paul* underſtood not what charity was, and he hath ſpoken very improperly of it in 1 *Cor.* 13. where making the moſt expreſs and exact deſcription of this divine vertue that we have in the Scripture, he places this amongſt its qualities and properties as the Centre and Principle of all the reſt, and as the heart of this divine vertue, that it ſeeks not its own intereſts, *non quærit quæ ſua ſunt.* And this Jeſuit pretends on the contrary that, *the higheſt perfection of charity may ſubſiſt in a heart attentive to all its own affairs*: that is to ſay, in a heart whoſe affections are faſtned to the things of this world; as he expounds himſelf ſufficiently by the words following; *and concerned to the utmoſt for himſelf*, by referring to himſelf and his private intereſt whatſoever he loveth in the world, and even in Religion it ſelf, in the exerciſes of piety and good works which he may do.

1 Qui amat animam ſuam, perdet eam. *Joan.* 12. v. 25.

Our Lord ſaith, (1) *That he who loveth himſelf ſhall loſe himſelf.* S. *John* forbids us on Gods behalf (2) *to love the world or any thing that is in the world*, and he declares openly, (3) *That the love of God is not in him who loves the* 22430 *world.* And Father *Sirmond* maintains on the contrary, that all this agrees well together, and that *charity in its higheſt perfection may ſubſiſt in a heart and perſon who is chiefly concerned for himſelf; and that this perſon may have his heart inclined to all his own concerns*; that is to ſay, *affectionately addicted to all worldly affairs, without failing in what he owes to the principal object of his affection.*

2 Nolite diligere mundum, neque ea quæ in mundo ſunt. 1 *Joan.* 2. v. 15.

3 Qui diligit mundum, non eſt charitas Patris in eo. *Ibid.*

He expounds this conceit by the example of the Bleſſed: *As it comes to paſs*, ſaith he, *to the Bleſſed who declining every ſort of evil, provide for all their own concerns, and yet are not the leſs appertaining to God*: That is to ſay, that the Bleſſed have great care of their intereſts, taking heed that no evil betide them, and that the good they enjoy eſcape not from them, and all this without diminiſhing their love to God.

Our Lord would not have us careful of any thing in this life but to ſerve God, leaving unto him the care of our ſelves, all that concerns us, and even that which is moſt neceſſary for us. (4) *Be not ſollicitous*, ſaith he in S. *Matthew*, *ſaying, What ſhall we eat, what ſhall we drink, wherewith ſhall we be cloathed? For the Heathen inquire after all theſe things; and your Father knows that they are neceſſary for you. Seek firſt the Kingdom of Heaven, and its Righteouſneſs, and all this ſhall be given unto you as an advantage.* And Father *Sirmond* on the contrary will have *the Bleſſed themſelves in Heaven to be careful of their intereſts, putting from them all ſorts of evil, and providing for all that concerns them.* And yet he pre- 22440

4 Nolite ſolliciti eſſe dicentes: Quid manducabimus? Quid bibemus? Aut quo operiemur? Hæc enim omnia gentes inquirunt. Scit enim Pater veſter quia his omnibus indigetis. Quærite ergo primum regnum Dei & juſtitiam ejus, & hæc omnia adjicientur vobis. *Matth.* 6. v. 31.

tends *that they ſerve God never the worſe*: becauſe they may be all at once for God and themſelves; ſo that according to him *Charity at the higheſt point of perfection*, ſuch as it is in the Bleſſed, *may ſubſiſt in a heart which is moſt deeply concerned for it ſelf.*

## SECTION IV.

### *The changing and transforming of Charity into Self-love by Father* Sirmond.

WE have now made appear that Father *Sirmond* mingles and confounds Self-love with Charity in the hearts of the Bleſſed themſelves; we muſt now ſee how he changes and transforms alſo love of God into ſelf-love, and acknowledges no other Charity but that of Self-love.

He makes as it were a Party upon this Point, for which he doth not at firſt declare himſelf; but propounds its reaſons and foundations.

1. He makes a perſon who deſires to love God, but fears to miſtake by loving himſelf inſtead of God, to ſpeak in this manner; *I fear that having made me for his own ſake, I only love him for my ſelf*, tr. 2. pag. 83. In his following Diſcourſe he encounters this fear, ſaying, that when we deſire God, we deſire not God for Gods ſake; but we deſire God to and for our ſelves. From whence he taketh occaſion to ſay unto this perſon as it were in drollery: *But ſay you do deſire him for his own ſake, do you not deſire him for your ſelf? Truly if you reject this conſideration, I by your leave ſhall not do the ſame*, pag. 84. And this perſon replying *that he doth not reject it neither*; that he deſires God indeed, but that he doth deſire him that he may be his, and refer all to him; *becauſe he is his Creature and a participation of his Being*; that he would be his, that he might be more obedient and entirely dependent on him: he anſwers him as it were to diſabuſe him: *Conſider that to be of God and to depend on him, ſeems not a motive proper to incline you to deſire the enjoyment of him*, pag. 85.

That is to ſay, that they who love God with an hope to enjoy him one day, as all good people in this world do love him, or thoſe who already do enjoy him by loving him, as the Bleſſed in Heaven, love him not nor deſire him, that they may depend on him and be his; but to the end that he may be theirs, and after a ſort refer himſelf unto them.

He confirms and eſtabliſheth this Principle by another like it, which is, that *none can love any thing beſides his own proper good, and that whoſoever loves hath neceſſarily a regard to himſelf*, pag. 86. And a little after he grounds his Principle on another Argument which he puts into the mouth of thoſe who are of the Faction of Self-love againſt Charity, making them to ſay, that *as good is the object of love, even ſo the private good of every one, is that which the love of every one regards.* Whence he infers without interrupting his diſcourſe, *that if I can deſire nothing but under the appearance of good, ſo no more can I do it without appearance of my own good, I of mine, and you of yours*, pag. 87.

And for fear we ſhould ſtop him in his Career, repreſenting unto him that all this is well in Self-love, which the Philoſophers call Love of Concupiſcence and Love of Intereſt; but that this cannot be ſaid of Love of Friendſhip, by which a friend reſpects and deſires the good of his friend whom he loves without intereſt, or at leaſt that it is impoſſible that this ſhould take place in the love of God and Charity, of which S. *Paul* ſaith in expreſs terms, (1) *That it ſeeketh not its own*; he prevents this objection, and cuts up by the root this difficulty, by ſaying or making them of the Faction of Self-love which he maintains to ſay; *that it is Nature that doth this, and that Charity which elevates and perfects it without deſtroying it, ought to keep cloſe to it*, pag. 88. That is to ſay, that Charity ought to follow the motions of Nature corrupted as it is at this day, and ſtay there. For it is Nature that inclines us always to love our ſelves and for our ſelves: and that ſo Charity gives the ſame inclination, and works the ſame motion in the heart it filleth; ſo that in charitable love as in natural, *the private good of every one is that*

(1) Non quærit quæ ſua ſunt. 2 Cor. 13.

*which every ones love regards*, ſo that no perſon in any ſort whatſoever *can deſire any thing which is without appearance of ſome private good to himſelf in particular*; that it is *Nature which doth cauſe this*, which being immutable in its Laws which are confirmed and not deſtroyed by Grace, *Charity is to be kept within thoſe bounds.*

It is true that Father *Sirmond* hath propounded theſe things in the name of another; but this is only to conceal himſelf, having not the confidence to appear 2247
as the firſt Author of ſuch ſtrange things; but he was not able to contain himſelf to the end. For after he had made others ſpeak, and ſay all that he had in his mind, he declares that he approves all their opinions. *I am content*, ſaith he, pag 90. *that all they maintain take place even in Charity, that it cannot be inclined towards any object without obſerving and ſeeking therein the proper good of him whoſe heart is inflamed therewith.*

He that would undertake to change and transform Charity into Self-love, could not do it more clearly, than by attributing Nature and its motions and the definition of Self-love unto Charity: and Self-love cannot be more naturally ſet forth, than by ſaying with this Jeſuit, that it is a weight or motion of the Soul *which cannot be inclined to any object without obſerving and ſeeking therein the private good of him whoſe heart is therewith inflamed.* So that when he ſaith that he is content that this ſhould take place in Charity, he avows that Charity and Self-love are one and the ſame thing.

After this we have leſs cauſe to be aſtoniſhed that he hath ſaid, as we have ſeen above, that God *neither ought nor could* command the love of Charity; and that Jeſus Chriſt is come from Heaven to Earth *to ſet us free*, and deliver us from it as a ſlavery and yoke unſupportable. For indeed God could not command Self-love; and Jeſus Chriſt is come into the world only to fight with and deſtroy it.

In this the conſequence and connexion of the Principles of the Jeſuits Divinity 2248
is very obſervable, and we may obſerve the oppoſition alſo which they have to Faith and Chriſtian Piety, ſince they deſtroy and entirely aboliſh Charity which is the foundation and top-ſtone, the Soul and Spirit of Religion.

## II. POINT.

### *That the Jeſuits by deſtroying the Charity which man oweth unto God, deſtroy alſo that which he owes himſelf.*

AS to love any one is to deſire his good; ſo to love ones ſelf is to deſire good to ones ſelf. Whence it follows, that God being the only true good of man which can render him content and happy in this and the other life, no man doth truly love himſelf but after the proportion of his love to God, the force and motion of the love which he hath to God inclines him to deſire, ſeek him, and do all he can to find and unite himſelf to him as his end wherein at length he finds his repoſe and happineſs.

So that to make appear that the Jeſuits deſtroy the true love that a man owes to himſelf, I need only to continue to ſhew that they deſtroy that which he owes to God, adding unto what I have already reported from Father *Sirmond* upon this Point, ſome opinions of other Authors of the Society. If it ſeems to the Jeſuits that Father *Sirmond* may find his juſtification in the conformity of his opinions with thoſe of his Fraternity; we ſhall alſo find therein what we pretend, that is, to make appear that his opinions upon this ſubject are not peculiar unto himſelf, and that all that he hath ſaid againſt Charity is taken from the grounds of the Societies Divinity.

1 Dilectio quam Deus exigit à nobis, propriè voluntas eſt implendi ejus mandata, quatenus hoc bonum illi & gratum eſt. *Dicaſtillus de pœnit. tr. 8. diſp. 2. dub. 5. num. 135.*

*Dicaſtillus* the Jeſuit ſpeaks in the ſame manner of the love which God obliges 2249
us to bear towards him. (1) *The love which God exacts of us, is*, ſaith he, *properly a will to accompliſh his Commandments.*

And *Tambourin* relying upon the ſame foundations, reaſons thus about the love

we owe unto our neighbour: (1) *As it is certain that we ought to love our neighbour according to the Commandment of the Gospel in S. Matth. chap. 22. You shall love your neighbours as your selves; so it seems to me also assured that there is no obligation to love him by an internal act of the will which is expressly terminated on him——For it is enough that you love God, and that you desire to accomplish his will, wherein the love of our neighbour is comprised. Whence it is, that if you hate him not, and observe for his sake the outward works of good will, you love him sufficiently.* See here the very consequences of Father *Sirmond* drawn from the same Principles.

1 Sicut autem certum est nos obligari ad proximum diligendum, juxta illud Matth. 22. Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum; ita ibi certum videtur non esse obligationem diligendi per aliquem actum internum expresse tendentem in ipsum proximum. S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 26. a. 8. in c. Suar. c. 3. d. 1. s. 4. n. 4. Conninck d. 24. d. 4. Satis enim superque est si summus Deum, ejusque voluntatem velis exequi, &c.

*Fillutius* expounding in what manner we are obliged to love God, that we may love him above all things, saith that this ought not to be extended in such manner as that we ought to have in our hearts a greater and more strong love for God than for the Creatures. His reason is; because if this were so, we should be greatly troubled, and scruple oftentimes to know whether we loved God as we
22500 ought. By this way, saith he, (1) *we may better provide for the repose of the consciences of pious persons, who without this would be always in doubt of their love they bear unto God, if it ought to be in a higher degree than the love of any creature whatsoever.* He had spoken truer, if he had said that this opinion is favourable to the lazines and lusts of men, and not to their conscience, which it destroys by procuring to it a false repose, which causes it to sleep securely in misery and death. Finally he pretends that we are not obliged to love God in any higher degree than the Creatures.

2 Ratius consulitur conscientiis piorum hominum, qui semper alioqui dubitarent de sua dilectione, si deberet esse intentior amore cujusvis creaturæ. *Fillius. tom. 2. mor. qq. tr. 22. cap. 9. num. 283. pag. 92.*

*Amicus* saith the same thing, and brings the same reason for it; (3) *That a man would be always in trouble to know whether he bore love towards God in a higher degree than towards any creature.* It seems these people have taken for their task, not to teach men their duty, and to carry them on to the performance of what they ought, but rather to dispense with them therein when they find any trouble or difficulty to perform it. Which thing they do in the greatest part of the most important Precepts of Christianity. For men believing them to be too perfect and difficult for them, look for nothing but to be dispensed with in their obligation unto them; instead of representing unto God their inability, and to pray him to give them force and grace to bear themselves therein as they ought.

3 Quod nimirum semper homo debeat sect. 2. *num.* 15.

*Amicus* enlarges himself yet farther on this reason. For speaking of two ways of loving God above all things; to wit, by loving him as much as we can by his common assistance, or by loving him indeed at the least more than any creature:
22510 (4) *The one and the other manner*, saith he, *make the Precept of loving God morally impossible, and leaves him who labours to fulfil it always in doubt whether he have accomplished it or not.*

relinquit operantem de ejus impletione. *Ibid.*

esse unus an intensiori actu amaverit Deum quàm ullam creaturam. *Amicus tom. 4 disp. 29. pag. 388.* 4 Uterque modus reddit præceptum servatum moraliter impossibile, & semper dubium

If it be impossible to love God as much as we can, or more than any creature, as this Jesuit pretends, it is impossible to love him with all our heart and all our might, and to love him as much as can be above all things, and to love him more than any creature, is but the same thing. He would say then that it is impossible to keep the first Commandment of God, in the manner God himself hath injoyned us to observe it. Which is not only simply to destroy it, but to reduce it, as we may say, below nothing, by maintaining that it is not so much as possible; since God cannot command that which is impossible, as he himself cannot do it.

1. Secunda sententia docet Deum diligendum esse super omnia tantum appretiativè seu prælativè, non autem intensivè, quæ vera est & sequenda. *Ibid. n. 15.*

We are not to wonder, if presupposing that it is impossible to love God as he hath commanded us, he conclude that we are not at all obliged thereunto. But he draws also from this same Principle many other Conclusions, whereof he makes so many Maxims and Rules of Christian life.

1. He saith that it is sufficient to love God *appretiatively*, (by way of *Valuation*)

Talis dilectio appretiativa seu prælativa essentialiter comparativa est; quia præfert Deum in amore omnibus aliis amabilibus. *Ibid. num. 16.*

*tion*) more than all other things, that is to ſay, as he expounds himſelf, to prefer God and his love before every Creature and its love.

2. Quoniam poſſumus talem æſtimationem de Deo habere, ut propter increatam ſuam bonitatem præferendus ſit in amore rebus omnibus creatis; & tamen nonniſi remiſſe in talem actum tendere.

2. That unto this it is not only not needful to have more love for God than for the Creatures; but that it is ſufficient to have one ſingle degree of love to God, how ſmall ſoever it may be. 22520

3. That God commands us no more when he commands us to love him above all things.

4. That this is ſufficient in effect to enable us to ſay that we love God above all things, and that we are ready to quit and loſe all things rather than offend him, and therefore to accompliſh the firſt and great Command of Divine love: And that to love God more, is an advice and not a command; and by conſequence no man is obliged thereto.

I undertake not to examine here theſe Maxims and Arguments, becauſe I have already ſaid ſomething of them in another place. I repreſent them here, only to diſcover according to the deſign of this Chapter, that the Jeſuits have taken in hand to blot out of the Goſpel the principal and greateſt Commandment which obligeth us to love God with all our heart, and with all our ſoul, and with all our might; and they ſay on the contrary, that we cannot love God ſo little as not to ſatisfie this Commandment.

Quod talis dilectio eſſe poſſit, etiamſi in gradu remiſſiſſima ſit, conſtat ex jactis principiis. *Ibid.* num. 20.

God declares that he will be loved *with all our heart*, that is, with all the extent of our affections; *with all our might*, that is to ſay, as much as we are able. *Amicus* on the contrary pretends that he ought to be content that we love him as little as we pleaſe: becauſe to love him more, (1) *and to a certain degree is only an advice*: It ſufficeth that we love him much under what we could, if we would; (2) *becauſe the leaſt degree of love is enough for him, and for to ſatisfie this Commandment.* 22530

3 & 4. Quod autem vi hujus præcepti ad nullam certam dilectionis intenſionem teneamur, conſtat ex dictis, cum nec uſpiam ſit, nec ex aliquo revelato deducatur. *Ibid.* n. 21. Unde negandum eſt certam intenſionem in actu dilectionis eſſe ſub præcepto, ſed tantum ſub conſilio. *Ibid.* n. 22. 1 Intenſio dilectionis non eſt ſub præcepto, ſed tantum ſub conſilio. 2 Sola dilectio appretiativa ſuper omnia ſufficit ad implendum præceptum charitatis erga Deum, etiamſi remiſſiſſima ſit. num. 19. Etiamſi nonniſi remiſſe in talem actum tendat.

If this Jeſuit had reſolved to make a Party againſt God, and to contradict and contend with him openly, he could not ſpeak with more violence and evidence: and unleſs he would quite aboliſh and deſtroy the Command which God hath given us to love him with all our heart and all our ſtrength, he could not diminiſh and debaſe it more than to reduce it to the laſt extremity, ſaying: *Ad implendum præceptum charitatis erga Deum, ſufficit dilectio, etiamſi in gradu remiſſiſſima ſit.*

But he ſtays not there, and as if he had feared, that he had granted too much unto God in allowing him the leaſt part of our heart and affection, he expounds his thoughts more clearly, and to pacifie the conſciences of pious perſons, who might fear they had not the love they ought to have unto God, if they ſhould be obliged to love him in that very manner the Jeſuit ſpeaks of above all things; he adds, that when God commands that we ſhould love him above all things, we muſt not extend this word *all things*, to the rigour in its utmoſt extent and according to its natural ſenſe, ſo that it ſhould comprehend under it all Creatures; but that we muſt underſtand by *all things*, only thoſe which are evil, contrary unto God, and capable to deſtroy the friendſhip which we have with him by Grace and Charity, that is to ſay, mortal ſin only.

Cum dicitur dilectio Dei appretiativa ſuper omnia, non neceſſario intelligitur ſuper omnia quæ amicitiæ Dei adverſantur, cujuſmodi ſunt omnia peccata mortalia. *Ibid.* num. 16.

So that according to this Maxime no perſon is obliged to love God more than any Creature, ſince there is no Creature evil, nor contrary to friendſhip with God; but rather appointed by the Ordinance of God himſelf to help us to know and love him. And ſo according to the Jeſuits we may love all Creatures more than God; and which is more ſtrange, without violating the Commandment which appoints us to love God above all things. 22540

If we believe *Amicus* then and his Brethren, there will be nothing but ſin, and that mortal ſin alſo, above which God ought to prevail in our eſteem and affection; becauſe that only deſtroys the friendſhip we have with him. And if God command us any thing in this matter, and a kinſman, a friend, or any whoſoever

desire the contrary, we may according to this new Philosophy refuse God what he desired of us, to content a kinsman, a friend, or other person, without offending the friendship we ought to exercise towards God, provided that this refusal be not in something expressly commanded, and of such consequence that we cannot fail thereof without sinning mortally.

22550 It is easie to judge whether this be to love God above all things, and not rather to love all things above God: and whether an Idea more base and unworthy of him can be had, than to imagine that we are not obliged to prefer him above any thing besides mortal sin only, and that we may love all things more than him without sin.

After he hath brought the love we owe unto God to this point, *Filliutius* adds that we are not obliged to love him in this manner above three or four moments in our life, whereof the first is, when we begin to have the use of reason; the second at the point of death, and the third to love him actually from five years to five years during life. The rest of the time he allows us to love God or the World, as we please, considering the love of God (except at these instants which he hath set down) as a work of Supererogation for which God is beholding to his Creatures.

Primum est initium moralis discussus; secundum articulus mortis, tertium est tempus intermedium vitæ, saltem quinto quoque anno. *Filliut. tom. 2. mor. qq. tr. 22. cap. 9. num. 286. & 290. pag. 93.*

This obligation also would be too severe and too hard, it would not be sufficiently proportionable to the weakness of our natures. Whence *Dicastillus* concludes, that God would have repentance separated from the love of God, to make it more easie. So that whereas, according to S. *Paul*, fear did render the yoke of the old Law unsupportable, *quam non potuerunt portare patres nostri*, and love makes the new Law sweet; *jugum meum suave est, & onus leve*; we must say, according to the Divinity of these Fathers, that the old Law was incomparably more sweet than the Christian, because fear reigned in that, and love *the most*
22560 *difficult of all, præ cæteris arduus*, in this. Or to speak conformably to their Principles, they are both equally sweet and easie to practise, since under the one and the other we are equally dispensed with for the love of God, and fear bears sway in both.

Videtur accommodata fragilitati humanæ, cum pœnitentia etiam ante adventum Christi esset obligata illi actui qui omnium maximus & præ cæteris arduus. *Dicastill. de pœnit. tr. 8. disp. 2. dub. 4. num. 106.*

*Molina* quite overthrows the Divinity of the Apostle. For after he hath established fear in the place of love in the new Law, he substitutes in the old Law love in the place of fear, pretending that it is in this that we may truly say thereof, *quam non potuerunt portare patres nostri*; and that this is the special priviledge of ours above the old. For this cause this obligation to love God only three or four times in our life, seems to him also too severe. This had been well under the old Law; but at present that we are under the Law of Grace, we have Sacraments which may supply the want of charity and love to God. (1) *Before the Law of Grace*, saith this Jesuit, *and before God by a singular mercy had yet instituted Sacraments capable to justifie those who approach unto them with attrition, so that they might receive by the vertue of these Sacraments supernatural charity, as they do who being contrite do receive the Sacraments, men were much more frequently obliged under the pain of mortal sin to love God by the motion of supernatural love, than Christians are under the new Law.*

1 Ante legem gratiæ, & antequam ex magna Dei misericordia in ea instituerentur Sacramenta quæ attritos justificarent, illisque vi Sacramentorum conferretur charitas supernaturalis, sicut sine Sacramentis confertur contritis,

22570 And confessing that under the old Law they were obliged to love God by a love of supernatural charity, every time that they found themselves in any danger of death, he maintains, (2) *That Christians who live under the Law of Grace, are not obliged under the pain of mortal sin to love God so often with a love of supernatural charity to obtain life, and avoid death eternal, because it is sufficient for them to have attrition, receiving at the same time some Sacrament of the new Law.*

sane longe frequentius sub lethali culpa tenebantur homines Deum ex charitate supernaturali diligere, quam Christiani in nova lege eum ex charitate supernaturali diligere tenentur. *Molina de just. & jure, tr. 5. disp. 59. num. 5. pag. 3166.* 2 Non ita frequenter sub reatu lethalis culpæ tenemur Deum ex charitate supernaturali diligere ad effectum comparandæ æternæ felicitatis, interitumque evadendi sempiternum, quoniam satis est nos alteri suscipiendo simul Sacramentum novæ legis. *Ibid.*

*Amicus* ſaith the ſame thing of the Commandment of Contrition, for our converſion unto God after ſin. But I will not ſtand here to alledge or make reflection on what *Molina* ſaith, becauſe it is ſpoken of elſewhere. I will only add, to clear up the conformity of the Jeſuits upon this Point, that which *Filliutius* ſaith. He demands, (1) *In what time we are obliged unto contrition, and whether it be ſo ſoon as we have ſinned?* And after he hath reported two opinions, *of which the ſecond*, ſaith he, *denies that we are ſo ſoon obliged, though we have convenience, and that we may eaſily do it*, he concludes in theſe terms: *I anſwer and ſay in the firſt place that we muſt follow the ſecond opinion*, which holds that we are not obliged.

1 Pro quo tempore urgeat ejus obligatio? An ſtatim poſt peccatum commiſſum? Secunda ſententia negat, etiamſi occurrat opportunitas, & facile fieri poſſit. Reſpondeo & dico 1. tenendum cum ſecunda ſententia. *Filliut. tom. 1. qq. mor. tr. 6. cap. 8. num. 198. & 199. pag. 157.*

He deſcends alſo yet farther in particular, and demands (2) *on what occaſion the Precept of Contrition obliges by the Law of Nature?* Whereto he gives three An- 22580
ſwers. The firſt is, that *if we regard the Law of Juſtice by which a man is obliged to ſatisfie God for the injury which he hath done unto him by ſin, in this manner he ſeems not to be obliged to contrition and ſorrow for his ſin, but only when he finds himſelf in danger of death.*

2 Quibus temporibus per ſe obliget contritio ex jure naturali? *Ibid. num. 205.*

His other Anſwer is, (3) *That if we reſpect the love which is due unto God, we are obliged unto it by that Law of Nature before death.* That is to ſay, that though in rigour and without any injuſtice a ſinner may remain in his ſin and averſion from God until his death; notwithſtanding he ought of charity to prevent that time, and to love God ſometimes without attending for this extremity, if he will not ask him forgiveneſs as ſoon as he hath offended him, nor even for many years after; it is reaſonable that at leaſt he paſs not above five or ſeven years before he do it. This is the charitable advice which *Filliutius* gives him in theſe terms. (4) *Speaking generally it ſeems that a man is not obliged thereto within one years time; that he ſhould be obliged thereto within five, or from ſeven years to ſeven, is very probable, as we ſhall ſee elſewhere, where I ſhall ſpeak the ſame thing of Charity.* He holds that a ſinner after he hath paſſed five or ſeven years in his ſin, and in a voluntary averſion from God, and all others in like manner who have paſſed over ſo long a time without once thinking of loving God, will be obliged, the one to ask God pardon, and the other to love him at leaſt after ſo long a time. If this be probable, as he ſaith, the contrary is alſo: and by conſequence of two probable opinions we may follow which we will with a ſafe conſcience, according to the Jeſuits Divinity, a ſinner may perſiſt in his ſin and in his averſion from 22590
God, and every other man in his inſenſibleneſs, without having any motion of love unto God, after he hath already paſt ſeven years without thinking of him.

Reſpondeo & dico 1. ſi reſpiciatur lex juſtitiæ qua homo tenetur ſatisfacere Deo pro injuria peccati, ſic non videtur obligari, niſi quando adeſt periculum mortis. *Ibid.*

The third Anſwer of *Filliutius* is, (5) *That if we regard the Law of Charity which every one owes unto himſelf, it is very probable that he is obliged to have contrition and ſorrow for ſin before the article of death.* And as if he feared leſt this ſhould alſo torment ſome conſciences, and give them too much trouble and ſcruple, he adds: (6) *For all that, becauſe of the Authority of the Doctors whom we have quoted in the former queſtion, it is probable that he is not obliged thereto.* That is to ſay, that a man who is in mortal ſin, may with a ſafe conſcience, according to this probable opinion, perſiſt voluntarily all his life in a ſtate of enmity againſt God, and delay his converſion until the point of death, demanding only forgiveneſs of God when he is ready to dye, and can offend him no longer, without doing herein any thing againſt the charity he owes to himſelf, any more than againſt that which he owes unto God.

3 Si reſpiciatur lex charitatis erga Deum, jure naturali obligat ante mortem. *Ibid. num. 206.*

4 In univerſum intra annum non videtur obligare: quolibet ſeptennio vel quinquennio, eſt probabile, ut alibi dicam de charitate. *Ibid. n. 208.*

5 Si reſpiciatur lex charitatis propriæ, probabile eſt obligare etiam extra articulum. *Ibid. num. 206.* 6 Ob authoritatem autem Doctorum quos citavimus in præcedenti quæſito, non eſt improbabile quod non obliget. *Ibid.*

I can hardly believe that a Jeſuit would approve a Child who ſhould deal with his Father in this manner as he ſaith we may carry our ſelves towards God; and I know not whether he would counſel any of his Brethren who had a mortal diſeaſe to ſuffer it five or ſeven years, or even until he ſhould ſee himſelf nigh unto death, without calling for the Phyſitian, and without applying any

remedy thereto, and whether he believes he may do this without danger of killing the body of his Brother by this delay, and his own Soul by ſo remarkable a negligence; eſpecially if he had an aſſured remedy whereof it was only his own fault if he did not make uſe.

I know well at the leaſt, that if herein he pretend not to offend againſt the Laws of Juſtice and Chriſtian Charity, he ſhall tranſgreſs thoſe of the Society, who have ſo well provided for the health of all their Brethren, that inſtead of delaying to the extremity, they have ordained to cauſe the Phyſitian to viſit them from time to time, though there be none of them ſick. What kind of prudence muſt this be which hath ſo great care of the health and life of the body, and ſo little of the Souls?

Father *Celot* is not content to ſay as *Filliutius* and others, that a ſinner is not obliged to ſeek God after he hath offended him; but even that God himſelf preventing and ſeeking, as we may ſay, his friendſhip by the inſpirations and good motions he beſtows on him, he may refuſe and reject them effectually, without herein making himſelf guilty of any fault. He ſaith alſo the ſame thing of them who make profeſſion of living well, and of all thoſe who of deliberate purpoſe reject the inſpirations and graces by which God inclines them to do any good work, though both the one and the other knew that their Salvation would depend upon theſe inſpirations, and that through neglect of receiving them, and complying with them, they might be loſt eternally. (1) *I acknowledge*, ſaith he, *that Salvation depends many times of this counſel, and the uſe that is made of it, you muſt ſay* (he ſpeaks to his Adverſary) *that in this caſe he that will not follow it, commits a great ſin. But as for me I hold that he commits none at all.* A man that ſuffers himſelf to dye of hunger, without being willing to take bread or any other nouriſhment that is preſented unto him, when he might eaſily do it, would paſs in the judgment of all the world for a ſelf-murderer: and he that ſuffers his Soul to dye, or rather who kills it, by refuſing knowingly and even reſolvedly, the graces and inſpirations ſent him by God, on which he knows that his eternal life and Salvation depend, ſhall be innocent in the judgment of theſe Jeſuits, *Quo tempore dicas oportet graviſſimo ſe obſtringere peccato; ego nullum præciſe agnoſco.*

1 Fateor certe in hujus acceptatione uſuque conſilii ſalutis cardinem non raro verſari: Quo tempore dicas oportet graviſſimo ſe obſtringere peccato qui omittat. Ego nullum præciſe agnoſco. *Celot lib. 9. cap. ſect. 7. pag. 816.*

## THE SUM

### *Of the Doctrine of the Jeſuits concerning the Love of Charity which a man owes unto God and to himſelf.*

They ſay that when God commands us to love him, he intends only that we ſhould ſerve him, though it be without love; that he deſires no other thing but that we obey him by doing outwardly that which he injoyns us; that he would have us alſo to keep the other Commandments, though in keeping them we love him not; that it is ſufficient not to hate him, to fulfil the Commandment of loving him, and by conſequence to be ſaved.

God hath commanded us to love him with all our heart and all our might; that is to ſay, ſo much as we can. The Jeſuits ſay on the contrary, that it is lawful to love him as little as we will, and much leſs than we might if we would, and that this ſuffices; becauſe according to them the leaſt degree of love may ſatisfie this Commandment.

As God loves us always, and doth us good without intermiſſion, ſo he would alſo that our love and acknowledgments ſhould be continual and without bounds. But the Jeſuits maintain that we may paſs over whole years without loving him; and that by bethinking our ſelves thereof once in five or ſeven years, we are quit: yea, that though we have never actually loved him at all through our whole life, it ſuffices to diſcharge us from this obligation we have to love him, to think thereof at the point of death; nay, there be ſome who do hardly acknowledge even this obligation.

God is not content to be loved in a ſlight way, he will be loved as God, and

as he deſerves, above all things. The Jeſuits ſay on the contrary, that we may love all things more than God, becauſe according to their Divinity the leaſt degree of love ſuffices to acquit us of what we owe him.

And when God ſaith that he will be loved above all things, they hold that he would ſay only above all things that are evil and contrary to his friendſhip, that is to ſay, above all ſorts of mortal ſins, which only can overturn and deſtroy the friendſhip which men have with God.

As man cannot find his bliſs but in God, ſo he loves not himſelf truly, but ſo far as he loves God, ſeeks, adheres, and is united to him by love: but the Jeſuits diſpenſe with him for this genuine love which he owes himſelf, by diſcharging 22630
him of that which he is obliged to bear towards God.

They ſay moreover, that being departed from God, he may continue in that eſtate without troubling himſelf about returning to God and himſelf; and that when God ſeeks him firſt by his inſpirations, he may refuſe and reject them, and abide in this eſtate of enmity and voluntary averſion from God until the point of death; and ſo expoſe himſelf to the danger of periſhing eternally, without making himſelf by this guilty of any fault, and without being deficient in the love he owes himſelf, any more than in that he owes God.

## III. POINT.

### *Of the Command to love our Neighbour, that the Jeſuits utterly deſtroy it.*

FAther *Bauny* in his Sum, Chap. 7. pag 81. expounds the Command to love our Neighbour in theſe terms: *By Charity we are obliged to teſtifie unto him who may have offended us, that we retain no animoſity againſt him, and according to the convenience of times and perſons give him proofs of the love we bear him.* He quotes ſome Divines from whom he hath taken what he ſaith; and he adds reaſon grounded on the Example and Authority of the holy Fathers. *For love,* ſaith he, *which we bear towards our brethren, ought to reſemble that which the members have one towards another, as writes S.* Auſtin *in the 15. of his 50 Homilies. Si enim ſic nos amare voluerimus, quomodo ſe invicem amant membra noſtri corporis, per-* 22640
*fecta in nobis charitas poteſt cuſtodiri.* And making application of this Example taken out of S. *Auſtin,* and which S. *Auſtin* took out of S. *Paul, Let us ſee then,* ſaith he, *what it is the members of the body do naturally one for another. They love and agree mutually, and ſympathize with one another in miſery. Quando ſanum eſt caput, congaudent omnia membra, & placent ſibi de ſingulis cætera membra, &c.*

See here the duties of Charity towards our Neighbour, which he acknowledgeth with the Divines and holy Fathers, and then he eſtabliſheth the command and obligation: *It is even hereunto that God and Nature obligeth us,* ſaith S. Ambroſe *in the firſt Book of his Offices, Chap.* 28. And therefore, *Secundum Dei voluntatem & naturæ copulam invicem nobis auxilio eſſe debemus, certare officiis, velut in medio omnes utilitates ponere, & adjumentum ferre alter alteri, vel ſtudio, vel officio, vel pecunia, vel alio quolibet modo, ut inter nos ſocietatis augeatur gratia.*

Perhaps it will be wondred at, at firſt, that I having undertaken to repreſent only the Errours of the Jeſuits, have rehearſed theſe places of Father *Bauny,* as if I had ſomething to reply againſt them. But I do not pretend to reprove him for producing the opinion of the holy Fathers with thoſe of the School-Divines, that he might eſtabliſh one of the principal points of Chriſtian Morality. I have no other deſign than to make him ſee clearly the exceſs wherewith he is tranſported by voluntarily deſpiſing the Doctrine of the holy Fathers after he hath acknowledged it, ſince he hath confidence to ſay afterwards: *I believe nevertheleſs that* 22650
*to fail in theſe things is no mortal ſin, unleſs in caſe of ſcandal,* pag. 81. He means *that it is no mortal ſin to be deficient in that which God and Nature obligeth us unto,* as he ſaid but now: *that it is no mortal ſin,* as he ſaith alſo in the ſame place, *to have ſuch an hatred againſt our neighbour, as not to be willing to keep company with him,*

*him, to have ſuch and ſo violent an averſion from him, as upon no terms or occaſion, to be willing to ſpeak with him nor help him in his buſineſs, nor at all to forgive him when he acknowledges his fault, and offers ſatisfaction.* For he declares roundly, that to be deficient in all theſe things which he hath related according to the opinion of the Fathers and new Divines themſelves, is no mortal ſin unleſs in caſe of ſcandal: that is to ſay, in the language of this good man, that provided men be not offended at theſe things, the violation of Charity and the Law of God is of little conſideration.

He ſpeaks alſo of Envy with the ſame ſpirit, citing alſo S. *Auſtin* and S. *Cyprian*, but only to deſpiſe their Authority alſo, by openly preferring his own opinion before that of theſe great Saints. For after he hath related the words of S. *Cyprian*, who wondring at the nature of Envy, crys out: *Qualis eſt animi tinea zelare in altero felicitatem, in malum proprium bona aliena convertere, illuſtrium proſperitate torqueri?* He adds ſpeedily after, as thinking ſtrange at S. *Cyprians* wondring, and correcting the opinion of S. *Auſtin* whom he quotes likewiſe: *This ſin, though by the teſtimony of S.* Auſtin *it be contrary to Charity, yet ſeems not to*
22660 *be mortal*, pag. 80. And the reaſon he oppoſes to the Authority of theſe great Saints, is; *Becauſe the good which is found in theſe temporal things, is ſo ſlender and of ſo little conſequence for Heaven, that it is of no conſideration with God and the Saints.*

I let paſs this reaſon of which I have ſpoken in another place, to relate that which he adds alſo concerning the ſin of Envy. *It is no more mortal*, ſaith he, *when a man gives way to ſuch deſires upon ſome good motive, ex bono motivo.* He expreſſes a little before ſome of theſe deſires which he doth not only diſcharge of mortal ſin, but which he juſtifies abſolutely, and would have to paſs for innocent, ſaying that *we may wiſh evil to our neighbour without ſin, when we are urged to it by ſome good motive*, pag. 77. And to expound and ſupport his opinion, he makes uſe of the Authority of *Bonacina* writing in theſe terms: *So* Bonacina *upon the firſt Commandment, diſp. 3. q. 4. n. 7. excepts from all faults the mother who deſires the death of her daughters, quod ob deformitatem aut inopiam nequeat juxta animi deſiderium eas nuptui tradere; or indeed becauſe for their ſakes ſhe is ill uſed by their father: quia occaſione illarum male ſecum agitur à marito, aut injuriis afficitur. Non enim proprie filias deteſtatur ex diſplicentia ipſarum, ſed in deteſtationem proprii mali*, pag. 77.

He brings alſo another Example on the ſame ſubject: *alſo one may without fault deſire ſome evil to befal a wicked man, as death; non quidem optando quatenus malum ipſius eſt, ſed quatenus boni rationem habet.* This good or this appearance of good which ſerves for motive to deſire the death of a man without offending God, is expounded by *Emanuel Sa* in this ſort. (1) *You may deſire the death*
22670 *of an enemy who might do you much hurt, not of hatred to him, but to avoid the damage and hurt which he would do you. You may alſo rejoyce in his death, becauſe of the good which you receive thereby.* Jeſus Chriſt was far off from this Doctrine, when in the Goſpel he forbids us to render evil for evil, and commands us on the contrary to do good for evil: But this Maxime juſtifies the greateſt part of the enmities and mortal feuds that are in the world. For commonly we deſire not the hurt, and eſpecially not the death of another, but to deliver our ſelves from ſome evil, or to reap thereby ſome good, and he muſt have loſt all regard of God and Nature, who ſhould deſire any evil or death it ſelf to befal a man out of a meer frolick, without occaſion, reaſon, or hope of any good.

1 Poteſt optare hoſti tibi alioqui valde nociturо mortem, non odio, ſed ad vitandum damnum tuum. Item de morte ejus gaudere ob bonum inde ſecutum. *Sa verbo charitas, num. 8. pag. 65.*

I might here alſo repreſent that the Jeſuits diſpenſe with the obligation of aſſiſting our neighbour, except only in extream neceſſity, and that they cheriſh the licence of committing, without fear of puniſhments, theſts, murthers, impoſtures, cheats, and breaches of truſt in all ſorts of condition. For all theſe abuſes and all theſe ſins are againſt the Command which God hath given us to love our neighbour as our ſelves, and never to do unto him what we would not have done unto us. But becauſe all theſe things have been largely proved in other places, I will ſpeak no more of them at preſent.

I will add only for concluſion unto this Chapter, that which *Amicus* ſaith upon a que-

a queſtion which he propoſeth concerning the command to love our neighbour; 22680
to wit, (1) *Whether by vertue of this Precept we be obliged to ſome act of Charity towards our neighbour? Or whether we may ſatisfie it by acts of mercy and bounty exerciſed towards him when neceſſity and occaſion require?*

1 An vi hujus præcepti teneamur ad aliquem actum charitatis erga proximum? An vero huic præcepto ſatisfacere poſſimus per ſolos actus externos miſericordiæ & beneficentiæ, quando neceſſitas & ratio poſtulat? *Amicus tom. 4. diſp. 28. ſect. 1. n. 3. pag. 377.*

After he hath quoted the Divines who hold the affirmative, and related their reaſons to the number of five which are very conſiderable, he cites *Suarez*, *Coninck*, and ſome others who are of the contrary opinion, with whom he concludes in theſe terms. (2) *This opinion is probable.* He attributes it alſo to S. *Bernard*, ſaying, *That S.* Bernard *teaches it expreſly in his* 50. *Sermon upon the Cantieles.* Which we ſhould have more reaſon to wonder at, if he had not alſo the confidence to ſay that he learnt it of Jeſus Chriſt, and that it was drawn and did evidently follow from theſe words of Jeſus Chriſt in the 7. of S. *Matthew*, and 6. of S. *Luke*. *Do unto men whatſoever ye would they ſhould do unto you.* As if Jeſus Chriſt commanding us to do good unto our neighbour, did diſpenſe with us from loving him from the bottom of our hearts, or as if he had not commanded the one as well as the other; and yet more expreſly to love him than to do him good, as it may appear in many places of the Goſpel, as in the 13. of S. *John*. (3) *I give you a new Commandment that you love one another as I have loved you.* And in the following verſe: (4) *All the world ſhall know that you are my Diſci-* 22690
*ples, if you love one another.* And without alledging other paſſages of Scripture upon this point, that alone which this Jeſuit abuſes to ſhew that God commands us only to ſerve and not to love our neighbour, doth abſolutely prove our obligation unto both. For as there is none who deſires not to be relieved in his neceſſities, ſo there is none who deſires not to be beloved and to be ſerved with affection, and there are many who had rather not be ſerved at all, than without affection and with regret, or with indifference. When God then commands men and ſaith: (5) *Do ye unto men whatſoever ye would they ſhould do unto you*, he commands as well to love as to ſerve, becauſe there is none that deſires not you ſhould do to him the one as well as the other.

2 Hæc ſententia probabilis eſt, quam expreſſe tradit Bernardus, Serm. 50 in Cantica. *Ibid. num.* 14.

Eaque non obſcure colligitur ex illis verbis, Matth. 7. & Lucæ 6. Quæcunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, & vos facite illis. *Ibid.*

He proves his opinion alſo by this reaſon: (6) *We are not obliged by this Precept to love our neighbour otherwiſe or more than our ſelves. Now ſo it is we are not obliged to love our ſelves with a love and internal act of Charity. And by conſequence we are not obliged neither unto our neighbour in that manner.*

3 Mandatum novum do vobis ut diligatis invicem ſicut dilexi vos. *Joan.* 13. *v.* 34.

He alledges another Reaſon and Argument in this manner: (7) *Thoſe who deny that to accompliſh the Command to love God above all things, it is needful to exerciſe any act of love and charity towards him, by ſtronger reaſon may hold this other opinion.*

4 In hoc cognoſcent omnes quia diſcipuli mei eſtis, ſi dilectionem habueritis ad invicem. *Ibid. v.* 35.

Finally, his laſt reaſon is, (8) *That if we were obliged to love our neighbour,* 22700
*multitudes of the world would be damned for never exerciſing this inward act of Charity towards all men, which is a very ſevere point, and not at all probable.* It ſuffices

5 Quæcunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, & vos facite illis. 6 Probatur autem hæc ſententia primo, vi hujus præcepti non tenemur diligere proximum aliter vel plus quam nos ipſos. Atqui nos ipſos non tenemur diligere actu interno charitatis. Ergo nec proximum. *Ibid. num.* 15. 7 A fortiori eandem ſententiam docent qui actum internum charitatis negant eſſe neceſſarium in implendo præcepto de diligendo Deo ſuper omnia. *num.* 14. 8 Multi damnarentur ex eo quod hujuſmodi actum internum charitatis erga omnes homines non elicuerint, quod eſt argumentum ab abſurdo & improbabili. *Ibid. num.* 18.

that a point appears difficult for it to be rejected of them who profeſs a complacent Divinity, and an eaſie devotion, how clear and evident ſoever it be in the Goſpel: and the ſame reaſon ſerves them to hold it for a thing indifferent or an advice only, whatſoever is contrary to the ſenſes, and which gives them any trouble, though it be expreſly commanded.

I ſtand not any longer upon this laſt reaſon no more than upon the two former, becauſe I have ſpoken ſufficiently thereof before. It ſuffices to obſerve that this Jeſuit eſtabliſhes here one errour upon two others, and that he pretends with his Brethren, that we are not obliged to love our neighbour, becauſe we are not obliged to love our ſelves, any more than to love God by any Command: and by conſequence that he and his Companions by their own confeſſion deſtroy and

abolish entirely the two Commandments of Charity, and the love of God in the second degree, which regardeth our neighbour, as well as in the first, which respects God himself.

## IV. POINT.

### That the Jesuits allow of Magick and Witchcraft.

IT would never be believed, if we did not read it in their Books. *Tambourin* saith, (1) *That he who knows another hath made a Covenant with the Devil to hide a treasure, may make a sign opposite to that which hath been made to commit this treasure to the Devils custody, that the Devil may keep it no longer.* As if the Devil had not still what he demands, whether the treasure be committed to him to keep, or he be hindred from keeping it, whilst the marks and superstitious Ceremonies whereof he is the Author are observed. It is not the treasure put into his custody that he demands; but the heart and soul of him who believes in him, and who makes use of his superstitions to oblige him, or prohibite him to keep a treasure.

The same Father puts a question, whether it be lawful to undo one Charm by another? He answers, (2) *That if I demand absolutely that he who hath set the Spell should take it off, knowing that he can, either with or without a new Charm, yet believing or knowing certainly that he will do it with one. I answer,* saith he, *that it is at least probable and safe in conscience that it may be lawfully demanded.* This is as it were to send a Messenger or a Deputy to the Devil, and to cause him be requested for what we dare not demand our selves, and to make use of another mans Magick as ones own, since we know certainly that he can do nothing without the help of the Devil.

He saith after *Sanchez*, (3) *That they are not superstitious who heal the sick by Charms composed of Psalms and other Prayers, and who by stroking and prayers heal them of incurable diseases. They call these persons Saviours,* saith he. These diseases being incurable, it is clear that they who heal them, as he saith, by stroking and prayers, must needs act by an extraordinary vertue and more than humane: and as they are not Saints, that so we might believe that they have the power of God in their hands, it is visible that they employ that of the Devil.

It is also lawful, according to this Father, (4) *to make use of sacred words to keep dogs from barking, to stanch bleeding, and to heal diseases, provided we attend on the event without firm confidence therein, and cut off all vain Ceremonies, if there be any.* This without doubt is a worthy use of the Word of God, to employ it only to keep Curs from barking; and this is without doubt to sanctifie the profession of Thieves, to teach them to pray unto God when they are about to enter into a house to rob, that by their prayers they may hinder the dogs from bawling and wakening the people.

1. Homo audita conventione cum dæmone utitur signo oppositicite, quia non fuit nisi contrarium signum apponere, quo posito dæmon promisit non amplius thesaurum custodire. *Tambur. num.* 12. *sect.* 2. *cap* 6. *lib.* 2. *prima parte Decalogi.*

2 Quod si absolute petam ut dissolvat, sciens ipsum posse dissolvere cum maleficio, & posse sine maleficio; putans tamen, imo certo sciens ipsum cum nevo maleficio dissoluturum, dico esse saltem probabile & tutum licite posse petere. *Ibid. n.* 7.

2 Colligit Sanchez non esse superstitiosos qui per quasdam scripturas, sive ex psalmis, sive ex aliis orationibus consectas curant infirmos qui suo tactu vel orationibus etiam incurabiles morbos pari modo sanant, hos salvatores vocant. *Ibid. num.* 30. *sect.* 1. 4 Verba sacra pro latratu canum, proque effluente sanguine, & pro morbetum expulsione, amota certa expectatione, & vanis, si forte adsint, cæremoniis, sunt licita. *Ibid. num* 80. *sect.* 1.

To avoid Witchcraft in these prayers, *Tambourin* requires two conditions. The first that *the event be not attended with certain confidence* nor the effect of these prayers, allowing it to be lawful to desire it, and to attend on the power of the Devil as probable, and to have a probable commerce with him, and to hope that he will help us, provided we be not wholly confident of it, the Devil not performing always what he would, no more than what he saith and what he promiseth. The other condition is, *that the vain Ceremonies be cut off, if there be any.* But the Devil regards not to employ vain and Pagan Ceremonies in Magick, when it is more advantagious for him to use those of the Church. 1. Because thereby he profanes the sacred signs of our Religion. 2. Because thereby he hide:

hides his malice better, and more eaſily ſurpriſes the ſimple by marks and appearances of piety.

But that none may ſcruple to conſult Aſtrologers about what ſhall befal them, *Tambourin* aſſures us, (1) *That he hath ſeen men of extraordinary piety and learning make no ſcruple to demand from Aſtrologers the figures of their birth, and productions of things which ſhould happen unto them.* This alone ſuffices to render their vertue ſuſpected, and entirely to ruine it, ſince this was to approve and authorize a profeſſion condemned by the Scripture & Church, and to cheriſh worldly men in a profane curioſity which leads them to conſult Diviners and judiciary Aſtrologers, about things to come, which depend on God alone, and not on the vain obſervations of theſe Impoſtors.

1 Video viros pietate & doctrina non mediocres ab Aſtrologis ſui natalis figuram, ſuoſque particulares futuros eventus non cum ſcrupulo expoſcentes. *Ibid. n.* 19. *ſect.* 1.

*Tambourin* adds, (2) *That he would not condemn him at leaſt of mortal ſin, to whom an Aſtrologer having predicted that he ſhould be advanced to ſome Prelacy, if he reſolved thereupon to go to Rome with ſome hope, but not with entire certainty to obtain the dignity foretold him.* Without doubt this is a very Eccleſiaſtick miſſion, and altogether divine, to go to *Rome* to obtain a Prelacy, being induced thereunto by a Diviner or an Aſtrologer, that is to ſay, by the illuſion of a Spirit humane or diabolick which governs theſe Foretellers, who having firſt deceived, them, doth by them deceive and blind others by their own ambition and folly. 22740

2 Certe cum cui prædicitur modo dicto Prælaturæ, non condemnarem, ſaltem de mortali, ſi adire Romam velit ad aliquam ſub aliqua ſpe, non vero certitudine exſpectandam. *Ibid. num.* 20.

There can be nothing more proper to authorize this pernicious Science, and to give it free paſſage through the world, than to ſay that it is capable of conducting Church-men in the greateſt and holieſt Charges of Religion But this is clearly enough to juſtifie and declare it innocent and lawful, and to confirm thoſe who profeſs it in their errour, to maintain that the gain they get thereby is juſt and lawful, as *Sanchez* doth when he ſaith: (3) *That if an Aſtrologer have not done what he could to know by the help of the Devil what he could not know otherwiſe, whether the thing happened, or happened not, he is bound to reſtore the money he received: but if he have done what he could to know of the Devil what would happen, he is not bound to reſtore what he received; becauſe he hath taken paines for this money.... For the paines, care, and induſtry of this Sorcerer hath its valuation, and may be eſtimated by money; and in this caſe he is not reſponſible for damages, nor obliged to reſtitution of expences; but he is then only obliged thereto when he is not well ſkilled in the diabolick Art.* 22750

3 Si nullam operam apposuit ut arte diaboli id sciret Aſtrologus quod nullo alio pacto scirí potuit, sive effectus eventerit, sive non, tenetur pretium restituere dandi: Si vero Aſtrologus ille vel divinator operam ſuam apposuit, & arte diaboli res ita evenit, non tenetur pretium reſtituere, quia ipſe ſuam operam, etſi turpem, apposuit— quia illa diligentia à mago illo apposita eſt pretio æſtimabilis, nec in hoc caſu tenetur damna & expenſas conſulenti reſtituere, ſed tantum quando nullam operam impendit, aut ejus diabolicæ artis ignarus eſt. *Sanchez in Summa, lib.* 2. *cap.* 38. *num.* 96.

He condemns him not then unto reſtitution, but only for not being ſufficiently employed in the ſtudy of this impious and horrible Science, and for not having intelligence enough with the Devil. This extravagance appears incredible, but it is a juſt puniſhment on him, for that he could imagine that it was juſt that thoſe goods which the Lord hath made for them who adore him, ſhould ſerve for recompence to the Worſhippers of the Devil, and that they could get them juſtly by doing of all injuries the greateſt unto him who is thereof the Soveraign Maſter.

ARTICLE

## ARTICLE II.

### THOU SHALT NOT SWEAR BY GOD IN VAIN.

***That the Jeſuits deſtroy this Commandment by diminiſhing, excuſing, weakning the ſins of Swearing and Blaſpheming.***

BAuny treating of *Blaſphemy* in Chap. 6. of his Sum, pag. 69 *acknowledges that we ſee but too many people who by utmoſt infidelity renounce God*; but he adds alſo ſhortly after, that *the raſhneſs of the tongue or mind in fits and ſallies of choler, which are the cauſe a man is not maſter of himſelf, excuſe from mortal ſin*, this
22760 extream infidelity of thoſe who renounce God: and this ſame excuſe may ſerve in a manner for all thoſe who are tranſported to renounce or blaſpheme God, there being few who do it in cold blood.

He hath written alſo in the ſame Page, *That by a moſt pernicious abuſe it is become a cuſtom in the world to affirm doubtful things by theſe words; As true as there is but one God, which cannot be conſiderately uttered without the ſin of blaſphemy.* He acknowledges the Commandment neither to ſwear nor blaſpheme, and the ſin committed in the violation thereof; but he aboliſheth it as ſpeedily, adding that *this ſin is mortal when there is an intention therein æquandi humanam veritatem divinæ*, to equalize the truth of humane things to Gods.

This Clauſe is remarkable; *When we have an intention.* For it preſuppoſes that when we have not this intention, there is no mortal ſin. And to expound and eſtabliſh this Doctrine yet farther, he brings this reaſon: *Becauſe this is againſt his ſacred honour, and the reverence which we owe him, to compare uncertain and mutable things to the conſtancy and eternal duration of his immutable and divine Eſſence*; (Sanchez *in the* 1. *Part of his Sum in the Book of an Oath*) *and by neceſſary conſequence to attribute unto him that inſtability which is contrary to his perfection and holy Nature, and ſo to blaſpheme*, pag. 70.

He always meaſures blaſphemy by the intention of him that commits it; ſo that, according to him to conclude that any perſon offends mortally in uttering theſe words: *As true as there is but one God*, or other ſuch like, it is neceſſary that he have an expreſs intention *to attribute inſtability unto God*, and that he believe
22770 that God is as mutable and inconſtant as the Creatures. *Which they do not for all that*, ſaith he, *who by this form of ſpeech, would not compare any thing unto God, but only ſhew indeed that the thing is true in a certain manner, as it is true that God is.* And by conſequence they blaſpheme not by the Principles of this Father; As if the ſin of Blaſphemy could not be committed, but when by an errour of the underſtanding, or a falſe opinion of God, or by affected malice, or a formed deſign to deſtroy and diſhonour him, he is blaſphemed. If this be ſo, then to be Blaſphemers we muſt become Hereticks, or rather Atheiſts, or Devils.

He expounds himſelf yet more clearly upon this very matter in the 66, 67, and 68 pages of the ſame Chapter, where giving out Rules of Practice for a Confeſſor, he ſaith, *That he ought to inform himſelf of the Penitent who accuſes himſelf of blaſphemy, whether he have done it with a formal intention to diſhonour God; and whether he were maliciouſly affected towards God; and whether he blaſphemed him out of hatred; whether he were touched with any deſpite againſt God.* And he adds in the ſequel, *That if the Penitent anſwer that he hath not been touched with any deſpite againſt God, &c. the ſaid Confeſſor is not to repute him for a Blaſphemer, nor deprived of Grace, becauſe he hath uſed blaſphemous words.*

And in the 66. page, after he hath ſaid, *That it is a ſort of blaſphemy, when we name with contempt, ſhame, and diſhonour the holy and moſt ſacred Members of the Son of God*, he adds in favour of theſe Blaſphemers: *Which they ſeem not to do, who make uſe of them in their common diſcourſe as ornaments of ſpeech, ſaying, Death,*
22780 *Head, Belly, &c.* He confirms his opinion by the Authority of ſome *who hold after* Bonacina, *that to name theſe parts in choler, and not through any indignation*

*againſt God, is no blaſphemy.* His reaſon is, *becauſe in theſe words; By the Head, by the Belly, nothing is uttered concerning God which is falſe, ſince it is true that God being become man hath theſe members; though*, as he ſaid in the beginning, *theſe members be named with contempt, reproach, ſhame, and diſhonour to the Son of God.*

If he could excuſe this crime of all ſin, as well as of Blaſphemies, and make it wholly innocent, it may be he would do it. But not daring to undertake that, he doth at leaſt what he can to diminiſh it, making uſe of *Laymans* Authority, who by his relation, ſaith, *That this is a ſin of irreverence againſt God, which is but venial when it is without perjury, ſcandal, or danger of ſwearing falſe.*

At the end of the ſame p. 66. continuing to give his advice and Rules of Practice to the Confeſſor, he ſaith, *That he ought to examine his Penitent whether he have an ill will and deſpite againſt his Creator.* And in the beginning of the following Page he declares that *his advice is, that if the Penitent declare that his choler hath tranſported him to theſe ſcandalous words, we may be perſwaded that in uttering them he hath ſinned only venially.* He ſaith alſo a little after, *That we muſt make the like judgment of thoſe who without conſideration do uſe them*; that is to ſay, that they ſin only venially.

Finally, he acknowledges none for Blaſphemers properly but thoſe *who voluntarily, of ſet purpoſe, and knowingly name theſe ſacred members of the humanity of the Son of God, if they do it out of formal contempt, wittingly againſt the truth, in which caſe it is a mortal ſin of blaſphemy or perjury.*

I let paſs all theſe paſſages without making any reflection thereon; neither 2279o
do I repreſent them with all their extent, having already related part of them in the Chapter *of the Intention*, where they may be ſeen. I have here only touched them in my paſſage, that I might make appear what is the opinion of Father *Bauny* concerning Blaſphemy, and that to find it ſuch as he ſets it forth, and with the conditions he requires in it, we muſt go into Hell. For we may ſpeak and judge of things by his Principles and Arguments, that he hath taken blaſphemy from the face of the Earth, by multiplying Blaſphemers, and giving them liberty to blaſpheme freely, and means to excuſe themſelves from all the blaſphemies they can commit, if they know how to make uſe of the Rules which he hath taught them.

One will ſay that he uſeth no blaſphemous words *but as ornaments of his language.* Another may ſay that he did it *through choler and deſpite* againſt ſome one whom he will, and not out of any evil affection or *indignation he had againſt God.* The moſt part may ſay that when they let flye *blaſpheming, curſing and deſpitefully railing againſt their Creator*, paſſion and *choler tranſported them unto theſe ſcandalous words.* And if they be all examined, as Father *Bauny* counſels a Confeſſor to examine them who addreſs themſelves unto him, ſaying, *That it is very pertinent to the purpoſe that he may learn of them, and know their intention from their own mouth, and what hath moved them to blaſpheme*, he will, it may be, find none who will not anſwer that he did it not *through any formal intention to diſhonour God*, or through any hatred which he had againſt him, nor through any formed 2280o
deſign *to reproach, contemn, and diſhonour God, or Jeſus Chriſt, or his moſt holy and ſacred members.* And thus there ſhall no more Blaſphemers be found in the world, and we muſt no more have recourſe to the Ordinances of the Church, nor of Princes to puniſh Blaſphemers, nor count that amongſt the Commandments of God which forbids blaſphemy; ſince according to the Divinity of this Father, there will be none in effect, they will be only ſins of irreverence and venial.

The other Jeſuits ſeem more moderate on this ſubject: but if they appear in this leſs to blame, they are, it may be, more indeed, and they are much more dangerous than *Bauny.* For the vice that proceeds to extremity, and is viſible in its exceſs, is only for them that have no conſcience; but it ſurpriſes and inſenſibly engages thoſe who have yet ſome fear of God, when it is propounded with ſome temperament, and when it is covered with ſome pretence which ſerves as a reaſon to commit it without ſcruple.

*Eſcobar*, by Example, in his Moral Divinity, places amongſt Problematick Queſtions, whether all blaſphemy be mortal ſin. And though he rank himſelf

indeed amongſt them that hold the affirmative, yet he forbears not to ſay that it is no blaſphemy when (1) *a Lover calls his Miſtreſs his Goddeſs and his Idol.* For after he had related divers opinions about this queſtion, according to his cuſtom, he joyns himſelf to thoſe who excuſe it from blaſphemy, and ſaith, (2) *If this Lover ſpeak before perſons of indifferent diſcretion, he ought not in any ſort be eſteemed a Blaſphemer, becauſe it is clear that it is only flattery; but if he ſpeak before groſs witted perſons, he would not altogether exempt him from a grand material blaſphemy.* If this reaſon take place, there will be no blaſphemy at all, unleſs he who hears it, believe that he who utters it, ſpeaks according to his judgment, ſo this ſhall be only a material blaſphemy; that is, the matter of blaſphemy only. So that there will be no true blaſphemies but what are uttered by Infidels and impious perſons who believe they ſpeak truth when they blaſpheme. And according to this Rule the *Tyrians* and *Sidonians* blaſphemed not when they ſaid unto King *Herod* to flatter him, that he ſpoke as a God and not as a man: And this proud King ought not to have been eaten of worms, as he was by the juſt Judgment of God, for ſuffering theſe blaſphemous words, ſince the flattery was altogether manifeſt.

1 Amans amaſium Deam ſuam, ſuum vocitat idolum.

2 Si coram mediocriter prudentibus obloquatur; nullatenus blaſphemiæ gota efficiendus eſt hujuſmodi utens locutionibus: quia amanti aperta eſt adulatio: at coram ruſticis, haud eum omnino a gravi materialis blaſphemiæ piaculo liberarim. *Eſcob. tom. 1. Theol. Mor. lib. 4. probl. 21.*

This reaſon may be made uſe of for a foundation of the Propoſition of *Tambourin* and *Azor* who hold, that to ſay, *This is as true as the Goſpel, or this is as true as God, is no blaſphemy*: And their reaſon is, becauſe it is viſible that this is an exceſs againſt the divine Truth. That is to ſpeak properly, that this is no blaſphemy, becauſe it is viſible that it is one.

*Sanchez* ſaith that he who ſwears lightly and unconcernedly, without thinking on what he ſaith, or through vanity, ſins only venially. (3) *The oath*, ſaith he, *whereunto the third condition is wanting, to wit, judgment, when men ſwear without neceſſity, or without the reſpect and reverence that is requiſite, is but a venial ſin; becauſe the irreverence herein committed is not great, being only a ſin of vanity, or of ſuperfluity.*

3 Juramentum cui deſuit tertius comes, nempe judicium quod attinet ad neceſſariam jurandi cauſam & debitam reverentiam, eſt ſola venialis culpa; ſiquidem ſolius vanitatis & ſuperfluitatis peccatum eſt. *Sanch. Opus Mor. lib. 3. cap. 4. num. 35. p. 17.*

*Fillintius* ſaith the ſame thing, and almoſt in the ſame words: (4) *If judgment only be wanting to an oath; that is to ſay, if it be uttered without neceſſity or utility, there is in it ſome fault.* And a little after: *An oath is not a mortal ſin, if it be without contempt.* We muſt not then ſay any longer in the Commandment that forbids Swearing; *Thou ſhalt not ſwear by God in vain*; but only thou ſhalt not ſwear falſely; ſince that, according to theſe new Divines, we may without great ſin ſwear in vain and out of vanity, without neceſſity, profit, occaſion, or reverence, which in ſwearing is due to God whom we take for Judge and Witneſs.

4 Si deſit juramento tantum judicium, hoc eſt, ſi fiat abſque neceſſitate aut utilitate, peccatum a-

*Fillintius*'s reaſon is, (5) *Becauſe though this oath*, thus made without neceſſity or reverence, *be in ſome ſort againſt the Authority of God; nevertheleſs becauſe it deſtroys it not in it ſelf, as a lye deſtroys his truth, and is not contrary unto him otherwiſe than as it renders him not all the reſpect that is due unto him, it is but a venial ſin.* As if it were a ſmall matter to fail of our reſpect towards God, and to demean our ſelves irreverently towards him, and not to be troubled for offending againſt his Authority, provided we do not abſolutely deſtroy it.

liquod committitur. Tale juramentum non eſt mortale, ſi deſit contemptus. *Fillint. tom. 2. qq. mor. tr. 25. cap. 11. num. 332. & 333. pag. 205.* 5 Licet aliquo modo ſit contra Dei auctoritatem, tamen quia non fit contra illam in ſe, ſicut deſtruitur veritas ejus per mendacium, ſed tantum fit contra illam, non tractando illam cum debita reverentia; ideo tantum committitur culpa venialis. *Ibid. num. 333.*

This Author conſiders not that to deſtroy truth in our ſelves, is no leſs a mortal ſin, than to deſtroy it in it ſelf, which is impoſſible. For we are obliged to have it in us as our life, by loving and honouring it: and to chaſe it from us by contempt or negligence, or by preferring other things before it which pleaſe us more, can be no other than a mortal ſin, ſince this is truly to kill our ſelves, and it in us.

And for the Authority of God, it is certain that we cannot indeed deprive him of it, any more than of his Power; and to deny it, were to become a Fool or an Atheiſt. Since then it cannot be deſtroyed in it ſelf, nor in the opinion and judgment of men that have their reaſon ſound, there remains but one way to de-

ſtroy it ſo much as may be, which is by contempt, and irreverence which is committed againſt it by uſing it indifferently without reſpect to confirm what we ſay, ſwearing without neceſſity or occaſion, and even of meer vanity. So that if in this caſe and theſe circumſtances the ſin committed againſt the Authority of God, and the reverence which is due unto him be a ſlight one, as theſe Jeſuits ſay it is, it ſeems that there can never be any great one, according to them in this matter.

*Filliutius* proceeds farther, and maintains, that to ſwear, not only without occaſion and reverence; but alſo upon ſome bad occaſion, as to affirm by oath that one hath committed murder or adultery, is but a venial ſin. (1) *For though we make uſe of this oath in the relation we make of a mortal ſin, as when we ſay: I ſwear that I have committed this murder, or this fornication; yet this may be done without any complacency in this crime, and only out of levity and without cauſe. Wherefore it is but a venial ſin.* 22840

He adds that though a man who ſwears thus, ſhould take pleaſure in the crime he relates, and ſhould ſcandalize and defame another perſon in his relation, this oath according to *Suarez* would not be mortal; which he alſo believes as probable with him. For after he hath ſaid that the more rational Caſuiſts hold, that (2) *if any one reporting a mortal ſin wrong the honour and reputation of his neighbour, as by ſaying, that he hath committed adultery with an honeſt woman, or if he take pleaſure therein, if he ſwear to affirm that which he ſaith, it is a mortal ſin;* he oppoſeth unto their s the opinion of *Suarez*, as probable. (3) *For all that Suarez*, ſaith he, *in the place now quoted, n. 8. maintains that it is no mortal ſin, if it be conſidered only as an oath; becauſe this oath regards not the matter of this diſcourſe, as bad, but only as true: And by conſequence there is none, at the leaſt no mortal ſin therein; which is probable enough.*

And becauſe this reaſon of *Suarez* is metaphyſical enough, *Filliutius* relates another, or rather expounds the ſame in another manner, and makes it more intelligible, (4) *Becauſe this defect*, ſaith he, ſpeaking of the injury done unto God by the man who takes him for a witneſs of the adultery he hath committed, *is not contrary to the end of an oath. For it may ſerve to confirm the truth; and he takes not God for a witneſs of a falſe, but at the moſt of a wicked and diſhoneſt thing, as we have ſaid; and this in it ſelf is no great injury againſt God.* By this reckoning we may ſay that a child ſhould do his father no great wrong, nor a ſervant his Maſter, nor wife her husband, to produce and take him for witneſs of her debauches, provided they were true; unleſs we will ſay, that the honour of God is leſs conſiderable than that of men, or that God ought to be inſenſible of all injuries and indignities committed againſt him. 22850

*Sanchez* diſcharges of ſin, at leaſt mortal, all thoſe who ſwear of cuſtom, (5) *of what ſort ſoever it be*, ſaith he, *though they have not yet recanted it.* If they in ſwearing have not ſo much preſence of mind as to perceive what they ſay and do, and what evil they cauſe, as the moſt prudent have, who have not this evil habit; ſo their vice and wicked cuſtom of ſwearing ſhall not hurt them; but on the contrary upon this occaſion it ſhall be favourable unto them. For if they had it not, they would perceive what they did in ſwearing, and would make themſelves Criminals. But becauſe the evil cuſtom of ſwearing which they have contracted, and wherein they perſiſt ſtill voluntarily, blinds, and hinders them from perceiving the crime they commit, it ſecures them from it, according to this Doctor. 22860

1 Quis licet juramentum hoc adjungatur narrationi peccati mortalis; ut juro me commiſiſſe tale homicidium, vel fornicationem; tamen non ſit cum complacentia in illo ex neceſſitate, ſed tantum ſit ſine cauſa & leviter, quare non excedet culpam venialem. *Ibid. n.* 336. *pag.* 205.

2 Si quis narret peccatum mortale, infamando proximum, ut adulterium cum muliere honeſta, vel complacendo in illo, tunc juramentum additum videtur mortale. *Ibid. num.* 337.

3 Attamen Suarez loco citato; n. 8. defendit à mortali, ſi tantum habeatur ratio juramenti: quia non cadit ſupra illam materiam quatenus mala, ſed tantum quatenus vera. Quare nec erit peccatum, ſaltem mortale, quod eſt ſatis probabile. *Ibid.* 4 Quia ejuſmodi defectus nec eſt contra finem juramenti. Poteſt enim confirmari per illud veritas, nec facit Deum teſtem mendacii, ſed ad ſummum rei malæ & indecentis, ut diximus. At id per ſe non eſt injuria gravis. *Ibid. num.* 336. 5 Quiſcunque illa ſit, & nondum ſit retractata. Atque ita ut ſint peccata lethalia, requirit talem advertentiam, qualis eſt neceſſaria in homine non ſic ad jurandum aſſueto. *Sanch. op. moral. lib.* 3. *cap.* 5. *num.* 28. *pag.* 21.

By this reaſon if a man being in a dangerous way, ſhould pull out his own eyes, and then fall into a precipice, he might be excuſed by this, that he could not ſee when he fell.

By all this which hath been ſaid unto this preſent, it is clear that the Jeſuits

excuſe them who ſwear and forſwear through an evil habit; who ſwear raſhly and without reaſon, vainly and without neceſſity, in wicked and ſcandalous matters, which tend to the diſhonour of our neighbour by defaming him, and of God by taking him for witneſs of crimes and debauchies, of which in ſwearing they boaſt themſelves. So that there remains nothing in this matter but ſwearing and forſwearing with full knowledge and black malice, to be a crime, and which properly retains the name of an oath and perjury in the Schools of theſe Fathers.

*Eſcobar* puts this Queſtion: (1) *Is it lawful to ſuborn any perſon to ſwear a falſe thing, which he notwithſtanding ignorantly believes to be true?* And after he had ſaid that *Azor* is not of this opinion, becauſe it is not lawful to cauſe that evil to be done by another which we cannot do our ſelves, he adds: (2) *But this is the opinion of* P. Hurtado. He might alſo have joyned *Sanchez* to him, who holds
12870 the ſame opinion; (3) *If ſome one preſents himſelf to me,* ſaith he, *without my ſollicitation to ſwear that which he in ſimplicity believes to be true, though I know well that it is falſe: if notwithſtanding it ſerve to prove ſome other thing which I know to be true, and conduces to binder that I be not deprived of my right, it is lawful for me to take his offer.*

The reaſon of *Eſcobar* is, (4) *Becauſe in this caſe we engage not our neighbour in a thing which is formally evil, ſince he ſins not in ſwearing.* We may ſay by the ſame reaſon, that it is lawful to cauſe a Fool to kill another man, becauſe he ſins not in killing him.

He demands alſo, (5) *Whether it be lawful to cauſe him to ſwear whom we fear will ſwear falſe.* In the diſpoſition wherein this man is ſuppoſed to be, it is one and the ſame thing to require him to ſwear and forſwear; ſince we know that the one is inſeparable from the other; and becauſe we dare not require both together, we need only, according to theſe Doctors, make an abſtraction in our minds, and ſeparate the one from the other in our thoughts, and only require him to ſwear, without conſidering the perjury he is about to commit.

*Filliutius* hath put the ſame Queſtion, and anſwered it in the ſame manner (6) *I hold,* ſaith he, *that any one may upon a lawful cauſe requeſt a man to ſwear, though he probably fear that he will be forſworn.* And this anſwer is but a con-
12880 cluſion drawn from a Principle he had minted before, ſaying, (7) *That this thing is not evil in it ſelf, to require an oath of a perſon whom we know will forſwear himſelf, ſo that ſome conditions be obſerved.* Amongſt theſe conditions, one of the principal is, (8) *That ſomewhat of value be in queſtion, and that there be ſome juſt cauſe to require this oath, as the neceſſity of our affairs or benefit we hope therefrom; otherwiſe it would be againſt Charity to expoſe and engage our neighbour in ſuch an occaſion.*

He believes not that it would be againſt the Charity we owe our Neighbour, to cauſe him to kill his own Soul by perjury when we pretend ſome temporal intereſt in it; but then only when we pretend nothing, nor receive any profit from it.

*Filliutius* ſaw this difficulty very well, but he forbears not for all that to perſiſt in the maintenance of his opinion, ſaying, (9) *That yet this is not againſt Charity, becauſe it obliges us not to avoid the ſin of another man by our own loſs.* This Maxime agrees well with the Word of Jeſus Chriſt who ſaith, that it were better to be caſt head-long into the bottom of the Sea with a Mill-ſtone about our neck, than to offend our neighbour, and to induce him to ſin. They conſider neither truth which is prejudiced, nor God who is offended by perjury, nor the Soul of our neighbour who kills himſelf by his perjury; but only the private intereſt of him who cauſes him to ſwear, which they are not aſhamed to prefer before all theſe things.

1 Licetne inducere aliquem ad jurandum falſum; quod tamen ipſe juraturus ex ignorantia putat? *Eſcobar tr. 1. exam. 3. cap. 7. num. 21. p. 74.*

2 Affirmat autem Petrus Hurtado.

3 Si abſque inductione aliqua mea ille ſe offerat ad jurandum quod bona fide putat eſſe verum, etiam ſi ego falſum norim, & conducat ad probandum quod ſcio verum eſſe, & ne juret meo defraudet, ſicebit utique acceptare. *Sanch. op. moral. lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 10. pag. 35.*

4 Quia proximus tunc non inducitur ad eſſectum formaliter malum, cum jurando non delinquat. *Ibid. Eſcobar.*

5 Licetne petere juramentum ab eo, quem ſcimus falſum juraturum? Licet, dummodo non petatur ut juret falſum. *Ibid. num. 33.*

6 Dico 4. poſſe quemcunque intercedente legitima cauſa, petere juramentum ab eo quem probabiliter timet eſſe pejuraturum. *Filliutius tom. 2. moral. qq. tract. 21. cap. 11. num. 447. pag. 206.* 7 Non eſſe intrinſece malum, petere juramentum ab eo quem ſcimus pejuraturum, dummodo ſerventur aliquæ conditiones. *Ibid. num. 346.* 8 Ut ſit aliqua juſta cauſa id petendi, neceſſitas videlicet, vel utilitas, alioqui eſſet contra charitatem proximum conſtituere in tali occaſione. 9 Nec propterea eſt contra charitatem; quia hæc non obligat ad vitandum peccatum alterius cum proprio damno.

Who dares excuſe him who ſhould induce his brother to do an action which he knew was capable to procure his fathers death and his alſo, becauſe he might from thence draw to himſelf ſome profit or advantage thereby? Nevertheleſs 22890
the Jeſuits allow this to all ſorts of perſons in reference to God and their Neighbour: that is to ſay, in reference to their brother and father, ſaying, (1) *That it is not a thing evil in it ſelf to intreat a perſon to ſwear, who, we know very well, will forſwear himſelf.*

This opinion is *Sanchez's* alſo, who after he had ſaid that there are ſome who hold, (2) *That it is not lawful to induce him to ſwear, who will forſwear himſelf, though he be very forward, and offer himſelf voluntarily thereto*; he adds, ſpeaking after his own opinion, and correcting that of thoſe Divines, (3) *That when ſome juſt occaſion to do it occurs, it is no ſin.* And a little after, to clear up this Queſtion, he adds: (4) *But the difficulty is greater when he who is to forſwear himſelf is not diſpoſed thereunto, and he who intreats it of him hath ſome neceſſity obliging him thereto.*

He acknowledges that according to the Principles of S. *Auſtin*, S. *Thomas*, and other Divines, whom he had quoted before, this is not lawful; but he forbears not to maintain on the contrary, (5) *That it is lawful when any juſt occaſion happens which renders this oath needful, though he who takes it, muſt forſwear himſelf, and was not diſpoſed to forſwear himſelf, if he had not been intreated.* His grounds are the ſame with thoſe of *Filiutius*, (6) *The reaſon is*, ſaith he, *becauſe he is not required to forſwear himſelf, but to ſwear; and the Law of Charity obliges not to eſchew this ſin of our Neighbour with notable damage to our ſelves thereby to be incurred.* And being deſirous to make us ſee what neceſſity and motive might ſuffice 22900
to make a perſon ſwear, who, we are aſſured, will forſwear himſelf, and offers himſelf to that purpoſe, he brings two Examples.

The firſt Example is, (7) *That it may happen that a man hath taken on him the care of another mans affairs, and that to acquit himſelf well therein, he ſhall be obliged to exact this oath; ſo that if he fail therein, he will give occaſion of ſuſpecting his fidelity, or his affection and vigilance.* So you have the firſt Example, which is of a man who being charged with ſome affairs, knows not well how to perform or diſpatch them ſo readily as he deſires, without making uſe of a Perjurer; this is to give great liberty, or rather a great and dangerous temptation to all Agents, Proctors, and Sollicitors of Affairs.

The other Example is of a man who hath need of a Knight of the Poſt to reform a Contract and make it valid, (8) *Moreover, ſaith Sanchez, this oath may be made uſe of to fortifie and make valid a Contract, which without it would be null.* This is to make good penny-worths of conſcience and our neighbours Souls, to abandon it in this manner, and to help him even to caſt himſelf into perdition and the power of the Devil, to ſecure a debt, or to avoid the reproach or ſuſpicion of being negligent in the conduct of an affair.

*Eſcobar* puts alſo this Queſtion about an Oath: (9) *Whether it be lawful to induce one to ſwear by falſe gods?* The Anſwer is, (10) *That to engage him expreſly thereto, is a mortal ſin: but to demand an oath of him who will ſwear by falſe gods, is no evil thing in it ſelf.* He holds then that it is no evil in it ſelf to take ſuch an oath of an Infidel; but it would be to demand it; that it may be demanded, but not expreſly; that we may ſollicite an Infidel and engage him to ſwear, provided we tell him not in expreſs terms, that he ſhall ſwear by his falſe gods, though we be aſſured that he will not ſwear otherwiſe, not acknowledging the true God. Who ſees not that this is to deride God and men, to treat of matters of Religion and Salvation in a manner ſo unhandſom and groſs, that common ſenſe only is ſufficient to perceive the exceſs and baſeneſs of it? 22910

1 Non eſt intrinſecè malum petere juramentum ab eo quem ſcimus perjeraturum.

2 Ut non liceat juramentum à pejeraturo petere, quamvis ille ad pejerandum paratus ſit, ſeque ſponte offerat.

3 At concurrenti juſta cauſa, nulla eſt culpa. *Sanch. op. moral. lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 6. pag. 34.*

4 Sed major eſt difficultas quando ille pejeraturus non erat actu paratus, at neceſſitas eſt in petente. *Ibid. num. 7.*

5 Dicendum eſt licere concurrenti juſta cauſa neceſſitatis ejus juramenti, quamvis alter ſit pejeraturus, nec eſſet paratus ad pejerandum. *Ibid.*

6 Ratio eſt quia non petitur ab eo perjurium, ſed juramentum. Nec lex charitatis obligat cum proprio notabili detrimento ad vitandum id proximi peccatum. *Ibid.*

7 Quia poteſt quiſpiam cauſam alterius agere, & ratio adminiſtrationis petit exigi id juramentum; & niſi petatur, arguetur prævaricationis exiſtimatæ, aut negligentis adminiſtrationis. *Ibid.* 8 Inſuper poteſt deſervire hoc juramentum confirmando contractui qui aliàs infirmus erit. *Ibid.* 9 Num liceat per falſos Deos ad jurandum inducere? Determinate inducere, mortale crimen eſt; petere vero juramentum ab eo qui per falſos Deos eſt juraturus, per ſe malum non eſt. *Eſcob. tr. 1. exam. 3. num. 57. pag. 79.*

*Escobar* cites *Filliutius* upon this Point, and he saith in effect the same thing with him, and in the same terms: (1) *To demand*, saith he, *an oath of him who, we are assured, will swear by his false god, is not a thing evil in it self.* This is also the Judgment of *Sanchez*, who with his Brethren acknowledging, that it is to contribute to an action of Idolatry, or at the least to give occasion of it also with them, that it may not be done without some reason for it. But instead of what the others say generally, that we ought to be engaged thereto by some necessity or utility, he saith more, that it cannot be so little, as not be sufficient thereunto. (2) *The least benefit or interest sufficeth*, saith he, *to dispense with the Precept which obliges us to avoid this occasion.*

1 Petere juramentum ab eo quem constat esse juraturum per falsos Deos, non est per se malum. *Filliutius tom. 2. mor. qq. tr. 21. cap. 11. num. 339. pag. 205.*

2 Vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc præcepto vitandæ hujus occasionis. *Sanch. ut supra num. 23. pag. 37.*

22920 And it is in a manner upon this reason that he gives a solution to another difficulty which he propounds a little after. (3) *What sin is it to require an oath of an Infidel who is ready to swear by false gods, without necessity or utility which might serve for excuse?* He answers, 1. That none have declared nor explicated this Question in the terms he hath proposed it. And after he acknowledges that some condemn this action of mortal sin; because it is entirely against the Charity which we owe to our Neighbour, which obliges us to hinder, and much more not to tempt him to offend God mortally, at least when we can do it conveniently and without any loss.

3 Secunda difficultas est quale peccatum sit exigere hoc juramentum ad Infideli parato ad jurandum per falsos Deos, quando defuit necessitas aut utilitas excusans. *Ibid. num. 22.*

This so weighty a consideration startles him a little; but it is not capable to make him to quit his opinion, and yield unto the truth. (4) *Though I believe*, saith he, *that this opinion is more probable, because the reason of these Authors which I now related is very urgent; it is very probable that it is but a venial sin.* His reason is, that since there needs so small a matter to be able without sin to prevail against the Precept forbidding us to demand an oath of an Infidel; this is a sign that this Command is not so rigorous, as to oblige under mortal sin, though we should violate it expresly and without any particular reason, (5) *Because*, 22930 saith he, *the least consideration of benefit sufficeth to exempt us from the Precept which obligeth to avoid this occasion; and it is not ordinary for so slight an occasion to dispense with Commands which oblige under mortal sin.*

Quam difficultatem in terminis non enodant Authores.

This manner of arguing is very ordinary with the Jesuits, to establish one Error by another, and to make use of one disorder which they have already introduced, to make way for a second, by drawing consequences from the one to the other. Because they give liberty without sin to demand an oath of an Idolater, when we have any small pretext for it, they infer from thence, that when we demand it without any reason, it cannot be any great evil. Thus it is that they take from themselves authority to dispense with the Commandments of God, and abolish them as they please; and that they make use of their own dispensations to give them liberty to violate them freely, or at least without any great sin.

Quia generale charitatis proximi ac correctionis fraternæ præceptum obligat quemlibet sub mortali ad vitandum lethale alterius peccatum,

quando commode & absque suo damno id potest. 4 Quamvis autem hoc probabilius esse credam, quia ratio adducta fortiter urget; at probabile est culpam solum venialem admitti. 5 Quia, ut vidimus n. 2. & seq. vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc præcepto vitandæ hujus occasionis; at à præceptis sub mortali obligantibus, non tam levis causa excusare solet. *Ibid.*

## ARTICLE III. Of the Commandment of God,

### HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER.

THis Commandment obligeth Children to their Fathers and Mothers in four principal things, as the Catechism of the Council of *Trent* observes; to love, reverence, obedience, and assistance. These are also the four Duties in which the Jesuits undertake to dispense with them.

1. For what concerns love, *Dicastilus* saith, (1) *That it is not altogether certain that a child can lawfully desire the death of his father or rejoyce in it, because of inheritance which might come to him thereby; but he believes that he sins not mortally in rejoycing, not in his death, considered as an evil unto his father, but as a lawful means*

1 Desiderare filium v. g. parentis mortem aut de illa gaudere ob hæreditatem eidem

provenientem, non ita certum eſt eſſe licitum, quamvis de gaudio & delectatione non quidem habita de morte ipſa ſecundum ſe, quatenus eſt malum patris, immo ad finem hæreditatis obtinendæ aut ſimilem, optare ut licita via, ſcilicet à Deo, non quatenus malum patris eſt, ſed quatenus inde filio bonum provenit, non putarem eſſe mortale. *Dicaſtill. lib. 2. tom. 2.*

*means appointed of God, for him to obtain the ſucceſſion; not becauſe ſome evil befel* 22940 *the father, but ſome good the ſon.*

See here a man exceedingly conſounded. He would gladly juſtifie a child who deſires the death of his father, that he may enjoy his eſtate; but he dares not do it abſolutely, becauſe this appears not to him to be *altogether certain.* He contents himſelf to exempt him from mortal ſin by the rule of directing the intention, which teaches him to look on his fathers death, not as ill to his father, but as good for himſelf, becauſe of the inheritance that comes to him thereby.

(1) *Tambourin* who wrote ſince *Dicaſtilius* is more hardy; he makes no difficulty of exempting this deſire from ſin, on condition the intention be directed according as *Dicaſtillus* diſcourſeth. And that he might render this more probable and more intelligible, he diſtinguiſheth of two ſorts of deſires, whereof the one is abſolute, and the other conditional. (2) *If you deſire the death of your father upon ſome condition,* ſaith he, *the anſwer is eaſie, that you may lawfully. For if one ſay in himſelf: if my father ſhould dye, I ſhould enjoy his eſtate; in this caſe he ſhould not rejoyce in his fathers death, but in his inheritance.*

Behold the Example of a conditional deſire, in which he finds no difficulty. 22950 He propoſes and expounds the other deſire which he calls abſolute, in theſe terms: (3) *I deſire the death of my father, not becauſe it is an evil to him, but becauſe it is good for me, or becauſe it is the cauſe of good unto me; and becauſe by this his death I enter into the poſſeſſion of my paternal inheritance.*

*diſp. 12. a. 1. dub. 6. num. 546.* 1 An poſſit filius mortem patris optare, vel de illa gaudere, non ut eſt malum patris, (hoc enim eſſet odium execrandum) ſed ut ipſe filius patris hæreditate fruatur—— facilis eſt reſponſio. Licite enim hæc optas vel amplecteris, quia non gaudes de alterius malo, ſed de proprio bono. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 1. ſect. 3. num. 29.* 2 Si deſideres ſub conditione, facilis item reſponſio licite poſſe. Si quis enim hunc actum eliciat: Si meus pater moreretur, ego hæreditate potirer, & gauderet tunc ille, non de patris morte, ſed de hæreditate. n. 30.

3 Cuplo mortem patris, non ut malum patris eſt, ſed ut bonum meum, ſeu ut cauſa mei boni; nimirum quia ex illius morte ego ejus hæreditatem adibo. Si, inquam, ſic deſideras, major eſt difficultas reſolvendi, &c.— Nihilominus Caſtropalaus....., ex quibus vides opinionem Caſtropalai eſſe ſatis probabilem. *num.* 31, 32, 33.

This is the ſame thing that he had already ſaid in the former paſſage; and this repetition makes us ſee more clearly the perplexity he is in through the deſire he hath to juſtifie this unnatural child in his deſire of his fathers death, that he may enjoy his eſtate. He finds therein ſome difficulty; but after he had reported the opinion of *Caſtropalao* who approves this ſort of deſires, he concludes that this opinion is probable enough; that is to ſay, that a child may lawfully and without ſin love his fathers inheritance better than his father himſelf. For if he loved his father better than the inheritance that he hopes from him, he could not rejoyce in the death of his father as in ſome good thing, ſince it would procure him more hurt than good by taking from him his father whom he loves more than all the eſtate he ſhould receive thereby.

I know not how without horrour any can, I will not ſay approve, but produce and publiſh ſuch thoughts and deſires ſo oppoſite to the moſt common notions of reaſon and of Chriſtian and natural piety; to exempt that from ſin in children which were horrible and criminal in the remoteſt kindred, friends, or domeſticks; and finally to pretend to prove this overthrow of Nature and Reaſon, by 22960 the moſt brutiſh and inhumane Principle that can be imagined, ſaying, that a man may deſire evil to any perſon whomſoever, and even death it ſelf unto his own father, provided he conſider this evil as his own proper good, and not barely as an evil unto him to whom he wiſheth it.

It is thus that Lyons, Bears, and Tygers devour men, not ſimply to kill them, and to do them hurt, but for their own proper good, that they may feed themſelves with their fleſh: yet they ſpare beaſts of their own kind, and in this they are leſs cruel and inhumane than men who are ſo blind and unnatural as to believe and follow a Doctrine ſo pernicious, and which teaches men to kill, eat, and devour one another through a deſire of any the leaſt temporal intereſt.

If this were lawful, as the Jeſuits pretend, there would be no more any true Chriſtian or humane Society. It would be lawful for every private man to de-

ſire publick Calamities, not conſidering them as the deſtruction of Families, Towns, and the Common-wealth, but as his particular benefit. There ſhould be no more Charity nor Religion, ſince we might without ſin, according to this Divinity, not only wiſh all ſorts of miſchief to our Neighbour; but deſire alſo the profanation of the moſt Holy things, and the out-throw of the Laws of God and the Church, provided only we ſay that it is not any hurt or offence to God or our Neighbour that we deſire, but only the good and profit that thereby we pretend unto.

Now *Tambourin* as he ſpeaks more abſolutely and boldly than *Dicaſtillus*, becauſe he wrote after him, ſo he adds alſo the reſolution of many like queſtions:

22970 (1) *May an inferior deſire the death of his ſuperior in the Church or Common-wealth, that he may ſucceed in his Office, or that he may be delivered from him, becauſe he favours him not?* Here is the caſe to which he anſwers preciſely and without heſitation in theſe words. *If you deſire only or receive with joy the effect of this death, to wit, the Inheritance of a Father, the Charge of a Prelate, the deliverance from ſome trouble he procured you, the anſwer is eaſie, that you may deſire all theſe things lawfully, and that becauſe you rejoyce not in the evil of another, but in your own proper good.*

1 An poſſit ſubditus mortem cupere ſui Prælati, ut Prælaturæ ipſe ſuccedat, vel ut ab eo Prælato ſibi infenſo liberetur? Si ſolum deſideres, vel cum gaudio exciptas ejuſmodi effectus, hæreditatem, moleſtiæ carentiam, prælaturam, facilis eſt reſponſio. Licet enim hæc optas vel amplecteris, quia non gaudes de alterius malo, ſed de proprio bono.

*Dicaſtillus* durſt not at firſt determine upon this queſtion, becauſe it ſeemed to him uncertain; the Authority and Example of *Caſtropalao* having made him more bold, he approves and propounds it as probable; and *Tambourin* makes thereof a Maxime, in which there is no difficulty at all, *facilis reſponſio*. Thus it comes to paſs, that theſe Doctors who make profeſſion of a complacent Theology, go on ſtill advancing, not to the better, but to the worſe, as S. *Paul* ſpeaks, and labour to ſtretch or rather to corrupt mens conſciences, by ſtretching and corrupting the moſt holy and inviolable Rules of Faith and Morality, and making thoſe things probable which in themſelves are incredible.

If to deſire the death of ones father be of it ſelf a crime, as none can queſtion it, the crime is yet greater when he is carried thereto by ſome wicked motive, as that of having his eſtate, which comes from covetouſneſs and injuſtice, and

22980 contains in it alſo a notorious ingratitude: and it is in the ſight of God a kind of theft and uſurpation to deſire to have the eſtate of another, and which is more, of ones father, againſt his will, the appointment of God, and all the Laws of Reaſon and Nature. So that to juſtifie the deſire a child hath of the death of his father, by that which he hath of his goods, is to juſtifie one crime by another wherein many more are alſo contained.

This injuſtice and diſorder may appear yet more viſible in the other Example brought by *Tambourin* of an Inferior who deſires the death of his Superior: A Monk, for Example, or a Clerk of his Abbot or Biſhop, that he might enter upon his Office. For the deſire alone of a Charge of this nature, even under pretence of a good motive, as to be ſerviceable unto Souls, is a kind of ambition and preſumption which renders a man unworthy of that Office which he deſires in that manner, as S. *Thomas*, after the Scripture and Fathers, doth expreſly teach us; he who hath not this good motive, and deſires to enter by a way ſo odious and criminal, as is the death of his Superior, is not only unworthy of the Office which he ſo deſires, but alſo deſerves to be excluded from the Clergy, and even to be chaſed out of the Church, as a rebellious and unnatural child from the houſe of his father, who deſires to ſee his death, though he dares not kill him himſelf. How then can one of theſe deſires juſtifie the other? How can we ſay that an Inferior may lawfully deſire the death of his Superior, if we pretend not that one may be a murderer, becauſe he is an Uſurper, and deſire the death of a man, becauſe we would have his goods, without having either right or capacity, but only an unjuſt and unreaſonable pretence unto the one or the other.

22990 This yet ſufficeth not this barbarous and murthering Theology, to permit children to deſire the death of their father and mother, they permit them alſo to be willing to kill them themſelves, to attempt their lives, and effectually to kill them in ſome caſes. It is from this Principle that *Dicaſtillus* ſaith, (2) *That a child who defends himſelf againſt his father who aſſaults him unjuſtly, may kill him;*

2 Colligitur ulterius licitum eſſe filiis contra parentes,

*him; as alſo Servants their Maſters, Vaſſals their Princes; Monks their Abbots and their Superiors.* Which he underſtands not only in ſuch manner that a Son may kill his Father by accident and beſides his intention, in his own defence; but ſo as he may have a deſign to kill him voluntarily. For after he had propoſed this caſe which I have now related, and many others, he concludes that in this caſe it is lawful to deſire to kill him who aſſails us.

As for what concerns the reſpect due unto Fathers and Mothers, *Tamhourin* declares confidently, (1) *That a Son is to be excuſed from mortal ſin who will not acknowledge his Father, if he do it not of contempt, but to avoid ſome inconvenience, or that he might not be put to the bluſh in acknowledging him.* It is manifeſt that according to Scripture this is to renounce ones father, as it is to renounce Jeſus Chriſt to be aſhamed to acknowledge and confeſs him; and yet this is a ſmall fault in the Jeſuits Divinity.

Neither is he more religious about their obedience, concerning which he de- 23000
mands, (2) *Whether children may lawfully contract Marriage with perſons unworthy of their alliance againſt the will of their fathers and mothers?* He anſwers, *Though ſome believe they cannot without mortal ſin, which is very probable, yet he avouches that it is probable and ſafe in conſcience that they may..... and that* Sanchez *hath reaſon to ſay, that a daughter is ſo free, as to Marriage, that though ſhe have not yet attained ſo much as twenty five years of age, ſhe may marry her ſelf unto a perſon unworthy of her, without her fathers conſent.* Whence it follows, according to this Author, that *Iſaac* exceeded his power when he ſo expreſly forbad his Son *Jacob* to marry in the family of *Chanaan*, which was unworthy of his alliance.

If the diſobedience of a Daughter towards her Father in theſe circumſtances be not criminal, it ſeems it never can be ſo, ſince it cannot be in a more important matter than this ſame wherein Marriage is concerned, which imports an engagement for the whole time of life, and a Marriage with an unworthy perſon, and which proves a diſadvantage and diſhonour, not only to the Daughter who enters it, but alſo to her kindred and whole family.

But if we object to this Father, that Scripture, Fathers, Popes condemn the 23010
diſobedience of theſe Children in terms capable to terrifie the moſt reſolute, and to aſhame the moſt impudent: He anſwers, that this proves indeed that it is very commendable for Children to do otherwiſe; but not that they ſin mortally if they fail therein. (3) *Though the Pope* Evariſtus, ſaith he, *have ordained that a daughter ſhould not be held for a married wife, if her father himſelf agreed not to the Marriage: Though the Pope S.* Leo *and S.* Ambroſe *ſay, that it is not becoming the modeſty of a Virgin to chuſe an Husband, but that ſhe ought to attend on her Fathers judgment: Though in the holy Scriptures this charge be laid upon Fathers: Though S.* Paul *teach expreſly, that daughters ought to be given in marriage by their fathers: Though many Examples of the Saints ſhew this manifeſtly; I anſwer with* Sanchez, *that theſe things and ſuch like prove well that it is very commendable for them to demand their fathers advice; but not that they in not doing ſo fall into the horrible diſorder of mortal ſin.*

ſervis contra dominos, vaſſallis contra principes vi vim repellere quando actu invaduntur, injuſte, cum prædictis conditionibus, idemque de Monachis aut ſubditis contra Abbates & Superiores. *Diaſtill. lib. 2. de juſt. tr. 1. d. 10. dub. 3. num. 30.*

An in caſibus præcedentis dubitationis liceat directe velle & intendere mortem injuſti aggreſſoris ad defendendam propriam vitam? Negat S. Thomas. His tamen non obſtantibus aſſerendum eſt tanquam veriſſimum, ſicut honeſtum eſt in executione repellere aggreſſorem illum occidendo, pari ratione honeſtum eſt directe illum velle & intendere occidere. *Dhh. 4. num. 4.*

2 Filius ſi recognoſcere nolit patrem, non ex contemptu, ſed ad vitandum aliquod incommodum aut erubeſcentiam, à mortali culpa ſic puto eſſet excuſandus. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 2. ſect. 2. num. 17.* 3 Difficultas ergo ſola ſupereſt an cum indignis poſſint filii licite contrahere, patre vel genitrice diſſentientibus? Et quidem licet aliquibus videatur non poſſe, idque ſub mortali, quod certe valde probabile eſt..... fatetor tamen probabile item eſſe ac tutum quod poſſint..... Et recte docet Sanchez filiam adeo liberam eſſe, ut ante vigeſimum quintum annum nubere valeat, etiam indigno, & ſine patris conſenſu. *Tambur. decal. lib. 5. cap. 2. ſect. 3. num. 5.* Vocavit itaque Jacob, Iſaac, & benedixit eum, præcipitque ei dicens, Noli accipere conjugem de genere Chanaam. *Geneſ. 28.* 4 Si ſtatuit Evariſtus Papa, ut pronupta nequaquam habeatur puella quam pater ipſe non deſponſat: ſi Leo Pontifex & Ambroſius aiunt non eſſe virginalis pudoris maritum eligere, ſed judicium parentum eſſe expectandum: ſi in ſacris Scripturis parentibus tribuitur hoc munus: ſi S. Paulus expreſſe docet à parentibus tradendas eſſe filias nuptui: ſi multa Sanctorum Scripturarum exempla id manifeſte demonſtrant: Reſpondeo cum eodem Sanchez hæc & ſimilia probare quod eſſet valde honeſtum ejuſmodi conſilium à patre exquirere, diram peccati mortalis neceſſitatem non probare. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 9. ſect. 3. num. 6.*

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This diſcourſe is proper for nothing but to countenance diſobedience and impudence in Children, and to favour Rapes and clandeſtine Marriages; and this is very inſolently and Jeſuitically to elude the holy Scripture, the Authority of
23020 the Church, Councils, and Fathers, and the Examples of the Saints, by taking only for ſimple exhortations and counſels of Decency and Civility what they ordain under ſo great penalties, ſaying, ſuch Marriage ſhould be null, and that *a daughter ſhould not be held for a married wife, if her father himſelf agreed not to her Marriage.*

See here another caſe wherein the liberty of Children, that is, their licentiouſneſs is ſufficiently eſtabliſhed. (1) *A Son*, ſaith the ſame Author, *is not ſubject to his Father in what concerns unlawful games: and by conſequence he may without wronging him, retain unto himſelf the gain he makes thereby.* He will have it that becauſe a Son commits two ſins, one in playing at an unlawful game, and the other in gaming contrary to his Fathers prohibition, that which he hath gained, is therefore juſtly acquired to his own uſe. If he had not been diſobedient in gaming contrary to his Fathers will, he had had nothing of that he gained; but becauſe he was diſobedient, that which he hath gained appertains to himſelf, though he have contemned his Father, and plaid only with his money. So he receives benefit not only of the money which is his Fathers, but of his contempt of his Father alſo; and this contempt gives him a right which he could not have had if he had not abuſed both his Father and his money. So marvellous and gainful too is the Divinity of theſe Doctors.

1 Filius in ludo ill cito non eſt ſubditus patri: aequa deo lucrum ex illo habitum abſque controverſia ſibi adquirere notat Rebellius. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 4. ſect. 1. num. 7.*

Finally, *Tambourin* ſpeaking of the temporal aſſiſtance which Children owe unto their Father, ſhews us how far this obligation may go. He propoſes the caſe of a Father taken by Thieves who threaten to kill him, if a certain ſum of money be not given them; he demands whether the Son were obliged to give
23030 this money? (2) *If a father*, ſaith he, *be in peril of his life, and money be demanded to ſave him of his Son who is rich, the queſtion is more difficult. As for me, I would make uſe of this diſtinction: If the ſum demanded may be taken out of goods ſuperfluous or only becoming the condition of the Son, I would oblige him to give it. But if it ought to be taken out of what is neceſſary unto him, in ſuch ſort that it would wholly impoveriſh him, or cauſe him to fall notably below his condition, I would not oblige him at all..... Notwithſtanding I ſay not, that it is altogether certain that this Son is obliged to give on this occaſion* ſuch goods as are ſuperfluous or convenient for his condition. Behold a deciſion very favourable to thoſe Children of whom he ſpoke before, who innocently deſired the death of their Fathers.

2 Quod ſi iſte pater in ſimili alias diſcrimine verſaretur, pecuniaque à divite filio exposceretur, difficilior eſt reſolutio. Equidem hac uterer diſtinctione; Si ea ſumma demi poteſt ex ſuperfluis, vel ſolum ſtatui convenientibus, obligarem patrem filiumque; ſi deberet demi ex neceſſariis, ita ut vel omnino depauperandi, vel admodum notabiliter à ſuo ſtatu dimovendi eſſent, neutrum obligarem..... Et nihilominus priorem dicti partem non tanquam omnino certam affirmo. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. 6. 1. ſect. 1. num. 11.*

He would be far enough from obliging a Son to expoſe his life to ſave his Fathers, ſince he would not that he ſhould be obliged ſo far only as to give for it a part of his goods which he may abſolutely ſpare. And if you repreſent unto him that which our Saviour recommends unto us to love one another as he loved us, and what S. *John* ſaith, that we ought to lay down our life for our Brethren, and by ſtronger reaſon for our Fathers and Mothers, I ſee not what he can anſwer, but what he hath already ſaid before, eluding the Authority of the Scripture and the Saints; that theſe Commands, though ſo expreſs, repeated, and ſolemnly confirmed by the whole Church, are wholeſom advices and counſels of Decency and Civility, which oblige no farther than we pleaſe to follow them.

ARTICLE

## ARTICLE IV. Of the Command of God: THOU SHALT NOT KILL.

23040

### *That the Jeſuits abſolutely overthrow this Commandment, and authorize all ſorts of Murthers.*

THere is, it may be, nothing in all the Morals wherein the Jeſuits are ſo tranſported as in this ſame. The exceſſes they have committed therein are ſo great, that as it is enough to raiſe an horrour againſt them only to underſtand them, ſo we ſhould have found it hard to believe them, had we learnt them from others than themſelves: and if they, after they had taught them in their Schools, had not alſo publiſhed them every where by their Books.

a Cum autem hujus legis vim Dominus explicaret, in eo duo continere oſtendit. Alterum ne occidamus, quod à nobis fieri veticum eſt; alterum quod facere jubemur, ut concordi amicitia charitateque inimicos complectamur, pacem habeamus cum omnibus, cunctа denique incommoda patienter feramus. *Catech. ad Parochos.*

1. *This Precept contains in it two things according to the explication which our Lord gives thereof*, as the Catechiſm of the Council of *Trent* obſerves. *The one is forbidden us, to wit, Murther; and the other is commanded us, to wit, love and charity towards our enemies, peace with all the world, and patience to ſuffer all ſorts of evils.* The Jeſuits deſtroy theſe two parts of this divine Precept by the pernicious Maxims of their Divinity. For as to the ſecond, they are ſo far from believing that God hath commanded the love of enemies, that they believe not ſo much as that there is any true Command to love our Neighbour in general, nor God himſelf, as we have ſeen whilſt we ſpoke of the firſt Commandment of the Decalogue. And for the firſt part, which is the Command not to kill, they overthrow it by infinite deciſions which are contrary thereunto.

For they generally allow to kill in defence of honour, life, and goods; not 23058
only when a man ſees himſelf in a near and evident danger of loſing them, but when it is far off and uncertain. They would not have you ſtay till a man ſmite you, it is enough that he threatens you; it is enough that you ſee him come afar off; it is enough that he offends you with his words, or that you know that he hath a deſign upon your life, honour, or goods, for you to prevent, and kill him with a good conſcience.

The allowance they make herein is general and without exception. They grant it to Clergy-men and to Fryars as well as Secular perſons. And to give the greater liberty to the uſe of it, they make it paſs for a right of nature, of which they pretend that any whoſoever may make uſe againſt any other whomſoever, even a Servant againſt his Maſter, a Son againſt his Father, a Monk againſt his Superior, leaving them at their choice to employ all means whatſoever they pleaſe, and which they judge moſt proper for their deſign, whether it be by open force, or by ſurprize, and making uſe of ſecret ways, and by ſervice of other perſons interpoſed, if they will not or dare not themſelves attempt to kill thoſe who do or would do them ſome hurt; as we ſhall ſee by and by. The matter is too large to be compriſed under one ſingle title, wherefore I will divide this Article into five Points, in each of which I will repreſent the Opinions of divers Authors of the Society, beginning with *Leſſius*.

### I. POINT.

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# I. POINT.

## *Leſſius* his Opinion concerning Murder.

## SECTION I.

***How far he enlargeth the permiſſion of Killing in defence of his own life: that he holds that a Prieſt at the Altar may break off the Sacrifice to kill him who aſſails him.***

*Leſſius* propoſes this Queſtion concerning Murder: *If it be lawful to kill a man in defence of my own life.* And then he relates many caſes, in which he maintains that this is lawful.

Utrum liceat alterum occidere in vitæ ſuæ defenſionem. *Leſſius de juſt. & jur. lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 8. num. 41. p. 83.*

*The firſt caſe,* ſaith he, *is if I be ſtruck with a weapon, and in this point there is no doubt at all.*

1. Si ipſa me ferias armis, & de hoc nullum eſt dubium. *Ibid. num. 42.*

*The ſecond is, if you draw near unto me to ſtrike me, and I cannot avoid it unleſs I flye or prevent your blow.*

*The third is, when you do not yet approach, but you are ready to invade me, and I cannot avoid you but by preventing you; I may in this caſe prevent you.*

2. Si accedas ad feriendum, nec poſſim evadere niſi vel fugiam, vel te præveniam. *num. 44.*

*The fourth caſe, when you have a deſign to cauſe me to be ſlain by a Servant or Aſſaſin.*

3. Si nondum accedis, tamen inſtructus es ad invadendum, nec poſſum evadere niſi præveniam. Tunc enim poſſum prævenire. *num. 45.*

*The fifth, when you fall upon me by way of juſtice to cauſe me to dye by falſe witneſſes, who accuſe me of crimes which I have not committed; impoſing upon me, for example, ſome Sacriledge or other deteſtable crime.*

23070 It appears then, that according to *Leſſius*, it is not neceſſary that you may with a good conſcience prevent and kill a man, for you to ſtay till he ſmite you; it is ſufficient that he draws near to ſmite you: *Si accedas ad feriendum.* It is enough that he is diſpoſed to do it, though he be far off from you: *Si nondum accedas, ſed tamen inſtructus es ad invadendum.* It ſuffices that he hath a will or hath given commiſſion to another to do it: *Si per famulum aut ſicarium me ſtatueris occidere.* It is ſufficient that he hath wrongfully accuſed you of ſome crime for which you may loſe your life: *Si falſis criminationibus*, &c.

4. Si per famulum vel ſicarium me ſtatueris occidere. *num. 46.*

If you enquire unto whom it is lawful to kill in all theſe caſes, *Molina* will anſwer that the permiſſion is general, and for all ſorts of perſons. (6) *To anſwer,* ſaith he, *to the queſtion propoſed, we muſt ſay that it is generally lawful to kill him who is reſolved to kill you, when there is no other means to avoid death or imminent danger of death, whereunto you are reduced by the reſolution he hath maliciouſly taken to cauſe you to dye.* That is to ſay, that a prudent man, according to *Molina*, will not expect to uſe means for aſſuring his life, till he ſee himſelf nigh unto death; but he will even prevent the danger, and without attending till his enemy aſſail or ſeek him out to kill him, will prevent & kill him, by getting the ſtart of him as ſoon as he believes he bears him ill will, and deſigns to put him to

5. Si falſis criminationibus teſtibuſque ſubornatis, v. c. imponendo ſacrilegium vel crimen infan-

23080 death: *Dicendum eſt fas eſſe univerſim interficere eum qui nos interficere decrevit.* This liberty is without any exception and for all people: *Fas eſt univerſim,*

dum, vitam meam imperas in judicio. *num. 47.* 6 Dicendum eſt ad dubium propoſitum, fas univerſim eſſe interficere eum qui nos interficere decrevit, quando aliter non patet via evadendi mortem, aut grande periculum mortis, quod nequitia illius ex eo decreto nobis imminet. *Molina de juſt. & jur. tom. 4. tract. 4. diſp. 13. num. 2. pag. 1760.*

*Amicus* ſaith the ſame thing, and he expounds it alſo more particularly. For after that he hath advanced this general Maxime; That every one hath a right to kill any whomſoever who would deprive him of his life, he draws from thence ſome conſequences which ſerve to eſtabliſh and declare his Principle (7) *It follows,* ſaith he, 1. *That not only one private man hath a right to defend himſelf againſt another private man, but alſo againſt a publick perſon; an inferior againſt his ſuperior; a Son againſt his father and mother; a Clerk or a Monk againſt a Layman,*

7 Inferur, 1. hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non ſolum habere per-

sonam privatam contra privatam, sed etiam privatam contra publicam, subditum contra Superiorem, filium contra patrem, Clericum aut Religiosum contra seculare, & è contra absque ulla irregularitatis contractione. *Amicus de just. & jure disp. 36. sect. 5. num. 76. pag. 537.*

*and a Layman against a Clergie-man or Monk, without contracting any irregularity thereby.*

And to shew us that this Maxime altogether barbarous and inhumane is common to and passes for certain with the whole Society, *Lessius* maintains and rehearses it almost in the self same terms with *Amicus*, and draws it like him from his Principles. (1) *Therefore*, saith he, *it is lawful for Church-men and Monks to kill for the security of their lives, as well as Laicks, and they may use this liberty against any whomsoever, and against their Superiors themselves; as a Monk against his Abbot, a Son against his Father and Mother, a Servant against his Master, a Vassal against his Lord and Prince.*

So that according to this Doctrine and what we have already seen and heard 23090
him say, relating and expounding the cases wherein we may prevent and kill a man in defence of our life, if a Souldier see his Captain, or a Child his Father, a Subject his Lord or Prince lay hold on a Sword or Cudgel, and lift his hand to strike him, all these persons may with all freedom prevent the blow and danger: yea, they may also first smite and kill upon fear only of being killed themselves. The consequences of this bloody Doctrine which leads men on to such crimes as nature it self abhors, are clearer than that I need to stay to represent them.

1 Quare etiam Clericis & Monachis hoc concessum sicut & Laicis; idque contra quoscunque, etiam contra Superiores; ut Monacho contra Abbatem, filio contra parentem, servo contra dominum, vassalo contra Principem. *Lessius supra num. 41. pag. 84.*

*Lessius* adds, (2) *That this may be done in what function soever we be employed, as if a Priest be assailed whilst he is at the Altar saying Mass, he may defend himself, and even kill, if it be needful, him who assaults him, and afterwards go on with his Mass.* This without doubt is perfectly to imitate Jesus Christ, who is offered in that Sacrifice, who being nigh unto death, prayed for those who caused it; this is, I say, well to imitate Jesus Christ, to forsake the Mass which is a Commemoration of the Sacrifice of the Cross, and to abandon the Altar, to smite and slay an enemy. This is a good disposition wherein to return unto the Altar, and continue the Mass, to imbrue his hands in the blood of his neighbour, and to come presently thereupon and lay them on the Body of Jesus Christ, and to receive his Blood which he shed for his enemies.

2 Et in quocunque officio sit quis occupatus, ut si celebret & invadatur, potest se tueri & occidere invasorem, si necesse sit, & postea Sacrum continuare. *Lessius ibid.*

This crime is not one single crime, since it contains in it many and the great- 23100
est which can be committed. It is without name as without example, so enormous is it and unheard of in all past Ages; and I see not to what end it could serve *Lessius* to speak of it without necessity, and propound it for an example, if it were not to make us see that the Jesuits Divinity is ingenious and fruitful in forming Monsters and inventing new Crimes, and audacious in giving liberty to commit them.

## SECTION II.

### *That according to* Lessius *it is lawful to kill in defence of our Honour.*

1 Fas etiam est viro honorato occidere invasorem qui fustem vel alapam conatur impingere ut ignominiam inferat, si aliter hæc ignominia vitari nequit. *Lessius ibid. dub. 12. num. 77. pag. 89.*

IT is not only in defence of our life, but in the preservation of our honour that we may kill any one whomsoever, according to *Lessius* Principles. (1) *It is also lawful*, saith he, *for an honourable person to kill an Assailant who would strike him with a cudgel, or give him a box on the ear to affront him; if he cannot otherwise avoid the disgrace.* And a little after, to facilitate the practice of so pernicious a Doctrine, he particularly sets down several ways by which we may attempt against anothers honour, which are so many occasions whereupon he pretends it to be lawful to kill him who makes this attempt. (2) *It is to be observed*, saith he, *that the honour of another may be invaded and violated in divers manners, against which it is lawful for him to defend himself* by the ways he hath related.

2 Notandum est variis modis honorem alterius posse impeti & tueri, in quibus videtur cessa defensio. *Ibid. num. 78.*

*First*, *If one endeavour to ſtrike him with a cudgel, or to give him a box on the ear*, of which we ſpoke but now.

1. Si baculum vel alapam nitaris impingere, de quo jam dictum eſt.

*In the ſecond place*, *If he be outragiouſly reproached by words or geſtures, he hath a right to defend himſelf*, and by conſequence to kill.

2. Si contumeliis afficiatur, ſive per verba, ſive per ſigns, hic etiam eſt jus defenſionis. *Ibid.*

*In the third place*, *If he who hath given him a box on the ear continue in the ſame place, or even though he flye away thereupon.* *Ibid.*

3. Si illata alicui alapa ceſſes, vel etiam fugias. *Ibid.* num 79.

*In the fourth place*, *If you endeavour to deprive me of my honour before a Prince, Judge, or Perſons of great quality, by accuſing me of feigned crimes; and I have no other way to divert this loſs of reputation but by killing you ſecretly.*

4. Si nomini meo falſis criminationibus apud Principem vel viros honoratos detrahere nitaris, nec alia ratione poſſim damnum illud famæ avertere, niſi te occulte interficiam. *Ibid. num.* 81.

And a little after he adds, alledging *Bannez* for it: * *The ſame is to be ſaid where the crime is true, ſo it be hid and ſecret.* And that he may eſtabliſh this ſo ſtrange Doctrine, of which there is none who may not ſee how dangerous and fatal the conſequences are, he brings three inſtances which are ſo many reaſons whereof he makes uſe to prove it.

* *This may be proved*, ſaith he, *firſt becauſe if one attempt to damniſie me in my honour and reputation, by ſmiting me with a cudgel, or giving me a box on the ear; I may betake me to my arms to keep him off; and by conſequence I have the very ſame* 23120 *right if he endeavour to do me the ſame wrong by reproaching me: for it is of ſmall conſideration what means are made uſe of to do me an injury, if I be hurt as much the one way as the other.*

*In the ſecond place*, *Recourſe may be had to arms to hinder an affront; and ſo likewiſe by conſequence to ſilence reproaches.*

*In the third place*, *The danger of loſing honour is equal to that of loſing life. But it is lawful to kill to avoid the peril of loſing life; and by conſequence* alſo for avoiding the danger of loſing honour. * *Becauſe*, as he ſaith a little before, *men by good reaſon eſteem their honour more than wealth and money; and by conſequence*, as he will ſay hereafter, *if one may kill for fear of loſing his money, he may alſo for fear of taking an affront.*

* Idem dicendum ſi crimen eſt verum, ſi tamen eſt occultum. * Probari poteſt 1. quia ſi baculo vel alapa impacta vellis meum honorem & famam violare, poſſum armis prohibere: ergo etiam ſi id nitar lingua. Nam parum videtur referre quo inſtrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam, ſi æque efficaciter nocebit. *Ibid. num.* 81. 2. Quia contumeliæ poſſunt armis impediri, ergo & detractiones. 3. Periculum famæ æquiparatur periculo vitæ: at qui ob periculum vitæ evadendum licitum eſt occidere: ergo, &c. Quia honor merito apud homines plutis æſtimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum: ergo ſi poteſt occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat, poteſt etiam ne ignominiam cogatur ſuſtinere. *Ibid. num.* 77.

I have no deſign for the preſent to conſider or examine this whole diſcourſe nor all theſe reaſons which contain almoſt as many exceſſes as words, I ſhall content my ſelf to ſay in general of him and thoſe who imitate him in this kind of reaſoning in matters of Chriſtian Morality, that the farther they advance, the farther they ſtray and are removed from the truth, and fall continually from one errour into another; and the latter are uſually the greater; their concluſions are worſe than the Maxims from whence they draw them; and the reaſons which they produce to prove the one and the other, are alſo oftentimes of yet more dangerous conſequence than all their propoſitions.

The ſame *Liſius*, after the three reaſons which we have now related, gives thereupon alſo a fourth, which comprehends all the reſt, & which alone may ſerve 23130 as a general Maxime to reſolve a multitude of caſes in this matter, but which may alſo be both the cauſe and juſtification of all ſorts of Murders. (1) *Becauſe the right of ſelf-defence*, ſaith he, *ſeems to give liberty to employ all the means which are neceſſary to ſecure ones ſelf from all ſorts of injuries.* He ſeems to have taken this Maxime, as good ſtore of others, from *Molina* who expounds it alſo more clearly. (2) *It is lawful*, ſaith he, *to employ all ſorts of means, and to make uſe of all ſorts of ways, and of all ſorts of arms to do that which is neceſſary for ſelf-defence.*

1 Quia jus defenſionis videtur ſe extendere ad omne id quod neceſſarium ut te ab omni injuria ſerves immunem. *Ibid.* num 81.

2 Fas eſt quacunque via & ratione, & quibuſcunque armis id totum efficere quod ad tuam defenſionem ſufficit neceſſarium. *Molina de juſt. & jure tom.* 4. *tract.* 3. *diſp.* 2. *num.* 5. *pag.* 1757.

The Propoſition of the one and the other is univerſal in all theſe points. They give no boundaries to mens paſſions, ſuſpicions, jealouſies, and pretences whereof they may make uſe to cover and juſtifie their intereſts and vain-glory. If we believe theſe Jeſuits, all men have right to make uſe of all ſorts of expedients to maintain their reputation, true or falſe, againſt all ſorts of people who offend againſt it in any manner whatſoever, or who hurt their intereſt and pretenſions. He may kill his adverſary himſelf, or employ other perſons whom he ſhall judge more proper to kill him, by open force or ſurprize. All this is lawful for every private man, according to theſe Doctors. *Jus defenſionis videtur ſe extendere ad omne id quod eſt neceſſarium, &c.*

They hold alſo, that we may uſe this right, not only in important occaſions, but even in the leaſt alſo, to repel or repair a petty as well as a grand injury, to have ſatisfaction for an offenſive word, as well as if we had ſuffered the greateſt reproachful outrage. And in a word, that we may make uſe of this right to protect our honour by all ſorts of effectual ways, ſo that it may not receive the leaſt diminution: *ut te ab omni injuria ſerves immunem.* 23140

After *Leſſius* hath eſtabliſhed ſo deteſtable a Maxime, which is equally prejudicial to the Church and State, and which overthrows all Laws divine and humane, he is conſtrained by the horrour he had towards it in himſelf, to declare that he approves not the practice of it: But there is cauſe to believe that this word comes rather from the ſecret check of his conſcience, than that it is a teſtimony of his true judgment, and that it proceeds not ſo much from the fear of God as men, who might, as he well perceived, reproach him juſtly therewith, and impute unto him all the unhappy effects of a Doctrine ſo abominable and pernicious to humane Society.

Verum hæc quoque ſententia mihi in praxi non probatur.

For if he had had God before his eyes, and had truly condemned the practice of this bloody and barbarous opinion, he would never have publiſhed and maintained it with ſo many reaſons, as true, juſt, and reaſonable; ſince this is at the ſame time to approve the practice thereof, there being none who doth not eaſily believe, that it is lawful to follow in the practice of a Rule which is juſt and conformable to reaſon and truth.

And though he had propoſed it only as probable, and not as his own opinion, he had thereby ſufficiently approved the uſe of it, and ought to be reſponſible for all the miſchiefs which may ariſe from it, ſince according to him and all his Society, it is lawful in practice to follow a probable opinion, even ſo as to prefer it before that which is more probable.

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## SECTION III.

### *That it is lawful to kill in defence of ones goods, according to* Leſſius.

THe third concern for which *Leſſius* holds that it is lawful to kill, is for the preſervation of our goods. His reaſons are: (1) *Firſt, becauſe temporal goods are neceſſary to preſerve life: and by conſequence it is lawful to preſerve them in the ſame manner as life it ſelf, as being neceſſary, not only to live abſolutely, but alſo to live honourably according to our rank and condition.* He made uſe of the ſame reaſon a little before, to prove that a man may fight a duel for the defence not only of his life and honour, but of his goods alſo. (2) *It ſeems to me,* ſaith he, *that the ſame reaſon for killing takes place when our goods are invaded; for our wealth is a neceſſary inſtrument, ſupport, and ornament of our life.*

1 Primo quia bona temporalia ſunt ad vitam conſervandam neceſſaria: ergo ſicut licet vitam tueri, ita etiam hæc quæ ſunt vitæ neceſſaria, non ſolum ut præciſe vivamus, ſed etiam ut convenienter & honeſte vivamus. *Leſſius de juſt. & jure lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 11. num. 67. pag. 88.* 2 Et eadem videtur eſſe ratio in invaſione fortunarum. Nam fortunæ ſunt neceſſarium vitæ inſtrumentum, ſubſidium & ornamentum. *Ibid. dub. 8. num. 49.*

So that, according to *Leſſius*, we may deprive our neighbour of his life, for fear he ſhould deprive us of our goods. It is manifeſt enough that this Maxime cannot appear very Chriſtian; but the reaſon on which he grounds it is much leſs; *becauſe*, ſaith he, *wealth is a neceſſary inſtrument, ſupport, and ornament of life.* 23160 That is to ſay, that the commodity and advantage which we reap from wealth in that it gives means, not only to live, but to live at eaſe and in honour, ought to be preferred before the life of our brother; and ſo we need not make any ſcruple to kill him, if he attempt to diſſeize us of our temporal commodities, without fear of violating the Laws of the Goſpel.

The ſecond reaſon is, (1) *Becauſe otherwiſe occaſion would be given to Thieves and Robbers to pillage honeſt men. For if it were not lawful to reſiſt them by doing what is neceſſary for our defence, there would be nothing ſafe and ſecured from their enterpriſes. But as it is lawful to defend our ſelves, ſo it is alſo lawful to kill, becauſe oftentimes we cannot defend our ſelves without killing.* He proves by the ſame argumentation, that we may kill to preſerve our honour, and to repel or prevent an affront: (2) *Becauſe if this were not lawful, occaſion would be given to wicked perſons to commit all ſorts of outragious abuſes upon honeſt perſons.* And a little after he repeats the ſame reaſon: (3) *Becauſe otherwiſe liberty would be given to wicked men to outrage any perſon whomſoever as they pleaſed.*

1 Secundo, quia daretur ſæpiuſquam occaſio furibus & latronibus viros probos ſpoliandi. Nihil enim ab illis eſſet tutum, ſi defenſio neceſſaria non poſſet objici. Conceſſa autem defenſione, etiam conceſſa cenſetur occiſio, ſine qua ſæpe non poterit eſſe defenſio. *Ibid. num.* 67. 2 Quia alias daretur occaſio improbitati optimos quoſque contumeliis vexandi. *Dub.* 12. *num.* 78. 3 Quia alias daretur licentia improbis quodvis genus contumeliæ in quemvis ingerendi. *Ibid.*

He is very much afraid to give way to robbery, detraction, calumny; but he fears not at all to make way for the murdering and damning of his neighbour, which follows thereupon inevitably in ſuch encounters; ſince a thief, a calumniator, 23170 a defamer, can no more avoid the loſs of his Soul than of his body, when they are ſlain in the act, or in the deſign of committing theſe crimes. But the Divinity of the Jeſuits judge that true charity may contemn theſe miſchiefs to avoid the loſs of temporal goods.

He contents not himſelf to eſtabliſh in this manner this inhumane and barbarous Maxime; but to render it more eaſie to be practiſed, he notes out many particular caſes wherein he pretends that it is lawful to kill, of which one is, (4) *When you conſpire to ruine us*; And another, (5) *When you unjuſtly hinder my Creditor from paying me.* So that as ſoon as any man ſhall threaten to undo us, or we ſhall know that he will hinder our Creditors from paying us, whether he do it of animoſity, or becauſe the ſame perſons who are indebted to us are alſo accomptable to him, and he may loſe his debt if we be firſt paid, it will be lawful for us to attempt upon the life of this man, and to kill him publickly or privately.

4 Si conjuraveris in meam damna.

5 Si impedis inique meos creditores ne mihi ſatisfaciant *Ibid.*

This Doctrine is ſo horrible, that *Leſſius* himſelf foreſeeing the extremities and deadly accidents which are inſeparable from this liberty of killing, which he gives all ſorts of people indifferently and without excepting any perſon, endeavours to moderate it by two conditions, that he might make it more tolerable, and diminiſh the horrour which at firſt ſight it raiſes in all thoſe who have only ſome reſentments of humanity. For after he hath ſaid abſolutely, that it is lawful to kill him who would take away our goods; he adds by way of exception, 23180 (6) *That this is to be underſtood in caſe the things be of great importance; becauſe there is no likelihood that for a ſmall occaſion it ſhould be lawful to defend our ſelves with ſo great damage to our neighbour; and it would be very unreaſonable and unjuſt to take away a mans life for an Apple, or a Crown it ſelf.* But he overthrows this exception immediately after, and deſtroys it ſtrangely, adding thereupon theſe words: (7) *Yet if ſome affront would be done you for not recovering your goods out of the hands of a thief, you may aſſail him, and even kill him if need be.*

6 Dixi in reſponſione ſi res illæ ſint magni momenti; quia pro re minima non videtur conceſſum jus defenſionis cum tanto alterius malo. Eſt enim valde iniquum ut pro pomo, vel etiam uno aureo ſervando, alicui vita auferatur. *n.* 68.

7 Si tamen tibi verteretur probro niſi rem furi extorques, poſſes conari, &, ſi opus eſſet, occidere.

It muſt then be confeſſed that it were a very rigorous and unjuſt thing, according to this Jeſuit, to deſire to deprive a man of his life, who had only taken an Apple from us: but if this ſhould cauſe any confuſion or diſgrace to him from whom it was taken, and that he ſhould be derided, if he ſuffered it to be carried away from him, he might endeavour to force it out of the hands of him who had done him this injury, and in caſe of reſiſtance it would be lawful for him to kill him. Certainly a mans life cannot be made more cheap than to give it or rather to take it away for an Apple.

The ſame Author diſcovers another condition whereupon we may kill him who hath taken away ſome temporal goods, that is, that the loſs cannot eaſily be recovered by ſome other means; but he hath no ſooner propounded this condition, then he ruines it by the ſame reaſon by which he ſeems to eſtabliſh it, in ſaying that to do otherwiſe, that is to ſay, to kill him who takes from us ſome thing which we might recover by ſome other more ſweet way, would be to fall ſhort of the charity which we owe unto our neighbour; but not to ſin againſt 23190
Juſtice. (1) *For*, ſaith he, *if we can recover it by ſome other way, as that of juſtice, it will be oftentimes at leaſt againſt charity to kill, that we may hinder him from taking it from us; as if a Thief flye when he hath taken away ſomething.* Which he expounds yet more clearly a little after, *num.* 70. where he puts this Queſtion: (2) *Whether it be againſt juſtice to kill a Thief that flyes, when that which he hath taken, may be recovered by Law?* To which he anſwers *No, according to the opinion which ſeems to him moſt probable.*

1 Quia ſi poſſet aliter recuperari, v. g. per judicem, ſæpe erit ſaltem contra charitatem non illius defenſio ne occidere; ut ſi fur reabiata fugiat.

2 An ſit contra juſtitiam ſi furem procul fugientem occidas, quando res judicio eſſet recuperabilis? *num.* 70.

Men believe now adays that they do very well to hold themſelves preciſely to that which they cannot omit without injuſtice; and they ordinarily trouble themſelves little about charity, provided they can perſwade themſelves that they do what they ought of Juſtice. So that to tell them that an action is in ſome ſort againſt Charity and not againſt Juſtice, is to give them liberty to commit it. And as for the Jeſuits who aboliſh the Commandment of Charity, as we have already ſeen, when they ſay that a thing is againſt Charity and not againſt Juſtice, they ſay according to their Principles and in their ordinary language, that it were good indeed to abſtain from it, but it is no ſin to do it.

*Leſſius* deſtroys alſo this condition in another way, ſaying, *num.* 70. that though we may abſolutely by way of Juſtice recover our goods out of the hands of him who retains them unjuſtly, yet we are not obliged to follow this way, and, (3) *That we may kill him when we cannot without great trouble and difficulty recover them by the way of Juſtice.*

3 Quando in judicio non poteſt niſi magnis incommodis recuperari. n. 70.

This is an excellent invention to cut off a multitude of Suits which ariſe daily 23200
for goods uſurped or unjuſtly detained: this is a good expedient to avoid the charge and pains which muſt be undergone in purſuit of them. He that knows well how to make uſe thereof, according to *Leſſius* advice, ſhall have no more need to ſeek to Judges or Advocates, and he may do himſelf Juſtice in all affairs of this nature; his Law ſhall be his own paſſion and intereſt; and inſtead of ſending a Serjeant to cite him who will not reſtore his goods, he may ſend a Murderer to take away his life.

He ſaith alſo the ſame in a manner, *num.* 66. aſſuring us, that a perſon who ſees a Thief carrying away his goods in the day time, may kill him, though the Thief neither was in a condition, nor had any will to offend him, nor even to defend himſelf. Behold his words: (4) *It follows that he who ſhould kill a Thief who ſteals by day, and who defends not himſelf with arms, would not be excuſed in Juſtice from the homicide which he had committed; and yet in conſcience he ſhould be excuſed, if probably he had no hope to recover what was ſtoln from him, or only doubted, and was not wholly aſſured thereof.* And his reaſon is, (5) *Becauſe he is not obliged to loſe his goods, or to expoſe them to the hazard of being loſt, to ſave a Thief.*

4 Hinc qui furem diurnum non ſe telo defendentem interficeret, non excuſaretur ab homicidio in foro exteriori; in foro tamen conſcientiæ excuſaretur ſi non erat probabilis ſpes recuperandi, vel ſi recuperatio non erat certa ſed dubia. *num.* 66.

5 Quia non tenetur res ſuas perdere, aut probabili periculo exponere, ut fur ſalvus fiat.

23210 God ſaith by the mouth of S. *John*, (1) *That we ought to lay down our lives for our neighbour*, and *Leſſius* ſaith we are not ſo much obliged as to part with our goods, nor a part of them to ſave his life; and that on the contrary we may take it from him and kill him our ſelves rather than to expoſe our goods to any hazard of being loſt, or to ſpare our ſelves the trouble of recovering them after they are loſt. So conformable are theſe Maxims to thoſe of the Apoſtle and the Goſpel.

1 Et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere. 1 *Joan.* 3. *v.* 16.

The horrour which he is conſtrained to receive hereof himſelf, or rather the fear which he hath to make himſelf odious and unſufferable in the ſociety of men, is the cauſe that he dares not abſolutely counſel men to practiſe this; and he himſelf alledges inconveniencies which may render it difficult or dangerous. For after that he had ſaid that it is lawful to kill him who is become an accuſer of us of pretended or even of true crimes, but ſecret and concealed, he adds: (2) *But this opinion alſo, though it may be probable in the Theory, yet for all that is not to be admitted in the practice, becauſe of the inconveniencies which may ariſe thereupon. For men eaſily perſwade themſelves that they are ſcandalized when they are accuſed, and that they have no other way to avoid the calumny, than by killing him who accuſeth them. And by this means there would be a multitude of unjuſt murders committed. Finally, they who ſhould practiſe this opinion in a Common-wealth well conſtituted, would be puniſhed as Murderers.*

2 Sed dicunt ſententiæ, etſi fortaſſe ſpeculative probabilis videri queat, non tamen in praxi admittenda ob incommoda quæ ex ea ſequi poſſunt. Facile enim hominis ſibi perſuadens ſe per calumniam accuſari, & non niſi mortem accuſatoris; ſicque multæ cædes injuſtæ patrarentur. Denique talis in Republica bene conſtituta, ut homicida plecteretur. *Dub.* 8. *num.* 47. *pag.* 85.

23220 And below, *num.* 55. having ſaid that it is a wholeſom advice rather to endanger our own life than to kill him that aſſaults us, he ſupports his advice with this reaſon: (3) *Becauſe herein there is danger leſt choler or hatred mingle it ſelf therewith, or that we ſhould be tranſported with ſome exceſs; and ſo thinking to preſerve the life of our body, we ſhould loſe that of our Soul.*

3 Quia periculum eſt ne ira aut odium ſe admiſceant, neve modum excedamus, & ſic dum volumus ſervare vitam corporis, vitam perdamus animæ. *num.* 55.

And in *Chap.* 12. *num.* 78. after he hath ſet down of himſelf a Propoſition of which he declares himſelf to be the firſt Author, ſaying, that he had not found it in any that had written before him, which is, that it is lawful to kill him who hath ſpoken any contemptuous word unto us, or who hath made only ſome ſign thereof, he brings in this reſtriction: (4) *Yet he ought notwithſtanding avoid herein the deſire of revenge.* And though afterwards, *num.* 80. having proved by three different reaſons that an honourable perſon who hath received a box on the ear, may purſue him who gave it him, and kill him, though he were withdrawn; ſpeaking always of this as of an opinion he holds for true in it ſelf, or at leaſt probable, becauſe of the reaſons upon which he hath grounded it, yet he ſeeks to ſweeten a little the rigour of it, concluding in theſe terms: (5) *For theſe reaſons this opinion is probable in the Theory; yet for all that it ought not, as it ſeems, be*
23230 *eaſily permitted in the practice.* (6) *Firſt becauſe of the peril there is therein, leſt hatred and revenge ſhould tranſport unto ſome exceſs.*

4 Cavenda tamen vindictæ libido. *Dub.* 12. *num.* 78.

5 Ob has rationes hæc ſententia eſt ſpeculative probabilis; tamen in praxi non videtur facile permittenda.

6 Primum ob periculum odii, vindictæ, & exceſſus. *num.* 80.

This judicious Jeſuit requires ſome prudent man to the practice of this ſo reaſonable and humane a Doctrine; he would have one kill in cold blood, after he had well thought of it, without heat or precipitation; and that having well weighed what he goes about, and being prepared for it as an action of importance, he ſhould follow this rare Doctrine with ſo great ſimplicity, that he ſhould thruſt the ſword into his brothers breaſt, and preſently withdraw it again without any kind of emotion; that he ſhould ſhed his blood, and waſh his hands in it as ſoberly as if it were in water.

It is therefore clear enough that all theſe precautions and apparent limitations proceed only from the apprehenſion he hath that this Doctrine which he believes to be good, might become odious by the imprudence and evil conduct of thoſe who know not rightly to make uſe of it. He diſtruſts not the truth of this opinion, ſince he ſaith that it is probable in the Theory, but doubts of the capacity of many perſons, for executing it as he deſires, *becauſe of the danger that is therein, leſt hatred or revenge ſhould tranſport them unto ſome exceſs.*

He produces alſo ſome other reaſons to the ſame purpoſe, which are all taken from conſiderations purely humane and politick. As when after he had given a liberty to kill upon an injury or word ſpoken in drollery, he adds, (1) *That for all that we ought not to follow this opinion; becauſe in a Common-wealth we ought to content our ſelves with the power of repelling injuries by words which conſiſt only in words, and to repreſs and chaſtiſe them by a lawful and reaſonable puniſhment.* 23240

And a little after, *num.* 82. to prevent the reproach which might be caſt upon him for ſaying we might make uſe of all ſorts of means which we ſhould judge neceſſary to kill an accuſer who charged us with falſe crimes, or would diſcover and publiſh ſecret ones, though true, he endeavours to cover this pernicious Maxime, by ſaying: (2) *For all that, neither do I approve this opinion in the practice.* And his reaſon is; *becauſe it would make way for many ſecret murders, not without great trouble and diſorder to the Common-wealth. For we ought always in making uſe of the right we have to defend our ſelves, take heed we do nothing which might tend to the prejudice of the Common-wealth. For in this caſe it muſt not be uſed.*

So he always maintains his opinion, which teacheth to kill, to be at leaſt probable, he alſo vindicates the licence he gives to kill, to be a true and lawful right, though he dares not adviſe us to uſe it at all times, becauſe of the conſequences thereof. Becauſe as he now ſaid, (3) *We muſt always beware that this bring no prejudice to the Common-wealth. For then we muſt not be ſuffered to make uſe of this right.*

1 Verum hæc ſententia non eſt ſequenda. Satis enim eſſe debet in Republica, ut injuriæ verbales verbis repelli, & legitima vindicta comprimi & caſtigari poſſint. *num.* 78.

2 Verum hæc quoque ſententia mihi in praxi non probatur, quia multis cædibus occultis cum magna Reip. perturbatione præberet occaſionem. In jure enim defenſionis ſemper conſiderandum eſt ne ejus uſus in perniciem Reip. vergat. Tunc enim non eſt permittendus. *num.* 82. Hæc ſententia eſt ſpeculative probabilis. 3 In jure enim defenſionis ſemper conſiderandum eſt ne uſus ejus in perniciem Reip. vergat. Tunc enim non eſt permittendus.

He ſaith not that it is a thing evil in it ſelf to kill, even in ſuch occaſions; he ſaith not, that we have no right to do it; but only that it is not for our advantage to make uſe of it; not becauſe of any principle of conſcience, as being againſt Gods Law, or againſt the love of our neighbour; but rather in reſpect of ſome Maxime of Policy: (4) *Becauſe this would produce ſome diſorder and miſchief in the Common-wealth.* 23250

And to terrifie him who againſt his counſel, but following his Maxims, would kill for ſo ſmall an occaſion as a word of contempt, he brings this reaſon, (5) That if he be taken in the manner, or accuſed before a Magiſtrate, he will be handled and puniſhed as a Murderer.

This is a conſideration of a prophane perſon rather than a Divine, and ſo are all the reſt which he alledgeth on this point. And we may ſay that the Pagans would have furniſhed us with more forcible and ſolid ones, to condemn the Doctrine as well as practice of murders, which this Jeſuit authorizes by his cruel Maxime.

And alſo it is eaſie to judg, that if he had had a true deſign to divert men from the practice of this murderous Doctrine which he teaches, he would have ſet himſelf to it after another manner, he would have preſſed them with the Authority of Gods Law, the obligation of their conſciences, and the fear and threats of eternal death, and not only with the dread of civil Laws, ſecular Judges, and temporal death.

But he would not rack the conſciences of others, nor ſpeak againſt his own: he believed, that abſolutely we are under no obligation to obſerve the counſel he gives us in this point of practice. And therefore he pretends not to make any Law therein, nor to propoſe his advice by way of command, but only as a counſel. He would not revoke the right he hath given to kill; but only he is not of opinion that we may make uſe of it in occurrences wherein we may bring ſome trouble and prejudice to the Common-wealth, and ſo be brought to tryal before a Magiſtrate, and puniſhed as Murderers. 23260

In concluding this Chapter which contains particularly the opinions of *Leſſius*



4 Quia ejus uſus in perniciem Reip. vergeret, cum magna Reip. perturbatione.

5 Talis in Rep. bene conſtituta ut homicida plectretur.

concerning Murder, I cannot omit one good advice which he gives Churchmen and Monks in this point. After he had ſaid generally that there was no obligation thereunto; nevertheleſs it would be good counſel many times, *ſalutare conſilium*, not to prevent and kill him who aſſails us; but rather to expoſe our own than to take away his life, he adds, (1) *That Church-men, and particularly Monks, ought to make great account of this counſel, and embrace it.*

But for fear he ſhould give them any ground of ſcruple by giving them this advice, he advertiſes them that for all that they have a right and liberty to kill as well as the people of the world when they are aſſaulted, and that if there be herein any fault, it is only againſt the reputation of their profeſſion. (2) *Not*, ſaith he, *that it is not abſolutely lawful for them to kill; but becauſe it doth not become them ſo well.*

23270 And to ſhew how far he is from diminiſhing the right which he gives Churchmen and Monks, and from pretending by his counſel to oblige them to ſuffer themſelves to be killed rather than kill him that aſſails them, he doth not ſo much as oblige them to flye when they may. (3) *Nevertheleſs*, ſaith he, *if they will not flye, they ſin not againſt juſtice, though they kill him who aſſaults them.*

He ſaith alſo the ſame thing afterwards, *num.* 86. and gives them the ſame liberty for defence of their goods as of their lives. For having put this expreſs Queſtion: (4) *Whether a Monk who will not flye, but defends himſelf, ſins againſt juſtice in hurting or killing him who aſſaults him?* He anſwers definitively in theſe terms: (5) *I think he ſins not againſt juſtice, eſpecially if his life or goods be invaded.*

He pretends then that a Monk who ſees a Thief take what belongs to him, may kill him without fear of acting againſt Juſtice, though he ſhould do better to pardon him, and ſpare his life withdrawing himſelf or flying: (6) *And though Charity incline, it doth not oblige thereto*, as he had ſaid before, though by withdrawing himſelf, (7) *he prevents his neighbour from deſtroying himſelf for ever.*

If Charity oblige not in this occaſion, as *Leſſius* pretends, I know not when it can oblige. Here we are concerned in the ſaving, or rather in the not taking away of a mans life: here we are concerned even in his eternal damnation; and that we may not be the cauſe, or at leaſt the occaſion and inſtrument of this double death, the queſtion is only of the peril of loſing a few goods, or of retiring and flying. The caſe concerns a religious perſon who is aſſaulted, or from
23280 whom what he hath would be taken. What ſhould he do in this encounter? Shall he withdraw or defend himſelf? Shall he reſolve to kill him with his own hand who hath taken his goods, rather than ſuffer him to carry them away? *Leſſius* anſwers that he may kill him without fear of ſinning againſt Juſtice. *Puto*, ſaith he, *non peccare contra juſtitiam*, nor even againſt Charity it ſelf abſolutely, becauſe it obliges not hereto. *Charitas non obligat.*

After this we may find it leſs ſtrange which we have ſeen already, that Father *Sirmond* maintains that the Law of Charity obliges us not in rigour always to love God, nor our neighbour, upon what occaſion ſoever; ſince, after *Leſſius*'s Maxims, there are many very ſlender occaſions upon which it is lawful to kill, though we may eaſily abſtain therefrom if we would, and though we ſee clearly enough that from temporal death he paſſeth on to eternal.

1 Ob has rationes cenſeo hoc conſilium magnifaciendum, & omnibus Clericis, maxime Religioſis, amplectendum. *num.* 55.

2 Non quod abſolute non liceat, ſed quod non ita deceat. *num.* 55.

3 Si tamen nolunt fugere, non peccabunt contra juſtitiam, etſi invaſorem occidant. *num.* 44.

4 Utrum ſi Religioſus nolit fugere vel ſe tueri, peccet contra juſtitiam, lædendo vel occidendo invaſorem?

5 Puto non peccare contra juſtitiam, maxime ſi vita vel fortunæ invadantur. *n.* 86.

6 Charitas etſi non obligat, tamen ad hoc magis inclinat.

7 Ne proximus in æternum pereat. *num.* 55.

II. POINT

## II. POINT.

### The Opinions of *Amicus* concerning Murder respecting the Religious.

***That he permits them to kill in defence of their Honour, him who impeacheth them of false Crimes, or only threatens to discover those they have indeed committed.***

NOt only to preserve his life and goods, as *Lessius* hath now said, but a Fryar may also kill to preserve his worldly honour, according to the Jesuits Divinity. 23290 This Doctrine at this day is very common in their Schools; notwithstanding because it is ordinarily attributed to *Amicus* in particular, and he himself makes no difficulty to declare himself the first Author thereof, at least of many points which he propounds himself, and which he saith he found neither cleared, handled, nor so much as propounded by any Author; we will afford him the honour of being treated as the Father of a new opinion, and we will represent apart his opinions upon this point, since they are singular, or at least were so when he first produced them. For they have since made a marvellous progress, as we shall see in the sequel of this Article.

He saith first as *Lessius*, that to eschew the danger of losing life, a Monk hath the same right as a secular person, to kill him that assaults him, whoever he be. (1) *This right*, saith he, *of defending his life, belongs not only to one private person against another, but also to a private against a publick person, to a Subject against his Superiour, a Son against his Father, a Father against his Son, an Ecclesiastick or Monk against a Secular, a Secular against an Ecclesiastick or Monk, without any irregularity thereby incurred.*

But he stays not there; he pretends that they may make use of this right of killing, for the preservation of their repute in the world, as well as their lives. 23360 (2) *The Authors of whom I speak*, saith he, *agree in this point, that to defend our selves from an affront which would be given us; it is lawful to prevent the aggressor by killing him: in the same manner as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of life or member, it is lawful to kill him before he can execute his wicked design.*

It seems at first sight that this general Proposition is to be extended only to the Laity. But besides that, he gives in all things which concern the right of killing, the same liberty to the Monks as to the Laity, as we shall see hereafter: he declares it also here very manifestly. For after he hath demanded whether that he now said, (3) That it is lawful to kill in defence of honour, ought to be extended to all sorts of persons? And said that according to Law and the common opinion of the Doctors it is forbidden the Religious, he forbears not to say afterward, (4) *That we cannot at least deny that Clergie-men and Fryars may and even are obliged to defend their honour and reputation which proceeds from vertue and prudence; because this honour doth properly appertain to their profession, and that if they lose it, they lose a very great benefit and advantage.* 233

1 Hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non solum habet privata persona contra privatam, sed etiam privata contra publicam, subditus contra Superiorem, filius contra patrem, parens contra filium, Clericus aut Religiosus contra secularem, & contra, absque ulla irregularitatis contractione. *Amicus tom. 5. de just. & jure disp. 36. sect. 4. num. 76. pag. 537.*

2 Conveniunt supradicti fas esse ad propulsandam ignominiam quam mihi aliquis inferre conatur, illum præveniendo occidere: sicut fas est ad declinandam mortem quam mihi injustus invasor molitur, illum occidere, antequam mihi mortem vel mutilationem inferat. *Ibid. sect. 7. num. 106. pag. 542.* 3 Sed adhuc superest difficultas, an omnibus personis licitum sit in tutelam honoris invasorem occidere? Negant id concessum esse Clericis & Religiosis, ut cum glossa in Clement. Si furiosus, de homicidio, & glossa in caput, Suscepimus, sub eodem titulo, docent communiter Doctores. *Ibid. pag. 544.*

4 Negari tamen non potest honorem famamque illam quæ ex virtute ac sapientia nascitur, quique verus honor est juste defendere Clerici aut Religiosi valeant, ac sæpe debeant: cum hic sit proprius professionis eorum. Quem si amittant, maximum bonum ac decus amittunt. *Ibid. num. 118. pag. 544.*

The point of honour then, according to the Principles of this Jesuits Divinity, ought to be accounted amongst Church-men and Monks, as well as amongst the most ambitious men of the world, for one of their greatest blessings. (5) *Maximum bonum ac decus.* Whereupon he concludes, and saith in the second place, *That the Clergie and Religious may at least defend their honour, and in doing all which is necessary thereto, may even kill him who would deprive them of it.*

1 Ergo saltem hunc honorem poterunt Clerici ac Religiosi cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ, etiam cum morte invasoris defendere. *Ibid.*

And to encourage and incline them to commit this Murder with greater confidence, he represents it to them as an action of vertue, and contents not himself to say that they may, but declares that sometimes they ought to do it; so that they should sin against Charity, if they failed therein: *Quin interdum, lege saltem charitatis, videntur ad illum defendendum teneri.* Ibid. Yea and sometimes, at least by the Law of Charity they seem obliged to defend it.

2 Charitas non inflatur, non est ambitiosa, non quærit quæ sua sunt. 1 *Cor.* 13. *v.* 4.

What kind of Religious Charity is this that obliges to commit Murders, for fear of suffering some loss or diminution in worldly honour? If it be Jesuitical Charity, it is not that of S. *Paul* which he recommends unto Christians, when he saith, (2) *That Charity is not puffed up, is not ambitious, and that it seeks no its own private interests.*

3 Unde licebit Clerico vel Religioso calumniatorem gravia crimina de se vel de sua Religione spargere minantem occidere, quando alius defendendi modus non suppetat. *Ibid.*

*Amicus* doth not content himself to have said once or twice very clearly, that it is lawful for a Monk to kill for the point of honour, he repeats it again as a thing very important, drawing this conclusion from his Principle. (3) *It follows, that it will be lawful for a Clergie-man or a Monk to kill a slanderer who threatens to publish some great crimes against him or his Order, if he have no other means to defend himself therefrom.*

It is not needful therefore, according to him, that a Monk attend until a slanderer speak evil of him or his Order, that he may kill him; it is sufficient that he threats to disgrace him; and even without expecting this, if he believes that he hath a will thereto; and that he is disposed and ready to do it. For in that case this Jesuit gives him the same right to kill him: (4) *If he be ready to charge these crimes on him or his Order publickly before considerable persons, if he be not slain before.* One of his reasons is, (5) *Because that in this case it seems that a Clergie-man or a Monk hath the same right as a Lay-man lawfully to kill a slanderer, there being no difference in this point betwixt a Lay-man and a Religious.* That is to say, that he would have the Clergy in this point conform themselves to the world, and that he would be sorry that Monks should have less liberty than Lay-men to follow their passions, and to revenge themselves before-hand of an injury they have not yet received.

4 Si calumniator sit paratus ea vel ipsi Religioso, vel ejus Religioni publice ac coram gravissimis viris impingere, nisi occidatur. *Ibid.*

5 Nam quo jure licitum est seculari in tali casu calumniatorem occidere, eodem jure licitum videtur Clerico & Religioso, cum in hoc Religiosus & secularis sing omnino pares. *Ibid.*

Which cannot but seem very strange to a person never so little equitable, seeing that instead of putting a stop to the passions of the world by the Example of the Religious, he would overthrow the vertue of the Religious by the Example of the World, without considering that worldly men that have any conscience would themselves refuse the power he attributes unto them of killing him that only threatens, or hath a simple design to hurt their reputation by some calumny: and though they should believe they had a liberty to defend their honour in this manner at the expence of another mans life, honour it self and natural generosity alone would forbid them to use it, though this Jesuit dares to lead on the Religious unto it.

A Disciple of the Society desirous to defend this Doctrine, that he might clear up and make it better comprehended, propounds it in a very remarkable Example. (6) *You have read,* saith he, *this Doctrine of* Amicus, *and you demand whether a Monk that hath sinned through frailty of the flesh with a woman of base condition, who takes it for an honour to be prostitute to so great a Personage, boasts her self of it, and defames him, may kill this woman.*

6 Legisti hanc doctrinam & inquiris an homo Religiosus qui fragilitati cedens fœminam vilem cognovit, quæ honori ducens se prostitutam esse tanto viro, rem narrat, & eandem infamat, possit illam occidere? *Garanuel fund. 55. sect. 7. pag. 551.*

He dares not at first declare his opinion, and he acknowledges he is in great suspence, and knows not which way to resolve, speaking thus: (1) *I knew not what to answer. It is true I have heard an excellent Father, a Doctor in Divinity of great wit and learning say, that* Amicus *might well have forborn to propound this proposition; but it being once published in print, he was obliged to maintain it, and we to defend him. This Doctrine indeed is probable, and a Monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned, for fear she should defame him.*

1 Quid scio? At audivi ab eximio P. N.S. Theologiæ Doctore, magni ingenii & doctrinæ viro: Potuisset Amicus hanc resolutionem omisisse; at semel impressam debet illam tueri, & nos eandem defendere. Doctrina quidem est probabilis, sed qua posset uti Religiosus, & pellicem occidere ne se infamaret. *Ibid.*

He saith well, that it had been better that *Amicus* had never published this mischievous Doctrine, but he saith not that it is wicked; and though he saw well enough the falsity and errour thereof, as he testifies by the difficulty he makes to approve it, yet he believes that *Amicus* was obliged to maintain it after he had published it, *semel impressam debet illam tueri.* For that it is a kind of disgrace to a learned man as he is, and to the Society, to seem to have been ignorant of any thing, or to have erred; and a Jesuit knows not what it is to recant sincerely when he hath once set forth a Proposition by the order and with the approbation of his Superiors. 23340

This Doctrine, though altogether brutish and inhumane, ceaseth not to be probable in the Judgment of this Casuist: *Doctrina quidem est probabilis,* because *Amicus* hath set it out; and because he who is a Doctor as well as *Amicus*, by the engagement he stands in to the party, and that he might gratifie his Master and his friend, finds himself obliged to give him his approbation: *Et nos debemus eandem defendere.* And upon a probability so well founded, a Monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned, for fear she defame him. *Poterit Religiosus pellicem occidere ne se infamet,* taking from her in this manner her life after her honour, and clearing an adultery by a murder.

A Judge cannot put to death a Malefactor, if he be not lawfully and evidently convicted; and if he condemn him upon simple conjectures, presumptions, and probabilities, he makes himself guilty of his death. So that the Casuists give more power to a Malefactor and an Adulterer, then the Laws give unto Judges, assuring him that he may upon a probable opinion kill her with whom he hath sinned, for fear she discover his crime. 23350

2 Doctrinam Amici solam esse veram, & oppositam improbabilem censemus omnes docti. *Ibid.* sect. 6. p. 544.

This is not sufficient to have made this opinion probable, he must also, that the Religious may have entire liberty to follow it without any scruple, remove from the contrary opinion all manner of probability; and this *Caranuel* doth, saying, (2) *That all able men and learned persons amongst them hold with him, not only that the opinion of* Amicus *is true, but that the contrary opinion is not so much as probable.*

3 Conformius rationi videtur honorem tueri gladio quam mendacio; generosius & sanctius famam defendere occidendo aggressorem quam ei falsum testimonium imponendo. *Ibid. fund.* 55. sect. 6. pag. 550.

It must needs be that this opinion which authorizes Murder in favour of Adultery, hath in a little time made a marvellous progress, since *Amicus* declares that he invented it, and *Caranuel* not daring at first to say that he approved it, speaks of it a little after as certain and evident truth, the contrary whereof seems not to him to be maintainable, because that upon his and *Amicus* Authority all the learned of the Faction of Probability have embraced it.

Then he fortifies this Authority by reason, which he proposes in this manner: (3) *It seems more agreeable to reason to defend honour by the Sword then by lying: That it is a thing more generous and holy to maintain reputation by killing an Assailant, then by bearing false witness against him.* He takes it for granted, that both the one and the other are reasonable, and that there is no difference but as of less and more: That it is an equitable, generous, and holy act to bear false witness against him that assails our reputation; but it is more generous and holy to kill him, (4) *provided only we pass not the bounds of a just and necessary defence,* and that we do no more then is precisely necessary to kill him. For it is, *thus that he declares he hath always understood it,* for fear we should question his prudence and moderation. 23360

4 Cum moderamine tutelæ. Id enim semper subintelligitur. *Ibid.*

He continues his reasoning and adds. (1) *Now it is probable that there is no mortal sin in the second*, to wit, in bearing false witness against him who would take away our honour: *and therefore neither any in the first*, to wit, in killing for maintenance of the same honour. We may conclude by the same reason, that it is lawful to rob to preserve our reputation, or to commit a second adultery to cover the first for which we fear to be disgraced, since these crimes are not greater than slander, false witness, and murder, which he pretends to be lawful for the same reason.

1 At non esse mortale hoc ultimum probabile est, ergo nec illud primum. *Ibid.*

Then he undertakes to verifie in order all the Propositions of this his Discourse, beginning with the first. (2) *I prove*, saith he, *the major, because manslaughter is not absolutely evil in it self, since many may kill justly; and on the contrary, a lye is so wicked, that God himself cannot make it lawful and honest according*
23370 *to all the Thomists, nay, according to many of the Scotists, who hold that God may dispense with some Precepts of the Decalogue.*

2 Majorem probo, quia homicidium ex natura sua malum non est. Multi enim interimunt justo & mendacium ita malum est, ut nec divinitus dispensari aut cohonestari possit, in omnium Thomistarum sententia; imo etiam in opinione Scotistarum plurium, qui putant posse Deum dispensare in aliquibus præceptis Decalogi. *Ibid.* Quod si dicantur non sufficere, vix erit ulla opinio probabilis. *Ibid.*

*Amicus* then and his Fraternity, and other his Partisans, who maintain at this day his opinion, must have more power than God himself; being they can justifie and sanctifie lyes and calumnies when they are serviceable to them for preserving their honour in the world, which God cannot so much as make lawful by dispensation.

But the proof of his second Proposition is remarkable. (3) *I prove also*, saith he, *the minor, namely, that it is probable that he who bears false witness to defend his right and his honour, sins not mortally: for that which is maintained by persons of piety and learning is probable; and this doctrine hath for it more then twenty great and very learned Personages.* Whence he concludes, *That if we imagine these not to be sufficient to make it probable, we shall hardly find any at all that is so.*

3 Probo minorem etiam, esse videlicet probabile non peccare mortaliter qui imponit falsum testimonium alicui, ut suam justitiam & honorem defendat: quia illud est probabile quod asseritur à viris doctis; at hæc doctrina habet in se viginti & plures viros magnos & doctos. Quod si dicantur non sufficere, vix erit ulla opinio probabilis. *Ibid.*

Behold a new wonder of the Doctrine of Probability, to prevail not only against the opinions of men, but against the Law of God and Nature. For this Casuist said a little above, that by the common consent of the Doctors, a lye is in its nature so bad, that God himself cannot prevent it from being so at all
23380 times, nor dispense with the Law which forbids it: And here he would have the opinion of twenty Jesuits or Disciples of Jesuits of force to make it lawful by the Doctrine of Probability, and not only to protect lying, but which is worse, false witness also against the Law of God.

It is impossible to advance the Doctrine of Probability any higher, then to elevate it above the Power of God, and to subject the Laws of God unto it, by giving it a power to approve what they condemn, and to justifie that which God himself cannot so much as tolerate.

I know not whether, as they hold that a Confessor is obliged to quit his own opinion to follow that of his Penitent, though he believe it is false, if it be supported by some probability, so they do not even pretend also that a man who hath killed one to preserve his honour, coming to appear before God to receive his Judgment, may not oblige him to renounce his own light, and to pass over his own Laws to absolve him, by representing unto him, that he could not sin, following a probable opinion supported by the Authority of twenty Doctors.

If the Jesuits be not confident enough to say this, yet they must needs believe it, or renounce their Doctrine of Probability, since it is a necessary and evident consequence of the Maxims of this Science. For as they hold it for certain, that we cannot sin in following a probable opinion; it is also very certain, that an equitable Judge, and by stronger reason God who is Equity and Justice it self,
23390 cannot condemn nor punish him who sins not. And by consequent this man who following the opinion of *Amicus* and these twenty Doctors who have approved it, hath slain one to preserve his honour, having not sinned, God cannot condemn nor punish him; but he shall be obliged to absolve him, and give him part of his

glory, in yielding to the Authority of these Doctors, and giving way to the Rules of Probability, though he judge according to divine light, that his action is wicked, and condemned by the eternal Laws.

After this we must not think it strange, that they will not submit this marvellous Doctrine to the Laws of the Church, or Princes, and that they pretend that they are of no force against it, as *Caramuel* declares, answering this question: (1) *May we entertain this Doctrine of* Amicus *without offending against Civil and Ecclesiastick Laws?* For he answers, (2) *That the Doctrine of* Amicus *is new, and later than the common Laws; and that by consequence the Popes, Emperors, and Kings have ordained nothing about this point.* Whence it will follow by the same reason, that if any one should begin at this day to teach some new and heretofore unheard of errour, as to say that Blasphemy or Adultery were no sin, his opinion would not be condemned by the Church; because it would be new and later than its Laws. When the Church condemns an Errour, it condemns all those who shall hold it for the future, as well as those who have held it in time past: And it hath truly and sufficiently condemned this of *Amicus*, in condemning slander and murder which this Jesuit approves and authorizes. 23400

1 Anne eadem doctrina poterit admitti sano jure civili & canonico?

2 Respondeo Amici doctrinam esse novam & legibus vulgatis juniorem; atque adeo nihil de illis à Pontificibus, Cæsaribus, aut Regibus fuisse dispositum. *Ibid. pag.* 549.

But if the Errour and Crime were not so evident as it is in this opinion, its novelty alone, of which this Casuist would make use to exempt it from the censure of the Church, suffices to make us see that it is condemned by the Church it self. For there is no Divine who knows not that Novelty, and particularly in matters of Doctrine, hath been always suspected and odious in the Church, and that it hath always rejected and condemned it by the Laws and Mouths of all the Saints which governed it. And by consequent this opinion of *Amicus* being novel by his own confession, it hath been condemned by the Church before it proceeded from his imagination.

After *Amicus* had expounded this pernicious Doctrine so largely, built it up with so great care, and supported it with all the reasons he could, he thinks to put himself under shelter by saying, (3) *That since he had not read these things in the Writings of any Author, his design was not to oppose himself to the common opinion, but only to propose it by way of dispute, leaving it to him who should read these things to judge thereof according to his prudence.*

3 Verum quoniam hæc apud alios scripta non legimus, nolumus à nobis ita sint dicta, ut communi sententiæ adversentur: sed solum disputandi gratia proposita, maturo judicio relicto penes prudentem lectorem. *Amicus supra tom. 5. disp. 36. sect. 7. num.* 118. *pag.* 544.

But seeking to hide, he discovers himself the more, and his words render him more guilty, since he acknowledges this Doctrine is novel, and that he hath not found it in any Author. He therefore by this makes known and declares openly that it is he who invented so abominable an opinion. And therefore we may say with all truth, that it had its birth in the School of the Jesuits; that they are the Authors of it, and that it is properly and particularly their Doctrine. 23410

And it is to no purpose for *Amicus* to say, that he doth not set on foot these Maxims so contrary to Justice, Nature, and humane Society, but only by way of disputation, and that he submits his unto others Judgment. For this discourse makes not an opinion good which is bad of it self; and this excuse and submission hinders him not from being blamable for publishing of it; but it only testifies that he did this with fear, and that he meant hereby to sound as it were the minds of men, to see how this his first Proposal of it would be received in the world, that he might afterwards declare himself more openly, and maintain it with an absolute confidence, if this first draught of his Essay should prosper with him, and an opinion so strange and odious should only be tolerated.

But besides this, it is an enterprise unsufferable and pernicious to the Church and Common-wealth to propose so horrible Errours and Maxims which carry on unto vice, revenge, and murder, under a pretence that it is done only for disputation sake, and for an exercise of wit, without determining any thing at all absolutely. There is no more certain way to teach men all sorts of villanies, and to imprint in their minds all sorts of the most brutish and abominable imaginations.

III. POINT.

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### *The Opinions of other Jeſuits concerning Murder.*

THis matter is too important to relye on the Judgment of *Leſſius* and *Amicus* alone. We muſt joyn thereto that of ſome others of their Fraternity, the better to verifie what we have reported of their Writings. Now if it fall out that they ſay in a manner all the ſame thing, it will prove the truth of what I ſay, that this Doctrine of Murder is not the opinion of one or two private perſons only; but of the principal Jeſuits, and of the Spirit of the Society.

1. *Dicaſtillus* as well as *Amicus* whom we have already quoted, with others alſo, gives licence to any one whomſoever to kill all ſorts of perſons indifferently, Father, Mother, Prieſt, Monk, all Superiors generally, without excepting Princes and Kings, no more than Biſhops or Popes, when they are perſwaded that they aſſault them unjuſtly. (1) *It is lawful*, ſaith he, *for Children to riſe againſt their Parents, Servants againſt their Maſters, Vaſſals againſt their Princes, and to repel force with force, when they are actually and unjuſtly aſſailed. And the ſame is lawful for Monks againſt their Abbots, and Inferiors againſt their Superiors.* So that if we ſhould ſee a Son ſmite his Father, we ought not lightly to condemn him, for it may be this Father would have beaten him unjuſtly.

*Molina* ſpeaking of an Adulterer, doth not only not call it in queſtion, whether it be lawful for him to kill the Husband of the Woman with whom he hath ſinned, when he takes him in the fact; but he takes it for granted as a certain
23430 thing, that he may do it for the defence of his honour and life. (2) *An Adulterer*, ſaith he, *may lawfully kill the Husband of a Woman with whom he hath committed Adultery, if her Husband having ſurpriſed him in the fact do aſſault him?*

*Tambourin* is alſo of the ſame opinion: (3) *An Adulterer*, ſaith he, *taken in the fact, may he defend himſelf, and kill thoſe that would kill him?* I anſwer he may. Becauſe according to the Laws of Conſcience the Husband hath not right to aſſault him. *If then in Conſcience* and before God, this Husband aſſaults him not *according to Juſtice*. He kills him then unjuſtly. And notwithſtanding *Tambourin* forbears not to give him a diſpenſation alſo, ſaying in the following Section, (4) *That a Husband may kill a young man that forces his Wife, though ſhe conſent to it in any ſort whatſoever.* This advice doubtleſs is very religious, to permit a diſhonoured Husband to revenge himſelf of treachery by injuſtice; and it is alſo an excellent manner for an Adulterer to repair his fault and expiate his crime of prophanation of Marriage by taking away the Husbands life, after he hath taken away the Wifes honour, according as theſe Jeſuits allow him.

23440 *Molina* in the proceſs of his diſcourſe ſaith the ſame of a Thief, (5) *According to this Doctrine we muſt ſay, that a Thief being entred into a houſe to ſteal, may in conſcience kill him that would kill him for his Theft, if he cannot otherwiſe eſcape death.* We muſt no more be ſo much aſtoniſhed that they aſſure us that he from whom one would take life, honour, or goods, may kill in his own defence, and prevent the Aſſailant; ſince they pretend that he who unjuſtly invadeth the honour or goods of another hath the ſame right and power.

1 Licitum eſt filiis contra parentes, ſervis contra Dominos, vaſſallis contra Principes vim vi repellere quando actu invadunturinjuſtè— Idemq; de Monachis aut ſubditis contra Abbates & Superiores eſt communis ſententia. *Dicaſt. l. 2. tr. 1. diſp. 19. dub. 3. num. 30.*

2 Adulter aggreſſus à merito adulteræ in facto deprehenſus, licite illum interficere poteſt. *Molina de juſt. & jur. tom. 4. tr. 3. diſp. 14. pag. 1765.*

3 Adulter in adulterio deprehenſus poteſt ſe defendere, occidendo eos qui ipſum occidere aggrediuntur; quia in foro conſcientiæ non juſtè invaditur vim inferentem

& merito. *Tambur. lib. 16. decal. cap. 1. ſect. 1. num. 7.* 4 Poteſt maritus occidere juvenem uxori quomodocunque conſentienti, quando illum aliter avertere non poteſt. *ſect. 2. num. 8.* 5 Juxta hanc doctrinam dicendum eſt fas eſſe furi qui ad furandum eſt ingreſſus interficere eum qui tali de cauſa vult talem furem interficere quando aliter non poteſt evadere eam mortem. *Ibid. pag. 1766. num. 2.*

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He alſo maintains, that in theſe occurrents wherein it is lawful to kill, according to him, it is lawful to deſire it, to lay a deſign for it, and to do all we can to effect it. See his words. (1) *We muſt ſay that he who is aſſaulted may form a deſign to kill the Aſſailant, and direct his blow at his heart or throat, that he may overthrow and killhim, when he ſees that it is neceſſary for him, that ſo he may certainly eſcape out of his hands.*

1 Dicendum poſſe aggreſſum intendere mortem aggreſſoris, petendo ictu cor aut jugulum aggreſſoris animo eum proſternendi ac necandi, quando videt ſibi ita eſſe neceſſarium ad tute evadendum manus ejus. *Ib. diſp.* 12. *num.* 4. *pag.* 1755.

*Tambourin* permits us to have this determinate will of killing in our own defence all ſorts of perſons. (2) *It is*, ſaith he, *the common Doctrine*, (without doubt amongſt the Jeſuits) *that to defend my life, but not to revenge my ſelf, I may kill him who aſſaults me unjuſtly, even with an intention to kill him, his death being as a means to ſave my life; yea, though it were my Father, Son, Brother, Maſter, Wife, a Prieſt, or Monk, without incurring any peril of Excommunication or irregularity.* He might have ſaid moreover, and added with merit, and even with pretenſion to gain an Indulgence by this man-ſlaughter; ſince according to his Brethren, an action of this nature is good and *honeſt*; and by conſequence a matter capable of merit and indulgence. 23450

2 Ut vitam meam defendam, non vero ut vindictam ſumam, communis eſt doctrina poſſe à me occidi eum qui me injuſte aggreditur, etiam intendendo ejus mortem ut medium meæ vitæ, licet is ſit meus pater, filius, frater, dominus, conjux, Sacerdos, Religioſus, ſine periculo excommunicationis vel irregularitatis. Hurtado, Dicaſtillus & alii apud Dianam. *Tambur. lib.* 6. *Decal. c.* 1. *ſect.* 1. *n.* 1.

*Amicus* ſaith in like manner, (3) *That he who is aſſaulted may endeavour to kill the Aſſailant, looking on his death, not as his end, but as a means to preſerve his own life.*

*Dicaſtillus* adds, that this deſign of killing is honeſt. (4) *We muſt ſay and maintain it as moſt true* (ſaith this Father) *that as it is an honeſt thing to repel him who aſſaults us, by killing him; ſo likewiſe it is honeſt directly to deſire to kill him, and to intend it for repelling him, and defending our own life.* This is not ſimply to tolerate, excuſe, or juſtifie murder, this is highly to praiſe it, and to ſtir up all people to commit it, and to give themſelves voluntarily to the practice of it as a good action, to ſay, as this Jeſuit doth, that the deſignment as well as the execution of it is commendable and honourable.

But if you have given occaſion to this unjuſt Aggreſſor to invade you, may you kill him? You may according to the ſame *Dicaſtillus*. (5) *He commits not a ſin of man-ſlaughter, who kills him that invades him unjuſtly, though he gave him occaſion to aſſault him.* That is to ſay, that he who by any offence or injury done againſt a perſon, hath given him occaſion to aſſault him, becomes juſt by taking up arms to maintain his injuſtice, and may juſtly kill after he hath unjuſtly offended. And herein he ſhall do alſo, if you will believe this Doctor, an honourable and commendable action. 23460

*Filliutius* aſſures us alſo, (6) *That in occurrences wherein it is lawful to kill the Invader, it is alſo lawful to deſire his death as a means neceſſary for our defence.*

*Molina* goes yet farther, and ſaith that though in killing him who aſſaults unjuſtly, we ſee that he will dye in an eſtate of eternal damnation, yet nevertheleſs we may kill him without offending againſt that Charity which we owe unto our Neighbour: (7) *Becauſe in this caſe Charity obligeth not to prefer this mans ſpiritual before our own corporal life, nor before our honour it ſelf, or our temporal goods which he would unjuſtly bereave us of.*

3 Infertur poſſe invaſum in defenſionem ſuæ vitæ intendere, non quidem ut finem, ſed ut medium neceſſarium, mortem invadentis. *Amicus de juſt. & jur. diſp.* 36. *num.* 78. *pag.* 538. 4 Aſſerendum eſt tanquam veriſſimum, ſicut honeſtum eſt in executione repellere aggreſſorem illum occidendo; pari ratione honeſtum eſt directe illum velle & intendere occidere ad repellendum illum & conſervandam propriam vitam. *Dicaſtillus lib.* 2. *tr.* 1. *diſp.* 10. *dub.* 4. *num.* 41. 5 Non peccat peccato homicidii invaſus qui occidit injuſtum invaſorem, etiamſi invaſus dederit cauſam invaſionis. *Ibid. dub.* 5. *num.* 25. 6 In caſu quo licet occidere invaſorem, etiam licitum eſt intendere ejus mortem tanquam medium neceſſarium ad ſui defenſionem. *Filliutius Moral. qq. tom.* 2. *tr.* 29. *cap.* 3. *num.* 37. *pag.* 358. 7 Tunc lege charitatis non eſt neceſſe præponere vitam illius ſpiritualem noſtræ propriæ corporali. Imo vero nec honori aut bonis externis quæ ille velit injuſte à nobis auferre. *Molina de juſt. & jure tr.* 3. *diſp.* 13. *pag.* 1752.

That is to ſay, that without violating the Laws of Charity, and much leſs of Juſtice, we may kill the body and ſoul of an enemy or thief, and ſend him to Hell rather than ſuffer any loſs in goods or honour, or hazard our lives; and if Charity ſhould require any other thing of us in theſe occurrences, its yoke would be, according to this Jeſuit, unſupportable, unreaſonable, and contrary to publick

23470 good and humane Society. (1) *Otherwiſe*, ſaith he, *this would be a yoke and command unreaſonable, unſupportable, and contrary to publick good; ſince it would oblige us to ſuffer an unjuſt loſs of our lives and goods, for fear that in defending our ſelves, and doing what is neceſſary for our ſecurity, we ſhould cauſe a man to loſe his life who invades us unjuſtly, and who of meer malice refuſes to deſiſt from ſo great injury as he would do us, or leſt he ſhould incur eternal damnation, by continuance in the ſame wicked diſpoſition.*

1 Irrationabile autem & importabile, boque communi contrarium eſſet jugum & præceptum quo præciperemur pati jacturam

injuſtam vitæ & bonorum omnium noſtrorum externorum; ne nos noſtraque cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ defendendo interficeremus injuſte aggreſſorem qui ſua nequitia à tanta injuſtitia non vult deſiſtere: aut nolle illa ſua nequitia deſiſtere, nolendo, interitum incurrat æternum. *Ibid.*

By this reckoning S. *Paul* was unreaſonable, and made an unſufferable remonſtrance to the *Corinthians*, when he reproved them that they did not ſuffer themſelves to be wronged, defrauded, unjuſtly ſpoiled of their goods, rather than, not only to offend or kill the wrong-doers, as this Jeſuit allows; but alſo rather than ſue and conteſt publickly with them. (2) *You are to blame*, ſaith this great Apoſtle, *in this very thing, that you go to Law together before the Judges, why do you not rather ſuffer wrong? Why do you not rather ſuffer your ſelves to be defrauded?* And S. *John* muſt be yet more unreaſonable and inhumane, when he ſaith that all the faithful ought to lay down their lives for their brethren.

2 Jam quidem omnino delictum eſt in vobis, quod judicia habetis inter vos. Quare non magis injuriam accipitis? Quare non magis fraudem patimini? 1 *Cor.* 6. v. 7. Et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere. 1 *Joan.* 3. *verſ.* 16.

23480 And yet the licence which *Molina* gives in this point, is abſolute and general, and he will have it (3) *belong not only to the Laicks, but to the Eccleſiaſticks, as being allowed by the Law of Nature; and not found to be forbidden them at any time; ſince on the contrary it is lawful for them to defend their worldly goods.*

*Amicus* applies alſo this Maxime to the Religious particularly, ſaying, (4) *That it is certain that the right of defending their goods at the expence of their lives, who would take them away, doth not only belong to Secular, but alſo to Eccleſiaſtick and Religious perſons.* Thence it follows, that a Monk encountring a man who is entred into his Monaſtery to rob it, may take a Sword or a Knife to kill him, if he cannot otherwiſe hinder him from bearing away the goods of the Monaſtery.

3 Eſt autem hoc licitum, non ſolum Laicis,

ſed etiam Clericis, cum jure naturæ liceat; nullibique illis prohibitum reperiatur; quin potius defenſio bonorum externorum illis permittatur. *Ibid. pag.* 1770. 4 Quod hoc jus tuendi proprium vitam etiam cum periculo mortis invaſoris, non ſolum habeant ſeculares, ſed etiam Clerici & Religioſi, conſtat. *Amicus de juſt. & jur. diſp.* 36. *num.* 128. *pag.* 546.

*Dicaſtillus*, ſupported by the Authority of many Authors whom he quotes, ſpeaks more reſolutely and more generally, (5) *That it is lawful for all ſorts of perſons, Clergie-men themſelves, to kill them who take away their goods.* And if you will take his word, and keep to his Principles, this ſort of man-ſlaughter is an action not only not wicked, but honeſt and worthy the profeſſion of a Clerk or

23490 Religious Monk. (6) *That if a Thief flye away on horſe-back, he may be purſued with a weapon, or killed by a Piſtol-ſhot, when after he hath been threatned to be killed, he ceaſe not to bear away what he hath taken; and even though he be not threatned nor admoniſhed thereof, becauſe time permits not, and there is danger never to recover what he carries away.*

But what if ſatisfaction might be had for it by Law, were it not then ill done to kill him? *It is not*, ſaith he, *againſt Charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I cannot recover at Law without much trouble.* So it is that in the Jeſuit-Divinity the Law of Charity hath no force againſt that of Intereſt, and the life of a man is not worth the pain of purſuing at Law the reſtitution of what he hath robbed.

5 Aſſerendum eſt omnibus, etiam Clericis, licitum eſſe occidere invaſorem ſuarum facultatum nobilis momenti, quando aliter ſervari vel recuperari non poſſunt. *Dicaſt. lib.* 2, *tract.* 1, *diſp.* 10. *dub.* 5. *num.* 46.

6 Colligitur poſſe occidi furem dum fugit cum re quam

ſurripuit, ut ſi fugiat cum equo quem mihi ſurripuit, poſſim illum inſequi telo vel bombarda confodere, quando fur prænonitus de morte recuſat rem acceptam dimittere; vel etiamſi non ſit prænonitus, quando non eſt locus prænonendi, & periculum nunquam recuperandi rem meam. *Ibid. num.* 58.

*Molina* gives the ſame liberty, and yet greater, for he allows killing for preſervation of worldly honour. For he fears not to ſay, (1) *That if an honourable perſon be aſſaulted, and in danger to loſe his reputation, if he flye, though by flying, he might preſerve his own life, and his who aſſaults him, he is not for all that obliged to flye; but it is lawful for him to kill him who invades him unjuſtly, in defence of his life and honour, when he cannot do it otherwiſe.* So a worthy perſon is not obliged to retire, nor ſtep one pace backward, no more than abate a point of honour to ſave the life of him who offends him in ſome matter, or aſſaults him. 23500

1 At ſi homo ingenuus, cui dedecori ſit fugere quando alius eum aggreditur, tunc eſto fugiendo, vitam propriam & aggreſſoris poſſet conſervare, non tenetur fugere, ſed defendendo propriam perſonam & proprium honorem interficere poteſt injuſtum aggreſſorem, quando aliter non poteſt utrumque conſervare. *Molina ſupra pag.* 1778.

*Vaſquez* finds ſo little difficulty in this point, that he ſpeaks of it as a thing of which none ought to doubt, ſaying, (1) *That all are agreed* (without doubt they of the Society) *that when a man comes upon us to aſſault us, and teſtifies that he would violate our honour, by threatning to beat us with a Cudgel, or give us a box on the ear, it is lawful for us to kill him, if we have no other way to defend our ſelves.* He is not content to ſay we may revenge an affront received; but he pretends that it is lawful even to prevent the miſchief, and to kill him that only threatens to do it.

The reaſon is, (2) *Becauſe he who invades us in this ſort, ſeeks to deprive us of our honour, which is juſtly eſteemed of more value than money or goods. For he who repels not ſuch an affront, is of no account amongſt the people.* And hereupon after he hath ſaid that the Caſuiſts are agreed, that when a man is in hazard to loſe his life and honour at once, it is lawful to kill him who aſſaults him; he adds, that albeit he were not in danger to loſe his life, he is not obliged to flye, and that he may kill only to defend his honour. (3) *It ſeems to me alſo,* ſaith he, *that when a man hath his honour only to defend, he is not obliged to flye; becauſe he is to ſet more by his honour than money or goods. Wherefore there is no reaſon to oblige Chriſtians to loſe poſſeſſions ſo precious, by flying from him who aſſaults them unjuſtly.* 23510

2 Omnes fatentur quod licitum eſt invaſorem qui ſuæ aut alapa minatur nobis malum contra honorem, occidere, ſi alius non ſit ſufficiens modus defenſionis. *Vaſquez opuſc. moral. cap. 2. dub. 9. num. 34. pag. 43.* 3 Quia aggreditur proprium honorem auferre, qui ju.. optimo pluris pecunia æſtimatur. In populo enim pravi, haberetur qui ſimilem injuriam non propelleret. *Ibid.* 4 Sed & mihi etiam videtur quod ob tutendum honorem non tenetur fugere, quia pluris ſcienqus eſt honor quam pecunia aut res familiaris. Unde non eſt cur obligemus Chriſtianos ita pretioſa amittere ex eo duod fugiant invaſorem injuſtum. *Ibid.* Honeſtus vir ſi alapa, &c. percutiatur, &c. *Tambur. lib. 6. cap 1. ſect. 3. num. 1.*

*Tambourin* ſaith the ſame, and *Dicaſtillus* extends and expounds it very largely, exempting him that follows his opinion in this point from reſtitution as well as ſin. And by the ſame Principle upon which he eſtabliſhes this Doctrine, (4) *he approves the Doctrine of* Sanchez *who believes that it is lawful ſecretly to kill a ſlanderer or falſe witneſs in an affair wherein not only life, but even outward goods alſo of great importance are in queſtion.* And in another place (5) he extends this permiſſion of killing falſe witneſs and ſlanderers, (6) *unto ſuch as defame us before a Judge, Prince, or honourable perſons, when we have no other means to ſecure our ſelves againſt this damage.* He proves that it is even probable in the Theory, that we may prevent this ſlanderer, and kill him before he have defamed us.

4 Poterit ſtatim repercutere vel fugientem inſequi, & tantum inſligere verberum, quantum putatur neceſſarium ad honorem recuperandum. *Dicaſtil. lib. 2. tr. 2. diſp. 12. par. 4. dub. 2. num. 410.*

And that Church-men may not in this regard be in worſe condition than others, *Tambourin* who quotes for himſelf *Dicaſtillus*, *Lugo*, &c. ſaith, (7) *That it is lawful for a Gentleman, though he be a Clergie-man, not to flye, becauſe this would be a ſhame to him.* Though this Father *Tambourin* had lived all his life time amongſt Armies, he could not have determined more Souldier-like of the point of honour. He believes not that a Gentleman in turning Clerk, and renouncing the world, hath renounced the right his Divinity gives him to kill for preſervation of his worldly honour. 23520

5 *L. 2. tr. 1. diſp. 10. dub. 15. num. 220.*

6 Si quis falſis criminationibus apud Principem, Judicem aut viros honeſtos te infamare parat & nititur, & aliter non poſſis damnum illud avertere niſi eum occidendo, poteris eum occidere— Idem dicendum ſi crimen ſit verum, dummodo ſit occultum. *Dicaſt. lib. 2. tr. 2. diſp. 12. pag. 4. dub. 2. num. 414.*

6 Si alia via, v. g. fugiendo, te tutari poſſis, fugere teneris ſi dedecori magno tibi fuga non vertitur, ut certe non verteretur ſi eſſet Religioſus; non ita ſi vir ſit nobilis, quamvis ſit Clericus, cui dedecus eſſet ſi in pedes dare. *Dicaſtillus lib. 6. decal. cap. 1. ſect. 1. num. 6.*

It is not ſufficient for *Vaſquez* to place worldly honour above other temporal goods; it ſeems that he would have it current as the moſt precious thing among Chriſtians. And this honour and eſtimation which he would make ſo dear and precious with Chriſtians, is that which depends on the opinion and fancy of thoſe perſons who are of baſeſt and moſt contemptible condition in the world, which are the common Rabble. (1) *This honour*, ſaith he, *is juſtly of more eſteem than money and goods. For he who repels not this affront, is of no account at all amongſt the common people.*

1 In populo enim parvi haberetur qui ſimilem injuriam non propelleret.

The value and love of this worldly honour, is that which we properly call Ambition and Vain-glory. So that when *Vaſquez* ſaith we may kill him who invades this honour, he gives a liberty and power to ſacrifice the lives of men to ambition and vain-glory, it being clear, that we cannot love the honour of the world ſo far as to kill men for the preſervation thereof, not only without ambition, but without extraordinary ambition, whereof many ambitious perſons themſelves are not capable, having an horrour againſt ſo barbarous a cruelty.

This very Jeſuit, as well as his Fraternity, granting a liberty to kill for pre-
3530 ſervation of goods, doth with them put thereto this reſtriction: (2) *Provided that what the Thief ſteals be not of very ſmall value: for it is not fit to kill him who would take ſome ſlight thing.* And immediately after, to mitigate what might ſeem too ſevere in this condition, he adds: (3) *But though the thing be of ſmall value; yet if be to whom it belongs, be in the eſtimation of the people an honourable perſon, and who will receive ſome reproach, if he force it not out of the Thiefs hands, he may kill the Thief if there be no other remedy.*

2 Omnes intelligunt id quando res quæ latro furatur non ſunt minimi pretii, quia pro parvo detrimento non eſt bonum occidere invaſorem. *Ibid. num.* 31. *pag.* 42.

And that he may leave no doubt at all about this point, he propoſes alſo this difficulty: (4) *Perhaps it will be demanded, after how long time it is lawful to kill a Thief?* He firſt relates the opinion of thoſe who ſay, (5) *That it is only lawful to kill when he is taken in the fact.* And he afterward concludes with ſome others who hold on the contrary, that it is lawful to purſue and kill him. (6) *It ſeems to me*, ſaith he, *more true, that ſeeing a Thief flye away on horſe-back or otherwiſe, it is lawful to kill him before he hides what he hath ſtoln.*

3 Sed licet res pravi pretii, ſi tamen ex eo quod dominus illius non eripiat illam de manibus latronis, illi vertatur dedecori, & ille ſit homo dignus honore in populo; poteſt illum latronem occidere, cum aliud non reſtat remedium. *Ibid.* 4 Sed dices: Quo tempore licet latronem occidere? *Ibid.* 5 Tantum licet in ipſo flagranti delicto occidere. 6 Sed oppoſitum videtur verius quod poteſt etiam fugientem latronem in equo vel alio modo occidere, antequam rem occultet. *Ibid.*

*Leſſius*, as we have ſeen already, propounds the ſame caſe, and reſolves it in the ſame manner. He ſpeaks as *Vaſquez* of a perſon that hath taken away ſomething of no value, as an Apple, and will not reſtore it. He avows that he deſerves
3540 not to be killed for that; but he adds, (7) *That if it would be a ſhame to you not to take it out of the Thiefs hands, you may endeavour to take it from him, and even kill him if it be neceſſary.*

7 Si tamen tibi verteretur probro niſi rem furi extorqueas, poſſes conari, & ſi opus eſſet, etiam occidere. *Leſſius de juſt. & jur. lib.* 2. *c.* 4. *c.* 9. *d.* 11. *num.* 68. *p.* 88.

The Stoicks taught indeed that it was lawful to kill ones ſelf rather than loſe his honour, and there are many Examples found in the Hiſtories and Books of the Pagans, of perſons commended for having practiſed this wicked Maxime. But I find no moral Rule nor civil Law in all Heathen Antiquity, which ever tolerated what the Jeſuits allow, to kill a man for a thing of ſo ſmall importance as an Apple, ſo often as it falls out that the loſs thereof brings upon us ſome abatement of worldly honour.

I have not found, I ſay, in all Heathen Antiquity any Philoſophy which hath taught, no Law which hath tolerated this, no more than any Example of any perſon that ever did it with the approbation of any ſage perſons. For this cauſe the Jeſuits may boaſt truly, that they have paſſed the bounds, not only of the Fathers of the Church, as they brag openly, but even of all the Heathen Philoſophers, and to have diſcovered Principles, and invented Rules of Morality, which the Pagans deſtitute of faith, by the light of reaſon only would have abhorred and rejected as errours and extravagances.

Nevertheleſs *Vaſquez* believes that he is obliged to extend this ſame power of killing in defence of what belongs to them, unto the Clergy and Monks. *It ſeems*

*to me*, saith he, *that this is lawful for them as well as the Laity, and that herein there is nothing contrary to their Profession.* 23550

The Jesuits content not themselves to allow killing, as we have now seen; they teach also and note out in particular the ways to do it, *Lessius* and *Molina*, as we have already seen, give herein an entire liberty to do whatsoever we please, and to take all ways which seem necessary, and which may be most commodious and easie.

*Sanchez* descending farther unto particulars, saith it is lawful to take the way of a Duel, if we be expert therein, and think to have advantage thereby: (1) *Because*, saith he, *this duelling is accounted a just defence, moderate also and without excess, and this sort of defence is lawful for the preservation of life, honour, and goods.* 935

1 Quia hoc duellum rationem defensionis cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ induit. Ea defensio contra invásorem est licita, & pro vita, & pro honore, & pro rebus etiam tuendis. *Sanch. opusc. moral. lib. 2. cap. 29. num. 7. p. 295.*

There are Casuists who on these occasions would at least that the Princes licence be had; but *Sanchez* saith that this is not necessary: (2) *Because Nature gives a right of self-defence without need of demanding any toleration.* And this natural right gives leave to send as well as receive a Challenge, according to this same Jesuit, who attributes, not without commendations, this opinion to *Bannes*, saying, (3) *That he hath very well observed, that in these occurrents the innocent party may accept or offer combat*, if he had not rather deal more securely for himself by killing him secretly instead of fighting him. For he pretends that the same 23560 reason which gives liberty to kill an enemy in a Duel, gives him leave also to kill him secretly, (4) *Because this slaughter*, in what manner soever it be done, *is always a true defence.*

2 Nam defensio jure naturali absq; alicujus licentia conceditur. *Ibid.*

And he declares that this right of killing an enemy in secret rather than by fighting with him, is so strong, that it sometimes passeth into an obligation. Insomuch that he even assures us, (5) *That* Navarra *saith very well, that an innocent person ought neither to offer or accept the combat, if he can kill his enemy privily, and thereby escape that peril of life, honour, and goods.* And he holds, that this obligation proceedeth from the Charity which this innocent person, who commits this secret murder, owes to himself and him whom he kills. (6) *For as much*, saith he, *as by this means he will avoid the imminent danger of his own life whereunto he had exposed it in fighting a duel, and he will withhold his Adversary from offending God by giving or accepting the Challenge.*

3 Atq; optime Bannes ait licere — innocenti in his casibus accepare & offerre duellum ob rationem traditam. *Ibid.*

Imo non provocando ad duellum, interficere occulte actorem illum calumnioſum. *Ibid.* 4 Cum hæc occisio sit vera defensio. 5 Imo bene Navarra n. 290. ait teneri innocentem non accepare duellum, nec indicere, si potest occulte illum occidendo id vitæ, honoris, fortunarum periculum evadere. *Ibid.* 6 Quippe qui propterea vitæ periculum in duello imminens vitabit, & peccatum actoris offrentis aut acceptantis duellum. *Ibid.*

It must be confessed, that this is a strange and unheard of Law of Charity which obliges to kill our Neighbour and Brother to keep him from offending God, and to cause him to be slain secretly, for fear that if he be openly set upon, he should be transported with some excess through a desire to defend himself, and commit a crime in fighting a duel; and in the mean time to make no difficulty nor scruple of sending him to Hell by killing him in an estate which he believes to be criminal and guilty of injustice, which ought surely to be very great and manifest, since it is taken for the ground and pretence of killing. It is sufficiently manifest, that this is not the Charity which Jesus Christ hath taught us by his 23570 Words and Example, which obligeth us to dye for our brethren and for our enemies themselves, and to prefer the good of their Souls and their Salvation above all our interests and all the goods of the world.

*Molina* proceeds yet farther than *Sanchez*, or at least he declares himself better upon this Point. For *Sanchez* seems not to oblige us to kill our enemy in our defence no otherwise than by the Charity we owe to our selves, and imposes not this obligation on other than the innocent, without determining what his sin would be, if he failed herein. But *Molina* extends this obligation to every sort of Superiors, publick Persons, and even to many private Persons, pretending that it is a duty of Justice: and he fears not to say and declare, that he who fails

 herein

herein sins mortally. (1) *When he who is assaulted*, saith he, *is a person whose life is of importance, and necessary to the Weal publick, whether it be in temporals or spirituals, he is obliged under mortal sin to kill, if he can, the Aggressor, in defence of his life.*

1 Quando aggressus persona esset cujus vita multum Reipublicæ vel in spiritualibus vel in temporalibus referret, teneretur sub reatu culpæ lethalis interficere aggressorem si posset, ut vitam suam conservaret. *Molina de just. commut. tract. 3. disp. 14. pag. 1754.*

If this Jesuit had been found amongst the Apostles when our Lord said unto them, that he should be delivered unto the Gentiles, outragiously dealt with, and put to death, he would have believed without doubt, that he ought to have opposed himself thereto more forcibly than S. *Peter* did, who said unto him only by way of advice and natural affection: (2) *God forbid, Lord, that this should befal thee, this evil shall not be unto thee.* And he would have had no better
13581 answer than that which Jesus Christ made unto S. *Peter*: (3) *Get thee behind me, Satan, thou art an offence unto me; for thou savourest not the things that are of God, but of men.*

2 Absit à te, Domine, non erit tibi hoc. *Matt. 16. v. 22.*

3 Vade post me, Satana, scandalum es mihi, quia non sapis ea quæ sunt Dei, sed quæ hominum. *Ibid. v 23.*

It must also be observed, that he would have the Commandment to kill an Aggressor, unless we will sin mortally, not to be only for publick persons, when the publick good is in question, but also for private persons, when the interests of their families are concerned. See here his words: (4) *It seems that the same is to be said, if his death would bring some great prejudice unto his family, as to his wife, his children, whom he is obliged to sustain.*

And for fear that it should be objected to him, that if this man be not obliged in Justice to expose his life or his goods for his neighbour, that he might recover him from death eternal and temporal at once, he might at least do it of Charity; he prevents this objection by saying, (5) *That though it might be lawful for him to depart from his right by suffering himself to be slain by him that assaults him, to prevent his falling into death temporal and eternal; yet he cannot give away the right of those who belong unto him, to whom his life is necessary, being obliged to maintain and defend them.* And by consequence *he sins mortally in not killing the Aggressor, if he can, for the preservation of his life.*

4 Idem videtur esse si ex ipsius morte sequeretur maximum detrimentum familiæ, ut uxori ac filiis quos alere tenetur. *Molina ibid.* 5 Quamvis enim posset cedere juri suo, permittendo se ab aggressore interfici ne aggressor damnum mortis temporalis & æternæ incurreret, non tamen posset cedere juri suorum quibus vita ipsius est necessaris, & quibus alimenta & protectionem debet, quæ à vita ipsius pendent. *Ibid.*

But why may not he say also of the Head of an Ecclesiastick Body, of the Superior of an Order, and of all those who have any Charge or Employment in
13590 the Church, what he speaks generally of those whose lives are necessary for the Common-wealth or their private Families, (6) *That they are obliged under mortal sin, to kill the Aggressor, if they can, for the preservation of their lives.*

6 Tenetur sub reatu culpæ lethalis interficere aggressorem, si possit, ut vitam suam conservet.

The one as well as the other is a consequence of his Principle, and his reason is stronger for a Head of an Ecclesiastical Body, or Superior of an Order, or a person who hath some Charge in the Church, than for a Secular Magistrate, or a Father of a Family, it being more true of every one of the former than of the latter, (7) *That he is a person whose life is very important to the Weal-publick of the Church both in temporals and spirituals.* Whence it will follow, that we may say according to the same Jesuit, (8) *That he sins mortally, if he kill not him that assaults him, if he can, in the defence of his life.*

7 Est persona cujus vita multum Reipub. in temporalibus & in spiritualibus refert.

So that it shall not be in one or two cases only, but in an infinity of occurrents almost, that this Command of Killing, which *Molina* would introduce amongst Christians, shall oblige them under pain of eternal damnation. And it would not be easie, according to the Doctrine of this Jesuit, to exempt from mortal sin a multitude of holy Martyrs who have suffered themselves to be slain unjustly, not only without defending themselves; but also sometimes forbidding those who could and would to defend them; because some of them being Fathers of Families, and others Fathers of the Church and of the Faithful, their lives were
13600 of importance both in spirituals and temporals. So that though they might recede from their right in Charity, and suffer themselves to be slain without defending themselves, yet they could not, according to this new Theology, recede

8 Tenetur sub reatu culpæ lethalis interficere aggressorem, si possit, ut vitam suam conservet.

from the right of thoſe who appertained to them, and who were under their Charges, whereunto their lives were neceſſary. And by conſequence if this Jeſuit do not ſhew them favour, and grant them a diſpenſation from this Rule, they ſin mortally in dying for Jeſus Chriſt, and not defending themſelves, and not doing all they could to preſerve their lives, ſo far as to kill, if it were needful, their Aggreſſors.

But if he pretend, that this Commandment is from God, as it ought to be, that it may imply ſo great and ſtrict an obligation, we muſt alſo believe that the Law of God is leſs reaſonable and leſs juſt than the Maxims of Philoſophy, and the Civil Laws of Pagans, who never commanded nor taught any ſuch thing, and who rather condemn it in many caſes in which the Jeſuit approves it, as an exceſs and crime; he muſt therefore be conſtrained either to change the Commandments of God, or to increaſe their number; we muſt, according to him, make eleven Commandments of God inſtead of ten; or indeed inſtead of what hath been ſaid to this preſent; *Thou ſhalt not kill*, we muſt ſay for the time to come: Thou mayſt kill oftentimes without fear of mortal ſin, and thou ſhalt even be obliged ſometimes to kill on pain of Hell.

## IV. POINT.

23610

### *The Opinion of* Eſcobar *concerning Murder.*

I Will give all this Article to *Eſcobar*, and indeed he deſerves it well, for he is Spokeſman for twenty four of the moſt famous and ancient Divines of the Society. And he hath alſo handled this ſubject of Murder very largely, and in that ſhort Piece of his Epitome he hath omitted in a manner nothing of what the reſt have ſaid. So that in his Book, as in an Abridgment, may be ſeen, what is diffuſed through a multitude of great Volumes of his Fraternity.

He propoſeth many exceptions to the Law of God which forbids killing, of which the firſt is this: (1) *All that do wrong may be killed, as thoſe who rob by night or by day, and all ſuch as offend us, though we be certain they will be damned, dying in that eſtate.* In ſaying all wrong doers, he gives liberty to kill all in general who hurt us, in what manner ſoever it be, leaving it to the diſcretion of private men to judge whether they deſerve death or no.

He expounds himſelf after more clearly, introducing a perſon who ſpeaks in theſe terms: (2) *Of what price ought the thing to be, for preſervation whereof a Thief may be ſlain?* He anſwers preſently, (3) *That it ought not to be of ſmall value.* But he adds after this exception: (4) *If this turn not to the diſgrace of him from whom it is taken.* This is the opinion of *Leſſius*, as we have ſeen already, and indeed he quotes him.

He relates alſo the opinion of *Molina* who holds, (5) *That ordinarily it ſhould be a Crown*, or of the value of a Crown. So his general Rule is, that ordinarily we may kill a man, whoever he be, for a Crown. But he pretends there are extraordinary caſes wherein far leſs doth ſuffice, and that ſometimes it is enough to have taken an Apple, as *Leſſius* ſaith in expreſs terms, or to have ſpoken an offenſive word, or to have given the lye, as *Eſcobar* aſſures us after *Badel*. For propoſing this Queſtion: (6) *Whether it be lawful for an honourable perſon to kill him who hath given him evil language, or the lye.* He anſwers, (7) *That* Badel *holds, that it is lawful to kill him who utters reproachful words, in caſe he cannot otherwiſe be repreſſed.*

23620

1 Malefactores poſſunt occidi, nocturni, diurni fures, & alii quicunque malefactores etiam certo damnandi. *Eſcobar tr. 1. exam. 7. cap. 2. num. 2. pag. 115.*

2 Quærerim quanti valoris debeat eſſe res pro cujus conſervatione poſſunt furem occidere? *Ibid. num. 44. pag. 122.*

3 Non debet eſſe res parva.

4 Niſi toleretur cum injuria.

5 Regulariter autem Molina tom. 4. de juſt. tr. 3. dub. 16. num. 7. unum aureum aſſignat. *Ibid.* 6 Num liceat contumelioſum, ſeu profantem, mentiris, honorato viro, interficere? 7 At Badelli lib. 3. dub. 24. num. 24. putat licitum eſſe occidere contumelioſum, ſed in caſu in quo aliter arceri non poteſt.

He gives the same liberty to a Gentleman, against him that threatens him with a blow of a Cudgel, or a box on the ear, and prepares to smite him; saying, (1) *If any one attempt to give a box on the ear, or a blow with a Cudgel to a Gentleman, it is lawful for him to prevent and kill him, according to* Lessius. And if he could not prevent him, he demands, (2) *Whether it be lawful for him after he hath received a blow on the ear, to pursue him who smote him, and to kill him?* To which he answers, (3) *That some say no; because this is to revenge, and not* 23630 *defend himself.* But he is not content with this answer, and he opposes to it that of *Lessius*, (4) *who believes that it is lawful in the Theory, though it be not advisable to practise it, because of the peril of malice, revenge, disorders, duels, and murders, which may arise from it, to the prejudice of the Common-wealth.*

1 Aggreditur quis virum nobilem seu alapa, seu baculo percutiat, licitne ei prius occidere aggressorem? Affirmat Lessius l. 2. cap. 9. dub. 12. num. 77.

post impactam alapam, percudentem insequi & interimere? 3 Aliqui negant, quia id est injuriam vindicare, non defendere. 4 At Lessius lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 12. num. 80. licere existimat speculative, sed in praxi non consulendum, ob periculum odii, vindictæ, excessuum, pugnarum & cædium, in Republ. perniciem. Alii seclusis his periculis in praxi probabilem ac tutam judicarunt. *Ibid. num.* 48. *pag.* 123.

We have already observed before, that all these reasons are humane and politick: and though they conclude the practice of this Doctrine to be difficult and dangerous, they are no hinderance but that it may continue always probable, according to these Authors, and by consequence that it may be followed with a safe conscience, care being only had to avoid the dangers and mischiefs that may arise thereupon, as some of those cited by *Escobar* do expressly say. That is to say, that according to these Casuists, we may pursue a person from whom we have received a box on the ear, or some other affront, without giving over, or being satisfied till we have slain him.

5 Præveniri aggressor potest aliquando? Potest, ut etiam insidiator. *num.* 6. *pag.* 115. Teneturne aggressus cum decore fugere? Minime. *Ibid.* Accedit quis ad me pugionem extracturus ad me occidendum; nec possum aliter mortem evitare? Potes præveniendo occidere. *num.* 38. *pag.* 121.

(5) They also teach, that we may prevent the mischief by preventing him who might do it, and killing him before-hand, without need to attend till he falls upon you indeed; because it is enough that he seeketh occasions, or lays trains against you.

But if he present himself to fall upon you, though you may save your self by retiring, you are not obliged thereto, if your flight would be dishonourable. But if he come near, and lay hand on his Weapon, it is lawful to prevent and kill 23640 him first, if there be no other way to avoid death, and preserve his honour.

(6) They declare, that it is not needful so much as to attend till he smites us, or till he puts himself in a posture to do it; that he assail us, or seek occasions to do it, and that it is enough that he is minded to do it, to give us power with a safe conscience to prevent the mischief we apprehend, and to take away an enemies mischievous intention with his life.

6 Licetne occidere eum qui non invadit actu, sed decrevit invadere? Docet *Molina*

(7) If any man have committed a crime which is not publickly known, and he knows that another hath a design to inform against him before a Magistrate, if he fears lest this Accuser should cause him to be condemned to lose his life, or part of his goods, *Escobar* gives him, by the Authority of *Bannez*, liberty to kill him. He only wills him, that he may not offend against the Laws of Prudence in doing Justice in this manner, to consider well before-hand whether there be not some other means to quit himself of this peril, and that by all means he admonith the Informer to give over his prosecution, that if he refuse, he may be slain with greater satisfaction of conscience.

*de just. tom.* 4. *tract.* 3. *dub.* 12. *num.* 2. *Ibid. num.* 37. 7 Scio falsum testem vel iniquum accusatorem contra justitiam legalem expandere intendere crimen verum, sed occultum, licetne occidere, si ex eo timeam capitalem sententiam, aut notabilem bonorum amissionem? Bannez asserit, dummodo prius admonitus nolit desistere, & non sit spes evadendi. *Ibid. num.* 39. *pag.* 121.

*Coninck*, by the report of *Escobar*, is not altogether of this opinion, not that he condemns the opinion which is attributed to *Bannez*, but on the contrary he acknowledges, (8) *That it is probable, if we respect the Law of Nature:* but he

8 Coninck de act. Super. d. 32. dub. 2.

num. 12. docuit, licet opinio Bannez spectato solo jure naturali sit probabilis; jus tamen positivum potuisse id prohibere, & de facto prohibuisse. *Ibid.*

ſaith, *that poſitive Laws might, and have in effect forbidden it.* And one of the 23650
moſt forcible conſiderations which he bringeth to diſſwade us from following this opinion in the practice, is that though we may, if we will repoſe our conſcience and Salvation upon the Faith of this Author; yet for all that we ſhall not therein find ſecurity for our perſons and lives. (1) *Becauſe he who thus kills a man for being an Informant, or witneſs againſt him, under pretence that he had revealed ſome crime true, but ſecret, or even had accuſed him falſly, cannot free himſelf from being puniſhed by the Judge.*

1 Nec impunis abit qui accuſatorem & teſtem prætextu falſitatis, aut injuſtæ veri criminis revelationis, necat. *Ibid.*

So that if one can deſign his plot ſo well, and give the blow ſo ſecretly, that he be not known, killing a man in this manner, that he may eſcape the chaſtiſement juſtly due unto the crime he hath committed, he hath nothing to fear, according to this Doctrine, neither from the Juſtice of God nor man.

*Eſcobar* alſo maintains with his Brethren, that it is lawful to kill in defence of our goods, and he brings their very reaſon for it, ſaying, (2) *That worldly goods ſerve to the preſervation of life and honour, and for the ſupport of our ſtate and condition.* And to add ſomething to this invention, which is common to him with his Brethren, he ſaith, (3) *That it is for this reaſon that worldly goods are called the life and blood of men.*

2 Quia bona externa medium ſunt ad vitæ, honoris & ſtatus ſuſtentationem. *Ibid. n.* 43. *pag.* 122.

But if they be the life of men, they are only ſo to them that love them, and who are of the world, and live according to its Maxims. And this ſpeech is unworthy to proceed from the mouth of a Religious perſon, and agrees not with the profeſſion of deſpiſing the world and its goods to follow Jeſus Chriſt and his Goſpel. But this Jeſuit teſtifies alſo, that he ſpeaks as he thinks, and believes 23660
not that Monks are obliged to deſire and love the goods of the world leſs, than Worldings themſelves, ſince he gives them the ſame liberty with the Laity, to kill thoſe who would take them from them.

3 Et ideo bona externa vita & ſanguis hominum appellantur.

For after he hath ſaid that *Molina* extends this Doctrine, which permits to kill in preſervation of goods, unto the Clergy, he demands, (4) *Whether it may be alſo extended unto Monks, ſeeing they have nothing of their own.* And he anſwers, *Yes; becauſe all men have a right to defend not only what every one poſſeſſeth in particular, but alſo what they poſſeſs in common.*

4 An poſſit extendi ad Religioſos, cum proprium nihil habeant? Poteſt, quia unuſquiſque habet jus defendendi, non ſolum propria, ſed ea quæ poſſidet in communi. *Ibid. num.* 43. *p.* 122.

That is to ſay, that the goods of the Monks are to Monks, as the goods of the world are to Lay-men; and that there is none but this difference advantagious to Monks; that every private perſon in the world enjoys only his own propriety; but in a Monaſtery every one doth not only poſſeſs a part of the goods of the Society, but the whole is common to him with the reſt. Whence it follows, that every Monk hath a right to kill him that invades the goods of his houſe.

He demands a little after, *num.* 46. if Monks have the ſame right to kill for maintenance of their honour, as for defence of their goods. (5) *Is it lawful for a Monk to kill a ſlanderer who publiſheth great crimes againſt his Order, as it is lawful for all men to kill for preſervation of their honour with requiſite moderation?*

5 Licitumne Religioſo occidere calumniatorem gravia crimina de ſua Religione ſpargentem, ſicut licitum eſt cuilibet pro tuendo honore cum moderatione interimere? *Ibid. num.* 46.

And he ſaith firſt, (6) *That* Amicus *durſt not hold to the affirmative for fear* 23670
*of ſeeming to oppoſe himſelf againſt the common opinion.*

6 P. Amicus, cujus octo decurſu Theologiæ volumina nuper ad meas venere manus, tom. 5. de juſt. d. 36. ſect. 2. num. 118. non audet ſententiæ affirmativæ adhærere, ne omnium adverſari videatur.

He acknowledges that until the time of *Amicus*, Monks had not yet the liberty of killing for the preſervation of their honour. This Jeſuit would gladly give it them, but he dares not; and that which reſtrains him, is not conſideration of Juſtice, but of men and cuſtom. He is not afraid of violating the Law of God by granting them this diſpenſation, but of offending the Caſuiſts, and oppoſing himſelf to the common opinion. *Ne communi ſententiæ adverſari videatur.* In the mean time he forbears not to propound this opinion which he dares not yet maintain, and he approves and ſupports it as much as he can.

His reaſon for it is, (7) *Becauſe if it be lawful for a Lay-man to kill for the preſervation of his honour and reputation, it ſeems by ſtronger reaſon, that it is lawful*

7 Si Laico, ait, propter honorem & famam

*also for a Church-man or Monk. For as much as their profession, wisdom, and vertue, from which the honour of a Clergie-man or Monk proceeds, is more to be esteemed than skill in Arms, from whence Lay-men draw their honour.*

hoc licitum est, multo magis videtur licere Clerico ac Religioso, siquidem professio, sapientia & virtus, ex quibus hic Clerici & Religiosi honor progignitur, majoris est quam dexteritas armorum ex qua secularibus honor nascitur. *Ibid.*

*Amicus* quoted in this same place by *Escobar*, adds also to confirm his reason, that in this the condition of a Monk is altogether equal to a Lay-mans. *Cum in hoc Religiosus & Secularis sint omnino pares.* But *Escobar* forgot these words, or rather left them out purposely, though they seemed favourable enough to the design he had of establishing unto Monks the right of killing for honour. Without doubt he believed that this would debase too much the right of the Monks in this point, to make them equal to Lay-men.

23680 For the right of the Monks being grounded, according to him, on their Profession and Vertue; as the Laicks on their valour, and dexterity in managing their Arms; being the Profession and Vertue of Monks is more elevate and more to be esteemed than the Exercise of Arms, it must necessarily follow by this reason of *Amicus*, that the right which the Religious have to kill for honour, being better grounded, should also be stronger and greater than the Laicks. And by consequence he ought not to have said, that the condition of the one and the other was altogether equal; but it must be concluded by the Principle and Argumentation of these Jesuits, that in this the Monks ought to have advantage over the Laicks, and that they may kill with more liberty, and upon less occasion those who invade their honour.

And the reason hereof is clear. Because the more precious honour is, the more easie it is to hurt it, and the fault of him that doth it, is the greater; and as offences which are slight, being done against private persons, are very great, and deserve exemplary chastisement, being done against the honour of a Prince or a King; so an injury which would not be considerable against the person of a Laick, would be criminal, being done against a Monk, to blast his or his Orders reputation.

By this Rule it is easie to judge how far this pretended right may be extended; or rather it will be hard to judge of its so great extent. As it will be at
23690 the pleasure of Monks to set their honour, vertue, and the respect due unto their Profession at what rate they please, so it will also be in their power to judge of the greatness of the faults which are committed against them in this point, and consequently of the penalty they deserve who commit them.

And if it be lawful for a Lay-man to kill for a matter of small value, *licet sit res parvi pretii*, as *Vasquez* saith, by example, for an Apple or a Crown, *ut pro pomo, vel etiam uno aureo servando*, as saith *Lessius*, as we have seen; when a mans honour is concerned in the taking these things from him, we must confess that a yet lesser occasion, if a less can be had than an Apple or a Crown, will suffice, according to this Divinity, to give the same toleration to a Monk. We need only look surlily upon him, do or say the least thing to offend him, to incur his displeasure, and thereupon to dye by his hand, if he please to make use of this right which the Jesuits attribute unto him, as they also usurp it themselves, and pretend they may use it, as we shall see in the following Point, where we relate the Opinion of Father *Petavius* upon this matter.

## V. POINT

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*The Conformity of the Jesuits, who in our days have taught in their Colledges, with the more Ancient, in the Doctrine of Murder.*

THis Doctrine having been invented and established partly by the most ancient and most considerable Divines of the Company of Jesuits, as we have now seen in the preceding Points, their Authority hath given such credit and such a current to it amongst their Fraternity, that passing thus from one to another, as a Tradition of the Society, it hath been ever since maintained by their Schools, and is propagated unto our days without any interruption. On the contrary, it hath by succession of time received a notable increase, and far greater Authority by the multitude of those who have followed it, the later always endeavouring to add something, and to augment the inheritance of their Fathers, by expounding and extending more and more the bloody and inhumane Maxims which they had left them on this subject.

For some years this Doctrine hath also been taught in divers places of this Realm, in many Colledges of the Jesuits at the same time, and many years together in the same Colledges. Father *Flachaut* and Father *Le Court* have taught it at *Caen*, and in teaching it, have been transported to all excess which therein could be committed. I will only report here one or two passages of one of these two Casuists, faithfully extracted out of his Writings, which have been verified by publick Authority, by the diligence of the Rector of the University of *Paris*, 23710 wherein he hath heaped together, and said in short a great part of what *Lessius* and others have propounded upon this subject. See here his own words. (1) *I say that it is probably lawful for all sorts of persons, even for Clergie-men and Monks, speaking absolutely, and setting aside scandal, to kill a Thief who flyes, though he make no resistance, when he takes away some precious thing, as a Horse; especially Church-goods, and which he cannot otherwise recover.*

1 Dico 5. probabiliter licitum esse cuivis, etiam Clerico & Religioso, per se loquendo, & semoto scandalo, occidere furem fugientem, etiam non resistentem, ferentem res suas pretiosas, puta equum, & præsertim Ecclesiæ, si aliter recuperare nequeas.

(2) *I say moreover, that it is lawful to kill a Thief who flyes, if it be necessary to the preservation of mine honour therein notably concerned.*

(3) *Finally it is lawful, especially for Gentlemen, to kill him who is minded to smite them, though slightly, if the injury and dishonour they receive thereby be remarkable; so after they have received a box on the ear, they may presently strike with the Sword to avoid disgrace, and preserve their honour. This is the opinion of many learned men.*

2 Itemque licitum esse occidere fugientem, si id necessarium sit ad defensionem honoris tui notabiliter amittendi. 3 Denique licet volentem te percutere leviter, occidere, ubi id insignis est injuria, præsertim in Nobilibus, nimirum accepta alapa, gladio percutere statim ad vitandam ignominiam, conservandumque honorem. Ita docti permulti.

These learned men are *Molina*, *Lessius*, *Sanchez*, and others whom we have produced in the fore-going Points, as the Authors and Fathers of this Doctrine, since they have confessed themselves, that they found it not in the Books of other Divines, at least as to certain the most important Propositions.

The same Casuist saith, that a man who fears lest another should lay some 23720 Indictment against him, or accuse him unjustly, that he might destroy him, because he hath affirmed, that he hath such a design, may justly kill this his enemy, challenge him into the field, or rid his hands of him by secret means, as he judges it convenient. And then he advises rather to make use of the latter than former way. (4) *Because of two ways which are both lawful, it seems that ought to be preferred which is most secure for the defendant, that he may avoid evident peril or death*

4 E duobus mediis licitis illud videtur eligendum quod tutius est ex parte ejus qui seipsum defendit, ad vitandam certam mortem, ejusve certum periculum.

*death it ſelf.* And a few lines after, he adds, (1) *That all this ought to be underſtood in the ſoveraign and inward Court of God and Conſcience. For in the outward Court which proceeds according to forms of Juſtice, and conſiders preſumptions and conjectures, he who ſhould thus prevent his Adverſary how injurious ſoever, would be condemned as a Murderer, if he could not clear himſelf.*

As if Gods Law did not forbid Murder as ſtrongly as thoſe of men, and it were lawful to abuſe his goodneſs by fearing him leſs than his Creatures, becauſe his Juſtice doth not commonly puniſh with ſo great ſeverity and ſpeed as that of the Princes of the Earth.

This Jeſuit raiſes yet another Queſtion, whether one may kill a perſon from
3730 whom he yet never received any diſpleaſure, as an infant, when he cannot ſecure his own life but by his death. And after he had ſaid, that there are many who cannot approve ſo barbarous an action, he adds, (2) *That according to the opinion of ſome others, which is alſo his own, it is probable that this is lawful; becauſe this Commandment, Thou ſhalt not kill, forbids not abſolutely to kill an innocent; but with this exception, not to kill him without obligation and juſt cauſe, according as S. Thomas ſpeaks. Now in this caſe he that kills, doth it not without juſt and very urgent reaſon, ſuch as is the preſervation of his own life.*

1 Hæc intelligenda ſunt in foro fori, quod dicitur forum Dei & conſcientiæ. Nam in foro litigioſo ubi locus eſt præſumptionibus ita præveniens actorem injuſtum habetur reus homicidii, niſi ſeipſum purgaret.

2 Reſpondeo nihilominus cum quibuſdam probabiliter id licere. Propterea quod hoc præcepto, Non occides, non prohibetur abſolute omnis occiſio Innocentis, ſed cum limitatione, ne videlicet indebite & ſine juſta cauſa fiat. Sicut docet S. Thomas 1. 2. q. 100. a. 3. Iſta autem occiſio non fit ſine juſtiſſima cauſa & urgentiſſima, qualis eſt conſervatio propriæ vitæ.

This reaſon may be extended yet farther. For hence it will follow, that liberty may be taken to kill an innocent, not only to preſerve life, but honour and goods; and if he ſhould be blamed, who had done it, he may alledge for his juſtification, that if he had not done this, he had been ruined in eſtate and honour, whereof the one is neceſſary to life, and the other more dear than life it ſelf; and he will ſay as the Caſuiſt here: *Iſta occiſio non fit ſine juſtiſſima cauſa & urgentiſſima.*

*Tambourin* hath very lately cauſed the ſame thing to be imprinted. *If any one,* ſaith he, *aſſault you, and make uſe of an innocent perſon to ſhelter him, you may kill him, that you may hit him who invades you.*

*Eſcobar* is of the ſame opinion, tr. 1. ex. 7. num. 52. pag. 121. and *Leſſius*
3740 whom he quotes, propoſeth the Queſtion in theſe terms: (3) *It is demanded, whether if a perſon aſſaulted cannot ſecure himſelf but by hazarding the death of an innocent wherewith the Aggreſſor covereth himſelf, he may defend himſelf notwithſtanding that hazard?* He anſwers, (4) *That it is more probable he may.* He afterwards propoſes the ſame caſe in another faſhion. (5) *Suppoſe,* ſaith he, *that a man flyes from his enemy, and he cannot eſcape but through ſome ſtrait way wherein he will cruſh to death ſome infant or lame perſon, it is demanded, whether he may take that way to ſave himſelf?*

He anſwers firſt, (6) *That* Navarra *ſaith that he may not, unleſs he have probable hopes not to kill him.* But though this be always a great injuſtice to hazard the life of an innocent, over whom we have no power, to ſecure our own; yet this ſatisfies not *Leſſius*, who outvying *Navarra*, adds, (7) *That in truth it ſeems that we ought to ſay the very ſame thing of this caſe as of the former.* That is, that as to ſave my life I may kill an innocent with my own hand; ſo one may ride over him, though we be aſſured that he will dye thereof.

3 Si is qui invaditur non poſſet ſe tueri niſi cum periculo innocentis quo invaſor ſe protegit, utrum & liceat cum eo periculo ſe defendere?

4 Reſpondeo probabilius eſſe poſſe. *Leſſius de juſt. lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 9. num. 57. pag. 86.*

5 Petes ſi fugiens hoſtem non poſſit evadere niſi per anguſtum iter ubi proteret infantem vel claudum; poteritne illac fugere ut ſe ſalvet? 6 Petrus Navarra negat, niſi ſit aliqua probabilis ſpes non interficiendi. 7 Sed revera videtur eadem ratio quæ in caſu ſuperiori. *Ibid. num. 59.*

His reaſon is, (8) *Becauſe he who is aſſaulted hath right to defend himſelf, and that his meeting with, or the interpoſure of an innocent doth not take from him this right.* Which is no other than an application of the general Maxime whereon he grounds all this Doctrine of Murder under pretence of defending life, honour,

8 Quia qui invaditur jus habet ſe defendendi, quo jure non privatur ex illa Innocentis interpoſitione.

and goods: which is, (1) *That this pretended right of self-defence is generally extended to whatsoever is necessary to secure ones self from all injuries.* 23750

1 Jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad id omne quod est necessarium ut te ab omni injuria serves immunem.

But he gives a charitable advice to temper a little these answers, if they be found too rigorous. That is to consider, (2) *That we are obliged, at least by Charity to flye, if we can, for fear of killing an innocent.* But this language, as we have already observed elsewhere, according to the Principles of the Jesuits Divinity, is not intended to signifie any more than that if being assaulted, you can flye without any inconvenience to you, rather than kill an innocent, in your defence, you shall do well, though you are not obliged to it absolutely, and in doing the contrary, you cannot be blamed of any injustice. This is that which the same *Lessius* saith in another case. (3) *If notwithstanding you will not flye, you sin not against Justice.*

2 Advertè tamen primo, si potes fugere, teneris saltem ex charitate, ne innocentem interficias. *Ibid. num.* 58.

All this murderous Doctrine hath also been taught at *Paris* in the Colledge of *Clermont* by Father *Hereau*, under the view and with the approbation of the Superiors and Chief of the Society. For he demands: (4) *If when any one endeavours to defame me before a Prince, a Judge, or Persons of Honour by false reports, and I cannot by other means prevent him from causing me to lose my reputation than by killing him secretly, I may do it with a good conscience?* This is the same Question which *Lessius* hath already proposed before, and others with him. And he gives also thereto the self same answer. (5) *Bannez*, saith he, *believes it, and* 23760 *adds moreover, that we ought to say the same also, though the crime be true, provided it be secret, so that according to the Rules of Law and Justice, he could not discover it.*

3 Si tamen nolis fugere, non peccabis contra justitiam.

4 An si nomini meo falsis criminationibus apud Principem, Judicem, vel vicos honoratos detrahere nitaris, nec ulla ratione possim hoc damnum famæ avertere nisi te occulte interficiam, id licite possum? *P. Hereau.*

A crime can never be more strongly authorized than by allowing another to be committed to conceal it, and giving liberty to kill a man who hath knowledge of it, when there is fear that he will utter it.

The reason of this Casuist is, (6) *Because if you profess that you will take away my honour or reputation by striking me with a Cudgel, or giving me a box on the ear, I may oppose you with Arms; and by consequence if you endeavour to do it with your tongue, I may make use of the same means when I cannot save my self otherwise than by taking away your life. For the difference is of small moment, whethersoever of these two ways you assail me, since as much mischief may be done with the tongue as any other instrument.*

5 Affirmat] Bannez q. 64. a. 7. d. 14. addens id dicendum, etiam si crimen sit verum, dummodo occultum sit, ita ut secundum justitiam legalem non possit pandere.

6 Quia si baculo vel alapa impressa velis honorem meum vel famam violare, possum armis prohibere. Ergo etiam si id conaris lingua, nec aliter possim evadere nisi te occidam, parum id videtur referre, cum æque lingua atque alio instrumento mihi nocituras es.

If this reason and this bloody Maxime be current amongst men in our days, as this Jesuit seems desirous to make it, by giving it his stamp, and teaching it in his publick Lectures, no man can be sure of his life, or rather there will hardly be any person left alive in this world, wherein defamations serve for common entertainment, and a flouting humor goes for a vertue.

He alledges also this other reason which is more general. (7) *The right of self-defence is extended to all that is necessary to secure ones self from all sorts of injuries.* He took this reason from *Lessius*, which we have already examined, 23770 but he adds this sweetning thereto, (8) *That it were good to admonish this Detractor before we kill him, that he should desist from his bad intention; and if he will not do it, not to kill him publickly, for avoiding scandal, but in secret:*

7 Deinde jus defensionis extendit se ad omne quod est necessarium ut se quis ab omni injuria servet immunem.

8 Monendus tamen prius esset detractor ut desisteret, & si nollet, ratione scandali, non esset aperte occidendus, sed clam.

The Jews had this same consideration, and said in a manner the same thing when they were upon the demand of the death of Jesus Christ, and yet would not for all that have him put to death on the Feast-day for fear of scandal and tumult. (9) *The chief Priests and Scribes, saith S. Mark, sought means to take him*

9 Et quærebant Summi Sacerdotes & Scribæ quomodo eum dolo tenerent & occiderent: Dicebant autem, Non in die festo, ne forte tumultus fieret in populo. *Marci* 14. *v.* 12.

*by ſubtilty, and put him to death; but they ſaid, This muſt not be done on the Feaſt-day, leſt it ſhould cauſe a tumult amongſt the people.*

I will put an end to this Chapter, and cloſe it with ſome remarkable places of a Book which Father *Petavius* cauſed to be printed ſome years ſince, of Publick Penance. For writing after thoſe whom we have already quoted, and ſeeing he could add nothing to the licentiouſneſs of their opinions about Murder, he was minded to ſignalize and make himſelf remarkable above all others, by ſhewing himſelf more audacious than they in the practice and execution of what they had taught.

This Doctrine is of it ſelf ſo far diſtant from all reaſon and humanity; that the greater part of themſelves who would have it paſs for true, or at leaſt for
23780 probable, have maintained it only in general and in the Theory: and when they more nearly conſidered it in the particular caſes and dire conſequences it drew after it, horror and ſhame kept them back, and hindred them many times from approving the practice.

Perhaps there will be none found beſides Father *Petavius*, who tranſgreſſing all bounds of moderation, is not content to maintain, as others, that this Doctrine, which teaches Murder, is probable, or to approve it in the practice; but he requires and preſſes the execution of it, and purſues it with all extremity of heat againſt a Doctor and Prieſt whom he acknowledges unreproachable in his life, and who could not be criminal in that point upon which he purſues him, if not in this, becauſe he being obliged in Charity and of neceſſity to reprove ſome defaults of the Jeſuits conduct in the adminiſtration of the Sacraments of Penance and the Euchariſt; *that which this Doctor of* Sorbonne *ſaid, was not pleaſing to him, nor his Brethren.*

He would cover his inhumane paſſion with a veil of imaginary good intention.
23790 He would have his averſion againſt an innocent perſon, paſs for a laudable and neceſſary duty. And becauſe he can find nothing in the life of this famous Doctor which could render him ſo criminal as he repreſents him, he forms againſt him general accuſations, and imputes unto him the greateſt crimes againſt the State and Religion, without any proof, without other foundation than that of his paſſion and blindneſs.

He goes yet farther, and to rid his hands of his Adverſary more eaſily, he ſhews a deſire; that the invention of a famous Law-giver might be followed, who ordained, *That if any one would change and innovate any thing in the received Laws, he ſhould preſent himſelf with a Halter about his neck, caſt into a running knot, and having in this manner propoſed his reaſons in oppoſition to them, if they were judged equitable, the Law ſhould be aboliſhed or moderated, and the Propoſer come off ſafe; but if his overture were not conſented to, he ſhould be ſtrangled immediately; and ſo undergo the penalty due unto his unadviſedneſs. This courſe,* ſaith he, *may ſeem too rigorous, but the intent is commendable; nay, it is neceſſary for them in whoſe hands the Government now is.* By this diſcourſe it is eaſie to conclude, according to this Fathers Morals, that Dr. *Arnauld*, having propoſed a Doctrine contrary to that which is in credit amongſt the Jeſuits, deſerved death, and that he ſhould do no other than a very laudable act, *who ſhould draw the running knot about his neck* to ſtrangle him; nay, that it is neceſſary for them who have the Government in their hands to act thus, and to make themſelves the inſtruments of the paſſions and intereſts of theſe Fathers.

It is an incredible thing, that a Prieſt, a Monk, and a Chriſtian durſt ſpeak in this ſort, and durſt riſe up in a manner ſo cruel and ſhameful againſt a Prieſt and *Sorbonne* Doctor. But it is more incredible, that he would extend this fury, as
23800 he makes ſhew of againſt ſo many Biſhops and Doctors who approved his Book of frequent Communion, and generally againſt all thoſe who followed and eſteemed the opinions of this Book; that is to ſay, againſt an infinity of learned and pious perſons of all conditions.

It muſt be avowed, that thoſe who have allowed Murders, who have given liberty to diſpatch enemies by killing them, were never tranſported to ſo great excels, and that there are few men who have in their whole lives committed ſo

great and abominable homicides, as this Father, ſo good and gentle, hath a will to do with his own hand.

I ſpeak not here, though this ſeems to be its place, of that deteſtable Doctrine which teaches Subjects to kill their Kings, under pretence of their being Tyrants; women great with child, to cauſe the fruit in their wombs to periſh, when they cannot be delivered thereof without endangering their lives; young Maidens defloured, to expoſe their children to ſave their credit, which is the Jeſuits Doctrine. I ſhall repreſent all theſe things more conveniently, when I ſhall come to ſpeak in particular of the Duties of every perſon according to his condition.

I will only obſerve here, that if the Murder which is committed in all theſe caſes, and in all others which we have formerly related, and extracted out of the Jeſuits Books, be not againſt the Commandment of God which forbids to kill, as the Jeſuits maintain; it will not be eaſie to imagine on what occaſion one may poſſibly break that Commandment, or make himſelf criminal in the violation thereof, if he may kill an enemy, a ſlanderer, a thief, an invader, an informer in falſe crimes, and even in true ones, but ſecret, and which is yet more an innocent perſon, and from whom he never received any diſpleaſure; an Infant, a Prince, a 23810
King, all ſorts of Superiors, without excepting Fathers and Mothers.

If he may challenge into the field, aſſaſſinate publickly, kill by ſurpriſe or upon advantage, cauſe to dye ſecretly, by poyſon, or otherwiſe for the preſervation of his life, honour, or goods, and even for the leaſt thing in the world, as for an Apple, when he believes himſelf obliged in honour not to let him carry it away who hath taken it.

I ſay, if one may kill, or cauſe to be killed in all theſe caſes without puniſhment or ſin, as the Jeſuits teach publickly, it will neceſſarily follow, that according to their Maxims, for a man to make himſelf criminal againſt the Commandment which forbids Murder, he muſt kill in a frolick, and without any true or apparent cauſe. Which cannot be ſuitable to any but Devils, and thoſe that have a diabolick malice.

## ARTICLE V.

### *Of Uncleanneſs, which the Jeſuits allow againſt the Command of God and natural Reaſon.*

THe Jeſuits allow almoſt every thing in this matter, excepting the laſt act of this ſin; and it would be even hard to juſtifie according to their Maxims and Reaſons, that they condemn it at all in good earneſt, ſince they approve, as we ſhall ſee preſently, and diſcharge from all crime all the ways and means that conduce to that end, as lewd company, impudent diſcourſes, kiſſes, looks, diſho- 23820
neſt thoughts, pollution it ſelf, which is in ſome ſort the accompliſhment of fleſhly luſt.

I know not whether we may not fear after what Father *Tambourin* hath written, leſt the Jeſuits ſhould at length affirm, that Fornication may be lawful. See here his words. (1) *It is defined by the Clementine* Ad noſtram: De Hæreticis. *That Fornication is a mortal ſin, and that to ſay the contrary, is an Hereſie.... But whether it be forbidden by poſitive or natural Law; and by conſequent whether it be evil in it ſelf, is a queſtion amongſt the Doctors.* Durand, Martinus de Magiſtris, Caramuel, *and ſome few others believe that it is forbidden by poſitive Law only. But the common opinion and of almoſt all the Doctors is, that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature.... As for me I hold two things for certain. Firſt; that the common opinion is true. Secondly, that this truth being preſuppoſed, we muſt ſay, that there* 23830
*is ſome natural reaſon which proves it. But I muſt ingenuouſly acknowledge, that the Principle whence this Concluſion is drawn, is not yet entirely diſcovered. After this manner it is that we are accuſtomed to anſwer concerning ſome ſecrets of Heaven, as the ſquaring of the Circle, or other like queſtions when we diſpute of them in Philoſophy.*

(1) Fornicationem eſſe peccatum mortale, & contrarium aſſerere eſſe hæreticum decretum eſt in Clement. Ad noſtram. De hæreticis. Sed an ſit ſolum prohibita jure poſitivo an etiam jure naturali; at-

phy. *For we ſay, that theſe things are certain, and that they may be proved by demonſtrative reaſons, but no man hath yet propounded them. I ſay, the Principle whence this Concluſion is drawn. For if the conſequences of it be conſidered, it may be proved manifeſtly enough, principally from this, that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature, it might be granted by diſpenſation in ſome very preſſing occaſions, which cannot be ſaid in any wiſe.*

que adeo ex ſe ſit intrinſece mala, quæritur à Doctoribus. Et Durandus quidem, Martinus de Magiſtris, Catamuel, aliique putant eſſe ſolum ex jure poſitivo. Verum communis & omnium fere Doctorum ſententia docet eſſe de lege naturali. Mihi vero duo ſunt certa. Primo hanc communem eſſe veram ſententiam; Secundo data hac veritate, dicendum à nobis eſſe dari rationem naturalem id certo probantem, ſed ingenue fateri nos debere eam à priori nondum clare eſſe compertam. Ita ſolemus reſpondere cum de cœli quibuſdam occultis, cum de quadratura circuli, aliiſque ſimilibus etiam in Philoſophia diſputamus; ea nimirum certa eſſe, certiſque rationibus poſſe probari, verum eas nondum adhuc fuiſſe manifeſte ab ullo propoſitas. Dixi à priori; nam à poſteriori ſatis manifeſte probatur, præſertim ex eo quod ſi non eſſet jure naturali prohibita, in aliquo tandem urgentiſſimo caſu poſſet in ea diſpenſari, quod nullo modo dici poteſt. *Tamburin. lib. 7. decal. cap. 1. ſect. 2. num. 1.*

1 Dari poſſe ignorantiam invincibilem circa præceptum non fornicandi, ſaltem apud Barbaros & incultos, probabile eſt. Ita Azor, Fagundes, quia non admodum manifeſte illud deducitur ex primis principiis luminis naturalis. num. 10.

It is eaſie to ſee whither this reaſoning tends. (1) *It is probable*, ſaith he, *that one may be invincibly ignorant of the precept which forbids fornication, at leaſt amongſt barbarous and groſs-witted perſons. This is the opinion of* Azor *and* Fagundez. *The reaſon is, becauſe this precept is not drawn manifeſtly from ſome firſt principle of natural light.*

He ſaith firſt of all, that many Doctors, whom he cites, hold, that Fornication is forbidden only by poſitive Law; and by conſequent this opinion is probable, according to him, being ſupported by the Authority of theſe Doctors, who without doubt are not deſtitute of reaſons to prove it

In the ſecond place he ſaith, the Principle from whence we may infer, that Fornication is evil in it ſelf, and forbidden by the Law of Nature, is not evident; that it cannot be found, or at leaſt wiſe not clearly diſcovered. Whence it follows, that this Concluſion is no more evident than its Principle, but is it ſelf only probable. And though it be more probable at this day than the contrary opinion which hath not ſo many Partizans and Caſuiſts on its ſide, nevertheleſs as it is the more ſweet, that is to ſay, hath more liberty and canformity to the corrupt inclinations of Nature, it may perhaps ſhortly prevail above the other by ſuffrages, and the greater number of theſe new Caſuiſts who profeſs a complacent Divinity, and follow voluntarily the moſt indulgent opinions. 23840

In the third place, though it ſhould continue always leſs probable, it is enough that it is ſimply probable, ſince the leaſt or laſt degree of probability ſuffices to be followed with a ſafe conſcience, according to theſe Doctors.

4. Whence it follows evidently, that he who ſhall be of *Tambourins* opinion, may abſolutely demand and receive a diſpenſation for Fornication, as well as for faſting, becauſe it is at leaſt probable, according to him, that neither the one nor the other is forbidden, but only by poſitive Law; and where things are not evil, ſave only in regard they are forbidden, one may with ſome reaſon, and even without any reaſon, according to ſome Caſuiſts, obtain and make uſe of a diſpenſation for it.

5. *Tambourin* hath foreſeen this inconvenience and diſorder, and confeſſeth openly enough, that it follows from his opinion in the manner he propounds, and that he maintains it when he ſaith, (2) *That if for want of an evident Principle, which he confeſſes it hath not, one would prove it by conſequences, it may be proved manifeſtly enough, from this principally, that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature* (he ſpeaks of Fornication) *it might be indulged by diſpenſation.* 23850

He produces here as a principal reaſon which may prove it, or rather as a conjecture which may make it believed, that Fornication is forbidden by the Law of Nature, becauſe we cannot have a diſpenſation to commit it. And ſome other time, if the world be better diſpoſed than at preſent, he himſelf or his Society building upon the ſame Principles with him, may eaſily prove, that it may be diſpenſed with; becauſe it is not evident that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature, and that it is even probable, that it is only by poſitive Law, as he declares

2 Si non eſſet jure naturali prohibita, in aliquo tandem urgentiſſimo caſu poſſet in ea diſpenſari. *Tamburin. lib. 7. decal. cap. 1. ſect. 2. num. 1.*

it himſelf. And ſo Fornication ſhall be in the number of things indifferent; and it may be lawful, when it pleaſes them to employ their Authority and their reaſons, to take away the prohibition which alone renders it evil and criminal.

And it ſeems that he would prepare before-hand, as it were at diſtance, mens minds one day to receive this unhappy Doctrine, when he ſaith in the end of the Section, (1) *That it is probable that there may be invincible ignorance of the precept which forbids Fornication, at leaſt amongſt Barbarians and groſs-witted people. This is the opinion of* Azor *and* Fagundez. *The reaſon whereof is, becauſe this precept is not manifeſtly drawn from the firſt Principles of the light of Nature.*

1 Dari poſſe ignorantiam invincibilem circa præceptum non fornicandi, ſaltem apud Barbaros & inculcos, probabile eſt. Ita Azor, Fagundez— quia non admodum manifeſte illud deducitur ex primis principiis luminis naturalis. *num.* 10.

He alſo ſaid once, that it is neither evident nor certain by way of Principle 23860
or by natural Reaſon, that Fornication is evil of it ſelf, and forbidden by the Law of Nature. And from thence he infers, that a man may be invincibly, that is, innocently, ignorant that Fornication is a ſin. Whence it follows, that in ſuch a diſpoſition it may be committed innocently and without ſin: becauſe, according to the Principles of his Divinity and Society, that which is done by invincible ignorance is no ſin.

This permiſſion which he grants to commit Fornication by ignorance, is as it were, a preſumption and proof, that Fornication may be committed, according to him, by diſpenſation, ſince the one follows as well as the other from his reaſoning, and is grounded upon the ſame foundation, which he eſtabliſheth or ſuppoſeth here in this place: That there is no evident Principle drawn from the light of Nature, by which it may be demonſtrated, that Fornication is evil in it ſelf, and forbidden by the Law of Nature.

And this ſame reaſon proves alſo, that he holds Fornication not to be forbidden by the Law of God. For no man can diſpenſe any more with the Law of God than with the Law of Nature. So that if Fornication were not forbidden by the Law of Nature, nevertheleſs it could not be diſpenſed with, if it were forbidden by the Law of God; and ſo whilſt he maintains, that if the Law of Nature forbad it not, it might be lawful in ſome caſe by diſpenſation from men: he teſtifies clearly, that he believes not that it is forbidden by the Law of God.

*Bauny* in his Sum, Chap. 46. pag. 717. aſſures us, *That they who in the places* 23870
*of their Trade and Commerce are obliged to ſee, ſpeak, and treat with young Maids, and Women, whoſe ſight and company cauſeth them oftentimes to fall into ſin, are capable in this perpetual danger of being in a ſtate of Grace, and of receiving the Sacrament.*

*Layman* affirms indeed in general, that we are obliged to flye the next occaſions of ſin, but he adds thereto theſe exceptions: (2) *Unleſs it be ſo that this peril and next occaſion of ſinning mortally, cannot be removed without undergoing ſome notable incommodity in body, reputation, or goods. For in this caſe there is an advice, but no command to forgo the leſſer for the greater good, and to make leſs account of our temporal commodity than of the ſecurity and Salvation of our Souls.*

2 Excipe niſi proquinquum periculum ſeu occaſio mortaliter peccandi, ſine gravi incommodo corporis, famæ, aut fortunarum tolli non poſſit; tunc conſilium quidem eſt minorem illam jacturam majori bono ſecuritatis animæ poſthabere. *Layman lib.* 5. *tract.* 6. *cap.* 4. *num.* 9.

There is no perſon, how engaged ſoever he be in the next and moſt dangerous occaſions of ſin, who may not always take for pretence to abide therein, ſome one of theſe reaſons, and therefore none will ever believe himſelf obliged to avoid them.

*Leſſius* ſpeaking of lewd Diſcourſes, ſaith, that it is only a venial ſin to hear or utter them, (3) *though we take pleaſure in them, provided we have ſome other intention beſides the pleaſure we take therein.* He might ſay as much of an idle word, or of an inconſiderate diſcourſe ſpoken at random.

3 Si ſolum fiat ob voluptatem quæ præciſe ex ipſa narratione capitur abſque ulteriore intentione, eſt peccatum veniale. *Leſſius de juſt. lib.* 4. *cap.* 3. *dub.* 9. *num.* 63. *pag.* 618.

3880 And a little after, ſpeaking of the pleaſure which comes by the imagination and thinking of diſhoneſt things, he ſaith alſo the ſame thing in another manner. He diſtinguiſheth of two ſorts of pleaſure, or rather of two ways of taking pleaſure in diſhoneſt things. The firſt is, when the pleaſure comes from the diſhoneſt thought: the ſecond is, when it comes from the object or thing it ſelf, or the diſhoneſt action whereon we think, and wherewith we entertain our ſelves.

He declares then, that in the firſt ſort of pleaſure there is no ſin at all. And his reaſon is, (1) *Becauſe the pleaſure is of the ſame nature with the action from whence it proceedeth. For it is like unto this action, as ſaith* Ariſtotle *in the* 10. *of his Ethicks, cap.* 4. *and it is a neceſſary conſequent of every operation which is agreeable unto us. Now the operation from whence this pleaſure iſſues, is not bad, but good, or at leaſt indifferent, to wit, the knowledge of the truth, or the view of any rare and admirable thing, which men eſteem very much, though they abhor the object of this knowledge and view.*

1 Si prior modo delectatio percipitur, non eſt per ſe peccatum; quia delectatio ſequitur conditionem operis ex quo naſcitur. Talis enim eſt delectatio quale eſt opus ex quo naſcitur, juxta Ariſtotelem 10. Eth. cap. 4. Eſt enim quiddam neceſſario ex operatione nobis congrua reſultans. Atqui opus ex quo naſcitur non eſt malum ſed bonum, vel quid indifferens, nimirum notitia veritatis, vel rei raræ aut admirandæ viſio; quam notitiam & viſionem homines magni æſtimant; etiamſi objectum circa quod verſatur maximè execrentur. *Ibid. dub.* 15. *num.* 108. *pag.* 698.

(2) The things, the knowledge whereof men ſo much eſteem, and which they take ſo much pleaſure to behold, or to entertain themſelves with, are, as he 3890 ſaith himſelf, Combats, Duels, Inchantments of Magicians, the Generation of Beaſts or men, and every thing that belongs to that action. So that, according to him, the thoughts of all theſe things, though a man entertain himſelf with them voluntarily and with pleaſure, and even for the pleaſures ſake which he reliſhes therein, will be no ſin. For he concludes all his Argumentation in theſe words: (3) *This pleaſure is not evil in it ſelf.*

2 Hæc modo delectantur homines lectione vel narratione præliorum, duellorum, & rerum admirandarum quæ per artem magicam fiunt, vel eorum quæ pertinent ad opus generationis & conceptum prolis. *Ibid.* 3 Ergo talis delectatio non eſt de ſe mala.

He might have ſaid more, and infer from the Principle which he ſaith is *Ariſtotles*, that this ſenſual pleaſure not only is no ſin, but it is alſo commendable and honeſt, ſince the object he hath given it, is good and honeſt, namely, the knowledge of the truth: *Nempe notitia veritatis.*

The only condition then which he demands, that we may entertain our ſelves innocently with the thoughts of theſe things, is that we ſtay not at the pleaſure alone which ariſes from theſe thoughts; and that we think not of what may come from the thing, or the wicked and diſhoneſt action we think on.

I will not ſtay to examine this imaginary condition in moral matters, any more than the Metaphyſical diſtinction and abſtraction whereupon it is grounded. I will only ſay, that to declare unto any perſon that he may take pleaſure in any filthy thought, provided that he reſpect not the filthy object that this thought repreſents unto him, or that he be not touched with the pleaſure which comes from it naturally; is as if one ſhould ſay, that one may ſtand before a fire, provided he be not heated, and paſs through the dirt, provided he be not defiled.

3900 Common ſenſe only and continual experience ſhew ſufficiently, that it is as it were impoſſible to behold thoſe things which we love, and to which we have an inclination; as men have naturally to the objects of fleſhly concupiſcence, without exciting love and the motions of that propenſion we have to them; as it is impoſſible to behold and conſider the things which we hate, without conceiving an hatred and averſation yet more great againſt them.

As for Kiſſes, *Leſſius* propounds a Queſtion in this manner: (4) *There is ſome difficulty about Kiſſes, being conſidered as actions in themſelves agreeable to the fleſh, and diſpoſing, though afar off, unto pollution; to wit, whether in uſing them in this manner, without having an intention to paſs any farther in ſenſual pleaſure, we ſin mortally?* He anſwers firſt, according to the opinion, which is, as he ſaith himſelf, the more common in the Schools; that there is mortal ſin in Kiſſes which

4 Difficultas eſt de oſculo quatenus ipſum per ſe eſt actus delectabilis carni, & remote diſponens ad ſeminationem: utrum ſi quis hac ratione illo utatur, non intendendo ulteriorem voluptatem, peccet mortaliter. *Ibid. dub.* 8. *num.* 58. *pag.* 687.



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are taken in this manner, and he teſtifies that he doth approve it. (1) *Firſt, becauſe this opinion is the more common. In the ſecond place, becauſe it is the ſafer courſe to remove our ſelves as far as we can from theſe things. In the third place, becauſe there is oftentimes danger to conſent unto theſe things, and ſo to ſtay therein with pleaſure, or to fall into pollution, according to the complexion or diſpoſition of the body. For this cauſe*, ſaith he, *it is expedient not to be too looſe in theſe things.* Whence he infers, that theſe kiſſes muſt be abſolutely forbidden unto perſons betrothed. 2391o

But a little after he grants them as innocent and lawful things to the betrothed themſelves. For having made this Objection on the behalf of thoſe who are of the contrary opinion: (2) *It is allowed unto perſons betrothed to enjoy the pleaſure they take in kiſſing, or touching the hands or faces of one another, ſo that herein they ſin not ſo much as venially.* He anſwers, affirming this Propoſition, (3) *That it is allowed to betrothed perſons, becauſe this is a ſign of the carnal conjunction which is to be afterwards, whereunto they have in ſome ſort a right to conſent by reaſon of Marriage.*

He allows them the ſame kiſſes, which he had before condemned of mortal ſin, according to the more common Doctrine and his own opinion. And which is yet more ſtrange and extravagant, he hath allowed theſe unto them for the ſame reaſon for which he had ſaid above, that they could not be allowed them. *This is granted*, ſaith he, *to perſons betrothed; becauſe it is a ſign of the future carnal conjunction, whereunto they have in ſome ſort a right to conſent by reaſon of Marriage.*

And a little above he had ſaid: (4) *My advice is, that we ought wholly to divert from them, even perſons betrothed themſelves, becauſe theſe kiſſes as they produce ſenſual pleaſure of themſelves, ſignifie naturally preſent or future carnal conjunction, as may be ſeen commonly amongſt Animals themſelves. For which cauſe it ſeems that they contain in them a ſilent conſent unto this conjunction.* 2392o

I leave it to his Brethren to undo theſe contradictions: I will only obſerve here farther that he aſſures us, that betrothed perſons may take pleaſure, and conſent in ſome ſort to the action of Marriage, which they ſhall exerciſe when they are married; as if it were lawful to enjoy a right which we have not yet, and even which we ſhall never have; Marriage giving us only a power to do what is neceſſary for the begetting of children, and not to hunt after ſhameful pleaſures, and the ſatiating of luſt.

*Layman* hath taught the ſame thing. For taking the difficulty at the higheſt, he puts this general Queſtion: (5) *Whether a married perſon commit mortal ſin by a too long continued delight taken in diſhoneſt pleaſures of mind, when in the abſence of his Bed-fellow he entertains himſelf with the thoughts of the pleaſure which ariſes from the uſe of the Marriage-bed? The ſame Queſtion is commonly made concerning a Widow entertaining her ſelf with the remembrance of pleaſures paſt, and a Sponſe who deſires, and fore-taſtes as it were by way of advance that which he ſhall have.* He anſwers, (6) *That a Husband and Wife ſin not mortally, when at a diſtance from one another, they think of the action of Marriage, and admit and entertain this thought with pleaſure and joy.*

1 Communis ſententia eſt in iſtis eſſe peccatum mortiferum, quæ & mihi probatur, tum quia communior, tum quia tutius eſt ut omnia iſta quam maxime vitentur; tum quia ſæpe periculum eſt ulterioris conſenſus vel moroſæ delectationis, vel etiam pollutionis, ratione temperamenti ſui peculiaris diſpoſitionis corporis. Quam ob cauſam expedit in hujuſmodi non eſſe laxum. Unde etiam inter ſponſos cenſeo plane eſſe diſſuadenda, ſi cauſa voluptatis fiant. 2 Sponſis conceditur ea voluptas quæ præciſe ex oſculo & contactu manus vel faciei percipitur; ita ut ne venialiter quidem in eo peccet. *Ibid. num.* 59.

3 Sponſis conceditur; quia eſt ſignum copulæ futuræ, in quam ratione matrimonii conſentire quodammodo poſſunt. *num.* 59.

4 Etiam inter ſponſos ſuadeo plane diſſuadenda. Quia oſculum ut eſt delectabile carni, natura ſua eſt ſignum copulæ vel inſtantis, vel futuræ, ut etiam ex uſu animalium conſtat. Itaque in eo contineri videtur tacitus quidam conſenſus in copulam. *Ibid. num.* 59.

5 An ſit mortale peccatum moroſæ delectationis, ſi conjux abſente conjuge delectet ſe cogitatione copulæ maritalis. Eademq; quæſtio proponi ſolet de vidua obſtante ſe recordatione copulæ præteritæ. Idem de ſponſo deſiderante vel oblectante ſe in copula futura. *Layman lib.* 1. *tract.* 3. *cap.* 6. *num.* 12. *pag.* 41. 6 Dico 1. conjux mortaliter non peccat ſi de maritali copula abſente conjuge cogitans, rem cogitatam, voluntarie approbet, ſive de ea gaudeat.

23930 He ſaith the ſame thing after of Widows and betrothed perſons who do what he ſpoke of in the Queſtion he propounded. He proceeds yet farther, and makes uſe of the Authority of *Sanchez* to maintain that all ſorts of perſons indifferently may voluntarily continue and with complacence in the thoughts of pleaſure which they might have with any woman whatſoever ſhe be, if they were married together.

Quod idem Sanchez lib. 1. moral. cap. 2. num. 33. & Filliut. cap. 1. extendunt ad omnem voluptatis affectionem, etiam bmplicis complacentiæ conceptæ ex cogitatione concubitus cum muliere, ſi uxor eſſet. *Ibid.*

It is eaſie to ſee, that there are no filthy and diſhoneſt deſires which may not be juſtified by theſe diſtinctions and ſubtilties, which are of no uſe but to corrupt minds, and to give them liberty to commit without ceaſing an infinite of Fornications, Adulteries, and Inceſts within themſelves without any ſcruple of conſcience.

As for Pollution, *Leſſius* maintains, that it may be deſired when any good is expected from it. His words are: (1) *It is probable that it may be deſired with a ſimple affection, by reaſon of ſome good effect which may thereby be produced; as health, deliverance from temptation, and repoſe of mind.*

1 Dico 3. probabile eſt licitum eſſe illam deſiderare ſimplici affectu cauſa alicujus boni effectus cum ea conjuncti, v. c. cauſa ſanitatis, ſedandæ tentationis, obtinendæ tranquillitatis animi. *Leſſius de juſt. lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 14. n. 104. pag. 697.*

*Tolet* ſaith the ſame thing more clearly: (2) *If any one deſire pollution for ſome good end, as for his health, or that he may be quit of ſome fleſhly temptations which are a trouble to him oftentimes, it is no ſin. Emanuel Sa, Sanchez,* and *Eſcobar* 23940 are of the ſame opinion. I will only relate the words of the laſt who ſaith, (3) *That a perſon who in his ſleep begins to fall into pollution, is not obliged to repreſs it when he awakes.* This he takes for certain in his Divinity; and then demands, what is to be ſaid to it, (4) *If he be well pleaſed with this pollution, and deſire it?* His anſwer is, (5) *That if he be pleaſed with this pollution, and deſire it, not becauſe of the pleaſure, but becauſe of his health, or to appeaſe temptations, it is not ſo much as a venial ſin.*

2 Si quis deſiderat pollutionem ob bonum finem, ſcilicet ſanitatem, vel ad levandas carnis tentationes quibus interdum affligitur, non eſt peccatum. *Tolet lib. 5. cap. 13. num. 4. pag. 772. Sa verbo Luxuria num. 11. pag. 449. Sanchez moral. lib. 1. cap. 2. num. 18. pag. 7. Eſcobar tr. 1. exam. 8. num. 95. pag. 154.* 3 Inchoatam in ſomno pollutionem non tenetur quis evigilans reprimere. 4 Quid ſi gaudeat de illa pollutione, vel opter evenire? Si gaudeat vel opter, non ob delectationem, ſed propter ſanitatem, vel ad ſedandas tentationes, nec peccatum quidem veniale eſt. 5 Quia quod licitum eſt deſiderare ut fiat, licitum eſt etiam eo gaudere quod factum ſit, & contra, ſi ſas gaudere de facto, etiam licitum erit deſiderare ut fiat. Hæc enim ſunt ejuſdem moris. Nam gaudium reſultat neceſſario ex bono deſiderato obtento, & ſupponit, vel implicite deſiderium includit. *Leſſius ſupra num. 105.*

*Leſſius* gives the reaſon why the one and the other are lawful, to wit, to deſire pollution, and rejoyce in it. (6) *Becauſe,* ſaith he, *when it is lawful to deſire a thing to come to paſs, it is alſo lawful to rejoyce in it when it doth come to paſs. For theſe things are of the ſame nature, according to the Rules of Morality; becauſe delight followes neceſſarily from the enjoyment of the good we deſire, and it preſuppoſes and contains in it the deſire of this good.*

He ſeems to ſet pollution in the rank of good things, ſince he finds the deſire thereof and delight taken therein to be good, ſaying, (7) *That delight follows neceſſarily from the fruition of the good deſired.* And indeed if pollution were not a good action, or at leaſt indifferent, his Argument were nothing worth. For as he ſaith, delight follows the nature of the thing wherein we delight. If 23950 therefore pollution be wicked and unlawful, according to him, the delight as well as deſire of it would be wicked, he could not ſay as he doth, that both are lawful. *Leſſius* his opinion then is, that pollution is good and commendable, or indifferent at leaſt.

7 Nam gaudium reſultat neceſſario ex bono deſiderato obtento.

Upon which he expounds himſelf more clearly in the ſame place, building always upon this ſame reaſon, and ſaying for corroboration thereof, (8) *That the material object of this joy is not wicked, and that its formal object is good.* And he had ſaid a little above, that the reaſon why the deſire of pollution was lawful, is, (9) *Becauſe the thing deſired is no ſin, but in it ſelf indifferent.*

8 Confirmatur, quia objectum materiale hujus gaudii non eſt malum, & formale eſt per ſe indifferens bonum. *Ibid.* 9 Ratio eſt, quia quod hic deſideratur, non eſt peccatum, ſed per ſe indifferens

Whence he infers, not only that it is lawful to deſire the good effect which follows from pollution, as health, without deſiring the pollution it ſelf, as ſome teach, who are a little more reſerved than himſelf. But he concludes, that we may alſo deſire both at once, and be well pleaſed not of the relief only we receive by means of the pollution it ſelf. (1) *It is not only lawful*, ſaith he, *to rejoyce in this good effect, according to ſome, though this joy have no other object or motive than this effect it ſelf, and regards it only as preſent or to come; but it is lawful to delight in the cauſe it ſelf, which is pollution, becauſe of the good effect it produces.*

1 Non ſolum licitum eſt gaudere de ipſo effectu bono, ut quidam volunt, quamvis hic ſit formalis ratio objectiva, ſeu totum motivum deſiderii & gaudii conſideratus cum conditione futuri vel præſentis, ſed etiam de ipſa cauſa (pollutione ſc.) propter effectum.

He ſpeaks in all this diſcourſe of pollution as he might of eating and drinking, and all indifferent things. For in the Morals we can give no other rank unto eating 23960
and drinking, which are natural actions, than that of indifferent things, which are not lawful to be deſired but becauſe of the need we have of them to the diſcharging of our duties, and preſervation of our lives; and this Author would have it lawful to ſay all this of pollution; and he ſaith it in expreſs terms, (2) *That it is no evil, that it is no ſin; that of it ſelf it is an indifferent thing, that it is lawful to deſire it, that it is lawful to rejoyce in it.*

2 Non eſt peccatum, non eſt malum, eſt per ſe indifferens; licet eam deſiderare, licet de ea gaudere. *Ibid.*

So that according to his Principles there is no more ill in pollution, than in eating and drinking; and as eating and drinking are a remedy againſt hunger and thirſt, pollution is, according to him, a remedy againſt indiſpoſition, heavineſs of body and mind, and againſt temptation which puts the Soul in hazard of Salvation. And ſo as we make uſe of meat and drink to repair our ſtrength, and ſuſtain Nature; he holds, that we may alſo make uſe of pollution to recreate Nature, and to preſerve the health and repoſe of the mind as well as of the body.

Whence it follows from theſe very Principles of this Jeſuit and his Brethren, that as we may take and demand bread when we are hungry, we may likewiſe not only deſire, but alſo procure pollution when we feel our ſelves urged by temptation, or any corporal indiſpoſition which we hope by this means to alleviate.

This follows neceſſarily from his Principle. For it is allowable to do that which it is lawful to deſire and receive with joy; it being ſo that deſire and joy cannot 23970
be ſetled but upon good things only, as *Leſſius* himſelf confeſſed formerly, ſpeaking of Pollution it ſelf. And it is not only lawful to deſire the things which are good, and to rejoyce therein, but alſo to do them, to ſeek after, and procure them: So that if it be lawful to deſire pollution in it ſelf, and to rejoyce therein, it is alſo lawful to ſtir up and incline our ſelves to it as a good and blameleſs action.

So they are not aſhamed to declare, that we are not obliged to abſtain from things which cauſe pollution, though we know it by experience. And this is the formal deciſion which *Eſcobar* draws from the Principles of the Society. (3) *I collect from hence*, ſaith he, *that a perſon who knows by experience that when he uſes hot victuals, when he is to ride a journey, or lying in his bed in a certain manner, he ſhall fall into pollution, is not obliged to abſtain from theſe things.*

3 Hinc colligo teneri neminem abſtinere à calidis cibis, ab equitatione, à tali accumbendi ratione quibus expertus pollutur. *Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 8. num. 77. pag. 150.*

*Layman* ſaith more clearly the ſame thing, to wit, that if the cauſe from whence pollution proceeds, be in it ſelf lawful and honeſt, we are not obliged to avoid it, and that pollution in this caſe is no ſin. And afterwards he there adds;

1 Sed actio talis ſecundum ſe honeſta eſt, & finis ejus honeſtus, v. c. confeſſiones mulierum audire, vel eas ſecundum morem patriæ

(1) *That if the action whereupon we believe pollution will enſue, be unlawful of it ſelf, or by reaſon of ſome circumſtance, or perhaps be done without benefit or neceſſity,*

23980 *as when one eats or drinks to exceſs, or when we entertain our ſelves with fruitleſs diſcourſes whereby we foreſee we ſhall fall into pollution, though we have no ſuch intention; in this caſe we ſin only venially againſt chaſtity; though the cauſe whence the pollution ariſes, be in it ſelf a mortal ſin.*

ampliatis quando ſint gravi offenſione intermitti non poteſt à Laicis & Secularibus, hujuſmodi actiones licitæ ſunt, non obſtante periculo pollutionis inde naturaliter ſecuturæ. Vel actio ex qua pollutio ſecutura putatur, ſecundum ſe vel ratione circumſtantiæ neceſſaria eſt, v. c. nimio cibo aut potu ſe ingurgitare, inutiliter confabulari, unde pollutionem ſecutam exiſtimes; quam tamen minime intendas; tunc veniale tantum peccatum contra caſtitatem committitur, etiamſi cauſa ex qua pollutio ſequitur in ſe mortale ſit, v. c. ebrietas. *Layman lib. 3. tract. 4. num. 16.*

There is no man who will not affirm, that this is to fall voluntarily into pollution, not to do what we can to avoid it; that not to flye the occaſions of it, is to ſeek after it; and by the common ſenſe of all men to purſue of our ſelves the things which we know by experience will produce it, when we may freely abſtain therefrom, is to procure it; which is yet more certain, when the things are in themſelves forbidden and criminal, as drunkenneſs, according to *Layman.*

The reaſon he alledges to excuſe him who falls thus into pollution after he had been drunk, is becauſe he had no intention to fall thereinto, although he have perceived that being drunk, he ſhould fall into it; *Unde pollutionem ſecuturam exiſtimes*, ſaith he, *quam tamen minime intendas.* But if this reaſon excuſe pollution, we muſt ſay that it excuſes drunkenneſs alſo. For this mans intention, without doubt, was not to make himſelf drunk, any more than to fall into pollution, but only to take his pleaſure in eating and drinking, though he foreſaw that giving way thereto, he ſhould fall into drunkenneſs, and conſequently into pollution.

23990 We may even affirm truly, that his intent was farther from drunkenneſs than pollution; becauſe drunkenneſs bringing nothing but hurt and inconvenience to the body and mind, is not a thing deſirable in it ſelf; and pollution on the contrary, ſince it may have good effects, as the allaying of the inconveniencies of the body, or troubles of the mind, may, by this Jeſuits Argument, be abſolutely deſired. And by conſequence, if when a man falls into pollution after he hath been drunk, pollution be no mortal ſin, becauſe he had no intention to fall into it; drunkenneſs will yet be leſs ſuch, becauſe he had leſs intention to be drunk.

The Jeſuits ſay then, 1. That it is lawful to deſire pollution in it ſelf. 2. That it is lawful to rejoyce in it when it is come on us. 3. That it is lawful to do that which excites it, as to uſe hot meats, to be tranſported to exceſs in eating and drinking, ſo far as to be drunk, though we foreſee, and know by experience, that the conſequent thereof will be, that we ſhall fall into pollution. It muſt needs be that they believe, that we may abſolutely procure it. For this is indeed to procure a thing, to purſue it with inclination, and after we have done what we know is neceſſary to procure and produce it, to rejoyce and be well pleaſed when it is come.

This Doctrine is very convenient to bring to paſs the deſigns of the Devil of Uncleanneſs, who after he hath tempted men by day with diſhoneſt thoughts, continues to torment them alſo in the night by illuſions. Which the Church hath judged ſo important a thing, and ſo much to be feared and avoided by its Children, that in its Publick Prayers it hath inſtituted one for demanding peculiarly of God, that he would preſerve them from theſe nocturnal illuſions, and eſpecially from pollution.

*Procul recedant ſomnia,*
*Et noctium phantaſmata,*
*Hoſtemq; noſtrum comprime,*
*Ne polluantur corpora.*

And the Jeſuits on the contrary inform us, that we may deſire pollution, 24000
teaching us to make a prayer altogether contrary, ſince to deſire is indeed to pray in the ſight of God.

But if the Church teach us in this manner to avoid, and by our prayers to prevent pollutions which might happen in the night againſt our wills, and without our giving occaſion unto them; with what ſeverity would it not have condemned them to whom they happen night and day, after they have deſired and procured them, by doing what they foreſaw muſt needs bring them on?

Beyond the things I have formerly related concerning this ſubject in the Chapter of Luſt, and thoſe which I ſhall relate alſo, treating particularly of the Duties of married Perſons, I could report here alſo abundance of other moſt filthy and ſhameful opinions, if Chriſtian modeſty did not oblige me to uſe great moderation in a diſcourſe which neceſſity only allows me to make uſe of, and honeſty obliges me to cut as ſhort as poſſibly I can, ſpeaking of a matter wherein 24010
the things themſelves that are lawful and honeſt, can hardly be honeſtly repreſented. I will therefore take heed here carefully to paſs by all thoſe Filthineſſes whereof *Sanchez* hath made whole Volumes, and whereof ſome were ſo ſcandalous, that they have been left out in ſome Editions; which hath not reſtrained *Tambourin* from renewing them in his Book.

It ſuffices to ſee by theſe diſcourſes of the Jeſuits which I have cited, the great licence their Divinity gives to the luſt of the fleſh, of abandoning our ſelves to filthy and diſhoneſt thoughts, ſo as to rejoyce in the imaginations of them towards all ſorts of perſons, provided we imagine that we have married them, or that we deſire to marry them; and that pollutions and other ſhameful effects which may ariſe from theſe thoughts, are not ſins, or but ſlight ones. There are many vicious and immodeſt people who would content themſelves with this, to ſatisfie their infamous paſſions. Alſo from theſe its eaſie to paſs to other exceſſes, and wholly to let the reins looſe to all ſenſual motions and deſires.

## ARTICLE VI. Of Theft. 24020

### *That the Jeſuits authorize it, and aboliſh the Commandment of God which forbids it.*

TO ſteal is no other thing than to wrong another in his goods, and therein to cauſe him ſome damage, in what manner ſoever it be, whether we take or detain [illegible]thing which is his; whether we take it by force, ſlight, or artifice; whether we diſpoſe of it, give it, or conſume it; whether we make profit of it or not. For in all theſe different ways of uſing another mans goods as our own, his right to whom it belongs, is always equally violated, and injury is done him by taking from him what is his. Let us ſee how the Jeſuits Divinity excuſes Theft in all theſe different manners.

1 Qui damnum nullum dedit rem alienam accipiens, quia ea dominus non utebatur, non tenetur reſtituere, ſi nulli eſt Domino uſui futura. *Sa verbo furtum, cap. 6. pag. 392.*

*Emanuel Sa* amongſt his Aphoriſms puts this concerning Theft: (1) *He who in taking what is anothers, doth him no prejudice, becauſe he made no uſe of it, and was not like to uſe it, is not obliged to reſtitution.* There are no Thefts almoſt which may not be cloaked with this pretence, it being eaſie to be perſwaded, that what we would take, is for no uſe to him from whom we take it, eſpecially if he be rich, and well to live. And indeed there are abundance of things whereof the owners make no uſe, and it may be never will, which by this Principle it will be lawful to take away without ſcruple, and without fear of being obliged 24030
unto reſtitution. This Maxime opens a great gap unto poor people and to

houſhold-ſervants of Perſons of Quality and well to paſs, to commit many Thefts boldly without fear of puniſhment, by taking away things which they ſee are not made uſe of, but are many times ſuffered to periſh.

He ſaith a little after, ſpeaking after the common opinion, (1) *That he who ſteals frequently by little at a time, ſo as to gather together a notable ſum, is obliged unto reſtitution*; but he adds afterwards in favour of theſe Thieves, (2) *That there are ſome who hold the contrary, when it is not done with intention to ſteal this great ſum.*

*Eſcobar* propoſes the ſame difficulty in the ſame terms. (3) *If a man after many ſmall thefts hath taken the laſt half-penny which makes up a great theft, whereof he thereby becomes guilty, be obliged to reſtore all the ſum which was compoſed of theſe petty theſts?* He anſwers, (4) *He is not obliged under mortal ſin to make reſtitution of all the ſum, but only part, which being taken off, the theft would be no more criminal.*

*Amicus* before had ſaid the ſame thing, almoſt in the ſame terms; (5) *That he who had ſtolen ſome notable ſum, is not obliged under mortal ſin to reſtore it all; but that it is enough that he reſtore what ſuffices to make the wrong done unto his neighbour not to be notable.*

1 Qui per vices pauca alicui furatur, cum ventum eſt ad notabilem ſummam, tenetur reſtituere. *Ibid. num.* 8.

2 Bſi quidam probabiliter negant, quando non fit ex intentione furandi totam ſummam. *Ibid.*

3 An qui ultimum obolum arripuit, & ſic ideo gravis furti reus, tenetur totam illam quantitatem quæ ex minimis illis furtis coaluit, reſtituere? *Eſcobar tract.* 1. *Ex.* 4. *num.* 23. *pag.* 161. 4 Non ad totam quantitatem tenetur ſub mortali, ſed ad illam, qua ablata, furtum grave non remanet. 5 Qui notabilem quantitatem furatus eſt, non teneri ſub mortali totam reſtituere, ſed ſat eſſe ſi reſtituatur quantum ſufficit ad tollendum notabile damnum illarum proximo. *Amicus tom.* 5. *diſp.* 38. *num.* 47. *pag* 441.

14040 The ſame Author in another place draws from theſe Principles another conſequence very different from this, though he be upon the ſame ſubject, ſaying, that (6) *When a man hath by many petty theſts proceeded unto a notable ſum, he ſins mortally every time after this that he takes any little thing from the ſame perſon.* This might ſeem ſevere after the ſweetneſs and complacence which he had teſtified in his other Anſwer; but ſuch is the property of mens ſpirits, that they cannot obſerve moderation, but are tranſported into exceſſes, paſſing from one extreme unto the other, when they quit the conduct of Faith, and the ſupport of Authority, to follow their own private light.

6 Tertio cum quis per ſingula furta ad notabilem quantitatem pervenit; quoties deinde ab eodem Domino levem materiam uſurpat, toties peccat mortaliter. *Amicus tom.* 3. *diſp.* 23. *ſect.* 7. *n.* 233. *p.* 257.

*Bauny* handling the ſame Queſtion ſaith, that it is the common opinion amongſt Divines, that he who hath at divers times ſtoln many ſmall ſums, loſes Gods grace when he attains to a ſum ſufficient to conſtitute a mortal ſin. And then he adds by way of correction to theſe Authors; *Nevertheleſs by their permiſſion I dare ſay, 1. That the laſt theft which is ſuppoſed to be a ſmall one, even as thoſe which went before, is only venial.* And a little after intermingling his own diſcourſe with *Emanuel Sa*'s, and ſpeaking part Latine, part French, as if he feared to be underſtood of all people, he draws this Concluſion from this Authors Argumentation: *Sa verbo furtum, num.* 8. ſaith he, *relying on this foundation that he, qui per vices pauca alicui furatus eſt, cum ad notabilem quantitatem pervenerit, is not obliged under pain of eternal damnation to reſtore any of it.*

*Bauny in his ſum, chap.* 10. *pag.* 143.

14050 That which above all things in the world toucheth men moſt, and hinders them moſt from doing wrong to their neighbour, is an apprehenſion of being obliged to reſtore; but this is to give them all kind of liberty to ſteal and commit all ſorts of injuries, to take from them this fear, diſpenſing with them for reſtitution and for all puniſhment not only of this life, but alſo of the other, and eternal damnation, as doth this Jeſuit.

*And the reaſon is a ſtrong one*, ſaith he. *For to repair the wrong whereof we have happened to be the cauſe, none is obliged under pain of eternal damnation, when in doing it, we have only ſinned venially; becauſe ſuch an obligation is not the effect of other than mortal ſin.*

So that according to *Bauny*, a man may feather his own neſt, and even enrich himſelf with the goods of another, provided he take not too much at once, and proceed thereto only by ſmall Thefts, which yet all together at length make up a notable ſum, without obliging the Thief to any reſtitution *on the pain of undergoing eternal damnation.* So reſtitution and damnation belong only to

Thieves that are not crafty enough, or covetous over-much. There are Merchants, Bankers, Confederates, and other Traders, who may heap up extraordinary riches by this method, by taking in many parcels ſmall ſums which together produce very great ones, and they need not ceaſe for all that to live in repoſe, without fear of damnation or reſtitution, which is to them many times more ſevere and afflicting, if they will relye upon *Bauny*'s word and the Divinity of his Society.

This ſame Caſuiſt ſpeaking of things that are found, demands *what muſt be done with them, that his conſcience may be ſet at quiet?* He anſwers, that according to the common and true opinion, they belong unto the poor. But he adds, *according to the opinion of ſome, we may without any ſin appropriate them unto our ſelves with the following circumſtances. The firſt is, that we inform our ſelves of the neighbourhood, or of thoſe who by their condition may beſt know news thereof, if they have no knowledge of the true and lawful poſſeſſor. The ſecond is, that we be in a diſpoſition readily to reſtore it when the true owner ſhall make appear it is his.* 24060

*Bauny in his Sum, chap. 13. pag. 185. & 186.*

Though this opinion be falſe and very unjuſt, yet he ſeems to make it leſs criminal by the qualification he gives it, being not willing that he who keeps the things he finds, ſhould appropriate them unto himſelf, and permitting him only to become depoſitory, and to make uſe of them, ſo only that he be *diſpoſed to reſtore them* to the demandant, *when he makes appear they are his.* But he immediately after deſtroys this condition, by eſtabliſhing three Principles which he holds for certain, and whereupon he will have the deciſion of this difficulty entirely to depend.

The firſt is, *that he who hath theſe things, may appropriate them to himſelf, if he be poor.* The ſecond, *that this being once done,* that is to ſay, the thing found being once thus appropriated, *it ſhall ſo properly belong unto him, that though the true owner appear afterwards, he ſhall not be obliged to quit the poſſeſſion thereof.* Which doth wholly deſtroy what he had before eſtabliſhed as a neceſſary condition unto the power of retaining what is found; *that he ſhould be diſpoſed to reſtore it to him who ſhould demand it, when it appeared that it was his.* 24070

The third Principle, *That under the name of the poor are compriſed the Monaſteries, Hoſpitals, Churches, thoſe that want things neceſſary for a moderate maintenance, as well of their quality as of their life.*

If he be a poor man that hath not all that which is neceſſary to ſupport him creditably according to his condition, there is ſcarce any man at this day who may not call himſelf poor, and who by conſequence may not appropriate to himſelf all the loſt things he can find, or which ſhall be directed to him, without being ever obliged to reſtore them, though they whoſe they are come to challenge them.

*Layman* is of the ſame opinion. For after he had ſaid, that in the caſe of things found, the common opinion of the Doctors is, that they ought abſolutely be reſtored to them whoſe they are, or at leaſt if he be not found to be diſtributed to the poor, and employed in good works; he ſupports this opinion alſo on the Authority of S. *Auſtin*, bringing a paſſage out of this great Doctor of the Church, which he took out of the 9. of his 50. Homilies. (1) *If you have found any thing, and have not reſtored it, you have ſtoln it.*

2 Si quid inveniſti & non reddidiſti, rapuiſti. *S. Auguſt. homil. 9. inter. 50.*

And on the other hand he relates alſo the contrary opinion which holds, that we may appropriate and keep things found. And afterwards paſſing ſentence upon this difference, he concludes in theſe terms. (2) *The firſt of theſe two opinions is more pious and ſecure; nevertheleſs the laſt is probable alſo.* And he adds in favour of this laſt opinion, that after we have attended ſome time, if it happen that he whoſe the thing is which was found, cannot be diſcovered, we have liberty to diſpoſe of it abſolutely, whether he give it, or ſell it, or ſpend it. (3) *And if it happen that after he hath alienated or ſpent it without fraud or unjuſt contri-* 24080

2 Inter has duas opiniones prior magis pia & tutior eſt; attamen poſterior quoq; probabilis. *Layman lib. 3. tract. 1. cap. 5. num. 24.* 3 Quod ſi vero poſt alienationem vel conſumptionem bona fide factam Dominus compareat, nihil ipſi reſtituendum eſt, niſi quatenus inventor locupletior inde factus eſt. *Ibid.*

*vants simply and honestly, the owner come and present himself, he is not obliged to restore any thing unto him but what he hath put out to use, and whereby he is become more wealthy.*

Bauny saith also the same thing, and seemeth to have taken it out of *Layman*, translating it only out of Latine into French. For in Chap. 13. of his Sum, pag. 191. he makes this Question; *Whereunto are we obliged, having spent what was numbers in honest simplicity, supposing it to be our own, and not anothers?* He answers: *To restore so much as we have profited thereby, and not more.* And foreseeing himself the objection might be made against him; That there was injustice therein, and by consequence an obligation to restitution, *in his action who contrary to justice appropriated unto himself what he neither could nor ought, because he took it from another*, he saith for Answer, *That in the above alledged acts there is no injustice to be found, because they have a specious shew of honest simplicity.*

This good Father speaks better than he intended, saying, *That these actions* (which he intended to justifie) *have a colour of sincerity.* For indeed they have only an appearance of fair dealing and equitable actions, and are true Thefts, as S. *Austin* above quoted by *Layman*, testifies: *If you find, and restore not, you steal.*

4090 Under the same pretence and *colour of simplicity he would have usurarious bargains and contracts to pass for good*; When he saith, *That they who by traffick, merchandize, usurarious bargains, or contracts, believing them to be good, have gained great wealth, being invincibly ignorant that such manner of dealings were forbidden and unlawful, are not obliged to make restitution of those goods so gotten, although after they have so gained them, they be informed of the injustice of such contracts.* Bauny in his Sum, chap. 11. pag. 156.

And a little after, pag. 154. after he had said, that a person after renunciation might in conscience substract and keep one part of his goods to maintain his family and his port; continuing his discourse, and enlarging his opinion, he adds: *Which thing I conceive also to take place in like manner when women by the ill government of their husbands, and children by that of their parents, are constrained to renounce their Estates unto the Creditors, who thereof cause an Act of Renunciation to be made by the hands of the Judges.*

And a few lines after he pursues it farther, and saith, *That a wife or children being called unto Judgment to see themselves condemned, to confess what they have put aside, taken out from, or usurped of the Moveables, Inheritance, or Goods of the Deceased, are not in conscience obliged to confess it.* And because they may be brought upon their Oaths, and obliged to swear before a Judge, he gives them this expedient: *Nevertheless that they may not lye, and so doing foreswear themselves, the prudent Confessor shall teach them that they are to frame a conception in their minds, according to which they may form their answer and oath, which they may make by the command of the Judge, to justifie, and make him believe their innocence.*

4100 And in case they meet not with a prudent Confessor who understands well these shifts and deceits, and fall into the hands of one who seems to them too exact, and would oblige them to restore what they have privily taken away, he holds that they are excused from giving credit unto him; and though the Church it self should interpose and employ its Authority, and press them by vertue of a Monitory to come unto Confession and Restitution, they would not be obliged to obey it: *Because in this occurrent*, saith he, *neither the wife nor the children aforesaid ought, or can be forced by the Confessor to reveal the things they so purloyn'd, though the Creditors should obtain Mandates and Letters monitory from the Bishop.*

From the same Principle he affirms in the same Chapter, pag. 200. *That a person, who is indebted for very great and notable sums, may, to the prejudice of his Creditors*, give away part of his goods, so that he to whom the gift is made, shall not be obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors, if he be not constrained by Law. See how he concludes after he had proposed contrary opinions upon this point: *I say then, that he who hath received by Deed of Gift any moveable or*

*or immoveable of a man in great debt, is not obliged to quit it in favour of the Creditors of such a Debtor, before the Law constrain him.*

In the following Page he propounds another Case upon the same Subject; and he resolves it after such a manner as authorizes and maintains, not only injury, but revenge also and murder. *Some one*, saith he, *entreats a Souldier to smite and beat his neighbour, or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended him. It is demanded, whether the Souldier failing, the other who prayed him to do all these outrages, ought to repair out of his own Estate the damage which proceeded thence?* 24110 Upon which he makes a Relation of some Authors who hold the affirmative, and without quoting any one for the contrary opinion, he broaches it as from himself, and saith for refuting the first: *My opinion is not as theirs. For no man is obliged to restore, if he have not violated Justice. Doth he so who submits himself to anothers pleasure, when he only entreats of him a favour?*

This goodly reasoning may serve to justifie from doing wrong, not only all men who employ their friends or other persons to do mischief, making use of them as their hands and instruments, and so doing the very same action and injury with them, whether they commit theft or murder, or other violences: but it may also justifie all persons who induce and sollicite others unto wickedness, and the Devil himself when he tempts men, and causes them to sin; because temptation and sollicitations unto evil force not the will, and are only inducements, and prayers as it were which depend absolutely on them who are tempted and sollicited to do evil, which many do also refuse and reject.

Behold whereunto the Maxims of this Casuist are reduced. They teach to steal with subtilty and confidence, without being obliged unto restitution; to speak against ones conscience, without lying; to forswear, without treachery; to make a mock of Justice, without being deficient in the respect due thereto; to contemn the Authority of the Church, without disobedience; and finally to defraud Creditors, ruine Commerce, destroy publick Faith, and make havock of our neighbours goods, without injustice.

## ARTICLE VII. 24120

### THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESSE.

BEaring false witness is a sin so odious and contrary to the Law of Nature, that the most corrupted persons, and who boast of all other sins, cannot endure to be accused of this, nor even of a simple lye. God hath always forbidden it, whether before a Judge, or in private; but the Jesuits favour it at any time, and the sins which depend on it, to wit, slander and detraction.

1. An tenetur quis retractare suum falsum dictum, quando ex eo inferenda est alteri mors seu mutilatio, etiamsi testi se retractanti fidem resultet simile damnum? Ex-

*Dicastillus* demands: (1) *Whether he be obliged to retract who hath affirmed some falsity which will cost the loss of life or member to another, when the witness by his retractation will himself incur the same penalty?* He answers, *That he believes that if the false witness have not sinned mortally by bearing this false testimony, he is not obliged after that he understands the truth, to retract what he hath said, so exposing himself to so great evils.* That is to say, it is lawful to kill an innocent after we have slandered him, rather than put our selves into any danger by retracting; since it is not so much the offences or the Hangmen, as the witnesses that put him to death who is condemned upon their depositions:

istimo si non peccaverit mortaliter, dicendo illam falsitatem; non teneri cum tanto suo incommodo cognita veritate dictum retractare. Legatur Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 59. Less. dub. 7. Reginald. sect. 2. num. 45. *Dicastill. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 8. dub. 7. num. 92.*

That we may have a clearer Exposition of this Question, this Jesuit sends us his to Treatise of Restitution, where he saith, (1) *That the opinion which holds that a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertence, without sinning mortally, is obliged to nothing, though this false testimony do occasion the condemnation of a man, is safe in practice, though the opinion seem to him more agreeable unto reason.* For he regards no more to follow the light of natural reason and equity, than the Rules of Faith; but only his own sense and the Authority of such as he is, in resolving difficulties which refer to Manners and Religion. And this is one of the most goodly and commodious Principles of the Jesuits Divinity, that we are not obliged to restitution when we have not sinned mortally in wronging our neighbour. For if this Principle *be sure*, they who find a great sum of money, or take it by ignorance and heedlesness, are not obliged to restore it, because they have not sinned mortally in taking of it. We may see the consequence of this in the Chapter of Restitution. But if you joyn hereto the conditions the Jesuits require to make an action a mortal sin, false witnesses will thereby receive great comfort and encouragement boldly to act and acquit themselves in this duty.

1 Ad nihil tenetur is qui falsum testimonium dixit ex ignorantia vel inadvertentia, etiamsi ex illo testimonio contingat aliquem damnari. Less. cap. 3. dub. 7. Hæc sententia in praxi tuta est, sed prior magis videtur consona rationi. *Dicastill. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 3. dub. 2. num. 57.*

The same Author is not less favourable to him who suffers himself to be corrupted by money, not to bear false witness, but not to testifie the truth. He approves *Azors* observation, who saith, (2) *That if a witness corrupted by money, bide or retire himself before he hath been legally examined, or cited into the Court, he is not obliged to restore the money he receives in this manner.* As if Justice were no other thing than the formalities, and outward appearance of Law. A man is in danger to lose his life for not having witnesses of his innocency: if being able to deliver him by your testimony, you take money not to render him your due assistance, you take it to put him to death; since not he only who deposes against the truth, but he also who conceals a truth whereon the life of an innocent depends, is the true cause of his death. Which is so much more true, or at least more criminal and unjust, when he suffers himself to be corrupted by money.

2 Notat Azor quod licet testis pecunia corruptus sese occultet nec discedat antequam judicio rogetur aut ad judicium vocetur, non peccat contra Justitiam, nec tenetur restituere pecuniam sic acceptam, nisi vero similiter crederet esse furtivam. *Dicast. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 4. dub. 8. num. 156.*

*Tambourin* saith, (3) *That he who is accused of a crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuser, may not only deny the crime; but say that the Accuser lyes, and slanders him.* He sends us to S. *Thomas* in his 2. 2. q. 69. art. 2. This is without doubt that we may see his condemnation. For S. *Thomas* proves in that Article, *That it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself by a slander,* and that even when he is not legally examined, *it is not lawful for him to speak an untruth. Falsitatem tamen proponere in nullo casu licet alicui. Tambourin* for all that finds there is no difficulty in his opinion; as if this were no lye, to say unto a man that he lyes, when we know he speaks the truth, and to slander an accuser as a slanderer, when he accuses us of a crime which we have committed. Of two accusers the one speaks the truth, the other lyes; the one objects a true crime, and the other a false; and according to *Tambourins* admirable Divinity, he who saith the truth, is the lyar; and he who objects a true crime, is a slanderer; of which he doubts not at all.

3 Hinc sequitur 1. cum qui accusatur de crimine quod judicio ab accusatore probari nequit, non solum posse negare crimen, sed etiam dicere accusatorem calumniari & mentiri. Ita Petrus Navarra lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 34. Lege etiam S. Thomam 2. 2. q. 69. art. 2. Qui enim accusat de crimine quod probari non potest, calumniator est & mentiri præsumitur. *Tambur. lib. 9. decal. cap. 2. sect. 2. num. 2.* 4 Hæc passim fere ore sunt omnium: illud singulare & difficile: An si alio modo te ab injusto teste tueri nequeas, licite falsa crimina illi possis obsidere, quibus sufficiunt ad tuam justam defensionem? Duo affero. Unum satis mihi probabile est; alterum satis incertum. Probabile mihi est te, si id facias, non peccare contra justitiam; unde nec obligari ad restitutionem— Incertum mihi est an id possit licite fieri sine ulla culpa— Ut quid enim si Sodomitam oporteat probari esse illum testem? si excommunicatum, si hæreticum? — Quid enim si sit necesse publicas Scripturas emendari? Possetne Notarius publicus adhuc induci? Libenter nodum hunc in aliud tempus exolvendum reservo. *num. 4, 5, 6, 7.*

*reſtitution---- but I do not know certainly whether this may be done without any ſin---- For if it be needful to prove that this witneſs is a Sodomite, excommunicated,* 24160
*an Heretick --- if it be neceſſary to this purpoſe to counterfeit publick Records, may we ſollicite a Notary hereunto? I leave this difficulty to be reſolved another time.*

It muſt be obſerved, that he ſpeaks not of a falſe Witneſs who charges with falſe crimes, but of an unjuſt Witneſs, *ab injuſto teſte*, who accuſes of true crimes, but ſecret, or which he cannot prove, according to the forms of Juſtice. For thus theſe Doctors expound themſelves what they mean by an unjuſt Witneſs, or Accuſer. (1) *That this Witneſs*, ſaith Dicaſtillus, *may thank himſelf, if in the concluſion he be held for a ſlanderer, ſince he could not prove the crime; and by conſequence having accuſed unjuſtly, he is obliged unto reſtitution.*

1 Hic accuſator ſibi imputet ſi ex hoc calumniator habeatur, immo cum probare non poſſit, atqui adeo injuſte accuſaverit, tenetur reſtituere accuſator. *Dicaſt. lib. 2. tract. 2. diſp. 12. pag. 3. dub. 18. n. 185.*

So that, according to this Divinity, to defend our ſelves from true but ſecret crimes, and whereof there are no publick proofs, we may ſay to the honeſteſt man in the world who would inform againſt us in a Court of Juſtice, that he is a Sodomite, Heretick, Excommunicate, &c. and we may for proof of this ſlander, make uſe of falſe Witneſſes, counterfeit falſe Deeds and Writings, and corrupt publick Notaries to ſubſcribe them, without committing any injuſtice in all this; though according to Scripture, thoſe who do evil, and thoſe who cauſe it to be done, or only conſent thereto, commit the ſame fault.

But after he hath maintained, that herein there is no injuſtice, *Tambourin* doubts if at leaſt there be not ſome ſin in an action which contains ſo many crimes, becauſe that he knows it not certainly, that is to ſay, according to the Principles of his Divinity, that it is alſo probable, that there is none therein. 24170
For a Doctor ſo learned as he is, remains not eaſily in ſuſpence concerning things which he hath well examined, and he doubts not thereof without reaſon. And therefore his doubting of it is a ſufficient ground whereon to eſtabliſh a probable opinion.

He holds then indeed, though he dare not declare it, that it is alſo probable, that one may without any ſin, as well as injuſtice, commit all ſorts of crimes to hide one he hath committed, and to oppreſs by ſlanders, falſe Witneſſes, forged Writings, corruption of Courts, and publick Perſons, him who would diſcover it; becauſe he is perſwaded he accuſes him unjuſtly, that is to ſay, he cannot prove what he ſaith by the ways and formalities commonly uſed in Courts of Juſtice, though it be true and certain.

*Tambourin* approves very well the manner wherein *Hurtado* believes that Scholars may give teſtimony of the ſtudies of their Companions. (2) *A Scholar*, ſaith he, *having need to prove that he hath gone through his courſe, and having need of two witneſſes hereof, may employ therein two of his friends, who have not ſeen him go to the Lectures, but are ſufficiently perſwaded that he did attend them: but they may not ſwear for all that they have ſeen him go.* Neither indeeed is it the cuſtom to cauſe them to ſwear, whereupon it will be no hard matter to get falſe atteſtations of our ſtudies, which may ſerve for obtaining degrees and benefices.

2 Scholaſticus volens probare curſum ad quod eget duobus teſtibus, adhibere poteſt duos amicos qui illum non viderint intereſſe lectionibus, at ſatis ſibi perſuadent illum interfuiſſe; at non poſſunt jurare ſe id vidiſſe. *Tambur. lib. 3. decal. cap. 2. ſect. 1. num. 8.*

For detraction, ſee here *Tambourins* Rule which he gives us to inſtruct us how 24180
to revile with pleaſure and delight, without mortal ſin. (3) *When one reproaches another, he who without deſiring that reproach, rejoyces in it, not becauſe of the ſhame that happens to his neighbour, but becauſe of the new and curious knowledge he obtains of his neighbours actions, or becauſe of the eloquence of the detractor, it is very probable that in this, preciſely taken, there is no mortal ſin.* We may then, according to him, without doing any great evil, rejoyce in the reproach of another without deſiring it; but he ſeems not to remember that Principle of his Divinity quite contrary hereunto, by which his Brethren conclude familiarly, that we may deſire pollution, becauſe we may rejoyce in it. And indeed it is one and the ſame thing, or the one is the conſequent of the other.

3 Qui ſuppoſita detractione, ſine ullo ipſius deſiderio lætantur non de ipſa infamia, ſed de ſola curioſa vel nova cognitione factorum proximi, vel de eloquentia detractoris, valde probabile eſt ex hoc per ſe non peccare mortaliter. *Tambur. lib. 3. decal. cap. 3. ſect. 7. num. 1.*

He adds, that this rejoycing ought to come from the eloquence of the detractor, and not from the ſhame of our neighbour who is reproached. This is done conveniently, and without trouble, by an abſtraction of the mind, or direction of the intention; but that takes nothing from the evil of the detraction, it augments it rather inſtead of redreſſing it. For it is true, of reproaches as well as impurities, that the beſt expreſt are moſt dangerous; becauſe eloquent words, and diſcourſes ſtudied, and agreeable to their ſubjects, are as it were a bait which entices and opens the heart, to cauſe the evil which is underſtood with pleaſure to enter with more delight into it.

After you have heard this defamation, (1) *It is lawful for you*, according to Dicaſtillus, *to believe certainly the evil that hath been related unto you of any one, provided he be publickly defamed by common report.* As if common report, which may be falſe, and oftentimes is ſo, might be made uſe of as a juſt foundation for a viſible injury, and a judgment diſadvantagious to our neighbour. By this reaſon *Dicaſtillus* could not have condemned of detraction or raſh judgment, thoſe who had an ill opinion of Jeſus Chriſt, and who accounted him a wicked and impious perſon; becauſe the envy and ſlanders of the Phariſees had made theſe reports very common during his life, and much more at his paſſion and death. 24190

1 Non eſt peccatum certo credere de aliquo id de quo publice eſt infamatus per rumorem. *Dicaſt. lib. 2. tract. 2. diſp. 12. dub. 2. num. 25.*

But will it not be lawful to utter ſome reproach as well as to hear it? *Dicaſtillus* holds, (2) *That it is probable that it is no mortal ſin to deſtroy a mans reputation in the mind of ſome conſiderable perſon, from whom no evil may be feared by revealing unto him ſome mortal ſin of the perſon defamed.* He would not have talked otherwiſe, had he taken upon him to maintain that detraction of it ſelf is not evil; and that if no other evil enſue than the infamy and loſs of reputation of him whom we reproach, it cannot be a great ſin.

2 Probabilis eſt ſententia non eſſe mortale (ſcilicet revelare mortale crimen alterius; ex quo ſequitur jactura famæ apud virum gravem à quo nil mali timetur) docent aliqui recentiores *Lib. 2. tr. 2. diſp 2. pag. 2. dub. 8. num. 133.*

(3) *Neither can it be any more a mortal ſin*, according to this ſame Author, *to reveal ſome great ſin, or even to impoſe a falſe one on a perſon who boaſts he hath committed ſuch, or who makes no account of them, or who is publickly defamed of ſuch like, this paſſes with him for a ſmall infamy:* That is to ſay, that we may without breach of charity ſpeak evil of thoſe of whom many perſons ſpeak it, not only in repeating what we have heard ſpoken of them, but alſo by impoſing on them falſe crimes: or if ſo be a perſon diſgraces himſelf by his wicked life, you may without any great evil help to reproach him yet more, and cauſe him to loſe his reputation altogether, by ſlandering him, and augmenting his diſorders, and attributing unto him diſorders he never yet thought of. I ſhould as ſoon ſay that one may, without much offending God or our Neighbour, help him to deſtroy himſelf, who by a tranſport of paſſion or folly, would burn his own houſe, drown or kill himſelf. 24200

3 Revelare peccatum grave, vel etiam falſo illud imponere tali perſonæ quæ de ſimilibus ipſa ſe jactat, aut nil curat, aut de iis eſt publice infamata, nec eſt mortalis detractio. Volenti enim & conſentienti non fit injuria. *Dicaſt. lib. 2. tract. 2. diſp. 12. pag. 2. dub.... num. 106.*

## CHAPTER III.

## Of the Commandments of the Church.

IF the Jeſuits afford ſo good penny-worths of Gods Commandments, as we have now ſaid, it is not to be hoped that they will uſe the Churches better. This ſhall be ſeen in this Chapter, wherein we ſpeak, 1. of the Sanctification of Feſtival days, 2. of Faſting, 3. of the Communion at *Eaſter*, 4. of the yearly Confeſſion commanded by the Church.

## ARTICLE I. 24210

### Of the Sanctification of Festival Days.

THis Commandment carries with it two obligations. One not to labour on Festival and Lords days; the other is to keep them holy. This is the end of the Precept, the other is but a mean to accomplish it. For that which God requires of us principally on these Holy-days, is that we employ our selves peculiarly to sanctifie him, or rather to sanctifie our selves in serving him. And that we may be at more leisure, and attend better and with greater devotion and liberty unto his Service, he wills, and the Church hath on its behalf commanded us on these days to quit the care of all other affairs, and abstain from all employments which might hinder or divert us from it.

The Jesuits acknowledge these two obligations contained in this Commandment; but they destroy them at the same time by false explications and accommodations altogether humane, as we shall now presently see in this Article, which we shall divide expressly into two Points, and each of them shall have two Paragraphs, that we may more distinctly and clearly represent the Opinions of the Jesuits upon each of these obligations.

## I. POINT. 24220

### SECTION I.

*That the Jesuits despise the Authority of the Church, and destroy the Commandment by which it forbids to work on Feast-days.*

*Layman* treating of the observation of Feasts, saith that in that part on this Commandment which forbids labour, it is commanded that we should (1) *abstain the whole Feast-day from doing any servile work.* And in his following discourse expounding what he intends by servile works, he adds: (2) *They are called servile works which being only for the service of the body, are in themselves base, and are not ordinarily done but by servants, as to plow, to build,* &c.

He testifies that to dance, play, go to a Stage-play, are not actions forbidden by this Commandment; because these are not actions proper unto servants nor slaves. And he discovers his opinion sufficiently by what he speaks in the sequel: (3) *That none but servile works are forbidden on Feast-days, but they are not all forbidden neither, if there be any particular reason or custom that allows them.*

1 Ut integro die Festo opera servilia non exerceantur.

2 Opera servilia dicuntur quæ corporis commoditatibus inserviendo, ignobiliora sunt, & per servos exerceri solita, cujusmodi sunt arare, fabricare, &c. *Layman lib. 4. tract. 7. cap. 2. num. 1. pag.* 181.

3 Dicimus igitur sola opera servilis, eaque omnia die Festo prohibita esse, præterquam si jure vel consuetudine permissa sint. *Ibid. n. 2.*

This suffices him not, to have reduced the Churches Prohibition of working on Feast-days to those works only which are proper for slaves and servants, as if this part of the Commandment were only for servants; he thought fit also to put a great exception to it by saying, *Præterquam si jure vel consuetudine permissa sint.*

From this exception, as a Principle, he draws many Conclusions, which are so many usurpations upon this Commandment, and so many dispensations to work on Feast-days. 24230

He allows 1. To write all sorts of things, to copy, to paint. And his reason is, (4) *Because Painters receive no less satisfaction in painting than those who love books in studying: which shews that the Painters Art is not servile, but liberal, and taken*

4 Quis non minus pictores in pingendo; quam literarum studiosi in legendo animi quadam voluptate capiuntur & detinentur; quod signum est artem pingendi non servilem ed liberalem esse, quippe ad rectum hominem instituram, liberoque homine dignam. *Ibid. num. 3.*

*up for a divertisement unto our minds, and worthy of a Gentleman.* As if Festivals were instituted for divertisement, or none but persons of base and servile condition were obliged to break off their ordinary Trades and labour, to serve God on these days.

He adds a little after, that to follow these exercises, that is to say, to write and paint on the Feast-days; not only for divertisement, or some just and necessary cause, but also out of a meer mercenary Spirit, and for lucre only, is no evil; and his reason is: (1) *Because interest and profit do not make an action servile.* There is nothing but toil and weariness of the body that seems to him to be servile, profane, and unworthy the Feast-days: but divertisements, pleasures, interests, and profits appear unto him honourable and worthy of generous persons and solemn Festivals.

1 Nam lucrum aut merces non facit opus esse servile.

And because, according to this Principle, hunting and fishing should be judged the most servile, being the most toilsom & of greatest labour, see how he speaks thereof. (2) *To hunt, and hawk, and fish, seem to be actions of a servile nature; and consequently forbidden by the civil Law, as may be gathered from the Chapter,* Licet. De Feriis: *yet custom hath obtained that it should be allowed to hunt for divertisement on Feast-days, as also to fish in Rivers without too many people and too much toil.*

2 Venari, aucupari, piscari, ex genere suo servilia opera esse videntur; ideoque jure communi prohibita, ut colligitur ex cap. Licet. De feriis. Consuetudo tamen obtinuit ut diebus festis licita & recreationis causa instituta venatio, itemque piscatio in fluminibus, sine, &c. *Ibid. n. 6.*

He doth well to set the civil Law and the Commandment of the Church on the one hand, which forbid hunting and fishing on Feast-days; and on the other hand the custom contrary to this Commandment, which hath introduced the abuse of hunting and fishing on these days; and herupon he passes sentence in favour of the custom: *Consuetudo obtinuit.*

It puts also the Exercises of War into the same rank with hunting and fishing. (3) *It seems,* saith he, *that the Exercises of War are servile works; because they tend directly to kill men: for this cause they are not lawful on Festival-days.*

3 Bellare videtur opus servile, cum proxime tendat ad hominum necem, quare die Festo permissum non est. *Ibid. num. 7.*

He declares then that the Exercise of War is a servile thing. But presently after he advances and ennobles it again in the same manner as he did hunting and fishing before, adding, (5) *That custom hath made it honourable and worthy of the Feast-days as well as hunting.*

The same thing may be said of Dances, Balls, Stage-plays, and other shews which the corruption of the world hath authorized against the intention and order of the Church; *consuetudo illa die festo honestavit.* But it is easie to see that the Feast-days do not make these exercises honourable, but rather these exercises dishonour and profane the Feasts, as all the Saints have at all times believed and taught in the Church, and the most common light of Faith and Christianity alone is sufficient for us whereby to know this.

4 Consuetudo tamen non minus autem quam venationem Festo die honestavit.

And the Jesuite himself acknowledges it sufficiently, in affirming that these Exercises of Hunting, and War, &c. are of a servile nature, and forbidden by the civil Law on the Feast-days. So that when he saith afterwards, that notwithstanding the prohibition of the Church, and order of Nature it self, custom hath authorized these Exercises, and made them honest and lawful on Feast-days, he must needs attribute an admirable vertue unto custom, and altogether extraordinary, which surpasses the Power of the Church, and Nature it self; since it can prevail without incurring any penalty against the Laws of the one and the other.

And since the Laws of the Church are also the Holy Ghost's, who by it hath given us them, and who guides it in all it doth and ordains, if custom carry it against the Laws of the Church, as this Casuists pretends, it must needs be, according to him, that it hath more power than the Holy Ghost, and that the Authority it hath in their School, is more to be considered than that of God himself, since he believes that we ought to yield to the abuses it hath introduced into the Church, to the prejudice of the primitive Orders and Laws which the Holy Ghost hath established.

But if these things seem extraordinary and incredible in themselves, and considered according to the Rules of Truth and natural Sense alone, yet they are not so in the Maxims of these new Doctors. For it is not in this case only, but in occasions of all other sorts, that the custom being found opposed and contrary to

the Laws of God and the Church, it ordinarily gains the cauſe by their Judgment; as hath been obſerved in many places of theſe Writings.

*Eſcobar* follows the ſame Rules with *Layman* to determine what labour is lawful or forbidden on Feaſt-days, that is (1) *Servile work*, ſaith he, *which is for ſervants and ſlaves.* And he adds, as *Layman*, that if a work be not ſervile in it ſelf, it doth not become ſervile when it is done for gain.

1 Servile opus eſt, ad quod ſervi deputati ſunt. Nec opus ſervile fit, quia eò lucrum eſt factum, ſi de ſe ſervile ante non erat. *Eſcobar tract. 7. exam. 5. cap. 2. num. 4. pag. 99.*

He afterwards ſets down in the number of actions which are not ſervile, *ſtudying, writing, travelling, dancing.* And although he affirm that hunting and painting are ſervile actions, he forbears not to ſay afterwards, (2) *That if hunting be followed upon obligation and of duty*, as when a Huntſ-man, or a ſervant hunts at the command of his Maſter, *it is ſervile as well as painting, but that it is not ſo if it be purſued of pleaſure and for paſtime.*

That is to ſay, that a ſervant may not go on hunting in obedience to his Maſter, when he ſends him; but the Maſter may go for his pleaſure, and the ſervant alſo; and by conſequence, that obedience in labour profanes a Holy-day, but pleaſure in the ſame work profanes it not.

2 Pingere ex ſuo genere ſervile eſt. Venatio ſi fiat ex officio, ſervile eſt ut pictura: ob voluptatem & recreationem, minime. *Ibid. num. 8.*

Speaking in the ſame place of thoſe who labour in cleanſing, hanging, and trimming Churches on Feaſt-days, he ſaith that they ſin at the leaſt venially, if they have not ſome lawful cauſe. He ſaith the ſame thing of the outward works of mercy which are exerciſed towards our neighbour, as to mend the cloaths of the poor, to carry them wood, or other things whereof they have need; theſe actions, according to him, are ſervile and forbidden on Feaſt-days. 24270

Mundare ſcopis, tapetibus veſtire parietes Eccleſiarum, & hujuſmodi, niſi aliqua intercedat excuſatio, ſaltem venialia ſunt. *Ibid. n. 6.*

He would have it lawful to paint and hunt for pleaſure on Feaſt-days; and he will not have it lawful to ſweep, hang, and adorn the Church for the Service of God. He would have us have power to walk, dance, travel, and go whither we will for our paſtime; but he will not have it lawful to viſit the poor and ſick, and to give them ſome aſſiſtance, pretending that works of mercy are more contrary to the Sanctification of Feaſts, than the ſports and paſtimes of the world. He will not have it lawful to carry alms themſelves unto the poor on Feaſt-days, as he ſaith expreſly a little after.

Num miſericordiæ opera exercenda? De ſe ſervilia non licent; ut conſuere veſtem pauperi, deferre ligna ædem, &c. *Ibid. num. 7.*

For having put the Queſtion, if thoſe who by a motive of piety do actions which are called ſervile, ſin againſt this Commandment of the Church, he anſwers in theſe terms: (3) *There are ſome who exempt them from ſin who buſie themſelves in ſervile works on Feaſt-days, to build or re-edifie Churches* gratis, *to carry alms to the poor, to adorn Temples*, &c. *But as for me, I am of the opinion of thoſe who exempt them not who labour without neceſſity on Feaſt-days, though they do it under this pretence*, that is to ſay, by a motive of piety. 24280

3 Excusandine aliqui ratione pietatis? ad eleemoſynam gerendam, ad ornanda delubra, &c. Aliqui liberant à reatu exercentes die Feſto opera ſervilia ad templa ædificanda, vel reſtituenda gratis, neceſſitate non excuſant. At ego cum illis ſentio qui laborantes vel hoc prætextu, ſine

He believes then that it is lawful to play, dance, walk abroad without neceſſity and for pleaſure only on Feaſt-days; becauſe, according to the Jeſuits Divinity, theſe actions are not ſervile. He pretends alſo, though painting and hunting be ſervile of themſelves; yet the motive of pleaſure and contentment which we look for in them, hinders them from being ſo, and makes them lawful: And yet he maintains, that to ſweep a Church for devotion, or to take delight to dreſs an Altar, to hang a Chappel, to carry alms unto the poor, are actions prohibited on Feaſt-days; and that neceſſity only, not pleaſure, can hinder them from being ſervile. As if the pleaſure taken in hunting or painting were more noble and holy, than that which is taken in ſerving the poor and God himſelf in the Churches.

He finds it difficult to exempt theſe actions of Piety and Religion from mortal ſin, ſo rigorous would he appear in this point. *They are*, ſaith he, *at the leaſt veniall ſins. Saltem venialia ſunt.*

*Filliutius* had ſaid it before him in the ſame terms, and yet more clearly.

(1) *It*

(1) *It seems that to sweep Churches, to hang them, and other such like actions, are ser-*
24290 *vile; and to do them without lawful excuse, is at least a venial sin, though not mortal, if not done through contempt.* Strange Divinity, that we need not to fear to contemn the Command of God, forbidding us to work on the Feast and Lords-days, by working for our selves; because we take our pleasure in the work, as in hunting; and that we ought to fear contempt and mortal sin in working only for the Service of God and the Church!

So that these days which God hath ordained particularly for his Service may be employed, according to this Divinity, to serve any thing but him. We may give one part of it to pastime, another to the world: and which is more astonishing and horrible, we may give it all entirely, or in part, to the Service of the Devil, passing it over in debauching and sinning against God, without violating thereby the Commandment which ordains that you should sanctifie the Feasts and Lords-days.

*Filliutius* teaches us this in expres terms, when he saith, (2) *That it is not particularly forbidden to sin and offend God on Feast-days, as if by crimes and sins the Feast-day were violated.* It will not then be a thing done contrary to the Sanctification of Festivals, to employ them wholly in offending God; but these Holy-days will be profaned, if they be employed in the Service of Churches, Altars, and Poor. If the former of these excesses be more impious, the other will appear more ridiculous, and both together do entirely abolish the Commandment to
24300 sanctifie Festivals; the one in condemning one part of that which God hath commanded; and the other in justifying or excusing what he hath forbidden, particularly on these days.

If *Filliutius* as well as *Escobar*, who in this is of his Judgment, had been in the company of the Pharisees when our Lord intending to heal the man who had the withered hand, to stay their envy, and prevent their malice, demanded of them, (3) *Whether it were lawful to do good or evil on the Sabbath-day?* Without doubt they would not have been so surprised, nor have been so gravelled as the Pharisees. For they answered nothing, and continued silent, saith the Gospel. But these Jesuits could not have been silent without betraying their own consciences and the cause of their Society. *Escobar* would have said that it was not lawful [to do good. *Non licet bene facere*: since he maintains that it is not lawful to dress Churches, nor carry alms to the poor: and *Filliutius* might have said that it is lawful to do evil, *licet male facere*, since he believes that sins do not profane these days: *Opera peccaminosa non esse specialiter prohibita die Festo, quasi per illa dies Festus violetur.*

After this *Filliutius* expounds what sins he means, when he saith they profane not Feast-days, alledging withal the reason of his opinion. (4) *The principal reason*, saith he, *is because this third Commandment, being divine as it is, obliges not particularly not to sin on the Feast-days.* As if to command us only to honour and serve him, and especially on this day, were not particularly to forbid us to offend God thereon, there being nothing more opposite to honouring God than sinning against him.

24310 He alledges a second reason yet more strange; saying, *That to sin, as to slander, forswear, commit fornication, and such like, are not servile actions.* And because S. *Thomas*, after the holy Fathers and the Scripture, hath said that there is no baser servitude, nor more opposite to the Sanctification of Feast-days, than that of sin, which makes us slaves of the Devil, and causeth us to give that service unto him which we owe particularly unto God on these days, he prevents this reason, and touches it only in his way, as not making any great account of it. *It is of no importance*, saith he, *to say, that he who sinneth becomes the slave of sin; because this is not true, but in Metaphor and figure, and not indeed and really*, as Suarez *hath shewn at large.*

He speaks this generally without excepting any person, when he saith, that this word: He who sinneth becometh the slave of sin, is not really true, though he could not be ignorant that it is Jesus Christ his speech in the 8 of S. *John*, where

1 Mundare scopis templum, vestire parietes tapetibus & hujusmodi, videtur servilis, & nisi aliqua excusatio intercedat, erit saltem peccatum veniale, non mortale, seclusio contemptu. *Filliutius qq. moral. tom. 2. tract. 3. cap. 9. n. 156. pag. 267.*

2 Dico 3. opera peccaminosa non esse specialiter prohibita in die Festo, quasi per illa dies Festus violetur. *Ibid. n. 147. p. 264.*

3 Licet Sabbatis bene facere, an male? *Marci 3. v. 4.* At illi tacebant. *Ibid.*

4 Ratio potissima est; quia hoc præceptum tertium, quatenus divinum est, non obligat specialiter ad non peccandum die Festo. *Ibid. num. 147.*

Tum quia opus peccati formaliter non est servile, ut detrahere, pejerare, fornicari, & similia. *Ibid.*

Nec obstat quod peccans dicitur fieri servus peccati; quia id tantum metaphorice & symbolice verum est, non autem reipsa, ut pluribus, Suarez n. 7. *Ibid. num. 148.*

where he ſaith, *That every man who ſinneth, is the ſlave of ſin: omnis qui facit peccatum, ſervus eſt peccati.*

This is an imagination very novel amongſt Chriſtians, that an indifferent action, or rather good in it ſelf and laudible, as it is to adorn the Church, ſhould be more baſe and more ſervile, and therefore more forbidden on Feaſt-days, and more contrary to the Holineſs which God demands of us on theſe days, than the moſt enormous ſins. But this is a novelty and an exceſs yet more ſtrange, to ſay that 24320
theſe ſins are not properly ſervile actions; that is to ſay, that they are not contrary to the natural liberty and honour of men, and above all of Chriſtians.

Whence it will follow, as in effect this Jeſuit fears not to affirm, that Jeſus Chriſt ſpoke not properly, when he ſaid, that he who ſinneth, is the ſlave of ſin; nor S. *Paul* when he ſaith, that ſinners are ſlaves of the Devil, and that he holds them Captives.

And he muſt hereupon declare that Jeſus Chriſt hath not properly delivered, nor redeemed us, ſince they cannot be properly delivered who are not properly ſlaves; and they are not properly redeemed who are properly in ſlavery and captivity. And finally in the height of impiety, he muſt take away from Jeſus Chriſt the quality of a Redeemer and a Saviour, and ſay that he is but a Metaphorick and Symbolick Redeemer and Saviour, and not a proper and true one, but an improper and figurative one, contrary to the word of Jeſus Chriſt himſelf. (1) *If the Son ſet you free, you ſhall be free indeed.*

1 Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis. *Joan. 8. v. 34.*

So that this Doctrine of the Jeſuits overturns the foundations of the Scripture and Religion, and is not only oppoſite to the Wiſdom of the Croſs and Chriſtian Philoſophy, but alſo to the Light of Reaſon and Heathen Philoſophy. For the Pagans themſelves have acknowledged that there is nothing more ſervile nor more contrary to the natural liberty of man and reaſon, than vice and ſin, though they knew not the Author of this ſervitude, and the true Maſter of theſe ſlaves, which is the Devil, no more than the true Deliverer of theſe ſame ſlaves, who is Jeſus Chriſt.

## SECTION II. 24330

### *Expedients which the Jeſuits propoſe to elude the Commandment which forbids working on Feaſt-days.*

WE have ſeen hitherto how the Jeſuits diſpenſe with Painters, Hunters, Fiſhers, &c. from the Commandment which forbids working on Feaſt-days, it remains now to ſee what expedients they give to elude it.

*Eſcobar* furniſheth us with two. The firſt is, if the Feaſts be local and commanded in one place only, as the Feaſts of Pariſh-Patrons often are, to depart from that place, and go work in another. Firſt, he puts the thing in queſtion, and demands, (2) *Whether it be lawful to depart purpoſely from a place where there is a Feaſt, to go to another where there is no Feaſt?* And he anſwers, (3) *That aſſuredly it is lawful to go thither, and to labour there in ſervile works.*

2 Num è loco Feſti ad locum ubi non eſt recedere conſulto liceat?

He doth not ſay, that he ought to have ſome reaſon or ſome neceſſity for it, but that he may do it only upon a deſign to work and diſcharge himſelf of the Commandment of the Church.

3 Ita plane, & ſervilibus ibi operibus vacare. *Eſcobar tract. 1. Exam. 5. cap. 3. num. 11. pag. 100.*

*Emanuel Sa* is of the ſame opinion, and ſaith, (4) *That after one hath heard Maſs in one place where there is a Feaſt, he may go into another place where there is none, to labour there.* He would have the Maſs heard, but only out of devotion, as *Filliutius* who cites and follows him, hath expounded him. For after he had 24340
demanded, (5) *Whether one may lawfully depart from the place of his abode where there is a Feaſt, to go unto another where men labour in ſervile works?* He anſwers

4 Audita Miſſa poteſt quis ad locum ubi non eſt Feſtum ire cauſa laborandi ex loco ubi Feſtum eſt. *Sa verbo Feſtum, num. 8. pag. 275.* 5 An licet recedere à proprio loco in quo eſt Feſtus dies ad locum in quo vacatur operibus ſervilibus?

abſolutely, (1) *That this is lawful, and that he being there may labour, as others do who live there.* And he adds, (2) *That for what concerns the Maſs, it ſeems more probable that he who departs, ſhould hear it in the place where the Feaſt is, if he can do it conveniently, and Maſs be ſaid early; that he may afterwards have ſpare time to go to and labour in the place where there is no Feaſt.*

1 Dico licere ac poſſe tilem vacare operibus ſervilibus in eo loco. *Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 27. cap. 7. n. 110. pag. 261.*

He would have him hear Maſs, but *provided he can do it commodiouſly*, otherwiſe he would not have him obliged thereto. And that you may not doubt of his thought and intention, he ſaith once more, as it were to expound himſelf yet better in theſe terms: (3) *I ſaid, provided he can do this commodiouſly: becauſe* Suarez *in the place I have already quoted, expreſſes this ſame condition. Yet* Sanchez *believes it very probable, that there is no obligation on him to hear Maſs, ſince he muſt before noon be out of the bounds of the place of the Feaſt-day.*

2 Quod ad Sacrum autem audiendum, probabilius videtur teneri recedentem à proprio loco ubi eſt dies Feſtus, ſi modo commode poſſit habere Sacrum ſummo mane, ut deinde in loco ubi non obligat dies Feſtus, vacare poſſit operi ſervili

And to clear up this difficulty yet more, *Filliutius* demands, (4) *Whether for*
24350 *doing all things lawfully, it be neceſſary to have ſome reaſon?* He anſwers, (5) *That though ſome hold this neceſſary, becauſe otherwiſe the Law would be eluded, yet it is more true that it is not; but it is in every ones power to go from the place where the Feaſt is, without other cauſe than to labour and gain ſomewhat.* His reaſon is, (7) *Becauſe, to ſpeak properly, it is no fraud for a man to make uſe of his right, and that it is rather to avoid the obligation of the Precept, which being it is not forbidden by the Precept it ſelf, it follows that it is a thing in it ſelf indifferent.*

*Ibid. num. 111.* 3 Dixi, ſi modo commode poſſit, quia ſic etiam limitat Suarez, quamvis Sanchez valde probabile putet non ſolum ad Sacrum audiendum, quando ante meridiem futuri ſunt extra limites iſtius loci. *Ibid.*

4 An ad hæc quæ diximus legitime facienda requiratur juſta cauſa? 5 Etſi aliqui requirant, quia alioqui fieret in fraudem legis; attamen verius eſt non requiri, ſed libere poſſe ad ea loca ſe conferre ſolius operis ſervilis faciendi gratia, & ſic lucrum aliquod colligendi. *Ibid. num. 113.* 6 Quia proprie loquendo non eſt ulla fraus ſi quis jure ſuo utatur, & potius eſt fugere obligationem præcepti, quod cum eodem præcepto non ſit prohibitum, erit res ex ſe indifferens. *Ibid.*

It is a ſtrange right, this of not obſerving Feſtivals, and to play in this manner with the Church, by eluding its Commandment. If all the Inhabitants would make uſe of this pretended right, and betake themſelves every one to his own affairs, to his work, or would only walk abroad for their divertiſement out of the Pariſh where the Feaſt is, there would be no Feaſt, or indeed the Rector muſt celebrate it all alone, or with his Prieſts only, if he have any.

But this Authors reaſon is pleaſant, that to depart expreſly out of the Pariſh where the Feaſt is, to labour in another where there is no Feaſt, is not to deceive, but only to avoid the Precept of the Church. As if to avoid payment of what we owe, were not to deceive, and a child ought not to be taken for diſobedient and rebellious who flyes away, that he may not do what his father commands him.

And that which he adds to confirm this reaſon, is alſo very conſiderable: That the Church not forbidding to depart out of the Pariſh where the Feaſt is, it
24360 is a thing indifferent and free to every one; and by conſequence there is no obligation upon any one to ſay and keep Feaſts.

By the Judgment of this Jeſuit the Manuals of the Church muſt be reformed, and when the Rector doth thenceforth recommend a Feaſt to his Pariſhioners; it will not be ſufficient to ſay, that they are obliged to obſerve it, he muſt alſo forbid them on the Churches behalf from going out of the Pariſh to diſcharge themſelves of their obligation. The Commandment of the Church muſt likewiſe be reformed, and not ſay only, as it hath done hitherto, *Thou ſhalt ſanctifie the Feaſts*, but add alſo; Thou ſhalt not flye out of the Pariſh where they are kept, to diſcharge thy ſelf of the obligation of keeping them holy: becauſe without this be done, all the Pariſhioners may abandon the Church, according to this new Divinity, and leave the Rector to officiate alone.

Another Expedient *Eſcobar* gives us to defeat this Command, is to keep infidel Servants and Workmen, who may be employed and made to work on Feaſt-days. That he might eſtabliſh this Maxime, he demands: (7) *Whether ſervile works are only forbidden unto Chriſtians on Feaſt-days, or to all ſorts of perſons in-*

7 Prohibentur opera ſervilia in Feſtis communiter? tantum Chriſtianis, an omnibus

[1] Haud damnandus Dominus qui hujuſmodi opera mancipio imponeret Infideli, quia mancipium Infidele non peccat, ſiquidem legibus Eccleſiæ non tenetur. *Ib. cap. 4. num. 13. pag. 101.*

Unde putat Layman licitum eſſe imponere onera ſervilia perpetuo amentibus, quia non delinquunt. *Ibid.*

*differently?* He anſwers, (1) *That a Maſter is not to be condemned who commands an Infidel ſervant to employ himſelf in his work on Feaſt-days.* And his reaſon is, *becauſe this Infidel ſlave ſins not, in as much as he is not obliged to obſerve the Laws of the Church.*

He might have ſaid the ſame thing of Atheiſts and Fools. And indeed he ſaith 24370
that it is *Laymans* opinion, (2) at the leaſt in fools. But if this were ſo, it were advantagious to take Atheiſts and Infidels for ſervants. This is without doubt to teſtifie a great love to the Laws of God and the Church, to cauſe them to be violated by others, when we cannot do it our ſelves; as if the act and fault of a Servant did not recoil upon the Maſter that commanded it.

A fool indeed ſins not, no more than a Horſe when he works on Feaſt-days; but he that makes the one and the other work, ſhall bear the ſin, becauſe he is the Author of the work, and it is he properly that works, as it is the Plow-man that turns up the land, rather than the Plow and the Oxen which he uſes thereunto: And it ſeems that they ought to renounce reaſon, who have renounced the obedience they owe unto God and the Church, that they may imagine that they offend not in cauſing that to be done in their houſes, for their own intereſt alone, which is forbidden, and which they dare not do themſelves.

Father *Bauny* in the 17. Chap. of his Sum, pag. 266. wherein he treats expreſly of this matter, ſaith that thoſe who neglect to honour and ſanctifie the Lords-days, *do plunge themſelves into a great and very enormous crime*; and he ſaith after, *that if they would avoid it, as they are obliged, they ſhould take the pains to hear Maſs, and not to work.* He reduces all the Sanctification of Feaſts to hearing Maſs, and not working; whatſoever we do the reſt of the day, he pretends we are diſcharged.

To give authority to his imagination, he ſaith *that the holy Apoſtles have commanded us both theſe things, by the teſtimony of S.* Auſtin, 261 *Serm. de Tempore.* 24380
See here his words, *Apoſtoli Dominicum diem, & Apoſtolici viri ideo religioſa ſolennitate habendum ſanxerunt, quia in eodem Redemptor noſter à mortuis ſurrexit, quiq; ideo Dominica appellatur, ut in eo terrenis operibus vel mundi illecebris abſtinentes tantum divinis cultibus ſerviamus.* The Apoſtles and Apoſtolick men have therefore ordained that the Lords-day ſhould be celebrated with Religious Solemnity, becauſe thereon our Saviour aroſe from the dead, whence it is that it is alſo called the Lords-day, that in it abſtaining from all earthly labours and worldly pleaſures, we ſhould give our ſelves only unto the Service of God.

He makes great account, and lays a great ſtreſs upon this paſſage, and he would have it obſerved as very important in this matter, believing he had therein found all he ſought for: *See*, ſaith he, *how he forbids us on the holy Lords-days to employ our ſelves in manual operations?*

I will not inſiſt on it, that this learned Divine quotes a Sermon as S. *Auſtins*, which notwithſtanding is not his. But I cannot but admire the ſimplicity of this good man, who brings for proof of his Propoſition a paſſage which deſtroys it, and which proves evidently the quite contrary to what he pretends. For the Author of this Sermon ſpeaking of that part of the Commandment which forbids to work on Feſtival and Lords-days, requires us on theſe days not only to cut off all buſineſſes and cares about all earthly things; but worldly pleaſures and diverſiſements alſo; *Ut in eo terrenis operibus & mundi illecebris abſtinentes*, &c. And on the contrary this Jeſuit and his Brethren allow a multitude of perſons to work, and leave an entire liberty to the whole world, to delight themſelves with what pleaſures and divertiſements they pleaſe: even with thoſe which are forbidden by Gods Laws, without herein doing any thing contrary to the Com- 24390
mandment of the Church or Sanctification of the Feaſts: *provided only they take the pains to hear Maſs*, as ſaith *Bauny*.

And for the other part of the Commandment which concerns the Sanctification of the Feaſt-days, he makes his blindneſs to appear much more clearly in what he relates out of the ſame Author and the Councils who evidently condemn his opinion in the very places he alledges, as we ſhall preſently ſee in the ſecond Part of this Chapter.

## II. POINT.

### SECTION I.

*That for the Sanctification of the Lords-day it ſuffices, according to the Jeſuits, to hear one low Maſs; that we may hear it where we will, the whole or part, and at as many parcels as we pleaſe.*

THis Author whom Father *Bauny* cites, after he had ſaid that the Apoſtles had ordained that we ſhould abſtain on the Lords-day from the buſineſs and pleaſures of the world, adds that they ordained this only the better to diſpoſe us by this retrenchment of our pleaſures and work, to keep holy this day in the holy Service of God, without employing our ſelves in any other thing; *ut in eo terrenis operibus, vel mundi illecebris abſtinentes, tantum divinis cultibus ſerviamus.* And Father *Bauny* ſaith that we are quit of all obligation to ſanctifie the Lords and Feaſt-days, *If we take the pains on thoſe Holy-days to hear Maſs.*

14400 And continuing to cite the ſame Author, as if he were for him; *And for the Maſs*, ſaith he, which is part of the honour which God requires of us on this day, he ſpeaks thus: *In die vero nullus ſe à Miſſarum Sacrârum celebratione ſeparet, neque quis domi remaneat cæteris ad Eccleſiam pergentibus, neque in venatione ſe occupet.* On that day let no man ſeparate himſelf from the celebration of the Sacred Maſs, nor let any ſtay behind at home whilſt others go to Church, nor ſpend his time in hunting.

If he would draw any advantage from this paſſage, he ought at leaſt to have cut off theſe laſt words; *neque in venatione ſe occupet.* For citing them as out of S. *Auſtin* who relates the Commandment of the Apoſtles, he acknowledgeth that according to S. *Auſtin* and the Apoſtles, hunting is forbidden on the Lords-day, which nevertheleſs, according to the opinion of this Father and his Brethren, is lawful on this day for thoſe perſons who employ themſelves therein only for recreation.

He ought alſo have taken notice, that this place makes nothing at all for him, and in no wiſe proves what he pretends. For this Author whom he cites, ſaith indeed that no perſon ought to diſpenſe with himſelf for hearing Maſs on the Lords-day; but he ſaith not that this will ſuffice him to acquit himſelf as he ought of this Precept which commands him to ſanctifie this day. And how was it poſſible for him to ſay that, having ſaid immediately before, that the intent of God and the Church is, that we ſhould not buſie our ſelves in any other thing than his Service. *Ut in eo tantum divinis cultibus ſerviamus.*

After *Bauny* had ſo well expounded this paſſage, and had made ſo happy uſe of it unto his deſign, he joyns the Authority of the Councils to that of the Apoſtles and S. *Auſtins*, and he goes on with his diſcourſe in this manner: *The Councils ſay as much. That of* Mayence, *cap.* 17. *and of* Tours 3. *both in the year* 813. 14410 *in the time of* Leo III. *and of* Charles *the Great, and the* 6. *of* Conſtantinople *in the* 8. *Chapter, in theſe terms: Dici vero Dominici tanta debet eſſe obſervantia, ut præter Orationes & Miſſarum ſolennia, & ea quæ ad veſcendum pertinent, nihil fiat:* So great ought the obſervance of the Lords-day to be, that beſides prayers and the ſolemn celebration of Maſſes, nothing ſhould be done, but what appertains to dreſſing of meat.

It would not be eaſie to find in the Councils a paſſage more expreſs than this for condemning Father *Bauny* and his Brethrens opinion concerning the Sanctification of the Lords-day; and yet he produces it, and pretends to make uſe of it as a ſtrong proof for himſelf.

*Bauny* would have handy labour only forbidden on the Lords-day, and the Council which he cites, forbids us doing any thing on that day, but what is neceſſary for our lives, *ut præter ea quæ ad veſcendum pertinent nihil fiat.* *Bauny* maintains, that in hearing Maſs we ſatisfie the Precept which commands us to

sanctifie the Lords-day; and the Council declares, that we ought to employ all the day in the actions of Piety and Religion, such as are prayers, presence at the Mass and divine Service: forbidding all other sorts of employments and divertisements; *ut præter orationes & Missarum solennia nihil fiat.*

*Layman* speaking of the obligation to sanctifie Festival days, expounds it in this manner: (1) *The other part of the Commandment of the Church which regards the observation of Festivals, is affirmative, and ordains that all the Faithful, who have the use of reason, should hear the whole Mass with attention.*

1 Alterum quod in Ecclesiastico præcepto de observatione Festorum continetur, affirmativum est; ut omnes Fideles usum rationis habentes integram Missam cum attentione audiant. *Layman lib 4. tr. 7. cap. 3. num. 1. pag. 184.*

If you be concerned to know which Mass ye are obliged to hear, he will answer you, (2) *That for fulfilling this Precept, it is indifferent whether the Faithful hear on Feast-days an high or low Mass.* If you represent unto him the obligation they are under to hear the high Mass in their own Parishes, he will resolve you this doubt by telling you, that there is not an absolute obligation of hearing Mass only in your Parish: *Neither is there any Church appointed, as namely that of your Parish, for hearing Mass,* saith he, *but in what place soever the Faithful hear it, they satisfie the Precept of the Church.* 24420

2 Non refert ad præcepti hujus adimpletionem utrum Fideles Festo die interfint Missæ solemni vel privatæ. *Ibid. num. 3.* 3 Neque etiam certa Ecclesia, puta Parochialis, pro Missa audienda definita est; sed ubicunque Fideles Missam audiant, præcepto Ecclesiæ satisfactum. *Ibid.*

He will acknowledge indeed that the Bishops and Pastors of the Church ordain that the Faithful hear Mass in their own Parish; but he acknowledges not their voice in this point for the voice of the Church, and he makes no scruple to say that the Faithful are not obliged to obey them, grounding himself upon the Authority of *Suarez* and *Tolet*, (4) *who give*, to that he speaks of, *this advice: that the Command which the Bishop makes unto those under his Charge, to hear Mass every one in his own Parish, is not obliging*; pretending that the Bishops themselves have not power to command this, without doubt, because they have not received it from *Suarez* nor *Tolet*, there being no appearance for them to say, that they have not received it from Jesus Christ, since he hath given them Authority to govern their people, and to command them whatsoever they judged profitable to their Salvation and the good of the Church, and hath said unto them, that whosoever obeyeth them, obeyeth him in their persons, and that they who despise them, despise him himself. Besides many Councils have ordained, that we should be present at Masses in our Parish, who deserve not to be heard, according to these Jesuits, as having gone beyond their power, and made rash Ordinances. 24430

4 Ubi admonent non obligare præceptum Episcopi ut subditi Missam audiant in propria Parœchia. *Ibid.*

*Tamburin* troubles not himself to know whether there be any Ordinance which forbids the hearing of private Masses in Religious houses, to the prejudice of the Parochial. For he pretends that these Decrees are abolished by custom. (5) *That if the Text de Parochis, cap. 2. say the contrary, it is at this day abolished by use and custom.*

5 Quod si textus, cap. 2. de Parochis contrarium dicat, jam is est usu & consuetudine abrogatus. *Tambur. lib. 1. meth. celebr. Miss. cap. 4. sect. 5. num. 6.*

*Diceastillus* before him had assured us the same thing. (6) *Whatsoever may be said by the Ancients, it is altogether certain at present,* saith he, *according to these Authors, that the ancient Law is abrogated by the custom.* And which is astonishing, after he had given unto this custom, which is a visible disorder, the power of abrogating the Right and Laws of the Church, he denies the Bishop the power to destroy this custom by his Ordinances. (7) *The Bishop,* saith he, *cannot order every one to hear Mass in his own Parish; because, according to the usage of the Church, every one is free to hear any where.*

6 Sed ubiq; & quæcunque Missa audiatur satisfit præcepto, quidquid aliqui ex antiquis dixerint, jam enim certissimum est apud omnes authores, antiquum jus consuetudine abrogatum esse. *Diceastill. de Sacr. Miss. tract. 5. disp. 5. dub. 4. num. 56.*

7 Episcopus non potest præcipere ut quisque audiat Missam in sua Parochia, eo ipso quod secundum Ecclesiæ usum liberum sit cuique ubique audire. *num. 59.*

So if you will believe these Divines, all the Sanctification of Feasts and Lords-days are reduced to the hearing of a Mass, and that a low Mass, and to hear that where we please, let the Bishops and Councils say what they will.

But if any one have not devotion and leisure to hear Mass, *Dicastillus* hath taken care to accommodate persons of Quality. (1) *If they cannot*, saith he, *conveniently remit publick Affairs to another time, they are exempt from the observation of this Precept.*

1 Senatores ac reliqui primarii viri qui Reipublicæ negotia in aliud tempus rejicere commode nequeunt. *Dicastillus de Sacr. Miss. tract. 5. disp. 5. dub. 10. sect. 5. n. 207.*

But that we might not accuse him for accepting of mens persons, he allows Servants not to go to Mass. (2) *If they must rise early thereto, and sleep less than they are accustomed.* If they were urged with their own affairs, sleep and drowsiness would not keep them in bed; and if their Master had *commanded them to rise very early in the morning* to follow him on hunting, or to do some infamous service for him, this Jesuit would have obliged him to obey him, and yet he dispenses with them for obeying the Commandment of the Church to serve God, in hearing Mass, if to observe this Commandment, *they must rise earlier and sleep less than they were wont.*

2 Famuli in locis ubi non est nisi una Missa, moderato somno extraordinariam adhibere diligentiam non tenentur, v. g. nimis diluculo surgendo, & ab ordinario & nimis demendo, vel aliquid simile præstando. Ad hoc enim non obligat præceptum. *num.* 214.

But if you would not hear a whole Mass, these new Casuists hold, that one may satisfie this duty by hearing part only: and it's a shameful thing to see how they talk thereof, how they divide and cut into pieces, as we may say, the most holy things in Religion, disputing and contesting one against another to determine precisely what part of the Mass may be omitted, and what is absolutely obliging to be heard to satisfie the Churches Command. They are all agreed, that he sins against the Commandment, who comes short of any notable part of the Mass; but they are at difference how to determine this notable part.

*Coninck* saith that he wants a notable part who hears the Mass only from after the Gospel. Others reduce it to a moity or third part of the Mass, as *Azor* who demands, (3) *What part of the Mass shall we hold to be notable?* And he answers, *That all are agreed, that the half or third part is notable.*

3 Quslem, secundum communem sententiam, committeret qui veniret post Evangelium. *Coninck de Sacr. q. 83. a. 6. dub. unico num. 285. pag. 285.*

*Bonny* in his Sum, cap. 17. pag. 277. is bolder than the rest, because he speaks after them. For he determines more particularly what part of the Mass we are obliged to hear precisely to satisfie the Precept. *This is my opinion*, saith he, 1 *that he who hears the Mass from the Offertory inclusively, until the after Communion, satisfies the Precept; because he finds himself present at all the essential and integral parts of that Mass.* I know not who hath given him Authority to diminish the Mass in this sort, and to chop off from it, as I may say, the head and the feet, by cutting away the beginning and the end of it.

4 Quænam pars Missæ notabilis habeatur? Inter omnes convenit dimidiam aut tertiam partem esse notabilem. *Azor lib. 7. cap. 8. pag 630.*

There are found some others who are yet more subtle on this subject, and teach us to cut the Mass in two in the middle, and to joyn the parts of two different Masses together, thereof to make up one entire one. *Azor* in the place I now alledged, gives us this Expedient, and saith that he that will make use thereof, shall acquit himself very well of his obligation to hear Mass; (4) *Because he doth all that is contained in the Precept, as much as the Church doth simply command when the whole Mass is heard, since it commands not the whole Mass to be heard of one and the same Priest.*

5 Præstat quidquid in præcepto continetur. Nec enim præcipit Ecclesia ut ab eodem Sacerdote totum & integrum Sacrum, sed simpliciter ut Missam totam audiamus. reliquam partem *Azor supra.* 6 Utrum qui venit ad unum Sacrum paulo ante consecrationem, v. g. & audit illius Sacri, & aliud sequens usque ad consecrationem exclusive, satisfacit præcepto Ecclesiæ? *Coninck supra num. 287.*

*Coninck* is also of this opinion in the place which I have now cited, where he makes this Question: (5) *Whether he who comes to the Mass, for example, a little before the Consecration, and hears that which remains of that same Mass, and the beginning of another said after, to the Consecration exclusively, satisfies the Precept of the Church?* He affirms that they who hold the negative, are grounded upon a very strong and effectual reason, which is, that he who carries the matter so, hears not any one whole Mass, whereunto nevertheless he is obliged by the

Commandment of the Church: (1) *For that*, ſaith he, *theſe two parts of two different Maſſes are independent one on another, they cannot make up an entire Maſs; whereunto nevertheleſs he is obliged; and this reaſon ſpeaking in rigour, proves this opinion effectually enough.* But quickly after theſe words he adds, that notwithſtanding this, (2) *Becauſe there are many Doctors who teach the contrary, he that ſo carries the buſineſs is in ſafety, and its probable that he ſatisfies this Commandment.*

1 Quia cum duæ illæ partes ſint inter ſe omnino indepen-dentes, non poſſunt integrum ſacrificium conſtituere, & conſequenter qui eas audit, non audit Miſſam integram, ad quam tamen obligatur; & hæc ratio in rigore loquendo hanc ſententiam ſatis efficaciter probat. *Ibid.* 2 Quia tamen plurimi Doctores docent contrarium, abſolute loquendo talis eſt ſecurus, & probabile eſt eum ſatisfacere. *Ibid.*

He aſſures this man upon a ſimple probability and the word of ſome Caſuiſts, againſt the Authority of the Church, ſince he confeſſes that it intended a whole entire Maſs, and which is not ſo, if it be not ſaid of one and the ſame Prieſt, and againſt reaſon, which he acknowledges to be evident and forcible; as if the new Caſuiſts ought to carry it againſt the Church and Reaſon it ſelf. 2447o

He is not content to renounce reaſon to follow a new and corrupt practice, and to take the liberty to overturn the Laws of the Church under pretence of expounding them; he would alſo caſt the fault of this licentiouſneſs and contempt of the Authority and Laws of the Church upon it ſelf. For to ſupport his anſwer, he ſaith, (3) *That the Church knowing well that the Laws are thus expounded by grave Doctors, and ſuffering their Expoſitions to be imprinted and taught publickly, is thought to ſweeten its Laws, and to moderate them according to theſe Explications.*

3 Ratio eſt quia cum Eccleſia ſciat ſuas leges ita à gravibus Doctoribus explicari, hoc ipſo quo eorum explicationes permittit publice imprimi & doceri, cenſetur ſuum præceptum juxta eas moderari. *Ibid.*

As if the Church approved all things it tolerates, or which comes not to its knowledge. A new Inquiſition altogether extraordinary would need to be eſtabliſhed to examine all the Errours which are in the new Books. And becauſe the Paſtors of the Church diſſemble them ſometimes, and ſuffer them with ſorrow and groaning, ſeeing at preſent neither means nor diſpoſition to correct or repreſs them, it is to do them great wrong, and to abuſe unjuſtly their patience and forbearance to draw from thence advantage to deceive the world, and to make the Commonalty and ſimple people believe that the Biſhops approve by their ſilence all that they condemn not openly, though they frequently lament it before God: See here how errours and abuſes ſlide into the Church, and eſtabliſh themſelves therein by little and little; they that have introduced them pretending at laſt to make them paſs for Laws and Rules of the Church. 24480

*Bauny* in his Sum, cap. 27. pag. 181. propoſes alſo this queſtion: *Whether it be ſatisfactory to the Precept of hearing Maſs, to hear one part of it of one Prieſt, and another of a ſecond different from the firſt?* He quotes *Emanuel Sa* and others who hold the affirmative, and approving this opinion, he adds: *I hold it for true, for that hearing it in that manner, that is done which the Church would have. For it is true to ſay that he who hears of one Prieſt ſaying the Maſs after he is entred into the Church, that which follows the Conſecration unto the end, and of a ſecond who ſucceeds the firſt, that which goes before the Conſecration, hath heard all the Maſs, ſince he hath been found preſent indeed at all its parts.*

He ſtays not here. He ſaith moreover, that we may not only hear the Maſs in this manner in parts at twice, when two Prieſts ſay it in courſe and ſucceſſively without interruption; but alſo at thrice or four times, and more with interruption and at as great a diſtance of time as we will. And becauſe he ſaw that this opinion might be ill received becauſe of its novelty, he would make it paſſable under the name of *Azor*, that we might not believe that he invented it himſelf. *It is demanded*, ſaith he, *if this ought to be done in an uninterrupted ſucceſſion, and without intermiſſion of time?* Azor p. 1. lib. 7. cap. 3. q. 3. *anſwers no, and that dividing it, we may at divers times attend unto ſo many parts of the Maſs, as may make up one entire Maſs.* 24490

That is to ſay, that we may hear it of ſo many different Prieſts as there are parts in the Maſs, provided that what we have heard of every one apart being

joyned together, contain all that is ſaid in a Maſs; and though the Prieſts ſay theſe Maſſes at far diſtant times and Altars, we fail not by hearing them in this manner, to ſatisfie the Commandment of the Church, and to have truly heard an entire Maſs compoſed of parts ſo different and incoherent. It were better to oppoſe the Commandment of the Church openly, than to make ſport with it in ſo ridiculous a manner, and with ſo ſtrange a liberty, which can be good for nothing but to make the Maſs and all Religion contemptible to Hereticks and Atheiſts.

In the mean time this goodly reaſon which ſuffices to fulfil the Precept of the Church, by attending at all parts of the Maſs in what manner ſoever we hear them, whether it be in a continued ſucceſſion, and at once, or by many parts, and at divers times, hath brought things to ſuch a paſs, that ſome exceed ſo far as to ſay, that entring into a Church where we find two Prieſts at two Altars, whereof the one hath newly begun his Maſs, and the other is at the middle of his, if we attend at once to the one from the beginning unto the middle, and to the other from the middle unto the end, we ſhall thereby diſcharge our duty of hearing Maſs.

24500 *Bauny* cites for this opinion *Azor* and ſome others, and *Azor* ſpeaks in theſe terms: *If that be true which the ſecond opinion affirms, I ſee nothing to hinder but he may fulfil the Precept, who entring into a Church hears the Maſs in two parts of two ſeveral Prieſts who ſay it at the ſame time. For as for attention he may lend it to them both at once. For this cauſe I approve this opinion, not becauſe it is grounded on a ſufficiently forcible reaſon; but becauſe it is ſupported by the Authority of conſiderable perſons.*

1 Non video, ſi verum eſt quod ſecunda opinio docet, quin ſatisfaciat præcepto qui eadem Sacram ingreſſus, duos Sacerdotes rem Sacram facientes audit ſimul per partes. Nam quod attinet ad attentionem, poteſt ad utrumque animum intendere. Quæ ſecunda ſententia mihi ſolum probatur, quia tantorum virorum eſt autoritate, non efficaci ratione ſuffulta. *Azor inſtit. mor. lib. 7. cap. 3. pag. 631.*

He acknowledges that this opinion is ridiculous in it ſelf, and contrary to the Commandments of the Church, and the reſpect which is due unto the Maſs, and is alſo without reaſon and ſolid foundation; and for all that he forbears not to approve it, for fear of diſobliging and reproaching thoſe who maintain it, to whoſe Authority he chuſes rather to ſubmit his Judgment, than to that of the Church and Reaſon.

*Coninck* ſaith the ſame thing, and he approves alſo this opinion as the more probable, though he follows it not, being reſtrained by this ſingle conſideration, (2) *That the Doctors do not aſſure us that this latter doth fulfil the Precept as well as they do for the former.*

2 Quia Doctores non eodem modo aſſerunt hunc ſatisfacere ſicut priorem. *Coninck ſupra.*

Here it is remarkable what ſubmiſſion and reſpect theſe Caſuiſts have for one another, which proceed ſo far as to make them renounce reaſon and truth, rather than to ſeparate from, and contradict one anothers opinions, if it be not rather ſome combination in a faction or private intereſt that obliges them thereunto. They give themſelves the liberty to reject the holy Fathers, and to preſer their proper imaginations and new opinions before the ancient Doctrine of thoſe

24510 Great Maſters of Divinity, as we have obſerved on many occaſions; and they are very tender of departing from the opinions of the Caſuiſts of theſe times, though they doubt that they are far off from reaſon and truth, eſtabliſhing by this means the Caſuiſts as Judges and Maſters of truth, and their novel opinions as the Law and Rule of Manners and Religion.

*Tolet* treating of this ſubject, ſpeaks thus: (3) *There are ſome who ſay, that if one hear the half of a Maſs of one Prieſt, and the reſt of another, he doth thereby ſatisfie the Precept, as well as if he had heard the whole Maſs entire. And this ſeems probable unto me.*

3 Aliqui volunt quod ſi quis mediam Miſſam audiret ab uno Sacerdote & reliquam ab alio, quod ſatisfaceret præcepto. Nam Miſſam integram audire, & mihi videtur probabile. *Tolet. Inſtit. ſacerd. lib. 6. cap. 7. num. 8. pag. 1030.*

*Eſcobar* takes it for granted as certain and general, that it is lawful to hear the Maſs in parts of divers Prieſts; and afterwards he makes a perſon that adviſes with him to talk in theſe terms: (4) *You have ſaid that we may hear the one half of the Maſs of one Prieſt, and the other half of another: I demand of you whether we*

4 Dixiſti poſſe quem partem Miſſæ ab uno, partem ab alio Sacerdote exaudire; Rogo an poſſit prius pars poſterior Miſſæ audiri & poſtea prior?

*may first hear the latter part of the Mass, and afterwards the former?* To which he answers thus: (1) Turrianus *saith you may; because so that is accomplished in substance which is commanded by the Precept; and therein he only inverts the order.* This is not the only point wherein the Jesuits make no dainty to overturn the order which the Holy Ghost hath established in the Mysteries of Religion and the Church.

He inquires also, (2) *Whether we may at once and the same time hear the Mass of two Priests, whereof the one is newly begun, and the other is at the Consecration?* And he answers, *That* Hurtado *believes it, because as* Azor *saith, one may attend to both Priests.* So that a person who could at the same time apply his mind to five or six Priests who said Mass together, and were in divers parts of the Sacrifice, might in a moment discharge the obligation of hearing Mass, taking from each a part to compose one compleat Mass in his mind. 24520

And it is upon this Principle that *Escobar* relyes, when he saith also, (3) *That he holds that probable which a certain Author*, whom he names not, *hath taught, that a person obliged by precept, vow, or penance imposed on him to hear three Masses, may fulfil it by attending at once to three Priests who celebrate at once.*

1 Asserit Turrianus select. p. 2. d. 16. dub. 7. quia præceptum quoad substantiam impletur, & solum invertitur ordo. *Escobar tract. 1. Exam. 11. num. 73. pag. 189.*

2 Potestne simul & eodem tempore audiri quando ex duobus Sacerdotibus unus Missam inchoaret, alter consecrationi daret operam? Affirmat Hurtado de Sacr. tom. 2. de Missa dub. 5. diff. 4. quia ut Azorius p. 1. lib. 1. cap. 3. q. 3. ait, potest quis ad utrumque Sacerdotem animum intendere. *Ibid.* 3 Unde aliquis docuit probabiliter ex præcepto, ex voto, ex pœnitentia injuncta obligatum tres Missas audire, satisfacere si simul à tribus Sacerdotibus eodem tempore celebrantibus audiat. *Ibid.*

There is nothing so easie as thus to accomplish Commands, Penances, & Vows. But this accomplishment will deserve a greater penance than the former, because it is nothing else than a playing with, and deriding Religion approaching unto impiety, when a man is commanded to hear three Masses, or to hear them as they are ordinarily heard in the Church, and according to the custom of Christians fearing God, and attending at his holy Sacrifice of the Mass, and not in a way so new-conceited, and capricious; this ridiculous invention of hearing three Masses, and even twenty or thirty in less than half an hour, if so many Priests were to be had who might celebrate at the same time, being never heard of by any man before. 24530

## SECTION II.

*That according to the Jesuits the Precept of hearing Mass may be satisfied, by hearing them without internal Devotion, Attention, Intention, even with an expres intent not to satisfie, and whilst we entertain our selves alone or with others with other discourse and wicked and dishonest thoughts.*

ALL that we have hitherto produced out of the Jesuit-Divinity concerning the obligation and manner of hearing Mass, respects precisely the outward Sanctification of Festivals only. We must say one word of the internal Disposition; and see with what devotion and attention they hold it ought to be heard that the Precept may be fulfilled.

*Coninck* taking the question higher, and making it general of all the Commands of the Church, maintains, (4) *That to satisfie it there needs no internal devotion*; and that it suffices to do that outwardly which it ordains; and he draws from this general Maxime a particular Conclusion, which is as follows: (5) *That he who is distracted the whole time of the Mass even voluntarily, satisfies the Precept of the Church, provided he have attention enough to attend at the Mass with outward devotion.* He had said before, according to the same Maxime, that 24540

4 Non est necessarium ut quis præcise satisfaciat præcepto Ecclesiæ, ut habeat internam aliquam devotionem. *Coninck de Sacr. q. 83. a. 6. dub. unico. num. 301. pag. 186.* 5 Hinc sequitur eum qui etiam voluntarie est toto tempore Sacri distractus, modo sibi sufficienter præsens sit ut Sacro cum externa devotione assistat, satisfacere Ecclesiæ præcepto. *Ibid. num. 302.* Possumus Ecclesiæ præceptis satisfacere per actum qui non sit vera virtus; imo qui sit peccatum. *Ibid. num. 295.*

the Command of the Church may be ſatisfied by an action not only not good, but even really a ſin.

*Azor* ſaith the ſame thing, and he expounds it more at length. (1) *It is demanded*, ſaith he, *whether he that ſins in hearing the Maſs, fulfils the Commands?* He reports firſt of all the opinions of the Ancients, ſaying, (2) *There have been ſome heretofore who believed generally, that no precept could be accompliſhed by an action that was bad in it ſelf.* They that held this opinion were all the holy Fathers and ancient Divines. (3) *But their opinion*, if you will believe this Author, *is now rejected with common conſent.* Without doubt, becauſe it is not large and obſequious enough for thoſe who have ſince invented others to ſweeten or rather to diſparage and aboliſh the Commands of the Church. The reaſon of this Jeſuit is, (4) *Becauſe*, according to him, *charity and the deſire of a good end is not neceſſary to accompliſh a precept in ſubſtance; that is to ſay, ſimply to perform what is commanded.*

1 An præcepto & legi ſatisfaciat qui cum peccato rem audit divinam? *Azor inſtit. mor. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 635.*

2 Fuere qui ſenſerint generatim nullum præceptum per actum qui ſit per ſe malus, impleri. *Ibid.*

3 Sed horum opinio communi eſt omnium conſenſu refutata. *Ibid.* 4 Neque enim ad præceptorum ſubſtantiam ſervandam requiritur charitas aut boni finis voluntas.

24550 He reduces his Maxime into Examples, which is a means to facilitate the underſtanding and practice thereof; he takes theſe Examples in part from S. *Antonin*, whoſe opinion he relates and refutes. This Saint ſaith, that a man who goes to Church only to look on Women, and to entertain himſelf with filthy thoughts in beholding them, ſo that without this he would not go to Church, nor hear Maſs on a Feaſt-day, doth not fulfil the Precept, if he be there with ſuch inclinations. But *Azor* rejects this opinion, eluding it by a very ſubtle diſtinction. He durſt not abſolutely deny but this man commits a great crime; but he ſaith, that this crime is againſt God who forbids luſt, and not againſt the Church which obligeth him to hear Maſs.

See how *Azor* diſcourſes: (4) *S.* Antonin *would ſay that a man that goes not to Church but only to ſee a woman, and ſatisfie his luſtful deſires, who without this would not go, ſins. Which is true, not becauſe he hath violated the Command to hear Maſs, but becauſe he went to Church for a diſhoneſt paſſion and pleaſure only, and becauſe he heard the Maſs with a ſpirit altogether diſordered. For this cauſe, ſpeaking in general, we muſt hold their opinion true, who ſay that though we ſin in hearing Maſs, yet we fail not of ſatisfying the precept.*

4 S. Antoninus id voluit dicere ejuſmodi hominem alias ad templum nullo modo acceſſurum niſi fœminæ videndæ, aut intemperanter appetendæ cauſa, peccare. Id verum eſt, non in eo quod rem divinam & præceptum omiſerit, ſed quod libidinis & voluptatis gratia, & quod depravato animi affectu rem divinam audierit. Quare ſi generatim loquamur, omnino verum eſt aliorum reſponſum, hoc præceptum ſervari etiamſi cum peccato res divina audiatur. templum adierit *Ibid.*

*Tambourin* ſaith the ſame thing in terms capable to ſtrike them with horrour 24560 who know what the Sacrifice of the Maſs is. (5) *If any one*, ſaith he, *attend at Maſs to look on a woman, or to attain ſome vain-glory, he ſatisfies the precept, provided in the mean time he attend to the Sacrifice.* According to this Author the Sacrifice of the Maſs may be attended to whilſt we entertain and feed our minds with thoughts of luſt and vanity; that is to ſay, that we may at the ſame time ſacrifice unto God and the Devil: with this difference that tends alſo to the Devils advantage, that he is adored and ſerved truly with the heart by the vanity and luſt which it voluntarily entertains. Whereas the homage we owe unto God in this eſtate, is only apparent and altogether outward, and conſiſts in nothing but the preſence and poſture of the body. And yet this Jeſuit will have the Church hold it ſelf ſatisfied with this manner of being preſent at Maſs, as with an entire accompliſhment of its Precept. Nothing more horrible can be ſpoken againſt God, more diſparaging againſt the Church, more ridiculous and contrary to common ſenſe, as well as Faith, and the moſt general reſentments of all Religion.

5 Si Miſſæ quis interſit ad videndam mulierem vel ad aucupandam vanam gloriam, ſatisfacit, ſi interim ſacrificio vacet. *Tambur. l. 4. decal. c. 2 ſect. 1. num. 17*

*Filliutius* ſpeaks alſo the ſame thing, and brings the ſame Example: (6) *An evil intention*, ſaith he, *as to look laſciviouſly upon a woman, joyned with a will to hear Maſs, is not contrary to the precept; wherefore he who hears in this diſpoſition, fulfils it,*

6 Prava intentio adjunctæ voluntati audiendi Miſſam, ut

aſpiciendi multitudinem libidinoſe, &c. dummodo ſit ſufficiens attentio, non eſt contraria huic præcepto; quare ſatisfacit. *Filliutius qq. moral. tom. 1. tr. 5. c. 7. num. 212. pag. 128.*

1 Niſi vel confabulatio eſſet diſcontinua, partim ſcilicet loquendo, & partim attendendo, u communiter fieri ſolet. *Ibid n. 216.*

*it, provided he give that attention which is neceſſary.* And a little after ſpeaking 2457
of this attention which is required in hearing Maſs, he confeſſes indeed that it were to fail herein to uſe idle talk, and diſcourſe of affairs during the Maſs; but with this exception: (1) *Unleſs this diſcourſe be ſometimes diſcontinued by talking one while, and then attending, as it is uſually done.*

He hath reaſon to ſay, as it is uſually done; becauſe it happens hardly at all to be done otherwiſe amongſt the moſt indevout themſelves. Since though the reſpect for theſe Myſteries could not induce them unto this interruption, yet the diverſity of the actions and Ceremonies of the Maſs would conſtrain thereunto all thoſe who would not appear openly profane. Private diſcourſes muſt needs be interrupted, that we may kneel when the Prieſt deſcends to the foot of the Altar at the beginning of the Maſs, when we ſtand up at the reading of the Goſpel, when we kneel after the Goſpel, or at leaſt before the Conſecration; there is no perſon ſo irreligious as not to be ſilent, and ſhew reſpect at leaſt outwardly when the Prieſt elevates the Hoſt to adore and cauſe it to be adored by the aſſiſtants; as alſo when he communicates, and when he gives the Communion. So that when *Filliutius* ſaith, that talking and diſcourſe of affairs are lawful during the Maſs, and are not contrary to the Commandment of the Church, provided they be interrupted and mingled with ſome attention, he declares openly enough that they be all allowed, there ſcarcely ever being other than of this ſort. *Bauny* is of the ſame opinion, and he expounds it alſo more clearly in his Sum, Chap. 17. 2458
pag. 278. in theſe terms: *Men and women who during the Sacrifice of the Maſs interrupt your prayers by unneceſſary diſcourſes, though often repeated, fulfil the Commandment.* And he adds a little after, *That to be ſlightly diſtracted in prayer, is of it ſelf a ſlight fault.* Whence he infers: *That albeit it be reiterated and multiplied during the Maſs, it can never proceed to be mortal.* And from this diſcourſe he concludes abſolutely. *Therefore to ſpeak a few words to our neighbour, after returning to prayer, and from thence to talk again, is not a thing which in rigour can hinder our attention to the Maſs.*

But if nevertheleſs any perſon would chat continually during the Maſs, theſe Doctors would not condemn him to hear another, provided theſe diſcourſes were not about ſerious matters, but ſlight, and which did not too much employ the mind. *Non de re ſeria, ſed levi, quæ non impediat attentionem neceſſariam.* And this attention is altogether external, and conſiſts in obſerving what the Prieſt doth, and the Ceremonies he practiſes, at leaſt by intervals, that he may ſtand up when he reads the Goſpel, kneel at the Conſecration, and adore our Lord at the elevation of the conſecrated Hoſt.

*Filliutius ſupra num. 216.*

According to this Doctrine, Tradeſmen and women who prattle and are merry together at their work, may in like manner chat and entertain themſelves while they are together at the Maſs; becauſe their ordinary diſcourſes being not ſeldom about ſerious things which buſie their minds, they may apply the ſame attention to the Maſs as to their work; which is ſufficient, according to theſe Divines.

They go ſo far as to ſay, that when diſcourſes made during the Maſs are wicked and diſhoneſt, they hinder not but that the Precept of hearing may be fulfilled. 2459
This is that (2) *Filliutius* ſaith, expounding *Soto* whom he will have to be of this opinion; and *Bauny* would come to agreement with them very eaſily upon this point, ſince he ſaith in his Sum, Chap. 18. pag. 176. *That he thinks they are not blame-worthy, who hold that Prebends and Canons diſcharge their duty who aſſiſting in the Quire during holy Service, paſs their time in ſcandalous diſcourſes, and in an employment altogether vicious, as in laughing, ſcoffing, &c.*

2 Quo pacto explicandus eſt Soto, diſp. 13. q. 2. a. 1. fin. cum dicit; etſi colloquia ſint de rebus indecentibus, tamen impleri. *Ibid. num. 216.*

*Eſcobar* concludes this point by reducing it to the uttermoſt extremity, when he demands, (3) *Whether he that hears the Maſs with a deſign not to fulfil, do fulfil the Precept?* He anſwers, *That he certainly fulfils it, according to Vaſquez's opinion.*

3 Audit quis Sacrum animo non ſatisfaciendi præcepto, ſatisfacitne? Ita plane ex Vaſquez aſſertione. *Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 11. num. 107. pag. 193.*

*Sanchez* saith the same. And that it might appear less odious, he draws it by consequence from another Principle which is yet more strange. (1) *He*, saith he, *who hears the Mass of contempt, accomplisheth the Precept truly. And with much stronger reason he that hears with an intention not to satisfie.* He would have us believe that we may do the will of the Church, doing it expressly against our intention; and that we may obey it by a wilful rebellion, and honour it by an
24600 affected contempt, hearing the Mass with a resolution not to satisfie it in what it desires, and with a formal contempt of its Command.

1 Vere implet audiendi Sacri præceptum illud ex contemptu audiendo; ergo à fortiori cum intentione non satisfaciendi. *Sanch. oper. mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 13. pag. 64.*

It seems impossible to advance farther in this matter, than to say that we accomplish a Precept by an action that we do in contempt of it, and with an intention not to satisfie it. But *Tambourin* goes yet farther. For he finds means not to transgress this Precept, not only with an intention not to accomplish it, but even in not doing outwardly that which is commanded, though it might be done if we would. (2) *We may*, saith he, *lawfully retire some days before a Feast unto some place distant from the Church where we foresee that we might hear a Mass on a Feast-day, though we do it with a design of not hearing, or of not being obliged to hear.*

2 Potest quis licite in aliquem locum distantem ab Ecclesia discedere, in quo prævidet non posse die festivo Missam audire, tempore à die festo remoto, etiam eo fine ne audiat, seu ne teneatur audire Sacrum. *Tambur. l. 4. decal. c. 2. sect 3. n. 6.*

This is a Paradox greater than those of the Stoicks, that we may obey by disobedience, honour by dishonouring, and discharge our duty to God and the Church by sins and crimes contrary to the Ordinances of God and the Church. And there remains nothing more for these Doctors to say, but that crimes and sins are good actions, since they may serve, according to them, to the accomplishment of the Commandments of God and the Church: since God and the Church cannot command other than good actions.

And this is that which *Celot* seems to pretend, when he maintains, that he who hears the Mass out of vain-glory, doth a good work. This is in his 9. Book and 7. Chapter, where he encounters with *Peter Siguenot*, and reproves him for having said, that though we cannot accomplish as we ought the Com-
24610 mandments of God and the Church, without the assistance of Grace; yet we may by the force of Nature only, and without Grace do all the outward actions that are commanded. And to oppose himself unto him more directly, he speaks in these terms: (3) *I maintain on the contrary, that a man who is in an estate of mortal sin, going to Church and Mass on a Feast-day, which is the Commandment, for fear of losing his reputation, though his work be imperfect, ceases not to act by Grace, preventing and accompanying him; and that he offends not against the obedience he owes to the Church.*

3 Ego contra disputo lethali peccato irretitum hominem qui publicæ meu infamiæ templum & Missam ex præcepto Festa die celebrat, id ipsum, licet imperfectum, opus præveniente comitanteque gratia facere, neque obedientiam Ecclesiæ debitam infringere. *Celot lib. 9. cap. 7. pag. 813.*

This action is out of vain-glory, and notwithstanding it must be good and holy if it be done by the motion of preventing and accompanying Grace, as he supposes; or indeed he must say that a sin must proceed of Grace as of its Principle, and that Grace may cause us to sin; which were Blasphemy, or rather a folly greater than theirs who have said that God is the Author of sin. For they have not said that he causes us to sin in giving us Grace, but rather in refusing to give it, and pushing us on unto sin, not by his Grace but by his Power.

Also *Celot* affirms, (4) *That it never came into the thoughts of any man to imagine that the Grace of Jesus Christ could press us on to any action which were sin.* He
24620 declares then, that he who hears the Mass in mortal sin out of vain-glory, or for worldly honour alone, doth it by the motion of the Grace of Jesus Christ; and by consequence that his action is good; and that in this quality it sufficeth to accomplish the Commandment to hear Mass on Feast-days.

4 Cui veniet in mentem dicere nos Christi gratia ad id impelli, quod fit cum peccato? *Ibid. pag. 815.*

This Jesuit pretends that all those who observe any Commandment outwardly as the Jews, and yet in worse manner than the Jews, doing it by a wicked motive, cease not to have the Grace of Jesus Christ, to act by his motion, and to do thereupon good works, though they be not perfect; that is to say, though the good motive, which is to them as the Soul and form, and which should give them perfection, be wanting; and on the contrary, though they be done by a wicked

and criminal motive, ſo that they be in themſelves true ſins and crimes covered with an appearance of good external actions. And ſo, according to this Doctor, ſins and crimes ſhall be good works, proper to content God, and to ſatisfie his Commandments and thoſe of the Church.

## ARTICLE II.

### Of Faſting, and the Commandment to Faſt.

FAſting in the Church conſiſts in abſtinence from certain victuals which it hath forbidden, and to be content with one meal a day, which ſometimes is not taken till in the evening after Even-ſong, or at leaſt after Noon in certain leſs ſolemn Faſt-days, as in the Vigils of Feſtivals; which was practiſed alſo in the days 24630
of S. *Bernard*, and long after, as the Caſuiſts themſelves agree. In our days they have anticipated the time of repaſt, changing ſupper into dinner, and they have of late introduced the cuſtom of making Collations at night.

There is none who ſees not that this change hath brought great relaxation in Faſting, according to what was obſerved and inſtituted by all Antiquity; and it is not without great condeſcenſion that the Church ſuffers that it ſhould be diſcharged by ſuch an obſervation.

The Jeſuits in the mean time find it too ſevere; and to ſweeten and accommodate it to the world, they have reduced it to ſuch a point, that to faſt, according to their Maxims, is in truth not to faſt at all, and to make good chear.

To make this more clearly appear, we will divide this Article into three Points. In the firſt we ſhall ſee how they regulate eating and the hour of repaſt on Faſting-days. In the ſecond what they ſay of drinking and of the Collation at night. And in the third their eaſieneſs to diſpenſe with all ſorts of perſons for Faſting, and upon all ſorts of occaſions, even the moſt criminal and infamous.

### I. POINT. 24640

*That according to the Jeſuits Divinity we may prevent the hour of Repaſt, make it as long and great as we pleaſe, eat more than on another day, and break out into all exceſs and intemperance, without breaking our Faſt.*

B*Auny* in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 251. declares, *that at preſent the hour of repaſt is at Noon*; but he adds, *that we may advance and anticipate this time one hour without ſin*, and he cites for this opinion *Layman*, *Binsfield*, and *Diana*, who ſaith, *that the Religious have this priviledge*. This is no great advantage nor honour for the Religious, that they are the firſt to favour themſelves, and demand priviledge to faſt more at their eaſe. But if *we may prevent and anticipate the time of refection by an hour*, as he ſaith, *without ſin*, there is no need of priviledge for this, and the Religious do ill employ their credits to obtain it. This Jeſuit alſo ſeems not to make any great account of it, ſaying afterwards, *that without any regard thereof they do it, and all others alſo without fault; and that altogether*, that is, Seculars and Monaſticks, *may prevent that time by two or three hours when neceſſity or convenience requires it.* That is, that we may break-faſt on Faſt-days, inſtead of dining, and ſit down at the table at eight or nine of the clock in the morning.

*Eſcobar* ſaith the ſame thing in a manner: He demands, (1) *Whether the* 24650
*Faſt be broken by anticipating the hour of refreſhment on a Faſt-day without cauſe?* He anſwers, (2) *That it is not broken, becauſe it is not of the eſſence of a Faſt to eat at a determined hour.* This anſwer gives an abſolute liberty and without bounds,

1 Anticipatur ſine cauſa hora comedendi die jejunii, ſolviturne?

2 Minime, quia determinatio horæ non eſt de eſſentia jejunii. *Eſcobar tract.* 1. *exam.* 3. *num.* 72. *pag.* 213.

and first of all to prevent the hour of repast on Fast-days, not only two or three hours, as *Bauny* saith, but more also, and it gives power to eat absolutely at what hour we will, *because*, as this Casuist saith, *to eat at one or other determinate hour is not of the essence of a Fast.*

But if any fault be committed in this disorder, it can be at the most but a venial one, according to this Doctor himself. (1) *It will be but a venial sin*, saith he, *if this anticipation be but a small one, as of half an hour. Whence he concludes in favour of the Religious, who have the priviledge to prevent dinner-time by an hour, that they may without sin dine at half an hour past ten.*

1 Delinquetur venialiter, nisi sit exigua anticipatio, ut dimidiæ horæ. *Ibid.*

Colligo Religiosos habentes privilegium anticipandi prandium per horam, posse sine ulla culpa per horam & medium ante meridiem prandere. *Ibid.*

The corrupt custom and looseness of the time gives them half an hour, and their priviledges give them an hour to anticipate their repast. So that they may dine without scruple at half an hour past ten on Fast-days, thereby giving a great example of Penance and Austerity to Seculars and ordinary Christians, who prolong their Fast an hour and a half, or two hours longer than they, and in these times dine not till after-noon.

14660 *Tambourin* flies yet higher than *Escobar*, and maintains that the Religious may dine on Fast-days at nine of the clock and a half in Winter, and at half an hour past eight in the Summer, saying, (2) *As for them who imagine that mid-day is appointed for repast under pain of mortal sin, it is to be observed that they may dine an hour before noon in Winter, and two hours in Summer—— Whence it follows, that the Mendicant Fryars, and those who participate of their priviledges to anticipate their dinners one hour on Fast-days, as it is contained in the Abridgment of the Priviledges of the Society of Jesus, may by this reason dine two hours by the Sun before mid-day in Winter, and three in Summer; because the moral duration of Noon gives them one or two, and the Papal Priviledge another. And because many do grant with probability, that to eat half an hour before the time appointed, even without cause, is no notable fault; because a little matter is considered as nothing; thence it comes, that in Winter they may dine two hours and a half before mid-day, and in Summer three and a half. But if this be done by reason of studying, travelling, or business, it is not so much as a venial sin.*

2 Pro iis quos juvat putare meridiem esse horam sic reficiendi statutam sub mortali, nota eos posse prandere una hora circiter ante meridiem in hyeme. Sanchez d. 53. num. 7. Trul. in d. n 3. cap. 2 dub. 4. num. 2. & dubus in æstate. Ita 2305. s. 4. cap. 18. num. 100. hinc quoniam Mendicantes, & qui eorum privilegia participant, gaudent privilegio anticipandi refectionem per horam, (ita Comp privilegiorum Societatis Jesu) ideo poterunt prandere duabus horis hyeme, tribus æstate ante meridiem. Nam unam aut alteram dat moralitas meridiei, reliquas Papæ concessio. Et quia multi probabiliter censent comedere semi-hora ante statutum vel concessum tempus, etiam sine causa, non esse notabilem culpam; quia parum pro nihilo reputatur, Dian. p. 5. tract 3. num. 10. p. 2. tract. 9. num. 17. p. 2. 19. num. 53. idcirco hyeme poterunt hi duabus horis cum dimidia, æstate tribus cum dimidia ante solarem meridiem mensæ accumbere. Et quidem ex causa studii; itineris, negotii, &c. etiam sine veniali. *Tambur. decal. lib. 4. cap. 5. sect. 4. num. 3.*

This priviledge seemed so considerable unto *Tambourin*, that he would gladly 14670 have it observed here, and to cause all the world to know that it was found worthy to be put into *an Abridgment of the Priviledges of the Society of Jesus*, as one of the most important for the good of the Society it self, and *for the greater Glory of God.* Where it must be observed, that all this is for them *who do imagine that the hour of mid-day is that appointed for repast under pain of mortal sin.* Whence it follows, that they who will not entertain this imagination, may eat in the morning, if it seems good unto them, without breaking their Fast.

As for the quality of the repast that is made on Fast-days, *Tolet* saith you may fare better than you would have done, had it not been Fasting-day. (3) *It is lawful*, saith he, *on a Fasting-day to take something more than usual to dinner.*

3 Licet tempore jejunii aliquid plus accipere in prandio. *Tolet. lib. 6. cap. 2. num. 4. pag. 103.*

*Sanchez* saith the same thing yet more openly, and with greater contempt of the Church and its Commands. (4) *He*, saith he, *who taking his refection on a Fast-day, takes care to fill his belly so with victuals, that he may not be hungry, doth*

4 Qui semel in die jejunii comedit, curans ita stomachum cibis replere, ut nihil prorsus famis patiatur, vere implet præceptum, cum tamen legis intentionem, quæ est saltem aliquem (quemcumque) macerare, despiciat. *Sanchez op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 4. pag. 65.*

*truly fulfil the Precept, though he elude the end of the Law, which is to mortifie the fleſh by hunger.* It is lawful then, according to this great Doctor, to mock the Church in this manner by doing the contrary to what it expects, even then when we ſeem to do what it commands.

*Tolet* proceeds yet farther, ſaying, that what exceſs ſoever we commit in eating or drinking at dinner, and how long time ſoever we ſpend therein, provided 2468
there be no intermiſſion, the Faſt is not broken, though ſobriety be notably violated, and we ſin grievouſly againſt this vertue. So that we may be three or four hours at table after the manner of *Germany*, and drink and eat as much as we will, without breaking the Faſt, and without tranſgreſſing the Order of the Church, according to theſe Fathers. We may accompliſh a Precept of Abſtinence by an exceſs of gluttony; we may faſt without ſobriety; do Penance by ſinning, and mortifie the fleſh and paunch by pampering and ſtuffing it.

In continua autem quantitate prandii non eſt certa ſervanda menſura ratione jejunii; ſed quamvis aliquis multum excedat, non ob id ſolvit jejunium, peccat tamen contra ſobrietatem. *Tolet. ſupra.*

According to this ſolid Divinity, they all in a manner conclude, that drink breaks not the Faſt at what time and in what exceſs ſoever it be taken. At this time (ſaith *Bauny* in his Sum, ſpeaking of the Collation at night, Chap. 16. pag. 255.) drinking concerns not the Faſt, as neither on the day. Which very well agrees with the Inſtitution of the Faſt, and as this Jeſuit ſpeaks himſelf, pag. 258. *with the end for which God and the Church do will and ordain that we ſhould faſt, which is to bridle the fleſh and ſubdue the appetite under the dominion of reaſon.* Uſe and exceſs of drinking, eſpecially of wine, having more force to inflame the fleſh, and ſtir up the appetite againſt reaſon, than the uſe of the moſt nouriſhing meats.

There are Drunkards that faſt all the year, according to this Doctrine, though they drink themſelves drunk every day, paſſing them all almoſt without eating, and contenting themſelves with a mouthful of bread and ſome little matter therewith, provided they want not wine.

The ſame Author ſaith in the ſame place, pag. 256. that ſo often as we eat fleſh and eggs on a Faſting-day, ſo many ſins we commit; but he adds, *That it is not ſo* 2469
*in other victuals, as bread, fiſh, and butter, the uſe whereof repeated ſo often as our appetite requires them, after the ſecond time is no ſin.* His reaſon is, *Becauſe ſeeing that what exceeds above neceſſary, turns into crudities in the ſtomach, which increaſe not but weaken ſtrength, it ſeems that it cannot reaſonably be ſaid that the repaſt which is taken above the ſecond, profits the body, much leſs that it ſtrengthens it.*

He would ſay that exceſſive eating and drinking do the ſame thing that Faſting, which is to enfeeble the body; and conſequently that exceſſes which are committed in *Lent* by eating as much and as oft as their appetite requires it, after the ſecond time, are not ſins againſt the Faſt, becauſe they are not againſt the intention and end for which it was inſtituted.

This Father hath not conſidered the difference betwixt mortifying and weakning the body; betwixt the abating the violence of ſenſuality, and enervating the forces of Nature. The intention of the Church and the end of Faſting is to abate the violence of ſenſuality, and not to deprive the body of its ſtrength. It pretends on the contrary to cure by abſtinence the weakneſſes and infirmities of the body as well as of the Soul, as it alſo declares frequently in the office and in the prayers of the *Lent*.

This good Elder took no heed of this diſtinction. He confounds ſenſuality which is in the body as a ſtrange heat equal to that of a Fever, and which gives no ſtrength to it but to rebel againſt the Spirit and againſt the Law of God, with the force and natural vigour of the body it ſelf, which ought to help him in his obedience to the Spirit, and to render it more fit and prompt to the outward actions of piety and vertue. He pretends that to mortifie ſenſuality, and to weaken the body being one and the ſame thing, according to him, he that eats 2470
exceſſively in *Lent*, by that means deſtroying his health, and weakning the natural ſtrength of his body, correſponds perfectly well with the intention of the Church when it commands us to faſt.

That is to ſay, that the true way of purſuing the intent of the Church in *Lent*, is to drink and eat exceſſively, and that the beſt invention to obtain the end of

Faſting is not to faſt at all, but rather to give ones ſelf unto debauches, becauſe debauches do more ſubdue the body than Faſting, and they weaken its force, which is the end of Faſting, according to this great Divine.

As for the Collation at night, *Bauny* in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 255. tells us that we may without breaking our Faſt, take any broth made with herbs, or any Sallet with a red Herring. And to clear it up yet more largely, he demands: And *if a man ſhould take ſome Confection of Almonds or Pottage with coorſe-grated bread, were it a ſin?* He acknowledgeth with ſome others whom he quotes, that this cannot be done without ſin; but he declares his opinion in theſe terms, pag. 255. *But I believe nevertheleſs that by the uſe of theſe things the Faſt is not at all concerned, when they exceed not the quantity which is allowed by the cuſtom of the Church, received by the conſent of prudent perſons.* And that there may be nothing wanting to this reformed Collation, he adds that in the time of this Collation *drinking concerns not the Faſt*: that is to ſay, that we may take as much thereof as we will without breaking our Faſt.

1 Communi jam uſu receptum eſt ut parum panis etiam edatur vel ſeorſim ſolum, vel una cum fruſtibus, herbis, vel aliis cibis levioribus, cujuſmodi ſunt ficus, uva paſſa, nuces, pyra, poma, vel alia ex ſaccharo & melle confecta, vel piſciculus parvulus. Nam conſuetudini in hac parte ſtandum eſt. *Azor. lib. 7. cap. 8. q. 7.*

2 Scio equidem Azorium & alios, piſciculos permittere, quod non improbarim ſi pauci ſint. *Eſcobar tract. 1. Exam. 13. cap. 1. num. 6. pag. 202.*

3 De juſculis ex leguminibus & amygdalo non conſen-

4710 *Azor* ſaith the ſame thing in theſe terms: (1) *The cuſtom is at preſent to take a little bread only, or with fruit, herbs, or other ſlight victuals, as Figs, Raiſins, Nuts, Pears, Apples, Confections made up with Honey or Sugar, or ſome ſmall fiſh. For herein we muſt obſerve the cuſtom.* If we may take for our Rule the liberty, delicacies and exceſs which cuſtom introduceth every day into Collations, there will be no bounds, and there will remain no appearance of Faſting at all, it being clear that men every day give themſelves more liberty in this matter, and many times make Collations which are good Suppers, and which coſt more than thoſe which many perſons of every condition, who neither do nor pretend to faſt, do make all the year long.

*Eſcobar* follows *Azor* in this point: (2) *I know well*, ſaith he, *that* Azor *and others permit to eat little fiſhes at Collation, and I condemn it not if they eat a few.* *Azor* nor *Bauny* ſpoke of no more than one ſmall fiſh, and *Eſcobar* makes him ſay that it is lawful to eat many. *Scio Azorium & alios permittere piſciculos*, becauſe according to his Judgment, it is indeed lawful to eat more at a Collation, pro-

4720 vided the quantity be not too great; *quod non improbarim ſi ſint pauci.* It will quickly be lawful, as we ſhall ſee preſently, to eat a great fiſh at Collation, ſince many little ones are as much worth as a great one, and may be equal to it.

He adds alſo; (3) *For what concerns Pottage of Almonds and Pulſe, the Doctors agree not; but he allows them, provided the quantity of them be not ſo great as that of fruit.* As ſoon as things concerning manners come to be deliberated of, and we begin only to doubt, theſe Doctors, who profeſs an eaſie and officious Divinity, will not fail to take the part of the fleſh and blood, and to conclude for ſenſuality, and the carnal humor of worldly men.

We muſt conclude and finiſh this Point with a paſſage of *Tambourin* who ſpeaks yet much more boldly, and is not ſo ſcrupulous as the reſt. He ſaith, (4) *That the meats which are uſed in* Lent, *to wit, raw and boiled herbs, little or great fiſh ſalted, freſh or dryed Fruits, Confections, Milk of Almonds or other Pulſe, may be taken for Collation, which ſoever we love beſt, provided that the whole, with the bread eaten with them, exceed not the weight of eight ounces.*

tiunt Doctores; permitto ſi quantitas permiſſum quantitatem frugum non exæquet. *Ibid.* 4 Dico de cibis communibus quadrageſimalibus, herbis nimirum, ſive crudis, ſive elixis, piſcibus ſive parvis, ſive magnis ſale coctis, fructibus ſive recentibus, ſive ſiccis, dulciariis pultibus ex amygdalarum cremore, ex leguminibus, ea accipi poſſunt in jentaculo quæ cuilibet arridebit, dummodo conflatum ex pane ut ſit & prælictis quod accipitur, non excedat uncias octo. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. ſect. 3. num. 3.*

4730 He muſt be very ſqueamiſh who cannot find in ſo great a diverſity of meats what may ſatisfie his appetite, and a very great Eater who cannot be ſatisfied with the quantity he ſaith may be taken. And yet he adds that on *Chriſtmas-Eve we may double the weight, and take the quantity of ſixteen ounces.* Perhaps this is becauſe on that day the Faſt is greateſt and moſt ſolemn. He proceeds in his indulgence, and ſaith, *We may add two ounces more to theſe eight, becauſe ſome*

N. 1. Sive iis octo unciis fames prorsus extinguatur, sive nequaquam.

*some hold it is too little; and though it may happen that eight ounces may suffice wholly to satiate, it ceases not to be lawful to eat them; which was prudently introduced to remove scruples from some very religious persons.*

Id quod prudenter inventum est pro praxi, ne scilicet scrupulis paterent paulo religiosioribus viis. Dixi autem octo circiter uncias. Nam parum excedere addendo unam vel alteram unciam supra prædictas octo, esset ex nonnullorum sententia provisio materiæ, nec mortale peccatum constituens.

This without doubt is an excellent way to remove scruples, to take away all pains of the body for fear of creating any to the mind, and to allow religious Souls to satiate themselves at Collations, that they may be delivered from the care of watching over themselves, and from the pains they should take to restrain and moderate their appetites.

## II. POINT. 24740

*That according to the Jesuits Divinity we may on Fast-days drink as much as we please during our Refection, or after it, and take, every time we drink, a morsel of bread or some other thing, and be drunk also without intrenching on the Fast.*

IT seems that all humane condescendence cannot reduce Fasting lower than these Jesuits do, whose opinions we are about to report. After they have said that we may anticipate the hour of Refection, and both dine and break-fast on Fast-days; that we may make our repast as good as we please, and better than on the days we fast not, so far as to proceed unto excess; that we may continue and lengthen it as much as we please; and after this make a Collation in the evening, which should be a true Supper; it might seem that there remained no difficulty in fasting, nor any appearance of any foot-step of that holy Severity wherewith it was instituted and faithfully observed in the Church, until these last Ages of Ignorance and Corruption have changed it in this manner.

Yet because the people of the World bred up in luxury and pleasures, are never contented with the indulgence and relaxation that is granted them, but demand always more, and find Fasting, such as it is at this day, too severe and troublesom, the Jesuits Divinity searches out new ways to satisfie them, and easily descends unto the lowest point of complacency.

1 Non violat jejunium qui extra consuetam corporis refectionem bibit etiam vinum & cervisiam: id enim consuetudo tempore immemoriali permittit. *Layman lib. 4. tr. 8. c. 1. n. 7. pag. 194.*

First of all it maintains, that we may in the morning, as well as at other 24750 times of the day, take as much wine, and as often as we please, without fear of breaking our Fast. (1) *He breaks not his Fast*, saith Layman, *who out of the time of the ordinary repast drinks Wine or Beer; because the custom of time beyond all memory allows it.*

He must never have heard of the manner of Fasting according to the Discipline of the Church in Ages past, to call it, as he doth, a custom beyond all memory, which was not introduced until of late times, and which is contrary to the Declaration which the Church hath publickly made in the Office of *Lent*, testifying to its Children that the Fast of *Lent* requires abstinence from drink as well as meat, whilst it causes daily to be said to excite us to keep it faithfully: *Utamur ergo parcius verbis, cibis, & potibus*, without putting any difference betwixt the one and the other.

2 Ecclesia nunc diebus jejuniorum non prohibet potum, quandoquidem is per se ac principaliter non tendit ad corpus nutriendum, sed ad sitim sedandam. *Ibid.*

But besides this custom so corrupt and opposite to the Laws and Discipline of the Church, this Doctor alledges also a reason which seems to him to be solid, saying, (2) *That the Church doth not at present forbid us to drink out of the time of refection on Fast-days, because it is not principally to nourish the body, but to quench thirst.* If this reason be true, eating will be no more forbidden than drinking. For as drinking is of it self a remedy against thirst, so eating is also a remedy against hunger; and if eating nourisheth by delivering us from hunger, drinking nourisheth us also by delivering us from thirst.

24760 There are even some drinks, as Wines and Beer, that nourish more than many slight meats. Whence it follows, that if the intention of the Church in the Precept of Fasting, as this Jesuit also testifies, and it is true, be to regulate and abridge the nourishment of the body, that it may be subjected unto the Spirit, and its vices and passions mortified, we must say that it indifferently forbids eating and drinking, which strengthen the body: which was exactly observed in the first Ages, wherein they knew no more what it was to drink wine, than to eat flesh on Fasting-days, as they may well know who have any understanding of the Antiquities of the Church, and the most loose of all the Casuists also do acknowledge, as *Bunny* in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 250. and many others, the Church thereby testifying that wine nourisheth and strengthens more than fish and other Lenten provision, which have been always allowed.

Yet if *Layman* had said, as some others, that thirst being more difficult to support, and in some sort more inconvenient than hunger, we might sometimes in case of necessity drink out of the time of refection, it had been more excusable; but he and most of his Brethren with him will have it, that we may drink as much and as often as we will on Fast-days, and even without necessity and without thirst, drinking to nourish our selves, and to allay our hunger, without offending against the Commandment of the Church. (1) *Wherefore*, saith *Layman*, concluding his discourse, *if any one drink Wine or Beer to appease his hunger, he doth nothing contrary to the Precept of the Church.*

1 Quamobrem si quis vinum aut cervisiam bibat gratis famis sedandæ, non agit contra Ecclesiæ præceptum. *Ibid.*

24770 But what shall we say of a person that drinks on this fashion purposely to elude the Fast? He will not fail for all that to observe the Law of the Church, according to *Tambourin*, provided he drink neither milk nor broth, he may drink what he pleases, even for the pleasure alone which he takes therein. See his own words here: (2) *It is not lawful on a Fast-day to drink Milk or Pottage; but it is lawful to drink Wine, Must, Beer, Waters distilled from Herbs or Wine, and these even in the morning, and for pleasure only, and many times in the day, and to defeat the Fast.*

2 Non licet intra diem jejunii ebibere lac vel jus, sed licet bibere vinum, mustum, cervisiam, aquas ex herbis vel eodem vino distillatas, etiam de mane, etiam ob solam delectationem, etiam multoties in die, etiam in fraudem jejunii. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. c. 5. sect. 2. num. 4.*

And for fear the drink should discompose or distaste us, especially taken on this manner in the morning without necessity or thirst, *Layman* holds that we may take a bit of bread after we have drunk. (3) *Hence it follows by the same reason*, saith he, *that when we drink after the hour of repast, it is lawful to take also a bit of bread, for fear that drinking should offend our health.* And if any person will drink ten or twelve times, as he may, according to these Casuists Rule, and yet more frequently without breaking their Fast, he may also every time take a morsel of bread, *ne potus noceat.*

3 His addo eadem ratione colligi eum extra tempora refectionis bibi-tur, licitum esse paucillum panis adjicere ne potus noceat. *Ibid.*

*Bunny* who takes many things commonly out of *Layman*, follows him also in this point, saying in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 258. *He who, after he hath drunk to quench his thirst, eats a little bread, or who during the day shall hold in his mouth some Confection, doth he sin?* He would shelter himself under some Authors whom he cites, saying, *That they answer boldly, No, in as much as those things supply the* 24780 *place of medicine rather than food.* He approves this answer, without producing any other, testifying that he is indeed neither less bold, nor less complacent than these Authors, though he make shew of being more reserved, making use of their names to declare his own opinion in a point, which he believed might be ill received; because the looseness thereof appeared too visible.

He would notwithstanding in this great facility, which is as it were natural unto him, appear sometimes severe. For in the same Chapter amongst the things about which he would have a Confessor examine his Penitent about the matter of Fasting, he places this for the seventh: *Whether during the whole day he have taken any crum of bread never so small. For in this, though there be no fault when it is done out of necessity; yet he cannot be excused from venial sin, who herein hath no other Rule but his concupiscence, which is so much more blameable, the oftner he hath taken the boldness to return thereto, and to take the same quantity at many several times, though it be little in it self. For though every one of them, considered singly, nourish not much, yet they do it, being joyned altogether; besides strengthning the body, they remove the difficulty of Fasting; and so deprive it of the end for which*

*God and the Church inſtituted and ordained it to be done, which is to curb the fleſh as with a bridle, and to bring the appetite into ſubjection unto reaſon.*

It ſeems that this is a great ſeverity for him to condemn this man of venial ſin, but he ſweetens it preſently, and corrects himſelf in the ſame page where he makes this queſtion. *And he who without hunger or thirſt ſhall take on a Faſting-day at the requeſt of a friend, ſome wine with a little morſel of bread and ſome few Comfits, ſins he?* He names many Authors who blame this action as contrary to Faſting; but he forbears not to conclude with others who exempt it from ſin, even from venial, whereof he relates this reaſon: *For that, ſay they, to act well and prudently is no offence.* 24790

This is without doubt a rare prudence to preſer our being complacent to a friend, before the Laws of God and of the Church, and humane Courteſie before Chriſtian Diſcipline. There is reaſon to call this *wiſdom of the world*, and even to doubt *if there be any wiſdom in the world like this*: For the people of the world would not have had the confidence to have violated the Laws of the Church at this time and at others more important, if others more wiſe than they in this worldly wiſdom did not furniſh them with reaſons, and give them Expedients to confirm, or rather to deceive their conſciences, in committing theſe exceſſes.

1 Die jejunii ab amico rogatus ſumo modicum cibi urbanitatis gratia, num venialiter delinquo? Negative cum Fagundez reſpondeo *Eſcob. tr. 1. ex. 13. num. 77. pag.* 214.

*Eſcobar* accords well enough with *Bauny* in this point. (1) *A friend prays me,* ſaith he, *to taſte a ſmall morſel on a Faſting-day; I do it out of civility to him, is it a venial ſin? I anſwer, with* Fagundez, *that it is not. I permit him the liberty to drink as much and as often as he pleaſeth.* And taking it for granted, that to drink breaks not the Faſt, he demands, (2) *whether we may take wine as often as we pleaſe, though it be in great quantity?* And he anſwers in one word, *Yes.* And acknowledging that by vertue of this permiſſion we may be carried out unto exceſs, and drink beyond reaſon and temperance, he adds to juſtifie his opinion, (2) *That exceſs in drinking may indeed violate temperance, but not the Faſt.* Whence he draws this Concluſion, which is a general Maxime in this matter, (3) *That whatſoever we drink, though it be taken frequently and in great quantity,* as he ſaid before, *breaks not the Faſt at all.* 24800

2 Dixi potum non violare jejunium, an vinum aſſumi poteſt quoties quis voluerit, licet in magna quantitate? Poteſt. *Ibid. num.* 74.

The common reaſon of all thoſe who hold this opinion, is, as we have already ſeen above, that drinking of it ſelf nouriſheth not. But there being drinks which nouriſh, as wine, they forbear not for all that to ſay, that we may take as much of it as we pleaſe, even without thirſt, and only to nouriſh and ſtrengthen ones ſelf.

3 Immoderatio poteſt temperantiam violare, ſed non jejunium. *Ibid. num.* 75.

*Eſcobar* ſuppoſing, (4) *That a man takes wine after dinner to appeaſe his hunger, and to nouriſh and ſuſtain himſelf,* demands *whether this be to break his Faſt?* He ſaith, (5) *That* Azor *believes it is.* But he condemns him boldly and ſtrongly, ſaying, *That by the common opinion it is not to break it.* His reaſon is that which I now related: (6) *Becauſe wine nouriſheth not but by accident, and the Church forbids only things that nouriſh of themſelves.*

4 Itaque quidquid potus eſt, jejunium non ſolvit. *Ibid. num.* 75.

It is true in general, that drink nouriſheth accidentally, becauſe there are drinks that nouriſh, and others which nouriſh not at all. But this is not by accident that wine nouriſheth; it hath a force and natural vertue to nouriſh; and there is no wine that nouriſheth not, more or leſs, according as it hath more or leſs ſtrength. And when the Church forbids or regulates the uſe of things which nouriſh, it conſiders not whether they nouriſh by accident or otherwiſe. Metaphyſical diſtinctions enter not her Regulations nor Diſcipline, which is ſo true, and particularly in wine, that formerly it abſolutely forbad the uſe of it in *Lent*, as well as of eggs and fleſh. 24810

5 Vinum quis in ſuſtentationem ſumit, & ad ſedandam famem extra prandium; an frangit jejunium?

6 Aſſerit Azorius p. 1. l. 7. cap. 10. q. 4. at certum eſt ex communi non frangere; quia vinum alit per accidens: Eccleſia autem prohibet ea quæ per ſe alant. *Ibid.*

As this Caſuiſt gives liberty to drink wine or any other liquor as much and as often as we will, *quoties quis voluerit, & in magna quantitate*, he gives alſo liberty to eat as often as we drink. For propounding this queſtion himſelf: (7) *It is lawful, every time we would drink, to take before-hand ſome little thing for feat the*

7 Licebit toties quoties frigidas potus hauriendus, aliquid ne noceat præſumere. *Ibid. num.* 28. *pag.* 261.

*drink ſhould hurt us?* He anſwers, (1) *That though* Azor (who holds that this is lawful) *except from this Rule certain meats; nevertheleſs the Doctors allow to take indifferently all kind of meats, which we uſe in* Lent, *provided we take them not in great quantity.*

1 Licet Azorius q. 7. aliquos cibos ab hac regula excipiat, Doctores modica inquantitate omnem cibum permittunt. *Ibid.*

There are Caſuiſts who allow us to take ſomewhat after we have drunk, but he permits us to take it before we drink. They commonly allow us only to take bread, but he gives us liberty to take all that we can eat on Faſt-days, *omnem cibum*, fiſh it ſelf. For he excepts nothing.

Faſting will not without doubt be too ſevere for them that can do in this manner, drinking at all ſeaſons whatſoever they will, and as much as they pleaſe, eating likewiſe every time they drink, bread, cheeſe, fiſh, or any other thing, whether after drinking, according to the more general Rule of theſe Caſuiſts, or be-
24820 fore it, according to the priviledge *Eſcobar* gives; aſſuring us that we ſhall not for all this fail in faſting, provided that every time we eat we take but a little, though we may drink as much as we will, even to exceſs.

2 Jejunium non violat potus aquæ aut vini, etiamſi aliquid edatur ne potus noceat: nec ſi ſtatim finito prandio, parum edat, rogatus ab amico comedente. Illud enim pars prandii cenſetur, nec ſi horam prandii ex cauſa præveniss. *Sa verb. Jejunium num.* 8. *p.* 317.

Though *Emanuel Sa* ſpeaks nothing ſingular nor novel upon this matter, which hath not been already ſaid by others whom I have already quoted, yet becauſe his contains in it the opinion of many, he doing nothing but collect and reduce into an Abridgment the moſt common opinions of the Society, it will not be impertinent to relate his words in this place. (2) *To drink water or wine is no violation of the Faſt, though you eat ſomething therewith, for fear it ſhould do you ſome hurt, no more than to eat a little after dinner, when a friend not yet riſen from dinner, entreats you; becauſe this paſſes alſo for a part of your dinner, as alſo to haſten the hour of dinner when there is ſome cauſe to do it.* Theſe words are as it were an Abridgment of all that others have ſaid concerning the liberty of drinking wine, of eating with our drink, of prolonging our refection, and preventing the hour of dinner. For he ſpeaks of all theſe things abſolutely, and almoſt without any limitation.

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## III. POINT.

### *That according to the Jeſuits Diſpenſations which they give in Faſting, hardly any perſon is obliged to Faſt.*

AFter Faſting is reduced to this point, changed and corrupted in this manner, that it deſerves not ſo much as the name of a Faſt, and cannot ſerve ſo much as to regulate the life of a perſon who is any thing ſober, it may ſeem that there is no more occaſion to ſpeak of a Diſpenſation for faſting, there being indeed no more any real Faſt, nor difficulty to paſs over the Faſting-days, according to theſe Doctors Maxims, ſince ſobriety alone commanded all men, and at all times, obliges us to more than what theſe people pretend that we are obliged to by the Churches Faſt. Nevertheleſs theſe moderate Divines that take ſuch part with the fleſh and the world, proceed yet farther, and diſpenſe with the greateſt part of men in all ſorts of conditions for Faſting, not only to eaſe them of the pain and difficulty, if any be to be found in Faſting, according to their Rules, but alſo to take away from it every thing which might put a ſtop to their luſts, and to give them an entire liberty to do whatſoever they pleaſe.

1. Firſt, They will have the obligation to Faſting to commence only at the age of 21 years; and that it ceaſes commonly at ſixty. Whereupon *Tamhourin* raiſes a queſtion worthy himſelf. (3) *If one*, ſaith he, *accompliſh the age of twenty one at one of the clock after midnight of a Faſting-day enſuing, is he bound to faſt that day?* He anſwers, *That if this firſt hour belong not to the twenty ſecond*
24840 *year, he is not obliged to faſt that day, becauſe he might have eaten this firſt hour, and ſo broken his Faſt.* So exact is he to maintain intemperance againſt Faſting, that he would not loſe one ſingle hour, and by this one hour he will gain a whole

3 Si quis in prima hora mediæ noctis hoc die quo jejunandum eſt, impleat annum vigeſimum primum; tenetur ſi prima hora pertinet ad annum vigeſimum ſecundum talis ætatis in quo urget præceptum. Si ſit natus in ipſa prima hora mediæ noctis, non obligatur. *Tambur. lib.* 4. *decal. cap.* 5. *ſect.* 7. *num.* 2.

day entire, and thereby discharge it of the obligation of Fasting; as if the liberty he gives to eat, could avail more in one hour than the most holy Law of God and the Church in a whole day.

2. In the second place, Father *Bauny* dispenses for this obligation with *Labourers, Vine-dressers, Masons, Joyners, and generally all Handicrafts and Artificers.* This is in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 262. & 263. Out of other Casuists, whose opinion he rather approves than condemns, he adds unto them *Painters, Taylors, Barbers, Chirurgeons, with Weavers, Bakers, Shoomakers; as also Scholars, Travellers, Pleaders, (Atturneys and Counsellors) and poor People.*

To these he adds such as have any infirmity of body or mind: And in the 261. page he saith generally, *They who complain of pain in head, heart, or stomach, and who being empty and without food cannot sleep, are not comprised under this Precept.* His reason is, *that the Church intends not to oblige us with this rigour, that we ought to the prejudice of our health, or lessening our strength to follow its pleasure.*

Fasting moderated and regulated, according to the order of the Church, doth rather repair our strength and health than diminish them, as appears by the testimony the Church it self gives in its Prayers, and by the experience and consent of 24850
the most expert and able Physitians. But though it should diminish them a little, and bring some incommodity to the body, ought we to conclude from thence that we were dispensed with, the intent of God and the Church being to give some trouble to the flesh, that it might do Penance for the pleasure given it, and to mortifie it, at least for some time, after it had been pampered and nourished with too much tenderness all the rest of the year.

*Tambourin* extends the Dispensation for Fasting yet farther than *Bauny*. For after he had said, (1) *That it is very certain that those who are notably sick, are exempt from Fasting, though they have fallen into this sickness by their own proper fault,* he adds, *that the same must be said of a sick person unto whose health Fasting might happily conduce. For being otherwise truly weak, he is exempt from the obligation to fast, though by accident Fasting might be beneficial unto him. Whence it follows, that if he fast not, he sins indeed against the temperance and charity he owes to himself, but not against the Precept of the Church.*

1 Excusari a jejunio notabiliter infirmos & valetudinarios, res est certa nimis, etiamsi il in infirmitatem inciderint propria culpa——

Idem de eo infirmo cui forte conducerent ad sanitatem jejunia— Idem de eo qui noctu dormire per notabile tempus non potest nisi cœnet. Iis enim esset onerosum sic jejunare— neque hunc obligo mane jentare seq; sero plene reficere, quo pacto jam jejunium sartum tectum conservare, non obligo, inquam, licet commode id facere queat. Nemo in jejunando est obligandus ad extraordinaria remedia, & ad relinquendum suum jus comedendi circa meridiem. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. sect. 7. num. 14.*

He speaks of a man who is fallen into a disease by his own fault, for example, intemperance, for the expiation whereof he is obliged to fast, according to the 24860
Rules of Penance. He supposes also that Fasting is a remedy for his disease, and profitable to his health. So that in not fasting he sins against the Laws of the Church, of temperance and of charity which he owes to himself, hurting his health already impaired, and augmenting his disease. And for all that he pretends that because he is sick he is dispensed with for Fasting. That is to say, that the same disease which obligeth him to fast, dispenseth with him for it; and the Church which dispenseth with none but for to relieve their weakness, agrees to this dispensation, which relieves not, but hurts him, and pretends not to oblige him unto a Fast, which, if it commanded him not, he could not omit without sin.

*The same must be said of him,* adds the same Author, *who cannot sleep in the night of a considerable time, unless he sup. For he would be over-charged too much by fasting in this manner. I would not oblige him neither to so much as to make his Collation in the morning, in which case the Fast would continue without intermission, though he might do it conveniently; for no man is bound to do extraordinary things that he may fast, and to abandon the right which he hath to eat about Noon.*

The Indulgence of the Church in suffering and permitting to eat at Noon on Fasting-days is a right, according to this Casuist, which its Children may make use of against it to the neglect of its Commandment. He finds not that it is need-

ful to do any thing extraordinary, nor to the leaſt change in the order or hour of
24870 our repaſt to keep the Faſt, and obey the Church. And in another place he finds it very reaſonable that to content a friend, for his own benefit, pleaſure, or any the leaſt reaſon in the world, and even without reaſon, we ſhould alter the uſual courſe of our repaſt, and advance the time two or three hours or more, if we will.

(1) *Finally we muſt ſay the ſame*, ſo this Author goes on, *of him who unleſs he ſup welt, is troubled to get heat; becauſe this is judged in ſome ſort prejudicial to his health.* There are who pretend to be diſpenſed with for Faſting, becauſe it heats the blood, ſay they, and cauſes headach; and this man would diſpenſe with it, becauſe it chills the feet, and hinders ſleep. I paſs by theſe ridiculous excuſes and viſible contradictions, and obſerve only that theſe people take the liberty to ſay whatſoever comes in their minds, and make uſe of all ſorts of reaſons to fight againſt the truth, and know to turn to the right and the left, not as S. *Paul*, to go unto God, and conduct his neighbour thither; but rather to confound the ways of God, make his Commands obſcure, and to teach men thereupon to violate them without fear of puniſhment. (2) *That infirmity or ſome notable prejudice of health hinders the common actions of every perſon, and we judge that he who after his uſual labour cannot, if he faſt, conveniently perform theſe actions, is much*
24880 *damnified by the Faſt. Whence it follows, that if Faſting makes a Scholars head ake, or diſturb his Studies; if a woman cannot, by reaſon of her Faſting, conveniently attend her houſhold affairs; if a man perform the exerciſes of his profeſſion with more difficulty; for that cauſe he is not obliged thereto, nor others ſuch like.* That is to ſay, that Faſting which is commanded for our mortification, is not obliging when it mortifies us; and that we may be obliged to faſt, we muſt be able to do it commodiouſly and without difficulty.

1 Idemq; dico de eo qui de necte abſq; facta cœna caleſtri notabiliter nequit. *Ibid.*

2 Ila infirmitas notabilis eſt quæ operationes ordinarias cujuſlibet perſonæ impedit, ita ut qui conſueto ſuo operandi modo eas exercere commode cum jejunio nequeat; ſi Scholaſticus quomodocunque cum difficultate ſtudeat; ſi mulier ex debilitate jejunii ſervitia domus incommode operetur: ſi vir ſuum officium artemque jejunando difficulter exerceat, ex hoc capite à jejunando legitime excuſabuntur. *Ibid. num.* 17.

It appears clearly that, according to theſe Maxims of the Jeſuits, few people are obliged to the Faſts of the Church, though they have been generally inſtituted for all the Faithful, obſerved in all Ages paſt by all thoſe who had any fear of God, of what condition ſoever they were, and that the Church hath always thus underſtood it, as may yet farther appear, ſeeing that in the general Commandment which it hath given ſo many Ages ſince, it doth not, nor ever did except any condition, exerciſe, or ſort of life.

But the Jeſuits leave hardly any Profeſſion which they exempt not from Faſting. (3) *The Office or Myſtery*, ſaith Tambourin, *which a man exerciſes, if it be laborious, as* (there are ſcarce any which are not) *exempts him of it ſelf from Faſting, and though there be ſome in the ſame Trade who can endure Faſting, yet he is*
24890 *not obliged—— For example, a ſtrong Labourer, and who can faſt with eaſe, is not obliged to faſt, though he be very rich, becauſe all Labourers as ſuch are exempt. And beſides this, the Church hath no intention to deprive the Faithful of the exerciſe of their Trades, and courſe of life.* It muſt be added, that in eſtabliſhing the Precept of Faſting for all thoſe who could bear it, it had an intention not to exempt thoſe who ſhould make falſe pretences for their not obſerving it. It ſeems that he would have us believe that the Laws of the Church regard not the Salvation of every one in particular; but that they are only general Ordinances of an outward Policy, and therefore odious and unjuſt, from which every one may ſave and exempt himſelf that can.

3 Officium & ars quam quis exercet, ſi ſit ex ſe laboriosa, hominem per ſe liberat à jejunio; & ita quidem etiamſi in illo exercitio quis inveniatur poſſe tolerare jejunium, adhuc ad illud non adſtringetur---- Arator etiam robuſtus patientiſſimuſque inedix; imo etiam gliſſimus, non obligatur ad jejunium, quia per ſe omnes aratores excuſantur, & ex alia parte Eccleſiæ non intendit privare Fideles ſuo officio modoque vivendi. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. ſect. 7. num.* 18.

He adds alſo more particularly, (1) *That it is probable, becauſe of the Authority of the Doctors who are of that Judgment, that no Handicrafts, and by conſequence neither are Taylors obliged to faſt.* And ſo the Artificers, and thoſe who labour in bodily occupations, making up the greater number, in compariſon of whom the reſt of Mankind are ſmall in number, the Precept of Faſting ſhall be of ſmall uſe, and ſhut up in very narrow bounds.

But leaſt any reſentment of Chriſtianity ſhould induce the Artificers to faſt, *Eſcobar* cited and confirmed by *Tambourin*, (2) *permits thoſe who hire Workmen, to condition with them not to faſt, for fear they ſhould work leſs.* Thus they would 24900
have us love God above all things, and our neighbour as our ſelves, by hindering him from rendering that obedience he ought and would yield unto the Church, that he may be poſſibly a little better ſerved, and gain ſome ſmall matter in the days work of an Artificer in a time of Alms and Charity.

The Monks and Clergy-men themſelves may find reaſons in theſe grave Divines to exempt them from Faſting. For 1. They who work with their hands, or who travel abroad about their affairs, may enjoy the priviledge which *Bauny* hath given Workmen, Artificers, (Counſellors and Attorneys) Thoſe who are employed in Study, Confeſſions, Miſſions, Preaching, ſhould not be uſed with leſs favour than Advocates and Students. *Thoſe who climb the Pulpit*, ſaith *Bauny* alſo, pag. 263. *every day in* Lent, *are not obliged to faſt, becauſe of the extreme toil they are obliged unto by their Profeſſion.* And there is the ſame reaſon for Confeſſors and Miſſionaries, who ſpend whole days almoſt in Confeſſion, and Profeſſors who commonly aſcend their Chairs twice a day, and continue therein commonly longer than Preachers.

It is true he diſpenſes with Preachers under a condition which he hath taken from ſome Authors a little ſtraiter laced than himſelf, *who reſtrain*, ſaith he, pag. 263. *this univerſal and general Propoſition, to thoſe who have not ſtrength enough to preach and faſt both at once, in which caſe they exempt them from the obligation to Faſting, and not otherwiſe.* And he ſaith after the ſame thing of Readers and Confeſſors. *As for Readers and Confeſſors, they muſt know that upon their ſtrength* 24910
*depends the Judgment they ought to make of themſelves and their obligation to faſt. For if without hurt to their bodies they can do it, and withal read and perform their duty to their Penitents in their Confeſſions, and afflict their fleſh at the ſame time with abſtinence practiſed in the Church on theſe holy days*; Fagundez *and* Diana *hold it for an indubitable Maxime, that they cannot be exempted without ſin.*

I know not how it comes to paſs, that they perceive not that the ſame reaſon they have in this manner to reſtrain the Diſpenſation for Faſting which they grant to Preachers and Confeſſors, doth alſo oblige them in like manner to reſtrain that which they give unto Artificers, Labourers, Travellers, and all other ſorts of people. For if they can faſt in their exerciſe and labour, by what reaſon ſhould not they be obliged as well as Preachers *who have ſtrength enough to preach and faſt both at once?*

If Confeſſors and Readers ought to conſider, *that upon their ſtrength depends the Judgment they ought to make of themſelves and their obligation to faſt*, wherefore may we not ſay the ſame thing indifferently of all ſorts of perſons, of what quality, age, or profeſſion ſoever? And what hinders but that we may declare unto them, *that if without prejudice to their bodies, they can faſt and do all that alſo which belongs unto their duty, they are thereunto obliged, and that it is an indubitable Maxime, that they cannot diſpenſe with themſelves therein without ſin?* Are they 24920
leſs Children of the Church than others, and are they leſs obliged to obey their Mother, and to employ themſelves with all their power to give teſtimony of their good affection towards her, which cannot be good, if it incline not to do that which it hath power to do?

Father *Bauny* ſhould remember the Doctrine of S. *Antonin* and others whom he quotes upon the ſame ſubject, pag. 261. who ſpeaking of the age at which we are obliged to faſt, *hold*, ſaith he, *that herein we ought to have regard to every ones ſtrength and complexion, and to the proportion of their greatneſs and littleneſs, for judging of the obligation of this Precept.*

1 Dico propter authoritatem Doctorum eſſe probabile nullos artifices, atque adeo Sutores obligari ad jejunia. *Ibid. num.* 28.

2 Propter eandem rationem poterit quis ex Eſcob. tr. 1. exam. 13. de jejunio cap. 3. operarios conducere cum pacto ut non jejunent, ne aliis minus laborent. *Ibid. ſect. 6. num. 4.*

Some Rules may well be eſtabliſhed to judge who are obliged to faſt; but there is nothing more certain nor more reaſonable than to ſay, that this ought to be regulated by the ſtrength of every one particularly. For if we can faſt without any notable inconvenience, what pretence can we have to exempt our ſelf from it? We diſpenſe with them who, according to the opinion of the Caſuiſts themſelves, are of age to faſt, and who are not engaged in any profeſſion nor exerciſe which might excuſe them from it, when they have not ſtrength for it. Wherefore then do they not oblige thoſe to faſt who are ſtrong enough, and who can do it without prejudice to their bodies, though they are in ſome toilſom Trade, or are not yet of the age which might oblige them thereto, according to the Rules of theſe Caſuiſts themſelves?

*Emanuel Sa* alledges theſe ſame cauſes with Father *Bauny* to diſpenſe with
14930 Faſting, and he hath added others to them, of which this is one: (1) *When Faſting hinders the Husband from performing the Marriage-duty towards the Wife, or cauſes the Woman to be diſliked by her Husband.*

*Filliutius* ſaith the ſame thing in other words: (2) *Hence it follows, that a Woman is exempt from Faſting, for the preſervation of the love which her Husband bears towards her.* He repeats it again in another place, where he ſaith, (3) *That if a Husband cannot diſcharge his Marriage-duty faſting, or a Woman become diſpleaſing to her Husband through leanneſs or paleneſs, they are both exempt from Faſting.*

1 Cauſa reddendi conjugi debitum, vel non diſplicendi, ſi hæc jejunio impediuntur. *Sa verbo jejunium num. 9. pag. 338.*

2 Sequitur uxorem excuſari à jejunio ratione conſervandi amorem mariti erga ipſam. *Filliutius tom. 1. tract. 10. cap. 9. num. 306. pag. 317.* 3 Tum vir non potens reddere debitum jejunando, tum uxor non valens ſe reddere gratam viro ob maciem vel pallorem, excuſantur à jejunio. *Filliutius tom. 2. tract. 27. cap. 6. num. 119. pag. 289.*

Heretofore Faſting diſpenſed with perſons for Marriage-duties, according to the order and cuſtom commonly obſerved in the Church; and at this day the duties of Marriage diſpenſe with Faſting, according to the Rules of theſe new Caſuiſts.

They who ſay that the Wife for fear of diſpleaſing her Husband, and Husband his Wife, *cauſa non diſplicendi*, may be diſpenſed with in a Faſt ordained by the expreſs Command of God and the Church, might very well by the ſame reaſon have excuſed *Adam* from ſin, or at leaſt have ſaid, that he had not committed any great ſin in eating only an Apple, giving way thereto, that he might not grieve his Wife, *cauſa non diſplicendi*, as many of the Ancients ſpeak.

*Tambourin* hath not only taken care of married perſons, he ſpeaks alſo in favour of thoſe who would marry. (4) *A young Maid*, ſaith he, *that would marry, if by Faſting continually all the* Lent, *ſhe notably blemiſh her beauty, is exempt from Faſting.*

4 Liberatur puella nubere volens, ſi ex continuato jejunio quadrageſimæ ſpecioſitatem faciei notabiliter amitteret. *Tambur. lib 4. decal. c 5. ſect. 7. num. 45.*

14940 *Emanuel Sa* ſaith alſo in the ſame place, (5) *That one may be juſtly excuſed from Faſting, when he cannot do it without great trouble.* As if Faſting were not in it ſelf troubleſom, and were not inſtituted to cauſe pain, to ſubdue and mortifie the fleſh, being an action of Penance which brings along with it pain and difficulty; beſides they who have moſt pain in, and moſt oppoſition unto Faſting, have commonly more need thereof than others, and their trouble is oftentimes more in their minds than in their bodies, and comes rather from effeminateneſs and daintineſs than want of ſtrength.

5 Diſpenſandi cauſa juſta eſt, magna in jejunando difficultas. *Sa verbo jejunium n. 10. pag. 338.*

*Eſcobar* ſaith the ſame thing, and brings the ſame reaſons with *Bauny* and *Sa* for diſpenſing with Faſting: and thereupon propoſes this queſtion: (6) *What muſt be ſaid of him who toils to an ill purpoſe, as in debauchery with women?* His reaſon is, *that he cannot break his Faſt, that he may be abler to commit that crime; but if he have committed it, he may break it to recover his ſtrength, and for fear of tiring and enfeebling himſelf yet more.* If he had not fallen into debauchery, he had been obliged to faſt, ſo that the penance for his crime ſhall be a diſpenſation from Faſting. *Tambourin* ſaith that he willingly admits this opinion as certain.

6 Quid de laborante ob malum finem, ut libidinis, v. c? Non poteſt jejunium ſolvere ut vires colligat ad crimen perpetrandum, ſed poteſt ad vires reparandas, laſſitudini, jejunio ſoluto, occurrere. *Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 13. cap. 2. num. 23. pag. 204. Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. ſect. 7. num. 32.*

*Filliutius* propoſes in a manner the ſame difficulty, ſuppoſing that ſome one or other demands of him, (1) *Whether he who labours in ſome wicked deſign, as to kill a man, or in purſuing a woman whom he would abuſe, or in doing ſome ſuch like thing, be obliged to faſt.* He anſwers, (2) *That ſuch a perſon would ſin indeed, becauſe of the wicked deſign he hath; but that having toiled and wearied himſelf in the execution thereof, he is to be excuſed from Faſting.* He adds that there are ſome who are of the ſame opinion with him, but upon this condition; (3) *That this be not done with an expreſs intention to elude the Commandment of Faſting.* But he finds them too rigorous, and taking part with others, who are more favourable to theſe perſons tired with debauchery, and overwhelmed with crimes, he adds, (4) *That there are others who ſay with better reaſon, that theſe perſons have done ill to reduce themſelves to that inability to faſt; but that having done it, they are exempt from Faſting.* 24950

(5) *Eſcobar* puts the ſame queſtion, ſuppoſing that ſome perſon had given himſelf unto debaucheries till he is tired, with a deſign to deliver himſelf from the obligation of Faſting. And knowing well *Filliutius*'s anſwer, though he diſapproves it not, yet he finds it ſo infamous and ſhameful, that to ſpare the reputation of his Brother, he cites it without naming him. (6) *There is one learned man,* ſaith he, *who diſpenſes with Faſting in this caſe.*

1 Dices an qui malo fine laboraret, ut ad aliquem occidendum, vel ad inſequendam amicam, vel quid ſimile, teneretur ad jejunium?

2 Reſpondeo talem peccaturum quidem ex malo fine; at ſecuta fatigatione excuſaretur à jejunio. *Filliutius ſupra num.* 123. *pag.* 289.

3 Niſi fieret in fraudem jejunii.

4 Sed melius alii culpam quidem eſſe in apponenda cauſa fractionis jejunii, at ea poſita, excuſari à jejunio. *Ibid.* 5 Quid ſi in jejunii fraudem ſeſe nimium fatigaſſet? *Eſcobar tract.* 1. *exam.* 13. *num.* 45. *pag.* 209. 6 Adhuc liberatur à docto.

If Diſpenſations be favours, as all agree they are, without doubt a Murderer or a Rake-hell deſerves well of the Jeſuits that they ſhould grant, or rather that they ſhould offer it him, for fear he ſhould not dare to demand it of them when he cannot obſerve the Faſt becauſe of his debauches. 24960

If Diſpenſations ought not to be given but only to thoſe who have juſt cauſe to demand them, according as the Laws of the Church ordain, and the Biſhops and Popes practiſe, never granting any but upon reaſons that are alledged to them, we muſt ſay, according to theſe Caſuiſts, that an honeſter and lawfuller reaſon to demand a Diſpenſation for Faſting cannot be alledged than that which is grounded on theſe two horrible crimes. And if ſincerity and honeſt meaning be required alſo much more for the juſt obtaining of a Diſpenſation, and to the right uſage of it, there is no doubt but it is to be found altogether in him who being reſolved not to faſt, and ſeeking out ſome means to deceive the Church, and to elude its Command, ſees no better pretence to exempt himſelf therefrom, than to diſ-enable himſelf to obſerve it, by tiring himſelf in the purſuit and execution of a murder, adultery, or other crime. So that two horrible crimes joyned with contempt of the Church, and a will not to obey its Command, will be a juſt cauſe and ſufficient motive to give him a Diſpenſation, according to *Filliutius* words: *Qui malo fine laboraret, ut ad aliquem occidendum, aut inſequendam amicam, vel ad ſimile quid---- ſecuta defatigatione excuſaretur à jejunio*, though the deſign of this man were to deride the Church, deceive it, and elude its Command: *Etſi fieret in fraudem.*

After this, all pretences which may be taken up to diſpenſe with a Faſt, be they moſt unjuſt, may appear reaſonable: and we ſhall not find even that ſo ſtrange which this Jeſuit ſaith alſo, (6) *That the Pope may diſpenſe with all ſorts of perſons for Faſting, though it were for their whole lives, and even without any cauſe.* 24970

*Tambourin* ſaith the ſame thing in a more odious manner againſt the Church and Pope. (7) *It ſuffices,* ſaith he, to the Pope for to diſpenſe *with Faſting, that he hath a deſign to ſhew his kindneſs towards ſome perſon who hath obliged him.* If it be kindneſs to diſpenſe with Faſting commanded by the Church, it is rigour contrary to the affection and humanity of the Church to command it. And this is to uſe the Pope in a baſe manner, and unbecoming his Holineſs and Greatneſs, to will that he ſhould pay his debts, and acknowledge the Services done him, at the charge of the Church, and to the prejudice of the obedience which all the Faithful owe unto its Commands.

6 Papam poſſe diſpenſare quemcunque, etiam per totam vitam, etiam ſine cauſa. *Ibid. n.* 126. *p.* 290.

7 Sufficit ad diſpenſandum, quia Papa vult ſe benignum alicui bene merito oſtendere. *Tambur. lib.* 4. *decal. c.* 5. *ſect.* 7. *num* 53.

That which *Eſcobar* ſaith is no leſs extravagant: (1) *That no perſon who cannot ſleep when he hath not ſupped is obliged to faſt.* And he adds, that which is more ſtrange: (2) *That if this perſon by making his Collation in the morning, and reſerving his ſupper till night, could faſt, he would not be obliged thereunto, becauſe no perſon is obliged to pervert the order of his repaſt.*

1 Dormire quis nequit niſi ſumpta cœna, tenenturne jejunare? Minime.

2 Si ſufficit manè collatiunculam ſumere; & veſpere cœnare, tenenturne? Non tenetur; quia nemo tenetur pervertere ordinem refectionum. *Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 13. num. 67. pag. 212.*

If he had been well informed of the order of Faſting, and the manner wherein it was inſtituted in the Church, he would have known that there was no order of
24980 repaſt in Faſting; becauſe the order of Faſting is, that we take but one refection, and that at ſupper, as *Bellarmin* himſelf and many others acknowledge; and ſo they that dine on Faſt-days do pervert the order of Faſting rather than they who make their Collation in the morning, and ſup at night, if the Church of its uſual kindneſs did not tolerate dinners on theſe days, and ſlight Collations at night.

(3) This ſame Jeſuit gives us alſo another Expedient to exempt us from Faſting without neceſſity and diſpenſation; which is to depart from the place where the Faſt is, and to go to another place where it is not obſerved. And if any think that this is to deceive our ſelves, whilſt we think to deceive the Church, *Filliutius*, as we have already obſerved, anſwers in a like caſe; (4) *That this is not to deceive the Church, nor to elude its Command; but only to avoid the obligation of the Commandment*, in purſuance of the right which every man hath to do it when he can; that is to ſay, that if the Church hath a right to command a Faſt or Maſs, we have alſo a right to avoid them, and to do all we can, that we may not be obliged to obey it; and after this we ſhall not ceaſe, in the Judgment of the Jeſuits, to be faithful and obedient Children of the Church; becauſe we neither offend nor deceive in making uſe of this right: *Non eſt ulla fraus ſi quis utatur jure ſuo.*

3 Poteſne aliquis alio ſe conferre ut jejunium vitet? Fagundus poſſe reſpondet. *Ibid. num. 64. p. 212.*

4 Proprie loquendo non eſt ulla fraus ſi quis jure ſuo utatur; & potius eſt fugere obligationem præcepti. *Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 2. cap. 7. n. 116. pag. 261.*

The laſt queſtion which I ſhall report here concerning the diſpenſing with
24990 Faſts, and the uſe of meats on Faſting-days, is *Eſcobars* alſo. (5) He demands if we may on Faſt-days give fleſh to children under ſeven years old? To which he anſwers, that they may eat it before they attain that age. He demands a little after whether in caſe they have the uſe of reaſon before that age, we may make them eat fleſh? And his anſwer is, that we may; becauſe it is by accident that the uſe of reaſon in any perſon prevents that age. It behoves them therefore who would give fleſh to theſe children not to ſeem to know that they have the uſe of reaſon; and that they may eat with a ſafer conſcience, to preſent it to them without acquainting them that the Church forbids them to eat it. That we may hold them in this ignorance, and conceal from them their fault, they muſt be hindered from learning the Commandments of the Church, and muſt not be brought to Church, where they are publiſhed every Lords-day.

5 Quid de pueris? Ante ſeptennium comedere carnes poſſunt. *Ibid. num. 10. p. 202.*

Darine poſſunt carnes pueris ante ſeptennium ſi ſunt doli capaces? Poſſunt, quia accidentale eſt quod in aliquo uſus rationis accelleretur. *Ibid. n. 52. pag. 210.*

He ſaith the ſame thing of Pagans, and thoſe that have loſt their Wits, conſenting that we may make them eat fleſh on Faſt-days as well as children; becauſe the one ſort have no uſe of reaſon, and the other are not ſubject to the Commands of the Church.

Quid de Paganis? Etiam, quia non tenentur legibus Chriſtianorum.

By this ſame reaſon we may ſuffer Fools and Infants to blaſpheme, and tolerate them in all ſorts of crimes; becauſe having no reaſon, they ſin not in committing them. We may make them alſo to violate all the Laws of the Church who are Infidels; becauſe they acknowledge not the Church, and are not ſubject unto it; but rather are its declared enemies. As if a Father who had forbid
25000 ſomething to be done in his houſe under grievous penalties, could take it well for his Son to cauſe it to be done by a ſtranger or a fool, not daring to do it himſelf. In the mean time they would have the Church to be well ſatisfied with a Chriſtian who out of a Frolick cauſes its Laws to be violated in his houſe by his houſhold-ſervants, under pretence that they are Children, Fools, or Infidels.

Quid de amentibus? Cum pueris ante ſeptenium computandi. *Ibid. n. 52. p. 210.*

They muſt be Fools or Infants that can believe ſo great a Paradox, and worſe

than an Infidel, to have ſo little care of their Houſhold, and to proceed to ſo groſs and viſible a contempt of the Church and Religion.

But may we not at leaſt condemn thoſe who induce others to violate the Faſt? *Tambourin* who hath had a care to ſecure Victuallers in this point, ſaith, (1) *That when they probably believe that thoſe who come to their houſes, break not their Faſt, it is evident that an Inn-keeper or Cook may give and ſell them victuals. And though they doubt whether or no they violate the Faſt, they yet may do it, becauſe we ought not preſume that a man is wicked unleſs we know it: And by conſequence we muſt not preſume that he will break his Faſt. But if they know probably or certainly that they will break it, it is more difficult to grant them this permiſſion; yet we grant it them with probability enough; becauſe the Victualler provides not theſe meats, nor provokes us to buy them with a direct intention that we ſhould break our Faſt, or ſin; but that he might get their money, as all Buyers know.* 25010

1 Quando probabiliter putantur accedentes non violaturi jejunium, poſſunt caupones & vendentes cibes iis miniſtrare, vendere, atque invitare. Sed quid ſi ſit dubium? Adhuc poterunt; quis niſi certo conſtet contrarium, nemo eſt præſumendus malus. At quando probabiliter vel certo ſciunt violaturos, conceſſu eſt difficilius: Concedimus tamen ſatis probabiliter..... quia miniſtratio illa, imo ultrones invitatio non fit à caupone vel venditore, directe alliciendo ad non jejunandum; atque adeo ad peccandum: ſed ad lucrum expiſcandum. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. ſect. 6. num. 4. & 7.*

See here a motive very capable to purifie this action. Intereſt which ſpoils the beſt things, and corrupts the moſt holy actions, purifies and juſtifies this which of it ſelf is vicious. By this reaſon it will be lawful for a Merchant to ſell poyſon to a man whom he knows certainly will take it or give it to another to deſtroy him; ſince as poyſon kills the body, ſo meats taken againſt the Churches Prohibition kill the Soul: and he that ſells the poyſon hath no more than he that ſells the meat, a direct intention to kill or commit a ſpiritual or corporal murder; but only to benefit himſelf by this murder, and to get money by the ſale of this meat and poyſon, which are the cauſe of this murder. And ſo it will be lawful to induce any perſon whomſoever to violate all the Commands of the Church and God himſelf, if therein we find our intereſt, and can draw thence ſome temporal benefit.

## ARTICLE III. 25020

### Of the Commandment to communicate at *Eaſter*, and of the Confeſſion to be made every year.

*That according to the Jeſuits Divinity theſe Commandments may be ſatisfied by true Sacriledges.*

THe Jeſuits expound not the Commandment to communicate at *Eaſter* more Chriſtian-like than the other Commandments of the Church. They pretend that it may be ſatisfied by a ſacrilegious Communion, and by receiving the Body of Jeſus Chriſt with a criminal conſcience, nay, though we know that we are in this eſtate and in mortal ſin. This opinion is common in their School, and paſſes there for indubitable. (2) *He that receives the Euchariſt unworthily on* Eaſter-*day, ſatisfies the Precept, quoth* Emanuel Sa.

(3) *Eſcobar* ſuppoſes a perſon to communicate unworthily, and ſaith that he faileth not for all that to accompliſh the Precept, though he receive the Body of Jeſus Chriſt in this eſtate voluntarily: that is to ſay, though he commit Sacriledge voluntarily, as the reſt whom we ſhall relate hereafter ſay it openly.

2 Euchariſtiam indigne ſumens in die Paſchatis, ſatisfacit præcepto. *Sa verbo Euchariſt. in fine. pag.* 233.

3 Quid ſi indigne communicem? Implet tamen per voluntarium ſuſceptionem præceptum. *Eſcobar tract. 1. exam. 18. cap. 2. num. 15. pag. 196.*

*Fillutius* saith the same thing almost in the same terms. He demands, (1) *Whether this Precept may be accomplished by receiving the Sacrament voluntarily, though unworthily?* And his answer is, *that it is accomplished.*

*Amicus* is of the same opinion, and he expounds it yet better than others. (2) *I hold absolutely*, saith he, *that the Precept of the Church touching the Eucharist is fulfilled even by a Sacrilegious Communion.* This is a strange manner of obeying the Church by committing Sacriledges, and it is to honour it very much to imagine that it may be satisfied with Sacriledges. It must needs be that they who believe it to be capable of this, have an horrible opinion of it; they must believe that it commands Sacriledges, if they believe that by obeying it, they may be committed, and it may be satisfied by these same Sacriledges. For when it commands any thing, it cannot be satisfied otherwise than by doing what it commandeth.

Jesus Christ hath said in the Gospel, that they who despise the Church and its Pastors, despise himself; and these Jesuits make the Church to say, that those who despise Jesus Christ, and dishonour him outragiously by a sacrilegious Communion, cease not to obey and satisfie it by fulfilling its Commandment.

*Celot* having undertaken to prove against *Aurelius*, that the Laws of the Church and Gospel may be accomplished without love, speaks thus against him: (3) Aurelius *cannot doubt but that he who communicates at* Easter *in mortal sin, satisfies the Command of the Church, and yet though he accomplisheth not the Justice of the Law, he accomplisheth for all that the Justice of Works.* He would not that his Adversary should doubt of this Maxime, though he knew well enough that he did not only doubt of it, but condemn it.

*Coninck*, to prove that the Commandment of the Church may be fulfilled, not only in an estate of sin, but also by an action which is a sin, brings an Example of a man who communicates unworthily at *Easter*. (4) *As it is clear*, saith he, *in his case who fasts for vain-glory, or communicates unworthily at* Easter. Which he propounds as a constant Maxime, and of which it was not lawful to make any doubt, saying, (5) *That it is certain that he satisfies the Precept of the Church, who makes shew of Fasting for devotion, and of communicating at* Easter *with requisite piety, though he fasteth out of vain-glory, and commits Sacriledge in communicating.*

This is also the opinion of *Azor*, answering those who demand, (6) *Whether he who receives the Sacrament of the Eucharist unworthily on* Easter-*day, whether it be that he hath not well confessed his sins, or for some other defect which renders him guilty of mortal sin, do accomplish the Precept of the Church?* For he saith, (7) *That he accomplisheth the Precept of the Church.* And his reason is: *Because though he violate the Law of God by approaching the Sacrament in a wicked estate; yet he observes the Law of the Church in the substance of it.* Whereunto he adds for a second reason, or as an explication of the former, (8) *That the Church by its Command requires no other thing, but that approaching at* Easter *unto the sacred Mysteries of the Eucharist, we receive them in some manner whatsoever it be.*

Nay he saith, that not only he who is guilty of mortal sin, but also an Excommunicate or interdicted person approaching to the Altar, and receiving the Body of Jesus Christ in that disposition, doth satisfie the Commandment of receiving the Sacrament at *Easter*. He inquires, (9) *Whether the same judgment may be past on him who being excommunicated or interdicted approaches to the Sacrament, with that he had already made of him who receives it in an estate of mortal sin?* And his

1 An impletur præceptum per voluntariam susceptionem Sacramenti, etiamsi indigne susciptatur? Respondeo & dico primo impleri. *Fillius. qq. mor. tom. 1. tract. 4. cap. 2. num. 60. pag. 74.*

2 Ecclesiasticum præceptum Eucharistiæ omnino censeo impleri, etiam per sacrilegam manducationem. *Amicus tom 8. disp. 29. sect. 5. num. 53. pag. 401.*

3 Non enim potest disputata cum Judæis disputare potest Aurelius, qui Paschalem lynaxim cum conscientia lethalis peccati celebraverit, quin is nihilominus Ecclesiæ paruerit, & justitiam operum, si non justitiam legis impleverit. *Celot lib. 3. cap. 3. pag 124.*

4 Ut patet in jejunante ob vanam gloriam; aut in Paschate indigne communicante. *Coninck de Sacr. q 83. a. 6. d. uni. n. 296. p. 286.*

5 Num certum est eum satisfacere præcepto Ecclesiæ qui simulat se jejunare ex pietate, & ple in Paschate communicare, etsi jejunet ob vanam gloriam & sacrilege communicet. *Ibid.* 6 An qui in die Paschatis Sacramentum Eucharistiæ accipit indigne, videlicet aut sua peccata non legitime confessus, aut alio quolibet modo lethalis peccati conscius, Ecclesiæ præceptum impleat? 7 Respondeo eum implere. Is enim licet jus divinum frangat aut violet male ad Sacramentum accedendo, legis tamen Ecclesiasticæ substantiam servat. *Azor Instit. lib. 7. cap. 30. pag. 734.* 8 Nimirum Ecclesia nihil aliud sua lege sanxit, nisi ut in Paschate ad sacra mysteria accedentes, ejus participes efficiamur. *Ibid.*

9 Rogabis an idem sit judicium de eo qui excommunicatione vel interdicto adstrictus ad hoc Sacramentum accedit?

1 Respondeo eum quidem peccare, ac non solum contra jus divinum, sed etiam contra jus Canonicum seu Ecclesiasticum facere.

answer is, (1) *That indeed he doth really offend not only against the Divine but also against the Canon and Ecclesiastick Law; because the Divine Law forbids him to approach the Sacrament in a wicked estate, and the Canon Law doth absolutely exclude the excommunicate and the interdicted persons from the Sacraments themselves, and forbids them to approach them: notwithstanding the Sacrament which he receives is a true Sacrament, though he receive it unworthily; and it seems that herein he accomplisheth the Precept and Law of the Church.*

Jus enim divinum prohibet, ne male quis accedat: & jus Canonicum in universum excommunicatos & interdictos à Sacramentis excludit & prohibet: attamen ab eo susceptum indigne Sacramentum est ratum, & ipse Ecclesiæ legem seu præceptum adimplere videtur. *Ibid.*

The Canon Law is nothing else but the Laws of the Church transcribed, and the Commandment to communicate at *Easter*, is part of the Canon Law. So that if we may satisfie the Commandment of communicating at *Easter*, by violating the Canon Law in this same Communion, as this Jesuit will have it; it follows that we may obey the Canon Law in despising it, and honour the Church in deriding, and even in outraging it externally, as the Souldiers treated Jesus Christ in adoring and prostrating themselves before him. 25060

2 Magis communis & probabilior sententia est præceptum hoc impleri per quamcunque voluntariam susceptionem Sacramenti Eucharistiæ, etiam sacrilegam. Solum enim præcipitur substantia actus, non vero modus.

*Dicastillus* is of the same opinion, and maintains that it is more probable. (2) *The more common and probable opinion, saith he, is that this Precept is fulfilled by a voluntary receiving of the Sacrament, in what sort soever, even sacrilegiously, because the substance of the act only is commanded; and the manner not at all, according to Suarez.* Could the Church express better the manner wherein it would have us communicate, than by joyning the Command of Confession and Penance to that of the Communion, and ordaining that we should receive this Sacrament with reverence, *reverenter?* And to the end we might not mistake this Reverence for any external Ceremony, it allows none to communicate at *Easter* whom their Confessors judge not fit, that afterwards it might be performed with the greater preparation and respect. Could it say more clearly that it would not be obeyed by Sacriledges?

*Dicastill. de Sacr. Eucharist. tract. 4. disp. 10. dub. 8. num. 175.* Suscipiens reverenter, ad minus in Paschæ Eucharistiæ Sacramentum, nisi forte de consilio proprii Sacerdotis ob aliquam rationabilem causam ad tempus ab ejus perceptione duxerit abstinendum. *Concil. Lateran. sub Innoc. 3. cap. 21. de pœn. & remiss. c. Omnis.*

As for what concerns the preparation unto the Communion, as the Jesuits make the Command to communicate altogether outward and politick, and maintain that we may accomplish it in any state of sin wherein we are, and even by a sin and sacrilegious manducation; it is no wonder if they scarcely ever speak of internal dispositions required to a worthy participation; and content themselves with those only which are external: And also they speak of them so slightly and so unworthily as is sad to consider, and gives cause of astonishment and indignation to those who have any knowledge of the Grandeur and Holiness of this Sacrament. 25070

And because they hold Confession to be a principal preparation to the Communion, it seems they believed that it was not reasonable to require it to be done in any better manner than the Communion. *Escobar* saith, (3) *That it is a probable opinion that we may satisfie the Command which obliges us to confess, by an invalid Confession*, because the Church cannot command the internal, but only the external act of Confession.

3 Porro probabiliter asseritur invalida confessione præcepto satisfieri; quia Ecclesia internos actus non potest præcipere, sed solum externum confessionis. *Escobar*

He had said already before, not as a probable opinion, but as an assured thing, that we might satisfie it by defective Confession, answering this question: (4) *May we satisfie the Churches Commandment by a Confession out of form?* And answering thereto in these terms; *We may satisfie it truly, as well as the Commandment of God made thereupon, as I have but now said.*

*tract. 1. exam. 12. cap. 3. num. 27. pag. 199.* 4 Satisfitne præcepto Ecclesiæ confessione informi? Ita, quo modo proxime de præcepto divino affirmavi. *Ibid. cap. 1. num. 9. pag. 195.*

*Filliutius* had ſaid before the ſame thing, ſpeaking thus: *It is demanded whether we may accompliſh this Precept* (of Confeſſion) *by a Confeſſion valid, but without form.* He anſwers, *That we may accompliſh it.* His reaſon is: *Becauſe we accompliſh the Precept in ſubſtance. And as to the end of the Precept, which is Grace, it falls not under the Precept.* That is to ſay, that when the Church commands ſinners to confeſs themſelves, it intends not to oblige them to return into a ſtate of Grace, and reconcile themſelves with God; but only to confeſs as they pleaſe themſelves.

1 Quæritur an impleatur præceptum confeſſionis per confeſſionem validam, ſed informem? Reſpondeo & dico impleri: quia impletur præceptum quoad ſubſtantiam: finis autem qui eſt gratia, non cadit ſub præceptum. *Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 1. tract. 7. cap. 2. num. 42. pag. 171.*

He ſaith the ſame thing a little above, and adds that being not obliged by the Command of the Church to confeſs our ſelves worthily, and receive Grace in the Sacrament; neither are we bound to prepare our ſelves to confeſs well, nor to do what lies in us to attract the Grace and Mercy of God. (2) *Neither is a man bound,* ſaith he, *by vertue of the Precept of Confeſſion to diſpoſe himſelf for Grace: For provided the Sacrament he doth receive be a true one, though it be without form, that is to ſay, without Grace, he ſatisfies the Precept. As for the diſpoſition unto Grace, it is the end or conſequent of the Sacrament, which falls not under the Precept.*

2 Nec tenetur homo ſe diſponere ad gratiam ex vi præcepti confeſſionis, quis etiam ſi reciperet Sacramentum informe, dummodo recipiat verum Sacramentum, ſatisfacit præcepto. Diſpoſitio autem ad gratiam, eſt finis ejus, vel quid conſequens. Finis autem non cadit ſub præcepto. *Ibid. tract. 6. cap. 2. num. 209. pag. 158.* 3 Pœnalia ſunt potius reſtringenda quam ampliſicanda. Cum igitur confeſſionis præceptum ſit pœnale, non debet ampliſicari mandatum confeſſionis formatæ; ſed potius reſtringi ad actum confeſſionis informis, modo quoad eſſentiam Sacramenti ſit valida. *Amicus tom. 8. diſp. 17. ſect. 3. num. 30. pag. 277.*

*Amicus* holds with the ſame Doctrine, and grounds it on that Principle, (3) *That we ought rather reſtrain than extend things that are impoſed as penalties.* Whence he draws this Concluſion; *that the Precept of Confeſſion being impoſed as a penalty, we muſt not extend it ſo far as to ſay, that it obliges to make ſuch a Confeſſion as may reſtore the ſinner into a ſtate of Grace: but we muſt rather reſtrain it, ſaying, that it is enough to make one that doth not confer any Grace on him, provided it be a true one, and have every thing elſe that is of the Eſſence of a Sacrament.*

This is not to honour the Sacraments very much, to pretend that they are not Gods gifts and graces, but penalties: and that when Jeſus Chriſt commanded Confeſſion, he ordained it not for our good, as a remedy and a means to deliver us from our ſins, and to reſtore us into Grace; but that he impoſed it upon us as a yoke and a puniſhment, as this Jeſuit ſaith. *Cum igitur præceptum confeſſionis ſit pœnale.*

He that ſhould ſay that a remedy ordained by a Phyſitian to a Patient were a puniſhment, and not a relief and a favour; or when a Prince ordains that a Malefactor ſhall confeſs the crimes whereof he deſires the abolition, that he uſes him rigorouſly, and impoſes an odious Law upon him, would paſs for a man of little diſcretion and without common ſenſe. The Malefactors hold this for a favour in ſuch ſort, that they ordinarily ſet down their crimes in the Letters of Grace which are given them, in the moſt effectual and odious terms they can, and are for the moſt part ready to ſay therein more than they have done, rather than leſs, to heighten the favour of the Prince, to render it more ample, and the better to aſſure themſelves of it, though this Declaration be publick and in writing. And yet *Amicus* dares ſay that the Confeſſion which God and the Church demand of a ſinner, that he may obtain remiſſion of his ſins, which is ſecret, and by word of mouth only, is rather a penalty than a grace and favour. *Præceptum confeſſionis eſt pœnale.*

He proceeds farther, and is not contented to ſay the Church commands us not to confeſs Chriſtianly and faithfully, according to the Inſtitution of Jeſus Chriſt; but he dares maintain alſo that it cannot ſo much as command us to receive the Sacrament of Penance in the manner inſtituted by Jeſus Chriſt. (4) *The Church,* ſaith he, *cannot ſo much as command all that which is required to the Sacrament of Penance as it was inſtituted by Jeſus Chriſt.* He expounds himſelf better

4 Non poſſet Eccleſia præcipere totum Sacramentum pœnitentiæ, prout eſt formaliter à Chriſto inſtitutum;

1 Quoniam hoc Sacramentum prout est à Christo institutum, essentialiter includit dolorem internum, & confessionem omnium peccatorum, etiam internorum. Sed Ecclesia non habet potestatem supra actus mere internos. Igitur non posset hoc Sacramentum prout à Christo institutum est, præcipere. *Ibid. sect.* 2. *num.* 12. *pag.* 274.

ter, by rendring a reason of this opinion. (1) *For that*, saith he, *the Sacrament as it was instituted by Jesus Christ, contains essentially an inward grief for sin, and a confession of all even inward sins. Now the Church hath no power over acts purely internal. And by consequence cannot command the Sacrament in the manner it was instituted by Jesus Christ.*

This language stifles the prime notions of Christianity, and the most common apprehensions of the Church, which believes on the contrary that it cannot command the Sacrament of Penance otherwise than Jesus Christ hath instituted it, and hath no other design in this Commandment, nor in all the rest, than to follow the orders of Jesus Christ, and to execute his will, it being far remote from its thoughts and all appearance that it would have us receive the Sacraments otherwise than Jesus Christ hath ordained. For it is not established for other end than to obey Jesus Christ, and to cause him to be obeyed; and its Commands serve only for the accomplishment of those of Jesus Christ, according to the order which was given it in the persons of the Apostles, when he sent them to teach all people, and instruct them how to observe all things he had commanded them. 25110

Docentes eos servare omnia quæcunq; mandavi vobis. *Matth.* 28.

So that the Commands of Jesus Christ are contained in those of the Church, and are as it were the Soul, Spirit, and Rule thereof; since it doth nothing but confirm or determine what it is that Jesus Christ hath ordained and instituted, as the usage of the Sacraments and the exercise of vertues, which are good works.

Which shews that the Jesuits know not the estate of the Church, nor its mind, nor its conduct; considering it as an humane and secular Society, which regards only what is outward; since it hath no other scope than civil peace and temporal happiness; or as the Synagogue of the Jews which adhered only to the letter and outward exercises of Religion and Gods Law. Though we cannot find in the very times of the Synagogue it self any Jews who have affirmed that the Law might be fulfilled by Sacriledges, and manifest and voluntary impieties, as the Jesuits, who say that we may satisfie the Commandments of communicating, confessing, hearing Mass, and such like, by doing them with contempt, and all sorts of unsufferable irreverences and profanations. Which never came into the head of any man but Casuists, who had any sense of Religion. But these are the new fruits of the new Divinity of the Jesuits, and the rare Method which they have invented for the Service of God in the Church it self, and under the new Law which is all Spirit and Charity, which considers not what it sees, but what it sees not, as saith S. *Paul*; because it neither acts nor sees but by Faith, and not by sense and reason all alone. 25120

The second disposition which the Jesuits require unto the Communion besides Confession, is Fasting. *Amicus* treating of this condition, puts it in question, and demands: (2) *Whether putting a little sugar in the mouth to stay defluxions from the brain, be a bar to the Communion?* And he answers that this is *Suarez*'s opinion. (3) *Nevertheless*, saith he after, *Tabiena and other learned men whom I have consulted, seem to be of a contrary judgment, and say moreover, that this opinion is safe in the practice. And in truth it seems probable, this liquor distilling down into the stomach in the form of spittle.* This opinion which was not received in *Suarez*'s time, is become probable in *Amicus*'s, and it may quickly become very common, because it is favourable unto sensuality.

2 Dubium est de saccharo quod retinetur in ore, ad temperandas capitis distillationes, an impediat Eucharistiæ sumptionem?

3 Affirmat Suarez; negare tamen videtur

Tabiena & alii viri docti quos ego consului, qui addunt hanc opinionem tutam esse in praxi. Et sane non videtur improbabilis, cum talis liquor in stomachum descendat per modum salivæ. *Amicus tom.* 7. *dub.* 27. *sect.* 1. *num.* 5. *pag.* 385.

25130 *Escobar* puts another question, to wit, (1) *Whether Tobacco in leaf or powder breaks the natural Fast?* He takes his answer out of *Præpositus* who saith, *That being taken in the leaf, and put into the mouth, it breaks not the Fast, provided that it be not swallowed down. Tannerus* goes beyond what he saith, and holds, *That this is true, though something of it do fall into the stomach, being mingled and incorporated with our spittle.* And as for the smoke of it, *Granado* whom he cites, saith, (2) *That it is all one, though it be taken in such quantity as may in some fashion serve for nourishment.* That is to say, that it hinders not nor breaks at all the natural Fast which is necessary for approaching to the Communion. And his reason is, (3) *That smoke is not taken in form of nourishment.* We may communicate, according to this reason, after we have taken some medicine, or drunk water; because neither are taken in form of nourishment.

1 Frangitne naturale jejunium solium aut pulvis herbæ illius quæ tabac vocitatur? Respondeo ex Præpositio in 3. p. 280. art. 8. d. 1. n. 34. Per os sumptum in folio non frangere nisi deglutiatur. Addit Tannerus tom. 4. disp. 5. num. 1. neque si quid salivæ incorporatum trajiciatur in stomachum. 2 De fumo idem asserendum Granado in 3. p. contr. 6. tract. 10. dub. 8. num. 4. putat, etiamsi sit tantæ quantitatis, ut ad aliqualem nutritionem sufficiat. 3 Quia fumus non sumitur per modum cibi. *Ibid.*

There remains nothing behind to the resolving of this question in all these instances, but to know what must be said of taking Tobacco in powder. *Escobar*
25140 fortified by the advice of those whom he hath made to speak before him, gives us the resolution of this point himself, and saith, (4) *That his opinion is, that we must affirm the same thing of the powder as of the leaf and smoke:* Because to keep us fasting, it is only forbidden to eat and drink.

4 De pulvere autem idem omnino censeo, quia ad hoc jejunium observandum solum prohibetur cibus & potus. *Ibid.*

*Amicus* allows us to take Sugar, *Escobar* Tobacco, so every one may please his own taste. And if any one have an aversion from Tobacco and Sugar, he may according to the reasonings of these Casuists, take in his mouth all sorts of Essences, Electuaries, Tablets, Comfits which may be taken without chewing, suffering them to melt, like Sugar, by little and little in the mouth, so the liquor which falls into the stomach with the spittle, shall not break his Fast, nor hinder him from communicating.

If any too scrupulous person should say that to take Comfits, or such like things, and to make them dissolve in the mouth, is a sort of eating and drinking; he may perhaps find satisfaction in that which this Jesuit adds for the explication of his thoughts, and supportation of his opinion; (5) *That we break not our Fast, if the meat and drink, which we take by the mouth, be not eaten and drunk by a vital action, and pass not on presently into the stomach:*

5 Jejunium non violatur, nisi cibus & potus per os sumptus in stomachum vitali quidem actione cometiva & potativa trajiciatur. *Ibid.*

And if you urge him farther, shewing that these things may serve for nourish-
25150 ment as well as what we eat and drink; he hath told you already out of *Tannerus* and *Granado* that this matters not; for though these things nourish, it is always true to say that in rigour and in the letter we neither eat nor drink in taking them, as *Granado* affirmed of Tobacco: *quia non sumitur per modum cibi*, though it do nourish. *Etiamsi sit tantæ quantitatis, ut ad aliqualem nutritionem sufficiat.*

This is very new and unheard of in the Church of God until these Authors. But that which he saith in the same place, relating the opinion of *Præpositus* is more strange. (6) *Præpositus*, saith he, speaking of the Commandment to communicate Fasting, *maintains that it is a Precept of the Church, and must be understood in such manner as the Churches command to fast in* Lent *and* Ember-*weeks.* From whence he draws this consequence, that it hath some latitude, (7) *and some small matter may be allowed.* Upon which we may consequently judge whether there be any evil in it or not, and what evil or sin it is to communicate after we have taken something.

6 Præpositus asserit esse præceptum Ecclesiasticum, & intelligendum eo modo quo Ecclesia in quadragesima & quatuor temporibus præcipit jejunium. *Ibid.* num. 65. pag. 870 7 Colligitur hinc parvitatem admitti materiæ. *Ibid.* Addunt aliqui peccare venialiter qui post modicum cibum synaxi reficitur. *Ibid.*

That is to say, that we may eat before we communicate, provided we eat not much; all one as in Fasting-days commanded by the Church, we may according to these Doctors, take a morsel of bread, and drink once without breaking our

Faſt. But if there be any fault in communicating thus, the moſt rigorous can make it but a venial one.

So the Jeſuits acknowledging hardly any, ſave theſe two diſpoſitions and preparations neceſſary to communicate, that is, Confeſſion and Faſting, yet are found in truth to deſtroy them both, and to give liberty to people to communicate without having any at all. And indeed if it be true, as theſe Jeſuits teach, that by communicating in an eſtate of mortal ſin, and knowing well that we commit Sacriledge, we ceaſe not to ſatisfie the Precept of the Communion, any thing is credible after this in this matter: and it ſeems that, according to this opinion, we need no other preparation to approach the Altar and holy Table, than for to eat at our common tables, and that a man may go with the ſame pace and temper to receive the Communion as he would to a Feaſt to be debauched. 25160

As for Prieſts who are the Miniſters of the Euchariſt, and who conſecrate the Body of Jeſus Chriſt upon the Altar, and who give it to the Faithful after they have taken it firſt themſelves, *Emanuel Sa* ſaith that for to ſay Maſs, they (1) *may make uſe of the ſame Napery whereof they make uſe to ſpread common tables, when they have no other, and make uſe of them after Maſs, as they did before, at table.*

But if this Caſuiſt be ſo liberal in this, he will appear very ſevere in another of leſs moment, when he ſuppoſes that it is a great ſin to ſay Maſs (2) *without ſhooes*, though he dare not ſay *that it is a mortal ſin when it is not done by comtempt*, as he aſſures us *it is when the Conſecration is celebrated on very foul Corporals.* But he is yet more rigorous afterwards, when he ſaith, it is not lawful to ſay Maſs before day nor after noon without a diſpenſation, adding that they who tranſgreſs Rule, and ſay the Maſs a quarter of an hour, or at moſt half an hour ſooner or later, ſin mortally; grounding this opinion upon *Azor*. 25170

*Amicus* ſaith the ſame thing, and acknowledging after *Baronius*, that the Maſs hath been heretofore celebrated in the Church at divers hours, and many times in the evening it ſelf; he ſaith that this ancient cuſtom hath been interrupted for ſome time, and another new one introduced into uſe, to ſay it only from the time it is day until noon. And after he adds, (3) *That this Cuſtom is inſtead of a Law, and hath a vertue to oblige upon pain of mortal ſin; as may be collected from the Priviledges that the Popes give unto Monks to ſay Maſs before day and after noon.*

He would ſay, that if it were only a venial ſin to ſay Maſs before day or after noon, there would be no need to demand a Diſpenſation, for neither he nor his Companions make any great account of venial ſins, mortal ones only in their opinion requiring a Diſpenſation, that they may be committed without fear or danger. So that all Laws and Commandments that oblige not under mortal ſin, have not any need of a Diſpenſation, according to theſe Doctors, and we may boldly violate and contemn them.

We have ſeen hitherto in divers places of this Book, and particularly in this Treatiſe of the Commandments of the Church, that, according to the Jeſuits, when the Church commands the Faithful to pray, to aſſiſt at divine Service, to ſay, to hear Maſs on the Feaſt and Lords-days, to communicate at *Eaſter*, to confeſs at leaſt once a year; we may ſatisfie and accompliſh all its Commands by doing only the outward actions which it commandeth, though we do them by compulſion, in hypocriſie, with a formal deſign not to obey it, through any wicked motive, and by committing in the very outward action of the obedience we render it, crimes and Sacriledges. It is now pertinent for us, and as it were neceſſary in the proſecution of this Work, to diſcover the cauſe of this miſchief, and to aſcend unto the Spring and Principle from whence the Jeſuits draw theſe Maxims ſo pernicious and contrary to all good Manners, Chriſtian Purity, Sanctity of the Sacraments, Authority and Conduct of the Church and of the Holy Ghoſt who animates and governs it in all things. This we are about to do in the next Chapter, where we ſhall ſhew that the Jeſuits hold, that the Church is no other than an humane Aſſembly and a Body Politick; and by conſequence that it hath no Power nor Authority over internal and ſpiritual actions, which are out of its Juriſdiction; becauſe they are hid and without its cognizance. Whence they infer, that when it commands any practice of Vertue, exerciſe of Religion, or uſe 25180

1 Poteſt quis, ſecundum quoſdam, in neceſſitate profanis lineis uti, eaq; poſtea Domino reddere utenda. *Sa verbo Miſſa, num. 7. p. 501.*

2 Celebrare ſine calceamentis, ſi abſit contemptus, non eſt mortale; eſt autem ſi celebretur corporalibus valde immundis. *Ibid. num. 15. pag. 502.*

Azor exiſtimavit mortifere eos peccare qui ſine juſta cauſa, tertia horæ parte ante auroram vel poſt meridiem faciunt Sacrum. *Ibid. n. 27. pag. 509.*

3 Quod autem hæc conſuetudo vim habeat legis obligantis ſub mortali, colligitur tum ex privilegiis quæ Pontifices concedunt Religioſis, &c.

of the Sacraments, its Commandment reaches only to, and ſtays at what is external in theſe actions, without proceeding farther unto inward actions, and obliges not to any other thing than to do ſimply what it ordaineth in ſome ſort whatever it be, and upon what deſign or motive ſoever it be done; that we may repreſent the Opinions the Jeſuits have of the Church, its Authority, and Commandments, we will add this Article to the three former.

## ARTICLE IV.

*That the Jeſuits teach that the Church cannot command ſpiritual and internal Actions; that its Laws and Guidance are humane; that it is it ſelf only a Politick Body.*

IF you inquire of the Jeſuits wherefore, according to their Divinity, we may be diſcharged of the Prayers ordained by the Church by praying with voluntary diſtraction, and reciting the divine Service without intention? Wherefore we may accompliſh the Command of ſaying Maſs on Feaſt and Lords-days, by attending without devotion; that of Faſting, by faſting for vain-glory; that of Confeſſion, by confeſſing without ſufficient ſorrow for ſin; that of Communicating at *Eaſter*, by receiving with hypocriſie, and knowing we are in mortal ſin? Wherefore we may acquit our ſelves of Penance injoyned us by a Confeſſor; accompliſh a Vow made unto God; ſatisfie a Promiſe, an Oath made unto men and God; by doing only in outward appearance what we are obliged to do? And why we may generally accompliſh all ſorts of Precepts by actions which in truth are ſins, by doing them without any deſign to diſcharge our duty, and on the contrary with a formal deſign not to diſcharge it, and by a formal contempt of the Commandment, and thoſe who made it, having an expreſs intention not to obey even then when we ſeem to obey it, doing outwardly what is commanded.

If you demand, I ſay, of the Jeſuits the reaſon of all theſe ſo ſtrange things, which we have already made appear that they teach for the moſt part; ſome will anſwer you with *Sanchez*, that this is becauſe the Church hath not the power to make Laws which command other than the ſubſtance of a thing: that is to ſay in his language, what is external in the actions it wills you to do: *Quia leges præcipiunt ſolum ſubſtantiam actus, non modum.* *Sanchez oper. mor. lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 1. pag. 65.*

Others will ſay with *Filliutius* and *Layman*, that it is becauſe when the Church commands any thing, it cannot preſcribe the manner of doing it, nor the end, nor motive wherefore it ought to be done; *Finis præcepti non cadit ſub præceptum*, ſaith *Filliutius*. And *Layman* adds; *imo nec cadere poteſt.* *Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 1. tr. 7. cap. 2. n. 24. pag. 171. Layman l. 1. tr. 4. cap. 4. n. 6. pag. 49.*

Finally, the greater part and almoſt all of them will tell you with *Amicus*, *Coninck*, and *Eſcobar*, that the Church hath no power over internal actions, and that it cannot command them, nor oblige us to accompany the outward actions, which we exerciſe by its order, with the inward actions of vertue which are neceſſary to their being well done. *Eccleſia non habet poteſtatem ſupra actus mere internos*, ſaith Amicus: *Eccleſia abſolute non poteſt actus mere internos præcipere aut vetare*, ſaith *Coninck*, and *Eſcobar* after him; *Eccleſia actus internos non poteſt præcipere.* *Amicus tom. 8. dub. 17. ſect. 2. num. 12. pag. 274. coninck q. 83. de ſacram. art. 6. dub. unic. num. 291. & 292. pag. 285. & 286. Eſcobar tr. 1. exam 12. cap. 1. n. 2. pag. 199.*

The laſt of theſe anſwers is moſt general. And indeed the other two depend on it, and are referred unto it as Concluſions unto their Principle. For the reaſon wherefore, according to them, the Church cannot preſcribe the manner of doing things which it commands, nor the end wherefore they ought to be done, is becauſe the end and good motion for which they ought to be done, that they might be well done, are acts of the will and internal power, upon which they pretend that the Church hath neither power nor command: *Eccleſia actus internos non poteſt præcipere.*

So that being here to declare the Principles of all the miſchievous Maxims which we have reported before, which tend to the ruine and entire abolition of

the Commands of God and the Church and all Christian Piety, I will only ſtand upon the Examination of this: *That the Church cannot abſolutely command or forbid internal acts*; becauſe this comprehends all the reſt.

Eccleſia non poteſt abſolute præcipere actus internos.

To make appear that this Principle is common amongſt the Jeſuits, we ſhall not need freſh proof. For beſides that they make no difficulty to confeſs it, I have already before in divers places reported many paſſages wherein they uſe it to elude the Commandments of God and the Church, and teach men to undervalue and deſpiſe them. And to refute this ſo pernicious Doctrine, it will ſuffice to have repreſented, as I have done, the wicked ſequels which infallibly ariſe from it, and the conſequences contrary unto the Foundations of Religion and Chriſtian Piety which depend thereon, and are inſeparable from it.

But becauſe that this point is very important, and hath a great extent in mat- 25220
ters of Religion and good Manners, I will here relate ſome more paſſages upon this ſubject, to make it yet more clear, and make the pernicious ſequels of this novel Doctrine of the Jeſuits evidently appear.

*Layman* ſpeaking of this matter, gives a charitable advice, or rather a Law to the Paſtors and Biſhops of the Church, ſaying, (1) *That it is no eaſie matter to find occaſions wherein a Law-giver or a Superior may oblige his Subjects under pain of ſin to have an intention or other inward accidental diſpoſition.*

1 Non poterit facile legiſlator aut Prælatus ſub peccato obligare ſubditos ad adhibendum intentionem, aliamve internam diſpoſitionem accidentalem. *Layman lib. 1. tr. 4. cap. 4. num. 13. pag. 51.*

He puts no difference betwixt Secular Law-givers and Paſtors of the Church, nor betwixt Authority of thoſe, and the Ordinances of theſe. He denies equally to both a Power of regulating what is internal of their Subjects, and to preſcribe unto them the intention and other ſpiritual diſpoſitions in which they ought to do what they command them. He excepts not the Superiors in Religious Orders, unto whom yet he gives in this point more power than unto the Biſhops and the Pope himſelf: (2) *The Prelates Regulars*, ſaith he, *have a little more power over their Inferiors, becauſe of the Religious vow they have made to obey their Superior in all that he ſhall command them according to the Rule and Cuſtoms of their Order.*

2 Prælatis tamen regularibus paulo major poteſtas in ſuos competit, ratione voti religioſi obediendi Prælato in omnibus, quæ ſecundum regulam & conſuetudinem Ordinis præcipiuntur. *Ibid.*

He grounds this pretended advantage of the Superiors of the Religious Orders 25230
above the Paſtors of the Church, upon the vow which the Religious make to obey them in all things; as if the Faithful were not obliged by Baptiſm to render all manner of obedience to the Church as well as thoſe who enter into any Religious Order promiſe to keep the Rule, and to obey thoſe who received them into it; and as if a Religious perſon could give more power over himſelf to his Superior than Jeſus Chriſt hath given his Church, and its Paſtors over the Chriſtians whom he hath committed to their Governance.

But he grounds himſelf alſo upon the Authority of *Suarez*, (3) *Who*, ſaith he, *treating on this ſubject, obſerves that there is difference betwixt the obligation of Religious perſons by vertue of their vow of obedience, and that of others by vertue of Civil and Eccleſiaſtick Law. For the Law is founded upon Juriſdiction and Authority, which is not given the Law-giver but for the common good. But the command of a Superior in a Religious Order is founded upon the will of him who makes the vow, and upon the covenant and promiſe by which he is obliged to obey. And this promiſe being principally made to God who hath power over the internal acts, it may be extended to theſe acts as well as the external.*

3 Quæ de re Suarez lib. 4. de legibus cap. 12. in fine, ubi monet diſcrimen eſſe inter obligationem regularium ex voto obedientiæ & obligationem aliorum ex lege civili vel Eccleſiaſtica. Nam lex fundatur in juriſdictione quæ ſolum data eſt quantum expedit ad bonum communitatis. Præceptum autem Prælati regularis fundatur in voluntate voventis, ſeu pacto & promiſſione ejus, quæ quia principaliter fit Deo, & actu etiam meræ interno fieri poteſt. *Ibid.*

If this arguing be good for the Superiors of Religious Orders, it muſt needs be good alſo for the Superiors of the Church. For we ſubmit our ſelves voluntarily to the Superiors of the Church, as the other ſubmit voluntarily to the Superiors in a Religious Order. We become Chriſtians voluntarily, as we become 25240
Religious voluntarily: and as we promiſe obedience to the Superiors of a Religious Order in becoming a Monk; ſo we promiſe obedience to the Superiors of the Church in becoming Chriſtians; and we promiſe to render them this obedience, as to them who hold the place of God, according to the Word of Jeſus

Christ: (1) *He that obeys you, obeys me.* And according to that of S. *Paul*: (2) *Gods speaks unto you by us; we are but the Ministers and Embassadors of Jesus Christ.* If then the Superiors of a Religious Order can command the internal actions; because the submission rendred unto them depends on the will and promise of their Inferiors which regards God in them: it must also be confessed by the same reason, that the Ecclesiastick Superiors & Prelates have the same power, and may as well command the internal actions of them that are subject unto them for their Salvation.

1 Qui vos audit, me audit. *Luc.* 10. *v.* 16.

2 Pro Christo ergo legatione fungimur, tanquam Deo exhortante per nos. 2 *Cor.* 5. *v.* 20.

Also it is incredible, and contrary to the most common apprehensions of Christianity; that the Superiors of Religious Orders should have more Power and Authority in their Congregations, than the Bishops and Pope himself have in the Church, and that the Power of the Pope and the Bishops should not be more internal and spiritual, than that of Magistrates and Secular Princes, unto whom these Jesuits compare them, setting them all equally in the same inability to command internal things, without acknowledging any difference betwixt them in this point, and giving this advantage above them only unto Superiors of Religious Orders, when they say, (3) *That this is the difference which is betwixt the obligation of Regulars, who come under a vow of obedience.*

3 Discrimen est inter obligationem regularium ex voto obedientiæ & obligationem aliorum ex lege civili vel Ecclesiastica.

And if the Laws of the Church differ not in this point from the Civil Laws; and the Prelates of the Church, no more than Civil Magistrates, have any power to command internal actions, we must say that the Superiors of Religious Orders, unto whom they ascribe this power, hold it not from the Church, and cannot receive from it that power which they say it hath not it self.

Also they pretend to hold it from the will of those who make vows of Religion, since they say, (4) *That the command of a Superior in a Religious Order is founded upon the will of him who makes the vow, and on the covenant and promise by which he is obliged to obey him, &c.* They would then that the Superiors of a Religious Order receive not from the Church the Authority and Power which they have to command; but from the will of those who become Religious; and they are herein soveraign and independent on the Church. Which is both against the modesty of Religious persons, the Order of the Church, truth it self, and evident reason, the Superiors of the Religious Orders being not capable of so much only as to receive any Religious into their Order, but by the power which they have received from the Superiors of the Church, who consequently have all the power of the Superiors of the Religious Orders, and much more; but they have it in a manner more eminent, as the Spring and Principle of this Power.

4 Præceptum Prælati regularis fundatur in voluntate voventis & pacto seu promissione ejus, &c.

And if the Inferiors can by their will and by their vows give to the Superiors of Religious Orders Authority and Power to command them even internal things, Jesus Christ might, with stronger reason, give it unto the Prelates of the Church over them and over all other the Faithful; since Jesus Christ hath more power over us, than we have over our selves, and we are, without comparison, more his than our own.

So that he might give the Church all power over us, which private persons can give over themselves to Superiors of Religious Orders by their vows, and much more.

Which shews that the Ecclesiastick is far different from the Civil Jurisdiction, with which the Jesuits nevertheless do confound it; and the Ecclesiastick are other than the Civil Laws, which they notwithstanding would make equal. For the Jurisdiction which Jesus Christ hath given the Church over all Christians, is more extended, holy, and divine than that of Secular Magistrates, and it respects Souls more than bodies, the inward than the outward; since it respects eternal Salvation, which depends altogether on the actions of the Soul, and not of the body, which do nothing without those of the Soul.

Also Jesus Christ hath not given unto Secular Powers the Holy Ghost to govern their people, as he hath given it to his Church. He hath not given them the power to open and shut Heaven unto them; to cut them off and re-unite them to his body; to nourish them with his flesh and blood, and to fill them with his Spirit, and he hath not said unto them that when they speak, it is the Holy Ghost who speaks in them; that it is the Holy Ghost who commands what they command; that whoso despise and dishonour them, despise and dishonour the Holy

Ghoſt. For thus the Apoſtles have ſpoken in the Scripture, ſince S. *Peter* ſaith to *Ananias* and his Wife, that they lyed unto the Holy Ghoſt, becauſe they had lyed unto one of the Miniſters of the Church. And this is the reaſon that the Councils and the Fathers ſo often call the Laws of the Church Sacred and Divine, knowing that they proceed from the Holy Ghoſt, who is always in the Church as Jeſus Chriſt was with the Apoſtles, and conducted them till his Paſſion and death. 25270

Which is ſo true, that *Layman* himſelf could not refrain from acknowledging it more than once, in very clear terms, (1) *Who doubts*, ſaith he, *that the Church which in all its conduct regards the Salvation of Souls, may command its Miniſters to pray and adminiſter the Sacraments with ſincerity, and not only in appearance, and to all the Faithful to receive in like manner the Sacraments with a true internal diſpoſition? Now they who pray without inward attention, and they who confeſs without a true ſorrow for their ſins, neither pray nor confeſs truly, but in appearance. And by conſequence they ſatisfie not the Commandment of the Church.* Which may be extended to all the Commandments and all the Laws of the Church, ſince they are all of the ſame nature, and all have reference to true piety and true vertue, and the eternal Salvation of Souls, and not the appearances and ſhadows of falſhood and hypocriſie. 25280

He repeats the ſame thing afterwards, and he ſaith it alſo more clearly and ſtrongly in theſe terms: (2) *There are two ſorts of Laws, and two ſorts of Powers to make Laws; Eccleſiaſtick and Civil. They are different, as well in their original, becauſe the Eccleſiaſtick Power is inſtituted immediately from God, and the Civil Power comes immediately from men; as in their objects and their ends; becauſe the Eccleſiaſtick Power regards properly and directly ſpiritual things which conduct Souls unto Salvation and eternal life, as thoſe words of our Saviour in* Matth. *16. do teſtifie. I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; and in S.* John *21. Feed my lambs; and thoſe of S.* Paul *in* Act. *20. The Holy Ghoſt hath eſtabliſhed you Biſhops to govern the Church of God, which he hath purchaſed with his Blood.*

He explicates the ſame truth yet more fully, and diſcovers the principal foundation thereof, purſuing his diſcourſe, and drawing this conſequence from what he now ſaid. (3) *Wherefore Jeſus Chriſt having ſhed his Blood to purchaſe and found a Church which is holy and ordained to eternal life, he hath alſo given it Paſtors and Biſhops to govern and conduct it to this very eternal life. But Civil Power regards properly and directly wealth and peace temporal only:* Which ſhews clearly the difference which is betwixt Politick and Church power, and betwixt the Laws of the one and the other. 25290

1 Quis enim neget quin lege vel præcepto Eccleſiæ, utpote animarum ſalutem ſpectante, præcipi poſſit ut miniſtri Eccleſiæ vere & non ſimulatorie orent, Sacramenta miniſtrent Fidelibus omnibus, ut Sacramenta vere & non per fictionem ſuſcipian? Qui autem ſine interna intentione orant, ſine ullo animi dolore peccata confitentur, &c. ſi non vere ſed ficte orant, non veræ ſed fictæ pœnitentiæ Sacramentum poſtulant. Ergo non ſatisfaciunt Eccleſiæ præcepto. *Ibid.*

2 Duplex eſt lex & legiſlatrix poteſtas: Eccleſiaſtica & civilis. Differunt inter ſe, tum ratione originis, quia Eccleſiaſtica poteſtas prox'me & immediate à Deo inſtituta eſt; civilis vero ab hominibus provenit; tum ratione objecti & finis: quia Eccleſiaſtica verſatur per ſe & directe erga res ſpirituales ad ſalutem & vitam æternam ordinatas, ſicut conſtat ex verbis Chriſti, Matth. 16. Tibi dabo claves regni cœlorum; & Joan. 21. Paſce oves meas; & ex Apoſtolo Paulo, cap. 2. Act. Poſuit nos Spiritus Sanctus Epiſcopos regere Eccleſiam Dei quam acquiſivit ſanguine ſuo. *Ibid. cap. 6. num. 1. pag. 53.*

3 Quare cum Chriſtus ſanguinem ſuum fuderit ut acquireret & fundaret Eccleſiam ſanctam & ad vitam æternam ordinatam; idcirco etiam Paſtores & Epiſcopos el conſtituit, qui ad eundem vitæ æternæ finem Eccleſiam dirigerent & gubernarent. Civilis vero poteſtas per ſe ac directe temporalem tantum commoditatem ceu pacem ſpectat. *Ibid.*

For the Civil Power regards the outward order and civil tranquillity alone, and preſcribes none but outward and humane means to attain this end. But the Church being eſtabliſhed for procuring unto men eternal life, inward and divine peace, it ought to have power to ordain means, and to give commands proportionate to that end, whereunto we cannot attain but by actions of the Soul altogether ſpiritual and divine. And for that cauſe it muſt needs be that its commands ſhould be more internal than external, ſpiritual than corporal, divine than humane.

We need then no other proofs againſt the errours of *Layman* and his Brethren than his own confeſſion, which is more than ſufficient to overturn all that they ſaid before; that we might ſatisfie the Commandments of the Church by actions of vain-glory, luſt, avarice, and Sacrileges: That we may fulfil them without any will to fulfil them, and even with an expreſs will not to ſatisfie them,

and to despise them; provided we do outwardly what is commanded. For these actions thus done, have no communication with the Salvation of Souls and eternal life, and being rather formally opposite thereto, they also have nothing common with the Commandments of the Church, which ordains for its Children no other than means to attain unto eternal life, and works which procure
25300 the Salvation of the Soul, that is to say, actions of vertue and charity, sobriety, penitence, and obedience especially, which is the Soul and Spirit of all other actions.

For to answer unto a truth so clear, what *Sanchez* doth, that the Church commands only a material obedience, is to forget the respect due unto the Church, and to oppose the light of reason as well as of Faith and the Gospel. (1) *But if you object*, saith this Jesuit, *that the Commandments oblige unto obedience, and that it seems that he hath it not, who hath no intent at all to satisfie the Commandment. I answer that they oblige not to a formal, but material obedience; that is, to do that which is commanded, though it be not done for the reason it was commanded.*

1 Quod si objicias, præcepta obligare ad obedientiam, quæ non adesse videtur ubi non adest intentio satisfaciendi præcepto. Respondeo non obligare ad obedientiam formalem, sed materialem; nempe ut fiat quod præcipitur, quamvis non fiat propter eam quod præcipitur. *Sanchez mor. qq. lib. 1. cap. 13. num. 9. pag. 63.*

And if this Explication make you not to understand sufficiently what this material obedience is, *Layman* will declare it unto you more perspicuously, and will tell you that it is a corporal and purely external obedience, maintaining that the Church demands no other, and proving it by *Seneca*'s Authority, who was without doubt very intelligent in the Government of the Church, and an excellent Judge of the Authority it hath received from Jesus Christ for conducting
25310 Souls unto eternal life. (2) *It seems*, saith Layman, *that it is reasonable that humane Power and Jurisdiction should not be extended further than to humane actions which are discernable by their objects and some external sign. Which* Seneca *also observes in* 5. *Book* de Beneficiis. *It is an errour to believe that servitude extends it self over all that which is in man, his best part is exempt from it. The body only is subject to the will of a Master, and depends on his power; but his spirit is always independent and its own.*

2 Convenienter videtur ut humana potestas sive jurisdictio solum se extendat ad actiones humanas, quatenus in externam materiam transeunt, ut signo aliquo produntur; quod etiam Seneca notat lib. 3. de Beneficiis. Errat si quis putet servitutem in totum hominem descendere. Pars enim melior excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt & adscripta dominis; mens sui juris est. *Layman l. 1. tr. 4. c. 4. n. 5. pag.* 49.

We must then believe, according to the opinion of this Jesuit, since he hath learned it of *Seneca*, that the Church hath no power save over the bodies of Christians, no more than Masters have over those of their slaves, and Princes over their Subjects; that Christ hath not subjected unto it the whole man, but the least part of him, which is his body, and it hath no power over Souls, which are free and independent in respect of it, and in their own governance. And so (3) S. *Paul* did amiss to pretend that he had received a power altogether divine to bring all Spirits into subjection unto Jesus Christ, and to make them Captives to his light and guidance. All this is not conformable to the Judgment of *Seneca*, nor by consequence to that of *Layman*, who exempts the Soul from the Jurisdiction of the Church, and allows it only over bodies, for the outward conduct of the Faithful, and to injoyn them material and corporeal actions and vertues, and to forbid them sins only of the same sort, *i. e.* external and gross ones.

25320 Neither will he leave it a power to command all these visible and carnal vertues, nor to forbid all sensual and material vices, how enormous soever they may be. For in the same Chapter where he reduces the Power of the Church, which he will have to be only humane, to command only external vertues, he speaks thus. (4) *I have said that humane Laws may command some vertuous actions, but not all; because there are some that are so high and difficult, that they ought indeed be counselled, but not commanded; as Gospel-poverty and Chastity.*

He saith moreover, and declares, (5) *That a publick Magistrate cannot forbid all sorts of vices and sins; but that he ought to tolerate many, though grievous ones, to avoid greater.* And the same thing ought to be said of the Church, according to him and his Companions; since they hold, that its Power and Laws are altogether humane, as those of the Secular Magistrates.

3 Arma militiæ nostræ non carnalia sunt; sed potentia Dei, ad destructionem munitionum, consilia destruentes, &c. & in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. 2 *Cor.* 10. *v.* 4. & 5. 4 Qui aliquas, non omnes actiones virtutum humanæ legi imperari posse. Quædam enim sunt nimis ardua ac difficiles, ut in consilio esse debeant, non in præcepto, *v. g.* Evangelica paupertas, castitas, &c. *Layman ibid. c.* 4. *n.* 1. *p.* 48. 5 Sed neque omnia peccata etiam externa ab humano Magistratu prohiberi possunt, sed multa permitti debent, ut graviora evitentur. *Ibid.*

And to give us to know what the crimes are which a Secular Magiſtrate or a Prelate of the Church may forbid, and what he may tolerate, he ſpeaks thus in general terms, and he eſtabliſheth this Rule, which is as it were a reaſon and a proof of what he had ſaid. (1) *Humane Law is made for the many, and for all thoſe who live in a Society, of whom the greateſt part are ſuch as are imperfect in vertue.* Whence he draws this conſequence; *Wherefore Laws are not wont to forbid other than the moſt enormous ſins, from which ſpeaking, morally, the greater part of the Commonalty may abſtain.* 25330

1 Lex humana ponitur multitudini ſive communitati in qua major pars eſt hominum in virtute non perfectorum. Quare ferme nonniſi gravia peccata legibus prohiberi ſolent, à quibus moraliter poſſibile eſt majorem partem multitudinis abſtinere.

So that when people are grown very corrupt, we muſt releaſe the more the rigour of the Church, as well as Civil Laws, and forbid no ſins but ſuch as are not common and ordinary. And becauſe they are all ſuch in a manner at this day, there being hardly any that is not done without fear of puniſhment againſt God and the Goſpel by the greateſt part of the world, who give themſelves up to them, and pamper themſelves in them with quiet of conſcience, by the favour of the Doctrine of Probability, which authorizes them all in a manner; it will follow, that the Church can hardly forbid any by its Laws, and that it will be obliged to tolerate them all. And ſo we muſt ſpeak no more of reformation of Manners in Church-aſſemblies and Councils. And though in theſe Propoſitions which we now obſerved, *Layman* expreſſes not formally the Eccleſiaſtick Power, yet he includes it in the general of humane Power and Law, pretending as he doth, that the Power and the Laws of the Church are humane, as well as the Laws of the Secular Magiſtrate, as we have made appear already.

2 Ea poteſtas conceſſa eſt Eccleſiæ, quæ accommodata eſt humano regimini. *Amicus tom. 8. dub. 17. ſect 2. num. 12. pag. 275.*

*Amicus* teſtifies this alſo where he ſaith, (2) *That the power which God hath given unto the Church, is ſuch as was needful unto an humane conduct.* He declares not only that the power of the Church is humane, but the conduct and government of it alſo. And it is from this Principle that he draws the Propoſition whereof we ſpeak in this Chapter; that the Church cannot command inward actions: (3) *Becauſe*, as he ſpeaks there, *they paſt the bounds of humane Government and cognizance.* Whence he infers, that whatſoever Laws the Chuch may make, (4) *all that it ordains, muſt be of external acts proportionable to the Eccleſiaſtical Government, and which may help in the outward conduct of thoſe who are under its charge.* 25340

3 Non poſſunt eſſe intra ſphæram humanæ gubernationis. *Ibid.*

And what he ſaith generally of the Paſtors of the Church, that their conduct is but humane and external, he ſaith particularly of the Pope, and prõves it by reaſon. (5) *As God*, ſaith he, *conducts his Church by men as his Inſtruments, ſo we muſt not believe that he hath given unto his Vicar other power than what is neceſſary and ſufficient for an humane Government.*

4 Nim totum id quod præciperet eſſet actus externus conducens ad externum regimen & gubernationem Eccleſiaſticam. *Ibid. num. 15. pag. 275.*

He acknowledges not in Jeſus Chriſt himſelf any other than an humane and outward conduct, whether he believes he could or would not take up any other Government in the Church. (6) *We muſt believe*, ſaith he, *that when Jeſus Chriſt gave theſe precepts unto men, he did it in an humane manner, and as the Princes of the Earth are wont to make their Ordinances and Laws for their Subjects, which oblige them to no other thing than what they contain and expreſs preciſely.* 25350

5 Cum enim Deus ſuam Eccleſiam regat per homines; eam tantum poteſtatem ſuo Vicario contuliſſe credendum eſt, quæ neceſſaria eſt & ſufficit ad humanum regimen. *Ibid. num. 14.* 6 Putandum eſt Chriſtum præcepta dediſſe hominibus more humano, quo ſolent terreſtres Principes ſuis ſubditis præcepta dare, quæ non obligant niſi ad id quod exprimunt. *Ibid. ſect. 3. num. 31. pag. 277.*

After this the Biſhops and the Pope himſelf have not, as it may ſeem, any cauſe to complain of the Jeſuits, ſince they treat them no worſe than Jeſus Chriſt, whom they think not that they have offended in ſaying, that he governs the Church and Faithful as well as they, in an humane manner as the Princes of the Earth govern their Subjects.

I know not whether ever there were any Heretick that had ſo baſe a thought of

the Power and Conduct of Jesus Christ, since they themselves who will not acknowledge him for a God, hold nevertheless that his conduct was divine, and that God himself, with whom he had an alliance and very peculiar union of affection and perfect correspondence of will, acted by him, and he by the Spirit of God who conducted and governed him. And if the Jesuits themselves had not set on foot and published in their Writings these excesses against Jesus Christ never heard of until this present, there are few persons that would have believed, or who durst have objected to them so great an impiety, as which renders Religion altogether humane, outward and politick, though it be contained in the bottom of their Doctrine, and be a necessary and evident consequence of the Principle of their Divinity, which we examine in this Chapter.

25360 For the Power of the Church, and that which the Pope and the Bishops exercise in the Church, being given them by Jesus Christ, and being the power of Jesus Christ himself whose place they hold, and person they represent; it thence follows, that if the power of the Church and its Pastors be humane, that of Jesus Christ is so also; and that if the Church in the vertue of the Authority which it hath received of Jesus Christ, cannot command internal and spiritual acts of vertues and exercises of Religion, the power of Jesus Christ is likewise bounded to the external, and his Laws oblige only to the external part of that which he hath commanded himself in the Gospel, or by the Apostles in their Writings, being in this like the power of the Princes of the Earth, who have an humane Authority, and external conduct, which obliges their Subjects to no other thing than to observe the external part of what they command, and to do precisely that which they say and express in their Commands. This is so as *Amicus* speaks of Jesus Christ. *Putandum est Christum præcepta hominibus dedisse more humano quo solent terrestres Principes suis subditis præcepta dare, quæ non obligant nisi ad id quod exprimitur.* But that we may see yet more clearly that these so strange discourses and propositions are not found by chance in the Books of the Jesuits; but are, as I have said, the sequels of their Maxims which they bring forth upon a formal design they have to debase the Church in its Pastors, and to render the
25370 Kingdom of Jesus Christ all carnal and earthly; as they have said that the power of the Church and its conduct is only humane, and like that of the Princes of the Earth, politick and civil Magistrates, they say also that the vertue and Holiness required of them who enter into the Offices of the Church, and to be exercised by them, is only humane, external, and politick.

For Father *Celot* after he had divided piety into that which is internal and true, and that which is only external and apparent, saith, that this latter suffices to the exercise of the Offices of the Church. *I call*, saith he, *the Holiness whereof the question here proceeds, external; and there needs not precisely any other to Jurisdiction and Hierarchick functions.* Which he expresses also in such manner, and in terms so strong and express, that I dare well say that the most criminal and infamous persons are not unworthy of an Episcopal Charge considered in it self, nor because of its greatness and Holiness, but only by reason of the Ordinance of the Church which hath judged them uncapable. (1) *Gratian holds*, saith he, *that he who is made infamous by some crime, is excluded from being a Bishop, not by the proper condition of Episcopacy, but by the Ordinance of the Church, which requires in*
25380 *its Ministers the greatest Holiness that is possible.* But always external, because it cannot demand any other, having no power of the internal.

For this cause they fear not to say that we may advance our kindred or friends to the highest Offices in the Church, (2) *though they be no Saints, provided they have politick and apparent vertues.* And that you may not contemn all these vertues, he calls them perfect, and maintains this name may be given them with reason; because they appear such in the eyes of men. And he pretends that we

1 Gratiani sententia est eos minibus nonnullis infames ab Episcopatu procul haberi, non vi statuti ipsius, sed optimo Ecclesiæ instituto, eximiam, quantum quidem fieri potest, sanctitatem in ministris suis exigentis. *Celot lib. 9. cap. 20. pag. 947.*

2 Attamen ego fieri dicam & sine vitio, eos etiam assumi posse qui non sunt perfectioris virtutis: modo politicis virtutibus sint præditi. *Ibid.*

ought thus understand the vertues which S. *Paul* requires in a Bishop. (1) *The vertues*, saith he, speaking to Mr. *Hallier*, *which you call most perfect, I call most resplendent, and most remarkable in the sight of men, and I shew that which you call perfection of the Episcopal estate, which requires more perfect vertues than the common ones, may easily be understood of more resplendent and politick, and not of those which produce a more perfect love of God.* This is that which he had expreſt a little before in other terms, when he propounded as a certainty, (2) *That the vertues which S.* Paul *required in a Bishop, writing to* Titus *or* Timothy, *are not at all above the vulgar.*

1 Quas tu perfectiores, ego illustriores & hominum oculis magis expositas voco, indeque ostendo caput illud tuum Episcopalis perfectionis, quod perfectiores virtutes exigat, facile explicari de splendidioribus politicisque, non de iis quæ majorem Dei amorem pariunt. *Ibid.* 2 Apostolus certe, sive ad Titum, sive ad Timotheum, virtutes non admodum supra vulgares desiderat in Episcopo. *Ibid. pag.* 946.

Finally, it will appear by these excesses which would seem to us incredible, if our eyes did not oblige us to believe in seeing and reading them in the Books of 25390
the Jesuits, that these men destroy the Church from its Foundation, and make it altogether external, humane, and politick. And this is that *Lessius* saith in expres terms, calling it a Body politick, *Corpus politicum*. After this we cannot think it strange, if other Jesuits, in conformity to the Opinions, and in consequence to the common Doctrines of the Society, have said that there need only politick vertues to govern the Church, and to exercise its principal Offices, which are Government and Policy, and that its Laws are but humane and politick, which oblige only to the external part of its Commands, not only in those made by the Ministers of Jesus Christ, but by Jesus Christ himself, who according to these Doctors, hath commanded nothing but in an humane manner, as other Princes do.

So that whereas Jesus Christ hath called his Kingdom not of this world, the Jesuits maintain that it is, and like to that of the Princes of the Earth. And whereas he hath said that his Kingdom is within us and in the innermost parts of our Souls, they maintain on the contrary, that it is external and without us, and that the Church, which is his Kingdom, is no other than a politick Body and Church. And so by the wonderful Judgment of God they fall into the condemnation which S. *Cyprian* hath pronounced so many Ages ago against the Novatian Hereticks who introduced an humane Church. *Ecclesiam humanam faciunt:* And in this they make themselves like the Libertines of our times, who reduce all Religion into Policy, and deserve as well as they to bear the name of Politicks, 25400
which they would injuriously and falsly attribute unto the Church and its Pastors, by representing and rendring as much as they can both their Authority and Government altogether humane and politick.

*FINIS.*

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